787b bjb
for the preservatiojjklhhhnkjnn of the allegiance owed
Laurel olkjkkkd permanent allegiance should not be
confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance
which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign
of the territory wherein he resides, so long as he
remains there, in return for the protection he receives,
and which consists in the obedience to the laws of the
government or sovereign.
Absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants
of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate
government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed
by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of
the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred
thereby to the occupier, and if it is not transferred to
the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the
legitimate government.
Even adopting the words "temporarily allegiance,"
repudiated by Oppenheim and other publicists, as
descriptive of the relations borne by the inhabitants of
the ljlklkmmmm oliop[oreign country, in the same
way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the
military forces of the enemy may commit treason
against his own legitimate government or sovereign if
he adheres to the enemies of the latter by giving them
aid and comfort; and that if the allegiance of a citizen
or subject to his government or sovereign is nothing
more than obedience to its laws in return for the
protection he receives, it would necessarily follow that
a citizen who resides in a foreign country or state
would, on one hand, ipso facto acquire the citizenship
thereof since he has enforce public order and regulate
the social and commercial life, in return for the
protection he receives, and would, on the other hand,
lose his original citizenship, because he would not be
bound to obey most of the laws of his own government
or sovereign, and would not receive, while in a foreign
country, the protection he is entitled to in his own.
While the offenses against public order to be preserved
by the legitimate government were inapplicable as
offenses against the invader for the reason above
stated, unless adopted by him, were also inoperative
as against the ousted government for the latter was
not responsible for the preservation of the public order
in the occupied territory, yet article 114 of the said
Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason
committed against the national security of the
legitimate government, because the inhabitants of the
occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance
to the latter during the enemy occupation.
The preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of
fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his
government or sovereign does not demand from him a
positive action, but only passive attitude or
forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the
latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a
corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or
1
suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential
by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or
compel them to adhere and give aid and comfort to
him.
The adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended
allegiance would lead to disastrous consequences for
small and weak nations or states, and would be
repugnant to the laws of humanity and requirements of
public conscience, for it would allow invaders to legally
recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the occupied
territory to fight against their own government without
the latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for
treason, and even compel those who are not aid them
in their military operation against the resisting enemy
forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the
whole nation, and thus deprive them all of their own
independence or sovereignty — such theory would
sanction the action of invaders in forcing the people of
a free and sovereign country to be a party in the
nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own
freedom and independence and repressing the
exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other
words, to commit a political suicide.
The change of our form of government from
Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the
prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason
committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an
offense against the same government and the same
sovereign people.
People vs Perez
Facts: Seven counts of estafa were filed agaist Susano
Perez. Only the 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 were sustained.
Count 1 – recruited, apprehended and commandeered
numerous girls and women against their will for the
purpose of using them, as in fact they were used, to
satisfy the immoral purpose and sexual desire of
Colonel Mini. Eriberta Ramo testified and recounted
how Colonel Mili successfully in having carnal
knowledge with her and how she escaped from said
bjhgjhbbnbm,m,nm,aohog and Eutiquia Lamay were
brought to Dr Takibayas. Before the girls were brought,
Susano and his co-accussed raped Eduardo and
Etiquia.
Count 5 – Feliciana Bonalos and her sister Flaviana
Bonalos were also brought to the Japanese to satisfy
their carnal aptite.
Count 6 – that the accused, together with his Filipino
companion apprehended Natividad Barcinas, Nicanora
Ralameda and Teotima Barcinas, nurses of the
provincial hospital were lured to the Japanese through
dance banquet invitations.
It is contended that the acts of Susano did not
constitute treason. If furnishing women for immoral
purposes to the enemies was treason because
women's company kept up their morale, so fraternizing
with them, entertaining them at parties, selling them
food and drinks, and kindred acts, would be treason.
Issue: WON the acts constituted treason
Ruling: NO.
The law of treason does not prescribe all kinds of
social, business and political intercourse between the
belligerent occupants of the invaded country and its
inhabitants. In the nature of things, the occupation of a
country by the enemy is bound to create relations of all
sorts between the invaders and the natives. What aid
and comfort constitute treason must depend upon their
nature degree and purpose.
As general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid
and comfort given to the enemies must be to render
assistance to them as enemies and not merely as
individuals and in addition, be directly in furtherance of
the enemies' hostile designs. To make a simple
distinction: To lend or give money to an enemy as a
friend or out of charity to the beneficiary so that he
may buy personal necessities is to assist him as
individual and is not technically traitorous. On the
other hand, to lend or give him money to enable him to
buy arms or ammunition to use in waging war against
the giver's country enhance his strength and by same
count injures the interest of the government of the
giver. That is treason.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, appellant's
first assignment of error is correct. His
"commandeering" of women to satisfy the lust of
Japanese officers or men or to enliven the
entertainment held in their honor was not treason even
though the women and the entertainment helped to
make life more pleasant for the enemies and boost
their spirit; he was not guilty any more than the
women themselves would have been if they voluntarily
and willingly had surrendered their bodies or organized
the entertainment. Sexual and social relations with the
Japanese did not directly and materially tend to
improve their war efforts or to weaken the power of the
United State. Intent of disloyalty is a vital ingredient in
the crime of treason, which, in the absence of
admission, may be gathered from the nature and
circumstances of each particular case.
People vs Prieto
Facts: Prieto is prosecuted for treason on 7 counts.
Count 1, 2, 3 and 7 of the information alleged that
Prieto, as a Japanese undercover, along with other
2
Filipino undercovers lead the Japanese militaries to the
hideouts of the guerrillas. The accused severely beat
and tortured the guerrilla suspects and even
prosecuted some of them.
Issue: Are the torturous acts of accused considered a
separate crime?
Ruling: NO. But it is considered an aggravating
circumstance.
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort
can only be accomplished by some kind of action. Its
very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as
opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer vs. U.S., ante.)
This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in
itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or
provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an
element of treason it becomes identified with the latter
crime and cannot be the subject of a separate
punishment, or used in combination with treason to
increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code provides.
This rule would not, of course, preclude the
punishment of murder or physical injuries as such if the
government should elect to prosecute the culprit
specifically for those crimes instead on relying on them
as an element of treason. It is where murder or
physical injuries are charged as overt acts of treason
that they cannot be regarded separately under their
general denomination.
However, the brutality with which the killing or physical
injuries were carried out may be taken as an
aggravating circumstance. Thus, the use of torture and
other atrocities on the victims instead of the usual and
less painful method of execution will be taken into
account to increase the penalty under the provision of
article 14, paragraph 21, of the Revised Penal Code,
since they, as in this case, augmented the sufferings of
the offended parties unnecessarily to the attainment of
the criminal objective.
US vs Bautista
Facts: During the latter part of the year 1903
a junta was organized and a conspiracy entered into by
a number of Filipinos, resident in the city of Hongkong,
for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the
United States in the Philippine Islands by force of arms
and establishing in its stead a government to be known
as the Republica Universal Democratica Filipina.
Prim Ruiz was recognized as the titular head of this
conspiracy and one Artemio Ricarte as chief of the
military forces. Ricarte came to Manila and held
several meetings.
Puzon allegedly held several meetings where they
were planning for the upcoming insurrection. In said
meetings, the group planned on a brigandage and
Puzon was assigned as brigader-general of the signal
corps.
Conspirators took the field and offered armed
resistance to the constituted authorities in the
Philippines, only failing in their design of overthrowing
the Government because of their failure to combat
successfully with the officers of the law who were sent
against them and of the failure of the people to rise en
masse in response to their propaganda.
Puxon denied any cooperation with the conspirators.
He also contended that he had accepted the
appointment as brigadier-general of the signal corps of
the revolutionary forces with no intention of ever
taking any further action in the matter, and merely
because he did not wish to vex his friend Muñoz by
refusing to do so.
Issue: Is Puzon guilty of treason for accepting the
appointment?
Ruling: NO. But he is guilty of conspiracy to commit
treason.
It is contended that the acceptance or possession of an
appointment as an officer of the military forces of the
conspiracy should not be considered as evidence
against him in the light of the decisions of this court in
the cases of the United States vs. Antonio de los
Reyes 1 (2 Off. Gaz., 364), United States vs. Silverio
Nuñez et al.2 (3 Off. Gaz., 408), the United
States vs. Eusebio de la Serna et al.  3 (3 Off. Gaz., 528),
and United States vs. Bernardo Manalo et al. 4 (4 Off.
Gaz., 570). But the case at bar is to be distinguished
from these and like cases by the fact that the record
clearly disclose that the accused actually and
voluntarily accepted the apppointment in question and
in doing so assumed all the obligations implied by such
acceptance, and that the charge in this case is that of
conspiracy, and the fact that the accused accepted the
appointment is taken into consideration merely as
evidence of his criminal relations with the conspirators.
United States vs. De los Reyes — the accused was
charged with treason, and the court found that the
mere acceptance of a commission by the defendant,
nothing else being done either by himself or by his
companions, was not an "overt act" of treason within
the meaning of the law, but the court further expressly
held that —
3
That state of affairs disclosed body of
evidence, . . . the playing of the game of
government like children, the secretaries,
colonels, and captains, the pictures of flags and
seals and commission, all on proper, for the
purpose of duping and misleading the ignorant
and the visionary . . . should not be dignified by
the name of treason.
Counsel for appellants contend that the constitutional
provision requiring the testimony of at least two
witnesses to the same overt act, or confession in open
court, to support a conviction for the crime of treason
should be applied in this case, but this court has
always held, in conformance with the decisions of the
Federal courts of the United States, that the crime of
conspiring to commit treason is a separate and distinct
offense from the crime of treason, and that this
constitutional provision is not applicable in such cases.
PIRACY
People vs Lol-lo & Saraw
Facts: Two boats of Dutch possession were on their
way to Peta from Matuta. When the second boat (with
11 men, women, and children) arrived between the
Islands of Buang and Bukid, the boat was surround by
six vintas.
Aboard in the six vintas are Moros, two of which are
the accused Lol-lo and Saraw. The Moros first ask for
food, but once on the boat, they attacked some of the
men and raped some of the women.
They were charged with piracy upon returning to Sulu
by CFI Sulu.
The counsel for the accused argued that the CFI Sulu
has no jurisdiction to try the case.
Issue: WON Lol-lo and Saraw may be convicted even
though CFI Sulu has no jursidiction
Ruling: YES.
Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a
crime not against any particular state but against all
mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal
of any country where the offender may be found or into
which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy
unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is
against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it
matter that the crime was committed within the
jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those
limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to
crimes."
People vs Rodriguez
Facts: M/V Noria left Jolo for Lauban. After two to three
hours of its departure a commotion occurred in one of
the cabins of its vessel.
The accused (Jaime, Dario, Rico, and Peter) were crew
members of M/V Noria 767. They were armed and they
helped one other in stealing the crew and passenger’s
belongings (total P3,687,300.00). In the same event,
the accused intentionally killed 30 people and injured
some others.
Issue: WON trial court erred in not considering the
plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance
Ruling: NO.
Anent the first assigned error, suffice it to say that
Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the
Anti-Piracy Law, amending Article 134 of the Revised
Penal Code and which took effect on August 8, 1974,
provides:
SEC. 3. Penalties.—Any person who
commits piracy or highway
robbery/brigandage as herein defined,
shall, upon conviction by competent
court be punished by:
a) Piracy.—The penalty of reclusion
temporal in its medium and maximum
periods shall be imposed. If physical
injuries or other crimes are committed
as a result or on the occasion thereof,
the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall
be imposed. If rape, murder or no
homocide is committed as a result or
on the occasion of piracy, or when the
offenders abandoned the victims
without means of saving themselves,
or when the seizure is accomplished by
firing upon or boarding a vessel, the
mandatory penalty of death shall be
imposed. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the penalty imposable upon persons found
guilty of the crime of piracy where rape, murder or
homicide is committed is mandatory death penalty.
Thus, the lower court committed no error in not
considering the plea of the three (3) defendants as a
mitigating circumstance.
People vs Siyoh
Facts: People’s version:
Alberto Aurea was a businessman engaged in selling
dry goods at the Larmitan Public Market, in the
province of Basilan. Antonio de Guzman together with
his friends (Anastacio, Rodolfo, and Danilo) who were
also travelling merchants like him, were on their way to
4
Pilas Island, Province of Basilan, to sell the goods they
received from Alberto Aurea.
They took their dinner and slept that night in the house
of Omar-kayam Kiram at Pilas Island. They sold the
goods in Bulakbulak. The following day group again
went to Baluk-Baluk accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh.
