ARZHY
Case No. 1 Rule 39, Section 17
Section 16 Rule 39: Proceedings where property claimed by third person
Spouses Ching v. CA, G.R. No. 124642, February 23, 2004
FACTS: Petitioner Alfredo Ching (Executive Vice-President), together with two
others, executed a continuing guaranty with private respondent Allied Banking
Corporation (ABC) to secure the loans granted by ABC to Philippine Blooming Mills
Company, Inc. Upon failure of the company to pay its loan at maturity, the 100,000
common shares of Citycorp stocks in the name of petitioner-husband were levied
on attachment by the Sheriff. Petitioner-wife, as a third-party claimant, filed a
motion to Set Aside the Levy on Attachment on the ground that the shares of stocks
were conjugal properties and that the indebtedness covered by the suretyship
contract did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. RTC granted
the Motion to Quash Preliminary Attachment. CA reversed. CA held that petitioner-
wife was not a party in the trial court; hence, she had no right of action to have the
levy annulled with a motion for that purpose. Her remedy in such case was to file a
separate action against the private respondent to nullify the levy on the shares of
stocks.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioner-wife has the right to file the motion to quash the levy on
attachment on the 100,000 shares of stocks
RULING: YES. When the sheriff erroneously levies on attachment and seizes the
property of a third person, the superior authority of the court which has authorized
the execution may be invoked by the aggrieved third person in the same case. Upon
application of the third person, the court shall order a summary hearing for the
purpose of determining whether the sheriff has indeed levied on attachment and
taken hold of property not belonging to the plaintiff. If so, the court may then order
the sheriff to release the property from the erroneous levy and to return the same
to the third person. In resolving the motion of the third party, the court does not
and cannot pass upon the question of the title to the property with any character of
finality. It can treat the matter only insofar as may be necessary to decide if the
sheriff has acted correctly or not. If the claimant’s proof does not persuade the
court of the validity of the title, or right of possession thereto, the claim will be
denied by the court. The aggrieved third party may also avail himself of the remedy
of “terceria” by executing an affidavit of his title or right of possession over the
property levied on attachment and serving the same to the office making the levy
and the adverse party. Such party may also file an action to nullify the levy with
damages resulting from the unlawful levy and seizure, which should be a totally
separate and distinct action from the former case. The above-mentioned remedies
are cumulative and any one of them may be resorted to by one third-party claimant
without availing of the other remedies. GRANTED.
FRED CASE 2
Estonina vs. CA, G.R. No. 111547
FACTS: In a previous civil case Estonino vs. Gracia et.al, Estonino was able to secure
a favourable judgement over a lot where their writ of execution was subsequently
grated. Later Estonina was able to acquire a TCT when it was sold to them at public
auction. It appears however, that Garcia sold the lot to Spouses Atayan. Thus,
Atayan sued for annulment of sheriff’s sale and TCT of Estonino before RTC Laguna.
RTC dismissed but CA reversed.
ISSUE: w/n Spouses Atayan cannot attack the validity of execution of the previous
case over the lot in favour of Estonina?
Ruling: NO.
Rule 39, Sec. 17. Provides: XXX nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant
or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property by any other proper
action. In the case at bench, the filing by the spouses Atayan of an independent
action with the court other than the one which issued the writ of execution is
proper as they were strangers to Civil Case No. 88430. Such an independent action
cannot be considered as an encroachment upon the jurisdiction of a co-equal and
coordinate court. 21 While it is true that property in custody of the law may not be
interfered with, without the permission of the proper court, this rule is confined to
cases where the property belongs to the defendant or one in which the defendant
has proprietary interests. But when the Sheriff, acting beyond the bounds of his
office seizes a stranger's property, the rule does not apply and interference with his
custody is not interference with another court's custody. 22
ADDALINO
3. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) vs.
Maunlad Homes, Inc.
RULE 39 – SEC 16
FACTS: Respondent Maunlad Homes, Inc. filed with the MTC, an unlawful detainer
case with damages against National Power Corporation (NPC). MTCC ordering NPC
to vacate the subject premises and surrender physical possession thereof to
respondent. RTC affirmed. Respondent filed a Motion for Execution (granted) which
was opposed by the NPC. The NPC also filed an motion for reconsideration –
denied. A Writ of Execution pending appeal was issued. Respondent then filed an
urgent motion for issuance of a Break Open Order since the sheriff who tried to
implement the writ of execution was prevented by the security guards assigned
therein (issued by RTC). Petitioner PSALM filed an Affidavit of third-party claim
with the sheriff pursuant to Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, and alleging
that it is the owner of the levied properties pursuant to the EPIRA Law. CA issued
its assailed Decision dismissing the petition for certiorari for being an incorrect
remedy.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari assailing
the denial of the latter's third party claim for being a wrong remedy.
RULING: NO. Petitioner cannot appeal from the denial of its third-party claim since
it is not one of the parties in the action where the writ of execution was issued, as
the unlawful detainer case was between respondent and the NPC. Also, the denial
of the third-party claim is not appealable as provided under the above-quoted
Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court since the remedy of a third party claimant
is to file a separate and independent action to vindicate his claim of ownership or
right of possession of the levied properties against the judgment creditor or the
purchaser of the property at the public auction sale. It is in this separate and
independent action that the issue of the third-party claimant's title to the levied
properties can be resolved with finality.
The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. An execution can be issued
only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court .The duty
of the sheriff is to levy the property of the judgment debtor not that of a third
person. For, as the saying goes, one man's goods shall not be sold for another man's
debts. Thus, if the property levied by virtue of a writ of execution is claimed by a
third person who is not the judgment obligor, Section 16 of Rule 39 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the remedy of such third party claimant.
AIRA
CASE NO. 4
RULE 39, SEC. 28
Filipinas Colleges, Inc. vs. Garcia Timbang, et al., 106 Phil. 247, Sept. 29, 1959
Note: Reference to the ROC was never made in this case.
FACTS: Blas was declared to be a builder in good faith of a building which was later
sold to Filipinas Colleges but still had an unpaid balance as to such sale. Sps.
