An Analysis of Ibn ʿArabī's inshāʾ al-dawāʿ ir with Particular Reference to the Doctrine of the

"Third Entity"
Author(s): Masataka Takeshita
Source: Journal of Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Oct., 1982), pp. 243-260
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/544086
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AN ANALYSIS OF IBN cARABI'S INSHA'AL-DA WA'IR WITH PARTICULAR
REFERENCE TO THE DOCTRINE OF THE "THIRD ENTITY"

MA SA TAKA TAKESHITA, University of Chicago

I. INTRODUCTION

IT is commonly held that Ghazali exercised the most influence on later Islamic
intellectual history, uniting Peripatetic philosophy, Ash'arite theology, and Sufism.
But Ibn 'Arabi also, in his unique manner, incorporated the traditions of philosophy
and theology into Sufism, and his influence is, if not greater, certainly as great as
GhazalT'sin later Islamic cultural tradition. In the Eastern Islamic world, in particular,
his thought is so penetrating that it is impossible to understand the ideas which
dominate various Sufi orders and especially their poets, without a good understanding
of Ibn CArabl.
Among the very large number of works written by Ibn 'ArabT, the Futuhat al-
makkiya and the Fusiis al-hikam are without a doubt the most important and well-
known, while most of his other works either remain in manuscript form or are very
poorly edited. The exceptions are three small treatises on metaphysics and cosmology:
the Inshad al-dawa'ir, the CUqlat al-mustawfiz, and the TadbTratal-ildhTya,all edited
by Nyberg.' Of these, the Inshd' al-dawdair is of especially great value, since in it the
basic tenets of Ibn 'Arabrs philosophy are lucidly and systematically explained. Thus
this treatise, although it cannot claim the comprehensiveness of his major works, is
more accessible, helps the reader to grasp the core of his rich and complicated
metaphysics, and serves as an excellent introduction to his later, more formidable
magna opera.
Besides being a compact and lucid introduction to Ibn 'Arabl's central thought, this
treatise is also distinguished by the fact that it elaborates what he calls "the third
entity" (al-shay' al-thdlith)2, a doctrine which explains the relationship between man
and God. The main subject of this small treatise is man's exalted rank in the universe,
due to certain correspondences existing between man and God. According to Ibn
'ArabT,these correspondences lie in the similarity between God's knowledge and man's
knowledge, and he explains this similarity through an intermediary "third entity"
which exists between God and all creatures, something which is neither existent nor
non-existent. This third entity is God's knowledge of Himself when it is connected
with God; at the same time it is man's knowledge of himself when it is connected with
man. Thus the third entity is the actual basis for the correspondences between God
and man, and it is due to this fact that man enjoys supreme rank among all creatures.
It is around this doctrine that the whole treatise revolves.
Historically, the concept of the third entity has its origin in the Mu'tazilite doctrine
of the Names and Attributes of God, but Ibn 'Arabl developed it into the cosmic

[JNES41 no. 4(1982)] 'H. S. Nyberg, Kleinere Schriften des Ibn al-
? 1982 by The University of
Chicago. 4ArabT(Leiden,1919).
All rights reserved. 2 Literally "the third thing"; see n. 3 below.
0022-29684104-0001
1.00.243 243
244 JOURNAL OF NEAR EASTERN STUDIES

principle which at the same time connects and divides God and all creatures. The third
entity, which is called in this treatise the "Reality of Realities" (haqiqat al-haqa'iq),
"summum genus" (jins al-ajnds), and "Prime Matter" (madda uila) plays a crucial role
in Ibn 'Arabi's entire metaphysical system. Indeed, without a proper understanding of
this concept, his other celebrated doctrines such as the doctrine of the wahdat al-
wujiid ("the Unity of Existence") and that of the insan kamil ("the Perfect Man")
would be impossible to follow. Although this third entity appears very often in the
Futhadt and the Fusus under various other names, the concept is seldom given any
explanation, for he assumes the reader's familiarity with it. In the Insha' al-dawa'ir,
however, an extensive, systematic treatment of the intermediary third entity is found.
The treatise, which occupies thirty-four pages, consists of the proem and two
chapters (fasl). The second chapter is further divided into four sections (bab), each of
which includes a chart. Although the first chapter is not further divided, we can
distinguish three different subjects treated therein: 1) the analysis of existence; 2) the
analysis of non-existence and knowledge; and 3) the classification of beings (ashya')
into three entities and a detailed discussion of the third entity. The entire first chapter
can be regarded as an introduction to the theory of the third entity and the second
chapter its amplification, especially of one of its aspects, the Names of God.
In spite of the important place occupied by this doctrine, little has been done
hitherto by scholars to interpret it on the basis of careful textual analysis of the
treatise. This article is an attempt to elucidate the doctrine based on the relevant
sections of the Insha' al-dawadir. In my analysis, I shall concentrate on the third part
of the first chapter and the last three sections of the second chapter because the others
are not directly relevant to an elaboration of the doctrine.

II. THE CLASSIFICATION OF BEINGS IN THE FIRST CHAPTER

Ibn CArabiclassifies beings (ashyda)3 into three groups. They are: 1) the existent by
itself (mawjud bi-dhatihi) and in concreto (fT Caynihi): the Absolute Existent, i.e.,
God; 2) the existent by God (mawjud bi-llah): the world of the Throne, the world of
the Chair, the Heavens and those who exist in them, the sky, the earth and those who
exist on it;4 and 3) the third entity which is neither existent nor non-existent.
Among these three, the distinction between the first and the second groups is well
established by Muslim philosophers, and Ibn 'Arabi repeats the philsophers' assertion
3 The term
"ashya" (lit. "things") is difficult to pp. 4 and 110. See also N. Rescher, "The Concept
translate. Ivanow in his introduction of Nasir al-DTn of Existence in Arabic Logic and Philosophy" in
Tusi's Tasawwuratcollects the combinations in which Studies in Arabic Philosophy (Pittsburgh, 1967),
the term "ashyd'" is used in this work and com- pp. 69-70 and n. 2.
ments as follows: "This shows that the literal mean- 4 In the c Uqlat al-mustawfiz his very elaborate
ing 'things' in the usual sense does not suit the case. cosmology is found. It is said that the Throne is the
But how to translate it: forms, ideas, principles, first in the organized universe ('alam al-tarkib). The
entities?" (Nasir al-Din TisT, The Rawdatu't-Tastim, surrounding angels (al-mala'ika al-haffun; see
Commonly Called Tasawwurat, ed. W. Ivanow Qur'an 32:75) dwell here. The universe of the Chair
[Leiden, 1950], p. xliii). The term "shay"' used by is created in the cavity of the Throne like a ring cast
the Ash'arites is a translation of the Stoic term "ti," in a vast plain. The organizing angels (al-mala'ika
the highest genus of all being, including the existent al-mudabbirat) reside here. Thus both universes are
and the non-existent. See Simon van den Bergh, the domains of angels ('Uqlat al-mustawfiz, ed.
Averroes' Tahafut al-Tahafut (London, 1954), vol. 2, Nyberg in Kleinere Schriften, pp. 57-59).
 AN ANALYSIS OF IBN CARABi'S INSHADAL-DAWAIR 245

that both classes are eternal, but only the first class precedes the second class in the
logical order.S It must be noted that in his explanation of the first class, Ibn 'Arabi
describes the Absolute Existent with the Names derived from the traditional attributes
of God.
He is the Absolute Existence(al-wujadal-mutlaq)who is not limited.He is Allah, the Living,
the Everlasting,the Knowing,the Willing,the Powerful,"theOne like whom there is nothing,
and He is the Hearingand the Seeing"(Qur"'n46:9).6