On their way back to Pilas after selling the goods,
another pumpboat approached them. Kiram threw a
rope to the other pumpboat which towed de Guzman's
pumpboat towards Mataja Island. On the way to Mataja
Island, Antonio de Guzman and his companions were
divested of their money and their goods by Kiram.
They were also asked to undress. Kiram with his
group killed Antonio’s companions, but Antonio
survived the incident.
Issue: Are the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of piracy?
Ruling: YES.
1. That if they were the culprits they could have easily
robbed their victims at the Kiram house or on any of
the occasions when they were travelling together.
Suffice it to say that robbing the victims at Kiram's
house would make Kiram and his family immediately
suspect and robbing the victims before they had sold
all their goods would be premature. However, robbing
and killing the victims while at sea and after they had
sold all their goods was both timely and provided
safety from prying eyes.
2. That the accused immediately reported the incident
to the PC. The record does not support this assertion.
For as the prosecution stated: "It is of important
consequence to mention that the witness presented by
the defense are all from Pilas Island and friends of the
accused. They claimed to be members of retrieving
team for the dead bodies but no PC soldiers were ever
presented to attest this fact. The defense may counter
why the prosecution also failed to present the Maluso
Police Daily Event book? This matter has been brought
by Antonio not to the attention of the PC or Police but
to an army detachment. The Army is known to have no
docket book, so why take the pain in locating the army
soldiers with whom the report was made?
(Memorandum, p. 7.) And Judge Rasul also makes this
observation: "..., this Court is puzzled, assuming the
version of the defense to be true, why the lone survivor
Antonio de Guzman as having been allegedly helped by
the accused testified against them. Indeed, no
evidence was presented and nothing can be inferred
from the evidence of the defense so far presented
showing reason why the lone survivor should pervert
the truth or fabricate or manufacture such heinous
crime as qualified piracy with triple murders and
frustrated murder? The point which makes us doubt
the version of the defense is the role taken by the PC
to whom the report was allegedly made by the accused
immediately after the commission of the offense.
Instead of helping the accused, the PC law
enforcement agency in Isabela, perhaps not crediting
the report of the accused or believing in the version of
the report made by the lone survivor Antonio de
Guzman, acted consistently with the latter's report and
placed the accused under detention for investigation."
(Expediente, pp. 127-128.)
3. That the affidavits of Dolores de Guzman, wife of the
deceased Anastacio de Guzman, and Primitiva de
Castro, wife of the deceased Rodolfo de Castro, state
that Antonio de Guzman informed them shortly after
the incident that their husbands were killed by the
companions of Siyoh and Kiram. The thrust of the
appellants' claim, therefore, is that Namli Indanan and
Andaw Jamahali were the killers and not the former.
But this claim is baseless in the face of the proven
conspiracy among the accused for as Judge Rasul has
stated:
It is believed that conspiracy as alleged in the
information is sufficiently proved in this case.
In fact the following facts appear to have been
established to show clearly conspiracy: A) On
July 14, 1979, while peddling, the survivor-
witness Tony de Guzman noticed that near the
window of a dilapidated house, both accused
were talking to two (2) armed strange-looking
men at Baluk-Baluk Island; B) When the
pumpboat was chased and overtaken, the
survivor-witness Tony de Guzman recognized
their captors to be the same two (2) armed
strangers to whom the two accused talked in
Baluk- Baluk Island near the dilapidated house;
C) The two accused, without order from the two
armed strangers transferred the unsold goods
to the captors' banca; D) That Tony de Guzman
and companion peddlers were divested of their
jewelries and cash and undressed while the
two accused remained unharmed or not
molested. These concerted actions on their
part prove conspiracy and make them equally
liable for the same crime (People vs. Pedro, 16
SCRA 57; People vs. lndic 10 SCRA 130). The
convergence of the will of the conspirators in
the scheming and execution of the crime
amply justifies the imputation of all of them the
act of any of them (People vs. Peralta, 25
SCRA, 759). (Id., pp. 128-129.)
4. That there is no evidence Anastacio de Guzman was
killed together with Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo
Hiolen because his remains were never recovered.
There is no reason to suppose that Anastacio de
Guzman is still alive or that he died in a manner
different from his companions. The incident took place
on July 14, 1979 and when the trial court decided the
5
case on June 8, 1981 Anastacio de Guzman was still
missing. But the number of persons killed on the
occasion of piracy is not material. P.D. No. 532
considers qualified piracy, i.e. rape, murder or
homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of
piracy, as a special complex crime punishable by death
regardless of the number of victims.
5. That the death certificates are vague as to the
nature of the injuries sustained by the victims; were
they hacked wounds or gunshot wounds? The cause of
death stated for Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen is:
"Hemorrhage due to hacked wounds, possible gunshot
wounds." (Exhs. D and E.) The cause is consistent with
the testimony of Antonio de Guzman that the victims
were hacked; that the appellants were armed with
"barongs" while Indanan and Jamahali were armed with
armalites.
ARBITRARY DETENTION
Umil vs Ramos
Facts: 8 petitioners filed for habeas corpus.
The respondents uniformly assert that the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is not available to the
petitioners as they have been legally arrested and are
detained by virtue of valid informations filed in court
against them.
The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful
as their arrests were made without warrant and,
that no preliminary investigation was first conducted,
so that the informations filed against them are null and
void.
Issue: WON the petitioners were validly detained
Ruling: YES.
An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5
paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, is justified when the person
arrested is caught in flagranti delicto, viz., in the act of
committing an offense; or when an offense has just
been committed and the person making the arrest has
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the
person arrested has committed it. The rationale behind
lawful arrests, without warrant, was stated by this
Court in the case of People vs. Kagui Malasugui 1 thus:
To hold that no criminal can, in any
case, be arrested and searched for the
evidence and tokens of his crime
without a warrant, would be to leave
society, to a large extent, at the mercy
of the shrewdest, the most expert, and
 the most depraved of criminals,
facilitating their escape in many
instances.
The record of the instant cases would show that the
persons in whose behalf these petitions for habeas
corpushave been filed, had freshly committed or were
actually committing an offense, when apprehended, so
that their arrests without a warrant were clearly
justified, and that they are, further, detained by virtue
of valid informations filed against them in court.
Umil vs Ramos – As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears
that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting
the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned. Nor was
he arrested just after the commission of the said
offense for his arrest came a day after the said
shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without
warrant is unjustified.
However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a
member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed
subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing
offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is
justified as it can be said that he was committing an
offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such
crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in
furtherance thereof or in connection therewith
constitute direct assaults against the State and are in
the nature of continuing crimes.
Roque vs. De Villa – The arrest without warrant of
Roque was additionally justified as she was, at the time
of apprehension, in possession of ammunitions without
license to possess them.
Anonuevo vs. Ramos – The arrest of Domingo
Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, without warrant, is also
justified under the rules. Both are admittedly members
of the standing committee of the NUFC and, when
apprehended in the house of Renato Constatino, they
had a bag containing subversive materials, and both
carried firearms and ammunition for which they had no
license to possess or carry.
The petitioners' (Anonuevo and Casiple) claim that
they were unlawfully arrested because there was no
previous warrant of arrest, is without merit the record
shows that Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple
were carrying unlicensed firearms and ammunition in
their person when they were apprehended.
Ocaya vs. Aguirre – The arrest without warrant,
of Vicky Ocaya is justified under the Rules, since she
had with her unlicensed ammunition when she was
arrested.
6
Espiritu vs. Lim – The respondents claim however, that
the detention of the petitioner is justified in view of the
Information filed against him before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, docketed therein as Criminal Case No.
88-683-85, charging him with violation of Art. 142 of
the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition).
The respondents also claim that the petitioner was
lawfully arrested without a judicial warrant of arrest
since petitioner when arrested had in fact just
committed an offense in that in the afternoon of 22
November 1988, during a press conference at the
National Press Club.
The record of this case shows that at about 8:30
o'clock in the morning of 14 December 1988, one
Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men near the
corner of T. Molina and Mendiola Streets in Alabang,
Muntinglupa, Metro Manila. One of the suspects in the
killing was Ramil Regal who was arrested by the police
on 28 December 1988. Upon questioning, Regal
pointed to Narciso Nazareno as on of his companions in
the killing of the said Romulo Bunye II. In view thereof,
the police officers, without warrant, picked up Narciso
Nazareno and brought him to the police headquarters
for questioning.
People vs Burgos
Facts: One Cesar testified that he was forcibly
recruited by accused Ruben Burgos as member of the
NPA, threatening him with the use of firearm against
his life, if he refused.
Through the help of Pedro Burgos, brother of accused,
the team was able to locate accused, who was plowing
his field.
At first accused denied possession of said firearm but
later, upon question profounded by Sgt. Alejandro
Buncalan with the wife of the accused, the latter
pointed to a place below their house where a gun was
buried in the ground.
Accused, when confronted with the firearm Exhibit "A",
after its recovery, readily admitted the same as issued
to him by Nestor Jimenez, otherwise known as a certain
Alias Pedipol, allegedly team leader of the sparrow unit
of New People's Army.
Issue: Was the arrest of Ruben Burgos lawful? Were
the search of his house and the subsequent
confiscation of a firearm and documents allegedly
found therein conducted in a lawful and valid manner?
Ruling:
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a
person who has just committed, is committing, or is
about to commit an offense must
have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense
must also be committed in his presence or within his
view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).
There is no such personal knowledge in this case.
Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting
officers, it came in its entirety from the information
furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the
firearm was given by the appellant's wife.
At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in
actual possession of any firearm or subversive
document. Neither was he committing any act which
could be described as subversive. He was, in fact,
plowing his field at the time of the arrest.
The right of a person to be secure against any
unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation
of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The
statute or rule which allows exceptions to the
requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed.
Any exception must clearly fall within the situations
when securing a warrant would be absurd or is
manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We
cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without
warrant or extend its application beyond the cases
specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe
upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so
often violated and so deserving of full protection.
The Solicitor General is of the persuasion that the
arrest may still be considered lawful under Section 6(b)
using the test of reasonableness. He submits that. the
information given by Cesar Masamlok was sufficient to
induce a reasonable ground that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof.
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b),
however, it is not enough that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed a crime. A crime must in fact
or actually have been committed first. That a crime has
actually been committed is an essential precondition. It
is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been
committed. The fact of the commission of the offense
must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground
applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.
In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis
of Masamlok's verbal report. Masamlok led the
authorities to suspect that the accused had committed
a crime. They were still fishing for evidence of a crime
not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the
subject firearm on the basis of information from the
lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful,
If an arrest without warrant is unlawful at the moment
7
it is made, generally nothing that happened or is
discovered afterwards can make it lawful. The fruit of a
poisoned tree is necessarily also tainted.
EXPULSION
Villavicencio vs Lukban
Facts: About midnight of October 25, the police, acting
pursuant to orders from the chief of police and the
Mayor of the city of Manila descended upon the
houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons,
and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited
their arrival. The women were given no opportunity to
collect their belongings, and apparently were under the
impression that they were being taken to a police
station for an investigation. They had no knowledge
that they were destined for a life in Mindanao.
The women were landed and receipted for as laborers
by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and
by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor
and the hacendero Yñigo, who appear as parties in the
case, had no previous notification that the women were
prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of
Manila.
The attorney for the relatives and friends of a
considerable number of the deportees presented an
application forhabeas corpus to a member of the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Can the mayor and chief of police expel these
women?
Ruling: NO.
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine
Islands in conformity with an Act of congress. But one
can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation,
which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of
Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens
of the Philippine Islands — and these women despite
their being in a sense lepers of society are
nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens
protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are
other citizens — to change their domicile from Manila
to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal
law specifically punishes any public officer who, not
being expressly authorized by law or regulation,
compels any person to change his residence.
If these officials can take to themselves such power,
then any other official can do the same. And if any
official can exercise the power, then all persons would
have just as much right to do so. And if a prostitute
could be sent against her wishes and under no law
from one locality to another within the country, then
officialdom can hold the same club over the head of
any citizen.
As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal
Code in force in these Islands provides:
Any public officer not thereunto authorized by
law or by regulations of a general character in
force in the Philippines who shall banish any
person to a place more than two hundred
kilometers distant from his domicile, except it
be by virtue of the judgment of a court, shall
be punished by a fine of not less than three
hundred and twenty-five and not more than
three thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.
Any public officer not thereunto expressly
authorized by law or by regulation of a general
character in force in the Philippines who shall
compel any person to change his domicile or
residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro
and a fine of not less than six hundred and
twenty-five and not more than six thousand
two hundred and fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.)
