The Military Balance

ISSN: 0459-7222 (Print) 1479-9022 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tmib20

Chapter Five: Russia and Eurasia

To cite this article: (2019) Chapter Five: Russia and Eurasia, The Military Balance, 119:1,
166-221, DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2019.1561031

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2019.1561031

Published online: 15 Feb 2019.

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166 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Chapter Five

Russia and Eurasia

 Improving air-ground cooperation is a focus for the 
armed forces, exemplified by the appointment of a
career ground-forces officer as C-in-C of the Russian
Aerospace Forces. Russia is also working to refine its
reconnaissance-strike complex. 
 This is another lesson from Russia’s operation in Syria,
which remains a springboard for senior commanders;
deployment there is important for promotion.
 Russia’s Su-57 development is progressing at a modest 
pace. Meanwhile, improved versions of a previous
generation, including the Su-35, are improving air
force capabilities.
Russia’s Navy commissioned its first new truly blue-
water principal surface combatant in some two
decades, including with a new, potentially more
capable air-defence system.
The creation of information troops and reinstatement
of the Main Directorate for Political-Military Affairs
showed that Russia’s command has sharpened its
attention on confrontation in the information domain.
Russia’s surge of naval capabilities into the Eastern
Mediterranean in late 2018 demonstrated its ability to
potentially pose challenges to NATO and other navies
in the region.

Russia real-terms total military expenditure, 2009–18 (US$bn, constant 2010)

100 20

80 12
US$bn, constant 2010

Year-on-year % change
60 4

40 -4

20 -12

0 -20
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Active military personnel – top 10

(25,000 per unit)

Russia Armenia 44,800

900,000
Kazakhstan 39,000
Ukraine 209,000
Turkmenistan 36,500
Azerbaijan 66,950
Georgia 20,650
Uzbekistan 48,000
Kyrgyzstan 10,900
Belarus 45,350
 Russia and Eurasia 167

Regional defence policy and economics 168 ►

Armed forces data section 184 ►

Arms procurements and deliveries 219 ►

Russia: top 5 deployments, November 2018

Russia and Eurasia

Russia
Ukraine (Crimea) – 28,000 Russia
Georgia – 7,000

Russia
Tajikistan – 5,000

Russia
Syria – 5,000 Russia
Armenia – 3,300

Short-range ballistic missile Attack helicopters, 2018 Tactical combat aircraft fleets,
launchers, 2018 2018
150 400 900

850
120 320

200
90 60
150
60 40
100

30 20
50

0 0 0
Russia – Army
Belarus
Ukraine
Armenia
Turkmenistan
Kazakhstan
Russia – Navy
Azerbaijan

Russia
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Azerbaijan
Kazakhstan
Belarus
Turkmenistan
Armenia
Georgia
Tajikistan
Kyrgyzstan

Russia – Air Force

Russia – Navy
Ukraine
Kazakhstan
Belarus
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Azerbaijan
Armenia
Georgia

(fighter / fighter ground-attack, attack)

168 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Russia and Eurasia
RUSSIA
In March 2018, Russia went to the polls in its latest
presidential election. Vladimir Putin was again
returned to office. Continuity was also the order
of the day at the defence ministry: both Minister of
Defence Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff
General Valery Gerasimov retained their posts after
the election.
Nonetheless, there were some personnel
movements of note. Perhaps the most interesting
reshuffle in the defence ministry in some years was
the appointment of Colonel-General Sergei Surovikin,
a career Ground Forces officer, as commander-
in-chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces. Such an
appointment is unprecedented not only in Russian
but also Soviet history and perhaps reflects the
officially stated rationale behind the selection – to
improve cooperation between the Aerospace Forces
and the Ground Forces. However, air-force officer
Lieutenant-General Andrei Yudin kept his post as
deputy to the commander-in-chief. Before taking on
his new role, Surovikin had commanded Russia’s
armed forces in Syria for nine months and gained
significant experience during 2017’s major offensive
against the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL.
Syria: battle laboratory
Russia’s operation in Syria remains a springboard for
senior commanders; deployment there is important
for promotion. Since the mission began in late 2015,
more than 500 Russian generals have rotated through
the country on deployment. Indeed, the newly
appointed commanders-in-chief of the Eastern and
Central military districts have commanded Russian
troops in Syria.
Moscow’s mission in Syria has two principal
priorities: firstly, to bolster the regime of its ally,
Bashar al-Assad, and secondly, to use the deployment
as a test bed for the development of joint operations
and new weapons and tactics. For example, Russia
has put its concept of a joint information battlespace
into practice there, by providing troops with real-
time information on friendly and adversary forces.
The defence ministry has invested considerable
effort in improving cooperation between units and
refining the reconnaissance-strike complex. As part
of this, Russia continues to work on modernising its
reconnaissance capabilities, to detect and monitor
targets in real time, and to reduce the time between
the detection of a target and its engagement by
artillery, aircraft or precision weapons.
According to reports from the Russian defence
ministry, between the start of the mission in
September 2015 and August 2018, the Aerospace
Forces carried out 39,000 combat flights in Syria. A
little over half of these were completed at night. These
figures indicate improvements to both air capability
and aircrew proficiency. But activity fell in 2018: from
January to September, only 5,000 combat flights were
carried out, which was reportedly a reduction on
the previous year. This decline is largely due to the
balance of power in the conflict changing in favour
of the pro-government forces, which has allowed
Russia to reduce its military presence in Syria. In
summer 2018, a number of aircraft and helicopters
returned to Russia, including, it was reported, all
the new Mi-28 and Ka-52 attack helicopters. At the
beginning of autumn, about 30 aircraft remained
in Syria – the lowest number since the beginning of
Russia’s intervention.
The information dimension
The Syria campaign continues to be studied in Russian
military academies, leading to a range of lessons
for tactics and procurement. As well as lessons on
the efficacy of weaponry, one of the most important
relates to active information and psychological
operations, which are used to suppress an opponent’s
will to resist. Alongside traditional methods, such
as spreading leaflets, missions of this type have
reportedly also been conducted in cyberspace.
Russia announced in 2017 that it had formed
the Information Operations Troops. There is little
information available in public on this group’s
activities, although it is understood that its covert
activity is conducted mainly in cyberspace. In 2018,
the defence ministry reinstated the Main Directorate
for Military–Political Affairs, which has among its
key responsibilities the management of propaganda

and counter-propaganda, patriotic education and
psychological support for the armed forces. The
creation of these new organisations shows that the
Russian command has sharpened its attention on
confrontation in the information domain.
Personnel
As a result of Russia’s demographic crisis of the
1990s, the number of young men each year reaching
draft age remains low. Nonetheless, according to
official statements, in 2017 the armed forces reached
95% of target strength. This is the result of the high
number of contract personnel being recruited, which
reached over 380,000 in early 2018. Consequently, the
draft continues to be reduced. In spring 2018, 128,000
men were conscripted, less than in spring 2017.
Around 260,000 recruits in total were expected to be
conscripted over the course of 2018. The reduction
in the draft will continue and the current plan is to
have 499,200 contract personnel with only 150,000
conscripts in the armed forces by 2020.
Support units contain fewer contract personnel,
freeing contractors to instead be employed in front-
line combat units, including the Airborne Forces and
marines, which are recruiting two battalion tactical
groups of contract troops for each regiment or brigade.
These units are intended to solve the problem of uneven
training levels caused by the draft and demobilisation
cycle for conscripts serving only one year. Overall, 126
battalion tactical groups wholly comprising contract
troops have been formed in the Ground Forces and
Airborne Forces. These are reported to be at constant
combat readiness, which, for Russian analysts, is
understood to mean around 24-hours readiness to
move. Meanwhile, special forces, combined-arms
units in Russia’s peacekeeping forces (such as the 15th
Separate Motor-rifle Brigade) and submarine crews
are entirely staffed by contract personnel.
However, the contract-personnel level falls
short of the goal set at the beginning of the reform
effort, where the armed forces would be composed
entirely of fully combat-ready units. Conscripts still
represent a third of the armed forces and remain
only marginally fit for real combat operations; it is
understood that they have not been sent to Syria,
even in support roles.
New weapons
On 1 March 2018, in his annual address to the
Federal Assembly, Putin referred to the ongoing
development of innovative strategic-weapons
Russia and Eurasia 169
systems. Some of these were hitherto publicly
unknown. Burevestnik, a nuclear-powered ultra-long-
range cruise missile, is currently in test. According
to Russian reports, Peresvet mobile lasers have been
observed at Strategic Rocket Forces bases. A squadron
of modernised MiG-31 fighters equipped with the
Kinzhal hypersonic air-to-surface missile (modelled
on the 9M723 (SS-26 Stone) ballistic missile from the
Iskander-M system) is undergoing operational testing
in the Southern Military District, in the Caspian Sea
area. Less still is known about Poseidon, a  nuclear-
powered uninhabited underwater vehicle.
Russia and Eurasia
Specialists understand that these weapons are
currently prototypes. It is unclear whether they
will complete the test-and-development process.
The first tests of the Burevestnik cruise missile were
unsuccessful, and efforts are currently being directed
towards developing an improved model.
However, there are fewer doubts about the RS-28
Sarmat (SS-X-29), the new liquid-fuelled,  multiple
independently targetable re-entry vehicle-equipped
heavy intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), to be
fitted out with the already-tested Avangard hypersonic
glide vehicle. Sarmat is intended to replace the RS-20
(SS-18 Satan) ICBM.
Despite Putin’s bold statements, these weapons
are not ‘game-changers’. They could be useful in
terms of securing a second-strike capability, but they
do not provide Russia with the capacity to mount
successfully an immediate counterforce nuclear
strike. It is possible that they are considered by
Moscow only as a reliable guarantee of preserving
Russia’s second-strike retaliatory capability, or
perhaps also a useful bargaining chip in any future
arms-control negotiations.
Infrastructure
The construction of military bases along the border
with Ukraine continues. The 152nd Logistics Brigade
was reported as formed at Liski in Voronezh in
February 2018. The 20th Combined Arms Army
(CAA), based close to the border, is still forming. In
addition to two motor-rifle divisions, the 20th CAA
includes an anti-aircraft brigade, an artillery brigade,
a missile brigade and a command-and-control
brigade, the 9th Signal Brigade at Voronezh.
There have been no significant changes in
the group of ground forces deployed to Crimea.
However, the Airborne Forces activated the 171st
Airborne Battalion in Feodosia in December 2017 and
the Aerospace Forces replaced the 12th Regiment’s
170 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
S-300PM1 (SA-20 Gargoyle) surface-to-air missile
(SAM) systems with S-400s. The modernisation of
Belbek airfield is the largest infrastructure project on
the Crimean Peninsula. Once the second runway is
complete, the airfield will be able to receive all types
of strategic-aviation assets. In addition, a squadron
of Tu-22M3 Backfire bombers equipped with anti-
ship missiles (possibly Kh-32s) may be permanently
stationed there, making the peninsula even more
important to Moscow in asserting its control over the
Black Sea.
Another significant development is the return of
Russian carrier aviation to the  NITKA land-based
carrier simulator in Crimea. Before the peninsula
was annexed, a new training centre was being built
by Russia in Yeysk, on the shores of the Sea of Azov,
though this was not completed. During summer
Command and control
Russia’s leadership often states that international affairs
are entering a period of rapid change and sustained
instability. President Vladimir Putin, for instance, has
pointed to the simultaneous growth of international
competition and the degradation of global governance
mechanisms. Chief of the General Staff General Valery
Gerasimov has discussed the evolution of the character
of war, noting increasing international competition
over energy, transit routes and access to markets. He
emphasises that the reasons for the use of military force
are broadening, and how quickly thriving states can now
be reduced to violent chaos.
Moscow categorises threats into two groups. The
first is the development of long-range, high-precision
weapons and mobile forces. These capabilities increase
the tempo of military activity, reducing operational
pauses in action. The second is based on the broad use of
political, economic, humanitarian, information and other
non-military measures, applied in coordination with the
protest potential of a population and supplemented by
military measures. As a result, according to Gerasimov,
it is increasingly important in contemporary conflicts to
be able to defend the population and strategic sites and
communications from the activity of special forces and
saboteurs and manage the system of territorial defence.
Taken together, these have led to the view in Moscow
that the (armed) protection of a state is not simply a
military matter, but one that requires the consolidation
of all agencies of state power. Indeed, Gerasimov has said
that territorial defence can only be organised with the
involvement of law-enforcement and security agencies.
2018, both regiments of the navy’s carrier-based
fighters were training in Crimea.
Meanwhile, plans to boost Russia’s military
presence in the Arctic have slowed and a new
Arctic motor-rifle brigade intended for the Yamal
Peninsula in northwest Siberia has been put on hold.
However, there are plans to build, before the end of
2019, a small air-defence base near Tiksi on Russia’s
northeast coast; there was a base near Tiksi during
the Cold War.
At the same time, recent investments in Arctic
airfields have proved their worth. After modernisation,
in 2018 a Tu-160 Blackjack strategic bomber was for the
first time able to land at Anadyr airfield in Chukotka.
In the same year, a group of Tu-142 anti-submarine
aircraft flew over the North Pole to the shores of
Alaska for the first time in some years. The provision
Furthermore, a priority for Moscow is to improve the
correlation between information management, decision-
making and executive actors across the state, in order to
improve responsiveness in times of crises. According to
Gerasimov, such views are now expressed in the Defence
Plan, a new form of strategic planning that emerged in
early 2013 and was subsequently updated for the period
2016–20.
Despite the widespread view in the Euro-Atlantic
community that Russian decision-making, apparently
unhindered by democratic processes, is a simpler and
faster process than in Western capitals, a number of
issues complicate the picture for the Russian leadership.
Firstly, the chain of command has in the past often
proved unreliable. For example, information – even
on strategic questions, such as during the early days of
the Ukraine crisis – is often inefficiently passed up the
chain, hindering timely decision-making. In addition,
instructions passed down the chain have sometimes
been fulfilled only tardily or incompletely, even in
implementing the strategic agenda set out in Putin’s
2012 May decrees. The leadership is making considerable
efforts to address such problems, but even if decision-
making in Moscow becomes faster, the quality of the
information on which decisions are based and the
effectiveness of action once decisions have been taken
are open to question.
Secondly, though organisations such as the Security
Council and the Main Directorate for Special Projects
(GUSP) exist to oversee such processes, it is often difficult
to coordinate the activities of different ministries,