The assumption underlying the above passage is the Mu'tazilite doctrine that the
attributes of God are identical with His Essence, that is, His Existence.7 But in Ibn
'Arabi the Names of God have another aspect which belongs to the third entity, and
this will be discussed later.
The explanation of the third entity occupies four pages of the Nyberg edition
including a digression on the theory of the best possible universe.8 From this long,
repetitious, and sometimes ambiguous description, three aspects can be distinguished:
the third entity as 1) the Reality of Realities, i.e., the most universal and compre-
hensive reality; 2) as Prime Matter; and 3) as the Names of God. The first and most
important aspect of the third entity is that it is the most universal and comprehensive
reality (haqTqa) which comprises all the intelligible and universal realities (haqa'iq).
The term "haqd'iq" is very difficult to define precisely.9 Ibn CArabiuses this term
frequently intending a wide range of meanings. But when he speaks of it in relation to
the third entity, it seems clear that he is essentially referring to universal, abstract
concepts.10
5 Both in Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd, the universe is 8 The doctrine presented here is repeated with
caused but eternal. For Ibn Sina's view, see Louis slight modification in the Futuhat (Al-futuhat al-
Gardet, La Pensee religieuse d'Avicenne (Paris, makkTya, ed. cUthman Yahya [Cairo, 1972], vol. 2,
1951), p. 41. For Ibn Rushd's view, see Roger Arnal- pp. 223-25).
dez, "La Pensee religieuse d'Averroes, 1. la doctrine 9 For the use of this term in Islamic theology, see
de la creation dans le Tahafut," Studia Islamica 7 R. M. Frank, Beings and Their Attributes (Albany,
(1957): 110. New York, 1978), pp. 80-81. For its usage in Islamic
6 Inshd' al-Dawa'ir, ed.
Nyberg in Kleinere mysticism, see M. Horten, Indische Stromungen in
Schriften, p. 15. der islamischen Mystik, II. Lexikon wichtigster
7 Concerning the doctrine of the Divine Attributes Termini der islamischen Mystik (Heidelberg, 1928),
in the Mu'tazilites, see H. A. Wolfson, "Avicenne, pp. 20-35. See also L. Gardet, "Hak'ka" in Ency-
Algazali and Averroes on Divine Attributes" in clopedia of Islam,2 vol. 3, pp. 74-76.
Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion, 10In this sense, the term "haqTqa"comes very
ed. I. Twersky and G. H. Williams (Cambridge, close to "essence" (mdhTya)and "form" (suira)in the
Mass., 1973), vol. 1, pp. 62-63. In fact, Ibn CArabi terminology of Peripatetic philosophy. Indeed, Ibn
claims in the Fu.sasal-hikam that God is the Merciful STnauses it as a synonym of "essence," and Jurjdni
(al-Rahim), and He is the very Mercy Itself ('ayn and Suhrawardi also identify "haqrqa" with "es-
al-rahma) and criticizes those who dare not say that sence." (See L. Gardet, "Haklka" in S. H. Afnan,
He is the Mercy Itself or that He is the attribute Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic [Beirut,
itself (Fusus al-hikam, ed. Abu al-'Ala 'Afifi [Cairo, 1969], p. 276). However, "haqTqa"and "essence" are
1946], p. 179). Also the Mu'tazilite formula, "He is not pure synonyms in Ibn CArabT,for while he says
the Hearer in virtue of Himself (al-samic li-nafsihi), that there are many haqdaiq in one chair, it cannot
the Seer in virtue of Himself, the Knower in virtue be said that a chair has many "essences" (madhyat).
of Himself" is used in the Futihat (Al-futahat al- As for the term "form,"it presupposes the dichotomy
makkiya, ed. 'Uthman Yahya [Cairo, 1974], vol. 3, of matter and form; however, this dichotomy is
p. 267). absent in Ibn 'ArabFs usage of "haqTqa."
246 JOURNALOF NEAR EASTERNSTUDIES

This third entity is the haqTqaof the intelligibleand universalhaqi'iq of the world in the
mind (haqdaiqal-'alam al-kulliyaal-macquilaf al-dhihni)."

Furthermore, after he has somewhat misleadingly compared the relationship between

the third entity and the universe to the relationship between timber (khashaba) and the
various objects made of timber, he adds the following remarks.

"Know that timber (khashaba)in its turn is but a special form of woodness(CuidTya); do not
conceive woodness except as intelligibleand comprehensivereality(al-haqiqaal-macqufiyaal-
jamica). It is found in every chair and ink-pot in its entiretywithoutany diminutionor excess.
Although there may be severalrealities(haqa'iq) in it, such as woodness(al-haqTqa al-c'udiya),
oblongness(istitalTya),squareness(tarbT'Tya), quantity(kammTya), and so on, everyone of them
is found in its entirety.12

Thus, woodness, oblongness, squareness, and quantity are all called haqdfiq.
In the Fusus al-Hikam, he also explains the universals (al-umur al-kulliya) in terms of
the haqd'iq.

The predication(hukm)of concreteobjects is reducibleto the universalsin accordancewith

what the realities of these concrete existents demand, like the relation of knowledgeto the
knower and life to the living. Life is an intelligible reality (haqTqamacqula), and knowledge is
also an intelligiblerealitywhichis differentfrom life.'3

Thus, such abstract concepts as knowledge and life are called intelligible realities. In
Al-futuhdt al-makkiya as well, he calls humanity (insdniya) a haqTqa.

Although Zayd is not identicalwith 'Amr with respectto their shapes, he is identicalwith
CAmrwith respectto humanity(insadnya).He is not otherthan 'Amr.If he is not otherthan him
with respect to humanity, then he is not his likeness, but they are identical.The haqTqaof
humanity is not divisible, ratherit is in every man in its entirety, not in a part. There is no
likenessof humanity.The sameappliesto all otherhaqd'iq.'4

We have seen that in one concrete object, numerous, if not infinite, haqd'iq are
present; for instance, in a chair, many haqa'iq such as woodness, oblongness, and
brownness are present. In Al-futuhat al-makkiya, Ibn cArabi asserts that there are
numerous aspects (wujiuh)even in a tiny atom (jawharfard), and he then states that
every aspect contains many aspects, calling these subordinate aspects the secondary
haqd'iq (haqd'iq thawdni).15 Although he does not mention the term "the primary
haqd'iq" in the Futihdt, in the Inshd' al-dawd'ir he calls higher genera "the primary
haqd'iq."'6 Therefore, we can assume that the haqd'iq are arranged in a order similar
to the order of genera-species, a higher haqiqa corresponding to a genus containing
the secondary haqaiiq corresponding to species.17 The highest haqTqa,the summum

Insha', p. 17. 16Insha', p. 19.

