CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 1
CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE
LAW OF NATIONS
G.R. No. L-409 January 30, 1947
ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,
vs.
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.
Claro M. Recto and Querube C. Makalintal for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor
Hernandez, Jr., for respondent.
RESOLUTION
In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the
Court, acting on the petition for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio
Laurel and based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to
the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese
occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined
and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the
reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the
Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino
citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a
change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of
the Philippine Republic:
(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and
temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, which
consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government
or sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent allegiance
should not be confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance
which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the
territory wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in return
for the protection he receives, and which consists in the obedience
to the laws of the government or sovereign. (Carlisle vs. Unite
States, 21 Law. ed., 429; Secretary of State Webster Report to the
President of the United States in the case of Thraser, 6 Web. Works,
526);
Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the
inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate
government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy
occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or
sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, as we
have held in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and
Dizon (75 Phil., 113) and of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil.,
285), and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily
remain vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty
vested in the titular government (which is the supreme power which
governs a body politic or society which constitute the state) must be
distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and
may be destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it
cannot be suspended because the existence of sovereignty cannot
be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the
possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension;
that what may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of
sovereignty with the control and government of the territory
occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant; that the
subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a
territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy during the war,
"although the former is in fact prevented from exercising the
supremacy over them" is one of the "rules of international law of our
times"; (II Oppenheim, 6th Lauterpacht ed., 1944, p. 482),
recognized, by necessary implication, in articles 23, 44, 45, and 52
of Hague Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that
the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the
enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their
legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is
no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which
the whole fabric of the petitioner's contention rests;
Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United
State was suspended in Castine, set forth in the decision in the case
of United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, 253, decided in 1819,
and quoted in our decision in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez
Tan Keh and Dizon and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra, in
connection with the question, not of sovereignty, but of the existence
of a government de facto therein and its power to promulgate rules
and laws in the occupied territory, must have been based, either on
the theory adopted subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907,
that the military occupation of an enemy territory does not transfer
the sovereignty to the occupant; that, in the first case, the word
"sovereignty" used therein should be construed to mean the
exercise of the rights of sovereignty, because as this remains vested
in the legitimate government and is not transferred to the occupier,
it cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or
divesting said government thereof; and that in the second case, that
is, if the said conclusion or doctrine refers to the suspension of the
sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete after the adoption of the
Hague Regulations in 1907, and therefore it can not be applied to
the present case;
Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily allegiance,"
repudiated by Oppenheim and other publicists, as descriptive of the
relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the
enemy toward the military government established over them, such
allegiance may, at most, be considered similar to the temporary
allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign
of the territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he
receives as above described, and does not do away with the
absolute and permanent allegiance which the citizen residing in a
foreign country owes to his own government or sovereign; that just
as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may be
prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign
country, in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the
military forces of the enemy may commit treason against his own
legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of
the latter by giving them aid and comfort; and that if the allegiance
of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign is nothing
more than obedience to its laws in return for the protection he
receives, it would necessarily follow that a citizen who resides in a
foreign country or state would, on one hand, ipso facto acquire the
citizenship thereof since he has enforce public order and regulate
the social and commercial life, in return for the protection he
receives, and would, on the other hand, lose his original citizenship,
because he would not be bound to obey most of the laws of his own
government or sovereign, and would not receive, while in a foreign
country, the protection he is entitled to in his own;
Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of
the rights of sovereignty by the legitimate government in the territory
occupied by the enemy military forces, because the authority of the
legitimate power to govern has passed into the hands of the
occupant (Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political laws which
prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government
and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance during military
occupation (Co Kim cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and dizon, supra), for
the only reason that as they exclusively bear relation to the ousted
legitimate government, they are inoperative or not applicable to the
government established by the occupant; that the crimes against
national security, such as treason and espionage; inciting to war,
correspondence with hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as
well as those against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, and
disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are of political
complexion because they bear relation to, and are penalized by our
Revised Penal Code as crimes against the legitimate government,

are also suspended or become inapplicable as against the
occupant, because they can not be committed against the latter
(Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra); and that, while the offenses
against public order to be preserved by the legitimate government
were inapplicable as offenses against the invader for the reason
above stated, unless adopted by him, were also inoperative as
against the ousted government for the latter was not responsible for
the preservation of the public order in the occupied territory, yet
article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to
treason committed against the national security of the legitimate
government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were
still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy
occupation;
Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to
respect or continue in force, unless absolutely prevented by the
circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate the
social and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all
the powers of de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either
change the existing laws or make new ones when the exigencies of
the military service demand such action, that is, when it is necessary
for the occupier to do so for the control of the country and the
protection of his army, subject to the restrictions or limitations
imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by
civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of
public conscience (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra; 1940
United States Rules of Land Warfare 76, 77); and that,
consequently, all acts of the military occupant dictated within these
limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who
are bound to obey them, and the laws of the legitimate government
which have not been adopted, as well and those which, though
continued in force, are in conflict with such laws and orders of the
occupier, shall be considered as suspended or not in force and
binding upon said inhabitants;
Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the
obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his
government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive
action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the
enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no
power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or
suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential for the
preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their
legitimate government, or compel them to adhere and give aid and
comfort to him; because it is evident that such action is not
demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not necessary
for the control of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his
army, and because it is tantamount to practically transfer
temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the titular government
or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the occupied
territory were compelled illegally by the military occupant, through
force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former
may lawfully resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto
without becoming a traitor;
Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended
allegiance would lead to disastrous consequences for small and
weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of
humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it would allow
invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the
occupied territory to fight against their own government without the
latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even
compel those who are not aid them in their military operation against
the resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue and
conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive them all of their own
independence or sovereignty — such theory would sanction the
action of invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign
country to be a party in the nefarious task of depriving themselves
of their own freedom and independence and repressing the exercise
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 2
by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a
political suicide;
(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of
the Philippines defined and penalized in article 114 of the Penal
Code, though originally intended to be a crime against said
government as then organized by authority of the sovereign people
of the United States, exercised through their authorized
representative, the Congress and the President of the United
States, was made, upon the establishment of the Commonwealth
Government in 1935, a crime against the Government of the
Philippines established by authority of the people of the Philippines,
in whom the sovereignty resides according to section 1, Article II, of
the Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of
section 2, Article XVI thereof, which provides that "All laws of the
Philippine Islands . . . shall remain operative, unless inconsistent
with this Constitution . . . and all references in such laws to the
Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be construed,
in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and
corresponding officials under this constitution;
Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a
sovereign government, though not absolute but subject to certain
limitations imposed in the Independence Act and incorporated as
Ordinance appended to our Constitution, was recognized not only
by the Legislative Department or Congress of the United States in
approving the Independence Law above quoted and the
Constitution of the Philippines, which contains the declaration that
"Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them" (section 1, Article II), but also by the Executive
Department of the United States; that the late President Roosevelt
in one of his messages to Congress said, among others, "As I stated
on August 12, 1943, the United States in practice regards the
Philippines as having now the status as a government of other
independent nations — in fact all the attributes of complete and
respected nationhood" (Congressional Record, Vol. 29, part 6, page
8173); and that it is a principle upheld by the Supreme Court of the
United States in many cases, among them in the case of Jones vs.
United States (137 U.S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the
question of sovereignty is "a purely political question, the
determination of which by the legislative and executive departments
of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other
officers, citizens and subjects of the country.
Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution which provides that pending the final and complete
withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States "All citizens of the
Philippines shall owe allegiance to the United States", was one of
the few limitations of the sovereignty of the Filipino people retained
by the United States, but these limitations do not away or are not
inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the same way that the people
of each State of the Union preserves its own sovereignty although
limited by that of the United States conferred upon the latter by the
States; that just as to reason may be committed against the Federal
as well as against the State Government, in the same way treason
may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against
the sovereignty of the United States as well as against the
sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth; and that the change
of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does
not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason
committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense
against the same government and the same sovereign people, for
Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that "The government
established by this constitution shall be known as the
Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete
withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the
proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the
Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the
Philippines";
 CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 3

This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more

extended opinion, to deny the petitioner's petition, as it is hereby
denied, for the reasons above set forth and for others to be stated
in the said opinion, without prejudice to concurring opinion therein,
if any. Messrs. Justices Paras and Hontiveros dissent in a separate
opinion. Mr. justice Perfecto concurs in a separate opinion.

[ GR No. L-322, Jul 28, 1947 ]
PEOPLE v. PEDRO MANAYAO ET AL. +
DECISION 78 Phil. 721
HILADO, J.:
Appellant Pedro Manayao and Filomeno Flores and Raymundo
Flores were charged with the high crime of treason with multiple
murder in the People's Court. The Floreses not having been
apprehended, only Manayao was tried. Convicted of the offense
charged against him with the aggravating circumstances of (1) the
aid of armed men and (2) the employment or presence of a band in
the commission of the crime, he was sentenced to death, to pay a
fine of P20,000, an indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of each of the
persons named in the third paragraph of the decision, and the costs.
He has appealed from that decision to this Court.
On or about the 27th of January, 1945, the guerrillas raided the
Japanese in sitio Pulong Tindahan, municipality of Angat, Province
of Bulacan. In reprisal, Japanese soldiers and a number of Filipinos
affiliated with the Makapili, among them the instant appellant,
conceived the diabolical idea of killing the residents of barrio
Banaban of the same municipality (Exhibits A, C, and C-1).
Pursuant to this plan, said Japanese soldiers and their Filipino
companions, armed with rifles and bayonets, gathered the residents
of Banaban behind the barrio chapel on January 29, 1945.
Numbering about sixty or seventy, the residents thus assembled
included men, women and children mostly women (Exhibits A, C,
and C-1; pp. 3-16, 29, 30, 65, 102, t. s. n.).
The children were placed in a separate group from the men and
women the prosecution star witnesses, Maria Paulino and Clarita
Perez, were among the children (pp. 3, 40, t. s. n.). Presently, the
Japanese and their Filipino comrades set the surrounding houses
on fire (pp. 14, 48, 70, 71, 103, t. s. n.), and proceeded to butcher
all the persons assembled, excepting the small children, thus killing,
among others, those known by the following names: Patricia, Dodi,
Banda, Tana, Uyang, Mina, Marta, Sana, Eufemia, Doroteo,
Andres, Perly, Tisiang, Urado, Pisan, Dorang, Felisa, and Eulalia
(pp. 8, 10, 13, 14, 31, 32, 47, 48, 61, 62, 63, t. s. n.).
Appellant alone killed about six women, two of whom were Patricia
and Dodi whom he bayoneted to death in the presence of their
daughters, Maria Paulino and Clarita Perez, respectively (pp. 8, 10,
13, 31, 32, 35, 47, 48, t. s. n.). Patricia and Dodi pleaded with
appellant for mercy, he being their relative, but he gave the callous
answer that no mercy would be given them because they were
wives of guerrillas (pp. 10, 42, 43, 49, t. s. n.).
Appellant would also have killed the small children including Clarita
Perez and Maria Paulino if he had been allowed to have his way.
For when all but the small ones had been butchered, he proposed
to kill them too, but the Japanese soldiers interceded, saying that
the children knew nothing of the matter (pp. 15, 49, 51, 66, 67, t. s.
n.). Appellant insisted in his proposal, arguing that the children
would be wives of guerrillas later when they grew up, but the
Japanese decided to spare them (p. 22, t. s. n.).
The foregoing facts have been clearly established by the testimony
of eye-witnesses Clarita Paulino, Maria Perez, and Policarpio Tigas
to the ruthless massacre of Banaban. There is a complete absence
of evidence tending to show motive on the part of these witnesses
for falsely testifying against appellant such a motive is not even
insinuated by the defendant. Indeed, appellant's counsel frankly
states (p. 3, brief) that he "does not dispute the findings of fact of
the People's Court." Speaking of the testimony of Clarita and Maria,
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 4
both aged ten years, the People's Court, who heard, observed and
saw them testify, had the following to say:
"The testimony of the last two in particular is entitled to very great
weight. They are simple barrio girls, only ten years old, whose minds
have not yet been tainted by feelings of hatred or revenge or by any
desire to be spectacular or to exaggerate. They were straight-
forward and frank in their testimony and did not show any intention
to appeal to the sentiments of the court. They could nut have been
mistaken as to the presence and identity of the accused for they
know him so well that they referred to him by his pet name of 'Indong
Pintor' or Pedro, the painter. They could not have erred in the
narration of the salient phases of the tragic events of January 29,
1945, in Banaban, for they were forced eye-witnesses to and were
involved in the whole tragedy, the burning of the houses and the
massacre committed by the accused and his Japanese masters
took place in broad daylight and were not consummated in a fleeting
moment but during a time sufficient for even girls of tender age to
retain a trustworthy mental picture of the unusual event they could
not help but witness."
Not only this, but the testimony of Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino
is so clear, positive and convincing that it would be sufficient for
conviction without any further corroboration. Yet, there is ample
corroborative proof. Thus, Tomas M. Pablo declared that he had
seen the corpses of the massacred residents of Banaban shortly
after the happening of the heinous crime (p. 136, t. s. n.). And
appellant himself admitted his participation in the massacre in two
sworn statements one made on August 28, 1945, before Lt. Jesus
Cacahit, Detachment Commander of the Angat 23d MP Command
(Exhibit A; pp. 75-77, t. s. n.) and another made on September 5,
1945 before Feliciano F. Torres, Assistant Provincial Fiscal of
Bulacan (Exhibits C, C-1; pp. 150-159, t. s. n.).
In No. 1 of his assignment of errors, appellant's counsel contends
that appellant was a member of the Armed Forces of Japan, was
subject to military law, and not subject to the jurisdiction of the
People's Court; and in No. 2 he advances the theory that appellant
had lost his Philippine citizenship and was therefore not amenable
to the Philippine law of treason. We cannot uphold either contention.
We are of the considered opinion that the Makapili, although
organized to render military aid to the Japanese Army in the
Philippines during the late war, was not a part of said army. It was
an organization of Filipino traitors, pure and simple. As to loss of
Philippine citizenship by appellant, counsel's theory is absolutely
untenable. He invokes in its support paragraphs 3, 4, and 6 of
section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, providing:
"* * * A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following
ways and/or events:
* * * * * * *
"(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
constituton or laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-one
years of age or more;
"(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of
a foreign country;
* * * * * * *