Ground forces
New units have formed incrementally in 2018,
including a new (127th) motor-rifle division, formed
out of some of the existing brigades of the 5th Army
around Vladivostok, the upgrade of three of six
Airborne Forces tank companies to battalions and the
formation of a new tank battalion in Kaliningrad. The
established tank and motor-rifle divisions appear to
be moving towards achieving their full complement,
although most still lack at least one of their planned
regiments.
The planned gradual reduction in expenditure
on equipment purchases was confirmed at the
‘Armiya 2018’ military exhibition, where contract
agreements were down on 2017. In addition, a
significant proportion of the equipment mock-ups
seen in previous years are still not yet ready for
agencies and departments – as well as actors at federal,
regional and local levels – and between civilian and
military authorities. The armed forces have criticised the
civilian authorities for their lack of readiness, for example,
and their slow implementation of military orders, as
well as noting more practical problems in terms of
logistics, transport, reconnaissance and communications.
Indeed, in many ways, this is a reminder that Russia is
not monolithic, and that numerous vested interests
throughout the chain of command and across the various
parts of the state mean that the orchestration of Russian
state power is not always harmonious.
Recognising such problems, the authorities have looked
to improve information management and synchronisation.
Measures have included major exercises that not only
rehearse rapid deployments over long distances, but also
bring together actors from across the state, such as the
central bank and various ministries, including transport,
communications, health and agriculture.
Similarly, there have been strategic policing exercises,
such as Zaslon 2015, while the armed forces have
exercised with the National Guard – a force established
in 2016 to combine the interior troops, special-forces
and rapid-response troops, and other non-military
armed forces in Russia – to rehearse the protection of
strategically important locations (such as energy, industry
and transport centres) against saboteurs and terrorists.
Territorial-defence staffs are also being established to
improve coordination between regional and military
authorities.
Perhaps the most important development, however,
has been the establishment of the National Defence
Russia and Eurasia 171
serial production. At the show, it was announced
that a total of 132 T-14 tanks and T-15 heavy infantry
fighting vehicles would be delivered between 2018
and 2022. However, it was striking that there were
no contracts to buy in quantity new light armoured
vehicles. The Kurganets-25 tracked platform and the
wheeled Bumerang will be produced only in small
batches for testing in 2019–21.
Indeed, there has been continued emphasis on
recapitalising existing vehicle fleets. The 2016 T-72B3
upgrade (with a more powerful engine and improved
reactive armour) is currently being issued to tank
Russia and Eurasia
regiments in the new motor-rifle divisions and all B3
models are expected to be retrofitted to this standard
at some point. Deliveries of the BMP-2 infantry
fighting vehicle upgraded with the Berezhok combat
module (BMP-2M) began in the Central Military
Management Centre (NDMC), sometimes also known as
the National Defence Control Centre. Mikhail Mizintsev,
commander of the NDMC, has stated that the armed
forces must be ready to react quickly to crises without
having to endure a prolonged transition to a war footing
– in other words, the goal is to minimise the mobilisation
gap. The NDMC, which opened in 2014, facilitates
this and has an extensive remit. It has three levels of
command: a supreme command centre, which controls
the strategic nuclear forces; a combat command centre,
which monitors the global political–military situation
and provides forecasting and analysis; and a centre that
oversees everyday activities, coordinating the work
of security ministries and departments in peacetime,
including the Interior Ministry, foreign- and military-
intelligence organisations, the Ministry of Emergencies
and the Federal Security Service’s Border Guards. Indeed,
all defence-related information flows are narrowed into
this single channel, to enable all military movement
in Russia and international defence and security
developments to be tracked in real time.
As the hub of a nationwide network of such centres,
the NDMC is intended to unify all existing command
and monitoring systems across Russia and act as a single
point of coordination for information and control over all
agencies. It also oversees information and cyber security,
and monitors social networks, unrest and protests. Since
being commissioned, the NDMC has also supervised
equipment modernisation, strategic exercises and
combat operations in Syria. It represents a new stage in
the attempt to enhance and improve Russian command
and control.
 172 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

of
▼anti-submarine capability
Map 3 Russian forces in this2018
in Crimea, sensitive region is increasingly a concern for Moscow.
Selected Russian equipment in Crimea
UKRAINE Mariupol
Name Type
T-72B3 MBT Melitopol
BTR-82A APC (W) Yeysk
Berdyansk
Su-30SM Flanker FGA ac
ersonSu-27SM Flanker FGA ac
S-400 (SA-21 Growler) SAM
3K55 Bastion (SSC-5 Stooge) AShM
3K60 Bal (SSC-6 Sennight) AShM

Sea of Azov
Navy Air force VDV
Main roads Main railroads 39th Helicopter Regiment
De facto boundary between
Russian-occupied Crimea and
Dzhankoy 382nd Naval RUSSIA
mainland Ukraine
171st Airborne Battalion Infantry Battalion
37th Mixed Aviation Regiment
43rd Mixed
Aviation Regiment Kerch
31st Air Defence Division

Yevpatoriya
8th Artillery Regiment

318th Mixed 18th Surface-to-Air

Aviation Regiment Novofedorovka Gvardeiskoye Feodosiya Missile Regiment
Simferopol
12th Surface-to-Air 126th Naval Infantry Brigade*
Peravalnoye 11th Anti-Ship
Missile Regiment Belbek 38th Fighter Regiment Missile Brigade Novorossiysk
Balaklava Sevastopol Otradnoe
219th Independent Electronic Gelendzhik
Warfare Regiment
1 battalion from 11th 7th Mountain
Anti-Ship Missile Brigade 1096th Surface-to-Air Missile Regiment Airborne Division

 15th Independent Coastal Black Sea

Black Sea Fleet HQ  810th Naval
Missile Brigade
 11th Anti-Submarine Warfare Ship Infantry Brigade
 4th Independent Chemical,
Brigade  127th Independent
Biological, Radiological Regiment
 41st Missile Boat Brigade Reconnaissance
 68th Area Protection Ship Brigade Brigade

Potential strike
range of MiG-31 UKRAINE
equipped with
Kinzhal missile

Mariupol
Melitopol
Kherson
Berdyansk Yeysk
RUSSIA
Crimea-based aircraft could also be armed with the
130 km range Kh-35 (AS-20 Kayak) AShM and the Sea of Azov
260 km range Kh-35U (AS-20 Kayak) AShM Dzhankoy

Kerch
Yevpatoriya

Simferopol Novorossiysk

Sevastopol Gelendzhik

100 km 130 km 200 km 260 km 300 km 400 km

S-400 system: S-400 system: S-400 system: S-400 system: 3K60 Bal (SSC-6A 3K60 Bal (SSC-6 3K55 Bastion
40N6 surface- 48N6D surface- 9M96-2 surface- 9M96 surface- Sennight) coastal- Sennight) coastal- (SSC-5 Stooge)
to-air missile to-air missile to-air missile to-air missile defence cruise missile defence cruise missile coastal-defence
(improved version in cruise missile
*Potential ranges marked from notional location development)
© IISS

District in 2018. Further production of the Tornado-S
300 mm multiple-rocket launcher appears to have
been complicated by a legal case brought against the
manufacturer in July by the defence ministry.
Aerospace forces
The Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) continued
during 2018 to absorb the lessons from their ongoing
involvement in Syria and to come to terms with
the more modest ambitions of Russia’s latest State
Armament Programme (SAP 2018–27).
Besides allowing new and upgraded aircraft and
weapons to be tested operationally, the Syria mission
has provided valuable experience for air and ground
crews. Workers from the defence-aerospace industry
have also supported the deployment from the air
base at Hmeimim in Syria.
The performance of Russian aircraft in Syria may
have allowed the VKS to take a more sanguine view of
the slow progress of the Su-57 being developed to meet
its future multi-role fighter (PAK-FA) requirement.
The Su-35S Flanker E made its operational debut in
Syria, as did one of its primary air-to-air missiles, the
R-77-1 (AA-12B Adder) active radar-guided medium-
range weapon. This Su-35 iteration of the Flanker was
originally conceived as an export-only product, but
as the PAK-FA was delayed it was adopted by the
air force as a gap-filler. Indications so far are that the
SAP to 2027 only supports the acquisition of a small
number of Su-57s (at least until 2023). Pre-production
versions of the Su-57 are being flown with an interim
engine, as the intended engine may not be ready for
series production before 2023.
Further indications of more modest near- to
medium-term acquisition aims for the VKS include
the emphasis on upgrades to existing bomber types,
and the intention to begin to build an upgraded
variant of the Tu-160 Blackjack, the Tu-160M2. The
latter features updated NK-32 engines (production
of which has been restarted), increased range and
updated avionics, which will serve as the basis for
those to be used in the PAK-DA next-generation
bomber requirement. Development continues of a
new bomber design, Tupolev’s Item 80, which is
meant to meet the PAK-DA requirement, but the pace
appears to have slowed. It is possible that PAK-DA
may be viewed increasingly as a complement to,
rather than a replacement for, the Blackjack. As
Tu-160M2 and PAK-DA enter production, the
Tu-95MS Bear strategic bomber may be gradually
withdrawn.
Russia and Eurasia 173
However, the emphasis for the VKS remains
the development and acquisition of a variety of
stand-off air-to-surface weapons for the bomber
fleet. As well as continuing to buy the Kh-101/
Kh-102 (AS-23A/B Kodiak) long-range cruise missile,
the development of both shorter- and apparently
longer-range land-attack weapons is under way.
The Kh-50 designation has been associated with a
smaller cruise missile likely intended for internal
carriage on aircraft whose weapons bay will not
accommodate the larger Kh-101. Boosting the
inventory of short-range air-launched precision-
Russia and Eurasia
guided weapons is also a priority. The air force has
relied on unguided free-fall bombs in Syria, in part
reflecting the need to complete the development of
or increase production rates on armaments projects
now reaching fruition, such as the Kh-30 family of
air-to-surface missiles.
Naval forces
At the end of July 2018, Admiral Gorshkov – the first
Project 22350 frigate – was finally commissioned
some 12 years after the ship was first laid down. This
marked the introduction into service of the first new
truly blue-water surface combatant in nearly two
decades. At the same time, a second Gorshkov-class
frigate was nearing completion, with four more in the
pipeline, possibly to be followed by an improved and
slightly enlarged version, the Project 22350M.
A factor in the effectiveness of these ships will
be whether issues have been resolved with the
development of their 3K96-2 (SA-NX-28) Poliment-
Redut air-defence missile system. If so, this would
mark a significant improvement in the Russian
Navy’s area air-defence capability.
In terms of legacy blue-water capabilities, the
much-needed refit of Russia’s sole aircraft carrier,
Admiral Kuznetsov, got under way in 2018. Indications
are that the work will focus on the refurbishment of
propulsion and electronic systems, rather than any
more substantial capability enhancements. Even so,
the vessel is unlikely to be back in operation before
the early 2020s; that could move further to the right
after the damage in October 2018 to the large floating
dry dock that carried the vessel.
It remains the case that the most significant recent
trend in Russian naval capabilities has been the
focus on the construction of relatively small surface
platforms and submarines armed with long-range
cruise and anti-ship missiles from the Kalibr family
of weapons. Even here, new deliveries in 2018 were
 Russia’s Kalibr family of anti-ship, land-attack and anti-
submarine weapons includes subsonic and supersonic
terminal-phase cruise missiles, the 3M54 (SS-N-27 Sizzler)
anti-ship missile and the 3M14 (SS-N-30) land-attack cruise
missile, as well as two rocket-boosted anti-submarine
torpedoes, respectively 91R1 and 91RT2. Export versions are
marketed under the Club banner, though some are range-
limited to adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR). A subsonic anti- ship version of the 3M54 is also
offered for export, but this does not appear to be part of the
Russian Navy’s system.
The 3M14 (SS-N-30) long-range cruise missile has design
a range in the order of 2,000 km, but the export derivative is
Russian Navy launch platforms
restricted to just below the MTCR limit of 300 km. The 3M14
provides a conventional land- attack capability, particularly In addition to vessels built to launch Kalibr variants,
Russia has announced plans to modify a number of
for smaller classes of Russian naval vessels. Strikes on Syria
existing vessels to enable the same capability. This
using 3M14 have been launched from conventional includes eight Antey (Oscar II) guided-missile
submarines (Kalibr-PL) and surface combatants (Kalibr-NK) in submarines (with up to 72 missiles per vessel), and
the Caspian Sea, up to 1,500 km away. the Orlan (Kirov) nuclear-powered cruisers.
Club-S is in service with the navies of Algeria, China, India
and Vietnam, aboard their Kilo-class submarines. Whilst only In service Planned 1 3 6 9 12
the sea-launched versions of Club are known to have been Submarines Yasen
exported, other launch options are marketed. This includes Varshavyanka
the Club-K complex, which is designed to fit within a standard Destroyers Admiral Gorshkov
174 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

