Ricard Zapata-Barrero

Theorizing State Behavior

in International Migrations:
An Evaluative Ethical
Framework

Outlining the problem: the Analysis of state

behavior toward migrants
an emerging research agenda exists around the ethics of
migration. In this context, I would like to propose a research frame­
work within a theory of state behavior in international migration.
My objective here is to discuss the first phase of the broader research:
justifying the need to establish an evaluative ethical framework for
analyzing state practices in relation to migration policies. In the second
phase, I will apply the framework to specific political practices, such as
bilateral agreements between receiving and sending countries, family
reunification policies, return policies, or state visa policies.
To drive the proposal, I put myself in the position of the policy­
maker and ask the following question: What information resources
(positions, perspectives, discourses, target groups, etc.) does the policy­
maker have or need to have for ethically orienting migration policies? I
ask this question in a determined context: the stage of first admission,

This paper belongs to a research project entitled “FRONTERAS,” funded by

the VI National Plan of Scientific Research, Development and Technological
Innovation 2008-2011, Ministry of Science and Innovation, Spain Consolidated
Group Ref: CSO2008-02181/CPOL.

social research Vol 77 : No 1 : Spring 2010 325

although it may be extended into other areas of immigration policies,
such as citizenship policies.
This reflection should help us theorize about state behavior
toward human mobility and propose a framework for addressing two
key issues, one related to difference between states, another to varia-
tions within a same state—namely, how to understand migration policy
differences and similarities between states and how to understand
migration policy change and permanence within the same state.

Migration and Borders: A review of the

normative debate
In the face of the current increase in international migration, the need
to recognize freedom of movement and human mobility begins to be
viewed as a serious issue that directly challenges the basic state expres-
sion of sovereignty: the control of borders.1 This does not refer to a
symbolic or conceptual border, but rather to the sea-air-land border
that territorially limits a state power jurisdiction.
Following on from the seminal work of Carens (1987), this norma-
tive debate has been referred to as the ethics of borders (Philpott 2001),
the ethics of migration (Seglow 2005b), the relation between borders
and justice (O’Neill 1994), democracy and borders (Balibar 2001), the
ethics of first admissions (Bader 1997, 2005; Gibney 1988; Carens 1999,
2000), or simply the case of open borders (Hayter 2001). Whatever the
label, the debate assumes at least two basic issues.
First, it is a debate based on finding that there are inconsisten-
cies in state practices if we compare liberal democratic principles and
current policies on border management. We are, therefore, situated
within a discursive context basically concerned with the distinction
between values and policies, having exhausted all possible measures
and resources that may be offered by the established institutional order.
This is the debate about principles, where inconsistencies are identi-
fied between the principles of freedom and equal respect championed
by the liberal democratic tradition, on the one hand, and state prac-
tices that constantly hinder the freedom of movement, on the other

326 social research

(Cole 2000; Meilaender 2001; Pécoud and de Guchteneire 2007). The
basic problem assumed is that liberal democracy, and the debate on
justice that it endorses, has real difficulties in conducting their argu-
ments beyond the traditional paradigm of the relation between states
and their citizens, neglecting the reality of increased human mobility
between states. To date, noncitizens have neither been contemplated as
beneficiaries of justice nor as subjects of liberal democratic thinking.
This debate has presupposed or ignored the issue of borders.2 Within
this theoretical framework there is also a line of discussion, related
to principles, which seeks to directly question asymmetrical situa-
tions that demonstrate the inconsistencies of political practice, such
as the asymmetry between the right of entry (the right of admission,
eminently under state sovereignty) and the human right of exit (no
state can impede the exit of its citizens), or the disparity between the
freedom of movement of goods, people, money and services (Barry and
Goodin 1992).
Second, and as a direct consequence of the first assessment, the
Kantian question of ethics par excellence is what frames the debate:
What can we do? That is, what alternatives to the current situation
can we propose? Although this is a theoretical question, it is oriented
toward practical principles. We find questions about whether closed
borders may be justified within our liberal democratic paradigm in
Gibney’s work (1988), and about whether restrictive policies may be
justified in Hudson’s work (1984). This debate originates from Carens’
influential article (1987) stating that strictly following the liberal prin-
ciples of freedom and equal respect does not justify the existence of
borders (neither according to the liberalism of Rawls, nor the liber-
tarianism of Nozick, nor utilitarianism). In this phase, the principle of
freedom of movement has been prevalent and has linked the issue of
border control with the very justification of the existence of borders
themselves, starting with the claim that the existence of borders is a
contingency upon which sovereignty is constructed. The positions in
favor of control have primarily been communitarian statist surrounded
by arguments of justice. Examples include the classic arguments of