"(6) By having been declared, by competent authority, a deserter of
the Philippine Army, Navy, or Air Corps in time of war, unless
subsequently a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted."
There is no evidence that appellant has subscribed to an oath of
allegiance to support the constitution or laws of Japan. His counsel
cites (Brief, 4) the fact that in Exhibit A "he subscribed an oath before
he was admitted into the Makapili association, 'the aim of which was
to help Japan in its fight against the Americans and her allies.'" And
counsel contends from this that the oath was in fact one of
allegiance to support the constitution and Jaws of Japan. We cannot
uphold such a far-fetched deduction. The members of the Makapili
could have sworn to help Japan in the war without necessarily
swearing to support her constitution and laws. The famed "Flying
Tiger" who so bravely and resolutely aided China in her war with
Japan certainly did not need to swear to support the Chinese
constitution and laws, even if they had to subscribe to an oath, upon
entering the organization, to help China fight Japan. During the first
World War the "National Volunteers" were organized in the
Philippines, pledged to go to Europe and fight on the side of the
Allies, particularly of the United States. In order to carry out that
mission although the war ended before this could be done they
surely did not have to take an oath to support the constitution or
laws of the United States or any of its allies. We do not multiply these
examples, for they illustrate a proposition which seems self-evident.
Neither is there any showing of the acceptance by appellant of a
commission "in the military, naval, or air service" of Japan.
Much less is there a scintilla of evidence that appellant had ever
been declared a deserter in the Philippine Army, Navy or Air Corps
nor even that he was a member of said Army, Navy, or Air Corps.
Further, appellant's contention is repugnant to the most
fundamental and elementary principles governing the duties of a
citizen toward his country under our Constitution. Article II, section
2, of said Constitution ordains:
"SEC. 2. The defense of the State is a prime duty of government,
and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law
to render personal, military or civil service." (Italics supplied.)
This constitutional provision covers both time of peace and time of
war, but it is brought more immediately and peremptorily into play
when the country is involved in war. During such a period of stress,
under a constitution enshrining such tenets, the citizen cannot be
considered free to cast off his loyalty and obligations toward the
Fatherland. And it cannot be supposed, without reflecting on the
patriotism and intelligence of the Legislature, that in promulgating
Commonwealth Act No. 63, under the aegis of our Constitution, it
intended (but did not declare) that the duties of the citizen solemnly
proclaimed in the above-quoted constitutional precept could be
effectively cast off by him even when his country is at war, by the
simple expedient of subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support
the constitution or laws of a foreign country, and an enemy country
at that, or by accepting a commission in the military, naval or air
service of such country, or by deserting from the Philippine Army,
Navy, or Air Corps.
It would shock the conscience of any enlightened citizenry to say
that this appellant, by the very fact of committing the treasonous
acts charged against him, the doing of which under the
circumstances of record he does not deny, divested himself of his
Philippine citizenship and thereby placed himself beyond the arm of
our treason law. For if this were so, his very crime would be the
shield that would protect him from punishment.
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 5
"But the laws do not admit that the bare commission of a crime
amounts of itself to a divestment of the character of citizen, and
withdraws the criminal from their coercion. They would never
prescribe an illegal act among the legal modes by which a citizen
might disfranchise himself; nor render treason, for instance,
innocent, by giving it the force of a dissolution of the obligation of
the criminal to hia country." (Moore, International Law Digest, Vol.
III, p. 731.)
"696. No person, even when he has renounced or incurred the loss
of his nationality, shall take up arms against his native country; he
shall be held guilty of a felony and treason, if he does not strictly
observe this duty." (Fiore's International Law Codified, translation
from Fifth Italian Edition by Borchard.)
As to the third asignment of error, the Solicitor General agrees with
counsel that it is improper to separately take into account against
appellant the aggravating circumstances of (1) the aid of armed men
and (2) the employment of a band in appraising the gravity of the
crime. We likewise are of the same opinion, considering that under
paragraph 6 of article 14 of the Revised Penal Code providing that
"whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted
together in the commission of an offense it shall be deemed to have
been committed by a band," the employment of more than three
armed men is an essential element of and inherent in a band. So
that in appreciating the existence of a band the employment of more
than three armed men is automatically included, there being only
the aggravating circumstance of band to be considered.
As to appellant's fourth assignment of error, the contention is clearly
unacceptable that appellant acted in obedience to an order issued
by a superior and is therefore exempt from criminal liability, because
he allegedly acted in the fulfillment of a duty incidental to his service
for Japan as a member of the Makapili. It is obvious that paragraphs
5 and 6 of article 11 of our Revised Penal Code cannot be construed
as sanctioning as legal acts done in compliance with duties to or
orders from a foreign sovereign, any more than obedience to an
illegal order. The construction contended for by appellant could
entail in its potentialities even the destruction of this Republic.
The contention that as a member of the Makapili appellant had to
obey his Japanese masters under pain of severe penalty, and that
therefore his acts should be considered. as committed under the
impulse of an irresistible force or uncontrollable fear of an equal or
greater injury, is no less repulsive. Appellant voluntarily joined the
Makapili with full knowledge of its avowed purpose of rendering
military aid to Japan. He knew the consequences to be expected if
the alleged irresistible force or uncontrollable fear subsequently
arose, he brought them about himself freely and voluntarily. But this
is not all; the truth of the matter is, as the Solicitor General well
remarks, that "the appellant actually acted with gusto during the
butchery of Banaban." He was on that occasion even bent on more
cruelty than the very ruthless Japanese themselves as regards the
little children. And his Japanese masters so fate willed it were the
very ones who saved the little girls, Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino,
who were destined to become the star witnesses against him on the
day of reckoning.
Conformably to the recommendation of the Solicitor General, we
find appellant guilty of the crime of treason with multiple murder
committed with the attendance of one aggravating circumstance,
that of "armed band," thus discarding the first aggravating
circumstance considered by the trial court. A majority of the Court
voted to affirm the judgment appealed from, imposing the death
penalty, convicting defendant and appellant to pay a fine of
P20,000, an indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of each of the victims
named in the third paragraph of the lower court's decision, and the
costs. But due to the dissent of Mr. Justice Perfecto from the
imposition of the death penalty, in accordance with the applicable
 CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 6

legal provisions we modify the judgment appealed from as regards

the punishment to be inflicted, and sentence defendant and
appellant Pedro Manayao to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with
the accessories of article 41 of the Revised Penal Code, to pay a
fine of P20,000, an indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of each of the
victims named in the third paragraph of the lower court's decision,
and the costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-856 April 18, 1949
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SUSANO PEREZ (alias KID PEREZ), defendant-appellant.
Crispin Oben and Isidro Santiago for appellant .Assistance
Solicitor General Manuel P. Barcelona and Solicitor Esmeraldo
Umali for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
Susano Perez alias Kid Perez alias Kid Perez was convicted of
treason by the 5th Division of the People's Court sitting in Cebu City
and sentenced to death by electrocution.
Seven counts were alleged in the information but the prosecution
offered evidence only on counts 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6, all of which,
according to the court, were substantiated. In a unanimous decision,
the trial court found as follows:
"As regards count No. 1 —
Count No. 1 alleges that the accused, together with the other
Filipinos, recruited, apprehended and commandeered
numerous girls and women against their will for the purpose of
using them, as in fact they were used, to satisfy the immoral
purpose and sexual desire of Colonel Mini, and among such
unfortunate victims, were Felina Laput, Eriberta Ramo alias
Miami Ramo, Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay, Feliciana
Bonalos and Flaviana Bonalos.
It would be unnecessary to recite here the testimonies of all the
victims of the accused; it sufficient to reproduce here succinctly
the testimony of Eriberta Ramo. She testified that on June 15,
1942, the accused came to her house to get her and told her
that she was wanted in the house of her aunt, but instead, she
was brought to the house of the Puppet Governor Agapito
Hontanosas; that she escaped and returned to Baclayon her
hometown; that the accused came again and told her that
Colonel Mini wanted her to be his Information Clerk; that she
did not accept the job; that a week later the accused came to
Baclayon to get her, and succeeded in taking some other girls
Puppet Governor Agapito Hontanosas; that Governor
Hontanosas told her that Colonel Mini wanted her to be his
wife; that when she was brought to Colonel Mini the latter had
nothing on but a "G" string; that he, Colonel Mini threatened her
with a sword tied her to a bed and with force succeeded in
having carnal knowledge with her; that on the following night,
again she was brought to Colonel Mini and again she was
raped; that finally she was able to escape and stayed in hiding
for three weeks and only came out from the hiding when
Colonel Mini left Tagbilaran.
"As regards count No. 2 —
Count No. 2 of the information substantially alleges: That
accused in company with some Japanese and Filipinos took
Eriberta Ramo and her sister Cleopatra Ramo from their home
in Baclayon to attend a banquet and a dance organized in
honor of Colonel Mini by the Puppet Governor, Agapito
Hontanosas in order that said Japanese Colonel might select
those first who would later be taken to satisfy his carnal appetite
and that by means of threat, force and intimidation, the above
mentioned two sister were brought to the headquarters of the
Japanese Commander at the Mission Hospital in Tagbilaran
where Eriberta Ramo was forced to lived a life of shame. All
these facts alleged in count No. 2 were testified to by said
witnesses Eriberta Ramo her mother Mercedes de Ramo. It is
not necessary here to recite once more their testimony in
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 7
support of the allegations in court No. 2; this Court is fully
convinced that the allegation in said count No. 2 were fully
substantiated by the evidence adduced.
"As regards count No. 4 —
Count No. 4 substantially alleges that on July 16, 1942, the two
girls named Eduardo S. Daohog and Eutiquia Lamay, were
taken from their homes in Corella, Bohol, by the accused and
his companion named Vicente Bullecer, and delivered to the
Japanese Officer, Dr. Takibayas to satisfy his carnal appetite,
but these two, the accused Susano Perez and his companion
Vicente Bullecer, before delivering them to said Japanese
Officer, satisfied first their lust; the accused Susano Perez
raping Eduarda S. Daohog and his companion, Vicente
Bullecer, the other girl Eutiquia Lamay. Eduarda S. Daohog,
testifying, said: that while on the way to Tagbilaran, the
accused though force and intimidation, raped her in an
uninhabited house; that she resisted with all her force against
the desire of the accused, but of no avail; that upon arriving in
Tagbilaran, she was delivered to the Japanese Officer named
Takibayas who also raped her. Eutiquia Lamay testified that on
July 16, 1942, the accused and his companion, Bullecer, went
to her house to take her and her sister; that her sister was then
out of the house; that the accused threatened her with a
revolved if she refuses to go; that she was placed in a car
where Eduarda Daohog was; that while they were in the car,
the accused carried Eduarda out of the car, and their
companion Bullecer took the other witness (Eutiquia Lamay);
that when the accused and Eduarda returned to the car, the
latter; Eduarda, covered her face, crying; that later, she and
Eduarda were taken to the Governor's house; that on arriving
and in the presence of the Puppet Governor Hontanosas, the
Governor exclaimed: "I did not call for these girls": but the
accused replied saying: "These girls talked bad against the
Japanese , and that is why we arrested them"; that the said
Governor Hontañosas then, said: "Take them to the Japanese
"; that the accused and Bullecer brought the two girls to the
Japanese headquarters; that Eduarda was taken to one room
by the Japanese Captain called Dr. Takibayas, and she
(Eutiquia Lamay) was taken to another room by another
Japanese living in that house; that she was raped by that Jap
while in the room; that she resisted all she could, but of no avail.
In the light of the testimonies of these two witnesses, Eduarda
S. Daohog and Eutiquia Lamay, all the allegations in Court No.
4 were fully proven beyond reasonable doubt.
"As regards count No. 5 —
Count No. 5 alleges: That on or about June 4, 1942, the said
accused commandeered Feliciana Bonalos and her sister
Flaviana Bonalos on the pretext that they were to bee taken as
witnesses before a Japanese Colonel in the investigation of a
case against a certain Chinese (Insik Eping), and uponarriving
at Tagbilaran, Bohol, the accused brought the aforesaid two
girls to the residence of Colonel Mini, Commander of the
Japanese Armed Forces in Bohol and by means of violence
threat and intimidation, said Japanese Colonel abused and had
sexual intercourse with Flaviana Bonalos; that the accused
subsequently of Colonel Mini and through violence, threat and
intimidation, succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her
against her will; that two days, later, upon the pretext of
conducting the unfortunate girls to their home, said accused
brought the other girls Feliciana Bonalos to a secluded place in
Tagbilaran, Bohol, and in the darkness, by mean of threat and
violence had carnal knowledge with her against her will.