SEARCH WARRANT MALICIOUSLY OBTAINED
Stonehill vs Diokno
Facts: 42 search warrants were issued against
petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which
they were officers for violation of Central Ban Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code to search their persons and/or the
premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences, and to seize and take possession of the
following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and
other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursements
receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are
null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the
Rules of Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not
describe with particularity the documents, books and
things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in
the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants
were issued to fish evidence against the
aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed
8
against them; (4) the searches and seizures were
made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents,
papers and cash money seized were not delivered to
the courts that issued the warrants
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1)
that the contested search warrants are valid and have
been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the
defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by
petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the
effects seized are admissible in evidence against
herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of
the aforementioned searches and seizures.
Issue: WON the search warrants were valid
Ruling: NO.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this
constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined
by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision;
and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the
things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in
the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued
upon applications stating that the natural and juridical
person therein named had committed a "violation of
Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other
words, nospecific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the
offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants
to have found the existence of probable cause, for the
same presupposes the introduction of competent proof
that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal laws.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and
seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of
whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the
petitioners and the aforementioned corporations,
whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the
explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things
to be seized be particularly described — as well as
tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination
of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1),
Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the
searches and seizures under consideration were
unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things
thus seized are admissible in evidence against
petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however,
we are unanimously of the opinion that the position
taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned.
Citing Mapp vs Ohio – We can no longer permit it to be
revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the
name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its
enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth,
gives to the individual no more than that which the
Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no
less than that to which honest law enforcement is
entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so
necessary in the true administration of justice.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the
Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned;
that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences
of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of
June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and
seizures therein made are illegal.
Burgos vs Chief of Staff
Facts: Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition
and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search
warrants issued respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano
under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3,
Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business
addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum"
newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office
and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia,
motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing,
publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as
well as numerous papers, documents, books and other
written literature alleged to be in the possession and
control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of
the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition
on the ground that petitioners had come to this Court
without having previously sought the quashal of the
search warrants before respondent judge. But this
procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance
of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency
of the constitutional issues raised not to mention the
public interest generated by the search of the "We
Forum" offices, which was televised in Channel 7 and
widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies.
Issue: Is the search warrant valid?
9
Ruling: NO.
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the
abovementioned documents could not have provided
sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon
which a warrant may validly issue.
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched. And when the search warrant applied for
is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in
connection with the publication of subversive
materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or
its supporting affidavits must contain a specification,
stating with particularity the alleged subversive
material he has published or is intending to publish.
Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad
statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner
"is in possession or has in his control printing
equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications
and other documents which were used and are all
continuously being used as a means of committing the
offense of subversion punishable under Presidential
Decree 885, as amended ..." is a mere conclusion of
law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable
cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a
finding of the existence of probable cause, said
allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a
search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent
judge to have done so.
In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the judge, ... after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce; the
Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge
by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon
which the issuance of a search warrant may be
justified.
Another factor which makes the search warrants under
consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they
are in the nature of general warrants.
Directions to "seize any evidence in connection with
the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been
held too general, and that portion of a search warrant
which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia
which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the
Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing with
the crime of conspiracy]" was held to be a general
warrant, and therefore invalid. The description of the
articles sought to be seized under the search warrants
in question cannot be characterized differently.
OFFENDING RELIGIOUS FEELINGS
People vs Baes
Facts: The accused, while holding the funeral of one
who in life was called Antonio Macabigtas, in
accordance with the rites of religious sect known as the
"Church of Christ", willfully, unlawfully, and criminally
caused the funeral to pass, as it in fact passed, through
the chruchyard fronting the Roman Catholic Church,
which churchyard belongs to the said Church, which
churchyard belongs to the said Church and is devoted
to the religious worship thereof, against the opposition
of the undersigned complainant who, through force
and threats of physical violence by the accused, was
compelled to allow the funeral to pass through the said
churchyard. An act committed in grave profanation of
the place, in open disregard of the religious feelings of
the Catholics of this municipality, and in violation of
article 133 of the Revised Penal Code.
Issue: WON the acts of the accused is offensive to
religious feelings
Ruling: YES
The fiscal, in his aforesaid motion, denies that the
unlawful act committed by the accused had offended
the religious feelings of the Catholics of the
municipality in which the act complained of took place.
We believe that such ground of the motion is
indefensible. As the fiscal was discussing the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint, he
cannot deny any of them, but must admit them,
although hypothetically, as they are alleged. The
motion raises a question of law, not one of fact.
In the second place, whether or of the act complained
of is offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholics,
is a question of fact which must be judged only
according to the feelings of the Catholics and not those
of other faithful ones, for it is possible that certain acts
may offend the feelings of those who profess a certain
religion, while not otherwise offensive to the feelings of
those professing another faith. We, therefore, take the
view that the facts alleged in the complaint constitute
the offense defined and penalized in article 133 of the
Revised Penal Code, and should the fiscal file an
information alleging the said facts and a trial be
thereafter held at which the said facts should be
conclusively established, the court may find the
accused guilty of the offense complained of, or that of
coercion, or that of trespass under article 281 of the
Revised Penal Code, as may be proper, pursuant to
section 29 of General Orders, No. 58.
10
REBELLION
People vs Hernandez
Facts: About March 15, 1945, Amado Hernandez and
other appellants were accused of conspiring,
confederating and cooperating with each other, as well
as with the thirty-one (31) defendants charged in the
criminal cases of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
They were accused of being members of PKP
Community Party of the Philippines which was actively
engaged in an armed rebellion against the government
of the Philippines. With the party of HUKBALAHAP
(Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa mga Hapon), they
committed the crime of rebellion causing murder,
pillage, looting plunder, etc., enumerated in 13 attacks
on government forces or civilians by HUKS.
The government, headed by the Solicitor General,
argued that the gravity of the crime committed
required the denial of bail. Moreover, the complex
crime charged by the government against Hernandez
has been successfully imposed with other arrested
communist leaders and was sentenced to life
imprisonment.
An appeal prosecuted by the defendants regarding the
judgment rendered by the CFI in Manila that rebellion
cannot be a complex crime with murder, arson or
robbery.
Issue: Whether or not rebellion can be complexed with
murder, arson or robbery
Ruling: NO.
The court ruled that “murder, arson, and robbery are
mere ingredient of the crime of rebellion as means
“necessary” for the perpetration of the offense. Such
common offense is absorbed or inherent of the crime
of rebellion. Inasmuch as the acts specified in Article
135 constitutes, one single crime it follows that said
acts offer no occasion for the application of Article 48
which requires therefore the commission of at least
two crimes.
*** Hernandez doctrine: Rebellion cannot be
complexed with common crimes such as killings,
destruction of property, etc., committed on the
occasion and in furtherance thereof. The thinking is not
anymore correct more so that there is no legal basis
for such rule now. Rebellion constitutes ONLY ONE
CRIME. ***
Enrile vs Salazar
Facts: Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile
was arrested by law enforcement officers led by
Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of
Investigation on the strength of a warrant ISSUEd by
Hon. Jaime Salazar.
They charged Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and
Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime
of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder
allegedly committed during the period of the failed
coup attempt from November 29 to December 10,
1990.
The Solicitor General insists that petitioners’ case don’t
fall within Hernandez RULING because information in
Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes
committed as necessary means for the commission of
rebellion, whereas, the information against petitioners
charged murder and frustrated murder committed on
occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion.
Issue: Whether or not the Hernandez RULING shall
apply
Ruling: YES.
There is one other reason and a fundamental one at
that why Article 48 of the Penal Code cannot be
applied in the case at bar. If murder were not
complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were
punished separately (assuming that this could be
done), the following penalties would be imposable
upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of
rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision
mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon
the modifying circumstances present, but never
exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the
crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present. In other words, in the absence
of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty
could not be imposed upon him. However, under Article
48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him,
even in the absence of a single aggravating
circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in
conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would
be unfavorable to the movant.
The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine
enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned
information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile
and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be
read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said
petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction,
as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to
petitioners being merely provisional in character, the
proceedings in both cases are ordered remanded to
the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be
posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said
11
respondent for any of the petitioners, the
corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall
become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.
Enrile vs Amin
Facts: An information was charged against Senator
Juan Ponce Enrile for having committed rebellion
complexed with murder with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. Another information was subsequently
filed with the Regional Trial Court 9of Makati, charging
the former with a violation of Presidential Decree No.
1829 for willfully and knowingly obstructing or delaying
the apprehension of Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio “Gringo”
Honasan.
Allegedly, Senator Enrile entertained and
accommodated Col. Gringo Honasan by giving him food
and comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house and not
doing anything to have Honasan arrested or
apprehended. It was the prosecution’s contention that
harboring or concealing a fugitive is punishable under
a special law while rebellion is based on Revised Penal
Code; thus, the two crimes can be separately punished.
Issue: Can a separate crime of a violation of PD 1829
be charged against the petitioner?
Ruling: NO.
The Supreme Court used the doctrine that if a person
cannot be charged with the complex crime of rebellion,
he can neither be charged separately for two different
offenses, where one is a constitutive or component
element or committed in furtherance of rebellion.
It was also noted that petitioner was already facing
charges of rebellion in conspiracy with Honasan. Being
in conspiracy thereof, the act of harboring or
concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component
or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance
of rebellion. It cannot be made the basis of a separate
charge.
Also, the High Court reiterated that in cases of
rebellion, all crimes committed in furtherance thereof
shall be absolved. Hence, the other charge of rebellion
complexed with murder cannot prosper. All crimes,
whether punishable under a special law or general law,
which are mere components or ingredients, or
committed in furtherance of rebellion, become
absorbed and it cannot be charged as separate crimes.
Ocampo vs Abando
Facts: On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was
discovered by elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of
the Philippine Army at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay
Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte.1 The mass grave
contained skeletal remains of individuals believed to be
victims of "Operation Venereal Disease" (Operation VD)
launched by members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines/New People’s Army/National Democratic
Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) to purge their
ranks of suspected military informers.
Prosecutor Vivero recommended the filing of an
Information for 15 counts of multiple murder against
named members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP, including
petitioners herein.
Petitioner Ocampo argues that common crimes, such
as murder in this case, are already absorbed by the
crime of rebellion when committed as a necessary
means, in connection with and in furtherance of
rebellion.
Issue: Whether the murder charges against the
petitioners should be dismissed under the political
offense doctrine
Ruling: NO.
The political offense doctrine is not aground to
dismiss the charge againstpetitioners prior to a
determinationby the trial court that the murderswere
committed in furtherance ofrebellion.
Under political offense doctrine common crimes,
perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are
divested of their character as "common" offenses and
assume the political complexion of the main crime of
which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently,
cannot be punished separately from the principal
offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the
imposition of a graver penalty.
When the political offense doctrine is asserted as a
defense in the trial court, it becomes crucial for the
court to determine whether the act of killing was done
in furtherance of a political end, and for the political
motive of the act to be conclusively demonstrated.
Any amendment before plea, which downgrades the
nature of the offense charged in or excludes any
accused from the complaint or information, can be
made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice
to the offended party and with leave of court. The court
shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and
copies of its order shall be furnished all parties,
especially the offended party.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a
mistake has been made in charging the proper offense,
12
the court shall dismiss the original complaint or
information upon the filing of a new one charging the
proper offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule
119, provided the accused shall not be placed in
double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses
to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
A first jeopardy attaches only after the accused has
been acquitted or convicted, or the case has been
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent, by a competent court in a valid indictment for
which the accused has entered a valid plea during
arraignment.
People vs Lovedioro
Facts: Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was
walking along Burgos St., away from the Daraga, Albay
Public Market when accused suddenly walked beside
him, pulled a .45 caliber gun from his waist, aimed the
gun at the policeman's right ear and fired. The man
who shot Lucilo had three other companions with him,
one of whom shot the fallen policeman four times as he
lay on the ground. After taking the latter's gun, the
man and his companions boarded a tricycle and fled.
Issue: Whether or not rebellion is the proper charge
and not murder
Ruling: No.
Divested of its common complexion therefore, any
ordinary act, however grave, assumes a different color
by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion, which
carries a lighter penalty than the crime of murder. In
deciding if the crime committed is rebellion, not
murder, it becomes imperative for our courts to
ascertain whether or not the act was done in
furtherance of a political end. The political motive of
the act should be conclusively demonstrated. It is not
enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly proven.
Both purpose and overt acts are essential components
of the crime. With either of these elements wanting,
the crime of rebellion legally does not exist. In fact,
even in cases where the act complained of were
committed simultaneously with or in the course of the
rebellion, if the killing, robbing, or etc., were
accomplished for private purposes or profit, without
any political motivation, it has been RULING that the
crime would be separately punishable as a common
crime and would not be absorbed by the crime
rebellion.
