Phase 3 IP

Lucretia Rossi

CJUS600-1301A-01

Advanced Review of Criminal Justice

January 28, 2013

RE: Juvenile Rights

 In the 1990’s, there was a spike in juvenile crime, in tandem with the “crack epidemic.”

John DiIulio, a professor of politics and public affairs, skewed studies and published a paper

describing what he called “superpredators,” describing them as “radically impulsive, brutally

remorseless youngsters” who “have absolutely no respect for human life…” His paper indicated

that the problem could not decline, and made it sound like a large percentage of the juvenile

population fit this description. He took his skewed numbers from 1990, and said that by 2010,

there would be at least 270,000 more children, on top of the 1990 figures, who fit this

description. This study single-handedly resulted in sweeping alarmist, knee-jerk legislation

regarding juveniles who commit crimes. His languages was extremely inflammatory and

exaggerative, such as that such juveniles were “flooding the streets,” and would be “coming at us

in waves” over the next 20 years. This study was based on his belief that no less than 6% of

children, babies, and juveniles would become chronic violent offenders. He now regrets this

alarmist standpoint that he caused, due to the effect it had with juvenile justice. He has said

multiple times that he now sees how faulty the information was, and the devastating effects of

his alarmist language. He has even spoken to Congress in an attempt to reverse the trend that he

started, and regrets that he has had little success (Howell, 2009).

On September 13, 2012, the New Jersey Supreme Court made a ruling that is a step in the

right direction for juvenile justice. In State in the Interest of V.A., no. 068707, the court made the

standard for transfer to juvenile court tougher, in a way. In this case, the prosecution sought

waiver to adult court for three defendants who were sixteen at the time of their crimes. As adults,

they would be charged with robbery, aggravated assault, and second-degree conspiracy. A

juvenile judge denied the waiver, but found probable cause that they had committed the crimes;

in other words, they were to be tried in juvenile court. The Appellate Court found that the
juvenile court had overstepped its bounds. The Supreme Court of New Jersey was asked to

clarify the standard of review for courts when considering a motion for waiver to adult court.

Seeking waiver to adult court is at the prosecutor’s discretion, but the legislature had told the

Attorney General to set out guidelines so that waivers were not requested arbitrarily, and

prosecutors were not abusing discretion. The prosecutor was challenging this standard of review,

which the juvenile court had applied. The prosecutor argued that this undermined prosecutorial

discretion (Haetir, 2012). The court ruled that this was not undermining prosecutorial discretion.

It was to review to ensure that the prosecution had valid reason under the law to request the

waiver. The court found that for the review to serve its function, the waiver, and the reasons for

seeking the waiver, must show that the prosecutor considered each factor in the Guideline for

that particular juvenile (State in the interest of v.a., 2012).

In Graham v. Florida, The Supreme Court of the United States basically expanded on

Roper v. Simmons, which was a case in 2005 that abolished the death penalty for juveniles. After

an armed robbery plea bargain, the defendant six months later violated his plea agreement.

Graham was sentenced to life in prison. It was effectively a sentence of life without parole, since

Florida had abolished parole. SCOTUS ruled that with the exception of homicide, juveniles

cannot be sentenced to life without parole. The Court found that to do so was a violation of the

Eighth Amendment, citing Weems v. United States, that punishment had to be proportionate to

the offense. The Court acknowledged that juveniles do not function as well as adults

intellectually, and that controlling precedents were against it, as well as societal standards. They

also considered that the U.S. is the only nation that will sentence a juvenile to life without parole,

thus indicating an international consensus (Graham v. Florida, 2010).

In Miller v. Alabama, SCOTUS ruled juvenile mandatory life without parole for juveniles
unconstitutional, period. This case was also based on 8th Amendment grounds. The court again

cited factors such as age, immaturity, and decreased impulse control (Miller v. Alabama, 2012).

Other than the obvious ways that these rulings have affected policy decisions, they have

also, hopefully, affected it in more subtle ways. All three cases, in the opinions delivered by the

courts, indicated juveniles’ decreased culpability due to the fact that they are less developed

cognitively. Courts use the stare decisis doctrine, not just in regard to the judgments themselves,

but also the reasons for the judgments. Ergo, this sends an implied message to other courts

regarding juveniles’ culpability and capacity for rehabilitation. These decisions imply that courts

should take a certain outlook with regard to juveniles. Whether courts shift toward this outlook

on a broad scale remains to be seen.

One of the primary challenges faced is keeping them safe from other inmates and

themselves. Juveniles housed with adults are much, much more likely to be physically and

sexually assaulted by other inmates. Abuse often begins within the first 48 hours of

incarceration. This also makes them at increased risk for contracting HIV, hepatitis, and the like.

HIV and AIDS rates are five times higher in the prison population than in the general population.