heritage from the Novator 3M10 Granat (SS-N-21 Sampson) shipping container. An air-launched derivative has also been Frigates Admiral Grigorovich
subsonic cruise missile, first deployed in 1986. The 3M14 has advertised as a possible development. Gepard
Gremyashchiy
Vasily Bykov
▼ Figure 11 Russia: Kalibr missile family

Kalibr (domestic variants) Club (Kalibr export variants)

Corvettes Buyan-M
Kalibr-NK Kalibr-PL Club-N Club-S Club-M/Club-K* Club-A Karakurt

Land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs)

Ground-launched Kalibr derivatives

3M14T 3M14K 3M14TE 3M14E 3M14KE 3M14AE

(SS-N-30) (SS-N-30) (SS-N-30) (SS-N-30) Range: 275 km 9M728 9M729
Range: 2,000 km+ Range: 2,000 km+ Range: 275 km  Range: 275 km  (SSC-7) (SSC-8 Screwdriver)
Range: <500 km Range: (est.) 2,000 km+

Anti-ship missiles (AShMs) Russia has developed new ground-launched

LACMs: the 9M728 (SSC-7) and the 9M729 (SSC-8
Screwdriver). Though their lineage has not been
officially stated, the missiles are assessed as
3M54T 3M54K 3M54TE 3M54E 3M54KE 3M54AE
derived from the 3M14 Kalibr and they are able to
(SS-N-27A Sizzler) (SS-N-27 Sizzler) (SS-N-27 Sizzler) (SS-N-27 Sizzler) Range: 220 km 
carry both conventional and nuclear warheads.
Range: 220 km Range: 220 km
The shorter-range 9M728 can be launched from a
variant of the 9K720 Iskander-M missile system. The
3M54TE1 3M54E1 3M54KE1 3M54AE1 launch vehicle can carry either or both 9M728
(SS-N-27B Sizzler) (SS-N-27 Sizzler) Range: 275 km cruise and 9M723 ballistic missiles internally.
Range: 275 km Range: 275 km The longer-range SSC-8 is believed to be a
version of the Russian Navy 3M14T, with an
assessed range in excess of 2,000 km. The United
Anti-submarine missiles States has formally protested against the apparent
Ground-launched deployment of this system; the US–Russia
Surface-vessel-launched Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty prohibits
91RT2 91R1 91RTE2 91RE1 Submarine-launched ground-launched ballistic- and cruise-missile
Range: 40 km Range: 50 km Range: 40 km Range: 50 km systems with ranges between 500 km and 5,500 km.
Air-launched
Status unconfirmed Status unconfirmed (The treaty does not cover sea-launched missiles.)
Assessed dual-capable

© IISS
*Club-K is a containerised system (using commercial ISO 20/40) and may also be mounted on ship decks
 Russia and Eurasia 175

proceeding slowly. Nonetheless, the first of the
improved Project 08851 Yasen-M-class submarines
began sea trials in September 2018. Programmes to
modernise the capabilities of a range of legacy large
surface platforms also continue, at a relatively slow
pace.
Also after a considerable delay, in June the navy
commissioned the amphibious landing ship Ivan
Gren, some 14 years after construction of the vessel
began. A relatively modest 120 metres in length and
displacing just 6,600 tonnes, the ship nevertheless
represents a considerable improvement over the
In 2018, the Strategic Rocket Forces completed the
rearmament of three missile divisions with the RS-24
Yars (SS-27 mod 2) ICBM. The plan remains to replace
all RS-12M Topol (SS-25 Sickle) and RS-12M2 Topol-M
(SS-27 mod 1) ICBMs with Yars by 2021, though
achieving this looks unlikely, given the production
rates that would be required. Nonetheless, thanks to
the rapid acquisition of new missiles, the Strategic
Rocket Forces stand out as the most advanced branch
of the Russian armed forces: as of 2018, some 79% of
its weapons were classed as ‘new’.

Russia and Eurasia

elderly inventory of amphibious shipping. A key DEFENCE ECONOMICS
question remains over the extent to which Moscow
plans to invest in further improvements in this area; Defence spending
only two of these ships have been ordered so far. Russia’s economy has exhibited only modest growth,
The navy has additionally sought to achieve or decline, since 2013. The economy grew by 1.5% in
strategic effect by moving platforms between 2017 and 1.7% in 2018. Russia’s Ministry of Economic
key theatres and undertaking some significant Development is forecasting 2.0% growth in 2020,
showcase deployments and concentrations of force. increasing to 3.3% by 2024, but new economic-policy
For example, in August 2018, the navy deployed initiatives will be needed if such a revival is to be
a group of more than a dozen ships, including at achieved. By contrast, the IMF forecasts only 1.2%
least six Kalibr-equipped vessels, in the eastern growth in 2023.
Mediterranean. Although dubbed an exercise, they Under the State Armament Programme (SAP)
appeared ready to support Russian operations 2011–20, Russian defence spending grew rapidly in
in Syria and to act as a deterrent to Western and real terms and as a share of GDP, peaking in 2015.
other naval forces operating in the area. In June, the Since then, the rate of growth has moderated and the
Northern Fleet carried out its largest Arctic exercise GDP share is now declining (see Table 11). The SAP
in a decade. Then, in September, the Pacific Fleet to 2020 was always regarded as a one-off process of
mounted an exercise involving more than 20 vessels, quickly tackling years of meagre funding, permitting
said to have been the largest since the end of the the transition to a more normal annual rate of arms
Cold War, followed quickly by a three-ship regional procurement after a few years. This time has arrived
deployment. These developments appeared to and, according to the Ministry of Finance’s plans,
mark a further increase in the level of Russian naval
activity, demonstrating at least an ability to deploy in
key regions, if not necessarily on a global scale. Table 11 Russian defence expenditure as % of
GDP
Strategic Rocket Forces Year ‘National defence’ Total military expenditure1
Compared to other service arms, Russia’s strategic Trillion roubles as % GDP Trillion roubles as % GDP
nuclear forces remain relatively immune to budget
2018 2.830 2.88 3.935 4.00
cuts. Nevertheless, they too have lost one of their
2017 2.666 2
2.90 3.712 4.032
major projects. In December 2017, it was announced
2016 2.982 2
3.46 3.831 4.452
that development of the Barguzin mobile railway
2015 3.181 3.81 4.026 4.83
complex would be discontinued due to financial
constraints, with the funds redirected to new strategic 2014 2.479 3.13 3.224 4.07
weapons. 2013 2.106 2.88 2.787 3.81
The most important of these is the new RS-28 2012 1.812 2.66 2.505 3.67
Sarmat (SS-X-29) heavy liquid-fuelled ICBM. Launch 2011 1.516 2.51 2.029 3.37
tests were carried out in December 2017 and twice 1
According to NATO definition
2
Excluding a one-off payment to reduce accumulated debts of defence-
more over the next six months, including a limited industry enterprises under the scheme of state-guaranteed credits.
firing of the first-stage engines. 2011–2017: actual spending; 2018: amended federal budget for 2018
176 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019 2018 Defence Spending (US$bn)
Real % Change (2017–18)
Between 10% and 20% increase
63.06
Between 3% and 10% increase
Between 0% and 3% increase 2
Between 0% and 3% decrease 1
Between 3% and 10% decrease .5
Between 10% and 20% decrease .01
More than 20% decrease
[1] Map illustrating 2018 planned defence-spending levels (in US$ at
Insufficient data © IISS market exchange rates), as well as the annual real percentage
change in planned defence spending between 2017 and 2018 (at
constant 2010 prices and exchange rates). Percentage changes in
defence spending can vary considerably from year to year, as states
revise the level of funding allocated to defence. Changes indicated
Russia here highlight the short-term trend in planned defence spending
between 2017 and 2018. Actual spending changes prior to 2017, and
projected spending levels post-2018, are not reflected.

Belarus

Ukraine

Moldova
Kazakhstan

Georgia Uzbekistan
Kyrgyzstan
Armenia Azerbaijan
Turkmenistan
Tajikistan

▲ Map 4 Russia and Eurasia regional defence spending1

revealed in July 2018, spending on ‘national defence’ In 2017, an additional factor led to a reduction
(the budget chapter covering the defence ministry’s in the reported level of spending. As part of its
military outlays) will increase to a modest extent in campaign to tighten contract discipline and effective
nominal terms in 2019–21. However, it is due to fall use of budget funding, the defence ministry decided
as a share of GDP from almost 2.9% in 2018 to 2.6% late in the year to withhold payments to defence
in 2021, resulting in a share of total military spending companies until contracts for the delivery of new
of approximately 3.6%. This corresponds to its level weapons had been completed. The outcome was that
before the start of the SAP to 2020. more than 200bn roubles (US$3.4bn) was withheld,
Understanding the trend of Russian military
spending has been complicated by technical factors
that have affected the reported defence budget. ▼ Figure 12 Russia: estimated total military
In 2016 and 2017, the ‘national defence’ chapter expenditure as % of GDP
included substantial sums to cover past debts to
5 4.83
the defence industry under the system of state- 4.45
guaranteed credits. This was used to boost spending 3.81
4.07 4.03 4.00
4
in the early years of the SAP. The debt settlement
amounted to 792 billion roubles (US$11.8bn) in 2016
3
% of GDP

and 187bn roubles (US$3.2bn) in 2017. But these

payments did not contribute to Russia’s defence 2
capability and should be excluded from any analysis
of the trend of actual military expenditure. Excluding 1
debt settlements, defence spending in nominal terms
fell by 6% in 2016 and 11% in 2017, compared with 0
the 28% growth in spending seen in 2015. 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