Timbang, owners of the land, instead of electing between appropriating the
building by reimbursing the builder of the value thereof or compelling the builder in
good faith to pay for his land, chose to seek recovery of the value of their land by
asking for a writ of execution; levying on the house of the builder in good faith; and
selling the same in public auction. And because they are the highest bidder in their
own auction sale, they now claim they acquired title to the building without
necessity of paying in cash on account of their bid. In other words, they in effect
pretend to retain their land and acquire the house without paying a cent therefor.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of Sps Timbang is valid.
RULING: NO. While it is the invariable practice, dictated by common sense, that
where the successful bidder is the execution creditor himself, he need not pay
down the amount of the bid if it does not exceed the amount of his judgment,
nevertheless, when there is a claim by a third-party, to the proceeds of the sale
superior to his judgment credit, the execution creditor, as successful bidder, must
pay in cash the amount of his bid as a condition precedent to the issuance to him of
the certificate of sale. In the instant case, the CA has already adjudged that Blas is
entitled to the payment of the unpaid balance of the purchase price of the school
building. Blas' claim is therefore not a mere preferred credit, but is actually a lien
on the school building as specifically provided in Article 2242 of the New Civil
Code. As such, it is superior to the claim of the Timbangs insofar as the proceeds of
the sale of said school building are concerned. The order of the lower court
directing the Timbang spouses, as successful bidders, to pay in cash the amount of
their bid is therefore correct.
ANGELO
Case No. 5
MANNER OF PAYMENT
Matias vs. Sheriff of Nueva Ecija
FACTS: Matias contends that being the judgment creditor and having filed a bond in
favor of the sheriff, she was not obligated to pay in cash the amount of her bid at
the public sale of the property of the judgment debtor. The Solicitor-General,
representing the sheriff, contends that all bids in a public sale should be paid in cash
regardless of whether or not the successful bidder be the judgment creditor
himself.
ISSUE: Whether the law provides the manner of payment in case the successful
bidder is the creditor himself.
RULING: NO. The law is silent as to the manner of payment. In the absence of a
third-party claimant to the proceeds of the sale, the execution creditor need not
pay down the amount of the bid if it does not exceed the amount of his judgment;
and if it does, he should only be required to pay the excess.
It is true that the appellant gave the sheriff an indemnity bond of P58,000 in order
that the latter might proceed with the sale; but the Court believes that said bond
did not cover the claim of the Government over the proceeds of the sale since it
appears that appellant filed said bond "in view of the said claim of Guan Suy.” The
bond is not attached to the record.
Just
 Case no. 6
Rule 39 Section 28
Ysmael vs CA GR 132497; November 16, 1999
Facts: Petitioners brought suit for sum of money against private respondents (PR)
the Lejanos; which ruled in their favor. The decision remained unexecuted for a long
time as petitioners were unable to locate property belonging to PR.
Trial court issued a writ of execution for the PRs 9 parcels of land which
was sold in the public auction. PR informed petitioners that they would be
exercising their right of 1st refusal.
The sale was registered in the registry of Deed July 25, 1995.PR believed
that the redemption period will end at July 25, 1996, but petitioner contends that it
will end July 19, 1996 since it was a leap year(** not stated pero baka ginamit ni
petitioner and Sheriff Banker’s calendar which 360 days lang ang one year)
PR filed a motion for consignation in the court when the petitioner and its
counsel refuse to accept payment. Petitioners opposed the motion, arguing that the
period of redemption had already expired and that cashier’s check is not sufficient
as valid a tender of payment. Nevertheless TC granted the consignation which was
affirmed by CA.
Issue: W/N Private Respondent can still redeem the property?
Ruling: Yes. Apparently equating the phrase “twelve (12) months” in Rule 39, §30
with one year of 365 days, private respondents reckoned the period of redemption
as ending on July 25, 1996 since the sale was registered on July 25, 1995. Indeed,
the certificate of sale stated that “the period of redemption . . . will expire one (1)
year from and after the date of registration . . .” There was thus an honest mistake
on a question of law. Rule 39, §28 of the 1997 Rule of Civil Procedure now provides
that the period of redemption shall be “at any time within one (1) year from the
date of registration of the certificate of sale,” so that the period is now to be
understood as composed of 365 days. Neither petitioners nor the sheriff corrected
private respondents’ mistaken impression, leading the latter to believe that July 25,
1996 was indeed the last day of the period of redemption.
MACY
RULE 39 Sec 33
7 Jose Uchuan v CA
FACTS: Flora Jaldon mortgaged a parcel of land to, the Philippine Banking
Corporation, who extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and in the public sale, the
bank was the highest bidder. As the property was not redeemed within the
reglementary period, a deed of final conveyance was executed, and accordingly,
TCT No. 43346 was issued to the bank. Unchuan's adverse claim had not been
cancelled; hence, it was carried over to TCT No. 43346. the bank filed a petition for
the cancellation of the annotations on its title and for the issuance of a writ of
possession. respondents were Unchuan and Faustino Neri, Jr. Unchuan filed an
opposition to the petition. Unchuan claims that he purchased one-half (1/2) of the
property. the trial court issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of
possession in favor of the bank. Unchuan filed a petition for certiorari
ISSUE: WON trial court acted in GAD when it directed the issuance of the writ of
possession w/o resolving the claim of Uchuan
RULING: No
Once the estate mortgaged is extrajudicially sold, and it is not redeemed within
the reglementary period, no separate and independent action is necessary to
obtain possession of the property. The purchaser at the public auction only has to
file a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession pursuant to Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court.The possession of the property shall be given to the
purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually
holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor.
The land involved is a Torrens-title property. It is basic that a person dealing with
registered property need not go beyond, but only has to rely on, the title. Uchuan
failed to present proof. He only presented in court a handwritten receipt for the
payment of his contribution to realty taxes allegedly signed by Flora Jaldon. He has
not bothered to prove the authenticity of the private writing, though. The alleged
receipt does not even sufficiently identify the land subject of the sale to Unchuan to
be the same land mortgaged and then sold to Philippine Banking Corporation.
Gomez
Case no. 8
Rule 39 Sec. 33; Redemption Perion: Possession
Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Prime Neighborhood Association
587 SCRA 582, G.R. Nos. 175728 & 178914 May 8, 2009
FACTS: For failure of Y-Electric to settle their obligation, secured by a real estate
mortgage by Sps. Yenko, DBP initiated a foreclosure proceeding and emerged the
highest bidder. Since no redemption was made after the lapse of the redemption
period, DBP filed an Ex Parte petition for a writ of possession. However,
respondents question the legality of its issuance, being owners of a portion of said
mortgaged land, they were not made aware of any of the proceedings related
thereto.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has no other option but to execute the writ of
possession, as this has already became a ministerial duty on its part as the period to
redeem the property has already lapsed.