There is also severe long-term psychological and emotional trauma in victimized juveniles. The

Prison Rape Elimination Act was passed to address these issues, but its true effect has been little

more than symbolic. They are also much more likely to be mistreated by prison staff. They also

have dramatically higher suicide rates than adult inmates. This risk increases even further in

juveniles who are victimized by other inmates or by staff. Juveniles housed in adult facilities are

five times more likely to commit suicide than the general juvenile population. Further, they are

eight times more likely to do so than juveniles incarcerated in juvenile facilities. Also, many

facilities do not have staff trained to deal with the special needs of juveniles. Also, juveniles
housed as adults do not have access to services crucial to a juvenile’s development. Partially as a

result of this, they are more susceptible to criminal socialization. Adult facilities also do not have

healthcare, rehabilitative, or educational services appropriate for juveniles. Many adult facilities

do not even provide basic services, such as counseling, for juveniles. Juveniles may also develop

violent practices to attempt to hide their vulnerability from adult inmates (Wood, 2012).

One of the criteria is the age of criminal majority in the state in question. Legislation and

the waiver process also make a difference. For example, some states are direct-file, some are

based on the crime committed and the age of the offender, some states must get judicial waiver

to adult court, et cetera. However, over the last twenty years, most states have changed their

systems to increase the likelihood that a juvenile will be tried as an adult. In some states,

prosecutors have sole discretion (Finlay, 2012).This is primarily where you get the idiotic

prosecutors trying eight- and ten-year-olds as adults. There is no way that there is any interest in

justice when this is done. The way I see it, in order to further their career, they’re throwing away

children.

I absolutely do not believe in the waiver of juveniles to adult court, especially as young

as thirteen and fourteen. There is so much research showing their capacity for rehabilitation, as

well as the negative effects of trying them as adults, that I’m astounded these laws aren’t

changing. There are several societal factors contributing to this, as well as political ambition and,

I’m sure, pressure from the private prison industry lobbyists. But I think it’s outrageous to try

juveniles as adults. We cannot rationally expect adult behavior out of children when we live in a

society that treats them as little more than a marketing demographic, first of all. Second, as a

society, we realize that children are not as mature and competent as adults. We realize that

because of this, they need additional protection and restriction. We do not allow them to smoke,
drink, drive, enter into contracts, serve in the military, and many of the other things that adults

can do. Unless they screw up, then we want to hold them as fully accountable as an adult. It’s a

contradiction. Another contradiction I find outrageous is that if a 35-year-old with the mental

capacity of a 12-year-old commits a crime, he in many jurisdictions qualifies for a diminished

capacity defense or something similar, but not a 12-year-old with the mind of a 12-year-old. In

an adult, the mind of a 12-year-old is considered a mental defect under the law. Then shouldn’t

the mind of a 12-year-old be considered a defect, when it comes to crime, at any age? The mind

of a 12-year-old, by the very nature of brain development, is a defect regardless of the physical

chronological age, as far as I’m concerned. It’s a glaring contradiction, and one that is very

harmful to this and the next generation, considering the recidivism rates of juveniles sentenced in

adult courts. We need to be steering the next generation down the right path, not throwing them

away. It also, in my opinion, sends these kids the societal message, “If you make a mistake,

society will discard you.” These kids have little chance. As a society, we have to do better. Our

policies, especially when it comes to children, should be based on logic and evidence-based

practices, not knee-jerk legislation as a result of alarmist papers or single instances of

sensationalized crime.
 References

Howell, J. C. (2009). Preventing and reducing juvenile delinquency: A comprehensive

framework (2nd ed., pp. 3-23). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc.

Haetir, S. (2012, September 12). Split NJ Supreme Court adds teeth to standards and process for

trying juvies in adult court. In Sentencing Law and Policy. Retrieved January 25, 2013,

from http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2012/09/split-nj-

supreme-court-adds-teeth-to-standards-and-process-for-trying-juves-in-adult-court.html

State In the Interest of V.A., No. 068707 (Sept. 12, 2012). Retrieved January 25, 2013 from

http://law.justia.com/cases/new-jersey/supreme-court/2012/a-9-11.html

Graham v. Florida (982 So. 2d 43)(2010, May 17). Retrieved January 25, 2012, from

http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/08-7412.ZS.html

MILLER v.ALABAMA (No. 10−9646, 63 So. 3d 676, and No. 10−9647, 2011 Ark. 49 ) (2012,

June 25). Retrieved January 26, 2013 from

http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/10-9646

Wood, A. (2012).Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Confining juveniles with adults after graham

and miller. Emory Law Journal, 61(6), 1445-1491. Retrieved January 29, 2013, from

http://www.law.emory.edu/fileadmin/journals/elj/61/61.6/Wood.pdf

Finlay, K. (2012, December 15). The Effectiveness of Criminal Majority and Juvenile Transfer

Laws. In Tulane University. Retrieved January 29, 2013, from

http://econ.tulane.edu/kfinlay/criminal_majority.pdf