leading to a 6% underspend compared with the
total federal budget allocation to ‘national defence’
in 2017. The withheld payments were disbursed in
the early months of 2018, leading to an overspend
that was not foreseen when the year’s budget was
adopted. An amended version of the budget law for
2018 was adopted in early July and this increased
the allocation to ‘national defence’ by about 245bn
roubles (US$3.9bn), covering additional outlays
relating to the 2017 state defence order. The budget
was amended again in November but with only a
modest increase in defence spending. It remains to be
seen whether the withholding of payments late in the
year will become a regular practice.
A new State Armament Programme to 2027
With the formation of a new government following
the start of Vladimir Putin’s fourth term as president
in May 2018, Yury Borisov, formerly deputy defence
minister for procurement, replaced Dmitriy Rogozin
as deputy prime minister responsible for oversight
of the defence industry and first deputy chair of
the Military-Industrial Commission (chaired by
Putin). Borisov has a background in the electronics
industry. His successor as deputy defence minister
for procurement was Aleksey Krivoruchko, who
was from 2014 to June 2018 general director of
Kalashnikov, part of the Rostec state corporation.
Before his departure, Borisov had overseen the
preparation of Russia’s new SAP, replacing the one
to 2020. Originally, this was to have been for the years
2016–25, but at the beginning of 2015 it was postponed
until economic prospects were more certain. At first,
it was expected to run from 2018 to 2025 but in 2017 it
was decided that it should be a ten-year programme
to 2027. President Vladimir Putin finally approved
the new SAP in December 2017.
The state programme is classified. It is valued
in current prices and only the first five years are
operational; the second five are presented only in
general terms. Total funding of the defence ministry’s
forces under the SAP to 2027 will be 19 trillion roubles
(US$304bn); for the forces of other agencies, such as
the Federal Security Service, the Russian National
Guard and the Ministry of Emergencies, more than
3trn roubles (US$48.1bn) has been allocated. In
nominal terms, the defence ministry will receive the
same sum as under the previous programme, but in
real terms probably only 50–60% of the sum allocated
in the SAP to 2020. In addition, the defence ministry
will receive 1trn roubles (US$16bn) for infrastructure
Russia and Eurasia 177
investment directly related to the deployment of new
weapons. It is not known what share of the ministry’s
allocation relates to the first five years of the SAP,
but it is probably much more than the 31% allocated
under the previous SAP to 2020. However, this time,
probably because of the tense international situation,
there has been no indication of the number of new
systems to be delivered under the programme.
As before, strategic missiles have first priority.
Acquisition of the RS-24 Yars (SS-27 mod 2)
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) will continue,
and from around 2020 the new RS-28 Sarmat (SS-X-29)
Russia and Eurasia
heavy ICBM should enter service. A number of old
RS-18 (SS-19 Stiletto) ICBMs will be equipped with
the new Avangard hypersonic boost-glide vehicle.
The priority for the space forces will be to restore
Russia’s missile early-warning satellite network,
with the re-equipping of the ground-based warning
system with Voronezh radars nearing completion. The
air-defence forces will receive more S-400 surface-
to-air missile (SAM) systems, but from around 2020
they should begin to receive its successor, the delayed
S-500 endo-atmospheric missile-defence system. The
new medium-range S-350 Vityaz SAM should also
enter service.
The air force will probably acquire a smaller
number of new aircraft than under the previous
SAP. A high priority will be the renewal of the
transport-aircraft fleet, including introducing into
service the Il-76MD-90A, starting production of the
light Il-112 military transport and completing the
development of the medium Il-276. However, the
number of transports in service is unlikely to increase
much before 2025. Rotary-wing development may
be limited to upgraded versions of the Ka-52 and
Mi-28N helicopters. Russia has made rapid progress
in developing and deploying reconnaissance
uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) but still lacks a
strike system, which is set to be a high priority under
the new SAP. The heavy Okhotnik, being developed
by the Sukhoi design bureau, may be the first real
strike UAV to enter Russian service.
The Armata main battle tank will likely enter
service with the ground forces but not in large
numbers. As acknowledged by Borisov, Armata is too
expensive for mass acquisition. Instead, procurement
in quantity will focus on modernised T-72, T-80
and T-90 tanks. More Terminator combat vehicles
and Koalitsiya-SV self-propelled howitzers will be
acquired. Work on new robotic systems will likely be
a priority under the new programme.
178 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
It is clear that the navy will receive very few, if
any, heavy surface ships before 2027. More Project
22350 frigates and Project 20380 corvettes will
be built, plus some new Project 20386 corvettes
and a larger number of small missile ships armed
with Kalibr and Oniks cruise missiles. Submarine
building will focus on completing the series of
Project 995A Borey-A ballistic-missile boats armed
with Bulava missiles and Project 08851 Yasen-M
multi-role submarines, though from the early
2020s construction is expected to begin on the
first Khaski-class successor. The building of new
non-nuclear submarines depends, to a large extent,
on whether Russia is finally able to produce a viable
air-independent propulsion unit.
Defence industry
Rogozin now heads the state corporation for the
space-missile industry, Roscosmos, which was
established in August 2015. This is now undergoing
a major reorganisation, with the aim of improving
efficiency after a series of costly launch failures.
The vast state corporation Rostec, headed by
Sergey Chemezov, uniting 700 enterprises grouped
into 15 holding companies, looks set to absorb the
United Aircraft Corporation as an additional holding
company, achieving full control of the entire aviation
industry – fixed wing, helicopters, engines and
avionics. Reorganisation of the United Shipbuilding
Corporation now also seems likely, as it is one of the
least effective corporate structures of the defence
sector. The building of many new naval ships has
been subject to long delays.
A significant development for the defence industry
was the adoption in late 2017 of a government decree
establishing new pricing principles for military
products developed and produced under the state
defence order. It is designed as a cost-saving measure
and should increase profits for defence contractors,
making possible the financing of more investment
and re-equipping from company earnings rather
than budget sources. It should also promote the
development of more extensive subcontracting. This
was discouraged by the old system of pricing, which
left subcontractors with meagre profits. The new
approach is now being introduced, but it will take
some time before it is operational.
Meanwhile, the elaborate system to closely
monitor the use of budget funding under the state
defence order continues to function. While the defence
industry still complains of excessive bureaucracy
and intrusive monitoring, the procurement process
should lead to fewer diversions of funding to other
purposes and corruption associated with arms
procurement. In response to sanctions, a specialised
lead bank, Promsvyazbank – organised so as to
minimise its vulnerability to sanction pressures – has
been designated the principal bank for servicing the
state defence order.
Arms exports
In 2017, for the third year running, Russian arms-
manufacturing firms signed contracts totalling
approximately US$15bn. Once again, sales of aircraft
and air-defence systems accounted for a large
proportion of total exports. By July 2018, China had
received a regimental set of S-400s, while a deal for
the system worth a reported US$2.5bn was concluded
with Turkey, notwithstanding NATO opposition,
with deliveries to begin in late 2019 or early 2020.
India has signed a contract for the S-400, while
several other countries, including Iraq, Saudi Arabia
and Qatar, have expressed interest in buying it. Most
of the 24 Su-35 fighters sold to China in November
2015 have been delivered, while in February 2018 a
deal worth US$1.14bn was concluded with Indonesia
for 11 Su-35s. India and Malaysia have also expressed
interest in buying the aircraft. There is an expectation
that Russia’s use of a wide range of weaponry in
Syria will boost export sales.
BELARUS
Belarus’s armed forces are slowly completing their
long transformation from the force that separated
from the Soviet military into those of a middle-
sized European country. While official documents
underline the still-close military alliance with Russia,
Minsk’s position is more nuanced. In general, this
stems from ad hoc decisions rather than deliberate
policies by either Minsk or Moscow. Belarus lacks the
funds for significant military investments and has its
own distinct priorities, while Moscow is unwilling to
invest much in its ally without gaining more control
over Belarusian armed forces and facilities.
Security and defence policy
The Belarusian government rarely discusses its
security policy in public. However, while Minsk
has limited military goals, it is tailoring its armed
forces to tackle contemporary security challenges.
Indeed, Defence Minister Andrei Ravkov describes

the armed forces’ ongoing rearmament programme
as ‘selective’. In February 2018, the defence ministry
revealed plans to reduce the army’s stored weapons
and materiel by a quarter in order to save costs,
although the age of some of this equipment makes
the prospect of selling it on unlikely. There are two
principal drivers for security policy: political stability
and relations with Russia.
Internal security
In numerous official statements and semi-official
pronouncements, the government has demonstrated
concern over the potential for civil unrest to turn
into violent clashes and armed conflict, and perhaps
prompt foreign intervention. In recent years,
Belarusian defence officials have emphasised the
need to be ready to cope with multiple security
issues without external assistance. While leaders
frequently say little on Russia’s role in defending
Belarus, President Alexander Lukashenko said in
October 2018 that in case of a security crisis, there
could not be 100% reliance ‘even on Russia’. Earlier,
in February Lukashenko suggested that Russia’s
leadership does not see the need to supply the armies
of its allies. He also said that Minsk looks to ‘arm and
modernise’ together with fellow Collective Security
Treaty Organisation (CSTO) member states, although
there is only public information on cooperation
with Kazakhstan. Belarusian officials also highlight
defence cooperation with China.
Ravkov described new challenges and threats
facing the country late in the decade as including
‘terrorist and extremist organisations actively [using]
new concepts and mechanisms of regime change in
other countries’, advancing constitutional change
and violating these states’ ‘territorial integrity by
provoking internal armed conflicts’. Analysts assess
that he also included powerful foreign states in this
group of challenges. Minsk had observed events in
eastern Ukraine and was keen to prevent the same
happening in Belarus. In January 2016, Belarus
adopted a new military doctrine, revising the
previous version from 2001. Among potential military
threats, the document emphasised ‘hybrid warfare’
and ‘colour revolutions’. The former term implied
Russian intervention of the kind Moscow undertook
in eastern Ukraine, although Belarusian officials did
not say so directly. The latter term refers to purported
Western attempts at regime change of the sort alleged
by Moscow to have occurred since the mid-2000s in
Georgia and Ukraine, although Belarusian officials
Russia and Eurasia 179
did not cite these as examples. Belarus’s military
exercises and rearmament programme reflect
Minsk’s preparation for these scenarios. However,
there is little evidence that Minsk is preparing for any
direct confrontation with Western states or NATO,
even as an ally of Russia. According to the official
military daily newspaper Belorusskaya voennaya
gazeta, ‘the preparation of Belarusian armed forces
is aimed mostly at fighting terrorist groups and not
engaging in any large-scale hostilities’.
Relations with Russia
Russia and Eurasia
For Minsk, cooperation with Russia does not mean
that both countries should adhere to identical defence
policies or views on security. Belarus elaborates a
more nuanced opinion on NATO activities in the
region and is more muted in public pronouncements
than Moscow. In a 2015 television interview, Ravkov
called the increasing NATO presence in the region
‘a danger’, but stressed that ‘there is no military
threat’. Unlike Moscow, Minsk remains committed
to transparency by remaining in the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and opening
up Zapad 2017 exercises that included Belarusian
units to NATO and OSCE observers, as well as
observers from neighbouring countries, including
Ukraine.
That said, Minsk recognises Russia’s security
concerns and to an extent provides support for
Russia’s defence efforts. Belarus, which has limited
economic potential and resources, leverages
Moscow’s use of Belarusian defence capacities and
territory. Indeed, some elements of its armed forces
may be more important to Russia than to Belarus,
most notably air and missile defence. Analysts
consider that Minsk maintains these capabilities
mostly to play a role in the defence of Russia. It also
enables Minsk to avoid the permanent basing of
Russian forces in Belarusian territory, except for two
highly specialised technical facilities – the Russian
Navy’s long-range low-frequency communications
centre in Vileyka and the Hantsavichy early-warning
radar, both of which were established in Soviet or
early post-Soviet times. It is believed that Russia
does not pay directly for either facility; in return the
Belarusian military has free access to Russian military
facilities such as the Ashuluk military training area.
Analysts also understand that Belarus has access to
economic and other benefits from the Kremlin, with
these perhaps including subsidised oil and gas or
access to markets.
180 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Belarus’s geography dictates much of its security
policy. By the mid-2000s, it had NATO neighbours to
the north and the west, and since 2014, Ukraine, to
the south, has developed closer ties to the West. These
developments left Minsk with the choice of either
risking tension with the West or adjusting its policies.
Minsk chose the latter by renouncing most of its
earlier anti-Western rhetoric, increasing divergence
with Russia on foreign policy and defence matters
(higher transparency in exercises, maintaining its
obligations under the Treaty on Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe, increasing self-reliance in military
policy), and increasing contacts with NATO and its
member states. The geopolitical situation with regard
to Russia, however, remained static. Belarus will
always be important to Russia, as it is situated next
to Russia’s core regions around Moscow. Because
of this, Moscow considers it necessary to have at
least minimal air- and missile-defence capacities in
Belarus, either under allied Belarusian command or
Russian units in-country. While Moscow would like
to increase its military capabilities in Belarus, with a
view to NATO states’ capacities to the west, in 2016
Minsk reportedly displayed reluctance to station
Russian 9K720 Iskander-M (SS-26 Stone) short-range
ballistic-missile systems under Russian command
in Belarus as Moscow refused to supply the systems
to Minsk. Prior to this, analysts had understood that
Russia was interested in obtaining for its forces an air
base in Belarus.
In 2016, Minsk and Moscow also completed the
formalities around the adoption of the 2009 agree-
ment on establishing a single air-defence system
for Belarus and Russia. The agreement essen-
tially formalised or confirmed already existing air-
defence cooperation mechanisms. The main joint
standby-alert duty arrangements (sovmestnoe boevoe
dezhurstvo) began in 1996, in addition to information
exchanges, joint training sessions and equipment
supplies. The joint operation of Belarusian and
Russian military units attached to this single air-
defence system will be coordinated from the
Russian air force’s central command centre. For all
other purposes, these units remain under national
command, but this would change in the case of
armed conflict, when a joint Belarus–Russia air-
defence command would be established. In 2017,
Minsk and Moscow amended the 2009 agreement
by specifying and limiting its scope: in the original
text, the joint command could be established in a
‘period of a threat’; the amendments stipulated the
establishment of such a command only in a ‘period
of immediate threat of aggression’.
In November 2017, the Belarus–Russia agreement
on supplying a joint regional group of Belarusian and
Russian troops entered force. Both parties agreed that
each had to supply their own national army units,
which shall become part of this group in case of an
imminent conflict – there is no permanently staffed
formation. Moscow has committed to supplying
Minsk with equipment and arms only during an
‘increasing military threat to the Union state [of
Belarus and Russia] and in times of war’.
The armed forces
When the independent Belarusian armed forces
formed in the 1990s, it was similar to its Russian
counterpart in terms of doctrine, training, equipment
and organisation, and officers moved between
the two forces. Now the two armed forces have
different missions, identities, structures, equipment
and training. Belarus switched to a brigade-based
organisational structure before Russia and kept
that structure after Russia started re-establishing
larger units. Belarus also maintains and modernises
many of the platforms that Russia is phasing out
and increasingly develops its own, sometimes in
cooperation with other countries, such as China.
However, the Belarusian armed forces are
deployed largely as they were in Soviet times. The
existing Western and Northwestern operational
commands, formed in 2001, reflect the tendency to
not make changes to military deployments unless
absolutely necessary. There have been some recent
changes, such as a new air-defence regiment armed
with Tor-M2E (SA-15 Gauntlet) surface-to-air missile
(SAM) systems and a battalion of internal troops
stationed near the Lithuanian border to guard the
nuclear power plant under construction there.
Minsk has said it will retain obligatory military
service for all men. Most of those drafted who have
secondary education serve for 18 months, while
those with a university degree serve for 12 months.
Conscripts can be assigned to serve in the army,
special forces, air defence and air force, internal
troops or border troops. However, the army is
looking to introduce a more flexible military-service
system and unlike in Soviet times does not call up
all conscripts. Conscripts with different educational
backgrounds and qualifications serve different types
of military service. According to official statements, in
2018, about 80% of conscripts were not immediately
 Russia and Eurasia 181