RULING: NO. The rule is not without exception. Under Section 35, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, which is made suppletory to the extrajudicial foreclosure of real
estate mortgages by Section 6 of Act 3135, as amended, the possession of the
mortgaged property may be awarded to a purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure
unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment
debtor. Thus, in the cited case of Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 374
SCRA 22 (2002), the Court held that the obligation of a court to issue an ex parte
writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale
ceases to be ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in possession of
the property who is claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor. This
is substantiated by the Civil Code which protects the actual possessor of a property.
Pastor
9 Autocorp Group vs. CA, GR No. 157553
Rule 39, Section 33
FACTS: Respondent Keppel Mnote Bank extended a loan of P85M in favor of
petitioner Autocorp Group (Autocorp) secured by pledge and real estate mortgage.
Petitioner was unable to pay the account, hence, the bank foreclosed the properties
extrajudicially. Respondent bank requested for the sale of the six (6) mortgaged lots
at a public auction, the bank being the lone bidder. Certificate of sale was presented
to the sheriff and was entered in the primary entry book of the ROD. Petitioner then
filed before RTC. The trial court issued preliminary injunction prohibiting the
respondent bank to possess the property and enjoined the ROD not to register the
certificate of sale. Respondent bank’s MR was denied. CA, however, reversed RTC’s
decision holding that the entry of the certificate of sale in the primary entry book
was equivalent to registration, citing Section 56 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529, also known as the “Property Registration Decree”.
ISSUE: Was CA correct?
RULING: YES.
A writ of possession is generally understood to be an order whereby a sheriff is
commanded to place a person in possession of a real or personal property, such as,
when a property is extrajudicially foreclosed. It has been consistently held that
during the period of redemption after the registration of the sale, a writ of
possession issues as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper motion and the
approval of a bond. A writ of possession may also be issued after consolidation of
ownership of the property in the name of the purchaser. It is settled that the buyer
in a foreclosure sale, who becomes the absolute owner of the property if the same
is not redeemed during the one-year redemption period after the registration of the
sale, is entitled to the possession of the property and can demand it at any time,
following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a
new transfer certificate of title. To underscore the writ’s ministerial character, we
have disallowed injunction to prohibit its issuance, just as we have held that
issuance of the same may not be stayed by a pending action for annulment of the
mortgage or the foreclosure itself. The preliminary injunction issued by the trial
court to prevent respondent bank from taking possession of the subject lots, was
properly set aside by the CA, as the trial court judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it issued the same. It was not alleged that respondent bank
committed acts of possession over the properties before it could file a petition for a
writ of possession during the redemption period. If the trial court cannot refuse to
issue a writ of possession in the event that respondent bank complies with the
requisites for its issuance, with more reason that the trial court cannot issue an
injunction, preempting respondent bank from filing a petition or application for a
writ of possession, over the properties subject of the certificate of sale.
RYLE
10. UCPB v. Sps. Lumbo
Rule 39, Sec. 33
FACTS: Sps. Lumbo borrowed P12,000,000.00 from UCPB. They constituted a real
estate mortgage on a parcel of land located in Aklan and all the improvements
thereon. UCPB applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure, and emerged as the highest
bidder. The title over the mortgaged property was consolidated in the name of
UCPB after the Sps. Lumbo failed to redeem the property within the redemption
period. Sps. Lumbo sought the annulment of the foreclosure, legal accounting,
injunction against the consolidation of title, and damages. UCPB filed an ex parte
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession to recover possession of the
property. RTC granted the same. Sps. Lumbo filed in the RTC a petition to cancel the
writ of possession and to set aside the foreclosure sale. They included an
application for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order to
prevent the implementation of the writ of possession. RTC denied the Sps. Lumbo’s
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Sps. Lumbo brought
a petition for certiorari and/or mandamus in the CA.CA ruled by granting
respondent’s petition and enjoining the RTC’s implementation of the writ of
possession.
However, records show that the UCPB has the legal course to file a petition for the
cancellation of the writ of possession bases on cited legal grounds that the
mortgage was not violated or that the sale was not made in accordance with the
provisions of the law. Also, the respondent judge erred in declaring that he could
not act on the application for injunctive relief because the writ was issued by
another court of coordinate jurisdiction. The petition was filed before the same
branch of the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan but was re-raffled to another branch and later on
consolidated before the branch of the respondent judge where the action for the
annulment of the foreclosure sale is pending. Thus, the case.
ISSUE: W/N CA erred in granting certiorari/mandamus petition.
RULING: Yes. The supposed error of the RTC amounted only to one of judgment,
not of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one that the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction, and such error is reviewable only through an appeal
taken in due course. In contrast, an error of jurisdiction is committed where the act
complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, and such
error is correctible only by certiorari. It should follow that its consideration and
resolution of the respondents’ application for the injunctive writ filed in Special
Proceedings were taken in the exercise of that jurisdiction. As earlier made plain,
UCPB as the registered owner of the property was at that point unquestionably
entitled to the full implementation of the writ of possession. In the absence of any
clear and persuasive showing that it capriciously or whimsically denied the
respondents’ application, its denial of the application did not constitute grave abuse
of discretion amounting to either lack or excess of jurisdiction.
RECHINE
CASE NO. 11
RULE 39: SEC. 33.
COMETA v. IAC, 151 SCRA 563, June 30, 1987
FACTS: Respondent Franco filed a suit for damages against Cometa, the then RTC
awarded to Franco the sum of the P57, 396. 85. The judgment became final and a
writ of execution was issued. Petitioner Herco Realty and AgriDevelopment
Corporation filed a motion to annul the levy on execution and sale at public auction
of the real properties. The trial court ordered the RD to cancel Cometa’s COT to the
lots and to issue new ones in favor of the respondent. Cometa went to this Court on
petition for certiorari questioning the said order. The respondent filed with the RTC
a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession. The petitioner opposed the
motion on the ground that there is pending before another RTC an action for the
annulment of the levy and sale of the properties in question. The Trial Court
granted the motion.