Theorizing State Behavior in International Migrations 327

Walzer (1983) regarding the right of citizenry to decide about their own
community, as well as the three highly debated arguments based on
security, identity, and welfare (Kukathas 2005). Perhaps we might also
look to the reactions of Isbister (1999) and Meilaender (1999), who close
this phase of the debate about the foundations of borders.
Both trends in the debate are clearly idealistic in character,
supporting Carens’ article (1996) about realistic and idealistic perspec-
tives. Perhaps there are two suppositions in this first stage of ethics of
migration that ought to be problematized.
First, there is the supposition that the debate about open borders
vs. closed borders implies a debate about a “borderless world.” This
confusion is present in numerous works, even in one of the latest
studies sponsored by UNESCO, edited by Pécoud and de Guchteneire
(2007). An analytical distinction needs to be made with regard to this
issue: first where states maintain their borders, but allow freedom of
movement in common agreement with other states, as in the case of
the European Union’s Schengen area. People are permitted to cross
the border without controls, but the border as an institution remains
and is activated when conflicts or serious problems arise (recall that
Spain threatened France with respect to controlling the borders in the
Pyrenees if it continued allowing immigrants to cross). Let us call these
“stand-by borders” that can be “on-line” if a conflict arises. Hence, the
debate should move from the simple question of border controls to the
possibility of stand-by borders and occasional controls, with the border
remaining as a basic state institution.
Within this open/closed border debate there is also the discussion
of the literal disappearance of borders as state institutions. This founda-
tionalist discussion is first directly addressed by O’Neill (1994), whose
arguments are an example of anti-idealistic rationale that must be kept
in mind. Her analysis attempts to link borders and justice. As she herself
affirms, “Why several states are better than just one World state is the
best focus to approach the justification of boundaries” (O’Neill 1994:
70). For O’Neill, arguing in favor of a world without borders is equiva-
lent to challenging the existing plurality of states, and thus, advocat-

328 social research

ing for a world government that would inevitably become tyrannical
in the absence of the plurality necessary for balancing power. O’Neill
tells us “it is often said that a plurality of political units, hence of states,
is needed for justice, because World government would concentrate
power too much, and so endanger the very consideration—e.g. order,
freedom and other rights that are thought to legitimate government”
(O’Neill 1994: 71). O’Neill also advocates the argument that achieving
a world without borders would require all states to be liberal, since
nonliberal states would threaten our tradition’s liberal democratic
principles. With respect to the necessary conditions, we must consider
not only the political orientation of states, but also economic inequali-
ties between states, as they constitute one of the principal explanatory
factors for human mobility. A basic example of this is the Schengen
area within the European Union, which permits the internal mobility
of European citizens (Kunz and Leinonen 2007).
Second, existing literature tends to mix (and maybe confuse)
two quite distinct practices. It is assumed that the debate about border
controls (the debate about open/closed borders) implies a debate on flow
management. Both migration policy practices are, of course, related,
but do not necessarily imply each other.3 The emerging debate about
the external dimension of immigration policies,4 for example, begins
with the assumption that migratory flows and movement of people can
be managed without the need to control territorial borders. There are
“remote policies” (Zolberg 1999),5 a practice that needs to be debated in
terms of normative foundation and should be included in the debate on
ethics. This refers to the idea that it is possible to control the movement
of people without the need to control territorial borders, instead carry-
ing out measures of control before people choose to migrate. This type
of political orientation, in one way or another, challenges the supposed
framework of the debate: that controlling migration is equivalent to
controlling territorial borders. In addition, since this issue deals with
an act of externalizing the borders, there are implications regarding
the extension of state sovereignty that have yet to be debated from a
normative point of view.

Theorizing State Behavior in International Migrations 329

 In short, the debate is combining desirability and viability, contrast-
ing the principles but with an interest in managing the contingencies of
radical proposals for opening borders.6 We now find ourselves in the phase
of viability where two types of debate prevail, each focused on an interest
in combining viability and achievability. The first regards recognition of the
right of human mobility as a basic human right. This is a debate that mobi-
lizes the principles and arguments of the discourse on the freedom of move-
ment, but that is more focused on the demand for a new human right: the
right of human mobility (Ugur 2007). The second regards the justification
of admission criteria, which have yet to be clearly defined, but that already
have a realistic desire to base themselves on criteria that mobilize states.
One of Carens’ last works takes this precise turn: from the frame-
work of desirability-viability to the framework of viability-achievability.
He asks, “What criteria do states use and what should they use in select-
ing . . . ?” (Carens 2003: 106). In his concluding arguments, he adds,
“even if one accepts the widely accepted premise that states have a right
to control immigration, there are still significant moral constraints on
how that control may be exercised” (Carens 2003: 110).7
We are really just at the beginning of analyzing the connection
between ethics, border management, and migration policies. In this
framework of the debate, I would like not so much to analyze what
states do in the area of migration policies as to theorize about the behav-
ior toward the demand for entry by people from other states. Analysis
of state behavior implies entering into the field of applied ethics and
taking a contextual approach. The construction of an ethical frame-
work for the evaluation of decision making represents a justified task
in the current context of migration policies in Europe, and can contrib-
ute to the incipient debate on the Ethics of migration.