LATVIA
Daugavpils

7
LITHUANIA VITEBSK
8

6
Vilnius BELARUS
4
9
MINSK 10

2 11 Minsk
MAHILYOW Roslavl
1 12 13
GRODNO 3
14
15 RUSSIA
5 17 16

Russia and Eurasia

Bialystok
18
Klintsy
POLAND 19
BREST Army, special-operations
HOMYEL’
20 forces and specialist troops
Air force and air defence
UKRAINE Russian bases

1 Grodno 7 Polatsk 12 Fanipal 17 Baranavichy

6th Mechanised Brigade 
1st Anti-Aircraft Rocket Regiment
2 Lida
116th Attack air base (Su-25 atk
ac)
3 Navahrudak
255th Radio-technical Regiment

4 Astravets
1146th Anti-Aircraft Rocket
Regiment
5 Slonim
11th Mechanised Brigade

6 Liepiel
19th Mechanised Brigade
231st Artillery Brigade
377th Anti-Aircraft Rocket 15th Anti-Aircraft Rocket
 61st Fighter Base (MiG-29 ftr ac)
Regiment Brigade 120th Anti-Aircraft Rocket
8 Vitebsk 13 Machulishchy
Brigade
8th Radio-technical Brigade
103rd Airborne Brigade 50th Air Force and Air Defence
33rd Special Forces Detachment Forces base (Tpt ac/hel) 18 Hantsavichy
49th Radiotechnical Brigade Radar station
9 Vileyka
Transmitter 14 Maryina Gorka 19 Byaroza
5th Special Forces Brigade 16th Electronic Warfare
10 Barysau
Regiment
740th Anti-Aircraft Rocket 15 Asipovichy
Regiment 465th Missile Brigade 20 Brest
336th Rocket Artillery Brigade 38th Air Assault Brigade
11 Minsk
51st Artillery Brigade 111th Artillery Brigade
120th Mechanised Brigade
115th Anti-Aircraft Rocket
56th Communications Regiment 16 Babruysk
Regiment
147th Anti-Aircraft Rocket
Regiment
© IISS

▲ Map 5 Belarus: principal military bases

drafted for full-time military service. The armed
forces are increasing reserve service, which includes
usually university-educated recruits serving for
shorter periods over the course of two years. Later,
these reserves attend refresher courses and take part
in military exercises. Conscripts do not have the
freedom to choose whether to do full conscription
service or reserve service. Minsk is also looking to
increase the professional component, and the share
of professional servicemen and women in the army
rose from 16% in 2014 to 20% at the beginning of 2018.
Army
While the army still contains remnants of the Soviet
era, there are lines of modernisation. The government
pays particular attention to special-operations forces
and rocket and missile forces. No spending figures are
published, but the intensive involvement of special-
operations forces in exercises and the development
of new weapons for the rocket and missile units
provides evidence for this.
Minsk’s reliance on Russia for air-defence
equipment has led to lower levels of investment
in that domain. In recent years, however, Belarus
has only obtained from Russia some Tor-M2E SAM
systems, second-hand S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble)
SAM systems (for the air force), Yak-130 aircraft and
Mi-8MTV-5 helicopters.
Minsk plans to modernise its T-72 tanks, in both
Belarusian and Russian plants, and to purchase
more Belarusian-manufactured armoured vehicles,
namely the Volat V1 armoured utility vehicle and
182 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
the Kaiman armoured reconnaissance vehicle, and
the Belarusian-modernised BTR-70MB1 armoured
personnel carrier. Planned acquisitions for 2018
included Tor-M2E air-defence systems and radars
from Russia, and a number of uninhabited aerial
vehicles (UAVs), including types designed for
artillery targeting and reconnaissance.
Air force
The air force has been incrementally retiring
sophisticated platforms, such as Su-24 and Su-27
combat aircraft and Mi-24 attack helicopters, without
identified replacements. Officials insist that the
Yak-130 training/light-attack aircraft can take on the
roles of most of these systems. The delivery of 12
Su-30SM aircraft from Russia was due to start in 2018
but has been postponed.
Annual flying hours for pilots have increased
but remain at a relatively low level. In the Soviet
era, flying hours amounted to around 120 each year
per fighter pilot; by the late 2010s, this had fallen
to just 70–75 hours. Minsk considers the reduced
capabilities of the Belarusian Air Force to be as much
a problem for Russia as for Belarus. For many years,
it seemed that Minsk expected Moscow to deliver
newer aircraft, either for a symbolic fee or as payment
in goods. Conversely, Moscow has unsuccessfully
tried – since at least the beginning of 2013 – to have
Minsk accept the deployment of a Russian Air Force
regiment in Belarus.
Training and cooperation
Belarus has established military training departments
offering various programmes in major civilian
universities. After establishing an aviation-training
capability in the 2000s, pilots can now train at the
Military Academy and civilian Minsk State Higher
Aviation College.
The armed forces train on a bilateral and
multilateral basis with Russia but also with CSTO
forces – the Belarusian 103rd Airborne Brigade is part
of the CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Force (KSOR)
– as well as China. Belarusian special-operations
troops trained with their Chinese counterparts most
recently in 2018 in China, while People’s Liberation
Army troops last exercised in Belarus in 2017. In
May 2018, Minsk also held its first joint drills with
Kazakhstan. Belarus also takes part in NATO’s
Partnership for Peace programme and, according
to the foreign ministry, there have been about 125
joint Belarus–NATO activities since 1997. In 2015–
16, Belarus signed bilateral military-cooperation
agreements with its three neighbouring NATO
member countries, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.
Army exercises mostly focus on counter-
insurgency and urban warfare. Minsk has retired
numerous types of equipment that would be
required for offensive operations, especially armour
and artillery, bombers and attack helicopters, and
has abandoned some military facilities; for example,
its only military-helicopter base is in Kobryn, on the
border with Ukraine. Belarus has not purchased
modern mechanised armoured vehicles in significant
numbers, except for light-armoured platforms.
Defence economics and industry
Unlike its neighbours, Belarus has not responded to
growing regional tensions with more than a modest
defence-budget increase. From a low point of US$506
million in 2016, the 2018 budget reached US$629m.
Indeed, not only does Minsk see no pressing need
for larger investments in national security, it has
little money for these. In 2012, Minsk urged Moscow
to contribute to the financing of the Belarusian
armed forces, stressing their importance to Russia.
In February 2018, Lukashenko once again criticised
Russia for failing to build up the armies of the CSTO
members.
Little is spent on military equipment and Minsk
looks to avoid imports, preferring to produce it
domestically, even if this results in weaponry of
only limited capability. That is particularly true of
mechanised armoured vehicles. Indeed, Belarus’s
defence industry is one of the few sectors of national
industry that is significantly developing. The armed
forces’ inventory is increasingly supplied by Belarusian
firms, which is in itself an achievement. For a long
time after independence, Belarusian industry only
produced limited defence products, such as electronic
and optical equipment and various components. Now,
government officials openly articulate the aspiration
to develop more defence products, particularly
artillery and small arms. However, with the national
budget constrained, defence firms are currently
focused on improving their exports. According to the
State Military Industrial Committee (SMIC) of Belarus,
arms exports in 2017 were 15% up on the previous
year, exceeding US$1 billion, though these figures are
at variance with other public estimates, which place
overall exports at around half that. Some Belarusian
defence firms are in private hands, although they
operate under the control of the SMIC.