Feliciana Bonalos testifying in this count, declared that the
accused came to get her on the pretext that she was to be used
as witness in a case affecting certain Chinaman before Colonel
Mini; that she and her younger sister Flaviana were brought in
a car driven by the accused; they were brought to the house of
Colonel Mini; that sister Flaviana was conducted into a room
and after remaining in the same for about an hour, she came
out with her hair and her dress in disorder; that Flaviana told
her immediately that she was raped against her will by Colonel
Mini; that she (Feliciana), after leaving the residence of said
Jap officer, was taken by Perez to an uninhabited house and
there by threat and intimidation, the accused succeeded in
raping her; that when she returned to her (the witness),
Flaviana was crying; that the following day while conducting the
two girls back to their hometown, she (Feliciana) was also
raped by the accused in an uninhabited house, against her will.
Victoriana Arayan (mother of Feliciana and Flaviana Bonalos)
testified as following: That on June 15, 1942, the accused came
and told her that the Japanese needed her daughters to be
witnesses; that accordingly, he daughters, under that
understanding, started for Tagbilaran; that later, she went to
Tagbilaran to look for her daughters and she found them in the
office of the Puppet Governor; that on seeing her, both
daughters wept and told her that they were turned over to the
Japanese and raped them; that her daughter Flaviana told her
(the witness) that after the Japanese had raped her the
accused also raped her (Flaviana) in an uninhabited house;
that the accused did not permit her two daughter to return home
on the pretext that the Puppet Governor was then absent and
in the meanwhile they stayed in the house of the accused
Perez; that when her daughter returned to her house ultimately,
they related to her (mother) what happened; that both
daughters told her they would have preferred death rather than
to have gone to Tagbilaran; that Feliciana told her (the mother)
that the accused had raped her.
The information give by Feliciana to her mother is admitted in
evidence as a part of the res gestae regardless of the time that
had elapsed between the occurrence and the time of the
information. In the manner these two witnesses testified in
court, there could be no doubt that they were telling the
absolute truth. It is hard to conceived that these girls would
assume and admit the ignominy they have gone through if they
were not true. The Court is fully convinced that all the
allegations contained in Court No. 5 have been proven by the
testimonies of these two witnesses beyond reasonable doubt.
"As regards count No. 6 —
Count No. 6, alleges: That the accused, together with his
Filipino companion apprehended Natividad Barcinas,
Nicanora Ralameda and Teotima Barcinas, nurses of the
provincial hospital, for not having attended a dance and
reception organized by the Puppet Governor in honor of
Colonel Mini and other Japanese high ranking officers,
which was held in Tagbilaran market on June 25, 1942;
that upon being brought the Puppet Governor, they were
severely reprimanded by the latter; that on July 8, 1942,
against said nurses were forced to attend another banquet
and dance in order that the Jap officers Mini and
Takibayas might make a selection which girls would suit
best their fancy; that the real purpose behind those forcible
invitations was to lure them to the residence of said
Japanese Officer Mini for immoral purposes.
Natividad Barcinas, a Lieutenant of the P.A., testified at
length. She declared: That on June 29, 1942, she and
companion nurses, saw the accused coming to the
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 8
hospital with a revolver and took them on a car to the office
of the Puppet Governor where they were severely
reprimanded by the latter for not attending the dance held
on June and receptions was to select from among them
the best girl that would suit the fancy of Colonel Mini for
immoral purposes that she and her companions were
always afraid of the accused Perez whenever he came to
said hospital; that on one occasion, one of the nurses on
perceiving the approach of the accused, ran up into her
room, laid down on bed and simulated to be sick; that said
accused, not satisfied, went up into the room of that
particular nurse and pulled out the blanket which covered
her and telling her that it was only her pretext that she was
sick.
The testimony of Lt. Natividad Barcinas is fully
corroborated by that of Nicanora Ralameda. Said
testimony need not be reproduced here.
In a carefully written brief for the appellant these findings are not
questioned, but it is contended that the deeds committed by the
accused do not constitute treason. The Solicitor General submits
the opposite view, and argues that "to maintain and preserve the
morale of the soldiers has always been, and will always be, a
fundamental concern of army authorities, for the efficiency of rests
not only on its physical attributes but also, mainly, on the morale of
its soldiers" (citing the annual report of the Chief of Staff, United
State Army, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1933).
If furnishing women for immoral purposes to the enemies was
treason because women's company kept up their morale, so
fraternizing with them, entertaining them at parties, selling them
food and drinks, and kindred acts, would be treason. For any act of
hospitality without doubt produces the same general result. yet by
common agreement those and similar manifestation of sympathy
and attachment are not the kind of disloyalty that are punished as
treason.
In a broad sense, the law of treason does not prescribe all kinds of
social, business and political intercourse between the belligerent
occupants of the invaded country and its inhabitants. In the nature
of things, the occupation of a country by the enemy is bound to
create relations of all sorts between the invaders and the natives.
What aid and comfort constitute treason must depend upon their
nature degree and purpose. To draw a line between treasonable
and untreasonable assistance is not always easy. The scope of
adherence to the enemy is comprehensive, its requirement
indeterminate as was said Cramer vs. United States. 89 Law. ed.,
1441
As general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid and comfort
given to the enemies must be to render assistance to them as
enemies and not merely as individuals and in addition, be directly in
furtherance of the enemies' hostile designs. To make a simple
distinction: To lend or give money to an enemy as a friend or out of
charity to the beneficiary so that he may buy personal necessities is
to assist him as individual and is not technically traitorous. On the
other hand, to lend or give him money to enable him to buy arms or
ammunition to use in waging war against the giver's country
enhance his strength and by same count injures the interest of the
government of the giver. That is treason. (See United
States vs. Fricke, 259 F., 673; 63 C.J., 816, 817.)
Applying these principles to the case at bar, appellant's first
assignment of error is correct. His "commandeering" of women to
satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men or to enliven the
entertainment held in their honor was not treason even though the
women and the entertainment helped to make life more pleasant for
 CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 9

the enemies and boost their spirit; he was not guilty any more than
the women themselves would have been if they voluntarily and
willingly had surrendered their bodies or organized the
entertainment. Sexual and social relations with the Japanese did not
directly and materially tend to improve their war efforts or to weaken
the power of the United State. The acts herein charged were not, by
fair implication, calculated to strengthen the Japanese Empire or its
army or to cripple the defense and resistance of the other side.
Whatever favorable effect the defendant's collaboration with the
Japanese might have in their prosecution of the war was trivial,
imperceptible, and unintentional. Intent of disloyalty is a vital
ingredient in the crime of treason, which, in the absence of
admission, may be gathered from the nature and circumstances of
each particular case.

But the accused may be punished for the rape of Eriberta Ramo,
Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay and Flaviana Bonalos as
principal by direct participation. Without his cooperation in the
manner above stated, these rapes could not have been committed.

Conviction of the accused of rapes instead of treason finds express

sanction in section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 682, which says:

Provided further, That where, in its opinion, the evidence is not

sufficient to support the offense (treason) charged, the People's
Court may, nevertheless, convict and sentence the accused for any
crime included in the acts alleged in the information and established
by the evidence.

All the above mentioned rapes are alleged in the information and
substantiated by the evidence.

Counsel assails the constitutionality of this of his provision as

violative of section 1, paragraph 17, Article III of the Constitution,
which guarantees to an accused the right "to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him." The contention is
not well taken. The provision in requires that the private crimes of
which an accused of treason may be convicted must be averred in
the information and sustained by evidence. In the light of this
enactment, the defendant was warned of the hazard that he might
be founded guilty of rapes if he was innocent of treason and thus
afforded an opportunity to prepare and meet them. There is no
element of surprise or anomaly involved. In facts under the general
law of criminal procedure convicted for crime different from that
designated in the complaint or information is allowed and practiced,
provided only that such crime "is included or described in the body
of the information, and afterwards justified by the proof presented
during the trial." (People vs. Perez, 45 Phil., 599.)

The defendant personally assaulted and abused two of the offended

girls but these assaults are not charged against him and should be
ruled out. The crime of coercion alleged and founded on count No.
6. need not be noticed in view of the severity of the penalty for the
other crimes which he must suffer.

We find the defendant guilty of four separate crimes of rape and

sentence him for each of them to an indeterminate penalty of from
10 year of prision mayor to 17 year and 4 months of reclusion
temporal, with the accessories of law, to indemnify each of the
offended women in the sum of P3,000, and to pay the costs; it being
understood that the total duration of these penalties shall not exceed
forty years.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones and Reyes,

JJ., concur.
Paras, J., reserves his vote. Montemayor, J., concurs in the result.

G.R. No. L-399 January 29, 1948
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO PRIETO (alias EDDIE VALENCIA), defendant
appellant.
Alfonso E. Mendoza for appellant. First Assistant Solicitor General
Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Isidro C. Borromeo for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
The appellant was prosecuted in the People's Court for treason on
7 counts. After pleading not guilty he entered a plea of guilty to
counts 1, 2, 3 and 7, and maintained the original plea to counts 4,
5, and 6. The special prosecutor introduced evidence only on count
4, stating with reference to counts 5 and 6 that he did not have
sufficient evidence to sustain them. The defendant was found guilty
on count 4 as well as counts 1, 2, 3, and 7 and was sentenced to
death and to pay the fine of P20,000.
Two witnesses gave evidence on count 4 but their statements do
not coincide on any single detail. Juanito Albano, the first witness,
testified that in March, 1945, the accused with other Filipino
undercovers and Japanese soldiers caught an American aviator and
had the witness carry the American to town on a sled pulled by a
carabao; that on the way, the accused walked behind the sled and
asked the prisoner if the sled was faster than the airplane; that the
American was taken to the Kempetai headquarters, after which he
did not know what happened to the flier. Valentin Cuison, the next
witness, testified that one day in March, 1945, he saw the accused
following an American and the accused were Japanese and other
Filipinos.
These witnesses evidently referred to two different occasions. The
last witness stated that the American was walking as well as his
captors. And there was no sled, he said, nor did he see Juanito
Albano, except at night when he and Albano had a drink of tuba
together.
This evidence does not testify the two-witness principle. The two
witnesses failed to corroborate each other not only on the whole
overt act but on any part of it. (People vs. Adriano, 44 Off. Gaz.,
4300; Cramer vs. U. S., 65 S. Ct. 918.)
The lower court believes that the accused is "guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of treason complexed by murder and
physical injuries," with "the aggravating circumstances mentioned
above." Apparently, the court has regarded the murders and
physical injuries charged in the information, not only as crimes
distinct from treason but also as modifying circumstances. The
Solicitor General agrees with the decision except as to technical
designation of the crime. In his opinion, the offense committed by
the appellant is a "complex crime of treason with homicide."
Counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 are as follows:
1. On or about October 15, 1944, in the municipality of Mandaue,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, said accused being a member of
the Japanese Military Police and acting as undercover man for
the Japanese forces with the purpose of giving and with the
intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy did, then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead, guide and
accompany a patrol of Japanese soldiers and Filipino
undercovers to the barrio of Poknaon, for the purpose of
apprehending guerrillas and locating their hideouts; that said
accused and his companions did apprehended Abraham Puno,
tie his hands behind him and give him fist blows; thereafter said
Abraham Puno was taken by the accused and his Japanese
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 10
companions to Yati, Liloan, Cebu, where he was severely
tortured by placing red hot iron on his shoulders, legs and back
and from there he was sent back to the Japanese detention
camp in Mandaue and detained for 7 days;
2. On or about October 28, 1944, in the municipality of
Mandaue, Province of Cebu, Philippines, said accused
acting as an informer and agent for the Japanese Military
Police, with the purpose of giving and with the intent to
give aid and comfort to the enemy, did, the, and there
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead,
guide and accompany a group of Filipino undercovers for
the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and guerrilla
suspects; that the herein accused and his companions did
in fact apprehend Guillermo Ponce and Macario Ponce
from their house; that said accused and his companions
did tie the hands of said Guillermo Ponce and Macario
Ponce behind their backs, giving them first blows on the
face and in other parts of the body and thereafter detained
them at the Kempei Tai Headquarters; that Guillermo
Ponce was released the following day while his brother
was detained and thereafter nothing more was heard of
him nor his whereabouts known;
3. Sometime during the month of November, 1944, in the
Municipality of Mandaue, Province of Cebu, Philippines,
for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and
comfort to the enemy and her military forces, said accused
acting as an enemy undercover did, then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and treasonably lead,
guide and accompany a patrol of some 6 Filipinos and 2
Japanese soldiers to barrio Pakna-an, municipality of
Mandaue for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and
guerrilla suspects, and said patrol did in fact apprehend as
guerrilla suspects Damian Alilin and Santiago Alilin who
were forthwith tied with a rope, tortured and detained for 6
days; that on the 7th day said Damian Alilin and Santiago
Alilin were taken about 1/2 kilometer from their home and
the accused did bayonet them to death;
7. In or about November 16, 1944, in Mandaue, in
conspiracy with the enemy and other Filipinos
undercovers, said accused did cause the torture of
Antonio Soco and the killing of Gil Soco for guerrilla
activities.
The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in these
counts and the infliction of physical injuries on others are not
offenses separate from treason. Under the Philippine treason law
and under the United States constitution defining treason, after
which the former was patterned, there must concur both adherence
to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. One without the other
does not make treason.
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be
accomplished by some kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a
deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation.
(Cramer vs. U.S., ante.) This deed or physical activity may be, and
often is, in itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or
provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of
treason it becomes identified with the latter crime and can not be
the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with
treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for possessing
opium in a prosecution for smoking the identical drug, and a robber
cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a
prosecution for robbery, because possession of opium and force
and trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively,
so may not a defendant be made liable for murder as a separate
 CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 11

crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this case,

it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason. This rule would
not, of course, preclude the punishment of murder or physical
injuries as such if the government should elect to prosecute the
culprit specifically for those crimes instead on relying on them as an
element of treason. it is where murder or physical injuries are
charged as overt acts of treason that they can not be regarded
separately under their general denomination.

However, the brutality with which the killing or physical injuries were
carried out may be taken as an aggravating circumstance. Thus, the
use of torture and other atrocities on the victims instead of the usual
and less painful method of execution will be taken into account to
increase the penalty under the provision of article 14, paragraph 21,
of the Revised Penal Code, since they, as in this case, augmented
the sufferings of the offended parties unnecessarily to the
attainment of the criminal objective.

This aggravating circumstance is compensated by the mitigating

circumstance of plea of guilty. it is true that the accused pleaded not
guilty to counts 4, 5 and 6 but count 4 has not be substantiated while
counts 5 and 6 were abandoned.

In this first assignment of error, counsel seeks reversal of the

judgment because of the trial court's failure to appoint "another
attorney de oficio for the accused in spite of the manifestation of the
attorney de oficio (who defended the accused at the trial) that he
would like to be relieved for obvious reasons."

The appellate tribunal will indulge reasonable presumptions in favor

of the legality and regularity of all the proceedings of the trial court,
including the presumption that the accused was not denied the right
to have counsel. (U.S. vs. Labial, 27 Phil., 82.) It is presumed that
the procedure prescribed by law has been observed unless it is
made to appear expressly to the contrary. (U.S. vs. Escalante, 36
Phil., 743.) The fact that the attorney appointed by the trial court to
aid the defendant in his defense expressed reluctance to accept the
designation because, as the present counsel assumes, he did not
sympathize with the defendant's cause, is not sufficient to overcome
this presumption. The statement of the counsel in the court below
did no necessarily imply that he did not perform his duty to protect
the interest of the accused. As a matter of fact, the present counsel
"sincerely believes that the said Attorney Carin did his best,
although it was not the best of a willing worker." We do not discern
in the record any indication that the former counsel did not conduct
the defense to the best of his ability. if Attorney Carin did his best as
a sworn member of the bar, as the present attorney admits, that was
enough; his sentiments did not cut any influence in the result of the
case and did not imperil the rights of the appellant.

