G.R. No.

L-15824             May 30, 1961 could be disqualified under the provisions of Rule 125 of the
Rules of Court.
RICARDO M. GUTIERREZ, petitioner, 
vs. Issue: Whether or not respondent should inhibit himself from
HON. ARSENIO SANTOS, ETC. ET AL., respondents. the case?
DIZON, J.: Ruling: YES.  that due process of law requires a hearing
before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that every
Doctrine: due process of law requires a hearing before an
litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an
impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is
impartial judge (30 Am. Jur. p. 767). Moreover, second only to
entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial
the duty of rendering a just decision, is the duty of doing it in a
judge
manner that will not arouse any suspicion as to its fairness and
Facts: Benigno Musni and others filed a complaint with the the integrity of the Judge. Consequently, we take it to be the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications against true intention of the law — stated in general terms — that no
Ricardo M. Gutierrez alleging therein, enter alia, that the latter judge shall preside in a case in which he is not wholly free,
had illegally constructed dams, dikes and other obstructions disinterested, impartial and independent.
across navigable waters, waterways, rivers and communal
In view of these circumstances, we are constrained to agree
fishing grounds located in Barrio San Esteban, Macabebe,
with His Honor that the opinion thus expressed by him years
Pampanga. They prayed that, pursuant to the provisions of
ago "might, some way or another, influence his decision" in the
Republic Act No. 2056, the said obstructions be ordered
case before him.
removed or destroyed. The original complaint was
subsequently amended by adding six more to the streams or
waterways mentioned therein.
March 12, 1923
On February 25, 1959 respondent de la Rosa filed a motion to
disqualify the Hon. Arsenio Santos from trying and deciding In re impeachment of Honorable TOMAS FLORDELIZA,
the case, upon the ground that sometime in 1948 he had acted Judge of First Instance of the Sixteenth Judicial District.
as counsel for fishpond owners, like the petitioner Gutierrez, in
an administrative investigation in involving the same or at least MALCOLM, J.:
similar issues and properties, and had expressed views in the
course of said investigation prejudicial or adverse to the DOCTRINE: The judge must cultivate a capacity for quick
contention of the respondents in the pending case. Petitioner decision.
Gutierrez objected to the motion aforesaid upon the ground
that there was no legal ground upon which Judge Santos
FACTS: Six members of the bar of Sorsogon who, together,
make claim to at least 50 per cent of the law practice of that
province, have filed a verified petition in this court praying for
the removal from office of the Honorable Tomas Flordeliza,
Judge of First Instance of the Sixteenth Judicial District. The
charges laid against the respondent Judge are, in general: (1)
That on different occasions the respondent certified falsely as
to the status of the cases pending decision before him, in
violation of section 129 of the Administrative Code; (2) that the
respondent is guilty of delay and lack of diligence in the
disposition of the cases pending before him, in violation of
section 165 of the Administrative Code, and generally
accepted principles which determine judicial standards; and
(3) that the respondents is guilty of partiality in the
performance of his official duties.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge is administratively liable?
RULING: The law requires that before leave shall be granted
or salary shall be paid to any judge or auxiliary judge of first
instance, he shall make a certificate that all cases and
proceedings which have been under submission for
determination or decision for a period of ninety days or more
have been determined and decided on or before the date of
making the certificate.  immorality
we state that the vacation months should not be excluded in
the computation of the ninety-day period prescribed by law,
that the time should begin to run from the submission of the
case, without awaiting notification from the clerk of court, and
that an oral decision is not sufficient.  forced to sign the documents used in the instant administrative
One of the proposed canons for a decalogue for the judiciary
is this: "The judge must cultivate a capacity for quick decision.
Habits of indecision must be sedulously overcome. He must
not deny by slothfulness of mind or body the judgment to
which a party is entitled.
A.M. NO. RTJ-05-1960. October 25, 2005]
(Formerly OCA-IPI No. 02-1547-RTJ)
JUVELYN D. KILAT, Complainant, v. JUDGE MARIANO S.
MACIAS, RTC, Branch 28, Liloy, Zamboanga del
Norte, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
DOCTRINE: A judge should, in fine, administer his office with
due regard to the integrity of the judicial system.
FACTS:
Complainant, a 16 year-old working high school student,
charged respondent Judge Mariano S. Macias of rape,
and violation of Anti-
Child Abuse Law. Respondent, on other hand, denied the clai
ms ofcomplainant. According to him, complaint was merely
used by his ex-wife and several other personalities who he
