G.R. No.

L-24693             July 31, 1967

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO
CHIU, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant. VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.

FERNANDO, J.:

FACTS: The petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. and Hotel del Mar Inc. are duly
licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels and motels in Malate and Ermita districts in Manila, organized
and existing under the laws of the Philippines, both with offices in the City of Manila; petitioner Go Chin is the
president and general manager of Hotel del Mar Inc.; and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City,
all having the capacity to sue and be sued.

The respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief executive of the City of Manila
charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders
for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances;

On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, which was approved on
June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the acting City Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the
respondent regular City Mayor, amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the compilation of the
ordinances of the City of Manila besides inserting therein three new sections.

The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760, filed on July 5, 1963, against the
respondent Mayor of the City of Manila. There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal
Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of
the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels:

That Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due
process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class
motels, that the provision in the same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or
letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to
public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the
address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any,
with the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well
as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has personally filled it up
and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with
such registration forms and records kept and bound together, it also being provided that the premises and facilities of
such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police,
or their duly authorized representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds, not only for being
arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for the alleged
invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination;

That Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels into two classes and requiring the maintenance of
certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and
laundry similarly offends against the due process clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a
conclusion which applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels to have a dining room; that the
provision of Section 2 prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging
houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion
thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and

That insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would,
cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the business
and loss of its investments, there is once again a transgression of the due process clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring the above ordinance
null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering
respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.

In the answer of respondent filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the provisions of the cited Ordinance
but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition did
fail to state a cause of action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to a proper purpose,
which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power and that only the guests or customers not
before the court could complain of the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self
incrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte  was contrary to law,
respondent Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and the dismissal of the petition.

Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress was laid on the presumption of
the validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its lack of conformity to the Constitution resting on the
party who assails it, citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but likewise applicable American authorities. Such a
memorandum likewise refuted point by point the arguments advanced by petitioners against its validity. Then barely
two weeks later, on February 4, 1965, the memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set
forth in the petition, with citations of what they considered to be applicable American authorities and praying for a
judgment declaring the challenged ordinance "null and void and unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of
preliminary injunction issued.

The lower court observed, without any evidence submitted by the parties, the decision passed upon the alleged
infirmity on constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly right and proper the
untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of Manila to regulate motels, and came to the
conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, would be unconstitutional and, therefore,
null and void." It made permanent the preliminary injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his agents "to
restrain him from enforcing the ordinance in question." Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause (NO)

RULING: Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the
presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice
Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of the elected representatives of the people
cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their
particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action.
The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to
the well being of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a
clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.

It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is
unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here. As underlying questions of
fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail
in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute. No such factual foundation being
laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the
presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.

Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective as being repugnant to the
due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not
cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public
morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of
substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been
properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does "to all
the great public needs." It would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state
if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals, public
safety and the general welfare. Negatively put, police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State which
enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.

There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to
public morals. The explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts,
speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to
the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus
become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then proposes to check the
clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill
up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing several
other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and
guests." Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from
operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government." It
would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the
ordinance, argues eloquently for it.

In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties however,
the exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject to judicial
inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for
correction by the courts.

We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection is raised to the question of due
process. There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which the
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be
valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to
free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity
sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.
Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official
action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is
thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as freedom from
arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and
judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that
reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought." It is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances," decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and
perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly
or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases.21

It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal
lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. It
would seem that what should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication of the power to
govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals. To be more specific, the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the need for a remedial measure. It provided it with the enactment of the
challenged ordinance. A strong case must be found in the records, and, as has been set forth, none is even
attempted here to attach to an ordinance of such character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due
process requirement. Nor does it lend any semblance even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment of
Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to single out such features as the increased fees for motels and hotels,
the curtailment of the area of freedom to contract, and, in certain particulars, its alleged vagueness.

Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or
the like, to lease or rent room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full
payment shall be charged, call for a different conclusion. Again, such a limitation cannot be viewed as a
transgression against the command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended
to curb the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to the
explanatory note, are being devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when there appears a
correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at
correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty
which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute. Thus: "One thought which runs through all these
different conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is
'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good
of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must
renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for
the common good x x x The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public
order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power."
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said
law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with
business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state x x x To this fundamental aim of our Government the
rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be
made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail
over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty
and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant
equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all.

It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of undue deprivation of freedom to
contract, People v. Pomar, no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some
extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations
affected with public interest. What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind
or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the
liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider. How
justify then the allegation of a denial of due process?

Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by invoking the principles of
vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a recital in the petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen of
the alleged grievance is that the provisions are too detailed and specific rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners,
however, point to the requirement that a guest should give the name, relationship, age and sex of the companion or
companions as indefinite and uncertain in view of the necessity for determining whether the companion or
companions referred to are those arriving with the customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the room
with him at about the same time or coming at any indefinite time later to join him; a proviso in one of its sections
which cast doubt as to whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent upon the discretion of its
owners or operators; another proviso which from their standpoint would require a guess as to whether the "full rate of
payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may be asked,
do these allegations suffice to render the ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the
question is to answer it. From Connally v. General Construction Co. to Adderley v. Florida, the principle has been
consistently upheld that what makes a statute susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either forbidding or
requiring the doing of an act that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application. Is this the situation before us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We agree to
all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no canon against using common
sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."

That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the arguments pressed with such vigor
and determination, the attack against the validity of the challenged ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far
from it. Respect for constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court
compels a reversal of the appealed decision.

Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted forthwith. With costs.