In conclusion, we find the defendant not guilty of count 4 and guilty

of treason as charged in counts 1,2,3 and 7. There being an
aggravating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion
perpetua. The judgment of the lower court will be modified in this
respect accordingly. In all other particulars, the same will be
affirmed. it is so ordered, with costs of this instance against the
appellant.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon, and Padilla,

JJ., concur.

PARAS, J.:

I concur in the result. Appellant is guilty of murder.


G.R. No. L-477 June 30, 1947
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
APOLINARIO ADRIANO, defendant-appellant.
Remedios P. Nufable for appellant. Assistant Solicitor General
Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lacson for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for treason by the
People's Court sentencing the accused to life imprisonment,
P10,000 fine, and the costs.
The information charged:
That between January and April, 1945 or thereabout, during the
occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese Imperial Forces,
in the Province of Nueva Ecija and in the mountains in the
Island of Luzon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Court, the above-named accused, Apolinario Adriano, who is
not a foreigner, but a Filipino citizen owing allegiance to the
United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in
violation of said allegiance, did then and there willfully,
criminally and treasonably adhere to the Military Forces of
Japan in the Philippines, against which the Philippines and the
United States were then at war, giving the said enemy aid and
comfort in the manner as follows:
That as a member of the Makapili, a military organization
established and designed to assist and aid militarily the
Japanese Imperial forces in the Philippines in the said enemy's
war efforts and operations against the United States and the
Philippines, the herein accused bore arm and joined and
assisted the Japanese Military Forces and the Makapili Army
in armed conflicts and engagements against the United States
armed forces and the Guerrillas of the Philippine
Commonwealth in the Municipalities of San Leonardo and
Gapan, Province of Nueva Ecija, and in the mountains of
Luzon, Philippines, sometime between January and April,
1945. Contrary to Law.
The prosecution did not introduce any evidence to substantiate any
of the facts alleged except that of defendant's having joined the
Makapili organization. What the People's Court found is that the
accused participated with Japanese soldiers in certain raids and in
confiscation of personal property. The court below, however, said
these acts had not been established by the testimony of two
witnesses, and so regarded them merely as evidence of adherence
to the enemy. But the court did find established under the two-
witness rule, so we infer, "that the accused and other Makapilis had
their headquarters in the enemy garrison at Gapan, Nueva Ecija;
that the accused was in Makapili military uniform; that he was armed
with rifle; and that he drilled with other Makapilis under a Japanese
instructor; . . . that during the same period, the accused in Makapili
military uniform and with a rifle, performed duties as sentry at the
Japanese garrison and Makapili headquarters in Gapan, Nueva
Ecija;" "that upon the liberation of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, by the
American forces, the accused and other Makapilis retreated to the
mountains with the enemy;" and that "the accused, rifle in hand, later
surrendered to the Americans."
Even the findings of the court recited above in quotations are not
borne out by the proof of two witnesses. No two of the prosecution
witnesses testified to a single one of the various acts of treason
imputed by them to the appellant. Those who gave evidence that
the accused took part in raids and seizure of personal property, and
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 12
performed sentry duties and military drills, referred to acts allegedly
committed on different dates without any two witnesses coinciding
in any one specified deed. There is only one item on which the
witnesses agree: it is that the defendant was a Makapili and was
seen by them in Makapili uniform carrying arms. Yet, again, on this
point it cannot be said that one witness is corroborated by another
if corroboration means that two witnesses have seen the accused
doing at least one particular thing, it a routine military chore, or just
walking or eating.
We take it that the mere fact of having joined a Makapili organization
is evidence of both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and
comfort. Unless forced upon one against his will, membership in the
Makapili organization imports treasonable intent, considering the
purposes for which the organization was created, which, according
to the evidence, were "to accomplish the fulfillment of the obligations
assumed by the Philippines in the Pact of Alliance with the Empire
of Japan;" "to shed blood and sacrifice the lives of our people in
order to eradicate Anglo-Saxon influence in East Asia;" "to
collaborate unreservedly and unstintedly with the Imperial Japanese
Army and Navy in the Philippines;" and "to fight the common
enemies." Adherence, unlike overt acts, need not be proved by the
oaths of two witnesses. Criminal intent and knowledge may be
gather from the testimony of one witness, or from the nature of the
act itself, or from the circumstances surrounding the act.
(Cramer vs. U.S., 65 Sup. Ct., 918.)
At the same time, being a Makapili is in itself constitutive of an overt
act. It is not necessary, except for the purpose of increasing the
punishment, that the defendant actually went to battle or committed
nefarious acts against his country or countrymen. The crime of
treason was committed if he placed himself at the enemy's call to
fight side by side with him when the opportune time came even
though an opportunity never presented itself. Such membership by
its very nature gave the enemy aid and comfort. The enemy derived
psychological comfort in the knowledge that he had on his side
nationals of the country with which his was at war. It furnished the
enemy aid in that his cause was advanced, his forces augmented,
and his courage was enhanced by the knowledge that he could
count on men such as the accused and his kind who were ready to
strike at their own people. The principal effect of it was no difference
from that of enlisting in the invader's army.
But membership as a Makapili, as an overt act, must be established
by the deposition of two witnesses. Does the evidence in the present
case meet this statutory test? Is two-witness requirement fulfilled by
the testimony of one witness who saw the appellant in Makapili
uniform bearing a gun one day, another witness another day, and
so forth?
The Philippine law on treason is of Anglo-American origin and so we
have to look for guidance from American sources on its meaning
and scope. Judicial interpretation has been placed on the two-
witness principle by American courts, and authoritative text writers
have commented on it. We cull from American materials the
following excerpts which appear to carry the stamp of authority.
Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. 3, section 1396, p. 2282, says:
In England the original Statute of Edward, although requiring
both witnesses to be to the same overt act, was held to mean
that there might be one witness to an overt act and another
witness to another overt act of the same species of treason;
and, in one case it has been intimated that the same
construction might apply in this country. But, as Mr. Wigmore
so succinctly observes: "The opportunity of detecting the falsity
of the testimony, by sequestering the two witnesses and
exposing their variance in details, is wholly destroyed by
 CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 13

permitting them to speak to different acts." The rule as adopted prosecution but because of them. And it was not by whim or by
in this country by all the constitutional provisions, both state accident, but because one of the most venerated of that venerated
and Federal, properly requires that two witnesses shall testify group considered that "prosecutions for treason were generally
to the same overt act. This also is now the rule in England. virulent.'"

More to the point is this statement from VII Wigmore on Evidence, Such is the clear meaning of the two-witness provision of the
3d ed., section 2038, p. 271: American Constitution. By extension, the lawmakers who introduced
that provision into the Philippine statute books must be understood
Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole of the overt act; to have intended that the law should operate with the same
or, if it is separable, there must be two witnesses to each part inflexibility and rigidity as the American forefathers meant.
of the overt act.
The judgment is reversed and the appellant acquitted with costs
Learned Hand, J., in United States vs. Robinson (D.C.S.D., N.Y., charged de oficio.
259 Fed., 685), expressed the same idea: "It is necessary to
produce two direct witnesses to the whole overt act. It may be Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros,
possible to piece bits together of the overt act; but, if so, each and Padilla, JJ., concur. Paras, J., concurs in the result.
bit must have the support of two oaths; . . .." (Copied as footnote in
Wigmore on Evidence,ante.) And in the recent case of
Cramer vs. United States (65 Sup. Ct., 918), decide during the
recent World War, the Federal Supreme Court lays down this
doctrine: "The very minimum function that an overt act must perform
in a treason prosecution is that it shows sufficient action by the
accused, in its setting, to sustain a finding that the accused actually
gave aid and comfort to the enemy. Every act, movement,
deed, and word of the defendant charged to constitute treason must
be supported by the testimony of two witnesses."

In the light of these decisions and opinions we have to set aside the
judgment of the trial court. To the possible objection that the
reasoning by which we have reached this conclusion savors of
sophism, we have only to say that the authors of the constitutional
provision of which our treason law is a copy purposely made
conviction for treason difficult, the rule "severely restrictive." This
provision is so exacting and so uncompromising in regard to the
amount of evidence that where two or more witnesses give oaths to
an overt act and only one of them is believed by the court or jury,
the defendant, it has been said and held, is entitled to discharge,
regardless of any moral conviction of the culprit's guilt as gauged
and tested by the ordinary and natural methods, with which we are
familiar, of finding the truth. Natural inferences, however strong or
conclusive, flowing from other testimony of a most trustworthy
witness or from other sources are unavailing as a substitute for the
needed corroboration in the form of direct testimony of another
eyewitness to the same overt act.

The United States Supreme Court saw the obstacles placed in the
path of the prosecution by a literal interpretation of the rule of two
witnesses but said that the founders of the American government
fully realized the difficulties and went ahead not merely in spite but
because of the objections. (Cramer vs. United States, ante.) More,
the rule, it is said, attracted the members of the Constitutional
Convention "as one of the few doctrines of Evidence entitled to be
guaranteed against legislative change." (Wigmore on Evidence,
ante, section 2039, p. 272, citing Madison's Journal of the Federal
Convention, Scott's ed., II, 564, 566.) Mr. Justice Jackson, who
delivered the majority opinion in the celebrated Cramer case, said:
"It is not difficult to find grounds upon which to quarrel with this
Constitutional provision. Perhaps the farmers placed rather more
reliance on direct testimony than modern researchers in psychology
warrant. Or it may be considered that such a quantitative measure
of proof, such a mechanical calibration of evidence is a crude device
at best or that its protection of innocence is too fortuitous to warrant
so unselective an obstacle to conviction. Certainly the treason rule,
whether wisely or not, is severely restrictive." It must be
remembered, however, that the Constitutional Convention was
warned by James Wilson that "'Treason may sometimes be
practiced in such a manner, as to render proof extremely difficult —
as in a traitorous correspondence with an enemy.' The provision
was adopted not merely in spite of the difficulties it put in the way of

G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellants. Acting Attorney-General Tuason for
appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque
buccaneers like Captain Avery and Captain Kidd and Bartholomew
Roberts gripped the imagination, when grostesque brutes like
Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and
romance. Nevertheless, the record before us tells a tale of twentieth
century piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all touches of
chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a horrible case of rapine
and near murder.
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch
possession, for Peta, another Dutch possession. In one of the boats
was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven
men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a
number of days of navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the evening, the
second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the
Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by
six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first
asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of
the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of
the women by methods too horrible to the described. All of the
persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young
women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea
that it would submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people,
after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored violating
them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two
of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the
women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-
Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and were
charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of
piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the
Moros, based on the grounds that the offense charged was not
within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court
of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public
offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands. After the
demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, trial was had, and a
judgment was rendered finding the two defendants guilty and
sentencing each of them to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to
return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in
another case, to the offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of copras
which had been robbed, or to indemnify them in the amount of 924
rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the costs.
A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by
the attorney de officio. By a process of elimination, however, certain
questions can be quickly disposed of.
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime
of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on
the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and
in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the
lover court and as is again done in this court, that the Court of First
Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in
law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any
particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 14
competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found
or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all
other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be
punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed
within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those
limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. vs.
Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)
The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court
for decision for the first time is whether or not the provisions of the
Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force. Article
153 to 156 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or
the subjects of another nation not at war with Spain, shall be
punished with a penalty ranging from cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of
another nation at war with Spain, it shall be punished with the
penalty of presidio mayor.
ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first
paragraph of the next preceding article shall suffer the penalty
of cadena perpetua or death, and those who commit the crimes
referred to in the second paragraph of the same article,
from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua:
1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by
boarding or firing upon the same.
2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder,
homicide, or by any of the physical injuries specified
in articles four hundred and fourteen and four
hundred and fifteen and in paragraphs one and two
of article four hundred and sixteen.
3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses
against chastity specified in Chapter II, Title IX, of this
book.
4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any
persons without means of saving themselves.
5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.
ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as
all others of this code, when Spain is mentioned it shall be
understood as including any part of the national territory.
ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this
code, every person, who, according to the Constitution of the
Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be considered as
such.
The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the
United States relating to the effect of a transfer of territory from
another State to the United States are well-known. The political law
of the former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law
in so far as it is consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the
United States, or the characteristics and institutions of the
government, remains in force. As a corollary to the main rules, laws
subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to secure good order and
peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character,
continue until by direct action of the new government they are

altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands, etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn
[1885], 114 U.S., 542.)
These principles of the public law were given specific application to
the Philippines by the Instructions of President McKinley of May 19,
1898, to General Wesley Meritt, the Commanding General of the
Army of Occupation in the Philippines, when he said:
Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute
and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political
condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the
conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person
and property, and provide for the punishment of crime, are
considered as continuing in force, so far as they are
compatible with the new order of things, until they are
suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent;
and practice they are not usually abrogated, but are
allowed to remain in force, and to be administered by the
ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the
occupations. This enlightened practice is so far as
possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.
(Official Gazette, Preliminary Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1.
See also General Merritt Proclamation of August 14,
1898.)
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code
dealing with piracy were meant to include the Philippine Islands.
Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the
Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the
provisions of the Code applicable not only to Spaniards but to
Filipinos.
The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the
same thing as piracy by the civil law, and he has never been
disputed. The specific provisions of the Penal Code are similar in
tenor to statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the
public law. This must necessarily be so, considering that the Penal
Code finds its inspiration in this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas,
and the Novisima Recopilacion.
The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress
shall have the power to define and punish piracies and felonies
committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations.
(U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting on the
statute books the necessary ancillary legislation, provided that
whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined
by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the
United States, shall be imprisoned for life. (U.S. Crim. Code, sec.
290; penalty formerly death: U.S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.) The
framers of the Constitution and the members of Congress were
content to let a definition of piracy rest on its universal conception
under the law of nations.
It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the
Philippines relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the
corresponding provisions in force in the United States.
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the
United States. A logical construction of articles of the Penal Code,
like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that
wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words
"United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the word
should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the United
States and citizens of the Philippine Islands." somewhat similar
reasoning led this court in the case of United States vs. Smith
([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word "authority" as found in the
Penal Code a limited meaning, which would no longer comprehend
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 15
all religious, military, and civil officers, but only public officers in the
Government of the Philippine Islands.
Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal
Code would read as follows:
The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United
States and citizens of the Philippine Islands, or the subjects of
another nation not at war with the United States, shall be
punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to
cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of
another nation at war with the United States, it shall be
punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime
of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the
Philippines.
The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal
Code in relation to article 154. There are present at least two of the
circumstances named in the last cited article as authorizing
either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was
accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the
abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving
themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to
whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be
imposed. In this connection, the trial court, finding present the one
aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating the
same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction
provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced
the accused to life imprisonment. At least three aggravating
circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime
was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary
for its commission, that advantage was taken of superior strength,
and that means were employed which added ignominy to the natural
effects of the act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the
penalty. Considering, therefore, the number and importance of the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances here present, which
cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of
instruction, and the horrible nature of the crime committed, it
becomes our duty to impose capital punishment.
The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the
propriety of the imposition of the death penalty upon the defendant
and appellant Lo-lo (the accused who raped on of the women), but
is not unanimous with regard to the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez,
registers his nonconformity. In accordance with provisions of Act
No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court as
to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed
as to the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the
crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at
such time and place as shall be fixed by the judge of first instance
of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two appellants together
with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall
indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties in the equivalent
of 924 rupees, and shall pay a one-half part of the costs of both
instances. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and
Romualdez, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-60100 March 20, 1985