believed had “selfish and personal axes to grind” against him.
Respondent said that complainant was kidnapped and merely
complaint.
Meanwhile, complainant filed criminal charges against those a
ccusedof kidnapping her. The Provincial Prosecutor filed the
corresponding information and the case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. L-00727 and was raffled to the RTC branch
presided by respondent judge. Respondent then issued a
warrant of arrest. The next day, accused moved for
theinhibition of respondent from the criminal case on the
ground thatrespondent is directly involved in the said case.
Respondent thus issued anorder inhibiting himself from said
case.
ISSUE: Whether or not judge is administratively liable.
RULING:
YES. The SC dismissed the charge of rape against him citing
that there was no sufficient evidence to prove the same.
However, the judge was found guilty of grave abuse of
authority when he issued warrant of arrest against his ex-wife
et al.
Rule 137 of the Rules of Court mandatorily disqualifies a judge
or judicial officer to sit in any case in which: (a) he, or his wife
or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise; (b) he is related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the
fourth degree, computed according to the rules of civil law; (c)
he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or
counsel; or (d) he has presided in any inferior court when his
ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written
consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered
upon the record.
There is no dispute that Mrs. Margie Corpus-Macias, accused
in Criminal Case No. L-00727, is the estranged wife of
respondent judge. This circumstance makes it mandatory for
respondent to inhibit himself from the case, but this he
unfortunately did not do. He cannot exercise his discretion
whether to inhibit himself or not. It was a clear case of violation
of the Rules of Court.
A judge should, in fine, administer his office with due regard to
the integrity of the judicial system. He must not be perceived
as being a repository of arbitrary power but as one dispensing
justice under the sanction of the rule of law. he should have
inhibited himself from the case if only to avoid any doubt or
suspicion of bias and partiality against the accused.
A.M. NO. RTJ-10-2236               July 5, 2010
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. NO. 09-3083-RTJ)
RUBEN N. SALCEDO, Complainant, 
vs.
JUDGE GIL G. BOLLOZOS, Respondent.
DOCTRINE: it must be established that he was motivated
by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other similar
motive
FACTS: complainant (together with his niece Rebecca R.
Lumbay and his nephew Alan Jose P. Roa) was supervising
an on-going construction over the disputed property,
Tanmalack and heavily armed men arrived and forced
themselves inside the fenced premises of the disputed
property. The complainant averred that Tanmalack and his
companions harassed and threatened to kill and to harm him
and his workers; that Tanmalack uttered defamatory
statements and accused him of land-grabbing; and that
Tanmalack and his companions occupied the property and
destroyed building materials such as G.I. sheets, lumber and Writ of Amparo at that time cannot be said to be a simple,
other construction materials. elementary, and well-known rule that its patent disregard
would constitute gross ignorance of the law.
the complainant questions the issuance of the Writ of Amparo
which he claims had been unusually issued with haste. The
complainant claims that the handwritten petition did not give
any ground to warrant the issuance of the Writ of Amparo; that More importantly, for full liability to attach for ignorance of the
the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion, law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in
bias, and obvious partiality, and in grave disregard of the the performance of official duties must not only be found to be
Rules and the rule of law when he acted upon and granted the erroneous; it must be established that he was motivated by
letter-petition for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo.  bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other similar motive.13
In the present case, the complainant failed to prove by
ISSUE: Whether or not judge is guilty of impartiality.
substantial evidence that the respondent judge was motivated
by bad faith and bias or partiality in the issuance of the Writ of
RULING: The fact that the respondent judge and Atty. Francis
Amparo.
Ku are members of the Masonic fraternity does not justify or
prove that the former acted with bias and partiality. Bias and
partiality can never be presumed and must be proved with
clear and convincing evidence. While palpable error may be
inferred from respondent judge’s issuance of the Writ of A.M. No. RTJ-08-2139 August 6, 2010
Amparo, there is no evidence on record that would justify a
finding of partiality or bias. The complainant’s allegation of Michael Belen v. Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen
partiality will not suffice in the absence of a clear and
convincing proof that will overcome the presumption that the Carpio, J.
respondent judge dispensed justice according to law and
evidence, without fear or favor Doctrine: members of the