ISSUE: W/N the issuance of a writ of possession is premature because the validity of
the levy and sale on execution is still in issue.
RULING: YES. It can be seen that the writ of possession may issue in favor of a
purchaser in an execution sale when the deed of conveyance has been executed
and delivered to him after the period of redemption has expired and no redemption
has been made by the judgment debtor. A writ of possession is complementary to a
writ of execution, and in an execution sale, it is a consequence of a writ of
execution, a public auction sale, and the fulfillment of several other conditions for
conveyance set by law. The issuance of a writ of possession is dependent on the
valid execution of the procedural stages preceding it. Any flaw afflicting any of its
stages, therefore, could affect the validity of its issuance.
The possession of the property sold at an execution sale shall be conferred on the
purchaser under the conditions set by Section 35 of Rule 39, Rules of Court.
That writ is available
(1) in a land registration proceeding, which is a proceeding in rem;
(2) in an extrajudicial foreclosure of a realty mortgage;
(3) in a judicial foreclosure of a mortgage, a quasi in rem proceeding, provided that
the mortgagor is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not
a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; and
(4) in execution sales (last par. of sec. 35, Rule 39, Rules of Court).”
The respondent appellate court’s emphasis on the failure of the petitioner to
redeem the properties within the period required by law is misplaced because
redemption, in this case, is inconsistent with the petitioner’s claim of invalidity of
levy and sale. Redemption is an implied admission of the regularity of the sale and
would estop the petitioner from later impugning its validity on that ground. 
WEE
CASE NO. 12
RULE 39, SEC. 33
Mabale v. Apalisokǀ G.R. No. L-46942 February 6, 1979
FACTS: Mabale was the registered owner of Lot No. 192 and an eight-hectare lot. She
sold both to respondent spouses under pacto de retro sales. Mabale failed to
exercise her right of redemption under both sales. Respondent spouses then sued
Mabale in the CFI- Zamboanga del Norte and in the CFI-Misamis Occidental.
However, both parties submitted themselves into a compromise agreement which
provides that when Mabale fails to pay, within a period of 5 years, the amount to
redeem her properties, an order for the cancellation of her TCT and the issuance
thereof TCT in the names of respondent spouses. This agreement was submitted and
approved of by the CFI-Misamis Occidental.
Mabale did not pay the sum stipulated in the compromise agreement. To enforce
the judgment based on that compromise, the lower court issued a writ of execution
and ordering the register of deeds to issue a new title to respondent spouses with
the annotation of her right to repurchase it . The lower court also issued a writ of
possession commanding the sheriff to e ject Mabale. The sheriff turned over the
possession of the lot to a representative of respondent spouses. However, Mabale
refused to vacate the property.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not, under the judgment based on the compromise
agreement, the lower court could issue a writ of possession so as to eject from lot
Mabale and "all the persons acting under her".
(2) Whether or not there can be an order to Mabale to deliver the possession of
said lot.
RULING: (1) NO. In that connection, it should be borne in mind that the law
specifies when a writ of possession may be issued. That writ is available (1) in a land
registration proceeding, which is proceeding in rem; (2) in an extra-judicial
foreclosure of a realty mortgage; (3) in a judicial foreclosure of mortgage, a quasi in
rem proceeding provided that the mortgagor is in possession of the mortgaged
realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened and
(4) in execution sales. Since the instant case does not fall among the above, the
issuance of the writ of possession was not proper. Moreover, the writ of
possession was addressed to the sheriff. Hence, the petitioners herein could not
have been guilty of disobeying that writ and, therefore, they could not be held
liable for contempt of court.
(2) YES. In the instant case considering that petitioners have no other claim to the
possession of the property in question, apart from their claim of ownership which
which was terminated by the issuance of a new title to respondent spouses, and
consequently, have no right to remain in the lot therein after such ownership was
adjudged to respondents, the delivery of possession of the land should be
considered included in the adjudication.
CHAM
Case No. 13
Rule 39, Section 47 (Section 49 focus nya)
Macahilig v. Heirs of Magalit
FACTS
Magalit, (deceased) filed with the then Philippine Fisheries Commission for
Fishpond Application. Macahilig protested Magalit’s application, contending that for
a period of 20 years, he had been in actual possession of the five-hectare area
included in Magalit’s application. BFAR Director dismissed Macahilig’s claim. RTC
ordered a writ of execution for the said property, affirmed by CA.
Citing Section 49 of Rule 39, Rules of Court, petitioner insists that the
September 17, 1997 Order of the trial court in Civil Case No. 3517 bars it from
rehearing questions on the ownership of Lot 4417. She insists that said Order has
become final and executory, because Dr. Magalit did not appeal it.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Magalit is barred from questioning due to res judicata
RULING/MAIN POINT
No. An interlocutory order cannot give rise to res judicata. Only a final and
unappealable judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
can effectively bar another action that has identical parties, subject matter and
cause of action as the prior one.
Final, in the phrase judgments or final orders found in Section 49 of Rule
39, has two accepted interpretations. In the first sense, it is an order that one can
no longer appeal because the period to do so has expired, or because the order has
been affirmed by the highest possible tribunal involved. The second sense connotes
that it is an order that leaves nothing else to be done, as distinguished from one
that is interlocutory. The phrase refers to a final determination as opposed to a
judgment or an order that settles only some incidental, subsidiary or collateral
matter arising in an action; for example, an order postponing a trial, denying a
motion to dismiss or allowing intervention. Orders that give rise to res judicata and
conclusiveness of judgment apply only to those falling under the second category.
For res judicata to apply, the following elements must concur:
(1) there is a final judgment or order;
(2) the court rendering it has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) the judgment is one on the merits; and
(4) there is, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter and cause of
action. 
For example, an order overruling a motion to dismiss does not give rise
to res adjudicata that will bar a subsequent action, because such order is merely
interlocutory and is subject to amendments until the rendition of the final
judgment.