According to an official SMIC statement, 54%
of the ‘international interaction’ of the Belarusian
defence industry involves Russian partners, which, if
anything, indicates some success in internationalising
Belarus’s defence industries. Belarusian firms supply
many of the components for Russian arms, such
as electronics, tank sights and chassis for Russian
missiles, including for Moscow’s strategic nuclear
systems. However, as early as 2010, Russia began to
replace foreign components and Belarus has been no
exception. However, it is understood that Moscow
has so far failed to replace the Belarusian chassis in
Russian missile systems or to buy the Minsk-based
MZKT factory that produces them. Nonetheless, in
the long term, Belarus’s defence industry and the
national defence-industrial base will be undermined
by such efforts.
Russia and Eurasia 183
While most Belarusian defence products are
modernised Soviet designs, there are some new
products, including rockets and missiles. Belarus
designed, with Chinese support, the Polonez
multiple-launch rocket system, then developed
and manufactured a missile for it. Together with
China, Belarus has also for some time worked on
designing a SAM system. In addition, Minsk is
developing UAVs for the Belarusian armed forces.
In 2016, it demonstrated a first-strike system, the
Burevestnik-MB, which is armed with eight unguided
57 mm rockets, and two so-called ‘kamikaze’ mini-
Russia and Eurasia
UAVs. Efforts to manufacture indigenous armoured
vehicles started relatively recently. Two models of
light armoured vehicle – the Caiman and the Volat V1
– and the BTR-70MB1 variant have been designed for
the Belarusian armed forces.
184 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

MANOEUVRE
Armenia ARM Mechanised
1 (1st) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 MR regt, 1 maint bn)
Armenian Dram d 2017 2018 2019
1 (2nd) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 MR regt, 1 lt inf regt,
GDP d 5.57tr 6.14tr 1 arty bn)
US$ 11.5bn 12.5bn 1 (3rd) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 4 MR regt, 1 lt inf regt,
per capita US$ 3,857 4,190 1 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 maint bn)
Growth % 7.5 6.0 1 (4th) corps (4 MR regt; 1 SP arty bn; 1 sigs bn)
Inflation % 0.9 3.0
1 (5th) corps (with 2 fortified areas) (1 MR regt)
Other
Def bdgt [a] d 210bn 248bn
1 indep MR trg bde
US$ 435m 506m COMBAT SUPPORT
FMA (US) US$ 1m 0m 1 arty bde
US$1=d 482.70 490.17 1 MRL bde
[a] Includes imported military equipment, excludes military 1 AT regt
pensions 1 AD bde
Population 3,038,217
2 AD regt
2 (radiotech) AD regt
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 1 engr regt
Male 10.0% 3.0% 3.4% 4.3% 23.1% 4.7% EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Female 8.7% 2.7% 3.3% 4.4% 25.3% 7.0% ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 109: 3 T-54; 5 T-55; 101 T-72A/B
Capabilities RECCE 12 BRM-1K (CP)
IFV 231: 75 BMP-1; 6 BMP-1K (CP); 150 BMP-2
The armed forces’ main focus is territorial defence, given continuing
APC • APC (W) 130: 8 BTR-60; 100 BTR-60 look-a-like;
tensions with neighbouring Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. In
early 2018, a Modernisation Programme was released for the period 18 BTR-70; 4 BTR-80
2018–24. Despite economic constraints, the document outlined ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
the ambitious goal of reorganising the command structure and AEV MT-LB
modernising the equipment inventory. The programme includes ARV BREhM-D; BREM-1
sections on cyber- and information-domain capabilities. Armenia ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
is a member of the CSTO and maintains strong defence ties with MSL • SP 22+: 9 9P148 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 13
Russia, centred on equipment-procurement, technical-advice and 9P149 Shturm (AT-6 Spiral); 9K129 Kornet-E (AT-14
personnel-training programmes. Military doctrine remains influ-
Spriggan)
enced by Russian thinking. Armenia is also engaged in a NATO Indi-
vidual Partnership Action Plan. Conscription continues, but there
ARTILLERY 232
is a growing cohort of professional officers. The armed forces have SP 38: 122mm 10 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 28 2S3 Akatsiya
deployed on NATO and UN missions in Afghanistan, Kosovo and TOWED 131: 122mm 69 D-30; 152mm 62: 26 2A36
Lebanon, providing learning opportunities. Personnel train regu- Giatsint-B; 2 D-1; 34 D-20
larly and take part in annual CSTO exercises and with Russia in bilat- MRL 57: 122mm 47 BM-21 Grad; 273mm 4 WM-80;
eral drills. Equipment is mainly of Russian origin. Agreements have 300mm 6 9A52 Smerch
been reached in recent years to purchase modern Russian systems. MOR 120mm 12 M120
Serviceability and maintenance of mainly ageing aircraft have been
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
a problem for the air force. There is some capacity to manufacture
defence equipment for the domestic market, including electro-
SRBM • Conventional 16: 8 9K72 Elbrus (SS-1C Scud B);
optics, light weapons and UAVs, but Armenia is reliant on Russia for 4 9K79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab); 4 9K720 Iskander-E
other equipment platforms and systems. UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
ISR • Light 15 Krunk
ACTIVE 44,800 (Army 41,850 Air/AD Aviation AIR DEFENCE
Forces (Joint) 1,100 other Air Defence Forces 1,850) SAM
Paramilitary 4,300 Medium-range 2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef); S-75 Dvina
Conscript liability 24 months (SA-2 Guideline); 9K37M Buk-M1 (SA-11 Gadfly)
Short-range 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful); S-125 Pechora
RESERVE
(SA-3 Goa)
Some mobilisation reported, possibly 210,000 with military service
within 15 years Point-defence 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); 9K310 Igla-1
(SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse); 9K333 Verba;
9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE GUNS
SP 23mm ZSU-23-4
Army 22,900; 18,950 conscripts (total 41,850) TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES Air and Air Defence Aviation Forces 1,100
1 SF bde 1 Air & AD Joint Command
 Russia and Eurasia 185

FORCES BY ROLE Russia 3,300: 1 mil base with (1 MR bde; 74 T-72; 80 BMP-
GROUND ATTACK 1; 80 BMP-2; 12 2S1; 12 BM-21); 1 ftr sqn with 18 MiG-29
1 sqn with Su-25/Su-25UBK Frogfoot Fulcrum; 1 hel sqn with 8 Mi-24P Hind; 4 Mi-8MT Hip; 2
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SAM bty with S-300V (SA-12 Gladiator/Giant); 1 SAM bty
AIRCRAFT 15 combat capable with 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful)
ATK 15: 13 Su-25 Frogfoot; 2 Su-25UBK Frogfoot United Kingdom OSCE 1
TPT 4: Heavy 3 Il-76 Candid; PAX 1 A319CJ
TRG 14: 4 L-39 Albatros; 10 Yak-52
HELICOPTERS
Azerbaijan AZE
ATK 7 Mi-24P Hind Azerbaijani New Manat m 2017 2018 2019
ISR 4: 2 Mi-24K Hind; 2 Mi-24R Hind (cbt spt) GDP m 69.1bn 77.5bn
MRH 10 Mi-8MT (cbt spt)
US$ 40.7bn 45.6bn
C2 2 Mi-9 Hip G (cbt spt)
per capita US$ 4,141 4,587
TPT • Light 7 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite
Growth % 0.1 1.3

Russia and Eurasia

AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Long-range S-300PT (SA-10
Grumble); S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble) Inflation % 13.0 3.5
Def bdgt [a] m 2.64bn 2.74bn
Paramilitary 4,300 US$ 1.55bn 1.61bn
FMA (US) US$ 1m 0m
Police
US$1=m 1.70 1.70
FORCES BY ROLE
[a] Official defence budget. Excludes a significant proportion of
MANOEUVRE procurement outlays
Other
4 paramilitary bn Population 10,046,516
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Male 12.3% 3.4% 4.0% 4.9% 22.3% 2.6%
RECCE 5 BRM-1K (CP)
IFV 45: 44 BMP-1; 1 BMP-1K (CP) Female 10.8% 2.9% 3.7% 4.7% 24.1% 4.2%
APC • APC (W) 24 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-152
ABCV 5 BMD-1 Capabilities
The armed forces’ principal focus is territorial defence, in light of
Border Troops continuing tensions with neighbouring Armenia over Nagorno-
Ministry of National Security Karabakh. A defence doctrine was adopted in 2010. Azerbaijan
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE maintains a defence relationship with NATO and is in the fifth cycle
(2017–19) of its NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan. Azer-
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
baijan is looking to deepen ties with Belarus, Serbia, the UK and
RECCE 3 BRM-1K (CP) the US through military-cooperation agreements. Defence coop-
IFV 35 BMP-1 eration with Moscow is focused on equipment procurement and
APC • APC (W) 23: 5 BTR-60; 18 BTR-70 technical advice. Readiness within Azerbaijan’s conscript-based
ABCV 5 BMD-1 armed services varies between units. Azerbaijan has taken part
in multilateral exercises and its forces have trained with Turkish
troops in bilateral drills. The armed forces have little expedition-
DEPLOYMENT ary capability though they contribute to NATO’s Operation Resolute
AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 121 Support in Afghanistan. Defence modernisation and procurement
has been a focus in the past decade, to replace the ageing inven-
ALBANIA: OSCE • Albania 1 tory of mainly Soviet-era equipment. The air force in particular
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 33 suffers from maintenance problems. Recent orders include for air-
defence and artillery systems and wheeled and tracked armoured
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 1 vehicles, predominantly of Russian origin. Azerbaijan’s limited but
MOLDOVA: OSCE • Moldova 1 growing defence-industrial capabilities are centred on the Minis-
try of Defence Industry, which manages and oversees the produc-
SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 40
tion of small arms and light weapons. While the country is reliant
UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 2 on external suppliers for major defence-equipment platforms
and systems, some defence companies have started to export to
foreign markets.
FOREIGN FORCES
OSCE figures represent total Minsk Conference mission ACTIVE 66,950 (Army 56,850 Navy 2,200 Air 7,900)
personnel in both Armenia and Azerbaijan Paramilitary 15,000
Bosnia-Herzegovina OSCE 1 Conscript liability 18 months (12 for graduates)
Germany OSCE 1 RESERVE 300,000
Moldova OSCE 2 Some mobilisation reported; 300,000 with military service within
Poland OSCE 1 15 years
186 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE ISR • Medium 3 Aerostar
AIR DEFENCE
Army 56,850 SAM
FORCES BY ROLE Medium-range 2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef)
COMMAND Point-defence 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); 9K35 Strela-10
5 corps HQ (SA-13 Gopher); 9K32 Strela (SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K34 Strela-3
MANOEUVRE (SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K338
Mechanised Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch)
4 MR bde GUNS
Light SP 23mm ZSU-23-4
19 MR bde TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2
Other
1 sy bde Navy 2,200

COMBAT SUPPORT EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 arty bde PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11
1 arty trg bde CORVETTES • FS 1 Kusar (ex-FSU Petya II) with 2 RBU
1 MRL bde 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm gun
1 AT bde PSO 2: 1 Luga (Wodnik 2) (FSU Project 888; additional trg
1 engr bde role); 1 Neftegaz (Project B-92) (ex-Coast Guard)
1 sigs bde PCC 3: 2 Petrushka (FSU UK-3; additional trg role); 1
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT Shelon (ex-FSU Project 1388M)
1 log bde PB 3: 1 Araz (ex-TUR AB 25); 1 Bryza (ex-FSU Project 722);
1 Poluchat (ex-FSU Project 368)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PBF 3 Stenka
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4
MBT 439: 95 T-55; 244 T-72A/AV/B; 100 T-90S
MHC 4: 2 Korund (Yevgenya) (Project 1258); 2 Yakhont
RECCE 15 BRM-1 (FSU Sonya)
IFV 216: 43 BMP-1; 33 BMP-2; 88 BMP-3; 7 BTR-80A; 45+ AMPHIBIOUS 6
BTR-82A LSM 3: 1 Polnochny A (FSU Project 770) (capacity 6 MBT;
APC 568 180 troops); 2 Polnochny B (FSU Project 771) (capacity 6
APC (T) 336 MT-LB MBT; 180 troops)
APC (W) 142: 10 BTR-60; 132 BTR-70 LCM 3: 2 T-4 (FSU); 1 Vydra† (FSU) (capacity either 3
PPV 90: 45 Marauder; 45 Matador MBT or 200 troops)
AUV 65+: 35 Cobra; 30+ Sand Cat LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGS 1 (FSU Project 10470)
ABCV 20 BMD-1
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES Air Force and Air Defence 7,900

AEV IMR-2; MT-LB FORCES BY ROLE
ARV BREM-L Brelianka FIGHTER
MW Bozena; GW-3 (minelayer) 1 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum; MiG-29UB Fulcrum
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
SP 10 9P157-2 Khrizantema-S (AT-15 Springer) 1 regt with Su-24 Fencer; Su-25 Frogfoot; Su-25UB Frog-
MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 foot B
Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); TRANSPORT
9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn); Spike-LR 1 sqn with An-12 Cub; Yak-40 Codling
ARTILLERY 598 TRAINING
SP 96: 122mm 46 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 33: 6 2S3 Akatsiya; 1 sqn with L-39 Albatros
18 2S19 Msta-S; 9 M-77 Dana; 155mm 5 ATMOS 2000; ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
203mm 12 2S7 Pion 1 regt with Ka-32 Helix C; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-24 Hind; PZL
TOWED 207: 122mm 129 D-30; 130mm 36 M-46; 152mm Mi-2 Hoplite
42: 18 2A36 Giatsint-B; 24 D-20 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
GUN/MOR 120mm 36: 18 2S9 NONA-S; 18 2S31 Vena AIRCRAFT 37 combat capable
MRL 147: 122mm 60+: 43 BM-21 Grad; 9+ IMI Lynx; 8 FTR 16: 14 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum
RM-70 Vampir; 128mm 12 RAK-12; 220mm 18 TOS-1A; ATK 21: 2 Su-24 Fencer†; 16 Su-25 Frogfoot; 3 Su-25UB
300mm 36: 30 9A52 Smerch; 6+ Polonez; 302mm 21 T-300 Frogfoot B
Kasirga TPT 4: Medium 1 An-12 Cub; Light 3 Yak-40 Codling
MOR 120mm 112: 5 Cardom; 107 M-1938 (PM-38) TRG 12 L-39 Albatros
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS HELICOPTERS
SRBM • Conventional 6: 2 IAI LORA; ε4 9M79 Tochka ATK 26 Mi-24 Hind
(SS-21 Scarab) MRH: 20+ Mi-17-IV Hip
 Russia and Eurasia 187