An applied ethics of migration policies:

Fundamental premises
The ethical phenomenon that we are interested in dealing with is not
only a person’s demand for entry in a territory, but also human mobil-
ity between states. There are three important and interrelating prem-

330 social research

 Migrant Immigrant Citizen

Figure 1: Stages of Migration

ises that we need to keep in mind when analyzing state behavior. A

political premise: the majority of people move from nonliberal demo-
cratic states, or states with difficulties consolidating liberal democracy,
to liberal democratic states. An economic premise: movement from the
third world or developing countries to economically consolidated coun-
tries. A social premise: movement of people attracted by our welfare
systems and social rights. In other words, we do not want to analyze
the movement of people between advanced liberal democracies with
similar economies and minimum social rights, such as the movement
of people within Europe or the Schengen area.
What implications might this line of thought have in the design
of migration policies? We will refer back to this question throughout
this paper. Specifically, my objective is to establish, justify, and criti-
cally discuss the ethical point of view in the debate on migration poli-
cies and the control of borders. And I would like to do that from an
applied perspective and in the framework of the “viability-achievabil-
ity” debate, introduced at the end of the last section.
In order to avoid formulating arguments that are too abstract,
we must be more precise when considering state frameworks for theo-
rizing about migration policies (Zolberg 1999). We specifically ask
what information resources (positions, perspectives, discourses, target
groups) the policymaker has to ethically orient migration policies. We
ask this question in a specific context: the migrant’s first entrance
gate (see figure 1). Later, once admitted, the “migrant” becomes the

Theorizing State Behavior in International Migrations 331

“immigrant,” with different legal obstacles to negotiate (different types
of residency permits) until finally achieving citizenship, if so desired,
with access to full citizenship rights (citizenship is always an option
and is never automatic for the immigrant).
Although the other stages can be considered within the perspec-
tive of borders, following the thread of the citizenship borders argu-
ment,8 what we particularly want to analyze here is the border that
coincides with the land border, “first admission.”
This stage is significant in ethical terms because we are facing
a “circumstance of justice” (in Rawls’ terms) that is significant to both
the principles and the criteria that guide distributive policies. In this
case, migration policies distribute the good that the entry into a state
represents, and the opportunity to reside and work in the receiving
society, along with other immigrants and citizens. It is important to
highlight that the policymaker is not facing a one-off situation, but
rather a social challenge. It is true that his decisions will affect different
individuals differently, but the frame of reference is always impersonal.
Therefore, we find ourselves facing a situation of ethical equality as
defined by Nagel (1991) in terms of impartiality. Furthermore, we must
not forget to mention that the state context is constantly present and
that we can either remain within or go beyond it in the ethical argu-
ment. In fact, if we are talking about the state context, we should also
mention the dimension of power behind the management of borders.
The border is the maximum expression of political power. In fact, the
functional definition of border is that it legally delimits a territory. In
this approach, classical definitions of the sovereign state that emerged
in the Westphalia period are used in international relations studies.
The border is a line that can be crossed, but only under the conditions
imposed by those inside it (Bigo 2001). The monopoly of the control
of borders is, perhaps, the last bastion of state sovereignty. There is a
direct link between border and state, up to the point that each needs
the other in order to define itself.
This framework is significant to applied ethics for at least four
reasons. First, the decisions being made affect third persons and the

332 social research

course of their lives.9 Second, we are in a situation of choice. Speaking
about ethics means speaking about options. In this respect, migration
ethics should examine the choices made by policymakers in control-
ling borders10 and also the decision to admit application for asylum
(Gibney 2004). The third reason is very much linked to ethics, consider-
ing the fact that the act of migration itself, in the strict sense, is not a
voluntary one. That is, people do not displace themselves of their own
will, but rather out of necessity. This need may be basic (such as the
need for decent shelter, a paid job, and for food and clothing) or more
complex (the need to change country for personal circumstances, in
order to study or work, or simply to give one’s children an education
and bring up a family in better conditions than in the country of origin).
Recognizing this implies that we are facing an ethical issue because it
affects one of the first foundations of ethics: the infringement of the
person’s will.11 The fourth and last reason we are facing a situation
significant to applied ethics is that we are discussing the approaches
and orientations of actions (Miller 1988: 651).
In short, we wish to analyze the ethical context that occurs when
there are people who wish to enter a state, and a state that limits this
freedom of movement. Of these four fundamental reasons that apply
to migration ethics, it is the practical situations requiring theorization
that most interest us.