COELI
CASE NO. 14
SEC. 47, RULE 39
PAEL V. CA, CHIN, MALLARI | GR 133547
(NOTHING HERE IS ABOUT RULE 39)
FACTS
 Maria Destura filed a complaint before the RTC QC against her husband, Pedro
Destura, together with Chin and Mallari. The complaint sought the annulment
of the MOA executed by them over 2 lots. It was alleged that Chin and Mallari
were former agents of Pedro, authorized to sell the lots; that when Destura
came from Canada, he discovered that the title to the land has been
transferred to Chin and Mallari; that the MOA stated that Chin and Mallari had
a buyer of the lots and they promised to pay Destura Php 1M, which did not
materialize. NOTE: Pael sps were the original owners of the lots (before
Destura sps)
 RTC: nullified the MOA; that the records competently and credibly show that
highly suspicious circumstances attended such transfers of registered
ownership. It then ordered the Register of Deeds QC to cancel the TCTs.
 CA: rendered a decision in favor of Chin and Mallari.
 The case was elevated to the SC by the Heirs of Pael and by Maria Destura via
separate petitions for review. However, the SC affirmed the title of Chin and
Mallari over the property. Heirs of Pael and Destura filed separate MRs. During
their pendency, the University of the Philippines (UP) filed a motion for
intervention, alleging that the properties covered by TCTs in the names of Chin
and Mallari form part of its Diliman Campus, registered in the name of UP.
 SC denied the MRs but granted the motion for intervention filed by UP. The
former remanded the case to the CA for reception of evidence on the
 conflicting claims over the property in question by Chin and Mallari as against
UP.
ISSUE: W/N UP has the superior right over the property covered by the petitions at
hand.
RULING: YES. The disputed property is part of the UP Diliman Campus. It was
established, after the survey conducted by the DENR-NCR that the property claimed
by Chin and Mallari overlaps the property covered by UP’s title. The superiority of
UP’s title over that of the Paels has been recognized by the courts in an earlier case
filed by Roberto Pael, et al. vs. UP. Further, it has been said that the foundation
principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties should not be
permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that when a right or fact has
been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an
opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it
remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with
them in law or estate. The said doctrine is applicable in the case at bar.
jAn Soriano
CASE NO. 15
SECTION 47, RULE 39 | RES JUDICATA
SPS. FELIPE, Layos V. FIL-ESTATE GOLF AND DEVELOPMENT, INC. (FEDGI) | GR NO.
150470
FACTS: Sps. Filed a petition for reconstitution (Reconstitution case) of an OCT filed
by Sps. Layos with the RTC. Several parties intervened in the reconstitution case,
including respondent FEDGI. The latter filed its Motion to Dismiss claiming that the
title sough to be reconstituted was held to be a forgery by the Supreme Court
(Forgery case). RTC ruled in favor of FEDGI. Petitioners appealed via Rule 45.
ISSUE: W/N the Decision of the Forgery case bars by res judicata the Reconstitution
case.
RULING (Mainpoint in Bold): Yes. The doctrine of res judicata lays down two main
rules which may be stated as follows: (1) The judgment or decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties
and their privies and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same
cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal; and (2) any right,
fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment or
decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein
and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not
the claims or demands, purposes, or subject matters of the two suits are the
same. These two main rules mark the distinction between the principles
governing the two typical cases in which a judgment may operate as evidence. In
speaking of these cases, the first general rule above stated, and which
corresponds to the afore-quoted paragraph (b) of Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court, is referred to as "bar by former judgment"; while the second general
rule, which is embodied in paragraph (c) of the same section and rule, is known as
"conclusiveness of judgment."
In the present case, there is a conclusiveness of judgment which bars the
re-litigation in a second case of a fact or question already settled in a previous case.
The second case, however, may still proceed provided that it will no longer touch on
the same fact or question adjudged in the first case. Conclusiveness of judgment
requires only the identity of issues and parties, but not of causes of action.
AREEJ
CASE NO. 16
RULE 39 SEC 47 RES JUDICATA
Rodriguez v. PAL | G.R. No. 178501, January 11, 2016
FACTS: Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines (ALP AP), consisting of Rodriguez
et al, filed with the NCMB a Notice of Strike, but the DOLE Secretary issued a
Return-to-Work Order. ALP AP reported for work but PAL did not accept them.
Thus, they filed a complaint for illegal lockout against PAL. NLRC dismissed. CA
affirmed. ALP AP filed a petition for certiorari with SC (1st ALP AP case), which was
dismissed. 1st ALP AP case became final and executory. Meanwhile, Rodriguez et al
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. LA ruled that they were illegally dismissed.
NLRC reversed. CA reinstated LA’s decision but with modifications as to damages.
Thus, Rodriguez et al filed partial MR, which CA denied. Hence, both Rodriquez et al
and PAL filed the instant separate petitions for review on certiorari before the SC
(G.R. No. 178501 and G.R. No. 178510).
In the meantime, during the pendency of the said Petitions (G.R. No. 178501 and
G.R. No. 178510), the Court rendered a decision in the case ALP AP v. PAL (2nd
ALPAP case). Under the 2nd ALP AP case, the Acting DOLE Secretary merely noted
the arguments of ALP AP. Thus, ALP AP filed with the CA a petition for certiorari,
which was dismissed. ALP AP then filed before the SC a Petition for Review
on Certiorari which SC dismissed. 2nd ALP AP case became final and executory.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 1st and 2nd ALP AP cases constitute res judicata on the
instant petitions for review on certiorari (G.R. No. 178501 and G.R. No. 178510)
RULING: YES. The doctrine res judicata  actually embraces two different concepts:
(1) bar by former judgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment. There is "bar by
prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered
and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case
constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. But where there is identity of
parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first
judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted
and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the concept
of res judicata  known as "conclusiveness of judgment". In sum, conclusiveness of
judgment bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact or question already settled
in a previous case. The elements for res judicata in the second concept,
i.e.,  conclusiveness of judgment, are extant in these cases. There is identity of
parties in the 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases,  on one hand, and the Petitions at bar. There
is likewise an identity of issues between the 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases and these
cases.
AYEH
Case No. 17
Pacasum v Atty. Zamoranos
RULE 39, Section 47 – Res judicata
FACTS: Pacasum filed an administrative complaint for disgraceful and immoral
conduct against Zamoranos on the ground that she had contracted a bigamous
marriage. In her answer to the complaint, Zamoranos raised as a defense the
dissolution of her previous marriage under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines (the Muslim Code).