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAIME RODRIGUEZ alias JIMMY alias WILFRED DE LARA y
MEDRANO and RICO LOPEZ, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. L-60768 March 20, 1985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DARIO DE REYES alias DARIO DECE RAYMUNDO y
ELAUSA, accused- appellant.
G.R. No. L-61069 March 20, l985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PETER PONCE y BULAYBULAY alias PETER POWE, accused-
appellant.
PER CURIAM:
Appellants Jaime Rodriguez alias Jimmy alias Wilfred de Lara y
Medrano, Rico Lopez, Davao Reyes alias Dario Dece Raymundo y
Elausa and Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay alias Peter Power were
charged of the crime of piracy in an information filed before the then
Court of First Instance of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, which reads:
That on or about 3:15 in the morning of August 31, 1981, at the
vicinity of Muligin Island and within the territorial waters of the
Municipality of Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi, Province of Tawi-Tawi, and
within the jurisdiction of this honorable Court, the above-named
accused Wilfred de Lara y Medrano, alias Jaime Rodriguez (Jimmy)
Dario Dece Raymundo y Elausa; Rico Lopez y Fernandez and Peter
Ponce y Bulaybulay alias Peter Power being crew members of the
M/V Noria 767, a barter trade vessel of Philippine registry,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another and armed with bladed weapons and high caliber firearms,
to wit: three (3) daggers, two (2) M-14, one (1) garand and one (1)
Browning Automatic Rifle, with intent of gain and by means of
violence and intimidation upon persons, did then and there willfully
and unlawfuflly, and feloniously take, steal and carry away against
the consent of the owners thereof, the equipments and other
persona) properties belonging to the crew members and
passengers of the said M/V Noria 767, consisting of cash money
amounting to Three Million Five Hundred Seventeen Thousand
Three Hundred Pesos (P3,517,300.00), personal belongings of
passengers and crew amounting to One Hundred Thirty Thousand
Pesos (P130,000.00), the vessel's compass, navigational charts
and instruments amounting to Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00)
to the damage and prejudice of the aforementioned owners in the
total amount of THREE MILLION SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P3,687,300.00)
Philippine Currency; that by reason of and on the occasion of the
said piracy and for the purpose of enabling the abovenamed
accused to take, steal and carry away the properties
abovementioned, the herein accused in pursuance to their
conspiracy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
with intent to kill and with evident premeditation, treacherously
attack, assault, stab, shot and, taking advantage of superior
strength, use personal violence upon the persons of Abdusador
Sumihag, Vicente America, Perhan Tan, Marcos Que, Ismael
Turabin, Mabar Abdurahman, Wadi Aduk Rasdi Alfad, Kasmir Tan,
Peter Paul Chiong, Juaini Husini Ismael Ombra, Sabturani Ulag,
Mutalib Sarahadil, Bajubar Adam, Quillermo Wee, Reuben Segovia
Ho, Michael Lao, Yusop Abubakar, Hahji Hussin Kulavan, Amjad
Quezon, Rebuan Majid Edgar Tan, Abdurasul Alialam Federico
Canizares, Omar Tahil Gilbert Que, Arajul Salialam, Masihul
Bandahala, Asola Mohammaddin, Batoto Sulpicio, Sakirani Bassal,
Ibrahim Jamil, Saupi Malang and Gulam Sahiddan, thereby inflicting
upon them multiple gunshot wounds which caused their
instantaneous death and likewise causing physical injuries upon the
persons of Inggal Issao Abduhasan Indasan Hadji Yusop H. Alfad
and Hadji Mahalail Alfad, thus performing all acts of execution which
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 16
could have produced the death of said persons, but nevertheless
did not produce it by reason or cause independent of the will of said
accused, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered
to said victims which prevented death.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the aggravating circumstances of
treachery, evident premeditation, night time and the use of
superior strength. (pp. 97-98, Rollo of L-61069)
Upon arraignment on February 25, 1982, Jaime Rodriguez and Rico
Lopez, assisted by their counsel, pleaded guilty to the charge, were
convicted on March 5, 1982 and sentenced each "to suffer the
extreme penalty of death."
Dario Dece Raymundo, upon arraignment, interposed a plea of not
guilty. However, he withdrew his plea and substituted it with that of
guilty. On March 10, 1982 he was convicted of the crime charged
and sentenced "to suffer the extreme penalty of death."
Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay entered the plea of not guilty.
After trial, he was found guilty and was also sentenced "to suffer the
extreme penalty of death."
No pronouncement was made with respect to the civil liabilities of
the four defendants because "there was a separate civil action for
breach of contract and damages filed with the same trial court in
Civil Case No. N-85 against the several defendants, including the
four accused aforementioned." (p. 26, L-61069)
The case of the four convicted defendants is now before Us on
automatic review.
Evidence shows that on August 29, 1981, at about 7:30 in the
evening, the vessel M/V Noria 767, owned and registered in the
name of Hadji Noria Indasan left Jolo wharf for Cagayan de Tawi-
Tawi. It arrived at the port of Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi the following
day, August 30, 1981, at around 2:00 in the afternoon. In the
evening of the same date, the vessel left for Labuan. On board the
vessel were several traders and crew members. Two or three hours
after its departure, while sailing about 25 miles from Cagayan de
Tawi-Tawi, a commotion occurred in one of the cabins of the vessel.
Three witnesses testified on what they saw and heard.
Mr. Clyde Que, a passenger, heard noises inside a cabin and, after
awhile, he heard shots being fired. He rushed to the motor launch
to hide and on his way through the engine room, he saw appellant
Peter Ponce. Then appellants Jaime Rodriguez, Dario Dece and
Rico Lopez, all armed with rifles, started firing towards Que's
companions after which they brought Que to the pilot's house to
handle the steering wheel. He was substituted by Usman, another
passenger, while Que and the other crew members were ordered to
throw overboard sacks of copra and the dead bodies of Peter
Chiong, Michael Lao, Casmin Tan and Vicente America. At the time,
appellant Peter Ponce, armed with a M-14 rifle, stood guard.
Hadji Mahalail Alfad, another passenger, heard commotions from
the motor launch, followed by gunfire. He hid by laying down among
the sacks of copra. He saw appellants Peter Ponce, Jaime
Rodriguez, Rico Lopez and Dario Dece coming down the stairs as
they were firing shots until Fred Canizares and Guilbert Que were
hit, their bodies falling upon him. When he tried to move, he realized
that he was also hit on the right side of his stomach. Thereafter, he
pretended to be dead till daytime.

Emil Macasaet, Jr., the skipper of the vessel heard the commotion
from one of the cabins. He ordered his men to open the door but it
could not be opened. After awhile, the door opened and he saw a
gun pointed at them. Whereupon, he hid behind the bags of copra
until appellant Jaime Rodriguez came and fired at him. Luckily, he
was not hit. He and some of his men crawled and they took cover in
the bodega of copra. While in hiding there were gunfires coming
from Dario Dece and Peter Ponce. About four (4) hours later, his
Chief Mate Usman persuaded him to come out otherwise something
worse would happen. He saw Jaime Rodriguez who ordered him to
direct his men to throw the copras as well as the dead bodies
overboard.
About ten o'clock in the morning of the same day, the vessel
reached an island where the four appellants were able to secure
pumpboats. Macasaet was ordered to load in one of the pumpboats
nine (9) attache cases which were full of money. Rico Lopez and
Jaime Rodriguez boarded one pumpboat, while Peter Ponce and
Dario Dece boarded another, bringing with them: dressed chicken,
softdrinks, durian, boxes of ammunitions, gallons of water and some
meat, as well as rifles.
Municipal Health Officer Leopoldo Lao went aboard the vessel M/V
Noria when it arrived at Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi on September 2,
1981 and saw at the wharf ten dead bodies, all victims of the sea-
jacking, namely: Gulam Sahiddan, Arajul Naran Salialam, Mallang
Saupi, Guilbert Que, Frederico Canizares, Masihul Bandahala,
Ribowan Majid Edgar Tan, Omar Sabdani Tahir and Abdurasul
Salialam.
In their brief, appellants Jaime Rodriguez, Rico Lopez and Dario
Dece claim that the trial court erred (1) in imposing the death penalty
to the accused-appellants Jaime Rodriguez alias Wilfred de Lara,
Rico Lopez y Fernandez and Davao de Reyes, alias Dario Dece
Raymundo y Elausa despite their plea of guilty; (2) in giving weight
to the alleged sworn statements of Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay,
Identified as Exhibits "C" to "C-10" and Exhibits "I to I-5", as
evidence against Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay; (3) in holding that
accused-appellant Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay is guilty of the crime
of piracy; (4) in holding that the defense of Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay
was merely a denial; and, (5) in holding that Peter Ponce y
Bulaybulay entrusted the P1,700.00 which was his personal money
to Atty. Efren Capulong of the National Bureau of Investigation.
There is no merit in this appeal of the three named defendants,
namely: Jaime Rodriguez and Rico Lopez in G.R. No. L-60100, and
Dario Dece in G.R. No. L-60768.
Anent the first assigned error, suffice it to say that Presidential
Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy Law, amending
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code and which took effect on
August 8, 1974, provides:
SEC. 3. Penalties.—Any person who commits piracy or
highway robbery/brigandage as herein defined, shall,
upon conviction by competent court be punished by:
a) Piracy.—The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and
maximum periods shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other
crimes are committed as a result or on the occasion thereof,
the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If rape,
murder or no homocide is committed as a result or on the
occasion of piracy, or when the offenders abandoned the
victims without means of saving themselves, or when the
seizure is accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel,
the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed. (Emphasis
supplied)
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 17
Clearly, the penalty imposable upon persons found guilty of the
crime of piracy where rape, murder or homicide is committed is
mandatory death penalty. Thus, the lower court committed no error
in not considering the plea of the three (3) defendants as a mitigating
circumstance. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code states that:
b) ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.—
In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible
penalty, it shag be applied by the courts regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have
attended the commission of the deed.
With respect to the other assigned errors, We also find them to be
devoid of merit. Appellants Peter Ponce gave a statement (Exhibits
"C" to "C-11") to the Malaysian authorities and another statement
(Exhibits "I" to "I-15") before the National Bureau of Investigation of
Manila. When said statement (Exhibits "C" to "C-11") was offered in
evidence by the prosecution, the same was not objected to by the
defense, aside from the fact that Peter Ponce, on cross
examination, admitted the truthfulness of said declarations, thus:
Q And the investigation was reduced into writing is that correct?
A Yes. sir.
Q And you were investigated by the police authority of Kudat
and Kota Kinabalo, is that right?
A Yes, sir. Only in Kudat.
Q And that statement you gave to the authority at Kudat, you
have signed that statement, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what you stated is all the truth before the authority in
Kudat?
A Yes, sir. (pp. 33-34, tsn, May 28, 1982)
Relative to the appeal of appellant Peter Ponce (G.R. No. L-61069),
which We likewise declare to be without merit, evidence shows that
his participation in the commission of the offense was positively
testified to by the master of the vessel, Emil Macasaet, Jr., and a
passenger, Hadji Mahalail Alfad. Another witness, passenger Clyde
Que also pointed to have seen him (Peter Ponce) armed with an M-
14 rifle.
Considering the testimonies of Clyde Que and Emil Macasaet, Jr.
who actually saw appellant Peter Ponce firing his weapon
indiscriminately at the passengers and crew members in wanton
disregard of human lives and the fact that after the looting and
killing, appellant Peter Ponce, still armed, joined Dario Dece in one
pumpboat, there can be no question that he was in conspiracy with
the three other defendants. After his arrest, Ponce gave a statement
to the authorities stating therein his participation as well as those of
his companions (Exhibits "I" to "I-1").
The four (4) appellants were arrested and detained by the Malaysian
authorities. On January 8, 1982, the National Bureau of
Investigation authorities fetched and brought them to Manila where
they executed their respective statements after Rico Lopez and
Peter Ponce delivered to the NBI, P3,700.00 and P1,700.00,
respectively, aside from the P527,595.00 and one Rolex watch
 CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 18

which the Malaysian authorities also turned over to the Acting In-
Charge of the NBI in Jolo.