People vs Umali
Facts: The complex crime of which appellants Narciso
Umali, et. al were found guilty was said to have been
committed during the raid staged in the town of
Tiaong, Quezon, between 8:00 and 9:00 in the evening
of November 14, 1951, by armed men. The raid took
place resulting in the burning down and complete
destruction of the house of Mayor Marcial Punzalan
including its content valued at P24,023; the house of
Valentin Robles valued at P10,000, and the house of
one Mortega, the death of Patrolman Domingo Pisigan
and civilians Vicente Soriano and Leocadio Untalan,
and the wounding of Patrolman Pedro Lacorte and five
civilians.
During and after the burning of the houses, some of
the raiders engaged in looting, robbing one house and
two Chinese stores; and that the raiders were finally
dispersed and driven from the town by the Philippine
Army soldiers stationed in the town led by Captain
Alzate.
Umali and Punzalan were old time friends who became
political rivals. Umali thru Pasumbal contacted the
Huks to kill Punzalan. It would seem that Umali and
Pasumbal had a feeling that Punzalan was going to win
in the elections the next day, and that his death was
the surest way to eliminate him from the electoral
fight.
Issue: Are the accused liable of complex crime of
rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder,
arson and robbery?
Ruling: NO.
We are convinced that the principal and main, tho not
necessarily the most serious, crime committed here
was not rebellion but rather that of sedition. The
purpose of the raid and the act of the raiders in rising
publicly and taking up arms was not exactly against
the Government and for the purpose of doing the
things defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal code
under rebellion. The raiders did not even attack the
Presidencia, the seat of local Government. Rather, the
object was to attain by means of force, intimidation,
etc. one object, to wit, to inflict an act of hate or
revenge upon the person or property of a public
official, namely, Punzalan was then Mayor of Tiaong.
Under Article 139 of the same Code this was sufficient
to constitute sedition. As regards the crime of robbery
with which appellants were charged and of which they
were convicted, we are also of the opinion that it was
not one of the purposes of the raid, which was mainly
to kidnap or kill Punzalan and destroy his house. The
robberies were actually committed by only some of the
raiders, presumably dissidents, as an afterthought,
because of the opportunity offered by the confusion
and disorder resulting from the shooting and the
burning of the three houses, the articles being
13
intended presumably to replenish the supplies of the
dissidents in the mountains. For these robberies, only
those who actually took part therein are responsible,
and not the three appellants herein. With respect to
the crime of multiple frustrated murder, while the
assault upon policeman Pedro Lacorte with a hand
grenade causing him injuries resulting in his blindness
in one eye, may be regarded as frustrated murder; the
wounding of Ortega, Anselo, Rivano, Garcia and Lector
should be considered as mere physical injuries. The
crimes committed are, therefore, those of sedition,
multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and physical
injuries.
SEDITION
People vs Cabrera
Facts: On December 13, 1920, policemen of the city of
Manila arrested a woman who was a member of the
household of a Constabulary soldier stationed at the
Santa Lucia Barracks in this city. The arrest of the
woman was considered by some of the Constabulary
soldiers as an outrage committed by the policemen,
and it instantly gave rise to friction between members
of Manila police department and member of the
Philippine Constabulary.
The next day, December 14, at about sunset, a
policemen named Artemio Mojica, posted on Calle
Real, in the District of Intramuros, city of Manila, had
an encounter with various Constabulary soldiers which
resulted in the shooting of private Macasinag of the
Constabulary. Private Macasinag was seriously, and as
afterwards appeared, mortally wounded.
One platoon of Constabulary soldiers apparently
numbering about ten or twelve, on Calle Real,
Intramuros, fired in the direction of the intersection of
Calles Real and Cabildo where an American policeman
named Driskill was stationed, and was taking with a
friend named Jacumin, a field clerk in the United States
Army. These two men were shot and died soon
afterwards.
Another platoon of the Constabulary, between thirty
and forty in number, had in the meantime, arranged
themselves in a firing line on the Sunken Gradens on
the east side of Calle General Luna opposite the
Aquarium. From this advantageous position the
Constabulary fired upon the motorcycle occupied by
Sergeant Armada and driven by policeman Policarpio
who with companions were passing along Calle General
Luna in front of the Aquarium going in the direction, of
Calle Real, Intramuros.
Issue: Did the accused commit sedition?
Ruling: YES.
Sedition, in its more general sense, is the raising of
commotions or disturbances in the State. The
Philippine law on the subject (Act No. 292) makes all
persons guilty of sedition who rise publicly and
tumultuously in order to obtain by force or outside of
legal methods any one of vie objects, including that of
inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon the person or
property of any official or agent of the Insular
Government or of Provincial or Municipal Government.
The trial court found that the crime of sedition, as
defined and punished by the law, had been committed,
and we believe that such finding is correct. The object
of the uprising was to inflict an act of hate or revenge
upon the persons of the policemen who were public
officers or employees.
Question: Does sedition absorb common crimes? NO.
Both in the cases of Umali and Cabrera, the accused
were found guilty of sedition and other crimes.
US vs Tolentino
Facts: Aurelio Tolentino, the appellant in this case,
was convicted upon an information charging him with
the crime of "uttering seditious words and writings,
publishing and circulating scurrilous libels against the
Government of the United States and the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands.
Tolentino wrote and directed a theatrical work which
was presented at the Teatro Libertad, entitled
"Kahapon, Ngayon, at Bukas."
It was proven at the trial beyond a reasonable doubt
that the accused did in fact write the drama and the
announcement thereof, substantially as set out in the
information, and did, with other members of a
theatrical company, of which he was director, utter and
publish the same substantially in manner and form as
charged.
Issue: Whether in writing, publishing, and uttering the
drama, the accused was in fact guilty of sedition?
Ruling: YES.
The manifest, unmistakable tendency of the play, in
view of the time, place, and manner of its presentation,
was to inculcate a spirit of hatred and enmity against
the American people and the Government of the United
States in the Philippines, and we are satisfied that the
principal object and intent of its author was to incite
the people of the Philippine Islands to open and armed
resistance to the constituted authorities, and to induce
them to conspire together for the secret organization
14
of armed forces, to be used when the opportunity
presented itself, for the purpose of overthrowing the
present Government and setting up another in its
stead.
This contention cannot be maintained. The public
presentation of the drama took place in the month of
May, 1903, less than two years after the establishment
of the Civil Government. The smouldering embers of a
wide-spread and dangerous insurrection were not yet
entirely extinguished, and here and there throughout
the Islands occasional outbreaks still required the use
of the armed forces of the Government for their
suppression. A junta in the city of Hongkong, composed
of persons whose announced purpose and object in
organizing was the overthrow of the present
Government, was actively engaged in the endeavor to
keep the people of these Islands from peaceably
accepting the authority of that Government, and this
junta, acting with confederates in the Philippines, was
still able to keep alive a certain spirit of unrest and
uncertainty which it hoped to fan into open revolt and
rebellion at the first favorable opportunity.
The manner and form in which the drama was
presented at such a time and under such conditions,
renders absurd the pretense that it was merely or even
principally a literary or artistic production, and the
clumsy devices, the allegorical figures, the apparent
remoteness, past and future, of the events portrayed,
could not and in fact were not intended to leave the
audience in doubt as to its present and immediate
application, nor should they blind this court to the true
purpose and intent of the author and director of the
play.
The play tended to instigate others to cabal and meet
together for unlawful purposes and to stir up people
against the lawful authorities and to disturb the peace
of the community and the safety and order of the
gov’t.
Espuelas vs People
Facts: Oscar Espuelas had his picture taken, making it
to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a
piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree,
when in truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a
barrel. After securing copies of his photograph,
Espuelas sent copies of same to several newspapers
and weeklies of general circulation, not only in the
Province of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines
and abroad, for their publication with a suicide note or
letter, wherein he made to appear that it was written
by a fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed
to the latter's supposed wife. The note contained words
that he committed suicide because he was not pleased
with tthe administration of Pres Roxas; and that our
gov't is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis for
which reason he cannot hold high brows to the world
with this dirty gov't. He instructed his children to burn
pictures of Roxas if and when they come across them.
Espuelas was found to be guilty of writing, publish, or
circulating scurrilous libels against the Government of
the Philippines or any of the duly constituted
authorities thereof or which suggest or incite rebellious
conspiracies or riots or which tend to stir up the people
againts the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of
the community.
Issue: Were the acts of Espuelas considered as
scurrilous libel?
Ruling: YES.
The latter is a scurrilous libel against the Government.
It calls our government one of crooks and dishonest
persons (dirty) infested with Nazis and a Fascistis i.e.
dictators. Writings which tend to overthrow or
undermine the security of the government or to
weaken the confidence of the people in the
government are against the public peace, and are
criminal not only because they tend to incite to a
breach of the peace but because they are conducive to
the destruction of the very government itself.
Not to be restrained is the privilege of any citizen to
criticize his government officials and to submit his
criticism to the "free trade of ideas" and to plead for its
acceptance in "the competition of the market."
However, let such criticism be specific and therefore
constructive, reasoned or tempered, and not a
contemptuous condemnation of the entire government
set-up. Such wholesale attack is nothing less than an
invitation to disloyalty to the government. In the article
now under examination one will find no particular
objectionable actuation of the government. It is called
dirty, it is called a dictatorship, it is called shameful,
but no particular omissions or commissions are set
forth. Instead the article drip with male-violence and
hate towards the constituted authorities. It tries to
arouse animosity towards all public servants headed by
President Roxas whose pictures this appellant would
burn and would teach the younger generation to
destroy.
Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences
the article cannot fail to impress thinking persons that
it seeks to sow the seeds of sedition and strife. The
infuriating language is not a sincere effort to persuade,
what with the writer's simulated suicide and false claim
to martyrdom and what with is failure to particularize.
When the use irritating language centers not on
persuading the readers but on creating disturbances,
the rationable of free speech cannot apply and the
15
speaker or writer is removed from the protection of the
constitutional guaranty.
If it be argued that the article does not discredit the
entire governmental structure but only President Roxas
and his men, the reply is that article 142 punishes not
only all libels against the Government but also "libels
against any of the duly constituted authorities thereof."
The "Roxas people" in the Government obviously refer
of least to the President, his Cabinet and the majority
of legislators to whom the adjectives dirty, Hitlers and
Mussolinis were naturally directed. On this score alone
the conviction could be upRULING.
Question: Define scurrilous? Scurrilous means low,
vulgar, mean, or foul.
ARREST
Martinez vs Morfe
Facts: The question raised in these certiorari
proceedings, one to which no authoritative answer has
been yielded by past decisions, is the scope to be
accorded the constitutional immunity of senators and
representatives from arrest during their attendance at
the sessions of Congress and in going to and returning
from the same except in cases of treason, felony and
breach of the peace. Martinez and Bautista are
delegates of the Consitutional Convention.
They are both facing criminal charges. Martinez for
falsification of a public document and Bautista for two
infos for violation of the Revised Election Code.
Petitioners invoke their parliamentary immunity under
Art. 145 of the RPC for under the Constitutional
Convention Act, delegates are entitled to the
parliamentary immunities of a senator or a
representative.
What is thus sought by petitioners Martinez y Festin
and Bautista, Sr. is that the respective warrants of
arrest ISSUEd against them be quashed on the claim
that by virtue of the parliamentary immunity they
enjoy as delegates, ultimately traceable to Section 15
of Article VI of the Constitution as construed together
with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code, they are
immune from arrest. In the case of petitioner Martinez
y Festin, he is proceeded against for falsification of a
public document punishable by prision mayor. 12 As
for petitioner Bautista, Sr., the penalty that could be
imposed for each of the Revised Election Code offense,
of which he is charged, is not higher than prision
mayor.
Issue: Are Martinez and Bautista immune from arrest?
Ruling: No. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of
the necessity to have members of Congress, and
likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention.
They are accorded the constitutional immunity of
senators and representatives from arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of Congress and in going to
and returning from the same except in cases of
treason, felony and breach of the peace. In the case at
bar, the crimes for which Martinez and Bautista were
arrested fall under the category 0f “breach of peace”.
Breach of the peace covers any offense whether
defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special
statute. Therefore, Martinez and Bautista cannot
invoke the privilege from arrest provision of the
Constitution.