With respect to the divorce between Zamoranos and De Guzman, the Decree of
Divorce was issued on June 18, 1992 by Judge Kaudri L. Jainul, who was the
presiding judge of the Shari 'a Circuit Court, Third Shari'a District, Isabela, Basilan.
Neither party interposed an appeal, consequently, the divorce has attained finality.
Pacasum then filed this petition for review on certiorari  arguing that
the Shari'a court had no jurisdiction to dissolve Zamoranos' first marriage.
ISSUE: WON contention of petitioner is meritorious.
RULING: NO. Jurisdiction over actions for divorce is vested upon the Shari'a Circuit
Courts, whose decisions may be appealed to the Shari'a District Courts.
Under the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari'a Courts, an appeal must be made
within a reglementary period of 15 days from receipt of judgment. The judgment
shall become final and executory after the expiration of the period to appeal, or
upon decision of the Shari 'a District Courts on appeal from the Shari 'a Circuit
Court. The effect of a final judgment is stated under Section 47, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, which applies suppletorily to civil proceedings in Shari 'a Courts.
The provision embodies the principle of res judicata in judgments in rem. Suits that
affect the personal status of a person are in the nature of proceedings in rem.
Divorce suits fall under this category, and divorce decrees are considered
judgments in rem. Final judgments in rem bar indifferently all who might be minded
to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established, and
anyone in the world who has a right to be heard on the strength of alleged facts
which, if true, show an inconsistent interest. Simply put, a judgment in rem is
binding upon the whole world.
Alcala
RULE 39 Section 47 Effect of judgments or final orders - Conclusiveness of Judgment
18. Yap v. Republic of the Philippines (thru DENR) GR 199810 (2017)
Facts: Petitioner Yap was able to buy the subject land from an allegedly patent
holder. DOTC filed a complaint for expropriation of a portion of the subject land
before the RTC of Davao City. RTC Branch 13 rendered its Decision, ruling that the
DENR is entitled to expropriate the land subject of this case for the purpose of road
right of way. DENR filed the Complaint for Cancellation of Patent, Nullification of
Title and Reversion with the RTC. RTC dismissed the DENR's complaint since the
subject land has already been sold to third persons, it must be shown that the latter
were part of the fraud and/or misrepresentation committed by the original grantee,
or at least were aware of it. However, since the RTC Branch 13 already declared in
its decision that petitioners were purchasers in good faith and for value, RTC Branch
16 maintained that, as a court of co-equal jurisdiction, it is bound by the said finding
under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment. DENR elevated its case to the CA
which reversed RTC. CA held that petitioners were not innocent purchasers for
value. Further, the CA maintained that the decision of the RTC Branch 13 did not
constitute res judicata insofar as the same has not yet attained finality.
ISSUE: W/N the decision of the CA run counter to the rule on conclusiveness of
judgment.
RULING: NO. The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, as a concept of res
judicata, states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and was
there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction,
is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action
and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in
any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any
other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of
action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. Identity of
cause of action is not required but merely identity of issue.
RTC Branch 16 falsely appreciated the decision of RTC Branch 13. The foregoing
shows that the question of whether or not petitioners are innocent purchasers was
not an actual issue of fact in the case before the RTC Branch 13, and which called
for said court's adjudication. "An issue of fact is a point supported by one party's
evidence and controverted by another's." Petitioners being buyers in good faith was
merely an allegation which was not proven in court and RTC Branch 13 did not
actually make any clear pronouncement on the matter.
The bar on re-litigation of a matter or question extends to those questions
necessarily implied in the final judgment, although no specific finding may have
been made in reference thereto, and although those matters were directly referred
to in the pleadings and were not actually or formally presented. "If the record of the
former trial shows that the judgment could not have been rendered without
deciding a particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that matter as to
all future actions between the parties." These principles now embody paragraph (c)
of Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Martin
Case No. 19
Rule 39, Sec. 47: Effect of judgments or final orders
ISLAMIC DIRECTORATE OF THE PHILIPPINES (IDP), Perea, SEC vs CA, INC|G.R. No.
117897, May 14, 1997
Facts: The controversy involves two parcels of land where it was subsequently sold
to INC by IDP. However, the issue started when members of the group (Carpizo
Group) who sold the land were not properly elected as members of Board of
Trustees of IDP. Thus, the other group (Tamano Group) sought to nullify the said
sale with the SEC. Meanwhile, INC filed an action for specific performance against
the Carpizo Group with the RTC and also to compel Ligon (mortgagee of the lots) to
surrender the OCT. The RTC rendered a partial judgment in favor of INC. Ligon
appealed to CA hence a petition for review before the SC (G.R. No. 107751). As to
the SEC case, a decision was rendered declaring the sale as void so the INC elevated
the case to the CA which reversed the SEC decision. Hence, the IDP-Tamano
brought this instant petition for review, and while petition was pending, however,
the SC rendered judgment in G.R. No. 107751 which sustained the order to compel
mortgagee Ligon to surrender the OCT.
Issue: Whether or not the decision rendered in G.R. No. 107751 constitutes res
judicata such that the petition under consideration would be barred if it were the
case.
Ruling: No. The requisites or res judicata do not obtain in the case at bench. Section
47(b) enunciates the first concept of res judicata known as "bar by prior judgment,"
whereas, Section 47(c) is referred to as "conclusiveness of judgment." There is "bar
by former judgment" when, between the first case where the judgment was
rendered, and the second case where such judgment is invoked, there is identity of
parties, subject matter and cause of action. When the three identities are present,
the judgment on the merits rendered in the first constitutes an absolute bar to the
subsequent action. But where between the first case wherein judgment is rendered
and the second case wherein such judgment is invoked, there is only identity of
parties but there is no identity of cause of action, the judgment is conclusive in the
second case, only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and
determined, and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is what is termed
"conclusiveness of judgment." Neither of these concepts of res judicata find
relevant application in the case at bench. While there may be identity of subject
matter (IDP property) in both cases, there is no identity of parties. The principal
parties in G.R. No. 107751 were mortgagee Ligon and the INC. The IDP was only
made an ancillary party as intervenor and it never originally a principal party
thereto. It must be noted that intervention is not an independent action, but is
merely collateral, accessory, or ancillary to the principal action.