Theorizing migration policy practices: facing

policy dilemmas
The policymaker finds himself in situations that are true moral dilem-
mas, in the sense that it is impossible for him to irrefutably know if the
decision to allow or deny entry of people moved by necessity is good and
right.12 One of the characteristics of these dilemmas is that they require
urgent responses. The dilemma is expressed not only at the level of
principles (which principle to follow) but also at a practical level (which
practice is the most appropriate for following up a principle). Generally
speaking, a situation characterized by a dilemma forces us to decide
between various possible practices. The information resources that can

Theorizing State Behavior in International Migrations 333

be used to respond to these dilemmas make up exactly what we call the
“evaluative ethical framework.”
We base our analysis on the system of reasoning available to the
policymaker when making an ethical decision. We want to consider at
least two theoretical issues directly linked to the political practice that
we are analyzing.
The task of policy evaluation is to challenge two types of tradi-
tional political policies. The first is evaluation centered on the relation
between policy aims and policy implementation. Focused primarily on
public political programs, an evaluation is made of what is said will
be done and the outcomes. Second, the evaluative task can be carried
out in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. For example, in the area
of migration, evaluative indicators can be introduced, based on the
hypothetical premise that zero migration is possible. In this case, the
number of people in irregular situations in a country allows us to evalu-
ate the migration policy in terms of access to borders. In this way, a
policy can be evaluated in terms of efficiency, taking into account the
objectives and resources used. However, all of these forms of evaluation
have a common denominator: the fact that they are based on the logic
of cost-benefit that always measures objectives, the means of reaching
them and outcomes.
In contrast, the framework that we propose deals with ethical
approaches and orientations. Further developing Zolberg’s relevant
observations on migration policy analysis (1999)—that is, it is not so
much who to let in, but rather who to leave out—this ethical debate
concerns both what is included and what is excluded. In both cases,
the partial or unequal treatment of migrants is directly discussed. Why
are some allowed entry and others not? What are the ethical references
that justify this inclusion or exclusion? How can the difference in treat-
ment of those demanding entry be ethically justified?
The theoretical task of proposing an evaluative ethical frame-
work is precedented by the work of Ruhs and Chang (2004) and Ruhs
(2005). Their approach has been centered on workers’ programs and
has an economic perspective that we, also, would like to discuss. To a

334 social research

certain extent, the effort made to think of migration ethics from the
point of view of the policies used and from the policymakers’ perspec-
tive is present in the work of Carens (2003) and Bader (2005). We would
like to develop the important turn they make in the normative debate.
Furthermore, the debate has always concerned the effects on the receiv-
ing society, driven by the question of which attitudes the state should
adopt in the face of demand for entry by migrants, without taking into
account all the actors involved, not just the state, but the citizens, the
immigrants, and the states of origin.

The policymaker’s information resources

There are two parameters around which decisions on policy revolve:
the numbers granted admission and the terms of admission. Kymlicka
considers, in his reflections on border ethics, that these two param-
eters are being constantly modified given that they reflect the assess-
ment of what is of interest to the political community (Kymlicka 2001:
264).13 These two parameters reflect the two fundamental questions of
how many should enter and who should enter. The first parameter is
quantitative in nature while the second has a more qualitative dimen-
sion. However, we need to know what information resources (positions,
perspectives, discourses, target groups) the policymaker has at hand for
designing a migration policy (see table 1).
Our intention is to consider each information resource (IR) sepa-
rately and later analyze the possible combinations that the policymaker
may make, leading to four ethical approaches and twelve orientations.
It is important to highlight that although we present some arguments
in dual terms, they should be interpreted gradually.14

IR 1. Ethical Position
There are at least two ethical traditions that can inform policymak-
ers.15 First, they may base their decisions on the teleological tradition
(Aristotelian), which takes purposes into account. In its modern form,
it is the tradition that focuses on the consequences of an action. In this
case, the aspect of what is good prevails over what is right. Therefore,

Theorizing State Behavior in International Migrations 335

Table 1: Information Resources (IR) and Categories Informing Policy-
maker Ethical Decisions
Information resources Categories
IR1. Ethical positions Deontology ——————— Consequentialism

IR2. Perspectives Nationalism ——————— Cosmopolitanism

Identity / Community (logic of inclusion/exclusion): origin,
community, language, skin colour, religion,….
Security / Stability (internal/external logic): economic (such as work,
IR3. Discourses on the ‘good’
salary), physical,…
Social welfare / cohesion (logic of access or no to state social
welfare): distributive justice, social equality,…
Society of origin
Collective Receiving Society
IR4. Target groups
Migrant
Individual
Citizen
a) Historical restrictions:
- Historical relation with the state of origin.
- Colonial past between receiving state and state of origin.

b) Socio-political and economical restrictions:

- Anti-immigration parties (and level of power in the party system)
-Economical context.
-Existence of an informal market

c) Structural and legal framework

IR5. Economy of the ethics of
first admission: contextual
restrictions.
d) position of actors
- Administrative actors (different levels of administration)
- Social actors (immigrant associations, citizen’s associations network,
and NGO’s)
- Economic actors (business people and trade unions)
- Religious actors (the catholic church and institutions of other
confessions)

e) Diversity context and profile of the majority of the population:

- Skin colour
- Religion
- Language

f) Media and public opinion

- The media treatment and categorisation of immigrants
- Negative public opinion

the main aim is to manage the consequences of a political decision

focusing on outcomes. In utilitarian terms, its pursuit is to maxi-
mize the good, interpreted as identity, welfare, or security (the three
discourses on the good that we shall see in IR3). It is concerned about
the consequences of the migratory act in the country of origin as well
as the receiving country, for both the migrant and the citizen (the
four target groups we shall see in IR4). We shall see how the manage-
ment of consequences cannot only be focused on effects but also on
causes—what the literature refers to as the root-cause (Boswell, 2003).