The above conclusion reached by this Court is
bolstered and fortified by policy considerations. There
is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have
members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the
Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost
freedom to enable them to discharge their vital
responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the
dictates of their conscience. Necessarily the utmost
latitude in free speech should be accorded them. When
it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would
amount to the creation of a privileged class, without
justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability
for a criminal offense, they would be considered
immune during their attendance in Congress and in
going to and returning from the same. There is likely to
be no dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a
delegate can perform his functions efficiently and well,
without the need for any transgression of the criminal
law. Should such an unfortunate event come to pass,
he is to be treated like any other citizen considering
that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that
crime should not go unpunished.
DIRECT ASSAULT
People vs Beltran
Facts: Accused-appellants Delfino Beltran, Rogelio
Bugarin, Cresencio Siazon, Manuel Puzon, Domingo
Hernandez, and Ceferino Beltran were indicted for
murder and double attempted murder with direct
assault in the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan.
In the evening of January 11, 1972 Ernesto Alvarado
was bringing Calixto Urbi home in a jeep. Passing by
the Puzon Compound, Delfino Beltran shouted at them,
"Oki ni inayo" (Vulva of your mother). After Alvarado
had brought Urbi to his house, he went to the house of
Mayor Bienvenido Quirolgico and reported the matter.
The newly elected Mayor told the Chief of Police that
something should be done about it.
16
They decided to go to the Puzon Compound with the
intention to talk to Delfino Beltran and his companions
to surrender. When they came near the compound,
they saw appellants Delfino Beltran, Rogelio Bugarin
and Domingo Hernandez and suddenly there was a
simultaneous discharge of gunfire, The mayor's son,
Vicente, was hit. Mayor Quirolgico and Patrolman
Rolando Tolentino also suffered injuries. When the
firing had stopped, they decided to bring Vicente to the
hospital. As the jeep left the compound, three (3) men
came out of the Puzon Compound and fired at the
fleeing vehicle. They were Cresencio Siazon, Ceferino
Beltran and Noling Puzon. Likewise, Domingo
Hernandez and Minong Beltran and Boy Bugarin tried
to give chase. After a while, all the six men returned
inside the compound.
An hour after admission to the hospital Vicente
Quirolgico died.
Issue: Is the finding of the appellants guilty of double
attempted murder with direct assault on Mayor
Quirolgico and Patrolman Rolando Tolentino correct?
Ruling: YES.
Considering that Mayor Quirolgico is a person in
authority and Pat. Rolando Tolentino is a policeman
who at the time was in his uniform, and both were
performing their official duties to maintain peace and
order in the community, the finding of the trial court
that appellants are guilty of attempted murder with
direct assault on the persons of Mayor Quirolgico and
Pat. Tolentino is correct.
People vs Dollantes
Facts: Due to the approaching fiesta of Brgy. Maglihe,
Tayasan, Negros Oriental, a dance was RULING on the
evening of April 21, 1983. While Brgy. Captain Marcos
Gabutero was delivering a speech to start the dance,
the accused Pedro Dollantes went to the middle of the
dancing floor, making a dance movement known in the
visayan as "nagkorantsa", brandishing his knife and
challenging everyone as to who was brave among the
people present. The Brgy. Captain approached Pedro
Dollantes and admonished him to keep quiet and not
to disturb the dance. However, the accused, instead of
heeding to the advice of the Barangay Captain,
stabbed the latter on the left arm. Immediately
thereafter, accused Hamlet Dollantes, who rushed
towards the Brgy. Captain, stabbed him at the back
and the other co-accused also took turns in stabbing
the Brgy. Captain, who, at that time, was not armed.
When the Brgy. Captain fell to the ground and died, the
accused in this case took turns in kicking his dead body
and were dancing around said dead body. He suffered
eleven (11) wounds in the different parts of his body,
two of which happened to be at the back of his dead
body. According to the attending physician, Dr. Rogelio
Kho who examined the body of the deceased, the
victim died of "Severe hemorrhage and cardiac
tamponade due to stab wounds."  shirt of the complainant which was torn. Clerk Carlos
The accused Pedro Dollantes, Hamlet Dollantes,
Alfredo Dollantes, Lauro Dollantes, Monico Dollantes,
Sidrito Lokesia, Merlando Dollantes, Hugo Grengia,
Danny Esteban and Leonilo Villaester, guilty of the
complex crime of assault upon a person in authority
resulting in murder.
Issue: Is the finding of the accused guilty of the crime
charged correct?
Ruling: YES.
The records show that the Barangay Captain was in the
act of trying to pacify Pedro Dollantes who was making
trouble in the dance hall when he was stabbed to
death. He was therefore killed while in the performance
of his duties.
In the case of People v. Hecto (135 SCRA 113), this
Court ruled that "As the barangay captain, it was his
duty to enforce the laws and ordinances within the
barangay. If in the enforcement thereof, he incurs, the
enmity of his people who thereafter treacherously slew
him the crime committed is murder with assault upon a
person in authority."
Justo vs CA
Facts: The offended party Nemesio de la Cuesta is a
duly appointed district supervisor of the Bureau of
Public Schools. On October 16, 1950, he went to the
division office in Laoag, Ilocos Norte. De la Cuesta was
leaving the office in order to take his meal when he
saw appellant Severino Justo conversing with Severino
Caridad, the academic supervisor. Appellant requested
De la Cuesta to go with him and Caridad to the office of
the latter.
In the office of Caridad, the Appellant asked about the
possibility of accommodating Miss Racela as a teacher
in the district of De la Cuesta. Caridad said that there
was no vacancy, except that of the position of shop
teacher. Upon hearing Caridad’s answer,
the Appellant sharply addressed the complainant thus:
17
“Shet, you are a double crosser. One who cannot keep
his promise.”
The Appellant then grabbed a lead paper weight from
the table of Caridad and challenged the offended party
to go out. Appellant left Caridad’s office and was
followed by De la Cuesta. De la Cuesta asked
the Appellant to put down the paper weight but instead
the Appellant grabbed the neck and collar of the polo
Bueno was able to separate them but not before the
complainant had boxed the Appellant several times.
The Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte
found Petitioner Severino Justo guilty of the crime of
assault upon a person in authority which the Court of
Appeals affirmed.
Issue: Has complainant disrobed himself of the mantle
of authority and waived the privilege of protection as a
person in authority when he accepted the appelant’s
challenge to fight outside and followed the appellant
out of the room of Mr. Caridad?
Ruling: NO.
The character of person in authority is not assumed or
laid off at will, but attaches to a public official until he
ceases to be in office. Assuming that the complainant
was not actually performing the duties of his office
when assaulted, this fact does not bar the existence of
the crime of assault upon a person in authority; so long
as the impelling motive of the attack is the
performance of official duty. This is apparent from the
phraseology of Article 148 of our Revised Penal Code,
in penalizing attacks upon person in authority “while
engaged in the performance of official duties or on
occasion of such performance”, the words “on
occasion” signifying “because” or “by reason” of the
past performance of official duty, even if at the very
time of the assault no official duty was being
discharged.
No other construction is compatible with the evident
purpose of the law that public officials and their agents
should be able to discharge their official duties without
being haunted by the fear of being assaulted or injured
by reason thereof.
DELIVERY OF PRISONERS FROM JAIL
Alberto vs Dela Cruz
Facts: In Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur, Eligio Orbita, a Provincial
guard, is prosecuted for the crime of Infidelity in the
Custody of Prisoner, defined and punished under
Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code, committed, as
follows:
On September 12, 1968, the accused, being then a
member of the Provincial Guard of Camarines Sur and
specially charged with the duty of keeping under
custody and vigilance detention prisoner Pablo
Denaque, did then and there with great carelessness
and unjustifiable negligence leave the latter unguarded
while in said barrio, thereby giving him the opportunity
to run away and escape, as in fact said detention
prisoner Pablo Denaque did run away and escape from
the custody of the said accused.  Cledera and Esmeralda under Article 224 of the
During the cross-examination of prosecution witness
Jose Esmeralda, assistant provincial warden of
Camarines Sur, the defense brought forth and
confronted the witness with a note purportedly written
by Gov. Armando Cledera. The note was asking Jose
Esmeralda to send five men to work in the construction
of a fence at his house at Taculod, Canaman,
Camarines Sur, then leased by the province and used
as an official guest house. Jose Esmeralda, declared,
however, that he could not remember who handed the
note to him; that he was not sure as to genuineness of
the signature appearing therein and that he was not
present when the note was made and signed by Gov.
Cledera.  execution of sentence was deferred to Feb. 12, 1965,
Beleiving that the escape of Pablo Denaque was made
possible by the note of Gov. Cledera to Jose Esmeralda
and that Cledera and Esmeralda are equally guilty of
the offense for which the accused Eligio Orbita had
been charged, the defense counsel filed a motion in
court seeking the amendment of the information so as
to include Gov. Cledera and Jose Esmeralda as
defendants therein.
Issue: Are Cledera and Esmeralda equally guilty of the
offense for which the accused Eligio Orbita had been
charged?
Ruling: No.
The offense under Art. 156 of the RPC is usually
committed by an outsider who removes from jail any
person therein confined or helps him escape. If the
offender is a public officer who has custody or charge
of the prisoner, he is liable for infidelity in the custody
of prisoner. Since Gov. Cledera as governor, is the
jailer of the province, and Jose Esmeralda is the
assistant provincial warden, they cannot be prosecuted
for the escape Of Pablo Denaque under Article 156 of
the Revised Penal Code.
There is likewise no sufficient evidence to warrant their
prosecution under Art. 223 of the RPC. In order to be
guilty under the aforequoted provisions of the Penal
Code, it is necessary that the public officer had
18
consented to, or connived in, the escape of the
prisoner under his custody or charge. No connivance in
the escape of Pablo Denaque from the custody of the
accused Eligio Orbita can be deduced from the note of
Gov. Cledera to Jose Esmeralda asking for five men to
work in the guest house, it appearing that the notes
does not mention the names of the prisoners to be
brought to the guest house; and that it was the
accused Eligio Orbita who picked the men to compose
the work party.
Neither is there evidence to warrant the prosecution of
Revised Penal Code. This article punishes the public
officer in whose custody or charge a prisoner has
escaped by reason of his negligence resulting in
evasion is definite amounting to deliberate non-
performance of duty.
EVASION OF SERVICE
Tanega vs Masakayan
Facts: Petitioner was convicted of slander. He was
sentenced to 20 days of Arresto Menor and the
but on this date, she did not show up in court, and her
arrest was ordered.
But she was never arrested and then on Dec. 10, 1966,
she moved to quash the warrants of arrest on ground
of prescription (light penalties prescribed in 1 yr)
It was RULING that there was no prescription because
the accused did not EVADE the service of her sentence.
Issue: WON the crime has prescribed
Ruling: NO.
Elements of EVASION:
1. Offender is a convict by final judgment
2. He is serving his sentence which consists in
deprivation of liberty
3. He EVADES the service of his sentence by
escaping during the term of his sentence
Based on FACTS, the convict who was sentenced to
imprisonment by final judgment was NEVER placed in
confinement. Also the accused did not evade the
service of her sentence. Prescription of penalty then,
does not run in her favor.
People vs Abilong
Facts: That on or about the 17th day of September,
1947, in the City of Manila, Philippines, Florentino
Abilong, the accused, being then a convict sentenced
and ordered to serve destierro during which he should
not enter any place within the radius of 100 kilometers
from the City of Manila for attempted robbery
He evaded the service of said sentence by going
beyond the limits made against him and commit
vagrancy.
ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in imposing a
penalty on the accused under article 157 of the
Revised Penal Code, which does not cover evasion of
service of "destierro."
Ruling: NO.
It is clear that the word "imprisonment" used in the
English text is a wrong or erroneous translation of the
phrase "sufriendo privacion de libertad" used in the
Spanish text. It is equally clear that although the
Solicitor General impliedly admits destierro as not
constituting imprisonment, it is a deprivation of liberty,
though partial, in the sense that as in the present case,
the appellant by his sentence of destierro was deprived
of the liberty to enter the City of Manila. Under the
case of People vs. Samonte, as quoted in the brief of
the Solicitor General that "it is clear that a person
under sentence of destierro is suffering
deprivation of his liberty and escapes from the
restrictions of the penalty when he enters the
prohibited area."
Torres vs Gonzales
Facts: In 1979, Wilfredo S. Torres was convicted of the
crime of estafa (two counts) and was sentenced to an
aggregate prison term and to pay an indemnity.
On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted by
the President of the Philippines on condition that
petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal
laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be
violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner
prescribed by law." Petitioner accepted the conditional
pardon and was consequently released from
confinement.
The Board resolved to recommend to the President to
cancel the conditional parole. It showed that 20 counts
of Estafa had been charged against petitioner which
cases were hen “PENDING” trial before RTC. Record
also showed that petitioner was convicted of sedition
but this conviction was then “PENDING” appeal before
Intermediate Appellate Court.