We find that the respondent judge’s error does not rise to the
level of gross ignorance of the law that is defined by
jurisprudence. We take judicial notice of the fact that at the
time he issued the Writ of Amparo on January 23, 2008, the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo has been effective for barely three
months (The Rule on the Writ of Amparo became effective on
October 24, 2007). At that time, the respondent judge cannot
be said to have been fully educated and informed on the novel
aspects of the Writ of Amparo. Simply stated, the Rule on the
Judiciary should be beyond reproach and suspicion in their
conduct, and should
be free from any appearance of impropriety in the discharge of
their o􀀽cial
duties as well as in their personal behavior and everyday life.
Facts: Complainant Michael B. Belen 􀀷led a Veri􀀷ed
Complaint dated 7 March 2001
with the O􀀽ce of the Court Administrator (OCA) of the
Supreme Court, charging Judge
Medel Arnaldo B. Belen with grave abuse of authority and
conduct unbecoming a judge.
According to complainant, 1 sometime in March 2004,
respondent judge 􀀷led a case
for Estafa against complainant's father, Nezer D. Belen, but
the same was dismissed for
lack of probable cause by Assistant City Prosecutor Ma.
Victoria Sunega-Lagman in a
Resolution dated 28 July 2004.
Respondent judge 􀀷led an Omnibus Motion (For
Reconsideration and Disqualif[ication]) before the O􀀽ce of the
City Prosecutor of San
Pablo City, alleging, inter alia, that Sunega-Lagman was
always absent during the
hearings in the preliminary investigation in the estafa case.
Respondent judge likewise
􀀷led a complaint for disciplinary action against Sunega-
Lagman before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline,
Thereafter, respondent judge allegedly started harassing and
threatening
complainant with the 􀀷ling of several cases against the latter.
Respondent judge also wrote several letters addressed to
certain local
government authorities and employees, requesting information
on complainant's
piggery and poultry business
Judge used his letterhead indicating respondent judge’s official
government position.
Issue: Whether or not respondent used his position improperly.
Ruling: YES. Respondent judge wrote letters to government
authorities and employees to
secure public information regarding complainant's piggery and
poultry business; to
inform addressees of the laws allegedly being violated by
complainant; and to remind
the addressees of their duties as government o􀀽cials or
employees and warn them of
the possible legal effects of neglect of public duties.
In writing these letters,
respondent judge's use of his personal stationery with greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness on
letterhead indicating that he is the individual than a

the Presiding Judge of RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36, and seat in the Judiciary.
stating that the letter was
the use of a letterhead should not be considered
"from [his] chambers," clearly manifests that respondent judge independently of the
was trying to use the
surrounding circumstances of the use — the underlying reason
prestige of his o􀀽ce to in􀁊uence said government o􀀽cials and that marks the use
employees, and to
with the element of "impropriety" or "appearance of
achieve with prompt and ease the purpose for which those impropriety".
letters were written. In other

words, respondent judge used said letterhead to promote his

personal interest.

This is [A.M. NO. RTJ-03-1781 : October 16, 2009]

violative of Section 4 of Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of
GEORGE P. MERCADO V. ERASTO SALCEDO
the New Code of Judicial
DOCTRINE:
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
judges and court employees - by the nature of their functions
members of the
and of the norms and standards peculiar to their positions -
Judiciary should be beyond reproach and suspicion in their live their lives under restrictions not otherwise imposed on
conduct, and should others

be free from any appearance of impropriety in the discharge of
their o􀀽cial
duties as well as in their personal behavior and everyday life.
No position exacts a
Where the law is straightforward and its application to the facts
plainly evident, not to know the law or to act as if one does not
know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law
FACTS:

A.M. NO. RTJ-03-1781 : October 16, 2009]