TPT 24: Medium 17: 1 Bell 412; 3 Ka-32 Helix C; 13 Mi-8 Bosnia-Herzegovina OSCE 1
Hip Light 7 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite Germany OSCE 1
UAV • ISR 16: Heavy 1 Heron; Medium 15: 4 Aerostar; 10+ Moldova OSCE 2
Hermes 450; 1 Hermes 900 Poland OSCE 1
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
United Kingdom OSCE 1
Long-range S-200 Vega (SA-5 Gammon); S-300PM/PMU2
Medium-range S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline); 9K37M
Buk-M1 (SA-11 Gadfly); Buk-MB; S-125-2TM Pechora-2TM TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT
(SA-26) DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL
Short-range Abisr
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES Nagorno-Karabakh was part of Azerbaijan, but mostly
AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer) IR/ populated by ethnic Armenians. In 1988, when inter-
SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo) ethnic clashes between Armenians and Azeris erupted in
ASM Barrier-V Azerbaijan, the local authorities declared their intention
to secede and join Armenia. Baku rejected this and armed

Russia and Eurasia

Paramilitary ε15,000 conflict erupted. A ceasefire was brokered in 1994; since
then, Armenia has controlled most of Nagorno-Karabakh.
State Border Service ε5,000 While Armenia provides political, economic and military
Ministry of Internal Affairs support to Nagorno-Karabakh, the region has declared
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE itself independent – although this has not been recognised
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES by any other state, including Armenia. Baku claims
IFV 168 BMP-1/BMP-2 Nagorno-Karabakh and the occupied territories as part of
APC • APC (W) 19 BTR-60/70/80 Azerbaijan. Data presented here represents an assessment
ARTILLERY • MRL 122mm 3 T-122 of the de facto situation.
HELICOPTERS • ATK 24 Mi-35M Hind
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICULES Nagorno-Karabakh
ISR • Medium Hermes 900 Available estimates vary with reference to military holdings
in Nagorno-Karabakh. Main battle tanks are usually placed
Coast Guard at around 200–300 in number, with similar numbers for
The Coast Guard was established in 2005 as part of the other armoured combat vehicles and artillery pieces, and
State Border Service small numbers of helicopters. Overall personnel-strength
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE estimates are between 18,000 and 20,000. Some of the
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 16 equipment listed may belong to Armenian forces.
PCG 3 Sa’ar 62 with 1 8-cell lnchr with Spike NLOS EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SSM, 1 hel landing platform ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
PBF 9: 1 Osa II (FSU Project 205); 6 Shaldag V; 2 MBT T-72
Silver Ships 48ft RECCE BRDM-2
PB 4: 2 Baltic 150; 1 Point (US); 1 Grif (FSU Zhuk) IFV BMP-1; BMP-2
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 5 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
ARS 1 Iva (FSU Vikhr) MSL
ATF 4 Neftegaz (Project B-92) (also used for patrol SP 9P148 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9P149 Shturm (AT-6
duties) Spiral)
MANPATS 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel)
Internal Troops 10,000+ RCL 73mm SPG-9
Ministry of Internal Affairs ARTILLERY 232
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 2S3 Akatsiya
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES TOWED 122mm D-30; 152mm 2A36 Giatsint-B; D-20
APC • APC (W) 7 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-80 MRL 122mm BM-21 Grad; 273mm WM-80
MOR 120mm M-74/M-75
DEPLOYMENT SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
SRBM • Conventional 9K72 Elbrus (SS-1C Scud B)
AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 120 HELICOPTERS
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: OSCE • Bosnia and ATK 5 Mi-24 Hind
Herzegovina 1 MRH 5 Mi-8MT Hip
UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 1 AIR DEFENCE
SAM
Medium-range 2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef); S-75 Dvina
FOREIGN FORCES (SA-2 Guideline)
OSCE figures represent total Minsk Conference mission Short-range 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful); S-125 Pechora
personnel in both Armenia and Azerbaijan
 (SA-3 Goa)
188 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Point-defence 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); 9K310 Igla-1 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

(SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse)
GUNS Army 10,700
SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 FORCES BY ROLE
TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2 COMMAND
2 comd HQ (West & North West)
Belarus BLR MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
Belarusian Ruble r 2017 2018 2019 2 mech bde
GDP r 105bn 115bn
2 mech bde(-)
COMBAT SUPPORT
US$ 54.4bn 56.9bn
2 arty bde
per capita US$ 5,727.00 6,020.00 1 engr bde
Growth % 2.4 4.0 1 engr regt
Inflation % 6.0 5.5 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Def bdgt r 1.03bn 1.22bn ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
US$ 531m 604m MBT 542: 527 T-72B; 15 T-72B3 mod
US$1=r 1.93 2.02 RECCE 132 BRM-1; Cayman BRDM
IFV 932 BMP-2
Population 9,527,543
APC • APC (T) 58 MT-LB
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
AUV 8 CS/VN3B mod; GAZ Tigr
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Male 8.1% 2.4% 2.8% 3.8% 24.4% 4.8%
AEV BAT-2; IMR-2; MT-LB
Female 7.6% 2.3% 2.7% 3.7% 26.9% 10.2% VLB 24: 20 MTU-20; 4 MT-55A
MW UR-77
Capabilities NBC VEHICLES BRDM-2RKhB; RKhM-4; RKhm-K
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL
Located between Russia and NATO European members, the main
SP 160: 75 9P148 Konkurs; 85 9P149 Shturm
task of Belarus’s armed forces is maintaining territorial integrity.
MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs
The country’s latest military doctrine was approved in July 2016,
(AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn)
and identified as security challenges ‘hybrid methods’ and ‘colour
ARTILLERY 583
revolutions’. It also called for smaller, more mobile forces with
SP 333: 122mm 125 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 208: 125 2S3
improved counter-terrorism capabilities. Belarus is a member of
Akatsiya; 71 2S5; 12 2S19 Msta-S
the CSTO. Russia remains the country’s principal defence partner,
TOWED 152mm 72 2A65 Msta-B
though Minsk has also looked to improve defence cooperation
MRL 164: 122mm 128 BM-21 Grad; 220mm 36 9P140
with China and Turkey. The forces remain conscript-based and
Uragan
train regularly with other CSTO partners. There has been increased
MOR 120mm 14 2S12
emphasis on the training of territorial-defence troops to allow
AIR DEFENCE
them to better operate with the regular forces. There is a small
SAM Point-defence 2K22 Tunguska (SA-19 Grison)
heavy-airlift fleet that could be supplemented by civil transport
aircraft, and Minsk has a special-forces brigade trained for the
GUNS • SP 23mm ZU-23-2 (tch)
air-assault role. There is no requirement to independently deploy
and sustain the armed forces, but they could do so as a part of Air Force and Air Defence Forces 11,750
the CSTO. Russia continues to be Minsk’s main defence-equip- FORCES BY ROLE
ment supplier. In recent years, Belarus has received air-defence FIGHTER
systems and advanced combat-trainer/light-attack aircraft from 2 sqn with MiG-29/S/UB Fulcrum
Moscow. A small number of Su-30SM multi-role fighters is on GROUND ATTACK
order. The local defence industry manufactures vehicles, guided 2 sqn with Su-25K/UBK Frogfoot A/B
weapons and electronic-warfare systems, among other equip- TRANSPORT
ment. However, there is no capacity to design or manufacture 1 base with An-12 Cub; An-24 Coke; An-26 Curl; Il-76
modern combat aircraft. The sector also undertakes upgrade work Candid; Tu-134 Crusty
for foreign customers. TRAINING
Some sqn with L-39 Albatros
ACTIVE 45,350 (Army 10,700 Air 11,750 Special ATTACK HELICOPTER
Operations Forces 5,900 Joint 17,000) Paramilitary Some sqn with Mi-24 Hind
110,000 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Conscript liability 18 months (alternative service option) Some (cbt spt) sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-8MTV-5 Hip; Mi-
26 Halo
RESERVE 289,500 (Joint 289,500 with mil service EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
within last 5 years) AIRCRAFT 64 combat capable
 Russia and Eurasia 189

FTR 34: 28 MiG-29 Fulcrum/MiG-29S Fulcrum C; 6 MiG- 1 MRL bde

29UB Fulcrum B 2 engr bde
FGA (21 Su-27/UB Flanker B/C non-operational/stored) 1 EW unit
ATK 22 Su-25K/UBK Frogfoot A/B 1 NBC regt
TPT 8: Heavy 2 Il-76 Candid (+9 civ Il-76 available for 1 ptn bridging regt
mil use); Light 6: 1 An-24 Coke; 4 An-26 Curl; 1 Tu-134 2 sigs bde
Crusty EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
TRG 8+: Some L-39 Albatros; 8 Yak-130 Mitten* ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
HELICOPTERS APC • APC (T) 20 MT-LB
ATK 12 Mi-24 Hind NBC VEHICLES BRDM-2RKhB; RKhM-4; RKhM-K
TPT 26: Heavy 6 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 20: 8 Mi-8 Hip; 12 ARTILLERY 112
Mi-8MTV-5 Hip SP 152mm 36 2S5 Giatsint-S
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES TOWED 152mm 36 2A65 Msta-B
AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer) MRL 300mm 40: 36 9A52 Smerch; 4 Polonez
SARH R-27R (AA-10 Alamo A) SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

Russia and Eurasia

ASM Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen); Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge) SRBM • Conventional 96: 36 9K79 Tochka (SS-21
ARM Kh-58 (AS-11 Kilter) (likely WFU) Scarab); 60 9K72 Elbrus (SS-1C Scud B)

Air Defence Paramilitary 110,000

AD data from Uzal Baranovichi EW radar
FORCES BY ROLE State Border Troops 12,000
AIR DEFENCE Ministry of Interior
1 bde S-300PS (SA-10B Grumble)
3 regt with S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble) Militia 87,000
1 bde with 9K37 Buk (SA-11 Gadfly); 9K332 Tor-M2E Ministry of Interior
(SA-15 Gauntlet)
1 regt with 9K322 Tor-M2E Internal Troops 11,000
2 regt with 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE DEPLOYMENT
AIR DEFENCE • SAM LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 5
Long-range S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble)
Medium-range 9K37 Buk (SA-11 Gadfly) UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 7
Short-range 17 9K332 Tor-M2E (SA-15 Gauntlet)
Point-defence 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); 9K35 Strela-10 Georgia GEO
(SA-13 Gopher)
Georgian Lari 2017 2018 2019
Special Operations Command 5,900 GDP lari 38.0bn 41.6bn
FORCES BY ROLE US$ 15.2bn 16.7bn
SPECIAL FORCES per capita US$ 4,086.00 4,506.00
1 SF bde Growth % 5.0 5.5
MANOEUVRE
Inflation % 6.0 2.8
Mechanised
Def bdgt lari 770m 802m 790m
2 mech bde
US$ 307m 322m
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES FMA (US) US$ 37m 0m
APC • APC (W) 185: 32 BTR-70M1; 153 BTR-80 US$1=lari 2.51 2.49
ARTILLERY 42 Population 4,926,087
TOWED 122mm 24 D-30
GUN/MOR • TOWED 120mm 18 2B23 NONA-M1 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL Male 9.5% 2.8% 3.2% 4.1% 21.8% 6.4%
MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs
Female 8.7% 2.4% 3.0% 4.0% 24.2% 9.9%
(AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn)