The statement of Ponce (Exhibit " I ") contains the questions and
answers pertinent to Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution, to wit:

l. QUESTION: Mr. Peter Ponce, we are informing you that you

are under investigation here in connection with the robbery
committed on the M/V Noria last August 31, 1981, where you
are an Assistant Engineer. You have a right to remain silent
and to refuse to answer any of our questions here. You have
the right to be represented by counsel of your choice in this
investigation. Should you decide to be represented by a lawyer
but cannot afford one we will provide a lawyer for you free.
Should you decide to give a sworn statement, the same shall
be voluntary and free from force or intimidation or promise of
reward or leniency and anything that you saw here maybe used
for or against you in any court in the Philippines. Now do you
understand an these rights of yours?

ANSWER: Yes, sir.

2. Q: Do you need the services of a lawyer?

A: No, sir.

3. Q: Are you willing to affix your signature hereinbelow to

signify that you so understand all your rights as above stated
and that you do not need the services of a lawyer?

A: Yes, sir. (p. 11 6, Rollo)

Thus, it is clear that Peter Ponce was fully advised of his

constitutional right to remain silent and his right to counsel.

Considering the written statements of all the appellants, (Exhibits

"E", "F", "G", "H", "J" and "K"), interlocking as they are with each
other as each admits his participation and those of the other co-
accused, there is no room for doubt that conspiracy existed among
them. The conduct of appellant

Peter Ponce before, during and after the commission of the crime is
a circumstance showing the presence of conspiracy in the
commission of the crime. As a consequence, every one is
responsible for the crime committed.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Melencio-

Herrera, Plana, Escolin Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas
and Alampay JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J., took no part,


G.R. No. L-57292 February 18, 1986
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULAIDE SIYOH, OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and
ANDAW JAMAHALI, accused-appellants.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the defunct Court of
First Instance of Basilan, Judge Jainal D. Rasul as ponente,
imposing the death penalty.
In Criminal Case No. 318 of the aforesaid court, JULAIDE SIYOH,
OMARKAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and ANDAW JAMAHALI
were accused of qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated
murder said to have been committed according to the information
as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of July, 1979, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
viz., at Mataja Is., Municipality of Lantawan,
Province of Basilan, Philippines, the above
named accused, being strangers and without
lawful authority, armed with firearms and taking
advantage of their superior strength, conspiring
and confederating together, aiding and assisting
one with the other, with intent to gain and by the
use of violence or intimidation against persons
and force upon things, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, fire their
guns into the air and stop the pumpboat wherein
Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de
Guzman and Antonio de Guzman were riding,
traveling at that time from the island of Baluk-
Baluk towards Pilas, boarded the said pumpboat
and take, steal and carry away all their cash
money, wrist watches, stereo sets, merchandise
and other personal belongings amounting to the
total amount of P 18,342.00, Philippine
Currency; that the said accused, on the occasion
of the crime herein above-described, taking
advantage that the said victims were at their
mercy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with intent to kill, ordered them
to jump into the water, whereupon, the said
accused, fired their guns at them which caused
the death of Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen,
Anastacio de Guzman and wounding one
Antonio de Guzman; thus the accused have
performed all the acts of execution which would
have produced the crime of Qualified Piracy with
Quadruple Murder, but which, nevertheless, did
not produce it by reasons of causes in
dependent of their will, that is, said Antonio de
Guzman was able to swim to the shore and hid
himself, and due to the timely medical
assistance rendered to said victim, Antonio de
Guzman which prevented his death.
(Expediente, pp. 1-2.)
An order of arrest was issued against all of the accused but only
Julaide Siyoh and Omar-kayam Kiram were apprehended. (Id, p. 8.)
After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision with the following
dispositive portion.
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 19
WHEREFORE, in view of the fore going
considerations, this Court finds the accused
Omar-kayam Kiram and Julaide Siyoh guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Qualified Piracy with Triple Murder and
Frustrated Murder as defined and penalized
under the provision of Presidential Decree No.
532, and hereby sentences each one of them to
suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH. However,
considering the provision of Section 106 of the
Code of Mindanao and Sulu, the illiteracy or
ignorance or extreme poverty of the accused
who are members of the cultural minorities,
under a regime of so called compassionate
society, a commutation to life imprisonment is
recommended. (Id, p. 130.)
In their appeal, Siyoh and Kiram make only one assignment of error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM AND
JULAIDE SIYOH HAS BEEN PROVED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. (Brief, p. 8.)
The People's version of the facts is as follows:
Alberto Aurea was a businessman engaged in
selling dry goods at the Larmitan Public Market,
in the province of Basilan (pp. 2-3, tsn). On July
7, 1979 and on July 10, 1979, Antonio de
Guzman, Danilo Hiolen, Rodolfo de Castro and
Anastacio de Guzman received goods from his
store consisting of mosquito nets, blankets, wrist
watch sets and stereophono with total value of
P15,000 more or less (pp. 4-6, tsn). The goods
were received under an agreement that they
would be sold by the above-named persons and
thereafter they would pay the value of said
goods to Aurea and keep part of the profits for
themselves. However these people neither paid
the value of the goods to Aurea nor returned the
goods to him (pp. 6-7, tsn). On July 15, 1979,
Aurea was informed by Antonio de Guzman that
his group was held up near Baluk- Baluk Island
and that his companions were hacked (p. 8, tsn).
On July 16, 1979, the bodies of Rodolfo de
Castro, Danilo Hiolen and Anastacio de Guzman
were brought by the PC seaborne patrol to
Isabela, Basilan (pp. 17-18, 29, tsn). Only
Antonio de Guzman survived the incident that
caused the death of his companions.
It appears that on July 10, 1979, Antonio de
Guzman together with his friends who were also
travelling merchants like him, were on their way
to Pilas Island, Province of Basilan, to sell the
goods they received from Alberto Aurea. The
goods they brought with them had a total value
of P18,000.00 (pp- 36-37, tsn). They left for Pilas
Island at 2:00 p.m. of July 10, 1979 on a
pumpboat. They took their dinner and slept that
night in the house of Omar-kayam Kiram at Pilas
Island (pp. 37-38, tsn).
The following day, July 11, 1979, de Guzman's
group, together with Kiram and Julaide Siyoh,
started selling their goods, They were able to sell

goods worth P 3,500.00. On July 12, 1979, the
group, again accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh,
went to sell their goods at another place,
Sangbay, where they sold goods worth P
12,000.00 (pp. 40-42, tsn). They returned to
Pilas Island at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon and
again slept at Kiram's house. However that night
Kiram did not sleep in his house, and upon
inquiry the following day when Antonio de
Guzman saw him, Kiram told the former that he
slept at the house of Siyoh.
On that day, July 13, 1979, the group of Antonio
de Guzman went to Baluk-Baluk, a place
suggested by Kiram. They were able to sell
goods worth P3,000.00 (pp. 43-46, tsn). They
returned to Pilas Island for the night but Kiram
did not sleep with them (p. 47, tsn).
The following day, July 14, 1979, the group
again went to Baluk-Baluk accompanied by
Kiram and Siyoh (pp. 48, 50 t.s.n), They used
the pumpboat of Kiram. Kiram and Siyoh were at
that time armed with 'barongs'. They arrived at
Baluk-Baluk at about 10:00 o'clock in the
morning and upon arrival at the place Kiram and
Siyoh going ahead of the group went to a house
about 15 meters away from the place where the
group was selling its goods (pp. 50-53, tsn).
Kiram and Siyoh were seen by the group talking
with two persons whose faces the group saw but
could not recognize (pp. 53-54, tsn). After selling
their goods, the members of the group, together
with Kiram and Siyoh, prepared to return to Pilas
Island. They rode on a pumpboat where Siyoh
positioned himself at the front while Kiram
operated the engine. On the way to Pilas Island,
Antonio de Guzman saw another pumpboat
painted red and green about 200 meters away
from their pumpboat (pp. 55, tsn). Shortly after"
Kiram turned off the engine of their pumpboat.
Thereafter two shots were fired from the other
pumpboat as it moved towards them (pp. 57-58,
tsn). There were two persons on the other
pumpboat who were armed with armantes. De
Guzman recognized them to be the same
persons he saw Kiram conversing with in a
house at Baluk-Baluk Island. When the boat
came close to them, Kiram threw a rope to the
other pumpboat which towed de Guzman's
pumpboat towards Mataja Island. On the way to
Mataja Island, Antonio de Guzman and his
companions were divested of their money and
their goods by Kiram (pp. 59-61, tsn). Thereafter
Kiram and his companions ordered the group of
de Guzman to undress. Taking fancy on the
pants of Antonio de Guzman, Kiram put it on.
With everybody undressed, Kiram said 'It was
good to kill all of you'. After that remark, Siyoh
hacked Danilo Hiolen while Kiram hacked
Rodolfo de Castro. Antonio de Guzman jumped
into the water. As he was swimming away from
the pumpboat, the two companions of Kiram
fired at him, injuring his back (pp. 62-65, tsn). But
he was able to reach a mangrove where he
stayed till nightfall. When he left the mangrove,
he saw the dead bodies of Anastacio de
Guzman, Danilo Hiolen and Rodolfo de Castro.
He was picked up by a fishing boat and brought
to the Philippine Army station at Maluso where
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 20
he received first aid treatment. Later he was
brought to the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at
Isabela, Basilan province (pp. 66-68, tsn).
On July 15, 1979, while waiting for the dead
bodies of his companions at the wharf, de
Guzman saw Siyoh and Kiram. He pointed them
out to the PC and the two were arrested before
they could run. When arrested, Kiram was
wearing the pants he took from de Guzman and
de Guzman had to ask Pat. Bayabas at the
Provincial Jail to get back his pants from Kiram
(pp. 69-72, tsn).
Antonio de Guzman was physically examined at
the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at Isabela,
Basilan and findings showed: 'gunshot wound,
scapular area, bilateral, tangenital' (Exh. C,
prosecution). (pp. 134-136, tsn). Dr. Jaime M.
Junio, Provincial Health Officer of Basilan,
examined the dead bodies of Rodolfo de Castro
and Danilo Hiolen and issued the corresponding
death certificates (Exhs. D and E, prosecution).
(pp. 137-138; 140-141, tsn). (Brief, pp. 5-11.)
As can be seen from the lone assignment of error, the issue is the
credibility of witnesses. Who should be believed Antonio de
Guzman who was the lone prosecution eye-witness or Siyoh and
Kiram the accused-appellants who claims that they were also the
victims of the crime? The trial court which had the opportunity of
observing the demeanor of the witnesses and how they testified
assigned credibility to the former and an examination of the record
does not reveal any fact or circumstance of weight and influence
which was overlooked or the significance of which was
misinterpreted as would justify a reversal of the trial court's
determination. Additionally, the following claims of the appellants
are not convincing:
1. That if they were the culprits they could have easily robbed their
victims at the Kiram house or on any of the occasions when they
were travelling together. Suffice it to say that robbing the victims at
Kiram's house would make Kiram and his family immediately
suspect and robbing the victims before they had sold all their goods
would be premature. However, robbing and killing the victims while
at sea and after they had sold all their goods was both timely and
provided safety from prying eyes.
2. That the accused immediately reported the incident to the PC.
The record does not support this assertion. For as the prosecution
stated: "It is of important consequence to mention that the witness
presented by the defense are all from Pilas Island and friends of the
accused. They claimed to be members of retrieving team for the
dead bodies but no PC soldiers were ever presented to attest this
fact. The defense may counter why the prosecution also failed to
present the Maluso Police Daily Event book? This matter has been
brought by Antonio not to the attention of the PC or Police but to an
army detachment. The Army is known to have no docket book, so
why take the pain in locating the army soldiers with whom the report
was made? (Memorandum, p. 7.) And Judge Rasul also makes this
observation: "..., this Court is puzzled, assuming the version of the
defense to be true, why the lone survivor Antonio de Guzman as
having been allegedly helped by the accused testified against them.
Indeed, no evidence was presented and nothing can be inferred
from the evidence of the defense so far presented showing reason
why the lone survivor should pervert the truth or fabricate or
manufacture such heinous crime as qualified piracy with triple
murders and frustrated murder? The point which makes us doubt
the version of the defense is the role taken by the PC to whom the
report was allegedly made by the accused immediately after the
 CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 21

commission of the offense. Instead of helping the accused, the PC
law enforcement agency in Isabela, perhaps not crediting the report
of the accused or believing in the version of the report made by the
lone survivor Antonio de Guzman, acted consistently with the latter's
report and placed the accused under detention for investigation."
(Expediente, pp. 127-128.)
WHEREFORE, finding the decision under review to be in accord
with both the facts and the law, it is affirmed with the following
modifications: (a) for lack of necessary votes the penalty imposed
shall be reclusion perpetua; and (b) each of the appellants shall pay
in solidum to the heirs of each of the deceased indemnity in the
amount of P30,000.00. No special pronouncement as to costs.

3. That the affidavits of Dolores de Guzman, wife of the deceased SO ORDERED.

Anastacio de Guzman, and Primitiva de Castro, wife of the
deceased Rodolfo de Castro, state that Antonio de Guzman
informed them shortly after the incident that their husbands were
killed by the companions of Siyoh and Kiram. The thrust of the
appellants' claim, therefore, is that Namli Indanan and Andaw
Jamahali were the killers and not the former. But this claim is
baseless in the face of the proven conspiracy among the accused
for as Judge Rasul has stated:

It is believed that conspiracy as alleged in the

information is sufficiently proved in this case. In
fact the following facts appear to have been
established to show clearly conspiracy: A) On
July 14, 1979, while peddling, the survivor-
witness Tony de Guzman noticed that near the
window of a dilapidated house, both accused
were talking to two (2) armed strange-looking
men at Baluk-Baluk Island; B) When the
pumpboat was chased and overtaken, the
survivor-witness Tony de Guzman recognized
their captors to be the same two (2) armed
strangers to whom the two accused talked in
Baluk- Baluk Island near the dilapidated house;
C) The two accused, without order from the two
armed strangers transferred the unsold goods to
the captors' banca; D) That Tony de Guzman
and companion peddlers were divested of their
jewelries and cash and undressed while the two
accused remained unharmed or not molested.
These concerted actions on their part prove
conspiracy and make them equally liable for the
same crime (People vs. Pedro, 16 SCRA 57;
People vs. lndic 10 SCRA 130). The
convergence of the will of the conspirators in the
scheming and execution of the crime amply
justifies the imputation of all of them the act of
any of them (People vs. Peralta, 25 SCRA, 759).
(Id., pp. 128-129.)