In the letter dated January 2, 2001, the respondent judge was
accused of bias and gross partiality in handling the
investigation of the administrative case filed against Judge
Napy Agayan (Judge Agayan) of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Kapalong-Talaingod, Davao del Norte. The
complainant alleged that the respondent judge mishandled the
investigation and based his "findings of facts" on "gossip and
rumors"6 to aid a fellow judge.
[A.M. NO. RTJ-03-1782]
On December 18, 2001, State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y.
Velasco (State Prosecutor Velasco) brought to the attention of
then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. the indictment of the
respondent judge for violation of P.D. No. 1612 and
recommended that appropriate administrative charges be
initiated by the Supreme Court against him for violations of the
provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct and of the Canons
of Judicial Ethics.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be held liable.
RULING: The Possession and Use of a Stolen Vehicle
The act of borrowing a vehicle by a judge or any court
employee is not per se a violation of judicial norms and
standards established for court personnel, as borrowing is a
legitimate and neutral act that can happen in everyday life.
However, judges and court employees - by the nature of their
functions and of the norms and standards peculiar to their
positions - live their lives under restrictions not otherwise
imposed on others; specifically, they cannot simply borrow in
situations when this act may or can affect the performance of
their duties because of the nature of the thing borrowed or the
identity of the borrower, or in situations when borrowing would
involve ethical questions under express rules. In this case, the
complaint alleged that what the respondent judge borrowed
was in fact a vehicle that was the subject of a previous
litigation before his sala; the respondent judge borrowed, too,
from a lender who still had cases before his sala.
The Execution of a Final Judgment in 
the Consolidated Agrarian Cases
The respondent judge ought to have known that the joint
decision was already final and executory and could no longer
be disturbed when he made his adjustments. This legal reality,
known as the rule of immutability of judgment, is an
elementary principle of law and procedure. Once a judgment
becomes final, it may no longer be modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived
to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of
whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court
rendering it or by the Highest Court of the land.51 The only
recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors, or
the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries, which cause no
prejudice to any party, and where the judgment is void. 52 To be
sure, the respondent judge's ground for modifying the joint
decision is not among these recognized exceptions.
For modifying a final and executory decision in the course of
its execution, we find the respondent judge guilty of gross
ignorance of the law. Where the law is straightforward and its
application to the facts plainly evident, not to know the law or
to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance
of the law.53 The respondent judge violated Rule 3.01, Canon
3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates
professional competence on the part of a judge. A judge owes
the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law and
is expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing
jurisprudence;54 otherwise, he erodes the confidence of the
public in the courts.55 Ignorance of the law by a judge can
easily be the mainspring of injustice.56
[A.M. No. RTJ-01-1650. September 29, 2009.]
MARGIE CORPUS MACIAS, complainant , vs. MARIANO
JOAQUIN S.
MACIAS, Presiding Judge, Branch 28, Regional Trial Court,
Liloy,
Zamboanga del Norte,
NACHURA, J.
DOCTRINE: Basic is the rule that in administrative
proceedings, complainant bears the onus of establishing the
averments of her complaint.
FACTS: This involves an administrative complaint 1 􀀺led by
complainant Margie C. Macias charging her husband, Mariano
Joaquin S. Macias (Judge Macias), with immorality and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The
complaint
was 􀀺led on March 7, 2001, when respondent was still sitting
as the presiding judge of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte.
Complainant alleged that sometime in 1998, respondent
engaged in an illicit liaison and immoral relationship with a
certain Judilyn Seranillos (Seranillos), single and in her early
20s. The relationship continued until the time of the 􀀺ling of
the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be liable.
RULING: In several cases, 31 this Court has ruled that if what
is imputed to a respondent judge connotes a misconduct that,
if proven, would result in dismissal from the bench, then the
quantum of proof necessary to support the administrative
charges or to establish grounds for the removal of a judicial
officer should be more than substantial. In more recent rulings,
however, the Court applied substantial evidence as the
normative quantum of proof necessary in resolving
administrative complaints against judges. In order to diffuse
confusion, a clari􀀺cation has to be made. First, the
pronouncements in Horilleno and Alcuizar may be said to have
been superseded by the Court's recent rulings in Gutierrez v.
Belen, 36 Reyes v. Paderanga, 37 and Naval v. Panday. 38
Second, members of the judiciary are not a class of their own,
sui generis, in the 􀀺eld of public service as to require a higher
degree of proof for the administrative cases 􀀺led against them
other than, perhaps, the fact that because of the nature of the
responsibility judges have, they are required to live up to a
higher standard of integrity, probity and morality. SaCDTA
When we dismiss a public o􀁆cer or employee from his position
or o􀁆ce for the commission of a grave offense in connection
with his o􀁆ce, we merely require that the complainant prove
substantial evidence. When we disbar a disgraceful lawyer, we
require that complainant merely prove a clear preponderance
of evidence to establish liability. 39 There appears no
compelling reason to require a higher degree of proof when we
deal with cases filed against judges.
Basic is the rule that in administrative proceedings,
complainant bears the onus of establishing the averments of
her complaint.
The undisputed facts follow.
On 4 and 25 August 2005, respondent borrowed money from
complainant in the amounts of ₱5,000.00 and ₱2,500.00,
respectively. The loans were evidenced by promissory notes.1