12Ibid.,p. 19. '7 Accordingto Porphyry,a speciescontainsindi-
13Fusus, p. 52. vidualsand is in turncontainedby priorclasses(i.e.,
14Futuhdt, vol. 3, pp. 345-46. genera). Warren comments in the footnote: "the
15 Ibid.,vol. 2,
pp. 124-25. relationof higherto lowerclassescan be conceived
 AN ANALYSIS OF IBN CARABY'S INSHA,AL-DAWA2IR 247

genus (jins al-ajnas), the Reality of Realities (haqrqat al-haqa'iq) is the third entity
which contains all the haqa'iq. As the name summum genus suggests, it consists of the
ten Aristotelian categories.
One of the most interesting points in his doctrine of the haqTqatal-haqa'iq is the
relation between a higher haqTqa and subordinated haqa'iq. It seems that a lower
haqiqa is a particular combination of the more general and more universal haqa'iq.
His paradigmatic example is "figure." The concept "figure," which is defined as "being
surrounded by lines," can produce a triangular figure and a rectangular figure, etc.,
when it is combined with another haqTqa,i.e., quantity. This logic seems to lead Ibn
cArabi to the assertion that even an individual particular existent of the universe can
be produced, at least mentally, through particular combinations of universal, intel-
ligible haqa'iq.'8

Relation is the combination of something with something else. From this combination, some
new thing comes into being, which is called a form .... If we want to bring forth a triangle, we
combine the parts in a particular way, and bring forth three constituents, which we call
"triangle." All kinds of figures, images, colors, and temporal beings (akwan) are known in the
most general and universal way.... With the combination of the parts which come under the
universal genera, the detailed universe comes into being, although it (the universe) can be
separated only mentally.19

Finally, the haqa'iq in the sense of universal, abstract concepts are closely con-
nected with Ibn CArabi'sepistemology.20 In the theory of universals, he follows very
closely that of Ibn Sina. According to the latter, universals have three modes of
existence. First, they are eternally in the mind of God (ante res), and these supra-
mundane universals are the ultimate causes of the intelligibility of sensible existents.
Secondly, they are individualized through their realization in the individual (in rebus).
Thirdly, they exist in the human mind through abstraction (post res).21 Similarly, in
Ibn 'Arabi, the haqa'iq are eternally in the mind of God as God's eternal knowledge
(ante res); as man's knowledge, they are comprehended or registered by the perception
of existents (post res).22They are also manifested in existents (in rebus).23

of as a series of concentric circles, the larger circles
(classes) enclosing smaller (classes). Analogously,
the lowest species encloses the particulars"(Porphyry,
Isagoge, trans. E. W. Warren [Toronto, 1975], p. 37
and n. 32). If the above metaphor is applied to Ibn
'ArabFs doctrine, the third entity is the largest circle
which contains the ten categories of Aristotle.
18 This "bundle
theory" is necessary to Ibn CArabrs
explanation of God's knowledge of particulars, since
he like Ibn STna denies that God has perceptual
knowledge (Insha', pp. 8-9). God's knowledge is
the third entity, the most universal knowledge. How-
ever, by combining the universals, He can attain the
knowledge of particulars.
19Insha', pp. 17-18.
20 Indeed, Ibn CArab!defines
"knowledge" as a
reality (haqiqa) in the mind. (Insha', p. 10). The
section on epistemology in this treatise will be treated
in full detail in my forthcoming paper "The Homo
Imago Dei Motif and the Anthropocentric Meta-
physics of Ibn 'Arabl," Orient (Tokyo) 18 (1982).
21 Wolfson, "Avicenna, Algazali, and Averroes,"
pp. 145-47. For the same doctrine in Thomas
Aquinas, see Rudolf Allers, "Intellectual Cognition."
in Essays in Thomism, ed. R. E. Brennan (New
York, 1942), p. 53.
22 Inshda, p. 26. Also when he is
speaking of an
absolute non-existent, he says that it has no haqiqa
which can be registered (in the mind) (ibid., p. 11).
23 It is said that the third entity is in existents (fT
al-mawjtudat)as a haqTqa(ibid., p. 26) and also that
the haqd'iq are manifest (zdhira) in existents (ibid.).
248 JOURNAL OF NEAR EASTERN STUDIES

In the section preceding the classification of beings, which deals with epistemology,
Ibn 'Arabi distinguishes between differentiated knowledge and undifferentiated knowl-
edge: accordingly, God's knowledge is the knowledge of the differentiated in the
undifferentiated, while man, on the other hand, can know the undifferentiated only
through the differentiated, namely through temporal objects which occur in the
phenomenal universe. Man knows the undifferentiated only differentiatedly and
separately as contingents.24 From the above distinction of two types of knowledge, we
can conclude that the haqa'iq correspond to the differentiated knowledge of particular
existents, and the haqTqat al-haqa'iq, i.e., the third entity, corresponds to undif-
ferentiated knowledge. Ibn 'Arabi states that the eternal knowledge of God relates
itself to the differentiated which the third entity contains undifferentiatedly.25 How-
ever, he also emphasizes the essential correspondence between God's knowledge and
that of man. Although man's knowledge depends on the existent in the phenomenal
universe for its differentiation, all knowledge, even man's, ultimately goes back to the
undifferentiated knowledge, i.e., the third entity. Therefore, both God's and man's
knowledge are ultimately the same, although in man it is temporal, and in God it is
eternal.26
Furthermore, the third entity is explicitly called by Ibn 'Arab! matter (hayula) and
Prime Matter (mddda lad).27 It is also called the root (asl) of the universe and of the
atom (jawharfard),28 the mother (umm) of all existents.29 According to Saadia, both
"asl" and "umm" are synonyms for Prime Matter used in the terminology of
theologians who claimed the creation of the universe from antemundane matter.30But
it is not clear from Ibn 'ArabT's description of the third entity in this section what he
means by Prime Matter and just what the relationships between Prime Matter and the
most universal concept, the haqTqat al-haqadiq is. As for the first question, Prime
Matter can be interpreted in two ways, and both, as will be seen later, are closely
connected to each other.
First, Prime Matter can be interpreted as the antemundane matter from which God
created the universe. In Al-tadbTrdtal-ildahya, Prime Matter is one of the names given
to the first existent. Indeed, Ibn 'Arabi states that the term Prime Matter is derived
from the phrase "that which was bestowed first" (mumadd awwal). This etymology is
obviously far-fetched, but the notion underlying it is the theory of antemundane
matter.

The first existent was createdwithout a precedentcause, then it becamea cause for other
existentsand matter(mddda)for them, and otherexistentsdependon it.31

Likewise in the Fusuis al-hikam, it is said that God brought the universe into being
with an existence resembling that of a fashioned soulless body before the creation of

24 Ibid., p. 14. and Saadia's Second Theory of Creation," Jewish

25 Ibid., p. 18. Quarterly Review, n.s. 36 (1946): 385-86; idem,
26 Ibid. "Arabic and Hebrew Terms for Matter and Element
27 Ibid., p. 19. with Especial Reference to Saadia," Jewish Quarterly
28 Ibid.,
p. 17. Review, n.s. 37 (1947): 55.
29 Ibid., pp. 25-26. 31 Al-tadbTrat al-ilahrya, ed. Nyberg in Kleinere
30 Wolfson, "The Kalam Problem of Nonexistence
Schriften, p. 122.
 AN ANALYSIS OF IBN CARABI'S INSHATAL-DAWAJIR 249