4. That there is no evidence Anastacio de Guzman was killed

together with Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen because his
remains were never recovered. There is no reason to suppose that
Anastacio de Guzman is still alive or that he died in a manner
different from his companions. The incident took place on July 14,
1979 and when the trial court decided the case on June 8, 1981
Anastacio de Guzman was still missing. But the number of persons
killed on the occasion of piracy is not material. P.D. No. 532
considers qualified piracy, i.e. rape, murder or homicide is
committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, as a special
complex crime punishable by death regardless of the number of
victims.

5. That the death certificates are vague as to the nature of the

injuries sustained by the victims; were they hacked wounds or
gunshot wounds? The cause of death stated for Rodolfo de Castro
and Danilo Hiolen is: "Hemorrhage due to hacked wounds, possible
gunshot wounds." (Exhs. D and E.) The cause is consistent with the
testimony of Antonio de Guzman that the victims were hacked; that
the appellants were armed with "barongs" while Indanan and
Jamahali were armed with armalites.

G.R. No. 81567 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO
VILLANUEVA. MANOLITA O. UMIL, and NICANOR P. DURAL,
FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN.
RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84581-82 July 9, 1990
AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN. RAMON
MONTANO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84583-84 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
OF ATTY. DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE.
DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL.
EVARISTO CARINO, LT. COL. REX D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO
DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding
Officer, PC-INP Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon
City, respondents.
G.R. No. 83162 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA AND DANNY RIVERA.
VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES
CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR MARIANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 85727 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
OF: DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO
REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. 86332 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
OF NARCISO B. NAZARENO. ALFREDO
NAZARENO, petitioner,
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE
STATION, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO
MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and
P/SGT. MAURO AROJADO, respondents.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82.
Ramon S. Esguerra, Barbara Anne C. Migallos and Agripino G.
Morga for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 22
Efren H. Mercado for petitioner in G.R. No. 83162.
Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Sy, Taquio & Association for
petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.
Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. No. 86332.
The Solicitor General for the respondents.
PER CURIAM:
The are eight (8) petitioners for habeas corpus filed before the
Court, which have been consolidated because of the similarity of
issues raised, praying for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus,
ordering the respective respondents to produce the bodies of the
persons named therein and to explain why they should not be set at
liberty without further delay.
In their respective Returns, the respondents uniformly assert that
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not available to the
petitioners as they have been legally arrested and are detained by
virtue of valid informations filed in court against them.
The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their
arrests were made without warrant and, that no preliminary
investigation was first conducted, so that the informations filed
against them are null and void.
The Court has carefully reviewed the contentions of the parties in
their respective pleadings, and it finds that the persons detained
have not been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of their
constitutional right to liberty, and that the circumstances attending
these cases do not warrant their release on habeas corpus.
The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous
complaint is recognized in law. The occasions or instances when
such an arrest may be effected are clearly spelled out in Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5 paragraphs
(a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is justified
when the person arrested is caught in flagranti delicto, viz., in the
act of committing an offense; or when an offense has just been
committed and the person making the arrest has personal

knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has
committed it. The rationale behind lawful arrests, without warrant,
was stated by this Court in the case of People vs. Kagui
Malasugui 1 thus:
To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched
for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be
to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest,
the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their
escape in many instances.
The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in
whose behalf these petitions for habeas corpus have been filed, had
freshly committed or were actually committing an offense, when
apprehended, so that their arrests without a warrant were clearly
justified, and that they are, further, detained by virtue of valid
informations filed against them in court.
A brief narration of the facts and events surrounding each of the
eight (8) petitions is in order.
I Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil vs. Ramos), the record shows that, on 1
February 1988, the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the
Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential
information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation
squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital
in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon verification, it was found
that the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital records as
Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA
liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of two (2) CAPCOM
soldiers the day before, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining
Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of this verification,
Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of
the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4
February 1988, Rolando Dural was positively identified by
eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the
CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the two (2) CAPCOM
soldiers seated inside the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and
CIC Renato Manligot.
As a consequence of this positive identification, Rolando Dural was
referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and
thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an
information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the
crime of "Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in
Authority." The case was docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-
30112 and no bail was recommended. On 15 February 1988, the
information was amended to include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal,
Jr. who, at the filing of the original information, was still unidentified.
Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was
filed with this Court on behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural,
and Renato Villanueva. The Court issued the writ of habeas
corpus on 9 February 1988 and the respondents filed a Return of
the Writ on 12 February 1988. Thereafter, the parties were heard on
15 February 1988.
On 26 February 1988, however, Roberto Umil and Renato
Villanueva posted bail before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City
where charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had been
filed against them, and they were accordingly released. The petition
for habeas corpus, insofar as Umil and Villanueva are concerned, is
now moot and academic and is accordingly dismissed, since the writ
of habeas corpus does not lie in favor of an accused in a criminal
case who has been released on bail. 2
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 23
As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested
while in the act of shooting the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers
aforementioned. Nor was he arrested just after the commission of
the said offense for his arrest came a day after the said shooting
incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified.
However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the
New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization.
Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural
without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing
an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or
offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith
constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature
of continuing crimes. As stated by the Court in an earlier case:
From the facts as above-narrated, the claim of the petitioners that
they were initially arrested illegally is, therefore, without basis in law
and in fact. The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and
offenses committed in the furtherance, on the occasion thereof, or
incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential
which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their
essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude.
Clearly then, the arrest of the herein detainees was well within the
bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.
2. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its
fighting armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in
furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the
course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the
purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory
offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure
in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by
a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a
judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is
bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal
impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts
of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but
equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or
capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that
involves the very survival of society and its government and duly
constituted authorities. If killing and other acts of violence against
the rebels find justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities
which is of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most
assuredly so in case of invasion, merely seizing their persons and
detaining them while any of these contingencies continues cannot
be less justified. . . . 3
The record, moreover, shows that the criminal case filed
against Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. for "Double Murder,
etc." was tried in the court below and at the conclusion thereof, or
on 17 August 1988, Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. were
found guilty of the charge and sentenced accordingly. Rolando
Dural is now serving the sentence imposed upon him by the trial
court. Thus, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available to him.
For, as held in the early case of U.S. vs. Wilson: 4
In this case, whatever may be said about the manner of his arrest,
the fact remains that the defendant was actually in court in the
custody of the law on March 29, when a complaint sufficient in form
and substance was read to him. To this he pleaded not guilty. The
trial followed, in which, and in the judgment of guilty pronounced by
the court, we find no error. Whether, if there were irregularities in
bringing him personally before the court, he could have been
released on a writ of habeas corpus or now has a civil action for
damages against the person who arrested him we need not inquire.
It is enough to say that such irregularities are not sufficient to set

aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint and
after a trial free from error.
II
In G.R. Nos. 84581-82 (Roque vs. De Villa), the arrest of Amelia
Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra, without warrant, is also justified.
When apprehended at the house of Renato Constantino in Marikina
Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, Wilfredo Buenaobra admitted that
he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato
Constantino and other members of the rebel group. Amelia Roque,
upon the other hand, was a member of the National United Front
Commission, in charge of finance, and admitted ownership of
subversive documents found in the house of her sister in Caloocan
City. She was also in possession of ammunition and a fragmentation
grenade for which she had no permit or authority to possess.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that on 27 June 1988, one
Rogelio Ramos y Ibanes, a member of the NPA, who had
surrendered to the military authorities, told military agents about the
operations of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the
New Peoples Army (NPA) in Metro Manila. He identified some of his
former comrades as "Ka Mong", a staff member of the
Communications and Transportation Bureau; "Ka Nelia", a staff
member in charge of finance; "Ka Miller", an NPA courier from
Sorsogon and Lopez, Quezon; "Ka Ted", and "Ka Totoy". He also
pointed to a certain house occupied by Renato Constantino located
in the Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina,
Metro Manila, which is used as a safehouse of the National United
Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP-NPA.
In view of these revelations, the Constantino house was placed
under military surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a
search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig, a search of the house was conducted at about
5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, by a combined team of the Criminal
Investigation Service, National Capital District (CIS-NCD) and the
Constabulary Security Group (CSG). In the course of the search,
the following articles were found and taken under proper receipt:
a) One (1) Colt M16A1 long rifle with defaced serial number;
b) One (1) Cal. .380 ACT/9mm Model PPK/8 SN: 260577 &
2605778;
c) Two (2) fragmentation hand grenades;
d) Fifty-six (56) live ammunition for Cal. 5.56 mm;
e) Five (5) live ammunition for Cal. .380;
f) One (1) ICOM VHF FM Radio Transciever SN: 14903
g) One (1) Regulated power supply 220V AC;
h) One (1) Antennae (adjustable);
i) One (1) Speaker with cord ALEXAR;
j) Voluminous Subversive documents.
When confronted, Renato Constatino could not produce any permit
or authority to possess the firearms, ammunition, radio and other
communications equipment. Hence, he was brought to the CIS
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 24
Headquarters for investigation. When questioned, he refused to give
a written statement, although he admitted that he was a staff
member of the executive committee of the NUFC and a ranking
member of the International Department of the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CPP).
At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day (12 August
1988), Wilfredo Buenaobra arrived at the house of Renato
Constantino in the Villaluz Compound. When accosted, he
readily admitted to the military agents that he is a regular member
of the CPP/NPA and that he went to the place to deliver letters to
"Ka Mong", referring to Renato Constatino, and other members of
the rebel group. On further questioning, he also admitted that he is
known as "Ka Miller" and that he was from Barangay San Pedro,
Lopez, Quezon. Among the items taken from him were the following:
(1) Handwritten letter addressed to "Ka Bing & Co. from A & Co."
dated August 11, 1988;
(2) Handwritten letter addressed to "ROD from VIC (Schell datre)"
dated August 11, 1988;
(3) Handwritten letter addressed to "Suzie" from "Vic", dated August
11, 1988.
Also found Buenaobra's possession was a piece of paper containing
a written but jumbled telephone number of Florida M. Roque, sister
of Amelia Roque alias "Ka Nelia", at 69 Geronimo St., Caloocan
City. Acting on the lead provided as to the whereabouts of Amelia
Roque, the military agents went to the given address the next day
(13 August 1988). They arrived at the place at about 11:00 o'clock
in the morning. After identifying themselves as military agents and
after seeking permission to search the place, which was granted,
the military agents conducted a search in the presence of the
occupants of the house and the barangay captain of the place, one
Jesus D. Olba.
The military agents found the place to be another safehouse of the
NUFC/CPP. They found ledgers, journals, vouchers, bank deposit
books, folders, computer diskettes, and subversive documents as
well as live ammunition for a .38 SPL Winchester, 11 rounds of live
ammunition for a cal. .45, 19 rounds of live ammunition for an M16
Rifle, and a fragmentation grenade. As a result, Amelia Roque and
the other occupants of the house were brought to the PC-CIS
Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, for investigation.
Amelia Roque admitted to the investigators that the voluminous
documents belonged to her and that the other occupants of the
house had no knowledge of them. As a result, the said other
occupants of the house were released from custody.
On 15 August 1988, Amelia Roque was brought to the Caloocan
City Fiscal for inquest after which an information charging her with
violation of PD 1866 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No.
C-1196. Another information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act
was filed against Amelia Roque before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Caloocan City, which is docketed therein as Criminal Case No.
C-150458.
An information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed
against Wilfredo Buenaobra before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Marikina, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal
Case No. 23715. Bail was set at P4,000.00.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed before
this Court on behalf of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra. At
the hearing of the case, however, Wilfredo Buenaobra manifested

his desire to stay in the PC-INP Stockade at Camp Crame, Quezon
City. According, the petition for habeas corpus filed on his behalf is
now moot and academic. Only the petition of Amelia Roque remains
for resolution.
The contention of respondents that petitioners Roque and
Buenaobra are officers and/or members of the National United Front
Commission (NUFC) of the CPP was not controverted or traversed
by said petitioners. The contention must be deemed admitted. 5 As
officers and/or members of the NUFC-CPP, their arrest, without
warrant, was justified for the same reasons earlier stated vis-a-
vis Rolando Dural. The arrest without warrant of Roque was
additionally justified as she was, at the time of apprehension, in
possession of ammunitions without license to possess them.
III
In G.R. Nos. 84583-84 (Anonuevo vs. Ramos), the arrest
of Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, without warrant, is also
justified under the rules. Both are admittedly members of the
standing committee of the NUFC and, when apprehended in the
house of Renato Constatino, they had a bag containing subversive
materials, and both carried firearms and ammunition for which they
had no license to possess or carry.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that at about 7:30 o'clock
in the evening of 13 August 1988, Domingo T. Anonuevo and
Ramon Casiple arrived at the house of Renato Constatino at
Marikina Heights, Marikina, which was still under surveillance by
military agents. The military agents noticed bulging objects on their
waist lines. When frisked, the agents found them to be loaded guns.
Anonuevo and Casiple were asked to show their permit or license
to possess or carry firearms and ammunition, but they could not
produce any. Hence, they were brought to PC Headquarters for
investigation. Found in their possession were the following articles:
a) Voluminous subversive documents
b) One (1) Cal. 7.65 MOD 83 2C Pistol SN: 001412 with one (1)
magazine for Cal. 7.65 containing ten (10) live ammunition of same
caliber;
c) One (1) Cal. 7.65 Pietro Barreta SN; A18868 last digit tampered
with one (1) magazine containing five (5) live ammunition of same
caliber.
At the PC Stockade, Domingo Anonuevo was identified as "Ka Ted",
and Ramon Casiple as "Ka Totoy" of the CPP, by their comrades
who had previously surrendered to the military.
On 15 August 1988, the record of the investigation and other
documentary evidence were forwarded to the Provincial Fiscal at
Pasig, Metro Manila, who conducted an inquest, after which
Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were charged with violation
of Presidential Decree No. 1866 before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Metro Manila. The cases are docketed therein as Criminal
Cases Nos. 74386 ad 74387, respectively. No bail was
recommended.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this
Court on behalf of Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, alleging
that the said Anonuevo and Casiple were unlawfully arrested
without a warrant and that the informations filed against them are
null and void for having been filed without prior hearing and
preliminary investigation. On 30 August 1988, the Court issued the
writ of habeas corpus, and after the respondents had filed a Return
of the Writ, the parties were heard.
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 25
The petitioners' (Anonuevo and Casiple) claim that they were
unlawfully arrested because there was no previous warrant of
arrest, is without merit The record shows that Domingo Anonuevo
and Ramon Casiple were carrying unlicensed firearms and
ammunition in their person when they were apprehended.
There is also no merit in the contention that the informations filed
against them are null and void for want of a preliminary investigation.
The filing of an information, without a preliminary investigation
having been first conducted, is sanctioned by the Rules. Sec. 7,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, as amended, reads:
Sec. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without a warrant. — When
a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information
may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a
preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on the basis
of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the
person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper
officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a
lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such
waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule
and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days
from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation
having been first conducted, the accused may within five (5) days
from the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for a
preliminary investigation with the same right to adduced evidence in
his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule.
The petitioners Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, however,
refused to sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. In the informations filed against
them, the prosecutor made identical certifications, as follows:
This is to certify that the accused has been charged in accordance
with Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, that
no preliminary investigation was conducted because the accused
has not made and signed a waiver of the provisions of Art. 125 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended; that based on the evidence
presented, there is reasonable ground to believe that the crime has
been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
Nor did petitioners ask for a preliminary investigation after the
informations had been filed against them in court. Petitioners cannot
now claim that they have been deprived of their constitutional right
to due process.
IV
In G.R. No. 83162 (Ocaya vs. Aguirre), the arrest without warrant,
of Vicky Ocaya is justified under the Rules, since she had with her
unlicensed ammunition when she was arrested. The record of this
case shows that on 12 May 1988, agents of the PC Intelligence and
Investigation of the Rizal PC-INP Command, armed with a search
warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, conducted a search of a house located
at Block 19, Phase II, Marikina Green Heights, Marikina, Metro
Manila, believed to be occupied by Benito Tiamson, head of the
CPP-NPA. In the course of the search, Vicky Ocaya arrived in a car
driven by Danny Rivera. Subversive documents and several rounds
of ammunition for a .45 cal. pistol were found in the car of Vicky