AR
CASE NO. 20
SECTION 47 RULE 39 (RES JUDICATA)
RCBC V. ROYAL CARGO CORP. GR 179756 (2009)
FACTS: Terrymanila, Inc. filed a petition for voluntary insolvency. One of its
creditors was RCBC with which it had an obligation of ₱3 Million that was secured
by a chattel mortgage. Royal Cargo Corporation, another creditor of Terrymanila,
filed an action for collection of sum of money and preliminarily attached "some" of
Terrymanila’s personal properties. Petitioner sought in the insolvency proceedings
permission to extrajudicially foreclose the chattel mortgage which was granted.
Respondent filed a petition for annulment of the auction sale. Apart from
questioning the inclusion in the auction sale of some of the properties which it had
attached, respondent questioned the failure to duly notify it of the sale at least 10
days before the sale. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss which was denied.
Petitioner appealed the denial of the Motion to Dismiss via certiorari to the CA. CA
dismissed the petition.
ISSUE: W/N the respective decisions of the CA and the SC conclusively settled the
issue on the need to give a 10-day notice to respondent of the holding of the public
auction sale of the chattels.
RULING: NO. The CA resolved only the interlocutory issue of whether the trial
court’s Order denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss was attended by grave abuse
of discretion. It did not rule on the merits of the petition. An order denying a
motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot give rise to res judicata,
hence, it is subject to amendments until the rendition of the final judgment.
RES JUDICATA
BAR BY PRIOR JUDGMENT CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT
There is bar by prior judgment when, Where there is identity of parties and
as between the first case where the subject matter in the first and second
judgment was rendered, and the cases, but no identity of causes of
second case that is sought to be action, there is conclusiveness of
barred, there is identity of parties, judgment. The first judgment is
subject matter, and causes of action. conclusive only as to those matters
actually and directly controverted and
determined, not as to matters merely
involved therein.
Eloise
21. TALA REALTY SERVICES CORP vs. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS & MORTGAGE
BANK (G.R. No. 181369) | SEC. 47, RULE 39, ROC EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION ON THE
CONCEPT OF RES JUDICATA—2016 CASE
FACTS: Banco Filipino filed a complaint with RTC-Manila against Tala Realty Services
Corporation, Inc. (Tala Realty) and the individual petitioners. This was one of the
17 reconveyance cases instituted by Banco Filipino against Tala Realty covering
properties located in different parts of the Philippines. The complaint alleged that
the properties were covered by a trust agreement between Banco Filipino, as
trustor-beneficiary, and Tala Realty, as trustee. Petitioners moved to dismiss the
complaint based on the following grounds: forum shopping, lack of cause of action,
and pari delicto. The RTC initially denied the motion to dismiss but later reversed
itself. It ordered the dismissal of the complaint against herein petitioners except
Tala Realty and ordered the suspension of the proceedings. Banco Filipino filed MR
but RTC denied. Banco Filipino elevated the case to the CA via Rule 65. CA granted,
finding that the RTC should have hypothetically admitted the truth of the factual
allegations in the complaint when it ruled on the motion to dismiss. CA
subsequently denied petitioners' MR. Hence, this appeal under Rule 45 where
petitioners principally claim that Banco Filipino's action for reconveyance is already
barred by stare decisis and conclusiveness of judgment. In G.R. No. 1883021 (2012)
and the consolidated cases of G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201 and
1666082 (2009), the Court applied the rule of stare decisis to deny Banco Filipino's
claims for reconveyance of various real properties based on a trust agreement that
we previously declared void in G.R. No. 1375333 (2002).
ISSUE: Hence, this case raises the question of whether Banco Filipino Savings &
Mortgage Bank's (Banco Filipino) complaint for reconveyance in the proceedings
below is likewise precluded by stare decisis and conclusiveness of judgment.
RULING: YES. The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, otherwise known as
"preclusion of issues" or "collateral estoppel," bars the re-litigation of Banco
Filipino's claim based on the void trust agreement. This concept is embodied in the
third paragraph of Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Conclusiveness of judgment is a species of res judicata and it applies where there is
identity of parties in the first and second cases, but there is no identity of causes of
action. Any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved
in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is
rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein, and cannot
again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim,
demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same. Thus, if a
particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will
depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former
judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in
the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first
suit. Identity of cause of action is not required but mere1y identity of issue.
In this case, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment is squarely applicable because
Banco Filipino's action for reconveyance is solely based on a trust agreement which
has long been declared void in a previous action that involved both Tala Realty and
Banco Filipino, i.e., G.R. No. 137533. In other words, the question on the validity of
the trust agreement has been finally and conclusively settled; hence, this question
cannot be raised again even in a different proceeding involving the same parties.
Although the action instituted in this case is one for reconveyance, which is
technically different from the ejectment suit originally instituted by Tala Realty in
G.R. No. 137533, "the concept of conclusiveness of judgment still applies because
under this principle, the identity of causes of action is not required but merely
identity of issues. Simply put, conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of
particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a
different claim or cause of action.
Banco Filipino cannot rely on G.R. Nos. 144700, 130184, 139166, 167255 and
144705.In these cases, we ruled that Banco Filipino did not violate the rule against
forum shopping when it filed separate cases for reconveyance in different trial
courts. These rulings were based on the Court's finding that the elements of litis
pendentia and res judicata were not present. However, the concept of res judicata
referred to in these cases is the one commonly understood as "bar by prior
judgment," which is enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b). Bar by prior judgment is
the traditional formulation of res judicata, which requires the identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action. It is this concept which is used in determining
whether litis pendentia or forum shopping exists. In contrast, res judicata as
conclusiveness of judgment requires only identity of parties and of issues. These
two kinds of res judicata are legally distinct.
Accordingly, under the doctrine of res judicata as bar by prior judgment, Banco
Filipino could not be prevented from filing separate actions for reconveyance
because each action involved a different subject matter, i.e., a different parcel of
land. Nonetheless, res judicata as conclusiveness of judgment would still apply to
these different cases, as it does here, insofar as they involve material facts or
questions which were in issue and which have been adjudicated in a former action.