On 25 August 2005, complainant filed a verified complaint 2 for

forcible entry and damages with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction before the MTC of
Bulan, Sorsogon, presided by Judge Marie Louise A. Guan-
Aragon (Judge Guan-Aragon). On 7 November 2005, Judge
Guan-Aragon inhibited herself from the civil case.3

A.M. No. MTJ-07-1689               March 13, 2009 On 4 and 24 January 2007, respondent again borrowed from
[Formerly OCA-I.P.I. No. 07-1897-MTJ] complainant the amounts of ₱15,000.00 and ₱3,000.00, as
evidenced by two (2) handwritten notes.6
PERLA BURIAS, Complainant, 
vs. On 23 March 2007, complainant filed an urgent motion for
JUDGE MIRAFE B. VALENCIA, MTC-Irosin, respondent’s inhibition on the ground of delay in the resolution
Sorsogon, Respondent. of the civil case and apparent bias against complainant based
on the Order of 6 December 2006. Respondent denied the
RESOLUTION motion on 18 April 2007, citing the demise of her son as cause
for the delay.7 Complainant moved for reconsideration but the
TINGA, J.: motion was denied by respondent on 8 January 2008.8

DOCTRINE: judge shall refrain from financial and business
dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the court’s
impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial
activities, or increase involvement with lawyers or persons
likely to come before the court.
FACTS: In a verified complaint dated 19 August 2005, Perla
Burias (complainant) charged Judge Mirafe B. Valencia
(respondent), then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Irosin, Sorsogon, of gross misconduct.
In her administrative complaint, complainant alleged that on 12
October 2005, respondent endorsed a check and thereafter
exchanged the same for cash in the sum of ₱5,000.00 that
complainant provided. Said check however was dishonored
when presented for payment by complainant. She also averred
that sometime in March 2007, respondent verbally demanded
from her the sum of ₱50,000.00 and that her ₱30,500.000
indebtedness be written off in exchange for a favorable
decision in Civil Case No. 590. According to complainant, she
refused to accede to the demands of respondent. In April not only impropriety, but also the appearance of
2007, respondent reportedly called her up and threatened that impropriety, because their conduct affects the people’s faith
she would release any of the two (2) draft decisions she and confidence in the entire judicial system
allegedly prepared favoring respondent in the civil case.
Complainant claimed that by reason of these threats, she was
constrained to file the instant administrative case.9

Issue: Whether or not respondent should be liable.

Ruling:

YES. With respect to the charge of borrowing money in

exchange for a favorable judgment, Rule 5.02, Canon 5 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall refrain
from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect
adversely on the court’s impartiality, interfere with the proper
performance of judicial activities, or increase involvement with
lawyers or persons likely to come before the court. A judge
should so manage investments and other financial interests as
to minimize the number of cases giving grounds for
disqualification.

Under Rule 5.04 of Canon 5, a judge may obtain a loan if no

law prohibits such loan. However, the law prohibits a judge
from engaging in financial transactions with a party-litigant.
Respondent admitted borrowing money from complainant
during the pendency of the case. This act alone is patently
inappropriate.20 The impression that respondent would rule in
favor of complainant because the former is indebted to the
latter is what the Court seeks to avoid. A judge’s conduct
should always be beyond reproach.

This Court has time and again emphasized that no

government position is more demanding of moral
righteousness and uprightness than a seat in the judiciary.
Judges as models of law and justice are mandated to avoid