Adam. This existent, resembling a fashioned soulless body, can also be interpreted as
antemundane matter.32Secondly, Prime Matter can be interpreted as supramundane,
i.e., intelligible matter.3 The concept of intelligible matter can also be derived from his
epistemology: according to Ibn 'ArabT, all knowledge both of God and of man is
ultimately based on self-knowledge.34 This self-knowledge, which is the ultimate
foundation of all knowledge, is regarded by him as undifferentiated knowledge. As we
have seen above, the haqTqatal-haqa'iq corresponds to this undifferentiated knowledge.
Ibn 'Arabi distinguishes, at least logically, the knower, the knowledge, and the object
of knowledge even in self-knowledge. This undifferentiated object of knowledge which
contains all other objects of knowledge must be Prime Matter. On the other hand, in
the case of God's self-knowledge, the object of knowledge is called "His eternally
existing image" (al-suira al-mawjuda al-qadTma), and God's knowledge is related
eternally to this image.35 If the above interpretation of Prime Matter as the object of
His self-knowledge is correct, we can conclude that "His eternally existing image" also
refers to Prime Matter.
In the above two interpretations of Prime Matter as antemundane matter and
supramundane matter, Prime Matter is regarded as "existent," antemundane matter is
called "the first existent," and supramundane matter corresponds to "His eternally
existing image." This seems contradictory to the doctrine of the third entity as that
which is neither existent nor non-existent. However, the phrase "neither existent nor
non-existent" is taken by Ibn 'Arabi from the Mu'tazilite doctrine of the Names
(asmd') and (sifat) Attributes of God,36 and the Mu'tazilite phrase does not express
absolute non-existence, rather the phrase means that although the Names and Attri-
butes are not existent in concreto, they are still "something." Thus this phrase is also
fitting for Ibn 'Arab?'sconcept of Prime Matter. In fact, Wolfson in his article, "The
Kalam Problem of Nonexistence and Saadia's Second Theory of Creation" indicated
that in the tradition of Kalam, antemundane matter is often referred to as a non-
existent which is still "something."37It is especially important to note that those who
claimed the creation from a non-existent "something," i.e., antemundane matter,
identified it with Plotinian supramundane matter, as Ibn cArabi did. The following
remarks of Wolfson on a Mu'tazilite sect can also apply to Ibn 'Arab?'sdoctrine.

32 Fusus, pp. 48-49. 36 On the Mu'tazilite formula, "the attributes of

33 The concept of "intelligible matter" (hyle nolte)
appears both in Aristotle and Plotinus. However,
the Plotinian version is closer to Ibn 'Arabrs con-
cept of Prime Matter than the Aristotelian one:
".. . whereas the intelligible matter of Aristotle was
a purely conceptual entity involved in the process of
abstraction (aphairesis), the Plotinian version has
a definite ontological status; it is the intelligible
counterpart of sensible matter, and its existence is
proved by the diversity of the genera of the eide, as
is indicated in the Philebus (Enn. 2.4.4.)" (F. E.
Peters, Greek Philosophical Terms [New York,
1967], p. 90).
34 Inshd', p. 14.
35 Ibid., p. 13.
God are neither existent nor non-existent," see
Wolfson, "Avicenna, Algazali, and Averroes," p. 164,
and idem, The Philosophy of the Kalam (Cambridge,
Mass., 1976), pp. 170-72. See also Rescher, "The
Concept of Existence," pp. 70-71. In particular, this
formula is used for the description of the ahwal
(modes) in the doctrine of Abi Hashim. According
to the interpretation of Wolfson, the ahwal of
Abui Hashim have a special kind of existence, an
intramental existence, which is unlike both the non-
existence of mere words and the extramental exis-
tence of objects of sense (Wolfson, Philosophy of
the Kalam, p. 197).
37 Wolfson, "The Kalam Problem of Nonexis-
tence," p. 379.
250 JOURNAL OF NEAR EASTERN STUDIES

Now those Mutakallimunwho maintain that non-existent is something, while following

Plotinus in his conceptionof an intelligiblematter,agreewith Plato in his belief in the creation
of the world. The Plotinian supramundanematter thus becomes with them also a Platonic
antemundanematter. With them, therefore,the old formulathat the world was createdout of
the non-existentcame to mean, on the one hand, as in Plato, out of an antemundanematter,
but on the otherhand,as in Plotinus,out of a supramundanematter.... 38

Regarding the second question, concerning the relationship between Prime Matter
and the most universal concept, the haqiqat al-haqiiiq, the latter seems to be
undifferentiated knowledge, while the former is the object of knowledge. Since,
however, this undifferentiated knowledge is the self-knowledge of man and God, the
knowledge and the object of knowledge are by extension identical. Therefore, the
distinction between Prime Matter and the haqTqatal-haqi'iq is only logical; they are
two aspects of one and the same thing.
The third entity as the Names of God is only hinted at here by its being called the
sphere of Life (falak al-haya);39however, in the last two sections of the second chapter
the third entity is treated mainly as the Names of God.
Ibn 'Arabi's theory of the Names and Attributes of God is very complicated, and its
relation to the doctrine of the third entity is not always very clear, but an under-
standing of his ideas on the Names and Attributes of God is the key to his doctrine of
the third entity, because historically speaking, speculation on them (which he took
mainly from the Mu'tazilites) is in fact the origin of the entire doctrine of the third
entity.40 Only the points which correspond to the doctrine of the third entity will be
mentioned here.
First, all the attributes of God ("knowledge" or "life") are the haqa'iq, namely, the
universal, intelligible concepts.41 Sometimes Divine attributes are called "the realities
of the Divine Names" (haqa'iq al-asma') through which Names distinguish them-
selves from each other.42
Secondly, the Names of God are relations (nisab) and modes (ahwal) which are
neither existent nor non-existent.43 In relation to God, they are identical with His
Essence; therefore in God, the Names are not yet differentiated, and the Name
"Benefactor" (mun'im) is identical with the Name "Punisher" (mucadhdhib).44On the
other hand, in relation to the abstract concepts which they convey, that is, in relation
to their haqaiiq, they are different from each other.
38 Ibid., p. 382. ahwal. According to the interpretation of Wolfson,
39 Insha', p. 17. "The Living" is later called the the ahwal of Abui Hashim are universals, for ex-
leader of all the Names of God. ample, genera and species, and should be treated
40 Nyberg went so far as to say that "Die Schrift like species and genera (Wolfson, Philosophy of the
'Ina ' al-dawadir stellt sich als ein typisches Kalam, p. 201). In that case, the ahwal correspond
Produkt der Ma'dimTja-Schule (i.e., the followers exactly to the haqdaiq of Ibn 'ArabT.However, the
of Jubba'i and Abu Hashim) heraus" (Nyberg, ahwal Ibn 'Arabi speaks of here are not the haqa'iq
"Einleitung" in Kleinere Schriften, p. 47). Josef van but the Names of God. In Ibn 'Arabi, the haqdaiq of
Ess also accepts the thesis of Nyberg (Josef van Ess, the Names are the Attributes of God, and they are
Die Erkenntnislehre des cAdudaddTnal-Tcr [Wies- also called the ma'adn of the Names. Is this the
baden, 1966], p. 197). harmonization of the doctrine of ma'ani of Mu'am-
41 Fusus, p. 52. mar and the doctrine of ahwdl of Abi Hashim?
42
Ibid., p. 65. 44 Futthat, vol. 2, p. 130.
43 Ibid.,
p. 178. This is Abii Hashim's theory of
 AN ANALYSIS OF IBN CARABT'S INSHAPAL-DAWAVIR 251