Ocaya. As a result, Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera were brought to
the PC Headquarters for investigation. When Vicky Ocaya could not
produce any permit or authorization to possess the ammunition, an
information charging her with violation of PD 1866 was filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The case is docketed
therein as Criminal Case No. 73447. Danny Rivera, on the other
hand, was released from custody.
On 17 May 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed, with this
Court on behalf of Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera. It was alleged
therein that Vicky Ocaya was illegally arrested and detained, and
denied the right to a preliminary investigation.
It would appear, however, that Vicky Ocaya was arrested in flagranti
delicto so that her arrest without a warrant is justified. No preliminary
investigation was conducted because she was arrested without a
warrant and she refused to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rule of
Court, as amended.
V
The petitioners Vicky Ocaya, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple,
and Amelia Roque claim that the firearms, ammunition and
subversive documents alleged to have been found in their
possession when they were arrested, did not belong to them, but
were "planted" by the military agents to justify their illegal arrest.
The petitioners, however, have not introduced any evidence to
support their aforesaid claim. On the other hand, no evil motive or
ill-will on the part of the arresting officers that would cause the said
arresting officers in these cases to accuse the petitioners falsely,
has been shown. Besides, the arresting officers in these cases do
not appear to be seekers of glory and bounty hunters for, as counsel
for the petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple say, "there is absolutely
nothing in the evidence submitted during the inquest that petitioners
are on the 'AFP Order of Battle with a reward of P150,000.00 each
on their heads.'" 6 On the other hand, as pointed out by the Solicitor
General, the arrest of the petitioners is not a product of a witch hunt
or a fishing expedition, but the result of an in-depth surveillance of
NPA safehouses pointed to by no less than former comrades of the
petitioners in the rebel movement.
The Solicitor General, in his Consolidated Memorandum, aptly
observes:
. . . . To reiterate, the focal point in the case of petitioners Roque,
Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple, was the lawful search and
seizure conducted by the military at the residence of Renato
Constantino at Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights,
Marikina, Metro Manila. The raid at Constantino's residence, was
not a witch hunting or fishing expedition on the part of the military. It
was a result of an in-depth military surveillance coupled with the
leads provided by former members of the underground subversive
organizations. That raid produced positive results. to date, nobody
has disputed the fact that the residence of Constantino when raided
yielded communication equipment, firearms and ammunitions, as
well as subversive documents.
The military agents working on the information provided by
Constantino that other members of his group were coming to his
place, reasonably conducted a "stake-out" operation whereby some
members of the raiding team were left behind the place. True
enough, barely two hours after the raid and Constantino's arrest,
petitioner Buenaobra arrived at Constantino's residence. He acted
suspiciously and when frisked and searched by the military
authorities, found in his person were letters. They are no ordinary
letters, as even a cursory reading would show. Not only that,
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 26
Buenaobra admitted that he is a NPA courier and was there to
deliver the letters to Constantino.
Subsequently, less than twenty four hours after the arrest of
Constantino and Buenaobra, petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple
arrived at Constantino's place. Would it be unreasonable for the
military agents to believe that petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple are
among those expected to visit Constantino's residence considering
that Constatino's information was true, in that Buenaobra did come
to that place? Was it unreasonable under the circumstances, on the
part of the military agents, not to frisk and search anyone who
should visit the residence of Constantino, such as petitioners
Anonuevo and Casiple? Must this Honorable Court yield to
Anonuevo and Casiple's flimsy and bare assertion that they went to
visit Constantino, who was to leave for Saudi Arabia on the day they
were arrested thereat?
As to petitioner Roque, was it unreasonable for the military
authorities to effect her arrest without warrant considering that it was
Buenaobra who provided the leads on her identity? It cannot be
denied that Buenaobra had connection with Roque. Because the
former has the phone number of the latter. Why the necessity of
jumbling Roque's telephone number as written on a piece of paper
taken from Buenaobra's possession? Petitioners Roque and
Buenaobra have not offered any plausible reason so far.
In all the above incidents, respondents maintain that they acted
reasonably, under the time, place and circumstances of the events
in question, especially considering that at the time of petitioner's
arrest, incriminatory evidence, i.e, firearms, ammunitions and/or
subversive documents were found in their possession.
Petitioners, when arrested, were neither taking their snacks nor
innocently visiting a camp, but were arrested in such time, place and
circumstances, from which one can reasonably conclude tat they
were up to a sinister plot, involving utmost secrecy and
comprehensive conspiracy.
IV
In. G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the release on habeas
corpus of the petitioner Deogracias Espiritu, who is detained by
virtue of an Information for Violation of Article 142 of the Revised
Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition) filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, is similarly not warranted.
The record of the case shows that the said petitioner is the General
Secretary of the Pinagkaisahang Samahan ng Tsuper at Operators
Nationwide (PISTON), an association of drivers and operators of
public service vehicles in the Philippines, organized for their mutual
aid and protection.
Petitioner claims that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 23
November 1988, while he was sleeping in his home located at 363
Valencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, he was awakened by his sister
Maria Paz Lalic who told him that a group of persons wanted to hire
his jeepney. When he went down to talk to them, he was
immediately put under arrest. When he asked for the warrant of
arrest, the men, headed by Col. Ricardo Reyes, bodily lifted him and
placed him in their owner-type jeepney. He demanded that his
sister, Maria Paz Lalic, be allowed to accompany him, but the men
did not accede to his request and hurriedly sped away.
He was brought to Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police District
at Blumentritt, Manila where he was interrogated and detained.
Then, at about 9:00 o'clock of the same morning, he was brought
before the respondent Lim and, there and then, the said respondent

ordered his arrest and detention. He was thereafter brought to the
General Assignment Section, Investigation Division of the Western
Police District under Police Capt. Cresenciano A. Cabasal where he
was detained, restrained and deprived of his liberty. 7
The respondents claim however, that the detention of the petitioner
is justified in view of the Information filed against him before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed therein as Criminal Case
No. 88-683-85, charging him with violation of Art. 142 of the Revised
Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition).
The respondents also claim that the petitioner was lawfully arrested
without a judicial warrant of arrest since petitioner when arrested
had in fact just committed an offense in that in the afternoon of 22
November 1988, during a press conference at the National Press
Club.
Deogracias Espiritu through tri-media was heard urging all drivers
and operators to go on nationwide strike on November 23, 1988, to
force the government to give into their demands to lower the prices
of spare parts, commodities, water and the immediate release from
detention of the president of the PISTON (Pinag-isang Samahan ng
Tsuper Operators Nationwide). Further, we heard Deogracias
Espiritu taking the place of PISTON president Medardo Roda and
also announced the formation of the Alliance Drivers Association to
go on nationwide strike on November 23, 1988. 8
Policemen waited for petitioner outside the National Pres Club in
order to investigate him, but he gave the lawmen the slip. 9 He was
next seen at about 5:00 o'clock that afternoon at a gathering of
drivers and symphatizers at the corner of Magsaysay Blvd. and
Valencia Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila where he was heard to say:
Bukas tuloy ang welga natin, sumagot na ang Cebu at Bicol na
kasali sila, at hindi tayo titigil hanggang hindi binibigay ng gobyerno
ni Cory ang gusto nating pagbaba ng halaga ng spare parts, bilihin
at and pagpapalaya sa ating pinuno na si Ka Roda hanggang sa
magkagulo na. 10 (emphasis supplied)
The police finally caught up with the petitioner on 23 November
1988. He was invited for questioning and brought to police
headquarters after which an Information for violation of Art. 142 of
the Revised Penal Code was filed against him before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila. 11
Since the arrest of the petitioner without a warrant was in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 113, Sec. 5(b) of the Rules
of Court and that the petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid
information filed with the competent court, he may not be released
on habeas corpus. He may, however be released upon posting bail
as recommended. However, we find the amount of the
recommended bail (P60,000.00) excessive and we reduce it to
P10,000.00 only.
VII
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno vs. Station Commander), we also find
no merit in the submission of Narciso Nazarenothat he was illegally
arrested and is unlawfully detained. The record of this case shows
that at about 8:30 o'clock in the morning of 14 December 1988, one
Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men near the corner of T.
Molina and Mendiola Streets in Alabang, Muntinglupa, Metro
Manila. One of the suspects in the killing was Ramil Regal who was
arrested by the police on 28 December 1988. Upon questioning,
Regal pointed to Narciso Nazareno as on of his companions in the
killing of the said Romulo Bunye II. In view thereof, the police
officers, without warrant, picked up Narciso Nazareno and brought
CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 27
him to the police headquarters for questioning. Obviously, the
evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong because on 3 January 1989,
an information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala, and two
(2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case is docketed
therein as Criminal Case No. 731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail,
but the motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated 10
January 1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his co-
accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this
Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the
Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24,
ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and
thereafter resolve the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna issued
a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that
the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by
reason of an information filed against him with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Metro Manila which had taken cognizance of said
case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso
Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the evidence
against him).
The findings of the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Biñan, Laguna are based upon the facts and the law. Consequently,
we will not disturb the same. Evidently, the arrest of Nazareno was
effected by the police without warrant pursuant to Sec. 5(b), Rule
113, Rules of Court after he was positively implicated by his co-
accused Ramil Regala in the killing of Romulo Bunye
II; and after investigation by the police authorities. As held in People
vs. Ancheta: 12
The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason
of a crime, does not presuppose as a necessary requisite for the
fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of a crime. For the
detention to be perfectly legal, it is sufficient that the agent or person
in authority making the arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to
believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime
and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought
to be detained participated therein.
VIII
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal
charges have been filed in the proper courts against the petitioners.
The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is
in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court judge,
and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or
make the order, of if such person is charged before any court, the
writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed. Section 4, Rule 102, Rules
of Court, as amended is quite explicit in providing that:
Sec. 4. When writ is allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears
that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody
of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of
a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge
had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make
the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears
after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by
reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or
order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the
discharge of a person charged with a convicted of an offense in the
 CRIMINAL LAW II ACJUCO 28

Philippines or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful

judgment. (emphasis supplied)

At this point, we refer to petitioner's plea for the Court of re-examine

and, thereafter, abandon its pronouncement in Ilagan
vs. Enrile, 13 that a writ of habeas corpus is no longer available after
an information is filed against the person detained and a warrant of
arrest or an order of commitment, is issued by the court where said
information has been filed. 14 The petitioners claim that the said
ruling, which was handed down during the past dictatorial regime to
enforce and strengthen said regime, has no place under the present
democratic dispensation and collides with the basic, fundamental,
and constitutional rights of the people. Petitioners point out that the
said doctrine makes possible the arrest and detention of innocent
persons despite lack of evidence against them, and, most often, it
is only after a petition for habeas corpus is filed before the court that
the military authorities file the criminal information in the courts of
law to be able to hide behind the protective mantle of the said
doctrine. This, petitioners assert, stands as an obstacle to the
freedom and liberty of the people and permits lawless and arbitrary
State action.

We find, however, no compelling reason to abandon the said

doctrine. It is based upon express provision of the Rules of Court
and the exigencies served by the law. The fears expressed by the
petitioners are not really unremediable. As the Court sees it, re-
examination or reappraisal, with a view to its abandonment, of the
Ilagan case doctrine is not the answer. The answer and the better
practice would be, not to limit the function of the habeas corpus to a
mere inquiry as to whether or not the court which issued the
process, judgment or order of commitment or before whom the
detained person is charged, had jurisdiction or not to issue the
process, judgment or order or to take cognizance of the case, but
rather, as the Court itself states in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, 15 "in all
petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase
and aspect of petitioner's detention-from the moment petition was
taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the
merits of the petition;" and "only after such a scrutiny can the court
satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution has in
fact been satisfied." This is exactly what the Court has done in the
petitions at bar. This is what should henceforth be done in all future
cases of habeas corpus. In Short, all cases involving deprivation of
individual liberty should be promptly brought to the courts for their
immediate scrutiny and disposition.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in

G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's
provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to
P10,000.00. No costs.

SO ORDERED.