19
The President cancelled the conditional pardon.
Petitioner was then arrested and confined in
Muntinlupa to serve unexpired portion of his sentence.
Petitioner CLAIMS: that he did not violate his
conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by
FINAL JUDGEMENT of 20 counts of Estafa nor Sedition.
Also, that he was deprived of his right of due process.
Issue: Whether or not Torres violated the condition of
his pardon
Ruling: NO.
A convict granted conditional pardon, like the
petitioner, who is recommitted MUST BE CONVICTED
BY FINAL JUDGMENT of a court of the subsequent crime
charged to him before the criminal penalty can be
imposed upon him.
The parolee or convict who is prosecuted as having
violated the provisions thereof must be charged,
prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he
can be made to suffer penalty prescribed in Article
159.
QUASI-RECIDIVISM
People vs Dioso
Facts: The 2 respondents, Abarca and Dioso, having
been previously convicted by final judgment of a crime
of homicide and robbery respectively, committed again
a crime while they were serving their sentence.
Dioso and Abarca were members of “Batang
Mindanao” gang while victims Reyno and Gomez
belonged to a group known as “Happy Go Lucky”. One
of the bloody clashes of these rival factions resulted in
the death of Balerio member of Batang Mindanao.
Suspecting that Reyno and Gomez, had authored the
slaying, the respondents decided to avenge his death.
While the victims were sick and confined in prison
hospital, they pretended to be sick and went to the
hospital to seek admission as a patient.
Then, accused suddenly drew out their improvised
knives and stabbed the victims.
The Trial Court imposed death penalty upon them. The
accused seek attenuation/reduction of death sentence
imposed by TC invoking the circumstances of voluntary
surrender and plea of guilty.
Issue: WON the mitigating circumstances be
considered to lower the penalty imposed
Ruling: NO.
SC ruled that it is not necessary to discuss the effects
of such mitigating circumstances on penalty imposed
Suffice it is to say that the accused are QUASI-
RECIDIVIST, having committed the crime charged while
serving sentence for a prior offense.
As such, the maximum penalty prescribed for the new
felony is death, regardless of the presence or absence
mitigating/aggravating circumstance (alevosia) or the
complete absence thereof.
FORGERY
Del Rosario vs People
Facts: Accused Apolinario del Rosario showed
complainant Philippine one-peso bills and induced
complainant to believe that the same were counterfeit
paper money manufactured by them, although in fact
they were genuine treasury notes of the Philippine
Government one of the digits of each of which had
been altered and changed. By virtue of the
inducement, Apolinario succeeded in obtaining from
complainant P1,700.00 for the avowed purpose of
financing the manufacture of more counterfeit treasury
notes of the Philippines.
Issue: Whether possession of the altered onepeso bills
constitute a violation of Article 168
Held: YES.
The possession of genuine treasury notes of the
Philippines any of “the figures, letters, words or signs
contained” in which had been erased and or altered,
with knowledge of such notes, as they were used by
petitioner herein and his codefendants in the manner
adverted to above, is punishable under said Article
168, in relation to Article 166, subdivision (1), of the
Revised Penal Code.
FALSIFICATION
Siquian vs People
Facts: Complainant Jesusa Carreon went to the
accused Manuel Siquian, then Mayor, to apply for
employment in the Office of the Mayor. The Mayor
agreed to employ her. Later, she was appointed clerk
to the Municipal Secretary by the accused.
20
Accompanying her appointment is the certification of
the availability of funds issued by the accused.
It turned out however that no such fund is available
and that the position of Clerk to the Municipal
Secretary is not available. Because of this, complainant
did not receive any salary. She instituted a complaint
for falsification.
Accused however alleged that the statements he made
in the certification are conclusions of law and not
narration of facts. Moreover, he had no intent to injure
any person and as such, he cannot be held criminally
liable.
Issue: Whether or not the existence of a wrongful
intent is necessary in the case at bar
Ruling: NO.
The existence of a wrongful intent to injure a third
person is not necessary when the falsified document is
a public document.
The rationale for this principal distinction between
falsification of public and private documents has been
stated by the Court in this wise: "In the falsification of
public or official documents, whether by public officials
or private persons, it is unnecessary that there be
present the Idea of gain or the intent to injure a third
person, for the reason that, in contradistinction to
private documents, the principal thing punished is the
violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth
as therein solemnly proclaimed" [People v. Po Giok To,
supra at 918, citing People v. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48
(1924)]. In falsification of public documents therefore,
the controlling consideration is the public character of
a document and the existence of any prejudice caused
to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such
damage becomes immaterial [People v. Pacana,
supra].
This essential element of falsification of a public
document by public officer requires that the offender
"abuse his office or use the influences prestige or
ascendancy which his office gives him, in committing
the crime" [U.S. v. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150 (1911)].
Abuse of public office is considered present when the
offender falsifies a document in connection with the
duties of his office which consist of either making or
preparing or otherwise intervening in the preparation
of a document [U.S. v. Inosanto 20 Phil. 376 (1911);
People v. Santiago Uy, 101 Phil. 159 (1957)], as in the
case of petitioner who was charged with the duty of
issuing the certification necessary for the appointment
of Jesusa Carreon.
People vs Villalon
Facts: Accused Federico de Guzman was able to
procure a loan from a bank. In order to get the loan,
accused mortgage a property owned in equal shares
by the complainant Mariano Carrera and his brother by
virtue of a notarized special power of attorney
allegedly executed in February 5, 1964.
Both the power of attorney and the mortgage contract
were registered in the Register of Deeds on February
13, 1964. The property was foreclosed by the bank and
was later sold to another.
Complainant only learned that his property is already
registered in the name of another when an ejectment
suit was filed against him in January 1972. Because of
this, complainant instituted a criminal complaint for
estafa thru falsification of public document against the
accused on March 29, 1974.
He alleged that the accused made it appear that
complainant signed and affixed his signature in the
said power of attorney when as a matter of fact; he did
not so participate therein.
Issue: Whether the charge of estafa thru falsification
of a public document has sufficient ground to exist in
law and in fact
Ruling: YES.
The falsification of a public document may be a means
of committing estafa because before the falsified
document is actually utilized to defraud another, the
crime of falsification has already been consummated,
damage or intent to cause damage not being an
element of the crime of falsification of public, official or
commercial documents. The damage to another is
caused by the commission of estafa, not by the
falsification of the document, hence, the falsification of
the public, official or commercial document is only a
necessary means to commit the estafa.
Petitioner posits that the offense charged is supported
by the fact that what was intended to be mortgaged
was the one-half portion pertaining to Severo Carrera,
not the portion pertaining to complainant, otherwise
complainant would not have quoted his brother's
words. The theory of petitioner and the findings of
public respondent are substantially the same. We
agree that the offense charged does exist in fact and in
law, as explained in the findings of the court below:
"In the light of the circumstances revealed by the
partial testimony of complainant Mariano Carrera and
of the record, as regards the first ground, the court
finds that the contention of the defense that the
21
authorization given to him to mortgage the whole
property is not sustained by the evidence because a
cursory study of the answer made by the witness
complainant clearly shows that what was intended to
be mortgaged was the one-half (1/2) portion pertaining
only to Severo Carrera, excluding that portion
pertaining to said complainant.
US vs Capule
Facts: On September 2, 1903, Nicasio Capule, for the
purpose of appropriating to himself a tract of coconut
land, situated in the town of San Pablo, Laguna,
without the knowledge or consent of the owners
thereof, the married couple Aniceto Maghirang and
Isabel Pili, by agreement and cooperation with the
notary public, Inocente Martinez, who later died,
prepared and drew up a document setting forth the
sale in his favor of the said land, pretending that it was
made and executed by the said owners of the tract,
stating in the document that they had made the
declaration that they had sold said land for the sum of
550 pesos paid at the time of the sale to the vendors,
and Jacinto Peñaflor and Jorge Tolentino appear in said
document as witnesses of the execution thereof; and
Eulogio Ortega and Doroteo Guia as the signers of the
deed of sale, because the alleged vendors did not
know how to do so. Recorded at the bottom of the
document was their ratification of its contents in the
presence of said notary, before whom the said married
couple appeared. The defendant Capule exhibited said
document later, although he had been assured that it
was false, in a trial before the justice of the peace of
that town in the attempt to sustain his alleged right to
the said piece of land.
The owners sold portions of the same land to two other
people. Capule, claiming to be the owners, accused the
owners of theft.
Aniceto Maghirang denies that he sold the said land to
Nicasio Capule or that he executed in his favor any
document of sale, stating that he had conferred a
power of attorney upon him so that he might represent
himself and his wife, who later died, in a suit they had
with Maximino Reyes, because of the absolute
confidence they had in the defendant, just as it was the
latter himself who drew up the document that was later
signed in his stead by Eulogio Ortega, because he
could not read or write; but he denied that he or his
wife had ever been in the house of the notary Inocente
Martinez to execute or ratify any document or that he
and his wife Isabel Pili, when she was alive, had told
the defendant Capule that they wished to sell the said
land and that he had offered to buy it.
Issue: Did Capule commit falsification?
Ruling: YES.
It therefore appears to be plainly proven that the crime
of falsification of a document has been committed
because the defendant executed upon said notarial
document of an official character acts constituting
falsification, by counterfeiting therein the intervention
of the married couple Aniceto Maghirang and Isabel
Pili, to whom he ascribed statements different from
what they had made to him and by perverting the truth
in the narration of facts, getting two persons to sign in
the name of said married couple through deceit, after
giving them to understand that the document
contained a commission or power of attorney, when in
fact it was a deed of sale of a piece of land, the
legitimate owners whereof had never intended or
consented to its alienation.
None of the persons who appear to have signed said
document and seem to have been present at its
execution were informed of its true contents, because
they all confided with the greatest good faith in the
false and deceitful statements of the defendant,
believing what he said to the effect that said
instrument was a commission voluntarily conferred
upon him by the couple executing it, who never
intended to execute any document of sale of their
property to the defendant, who went to the extreme of
getting a notary to certify to its ratification before him,
made apparently by the alleged vendors in the
contents of the said false document.
People vs Manansala
Facts: Felix Manansala was apprehended by Corporal
del Rosario for driving his jeepney outside of his route.
Required to present his driver's license, Manansala
showed a duplicate of his Traffic Violation Report which
was previously issued to him on account of his third
traffic violation. Noticing that the TVR had been
altered, del Rosario brought Manansala to the police
station for investigation.
The alterations were found to consist in erasing the
originally written figure "III" and the word "three", and
superimposed thereon was the figure "I" and the word
"one". The alterations made thus changed the meaning
of the said official document, because it was made to
appear in said duplicate TVR that Manansala only had
one pending case of traffic violation instead of three.
Manansala admitted having made the alterations in
question, in order to hide his pending traffic violation
cases. At the hearing however, he denied having
22
admitted responsibility for such alterations, claiming he
did not know the contents of the confession, but only
signed the same in order that he may be released.
Issue: Is the possessor of a falsified document
presumed to be the author of the same?
Ruling: YES.
The accused is guilty of falsification of a public
document mainly on the proposition that "the only
person who could have made the erasure and the
superimpositions is the one who will be benefited by
the alterations this made" and that "he alone could
have the motive for making such alterations". Besides,
accused had a sufficient and strong motive to commit
the falsification. The policy and practice of the MPD
was proved to be to arrest a driver who commits a 4th
traffic violation instead o f merely issuing to him a TVR,
as is usually done for the 1st, 2md, and 3rd violation.
Hence, Manansala had the strongest temptation to
erase the 3 violation in the TVR in question and make it
appear thereon that he only had committed one
violation in order to escape arrest in case of a 4th
infraction.
Manansala's exclusive possession, opportunity and
motive to falsify the TVR in question constitute
circumstantial evidence justifying the inference
(presumption of fact) that the forger was himself, in
the absence of adequate explanation.
USE OF FALSIFIED DOCUMENTS
US vs Castillo
Facts: Pio Castillo is one of the 3 clerks in Sheriff
James Watkin's office. Watkin's blank checkbook was
kept in a drawer in gis offcie, and Castillo was left
alone in the office he having locked the same after all
the clerks have gone.
On the morning of Dec 2, 1905, Pio Castillo presented a
check for the 56 pesos, Philippine currency, to Chinese
merchant named Lim Ponso. The said check was made
payable to bearer and purported to be drawn by one
James J. Watkins. Watkins' signature upon said check
was a forgery made in imitation of the genuine
signature of James J. Watkins, sheriff of the city of
Iloilo, and that, in fact, the said James J. Watkins never
signed or issued the said check. Castillo was paid the
su, of moneyThe blank upon which the check was
written was stolen from a book of blank checks.