336 social research

However, this we shall see later when we cross “Ethical Position” (IR1)
with ”Target Groups” (IR4).
At the other extreme we have the ethic that originates from the
Kantian tradition, which tells us that what is important is achieving the
principles, defined by duty, regardless of the consequences. In this case,
what is right prevails over what is good. The principle always prevails
over any other means of consideration. In general, this deontologi-
cal tradition does not manage consequences, but humanist a prioris,
such as considering the person in his moral and human statute, or also
depending on the perspective (IR2), according to national, ideologi-
cal, and religious conditions. As a human being, the person deserves
equal respect and should be treated as an end, and never as a means
of achieving other ends. This orientation adheres to certain principles
that can never be given up, although it generates consequences that do
not maximize the welfare, security, and identity (IR3) of the majority. If
necessary, pursuing this logic of ethical argument, the overall level of
welfare should be reduced so that a greater number can benefit.

IR 2. Perspectives
The perspective taken by each ethical position is always a determining
role in evaluating a decision. In order to understand them we must take
into account the population framework within which an ethical posi-
tion is found. This population framework can be linked to the category
of nation, characterized by a political community, or independent of it,
and include non-nationals. This means there is a division of the popu-
lation that can be the object of perspective, between those who are
nationals and those who are not, between those who are recognized
members of the state community and those who are not, given that
they have no system of direct relation with the state in the way citizens
do. Definitively, the frame of reference may be that which includes all of
humanity (cosmopolitanism) or that which is defined by a determined
state, for example citizenship (nationalism). The analytical basis of this
distinction focuses on the ever more visible differentiation between
those who belong to the category of population and those who belong

Theorizing State Behavior in International Migrations 337

to the category of citizens. Here the distinction lies between those who
fall under the state’s jurisdiction within the category of citizenship and
those within the noncitizen category. An admission policy does not
decide on citizenship, but rather on whether or not a person can form
part of the population category of a state.
Taking into account these two ways of categorizing people—
that is, they either form part of the population or part of the citi-
zenry—two perspectives are shaped: the cosmopolitan and the
nationalist, respectively. The nationalist perspective shapes its
arguments by taking into account the citizen population only,
identified as the population belonging to the political and cultural
community. The second perspective is that which breaks the distinc-
tion between the migrant and population, given that its territorial
frame of reference is not in the context of the state, but rather the
context of the world. In this case, cosmopolitanism rejects any
debate around priorities for justifying the treatment a person may
receive. Therefore, it rejects any moral argument that justifies up to
the last moment nationalistic patriotism. Necessity and humanitar-
ian attention are what should guide moral treatment, not the issue
of whether or not one belongs to a nation.
These two perspectives form the basis of two discourses, one
that takes the person into account, independent of nationality, and
another that specifically takes nationality into account.16 Here we are
referring to the difference between cosmopolitan universalism and
nation-state particularism. As we shall see, cosmopolitanism includes
the country of origin and the migrants themselves in its ethical
argument, while the nationalist argument does not take them into
account when resolving the moral dilemmas generated at the level of
first admission.

IR 3. Discourses on the Good

When speaking about the discourses on the good we think of three
categories: identity, security, and welfare (Kukathas 2005). Behind this
IR lies the premise that the state context determines discourses on the

338 social research

good. However, we argue that this discourse can be broader if the ethi-
cal position is cosmopolitan (we will link to IR2 and IR3 later).
These categories support different state logics. If we focus on the
category of identity, it is a known fact that the borders are symbolic
of cultural difference and identity. It has a direct relation with the
definition of “otherness” (Zapata-Barrero 2009b). It is also a historical
fact that the function of borders is to define cultural communities.
In this framework, the relation may be oriented in one of two direc-
tions: from borders to identity, and the other way around—that is,
the debate on whether borders create identity or whether the origin
of borders lies in the previous existence of an identity. In this case,
the logic of the argument is the logic of inclusion and exclusion, of
them and us, or as Zolberg (1999) correctly affirms, of like-us and not
like-us. The border is the line that separates identities. The interesting
fact is when territorial borders are expected to coincide with national
identities, and the logic of inclusion-exclusion is legitimately applied
by principles exclusively based on national identity (what we call the
nationalist perspective).
If we now move on to the category of security, we go into the
actual origin of the protective function of borders. In fact, this link
complies with the etymology of frontera (the Spanish word for border)
as “front” and ”barrier” to any external danger. The logic of the argu-
ment is the one that differentiates the external from the internal (rather
than inclusion from exclusion) and preservation. Here the argument is
based on maintaining order inside the border and preserving stability.
Inverting the effects of borders, with the disappearance of borders, the
main problems are related to order and stability (for example, O’Neill
1994).
Last but not least is the category of welfare. At this point, we must
accept that the ideas of social equality, distributive justice, and social
rights have always been thought of within this state framework of
implementation. Without borders, difficulties emerge in guaranteeing
the welfare state. The logic of the argument characterizing this cate-
gory is the access to the benefits of the social state. Thus, this empirical

