Capili vs People of the Philippines GR No.

83805 July
3, 2013
FACTS:

Petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the RTC. Petitioner thereafter
filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for
declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by
Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it
would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case
for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial question in
the instant criminal case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of second marriage is a ground for
dismissal of the criminal charge for bigamy.

RULING:

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as
follows:

Art. 349.  Bigamy. – The penalty of  prision mayor  shall be imposed upon any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.

It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was
contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage
between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999.
Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second
marriage between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial
declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the
prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.

Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with
the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second
marriage was celebrated.

Marzalado vs People of the Philippines GR No. 152997

November 10, 2004
FACTS:

Cristina N. Albano was the lessee of a unit in the house owned by Luz Marzalado, the
mother of herein petitioner, Salvador Marzalado, Jr.  Sometime in February 1993, Luz
Marzalado filed an ejectment case against Albano.  Judgment was rendered against
Albano, who was ordered to vacate the leased premises and to pay the unpaid rentals. 
Albano appealed to the RTC.Pending such appeal, Albano transferred her children to
her father’s house because the electricity supply was cut-off. Upon her return to the
unit, the padlocks were already changed and the unit was emptied.  She was informed
that on November 1, 1993, Marzalado, Jr., and his female companion took her lead
pipe and on November 2, 1993, Marzalado, Jr., took her personal belongings and
brought them inside his house.

ISSUE:

Whether the entry of Marzalado was legally justified?

RULING:

The entry was legally justified. As certified by Barangay Lupon Secretary Romulo E.
Ragaya, the unit rented by Albano was "forcibly opened by the owner because of the
strong water pressure coming out of the faucet…"19 As Albano herself admitted, she
and her children already left the unit when the electricity supply was cut off in the
month of September. Hence, nobody was left to attend to the unit, except during some
nights when Albano's maid slept in the unit. Clearly, Marzalado, Jr., acted for the
justified purpose of avoiding further flooding and damage to his mother's property
caused by the open faucet. No criminal intent could be clearly imputed to petitioner for
the remedial action he had taken. There was an exigency that had to be addressed to
avoid damage to the leased unit. There is nothing culpable concerning Marzalado, Jr.'s
judgment call to enter the unit and turn off the faucet instead of closing the inlet valve
as suggested by the OSG.