ARZHY
Case No. 22
Section 47 Rule 39: Effect of judgments or final orders (not even mentioned in this
case)
Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Judge Querubin, G.R. No. 155405, March 18, 2015
FACTS: Sandoval and Ozaeta filed an Application for Registration of Title covering
the two subject parcels of land which was granted by CFI in its 1966 Decision. In
1970, prior to the issuance of the decrees of registration, the properties were sold
to Eugenio Lopez, Sr who entered into possession of the property. In 1997, a
petition for cancellation of petitioners’ TCTs was filed by the administratrix of
Sandoval. In the land registration case, petitioners moved for the issuance of the
decree of registration over the subject property in their names as successors-in-
interest in light of the death of Lopez, Sr. Attached to the motion was the Deed of
Absolute Sale which authenticity was questioned by private respondents
Sandoval heirs. Pending this motion, the decree of registration was issued in the
name of original owner (Sandoval and Ozaeta). In 1998, a petition for the ex parte
issuance of a writ of possession was filed in the name of Sandoval heirs. RTC
granted which petitioners sought to annul.
ISSUE: W/N the heirs of Spouses Sandoval, represented by private respondent, are
bound not only by the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by said decedents but also
by the undertaking contained therein.
RULING: YES. Should the Deed of Absolute Sale be found authentic and duly
executed, the Sandoval heirs cannot escape its effects. Under the general rule
stated in Article 1311 of the Civil Code, the heirs are bound by the contracts
entered into by their predecessors-in-interest.
The ministerial duty of the land registration court to issue a writ of possession
ceases with respect to actual possessors of the property under a claim of
ownership. One who claims to be the owner of a property that is possessed by
another must bring the appropriate judicial action for its physical recovery. The
term "judicial process" could mean no less than an ejectment suit or
reinvindicatory action in which the ownership claims of the contending parties may
be properly heard and adjudicated. (Not the main point but Judge mentioned this).
FRED CASE 23
Rule 39, Section 48
Mijares vs. Ranada, G.R. No. 139325     FACTS: Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz is a naturalized Canadian citizen who married
FACTS: This case involves a suit rendering judgement against the estate of Marcos
in favour of the victims of torture, rape, arbitrary detention in the hands of
authorirites during Marcos regime to which the US CA affirmed the award of
$1,964,005,859.90. Petitioners sued before the RTC Makati for the enforcement of
final judgement. The Marcos Estate opposed on account of improper filling of
docket fee which is P410 only instead of $2.25 Billion pursuant to circular
concerning proper computation of docket fees. RTC judge dismissed the case as
well as the MR for the suit being capable of pecuniary estimation. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE: w/n the foreign judgement against the Marcos Estate is conclusive?
RULING: No.
 It bears noting that Section 48, Rule 39 acknowledges that the Final Judgment is
not conclusive yet, but presumptive evidence of a right of the petitioners against
the Marcos Estate. Moreover, the Marcos Estate is not precluded to present
evidence, if any, of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact. This ruling, decisive as it is on the question of filing
fees and no other, does not render verdict on the enforceability of the Final
Judgment before the courts under the jurisdiction of the Philippines, or for that
matter any other issue which may legitimately be presented before the trial court. 
Such issues are to be litigated before the trial court, but within the confines of the
matters for proof as laid down in Section 48, Rule 39. On the other hand, the speedy
resolution of this claim by the trial court is encouraged, and contumacious delay of
the decision on the merits will not be brooked by this Court.
NOTE: There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in
rem and one in personam. For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed
conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an action in personam, the foreign
judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title. 21 However, in both cases, the
foreign judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our local courts on the grounds
of want of jurisdiction or notice to the party, 22 collusion, fraud,23 or clear mistake of
law or fact.24 Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to defend
against the enforcement of such decision in the local forum. It is essential that there
should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court
in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. 25
ADDALINO
24. Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas
RULE 39-SEC 48
respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas. He filed a petition for divorce in Canada –
granted by the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. Two years later, Corpuz
went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian divorce decree on
his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas. However, despite the registration, an
official of NSO informed Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists under the
Philippine law until there has been a judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce
decree by a competent judicial court. He filed a petition for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce and/or declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC – denied
on the ground Corpuz cannot institute the action for judicial recognition of the
foreign divorce decree because he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided
further that Sto. Tomas was the proper party who can institute an action under
the principle of Article 26 of the Family Code which capacitates a Filipino citizen to
remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: W/N the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grants aliens like
Corpuz the right to institute a petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce
decree
Petitioner attempted to convince the Court that it is necessary to look into the
merits of the U.S. District Court’s Order because it committed clear mistake of law
and fact in issuing the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the local courts may review USDC’s order on the basis of the
same arguments presented before USDC by the petitioner.
RULING: NO. A Philippine court will not substitute its own interpretation of any
provision of the law or rules of procedure of another country, nor review and
pronounce its own judgment on the sufficiency of evidence presented before a
competent court of another jurisdiction. Any purported mistake petitioner
attributes to the USDC in the latter’s issuance of the Order would merely constitute
an error of judgment in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction, which could have
been corrected by a timely appeal before the USCA.

RULING: QUALIFIED. The unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the

Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to
petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign
divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national
law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.

AIRA
CASE NO. 25
RULE 39, SEC. 48
BPI Securities Corporation vs. Guevara, 752 SCRA 342, March 11, 2015

FACTS: Ayala Corporation is known as a leading company in the Philippines with

numerous business ventures. It owned several other companies such as Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC), Philsec Investment Corporation,
Ayala International Finance Limited (AIFL) which eventually became BPI
International Finance Limited (BPI-IFL), and Athona Holdings. Guevara, as President
of Ayala was tasked to resolve the outstanding debt of Ducat, a stockholder,
amounting to USD 3 Million which threatened the company’s position in the Makati
Stock Exchange. To pay off his loan, Ducat proposed to give off in exchange one of
his properties in Harris County, Texas, US which he owned with Daic, President of
1488, Inc., a US-based corporation. Ayala agreed to the proposal. Philsec and AIFL
granted Athona a loan of USD 2.5 Million, which Athona used as initial payment to
purchase the property, and Athona executed a promissory note in favor of 1488 to
cover the remaining balance of the property. However, Ayala was not able to sell
the Harris County property; for this, it failed to pay the remaining balance. In turn,
1488 and Guevara sued Ayala before the US court for failure to render its
obligations. Both the US District Court and US CA ruled in favor of complainants.