Every Name indicates the Essence and the (particular) concept (ma'na) which it conveys and
which it requires. With respect to its indication of the Essence, each Name comprises all other
Names. With respect to its indication of the (particular) concept through which it is distinguished,
it is different from other Names.... The Name is identical with the Named with respect to the
Essence; it is not identical with the Named with respect to the special concept which it conveys.45

However, this differentiation of the Names remains potential in God; only through the
creation of the universe are they actually differentiated,46 since these Names are
meaningless without the universe: the Name "Creator" requires the existence of
creature and the Name "Forgiver" requires the existence of the forgiven.47 These two
aspects of the Names of God closely correspond to those of the third entity. As we
have seen, the haqTqat al-haqa'iq is undifferentiated as the knowledge of God, but the
haqi'iq which the third entity contains potentially are manifested differentiatedly only
through the manifestation of the universe.
Thirdly, in the Fusus al-hikam, it is said that the image of God comprises the Names
of God48 and also that His image is nothing else but the Divine Presence (hadra
ilahTya),49 which as we know from the Insha' is the Divine Names. On the other hand,
as we have seen, the image of God is the object of His self-knowledge. It corresponds
to one of the aspects of the third entity, i.e., Prime Matter. (Further on in the Insha',
the Names of God are placed under the category of substance in the chart of Matter.)
Lastly, the relationship between such haqi'iq as "humanity" and "whiteness" and
the Names of God must be described. Although in Al-futuhat al-makkTya it is said that
every haqTqa has a corresponding Name of God,50 it is difficult to find a corresponding
Name to each haqTqa. On the other hand, later in the Insha', Ibn 'Arab! suggests that
the third entity as a whole is God's attribute of knowledge,5' and thus it corresponds
to His Name "Knower." Therefore haqa'iq such as "humanity" or "whiteness" are
included in His attribute of knowledge, since they are contained in the third entity.
Next, I would like briefly to analyze the digression Ibn 'Arabi makes on the theory
of the best possible universe or more precisely what Lovejoy calls "the principle of

45 Fusus, pp. 79-80. In the Futuhdt he states:
"Every Name of God has two indications: the indica-
tion of the Named and the indication of its haqTqa
through which it is different from one another"
(Futuhdt, vol. 3, p. 298). As is seen from the above
two quotations, the haqTqaof a Name is its meaning
(macna). As we have seen in n. 43, he uses the term
ahwal for the Names of God and maCanTfor the
Attributes.
46 In the Fusus, he
says that by the manifestation
of the universe, "God relieved the Divine Names
from the distress in which they found themselves
because of the nonmanifestation of their effects"
(Fusus, p. 145).
47 S. A. Q. Husaini, The Pantheistic Monism of
Ibn al-'ArabT (Lahore, 1970), p. 156. Nyberg also
writes, quoting Shacrani: "A khaliq (creator) with-
out a makhluq (creature), a qdhir (conqueror) with-
out a maqhuir (conquered), a qadir (overpowerful)
without a maqdur (overpowered), a rdhim (merci-
ful) without a marhuim (recipient of mercy) are
unthinkable, both preexistentially and existentially,
both potentially and actually" (Nyberg, "Einleitung,"
p. 61, quoting Sha'ranT, Al-yawaqTtwa al-jawdhirft
bayan 'aqa'id al-akabir [Cairo, A.H. 1305], vol. 1,
p. 48).
48 Fusus, p. 50. "Al-suwar al-ildahya"in the text
of 'Afifi must be a misprint for "al-sura al-ilahTya."
Both the commentary of Qashani and that of
NabulusT have "al-sura al-ilahTya"(QashanT,Sharh
CalaSfususal-hikam [Cairo, 1966], p. 18. NabulusT,
Sharh jawdhir al-nusus [Cairo, A.H. 1304], vol. 1,
p. 27).
49 Fusus, p. 199.
50 Futuhat, vol. 3, pp. 24-25.
51 Insha', p. 31.
252 JOURNAL OF NEAR EASTERN STUDIES

plenitude."52 According to this principle, in the phenomenal universe, all the pos-
sibilities of the intelligible universe are completely realized, and no single possible
being remains unrealized. Because the universe is better the more things it contains,
this phenomenal universe is the best possible universe. Ibn 'ArabTproves this theory
from the nature of God. If God withheld a better universe than this one, then it would
be contradictory to His generosity and omnipotence. The same argument is repeated
three times in the Inshia. Here this principle of plenitude is further combined with the
possibility of man's knowledge of God through his knowledge of the universe. Ibn
cArabi claims that this phenomenal universe exists in the image of God; thus, this
universe is the proof which leads to the knowledge of God. As Lovejoy points out, this
positive status of the phenomenal universe as the proof of the existence of God is
logically implied in the principle of plenitude.53 And Ibn 'ArabTcloses the digression
abruptly with the quotation of the famous hadTth,"Whoever knows himself knows his
Lord." In this way, man's knowledge of the universe, of himself, and of God coincide.

III. THE SECONDCHAPTER

The Chart of Matter
The aspect of the third entity as the Reality of Realities, which consists of the ten
Aristotelian categories, is explicitly illustrated in the chart of matter: this chart consists
of two homocentric circles; the area encircled by the inner circle is substance, and the
area between the inner circle and the outer circle the accidents, which are in turn
divided into the nine Aristotelian categories. The relationship between realities (haqaiiq)
and existents in concreto with respect to man's knowledge are then dealt with. As
Nyberg has pointed out, Ibn 'Arabi emphasizes here the unique modus operandi of
man's knowledge: man knows first inductively, then deductively.54 Therefore from the
point of view of man, realities and existents in concreto are interdependent; we could
not comprehend realities differentiatedly if it were not for existents in concreto, but we
could not really know existents in concreto if it were not for realities which potentially
exist in the mind of man.
This (the third entity) is the universalmotherto all the existents,and it is intelligiblein the
mind, but not existent in concreto . .; it is in existentsas a reality(haqTqa)which is neither
divided, nor increased, nor diminished. Its existence is from the emergence of particular
existents, both eternal and temporal. If it were not for concrete existents, we would not
comprehend (ma Caqalna)it (the third entity), for if it were not for them, we would not
comprehend(ma Caqalni)the realitiesof existents(haqa'iq al-mawdjudat).Althoughits existence
depends on existence of individuals, the knowledge of individualsin a differentiatedway
depends on the knowledge of it (the third entity), since whoever does not know it cannot
distinguishamong existents. We would say, for instance,that inorganicthings, angels, and the
eternalare one and the same thing, since one does not know realities(haqa'iq), and thus one
does not know with what he can distinguishexistentsfromeach other.55

52 A.
O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cam- 54Nyberg, "Einleitung," p. 31.
bridge, Mass., 1936). 55 Insha', pp. 25-26.
53 Ibid., pp. 52-54.
 AN ANALYSIS OF IBN CARABI'S INSHA~AL-DAWAIR 253