The trial court found Castillo not guilty of falsification,
but guilty of the crime of knowingly using with intent to
gain a falsified mercantile document.
Issue: Does the uttering of a forged document prove
that the utterer is author of the same?
Ruling: YES.
If the utterance of such document is unexplained, it is
strong evidence that the utterer himself forged the
instrument or caused it to be forged. The SC held that
Castillo is guilty of falsification as charged.
For the purposes of this case it is not necessary to
hold, and we do not hold, that the mere fact that the
accused uttered the check in question is proof of the
fact that he also forged it or caused it to be forged, but
we do hold that the utterance of such an instrument,
when unexplained, is strong evidence tending to
establish the fact that the utterer either himself forged
the instrument or caused it to be forged, and that this
evidence, taken together with the further evidence set
out above and brought out on the trial of the case,
establishes the guilt of the accused of the crime with
which he was charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
The uttering may be so closely connection with the
forgers that it becomes when so accomplished,
probable proof of complicity in the forgery.
It has been decided, nevertheless, that "possession of
a forged instrument by a person claiming under it is
strong evidence tending to prove that he forged it or
caused it to be forged." In several jurisdiction it has
been held that one found in the possession of a forged
order issued in his own favor is presumed either to
have forged it or procured it to be forged.
(NOT IN THE CASE, BUT UNDER ART. 172) Elements
which would DEEM the utterer as the author:
1.) The use was so closely connected in time with the
falsification;
2.) The user had the capacity of falsifying the
document.
In the case at bar, Castillo was in J. Watkin's office on
the night of Dec 1 and early in the morning of Dec 2.
The forged mercantile document was presented on the
morning of Dec 2. Castillo was also one of the 3 clerks
assigned by Watkins, and was the one who locked the
door on the night of Dec 1. As the uttering of the check
was so closely connected in time with the forging,
Castillo should be considered the forger thereof.
23
People vs. Dava
Facts: On October 19, 1975, while driving a car along
Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong, Rizal, petitioner
Michael T. Dava, then holder of non-professional
driver's license No. 1474427 1 with official receipt No.
7023037, bumped pedestrians Bernadette Roxas
Clamor and Dolores E. Roxas, causing death to the
former and physical injuries to the latter.
Dava's driver's license was confiscated and submitted
to the fiscal's office in Pasig, Rizal.
On April 12, 1978, Antonio Roxas, the brother of
Bernadette and the father of Dolores, saw Dava driving
a maroon Volkswagen (beetle-type) car. Knowing that
Dava's driver's license was used as an exhibit in court
and that no traffic violation receipt had been issued to
Dava, Roxas sought the help of then Minister of
Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in apprehending Dava for
driving without a license and was assisted by the
Constabulary Highway Patrol Group.
On the evening of July 21, 1978, Dava was confronted
by M/Sgt. Domingo Lising and S/Sgt. Arturo Viduya and
was asked for his driver’s license. They were shown
non-professional driver's license No. 2706887 with
official receipt No. 0605870 issued by Agency 2L
Pampanga in the name of Michael T. Dava. When
asked about the source of his license, Dava informed
them that his officemate Felizardo Manalili had secured
it for him.
In his affidavit of apprehension, Lising concluded that
Dava's driver's license was fake because when he
compared it with the xerox copy of Dava's license
which was attached to the record of the criminal case
in Pasig, the signatures and the dates of birth indicated
in the two licenses did "not tally."
Caroline Vinluan of the Angeles City branch of the
Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT), who was then the
registrar of the said office found that Dava’s license
was "fake or illegally issued.
Issue: Whether or not Dava should be convicted of the
crime charged
Ruling: YES.
The information specifically charges the petitioner with
having made it appear in his driver's license that
"officials of the Pampanga LTC agency participated" in
the in-preparation of said license and with having used
the said driver's license knowing that it was falsified.
The charges therefore are found on the provisions of
Article 172 (1) of the Revised Penal Code which
punishes any private individual who shall commit any
the falsification enumerated in Article 171 specifically
paragraph 2 thereof which penalizes the act of causing
it to appear that persons (public officials) have
participated in any act proceeding when they did not in
fact so participate. The information also charges Dava
with having knowingly used a false document under
the last paragraph of Article 172.
The elements of the crime of using a falsified
document in transaction (other than as evidence in a
judicial proceed penalized under the last paragraph of
Article 172 are following: (a) the offender knew that a
document was falsified by another person; (b) the false
document is embraced in Article 171 or in any of
subdivisions Nos. 1 and 2 of Article 172; (c he used
such document (not in judicial proceedings), and (d)
the use of the false document caused damage to
another or at last it was used with intent to cause such
damage. Except for last, all of these elements have
been proven beyond reason doubt in this case.
It is not disputed that it was petitioner himself who
requested Manalili to get him a license. He
misrepresented to Manalili that he has not at any time
been issued a driver's license. Through this
misrepresentation and capitalizing on Manalili
awareness of the dire necessity of obtaining a driver's
license the shortest time possible to enable petitioner
to perform duties as detailman, petitioner was able, in
a very subtle clever manner, to induce Manalili to deal
with "fixers" in securing the subject driver's license.
Manalili, who appeared to have been motivated by a
sincere desire to help a friend, did not hesitate to deal
with three fixers whom he paid P70.00 for the license
even if the legal fee then was only P15.00. As it was in
truth petitioner who induced and left Manalili with no
choice but to seek the aid of fixers, the fact that it was
Manalili and not petitioner who dealt directly with said
fixers cannot exculpate petitioner from the charge of
falsification. He is, beyond reasonable doubt, a
principal by inducement in the commission of said
crime.
The third element of use of the falsified document is
proven by the fact that when petitioner was
apprehended by Lising it was in his possession and it
was what he presented Lising to show that he had a
license. Because he was a detailman who did his job
with the use of a car, it is probable that from November
4, 1976 (its date of issuance) until April 12, 1978,
petitioner used the driver's license.
The driver's license being a public document, proof of
the fourth element of damage caused to another
person or at least intent to cause such damage has
become immaterial. In falsification of public or official
documents, the principal thing being punished is the
violation of the public faith and the destruction of the
truth proclaimed therein.
USURPATION
Gigantoni vs People
24
Facts: In 1981, accused Melencio Gigantoni was an
employee of Black Mountain Mining Inc. and Tetra
Management Corporation, which are both private
companies doing business in the Philippines.
On May 14, 1981, Gigantoni went to the office of the
Philippine Air Lines (PAL) allegedly to conduct
verification of some travels made by Black Mountain's
officials. Upon reaching the said PAL office, he falsely
represented himself to the PAL legal officer as a PC-CIS
agent. To further convince the PAL officials of his
supposed mission, Gigantoni exhibited his I.D.
purporting to show that he was a PC-CIS agent.
Thereupon, his aforesaid request was granted, and PAL
legal officer Atty. Conrado A. Boro showed to him the
requested PAL records. Gigantoni then secured xerox
copies of the requested manifest.
When Gigantoni was no longer around, PAL general
counsel Ricardo Puno, Jr., inquired from Atty. Boro
about Gigantoni's purpose in securing copies of PAL
records. They then became suspicious of the accused’s
real identity prompting them to conduct verification
from the PC-CIS office. They subsequently learned from
General Uy of PC-CIS that Gigantoni was no longer a
CIS agent since June 30, 1980 as he had been
dismissed from the service.
On May 15, 1981, in the presence of Atty. Boro and a
PAL security, Gigantoni was confronted by Atty. Puno
as to his real Identity. He later admitted that he was no
longer with the CIS.
The gist of petitioner's contention is that he could not
be guilty of the crime charged because at the time of
the alleged commission of the offense, he was still a
CIS agent who was merely suspended and was not yet
informed of his termination from the service.
Furthermore, he avers that the receipt by him of the
notice of dismissal, if there was any, could not be
established on mere presumption of law that official
duty has been regularly performed.
Issue: Whether or not Gigantoni knowingly and
falsely represent himself as an agent of the CIS,
Philippine Constabulary
Ruling: NO.
The information charges the accused with the crime of
usurpation of authority for "knowingly and falsely
representing himself to be an officer, agent or
representative of any department or agency of the
Philippine Government."
Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code on usurpation of
authority or official functions, under which the
petitioner was charged, punishes any person: (a) who
knowingly and falsely represents himself to be an
officer, agent or representative of any department or
agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign
government; or (b) who, under pretense of official
position, performs any act pertaining to any person in
authority or public officer of the Philippine Government
or any foreign government or any agency thereof,
without being lawfully entitled to do so. The former
constitutes the crime of usurpation of authority under
which the petitioner stands charged, while the latter
act constitutes the crime of usurpation of official
functions.
Petitioner admits that he received a notice of his
suspension from the CIS effective June 20, 1980.
However, as to petitioner's alleged dismissal effective
June 20, 1980, he denies having been informed
thereof. The record is bereft of any evidence or proof
adduced by the prosecution showing that the dismissal
was actually conveyed to petitioner.
The failure of the prosecution to prove that petitioner
was duly notified of his dismissal from the service
negatives the charge that he "knowingly and falsely"
represented himself to be a CIS agent. It was
incumbent upon the prosecution to establish by
positive evidence the allegation that the accused
falsely represented himself as a CIS agent, by
presenting proof that he knew that he was no longer a
CIS agent, having been duly notified of his dismissal. It
is essential to present proof that he actually knew at
the time of the alleged commission of the offense that
he was already dismissed from the service. A mere
disputable presumption that he received notice of his
dismissal would not be sufficient.
Estrada vs Desierto
Facts: On 23 January 2001, the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) placed petitioner’s foreign currency
deposit account at Citibank Greenhills Branch under
constructive distraint.
Contending that the BIR action was unlawful, petitioner
filed a complaint against respondent BIR and
respondent Citibank officers before the Office of the
Ombudsman for allegedly violating (a) Section 8 of the
Foreign Currency Deposits Act (Republic Act No. 6426);
(b) Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code; and (c)
Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(Rep. Act No. 3019);
The Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau
(EPIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman issued a
Resolution recommending the dismissal of the
aforesaid complaint for want of probable cause to
indict respondent bank and BIR officials.
Paul Elmer Clemente, Legal Counsel, Acting Director–
Office of the Chief Legal Counsel (OCLC), issued a
Memorandum approving EPIB’s recommendation, a
copy of which was received by petitioner on 01
February 2002.
25
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65[4] before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition on the ground that it did not fall
under its jurisdiction pursuant to Rep. Act No. 6770. 
The Court of Appeals held that the petition does not fall
under any law as coming within the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not respondents are liable for
violation of Art. 177 of the RPC
Ruling: NO.
Under Art. 177 of the Revised Penal Code, in order for
one to be held liable for Usurpation of Official Function,
there must be a clear showing that the person being
charged had performed an act pertaining to any person
in authority or public officer of the Philippine
government or any agency thereof, under pretense of
official position, and without being lawfully entitled to
do so.
In this instant case, respondent Hefti was the one
specifically charged with Usurpation of Official
Function, in view of her act of issuing the notice of
constructive distraint against the foreign currency
deposit of complainant with the Citibank.  The rest of
the public respondents and all the private respondents
were merely charged in conspiracy with the said
respondent.  Hence, the issue that must be resolved is
whether or not respondent Hefti being the Deputy
Commissioner of BIR had indeed usurped the duty of
the BIR Commissioner when she issued the notice of
distraint.
While it is true that under Sec. 206 of the NIRC as
amended, the Commissioner of the BIR and not any
Officer of the BIR was the one granted with the power
to issue a notice of distraint, it bears to stress,
however, that when respondent Hefti exercised such
function of the BIR Commissioner, she was then
designated Officer-In-Charge of the BIR by President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, as evidenced by a photocopy
of her Memorandum of Appointment.  By virtue of her
appointment as Officer-In-Charge of BIR, it necessary
follows that respondent Hefti can now legally exercise
the duties and functions pertaining to the BIR
Commissioner, including the issuance of a constructive
distraint.  Suffice it to say that when respondent Hefti
issued the notice of distraint, she was clothed with
authority to issue the same in view of her appointment
as the then Officer-In-Charge of the BIR.  Hence, the
charge for Usurpation of Official Function does not
apply to said respondent.
With the establishment of respondent Hefti’s authority
in the issuance of the constructive distraint, the
subsequent act of respondent Dagdag in serving the
said distraint to the Citibank, as well as the act of
respondents Equillos and Albiento in witnessing the
service of the same to the said bank, cannot be
construed as act in agreement to commit the crime of
Usurpation of Authority in the light of the foregoing
discussion.