Theorizing State Behavior in International Migrations 339

reference is fundamental in designing an ethical framework that can
orient first admission policies.
We can mention subcategories (identity, security, and welfare)
that help to define each narrative. These can be treated separately or be
combined in the ethical argument. In accordance with this viewpoint,
the discourse on identity conveys the notion of community, and can
manifest itself through the origin of the migrant, language, skin color,
and religion. The discourse on security conveys the notion of stability
and can manifest itself under the economic dimension of security (at
work, in maintaining a job, in maintaining a salary) but also physical
and national identity, including maintaining social dependence on the
state. Last, the discourse on welfare appears in the category of social
cohesion and can be shown under the socioeconomic ideas of distribu-
tive justice and social equality.

IR 4. Target Groups
The debate on migration policies tends to be two- or three-dimensional,
as it only builds arguments from the point of view of two actors (receiv-
ing society and immigrant) or three (the two aforementioned as well as
the society of origin). However, in reality there are at least four actors
that directly influence the ethical decision, each acting in its own inter-
ests: the migrant, the national citizen, the receiving society, and the
society of origin.
In this context, the policymaker can take into account either the
collective or individual dimension of the policy. By collective dimen-
sion we refer to two target groups: the receiving society or the society
of origin. By individual dimension we are especially thinking of the
migrant and of the national citizen.

IR 5. The Economy of the Ethics of First Admission: Contextual

Restrictions
Last, if we look from the policymaker’s viewpoint and in the frame-
work of the ethical decision, we can identify certain contextual
restrictions. Here, a variety of contexts exist, and not all of them act

340 social research

in the same way and at the same time. They can combine with each
other to varying degrees of intensity. They do not necessarily main-
tain relations with each other, as we have seen in the case of other
resources identified within the same category. We find, for example,
the historical relation with countries of origin, which may or may not
be linked with the colonial past. There are also information resources
related to society itself and how it reacts to the arrival of immigrants.
Here we are referring to negative public opinion and also to the exis-
tence of political parties that are clearly anti-immigrant (and their
level of power in the party system), or that have formed under this
same social fracture. The labor market situation plays a role in reduc-
ing the ethical argument and the existence of an informal economy.
Along the same lines, there can be structural factors, mainly coming
from the legal framework that can restrict ethical positions toward
migrants. Equally, the perceptions of other actors that form part of
the political system are also influential in deciding the orientation
of the criteria for first admission. We are referring to administrative
actors (public powers of the different levels of government), differ-
ent economic actors directly related to the management of the labor
market (such as workers’ unions and employers’ organizations), and
also social actors linked to the associations’ network (both citizen and
immigrant, including NGOs that are interested in the issue of first
admissions). We should also include the actors linked to the manage-
ment of beliefs and religious confessions (the Catholic Church, as it
forms part of the tradition on which society lies and is historically
linked to the state, but also others that wish to get involved with polit-
ical management). Last, but no less influential, is the contextual factor
of the media (both written and audiovisual) and how they categorize
immigration as negative or positive.
All these restrictions can condition an ethical decision, and can
help us to understand why states do not react always in the same way
(what we have called “policy change/permanence within a same state”)
and why states can decide to change their political orientation and ethical
view (what we have called policy differences/similarities between states).

Theorizing State Behavior in International Migrations 341

Table 2: Four Ethical Approaches to First Admission Policies
Deontology Consequentialism
Priority migrant (the person
Society of origin (the impact of the
without any relation to the national
Cosmopolitanism decision on the society of origin is
dimension has priority. The value
taken into account)
of equal respect prevails here)
Priority citizens (the national Receiving society (the impact of
citizen has priority over any the entry of migrants on the
Nationalism
interest that the migrant might receiving society is taken into
have) account)