Then Ibn CArabiasserts that the third entity manifests itself in its entirety through
the manifestation of existents in concreto. Therefore this phenomenal universe is the
perfect manifestation of the third entity, nothing added, nothing lacking; and for the
second time he asserts the theory of the best possible universe.
The Chart of the Divine Presence
This section serves as a kind of introduction to the next section in which Ibn CArabi
explains in full detail the relationships between the Absolute Existent and the Divine
Presence (the Names of God) and between the Divine Presence and the phenomenal
universe.
The section consists of three parts. In the first part, he emphasizes his fundamental
assumption of the unknowability of God.
Those who know about God do not know anythingabout Him except that He exists and that
He is Almighty,Knowing,Speaking,Willing,Living,Everlasting,Hearingand Seeing.... It is
not permissibleto speakwith referenceto God as to what He is, for He has no quidity(mahrya),
nor how He is, for He has no quality(kayfJya).56

It must be noted that in the above quotation Ibn 'Arabi holds the Mu'tazilite view
that the attributes of God are identical with His Essence, that is, His Existence. Thus,
His knowing and seeing are identical with His existing.57
The second part is the explanation of the chart and its use. The chart of the Divine
Presence is a list of the Names of God classified into three classes: Names of Essence,
Names of Attributes, and Names of Actions. Each Name of God is His Presence
(hadra) because in one of His Names God reveals Himself to the heart of each man.
Everyone has two Names of God: one which is his celestial counterpart and to which
he is permanently attached, and the other to which he is temporarily attached.
The third part is very ambiguous, difficult to understand, and not very well
organized. In the beginning it seems that Ibn CArabionce again explains the third
entity as the object of God's knowledge.
We made this chart of the Names of God immediatelyafterthe chartof matterand alongside
of it becausematteris conjoinedwith God from eternitywithouthavingany concreteexistence,
but it (matter)is knownto God. He knows it throughone of its realities(haqa'iq). He knowsit
only throughitself, not throughsomethingelse, since it containseverything.God is eternallyits
exterior, while it is the interiorof God, for it is His attributeof knowledge,so far as it is the
only objectof His knowledge.But it is not His knowledge,becauseknowledgecomes from it by
way of His beinga Knower,but it is manifest(zaharat)in knowledgeas a reality(haqTqa).58

As we have seen in the first chapter, the third entity has two aspects in relation to God
with which it is eternally conjoined. The first aspect is God's universal knowledge, that
is, the Reality of Realities. The second aspect is the object of God's knowledge, that is,
Prime Matter. While a particular object of knowledge is not identical with its
intelligible realities through which it is known (for instance, "whiteness" or "animal-
ness" is different from one particular white dog), in the case of God's knowledge of
56 Ibid., 58snshd', pp. 31-32.
p. 29.
57 See p. 245 and n. 7 above.
254 JOURNAL OF NEAR EASTERN STUDIES

Prime Matter, the object of knowledge is identical with His knowledge. Therefore, it
can be said that He knows it only through itself. The third entity is the mind of God,
His interior, His consciousness, because it is His self-knowledge. In the last part of the
passage, however, Ibn 'Arabi seems to maintain the logical difference between knowl-
edge and the object of knowledge. Even in the case of God's knowledge of Prime
Matter, the object of knowledge logically precedes knowledge; thus, His knowledge
logically depends on its object.
Then Ibn 'Arabi proceeds to the discussion on the relation between the Absolute
Existent and the Divine Names and between the Divine Names and the phenomenal
universe. His presentation here is so elusive, fragmentary, and indirect that a satis-
factory understanding is difficult without the help of his other writings. Concerning
the relation between the Absolute Existent and the Divine Names, he writes the
following:

We have loaded the existence of God with Names, becausethe actions (of God) go back to
them, and also because His Essence(the Absolute Existence)cannot be depictedin our mind.
But there must occur in the mindsomethingto which it can be related,so let it (this something)
be attributes.59

The notion that God's Names refer only to His actions appears also in the first chapter
as follows.

No one can find an adequateexpressionfor the reality(haqTqa)of the thirdthing, but we can
only allude to it with some kind of parableand example, and throughthis fact it is different
from God who does not come underany example,except in His aspectof action-not that this
indicatesHis Essenceand we can comprehendHim by our knowledge,for this is not possible.60

Both passages suggest that God's Names do not refer to His Essence but rather to His
actions. This is true, however, only from the point of view of man. As we have already
seen, the Names of God have two referents; they indicate both the Essence and the
particular meanings they convey.61 However, from the point of view of man, the
Essence is unknowable; thus, we can comprehend by His Names only the particular
meanings which express His actions. God's actions (which His Names signify) are His
creative actions; He creates through His Names, which are the direct agents of the
creation of the universe, as will be seen in the next section. We can only know Him
indirectly in the aspect of His actions, referred to by His Names, through the
phenomenal universe which is the effect of His actions. This is the real meaning of Ibn
'Arabl's assertion that the universe is the proof which leads to the knowledge of God.62
The precise meaning of "the existence of God," which is loaded with His Names and
its relation to His Essence, that is, the Absolute Existence still needs more explana-
tion. The clue to the answer is given in the following passage which is the continuation
of the passage above referring to the "loading of the existence of God with His
Names."

59 Ibid., p. 32. 61 See p. 251 and n. 45 above.

60 Ibid., pp. 18-19. 62Inshad p. 18.
 AN ANALYSIS OF IBN CARABI'S INSHA9AL-DAWA'IR 255

This chart of God'sNamesis underthe categoryof substance(jawhar)mentionedin the chart

of matter, since substancemeans the root (asl), and the root of all things is the existence of
God. If this divine root werenot existent,and this matterwerenot intelligible,this branch(farc)
which is originatedand which comes into being after it was not (i.e., the phenomenaluniverse)
would be neitherconceivablenor knowable.63

In the above passage, Ibn 'Arabi places the Names of God under the category of
substance, with the argument that the existence of god is substance, the root of all
things. However there are several difficulties in his argument.
The first difficulty is his use of the word "substance" in the above passage,
Substance is one of the ten categories which constitute the Reality of Realities; as such
it is understood as the abstract concept "substantiality." Can this abstract concept be
called the root (of existence)? It seems that Ibn CArabihere uses substance in the sense
of Prime Matter, which, as has been pointed out, is often called by Muslim theologians
the root (asl).64 In the previous discussion on the third entity we have seen how Prime
Matter, which is regarded both as Platonic antemundane matter and Plotinian
intelligible matter, is extentionally identical with the Reality of Realities, i.e., the
Aristotelian summa genera. The identification of intelligible matter with substance
already appears in Plotinus,65 and in fact Ibn 'Arabi sometimes uses the phrase "hyric
substance" (jawhar hayirdnr) in the sense of Prime Matter.66
The second difficulty is the meaning of "the existence of God," where he seems to
equate it with substance. Does it mean the Absolute Existence, which Ibn 'Arabi often
uses synonymously with the Absolute Existent,67 on the grounds that "existence"
(wujiud) is identical with the "existent" (mawjad) (which he asserts at the beginning of
the first chapter)?68 It cannot, because the difference between the Absolute Existent
and "substance," i.e., the third entity, has been firmly established in the third section
of the first chapter. In my view, Ibn 'Arabi's use of "the existence of God" can be
adequately interpreted here only through his celebrated doctrine of the unity of
existence (wahdat al-wujud), although the explicit presentation of this existential
monism is surprisingly lacking in this treatise. In the view of this doctrine, his
statement "the existence of God is the root of all things" must be understood in the
following way: only God is, in the true sense of the word, existent; and the existence
which contingents have is no other than the existence of God, albeit limited and
particularized. While the existence of God, when unmanifested, is identical with the
Absolute Existent, it appears in every existent through limitation (taqayyud) and
particularization (tacayyun).
When "substance" and "the existence of God" are interpreted in the above manner,
the equation of the two is easily explained. As I have already pointed out in my
analysis of Prime Matter, in Al-tadbTrdtal-ilahTya.Prime matter is considered the first
existent created by God without any intermediary cause and is itself the cause and
matter of subsequent existents. In other words, Prime Matter is the existence of God
in its first particularization, its first manifestation. While the existence of God as the