The same thing holds true to the bank officers who
were made respondents in this case, considering that
their act in informing complainant regarding the
existence of the constructive distraint as well as in
implementing the said distraint against the latter’s
account with the said bank, [were] merely in
compliance to an order issued by a competent
authority.
USING OF FICTITIOUS NAME
Hock Lian vs Republic
Facts: This is an appeal by the Solicitor General from
the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Oriental which granted the petition for naturalization of
Ong Hock Lian alias Julian Ong.
Appellant contends that the lower court erred (1) in
holding that the petition was published in a newspaper
of general circulation; (2) in not holding that
appellee uses an alias without court authority
and in violation of the Anti-Alias Law; (3) in not
holding that appellee had failed to report his true
income; and (4) in not holding that appellee has no
lucrative occupation.
Appellee, a citizen of the Republic of China, arrived in
the Philippines on April 30, 1927. He used to reside in
Zamboanga City but since March 1, 1940 he has been
living in Dumaguete City. He is married to Tan Ko
Kiem, also known as Alice Tan, a Chinese national, by
whom he has three children, two of whom are school
age and are enrolled at the St. Paul's College,
Dumaguete City. Appellee himself finished his first year
high school education at the Zamboanga Chinese High
School, Zamboanga City. He speaks the English
language and the Cebuano-Visayan dialect. A
merchant by occupation, he has a store in Colon
Street, Dumaguete City where he sells rice, corn and
general merchandise. He has two cargo trucks worth
and office equipment. To prove that he has none of the
disqualifications enumerated in the Naturalization Law,
he presented tax and police clearances; clearances
from the Philippine Constabulary, the City Fiscal, the
Provincial Fiscal, the Court of First Instance of Negros
Oriental and the Municipal Court of Dumaguete City;
and a medical certificate of the City Health Officer.
Issue: Whether or not Hock Lian is in violation of R.A.
6085 (Act Regulating the Use of Aliases)
Ruling: YES.
Under the law, except as a pseudonym for literary
purposes, no person shall use any name different from
the one with which he was christened or by which he
26
has been known since childhood, or such substitute
name as may have been authorized by a competent
court (Section 1, Commonwealth Act 142). Aside from
the name "Ong Hock Lian," appellee is using
the alias "Julian Ong." There is no evidence that
appellee has been baptized with the latter name or
that he has been known by it since childhood, or that
the court has authorized the use thereof. Appellee has
therefore committed a violation of the Anti-Alias Law.
Legamia vs IAC
Facts: Corazon Legamia lived with Emilio N. Reyes for
19 years from November 8, 1955 to September 26,
1974, when Emilio died. During their live-in
arrangement they produced a boy who was named
Michael Raphael Gabriel L. Reyes.
From the time Corazon and Emilio lived together until
the latter's death, Corazon was known as Corazon L.
Reyes; she styled herself as Mrs. Reyes; and Emilio
introduced her to friends as Mrs. Reyes.
After Emilio's death, Corazon filed a letter in behalf of
Michael with the Agricultural Credit Administration for
death benefits.
The letter as well as the voucher were signed "Corazon
L. Reyes” for using the name Reyes although she was
not married to Emilio, Felicisima Reyes who was
married to Emilio filed a complaint which led to
Corazon's prosecution.
Issue: Did the petitioner violate the law in the light of
the facts abovestated?
Ruling: NO.
It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a woman to
represent herself as the wife and use the name of the
man she is living with despite the fact that the man is
married to another woman.
And yet none of the women has been charged of
violating the C.A. No. 142 because ours is not a bigoted
but a tolerant and understanding society. It is in the
light of our cultural environment that the law must be
construed.
In the case at bar, Corazon had been living with Emilio
for almost 20 years. He introduced her to the public as
his wife and she assumed that role and his name
without any sinister purpose or personal material gain
in mind. She applied for benefits upon his death not for
herself but for Michael who as a boy of tender years
was under her guardianship. Surely, the lawmakers
could not have meant to criminalize what Corazon had
done especially because some of them probably had
their own Corazons.
Limson vs Gonzalez
Facts: On or about December 1, 1997, Limson filed a
criminal charge against Gonzalez for falsification,
before the Prosecutor's Office.
The charge for [sic] falsification of [sic] Limson is based
on Limson’s assertion that in the records of the
Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC), a certain
‘EUGENIO GONZALEZ’ is registered as an architect and
that Gonzalez, who uses, among others, the name
‘EUGENIO JUAN GONZALEZ’, and who pretends to be
said architect.
Gonzalez alleged that in his youth, he used the name
EUGENIO GONZALEZ y REGALADO and/or EUGENIO
GONZALEZ, and when he transferred to UST, he made
use of his second name, JUAN.
In his practice, he identified himself as Arch. Eugenio
JUAN Gonzalez, because the surname Gonzalez is very
common and he want to distinguish himself with his
second given name JUAN.
Prosecutor dismissed the criminal charge against
Gonzalez after receiving pertinent Affidavits and
evidentiary documents. Secretary of Justice affirmed
the findings of Prosecutor.
But still Limson filed a new complaint, adding the
accusation that because Gonzalez used various
combinations of his name, in different signature, on the
[sic] different occasions, Gonzalez had also violated
Republic Act No. 6085 (the Anti-Alias Law) Limson
insists that the names “Eugenio Gonzalez” and
“Eugenio Juan Gonzalez y Regalado” did not refer to
one and the same individual; and that respondent was
not a registered architect contrary to his claim.
Issue: Whether or not Gonzalez violated the Anti Alias
Law
Ruling: NO.
Sec. 2 of Anti Alias Law- Any person desiring to use an
alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings
like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority
for a change of name and no person shall be allowed to
secure such judicial authority for more than one alias.
The petition for an alias shall set forth the person’s
baptismal and family name and the name recorded in
the civil registry, if different, his immigrant’s name, if
an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names
other than his original or real name, specifying the
reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial
authority for the use of alias, the Christian name and
the alien immigrant’s name shall be recorded in the
proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any
name or names other than his original or real name
unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper
local civil registry.
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The Court observes that respondent’s aliases involved
the names “Eugenio Gonzalez”, “Eugenio Gonzales”,
“Eugenio Juan Gonzalez”, “Eugenio Juan Gonzalez y
Regalado”, “Eugenio C.R. Gonzalez”, “Eugenio J.
Gonzalez”, and – per Limson – “Eugenio Juan Robles
Gonzalez.” But these names contained his true names.
An erroneous middle or second name, or a misspelled
family name in one instance. The records disclose that
the erroneous middle or second names, or the
misspelling of the family name resulted from error or
inadvertence left unchecked and unrectified over time.
What is significant, however, is that such names were
not fictitious names within the purview of the Anti-Alias
Law; and that such names were not different from each
other. Considering that he was not also shown to have
used the names for unscrupulous purposes, or to
deceive or confuse the public, the dismissal of the
charge against him was justified in fact and in law.
An alias is thus a name that is different from the
individual’s true name, and does not refer to a name
that is not different from his true name.
PERJURY
Diaz vs People
Facts: Reolandi Diaz was a Senior Clerk at Jose Abad
Santos High School in San Fernando Pampanga. He
sought appointment as School Administrative Assistant
I, and as one of the requirements to said appointment,
he filled up Civil Service Form 212 and swore to the
truth and veracity of the date and information therein
that his highest educational attainment was Fourth
Year A.B.(Liberal Arts) allegedly pursued at the
Cosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges.
On that basis, he was appointed to the position. But
contrary to the claim of petitioner, he was never
enrolled at the Cosmopolitan Colleges certified by its
Registrar, neither was he a student at the Harvardian
Colleges, certified by the school’s president. The name
of the petitioner was not also included in all the
enrollment lists of college students submitted to the
then Bureau of Private Schools.
Petitioner Reolandi Diaz was charged with the crime of
Falsification of Official Document before the Court of
first Instance of Pampanga. He was found guilty as
charged.
On appeal, the court modified its decision increasing
the penalty of the accused.
Issue: Is the crime falsification?
Ruling: NO, the crime is perjury.
The court held that the crime committed was not
falsification but Perjury, which is the willful and corrupt
assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation
administered by authority of law on a material matter.
The elements of which are:
a) the accused made a statement under oath or
executed an affidavit upon a material matter;
b) that the statement or affidavit was made before a
competent officer, authorized to receive and
administer oath;
c) that the statement or affidavit, the accused made a
deliberate assertion of a falsehood;
d) that the sworn statement or affidavit containing the
falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.
All the elements enumerated therein are present in the
case at bar, thus the accused is guilty of perjury. The
decision of Court of Appeals was modified, finding the
accused guilty of perjury, imposing the corresponding
penalty therein and not of falsification.
SUBORNATION OF PERJURY
People vs Padol
Facts: An information had been filed in the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Sur charging Esminia Pudol and
Alberto Reyes with having committed the crime of
perjury, the former by subscribing a false affidavit by
induction and with the further cooperation of the latter.
When the case was called for trial, the provincial fiscal
filed a motion asking for the discharge of Esminia Pudol
in order to utilized as a witness for the prosecution
against her coaccused and the court dismissed the
case as to Esminia Pudol
The accused Alberto Reyes, in turn, asked for the
dismissal of the case as to him, alleging: (1) that once
the case is dismissed as to Pudol, the alleged
principally direct participation, there is no longer any
ground for prosecuting the case against the subowner
Reyes, and (2) that the Revised Penal Code does not
penalize subornation of perjury, as it was formerly
penalized by section 4 of Act No. 1697, which has
expressly been repealed by article 367 of said Revised
Penal Code.
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Issue: Whether or not Reyes should be dismissed on
the ground that Revised Penal Code does not penalize
subornation of perjury
Ruling: NO.
The Revised Penal Code does not penalize subornation
of perjury, as it was formerly penalized by section 4 of
Act No. 1697, which has expressly been repealed by
article 367 of the Revised Penal Code, suffice it to state
that, according to article 17 of said Code, the following
are considered principals:
1. . . .
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit
it. (Emphasis ours.)
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the
offense by another act without which it would not have
been accomplished.
The information charges Alberto Reyes not only with
having directly induced Esminia Pudol to testify falsely
under oath and to subscribe the affidavit before a
person authorized by law to administer oath, but also
with having cooperate and taken a direct part in the
execution of said false affidavit, without which
induction, cooperation and participation the false
affidavit in question would not have been
accomplished.
Therefore, the fact that subornation of perjury is not
expressly penalized in the Revised Penal Code does not
mean that the direct induction of a person by another
to commit perjury has ceased to be a crime, because
said crime is fully within the scope of that defined in
article 17, subsection 2, of the Revised Penal Code.
Furthermore, Alberto Reyes, as already stated, is
charged in the present case not only as subowner of
the perjury committed by his coaccused but also as
principal by cooperation and participation in the
preparation of the false affidavit subscribed by Esminia
Pudol.
MACHINATIONS IN PUBLIC AUCTIONS
Ouano vs CA
Facts: The appellate proceedings at bar treat of a
parcel of land registered under RFC (DBP). Said
property was offered for bidding for the second time
because the first bidding was nullified due to Ouano’s
protest.
It appears that prior to the second bidding, Ouano and
Echavez orally agreed that only Echavez would make a
bid, and that if it was accepted, they would divide the
property in proportion to their adjoining properties. To
ensure success of their enterprise, they also agreed to
induce the only other party known to be interested in
the property-a group headed by a Mrs. Bonsucan to
desist from presenting a bid.

They broached the matter to Mrs. Bonsucan's group.

The latter agreed to withdraw, as it did in fact withdraw
from the sale; and Ouano's wife paid it P2,000 as
reimbursement for its expenses.

Issue: Whether Ouano committed machinations in

public auction

Ruling: YES.

These acts constitute a crime, as the Trial Court has

stressed. Ouano and Echavez had promised to share in
the property in question as a consideration for Ouano's
refraining from taking part in the public auction, and
they had attempted to cause and in fact succeeded in
causing another bidder to stay away from the auction.
in order to cause reduction of the price of the property
auctioned In so doing, they committed the felony of
machinations in public auctions defined and penalized
in Article 185 of the Revised Penal Code, supra.

That both Ouano and Echavez did these acts is a

matter of record, as is the fact that thereby only one
bid that of Echavez was entered for the 'land in
consequence of which Echavez eventually acquired it.
The agreement therefore being criminal in character,
the parties not only have no action against each other
but are both liable to prosecution and the things and
price of their agreement subject to disposal according
to the provisions of the criminal code. This, in
accordance with the so-called pari delicto principle set
out in the Civil Code.

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