Combining information resources: ethical

approaches and orientations.
To resolve the moral dilemmas between “allow entry” or “prohibit
entry,” and to ethically guide the decision, the policymaker establishes
combinations of these IR. Not all combinations are feasible, and not
all are relevant in delimiting an ethical framework. We emphasize the
following combinations: IR1/IR2/IR4, IR1/IR2/IR4 + IR3. The first combi-
nation shapes four ethical approaches (that make up frames of refer-
ence) and the second shapes twelve ethical orientations (focused on
aims).
Ethical approaches (IR1/IR2/IR4): If we combine IR1 (ethical posi-
tions) and IR2 (perspectives), we can establish four different ethical
approaches that differ in the priority given to one or other of the possi-
ble target groups (IR4). If we describe the ethical argument in brackets
(that is, the argument that responds to the moral dilemma of deciding
who and how many enter), this first combination may be schematically
represented as shown in table 2.
The general hypothesis is that a consequentialist nationalism
and a deontological nationalism prevail over a deontological cosmopol-
itanism and a consequentialist cosmopolitanism. Deontological cosmo-
politanism would favor the freedom of movement between states
and a system of “stand-by borders.” To date, this deontological cosmo-
politanism has only been possible between liberal democratic states,
with advanced economies and well-consolidated welfare systems.
Consequentialist cosmopolitanism would be that which orients the
policies that value the consequences of the decision of admission,

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Table 3: Twelve Ethical Orientations of the Policies of First Admission
Identity Security Welfare
The moral condition
Deontological of the individual
Security of the Welfare of the
Cosmopolitanism prevails over all other
migrant migrant
(Priority migrant) aspects of his/her
identity
Consequentialist
Respect for a person’s Security of society of Co-development and
Cosmopolitanism
identity origin help in developing
(Society of origin)
Deontological Priority in
Priority given to
Nationalism Security of the citizen guaranteeing social
citizen’s identity
(Priority citizen) welfare of citizen
Consequencialist
Priority given to Guarantee welfare
Nationalism National security
national identity state
(Receiving Society)

of who is allowed to enter and who is denied entry, on the society of

origin. Consequentialist cosmopolitanism is one of the channels being
adopted in the externalization of migration policies, linked to the
“root causes” and “remote control” approaches (Zolberg 2003; Aubarell
Zapata-Barrero and Aragall 2009).
Ethical orientations (IR1/ RI2/RI4 + IR3): These four ethical approaches
can be linked to the discourse on the goods (IR3), resulting in twelve
ethical orientations. One of the characteristics of table 2 is that it devel-
ops a multidimensional conception of each good and steers away from
evaluative criteria that sometimes accompany them in the academic
and public debates. For example, the good of security is not necessarily
positive or negative, but rather acquires a different value depending on
each ethical approach. That is, each ethical approach expresses a differ-
ent conception of the good (identity, security, welfare). Table 3 shows
the different ways of understanding goods.

Some general remarks for further research: On

the application of the ethical framework17
In essence, the policy orientation of the ethical framework results
in two types of action: it can help in both evaluating and designing
a migration policy. In the first case, it serves to describe a previously
made decision, illustrating its ethical approaches and orientations. It

Theorizing State Behavior in International Migrations 343

is true that both the description and design of a policy are placed at
the level of intentions, but it does not provide possibilities for using
the framework for evaluating outcomes. This reflection could probably
form a new basis for reflection.
Likewise, it is important to emphasize that the evaluative task of
the ethical framework is not to focus attention solely on the action of the
state, but rather on its different forms of expression through migration
policies. We, therefore, emphasize that the framework is useful for eval-
uating policy, and that a state may have a more cosmopolitan approach
toward a determined policy and simultaneously, a nationalist orienta-
tion in other aspects. This variety of approaches and orientations should
be the object of future analysis. Furthermore, the second function of the
framework may open the lines for further empirical research.
The viability for empirical analysis of the framework is funda-
mental, and we may focus our attention on the variety of ethical
approaches/orientations that exist within a state in a given moment
(synchronic empirical analysis), or how a policy’s approach or orienta-
tion varies over time (diachronic empirical analysis) and even migra-
tion policies between states (comparative analysis).
In fact, this is what happens in many cases. It is here that the
moral dilemma appears strongest at the state level, as it often conveys
specific policies in the terms of the ethical orientations and approaches
that we have described. Probably, one way of going more deeply into
this line of reflection is by including the IR6 (economy of the ethics
of first admissions: contextual restrictions), which doubtlessly helps to
shape explanatory arguments. It is true that a policy is ethically justi-
fied by the outcomes when these are very clearly favorable for the citi-
zens. The state can use a more cosmopolitan argument when they are
not. The ethical framework can provoke an explanatory debate on the
factors that make a state move from one orientation or approach to
another. Here the contextual framework is fundamental in making
sense of potential explanatory arguments.
The ethical framework helps answer two key issues: how we
might understand migration policy differences and similarities between

344 social research

states, and, how we might understand change and continuities within
a same state.
To conclude, it is clear that migration policies can only be
analyzed contextually as a set of practices. Let us propose four specific
cases: a) bilateral agreements between receiving states and states of
origin, especially those related to the labor market, but also those
produced in the externalization framework of migration policies (see
Aubarell et al. 2009). Continuing on from Caren’s open line of norma-
tive reflection (2003), we could also take the b) family reunification
policy and analyze the justifications of these policies to see if they
follow determined ethical orientations and approaches. Furthermore,
c) return policies (although they are not strictly first admission, they do
have a direct relation to first admission, given that someone who has
been granted admission, or entered illegally, is returned) and d) visa
policies could be very good practices to analyze.
However, this application of the framework would, without a
doubt, involve a second phase of research. What concerns us now is
whether or not the proposed evaluative ethical framework is justified
and if we have proved its potential viability for public policy analysis
and empirical research. Let us leave the debate open.