63 Ibid., p. 32. 67For example,"Heis the AbsoluteExistence(al-

64See p. 248 and n. 30 above.
wujad al-mutlaq) which cannot be limited, He is
65Enneades2.4.5.20-25. Allah"(Insha', p. 15).
66Fusuis,pp. 144,200, and 219. 68 Ibid.
256 JOURNAL OF NEAR EASTERN STUDIES

Absolute Existent is the pure unity without multiplicity, as Prime Matter it is the unity
of undifferentiated multiplicity. This potential multiplicity contained in Prime Matter
undifferentiatedly is expressed sometimes as the Divine Names and sometimes as
intelligible realities.
The above interpretation not only explains why the Names of God, the potential
multiplicity, belong to "substance," i.e., the third entity, but also why both the
existence of God and intelligible matter are prerequisites for the creation of the
phenomenal universe. The phenomenal universe, so far as it exists, is permeated by the
existence of God, which goes back ultimately to the Absolute Existent; yet its
multiplicity requires the third entity, Prime Matter, whose potential multiplicity is
realized in this universe. Thus, Ibn 'Arabl says in the Fusus al-hikam:

Wereit not for the permeation(saraydn)of God, by meansof His form (suara),in all existents,
the universewould have no existence,just as, were it not for the intelligible,universalrealities,
no predication (hukm) would be manifest in concrete existents (al-mawjudat al-'ayniya).69

The Cause of the Beginning of the Universe70

This section is on the whole better presented than the preceding section. Here the
main subject is the relationship between the phenomenal universe and the Divine
Presence, i.e., the Names of God.
First, he asserts that the Divine Essence (i.e., the Absolute Existent) has nothing to
do with the phenomenal universe, since it is absolutely transcendent. So it is His
Names which play their role in the creation of the universe-but in what way? Ibn
CArabi'sanswer is as follows:

When we examine to learn which force operates in this universe, we find that it is the
BeautifulNames who manifestedthemselves(zaharat)in this universecompletelyand entirely.
These Names realized themselves(hasalat) in this universethrough their effects (athar)and
predications(ahkdm),not through their essences(dhawat),but throughtheir copies (amthal),
not throughtheirrealities(haqa'iq), but throughtheirsubtlebonds (raqadiq).7

The terms "predications" and "copies" suggest the Divine Names' function as Platonic
Ideas, which are the objects of predications and the paradigms of earthly existents.
Although their essences and realities do not appear in this universe, Ibn 'Arabi thinks
that their realities are connected with the phenomenal universe through the subtle
bonds. The subtle bonds which connect the realities of the Names with the phenomenal
universe are alluded to in the preamble, but the systematic presentation of the subtle
bonds is lacking in the Inshad.72
69 Fusis, p. 55. The
phrase "by means of His His image is Prime Matter, the first existent, from
form (sara)" can be interpreted in two ways. First which God created the phenomenal universe.
"form" here means "essence," i.e., His Existence. 70 This section is elaborated
by him in the Futahat,
QashanTcomments on "His form" as follows: "(His vol. 2, pp. 125-29.
form) is Existence qua Existence (hiya [i.e., suratuhu] 71 Insha', p. 32.
al-wujtd min hayth hawa wujud)" (QashanT,Sharh, 72 Ibid., pp. 4-5. The term raqTqais explained by
p. 30). Secondly, "sura" can be interpreted as "His QashanTas follows: "the 'raqTqa'is a subtle, spiritual
eternally existing image." As we have seen above, substance (al-latifa al ruhdnTya).It means the subtle
 AN ANALYSIS OF IBN CARABI'S INSHA'AL-DA WAIR 257

Next, he asserts that even though God's Names are many, there exists a unity
among them, and thus there must be leaders (a'imma) for these names. Who are these
leaders? Naturally the first claimant for the leadership of the Divine Names is Allah,
but Ibn 'ArabTidentifies this name with the Divine Essence and excludes it from the
discussion, because it is, like the Divine Essence, utterly transcendent. Then he
enumerates the seven leaders, namely, the Living, the Knower, the Willer, the Speaker,
the Almighty, the Benevolent, and the Just. The Living is the leader of the leaders
(imam al-a'imma). Although Ibn 'Arabi says that these names are also in accordance
with the sharra (the sacred law), they are slightly different from the Names derived
from the traditional seven attributes of God, which Ibn 'Arabi himself has enumerated
in the list of the Names of God in the preceding section.73 The Names "the Hearer"
and "the Seer" in his list are replaced here by the Names "the Benevolent" and "the
Just."
Then Ibn 'Arabi says that each of these two names, namely the Benevolent and the
Just, leads a set of Names (qabil, lit. "tribe"). The set which "the Benevolent" leads
includes the Names of God's mercy, and the set which "the Just" leads includes the
Names of God's wrath. He then states:

There is nothing in this universeexcept these leadersand these two tribes, namelythe Names
which indicate God's mercy and the Names which indicated God's wrath, and nothing else
(exists).74

The myth of creation which follows the chart of the relations between the Names of
God and the phenomenal universe is a kind of allegory to facilitate the understanding
of the above theory. Compared to what is proposed in Ibn 'Arabl's other writings, the
process of creation here is rather simplified, and the special status of man in the
universe is not clearly expressed in the myth,75which is briefly as follows: the guardian
names (the two tribes mentioned above) have been given the keys of the universe by
the leader names, but there is no universe to be opened. So they get together and
demand the creation of the universe from three of the leaders, namely the Willer, the
Benevolent, and the Just. They in turn take the matter to the other leaders, especially
to the leader of the leaders (here it is called Allah instead of the Living!), and Allah
orders first the Knower and the Willer to create the universe. They ask the help of the
Almighty and the Speaker, saying that they cannot accomplish this task without their
cooperation.

intermediary which connects the two things like the
extention of the connecting bond from God to the
slave" ('Abd al-Razzaq al-Qashani, Istilahat al-
sufiya, ed. Aloys Sprenger [Calcutta, 1845], p. 149).
Qashani's term al-latTfaal-ruhaniya, which was ren-
dered above "a subtle, spiritual substance," is prob-
ably related to the concept of subtle body (jism
latWf),a subtle immaterial substance from which
souls are made in the doctrine of al-Nazzam and the
Sufis. For the doctrine of subtle body, see R. Hart-
mann, "Zur Frage nach der Herkunft und den An-
fangen des Siufitums," Der Islam 6 (1926): 37-40
and Tor Andrae, Die person Muhammeds in lehre
und glauben seinergemeinde (Stockholm, 1918),p. 342.
73 Inshad, p. 28.
74 Ibid., p. 34.
75 A more complete and elaborate cosmogony is
found in the CUqlat al-mustawfiz and the Futuhat,
vol. 2, pp. 219-56.
258 JOURNAL OF NEAR EASTERNSTUDIES

Then God calledthe Almightyand the Speaker,and said to them,"Helpyour two brothersin
what they are going to do." The Almightlyand the Speakeranswered,"Yes."And the four of
them enteredinto the presence(hadra)of the Benevolent,and they said to him, "Wedecidedto
bring into existence (Tjad)the temporalbeings (akwdn)and the world of changes and bring
them from non-existenceinto existence. But this task pertainsto your presence,namely the
presenceof Benevolence.76

Then the Benevolent gives them absolute benevolence with which they create the
universe. (Ibn 'Arabi for the third time in this treatise asserts the theory of the best
possible universe.) Finally the Just sends down the religious laws, and the creation is
accomplished. The treatise ends with the following reaffirmation of the interde-
pendence between the Divine Names and the phenomenal universe.