notes
1. We are reminded here of H. Arendt’s famous assertion “Theoretically, . . .
sovereignty is nowhere more absolute than in matters of emigration,
naturalization, nationality and expulsion” (Arendt 1973; 278, quoted
by Zolberg 1999)
2. In his suggestive article, W. Kymlicka reminds us that “silence or
taken as given of boundaries is an unsatisfactory approach to some of
the world’s most urgent problems.” And later on: “in the real world,
we can’t assume that existing boundaries are accepted, let alone that
they will be accepted in perpetuity. Nor can we assume that people
outside these boundaries have no desire or claim to enter the coun-
try. Any political theory which has nothing to say about these ques-
tions is seriously flawed” (Kymlicka 2001: 252).

Theorizing State Behavior in International Migrations 345

3. I first became aware of this distinction reading Cassarino’s suggestive
paper (2006). See also Delanty (2006).
4. See, among others, of theoretical concern, Boswell (2003), Lavenex
and Uçarer (2004), Debenedetti (2006), and Aubarell, Zapata-Barrero,
and Aragall (2009)
5. This refers to the idea that it is possible to control the movement of
people without the need to control territorial borders, instead carry-
ing out measures of control before people choose to migrate. This
type of political orientation still requires normative reflection, since
it challenges in one way or another the supposed framework of the
debate: that controlling migration is equivalent to controlling terri-
torial borders. In addition, since this issue deals with an act of exter-
nalizing the borders, there are implications regarding the extension
of state sovereignty that have yet to be debated from a normative
perspective.
6. However, it is framed within the debate on the utopian way of think-
ing. What is of interest to me is the use of Wright’s suggestive analytic
distinction between desirability, viability, and achievability (2007).
Combining all the components, his argument is that “not all desirable
alternatives are viable, and not all viable alternatives are achievable”
(2007: 28). In the exploration of desirability, one asks the question,
“What are the moral principles that a given alternative is supposed to
serve?” (2007: 28) We enter here into the field of normative political
theory. Its material consists of abstract principles, not institutional
arrangements. The study of viability “is a response to the perpetual
objection that radical egalitarian proposals ‘sound good on paper, but
will never work.’” (2007: 28).
7. The debate about a “world without borders” (Pécoud and de
Guchteneire 2007) is also moving toward the viability-achievability
logic framework, although there are still few proposals dealing with
both advances in theoretical analysis and specific political reforms.
We can quote for instance the proposal of creating a global fund
regime and a global tax that transfers wealth to poor countries (see
Philpott 2001 and Bader 1997, 2005).

346 social research

8. Let us remember the article by Hammar (2003) on the different
“gates” that the person must go through.
9. As Seglow (2005b: 318) declares, “Immigration controls involve
considerations of justice because they plainly greatly affect people’s
life chances.”
10. Here the work of Sullivan (1996) is relevant, given that she takes into
account the different settings of choice for both the state and the
migrant. She emphasizes that circumstances may occur where the
state has no choice, for example, in the case of asylum.
11. There are numerous works that contemplate the act of migration
as an act of necessity, and therefore, have a determined involun-
tary aspect (the ideal for a person is to stay in his/her country, if the
circumstances were different). This is one of the conclusions of the
Global Commission on International Migration (2005) and authors
such as Zolberg (1999), who always highlights the socioeconomic
aspect that goes with the act of migration, and Miller (1988: 661),
who addresses the issue that the “need of other human beings make
demand of justice.”
12. I use the definition in the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (2nd ed.,
2006): “moral dilemma refers to any topic where it is not known
what, if anything, is morally good or right” (584).
13. Other authors consider that the variable of economic impact is the
key to understanding the variation in policies (Ruhs and Chang
2004).
14. As Lomasky (2001: 70) argues: “most policy goals are analogous rather
than binary, that is, they are advanced to a greater or lesser extent
rather than being on/off.“
15. Here I base my argument on the works of Ruhs and Chang (2004) and
Ruhs (2005), although, I will deal with these traditions differently and
broaden their content.
16. This population framework was a criterion for differentiating
between a reactive discourse (only takes the voting citizen popula-
tion into account) and a proactive discourse (takes the whole popula-
tion into account). See Zapata-Barrero (2009a).

Theorizing State Behavior in International Migrations 347

17. I am grateful for the discussions we had when I first presented
this ethical framework at the Interdisciplinary Research Group in
Immigration (GRITIM-UPF) seminar of the Department of Social and
Political Science (UPF), which, without a doubt, has helped me to fine
tune arguments, discriminate approaches and evaluate the empirical
potential of the framework.

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