Thus the Namesbecame(actually)equippedwith the keys (previouslythey wereonly potentially

equipped), and they came to know through the existence of the temporal beings (i.e., the
phenomenaluniverse)the reality (haqTqa)of what they have with them and the realityof that
over whichthey preside.77

IV. CONCLUSION

The conciliation between the transcendence and immanence of God, between the
Absolute One and the manifested many, is the problem faced by Muslim theologians
and philosophers, who, in turn, inherited it from Greek philosophy. Ibn 'ArabT's
doctrine of the third entity is the synthesis of the various solutions of the theologians
and the philosophers who had long struggled with this problem. For Muslim Peri-
patetic philosophers, God is absolutely simple, without any essence except His
Existence. Although God has knowledge, His knowledge is a knowledge of Himself,
and in Him the knower, the knowledge, and the object of knowledge are one and the
same, that is, the three are identical with His Essence which is His Existence. Thus,
God, who knows Himself, is utterly transcendent, and it is the First Intelligence which
emanates from Him by His thinking of Himself that is the basis of the plurality of the
universe. The above doctrine, however, was criticized by GhazalTand Fakhr al-DTn
RazTon the grounds that the unity of the knower, the knowledge, and the known is
logically impossible; and even in the case of God's self-knowledge, knowledge implies
the plurality and relationships of subject and object; thus, the doctrine would negate
the absolute unity and simplicity of God presupposed by philosophers.78
In Ibn 'ArabT'swritings, the above Peripatetic philosophy takes on quite a different
shape in order to meet the Ghazalian objections; the Absolute Existent is so tran-
scendent that He cannot even be said to know Himself, and He is so removed from the
phenomenal universe, He cannot be said to be the creator of it. In this unconscious
Absolute Existent, the transcendence of God is firmly safeguarded.

76
lnshd', pp. 37-38. History of Muslim Philosophy,ed. M. M. Sharif
77Ibid.,p. 38.
(Wiesbaden,1963),vol. 1, p. 607. Max Horten,Die
78Al-GhazalT,Tahafutal-falasifah,trans. Sabih spekulativeund positive Theologie
(Leipzig, 1912),
Ahmad Kamali(Lahore, 1963),pp. 19-20 and 123. pp. 39-40.
M. Saeed Sheikh, "Al-Ghazall:Metaphysics"in A
 AN ANALYSIS OF IBN CARABI'S INSHAVAL-DAWA!IR 259

On the other hand, everything which theologians and philosophers posited as the
intermediary between an absolute God and the phenomenal universe is incorporated
into Ibn 'Arabl's doctrine of the third entity. This entity corresponds not only to the
ten intelligences of Muslim philosophers and to the Divine Names and Attributes of
theologians, but also to the knowledge of God as the Reality of Realities, the summum
genus which comprises all the intelligible realities; it is also the object of the knowledge
of God, His image, and it is Prime Matter both antemundane and intelligible. In the
third entity, all plurality of the phenomenal universe is contained undifferentiatedly
and potentially. In itself, the third entity is neither existent nor non-existent. However,
when it is conjoined with God, it is God's eternal knowledge, and when conjoined with
man it is man's temporal knowledge.
The potential plurality contained in the third entity is perfectly realized in the
phenomenal universe. In fact, it is the still undifferentiated Names of God which
demanded and created the phenomenal universe. The third entity in the phenomenal
universe appears in two ways: first, it is the predications of existents and their essential
and accidental attributes; secondly, it is antemundane Prime Matter and the root of
atoms from which this phenomenal universe is made.
Man is created in the image of God; he is a microcosm, since the universe also exists
in the image of God. In man, all the Names of God are manifested collectively, while
in the universe they are manifested separately. Both the image of God and the Names
of God are the third entity conjoined with God. When, however, conjoined with man,
the third entity is man's knowledge of himself. Since it is also God's knowledge of
Himself, man's knowledge is the same as that of God. However, unlike God, man
needs particular existents in concreto, i.e., the phenomenal universe, because the third
entity per se is not intelligible for man. Only through the phenomenal universe can the
third entity in man be differentiated, and become man's knowledge. Through his
knowledge of the universe, he knows himself, and he knows the image of God in which
he was created.
In the above system, how is the immanence of God expressed? The doctrine of the
immanence of God, that is, the gradual manifestation of the Absolute Existent, is not
elaborated in this treatise except for a few allusions to it. Instead of an absolute God,
it is here the third entity which is immanent in the universe, both as the root of atoms
and the realities of existents. However, absolute God's relationship to self-knowing
God, who is conjoined with the third entity, remains unclear. This relationship can
only be explained in the light of the doctrine of the unity of existence, the doctrine
which is carefully avoided in the Inshd', except for ambiguous hints and allusions.
The Absolute Existent becomes self-knowing God through the third entity, which is
both His knowledge and the object of His knowledge.79 However, as in the doctrine of
Muslim Peripatetic philosophers, in the case of the knowledge of God, the knower, the
knowledge, and the object of this knowledge are ultimately identical; they are three
79 Ghazali, criticizing the
philosophers' view that consciousness. If consciousness were identical with
His self-knowledge is identical with His essence, the essence, this imagination would not be possible"
writes: "If God has never ceased to be a knower of (Tahafut, p. 123). Ibn CArabiaccepts this argument.
Himself, it does not follow that His self-knowledge God is as the Absolute Existent unconscious and
is His essence. The imagination admits the supposi- then conscious as the third entity.
tion of an essence, and then the occurrence of
260 JOURNAL OF NEAR EASTERNSTUDIES

aspects of the same thing. Therefore, the third entity is none other than God conscious
of self, the Second God (deuteros theos) of Gnosticism.80It is the first manifestation of
the Absolute Existence; the phenomenal universe is its second manifestation. All the
diversity and multiplicity of existents which this universe contains are the perfect
realization of the third entity; on the other hand, the concrete existence which this
universe has is the existence of God in its most particularized and limited aspect.
In this way Ibn 'ArabTsucceeds in maintaining both the transcendence of God, who
is the absolute One, and the immanence of God, who appears in diverse existents of
this universe.

If you assert only (pure) transcendence,you restrict God, and if you assert only (pure)
immanence, you limit God. If you maintain both aspects, you are right, an Imam and a master
in the knowledge (of God).8l

80 See R. Reitzenstein, Poimandres (Leipzig, 1904), 1963), pp. 141-43.

pp. 278-79. For the doctrine of two Gods in Marcion, 81 Fusus, p. 70.
see also Hans Jonas, The Gnostic Religion (Boston,