Joint 17,000 (Centrally controlled units and

Capabilities
MoD staff ) Georgia’s main security preoccupations concern Russian military
deployments and the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South
FORCES BY ROLE
Ossetia. A Strategic Defence Review 2017–20 was published in
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE April 2017. This aimed at improving personnel structures, training
1 SRBM bde facilities and equipment and stressed a ‘total defence’ approach
COMBAT SUPPORT involving the armed forces and civil society. The document noted
1 arty bde the importance of Georgia’s reserve component for this frame-
190 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

work. A new defence white paper was published in 2017. Long- TOWED 71: 122mm 58 D-30; 152mm 13: 3 2A36
standing security cooperation with the US includes the Georgia Giatsint-B; 10 2A65 Msta-B
Defence Readiness Program, designed to boost military capabili- MRL 122mm 37: 13 BM-21 Grad; 6 GradLAR; 18 RM-70
ties. The armed forces are professional and are working to develop MOR 120mm 65: 14 2S12 Sani; 33 M-75; 18 M120
NATO compatibility, although conscription is still active. Despite
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
participation in several NATO multinational exercises, readiness
Short-range Spyder-SR
varies greatly between units and training levels tend to be vari-
able. Georgia’s armed forces have little expeditionary logistic Point-defence Grom; Mistral-2; 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7
capabilities, contributing only to NATO’s Resolute Support mission Grail)‡; 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); 9K36 Strela-3 (SA-
in Afghanistan. The backbone of the armed forces’ military equip- 14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet)
ment is legacy Soviet-era systems with varying degrees of obsoles-
cence. The Major Systems Acquisitions Strategy 2019–25 outlines Aviation and Air Defence Command 1,300
efforts to procure new equipment in several areas, including air (incl 300 conscript)
defence, anti-tank systems, artillery, intelligence and aviation. The 1 avn base, 1 hel air base
country has only recently begun to develop a defence-industrial
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
base, and this is intended mainly to support the armed forces. The
State Military Scientific-Technical Center has demonstrated some AIRCRAFT 3 combat capable
maintenance, repair, overhaul and design capabilities for the pro- ATK 3 Su-25KM Frogfoot (6 Su-25 Frogfoot in store)
duction of light armoured vehicles. TPT • Light 9: 6 An-2 Colt; 1 Tu-134A Crusty (VIP); 2
Yak-40 Codling
ACTIVE 20,650 (Army 19,050 National Guard 1,600) TRG 9 L-29 Delfin
Paramilitary 5,400 HELICOPTERS
Conscript liability 12 months ATK 6 Mi-24 Hind
TPT 29: Medium 17 Mi-8T Hip; Light 12 Bell 205
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE (UH-1H Iroquois)
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
ISR • Medium 1+ Hermes 450
Army 15,000; 4,050 conscript (total 19,050)
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
FORCES BY ROLE Medium-range 9K37 Buk-M1 (SA-11 Gadfly) (1-2 bn)
SPECIAL FORCES Point-defence 8 9K33 Osa AK (SA-8B Gecko) (two bty);
1 SF bde 9K33 Osa AKM (6-10 updated SAM systems)
MANOEUVRE
Light National Guard 1,600 active reservists opcon
5 inf bde
Army
Amphibious
2 mne bn (1 cadre) FORCES BY ROLE
COMBAT SUPPORT MANOEUVRE
2 arty bde Light
1 engr bde 1 inf bde
1 sigs bn
1 SIGINT bn Paramilitary 5,400
1 MP bn
Border Police 5,400
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 med bn Coast Guard
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HQ at Poti. The Navy was merged with the Coast
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Guard in 2009 under the auspices of the Georgian
MBT 123: 23 T-55AM2; 100 T-72B/SIM1 Border Police, within the Ministry of the Interior
RECCE 5: 1 BRM-1K; 4+ Didgori-2 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
IFV 71: 25 BMP-1; 46 BMP-2 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 21
APC 189+ PBF 6: 4 Ares 43m; 1 Kaan 33; 1 Kaan 20
APC (T) 69+: 3+ Lazika; 66 MT-LB
PB 15: 1 Akhmeta; 2 Dauntless; 2 Dilos (ex-GRC);
APC (W) 120+: 25 BTR-70; 19 BTR-80; Cobra; 8+
1 Kutaisi (ex-TUR AB 25); 2 Point; 7 Zhuk (3 ex-
Didgori-1; 3+ Didgori-3; 65 Ejder
UKR)

AUV 10+: ATF Dingo; 10 Cougar
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCM 1 Vydra
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
(ex-BLG) (capacity either 3 MBT or 200 troops)
ARV IMR-2
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 DEPLOYMENT
Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); FGM-148 Javelin AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 870; 1
GUNS • TOWED ε40: 85mm D-44; 100mm T-12 lt inf bn: UN • UNAMA 2 obs
ARTILLERY 240
SP 67: 122mm 20 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 46: 32 M-77 ALBANIA: OSCE • Albania 1
Dana; 13 2S3 Akatsiya; 1 2S19 Msta-S; 203mm 1 2S7 Pion CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 35
 Russia and Eurasia 191

MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 1 lar priority, with new orders placed in 2018. However, airworthi-
ness across the air inventory remains problematic. Russia has also
SERBIA: OSCE • Kosovo 1
supplied Kazakhstan with S-300PS self-propelled surface-to-air
UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 22 missile systems as part of a Joint Air-Defence Agreement, boost-
ing its long-range air-defence capability. Kazakhstan is growing its
TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT indigenous defence industry, and exports increased in 2017–18. A
joint venture with South African firm Paramount Engineering will
DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL deliver Arlan 4x4 vehicles. Further joint ventures and production
Following the August 2008 war between Russia and of rotary-wing and medium-lift fixed-wing aircraft are envisaged in
Georgia, the areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia declared cooperation with European companies.
themselves independent. Data presented here represents
the de facto situation and does not imply international
ACTIVE 39,000 (Army 20,000 Navy 3,000 Air 12,000
recognition as sovereign states. MoD 4,000) Paramilitary 31,500
Conscript liability 12 months (due to be abolished)

FOREIGN FORCES
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Russia and Eurasia

Russia 7,000; 1 mil base at Gudauta (Abkhazia) with (1
MR bde; 40 T-90A; 120 BTR-82A; 18 2S3; 12 2S12; 18 BM-
21; some S-300 SAM; some atk hel); 1 mil base at Djava/
Army 20,000
Tskhinvali (S. Ossetia) with (1 MR bde; 40 T-72; 120 BMP- 4 regional comd: Astana, East, West and Southern
2; 36 2S3; 12 2S12) FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Armoured
Kazakhstan KAZ 1 tk bde
Kazakhstani Tenge t 2017 2018 2019 Mechanised
3 mech bde
GDP t 52.0tr 59.9tr
Air Manoeuvre
US$ 159bn 184bn 4 air aslt bde

per capita US$ 8,762 9,977 COMBAT SUPPORT
Growth % 4.0 3.7 3 arty bde
Inflation % 7.4 6.4 1 SSM unit
3 cbt engr bde
Def bdgt t 412bn 517bn 610bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$ 1.27bn 1.59bn
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
US$1=t 326.00 325.17 MBT 300 T-72BA
Population 18,744,548 RECCE 100: 40 BRDM-2; 60 BRM-1
Ethnic groups: Kazakh 63.3%; Russian 23.7%; Uzbek 2.8%;
IFV 607: 500 BMP-2; 107 BTR-80A
Ukraninan 2.1%; Tatar 1.3%; German 1.1%; other or unspecified APC 369+
5.7% APC (T) 150 MT-LB
APC (W) 209: 2 BTR-3E; 190 BTR-80; 17 Cobra
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus PPV 10+ Arlan
Male 12.8% 3.2% 3.7% 4.4% 20.8% 2.8% ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Female 13.2% 3.1% 3.6% 4.3% 23.0% 5.1% AEV MT-LB
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Capabilities MSL
SP 3+: 3 BMP-T; HMMWV with 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-
Kazakhstan’s new military doctrine, adopted in October 2017, 5 Spandrel); 9P149 Shturm (MT-LB with AT-6 Spiral)
indicates a change in focus from countering violent extremism
MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1
towards a wider concern for border security and hybrid threats to
national security. In May 2018, a new military branch was created Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn)
to protect against cyber threats. In the army, air-mobile units are GUNS 100mm 68 MT-12/T-12
held at the highest level of readiness. Kazakhstan entered a bilat- ARTILLERY 611
eral military agreement with Uzbekistan in September 2017 to SP 246: 122mm 126: 120 2S1 Gvozdika; 6 Semser; 152mm
cooperate on training and education, countering violent extrem- 120 2S3 Akatsiya
ism and reducing militant movements in their region. Kazakhstan TOWED 150: 122mm 100 D-30; 152mm 50 2A65 Msta-B
has a close defence relationship with Russia, reinforced by CSTO (122mm up to 300 D-30 in store)
and SCO membership, and Moscow operates a radar station at GUN/MOR 120mm 25 2S9 NONA-S
Balkash. In 2016, in an effort to improve training, Kazakhstan
MRL 127: 122mm 100 BM-21 Grad; 220mm 3 TOS-1A;
broadened the curriculum taught in military academies. Kazakh-
300mm 24: 6 BM-30 Smerch; 18 IMI Lynx (with 50 msl)
stan takes part in regional and CSTO exercises, including anti-terror
drills. By regional standards, the armed forces are both relatively (122mm 100 BM-21 Grad; 220mm 180 9P140 Uragan all
sizeable and well equipped, following the acquisition of significant in store)
amounts of new and upgraded materiel in recent years, primarily MOR 63 SP 120mm 18 Cardom; 120mm 45 2B11 Sani/
from Russia. Fighter/ground-attack aircraft seem to be a particu- M120
192 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS TPT 19: Medium 2 An-12 Cub; Light 16: 6 An-26 Curl,
SRBM • Conventional 12 9K79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab) 2 An-72 Coaler; 6 C295; 2 Tu-134 Crusty; PAX 1 Tu-154
Careless
Navy 3,000 TRG 18: 17 L-39 Albatros; 1 Z-242L
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12 ATK 24: 20 Mi-24V Hind (some upgraded); 4 Mi-35M
PCGM 2 Kazakhstan with 1 Barrier-BK lnchr with 4 Hind
RK-2B SSM, 1 Arbalet-K lnchr with 4 9K38 Igla (SA-18 MRH 26: 20 Mi-17V-5 Hip; 6 Mi-171Sh Hip
Grouse), 1 AK306 CIWS TPT 14: Heavy 4 Mi-26 Halo; Light 10: 4 Bell 205 (UH-
PCC 1 Kazakhstan with 1 122mm MRL
1H Iroquois); 6 H145
PBF 3 Sea Dolphin
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
PB 6: 3 Archangel; 1 Dauntless; 1 Turk (AB 25); 1 Other
CISR • Heavy 2 Wing Loong (GJ-1)
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 1
MCC 1 Alatau (Project 10750E) with 1 AK306 CIWS AIR DEFENCE • SAM
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGS 1 Zhaik Long-range S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon); S-300 (SA-10
Grumble); 40+ S-300PS (SA-10B Grumble)
Coastal Defence Medium-range 2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef); S-75M Volkhov
FORCES BY ROLE (SA-2 Guideline)
MANOEUVRE Short-range 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful); S-125 Neva (SA-3
Mechanised Goa)
1 naval inf bde Point-defence 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer); IR/
IFV 70 BTR-82A SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo); SARH R-33 (AA-9 Amos);
ARH R-77 (AA-12A Adder – on MiG-31BM)
Air Force 12,000 (incl Air Defence) ASM Kh-23 (AS-7 Kerry)‡; Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen); Kh-29
FORCES BY ROLE (AS-14 Kedge)
FIGHTER ARM Kh-27 (AS-12 Kegler); Kh-58 (AS-11 Kilter)
1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum
2 sqn with MiG-31B/MiG-31BM Foxhound Paramilitary 31,500
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
1 sqn with MiG-27 Flogger D; MiG-23UB Flogger C National Guard ε20,000
1 sqn with Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker Ministry of Interior
1 sqn with Su-27/Su-30SM Flanker
AIRCRAFT
GROUND ATTACK
TPT • Medium 1 Y-8F-200WA
1 sqn with Su-25 Frogfoot
TRANSPORT State Security Service 2,500
1 unit with Tu-134 Crusty; Tu-154 Careless
1 sqn with An-12 Cub, An-26 Curl, An-30 Clank, An-72 Border Service ε9,000
Coaler, C295M
Ministry of Interior
TRAINING
1 sqn with L-39 Albatros EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ATTACK HELICOPTER AIRCRAFT 7: Light 6: 4 An-26 Curl; 1 An-74T; 1 An-
5 sqn with Mi-24V Hind 74TK PAX 1 SSJ-100
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 15: 1 Mi-171; 14 Mi-
Some sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); H145; Mi-8 171Sh
Hip; Mi-17V-5 Hip; Mi-171Sh Hip; Mi-26 Halo
AIR DEFENCE Coast Guard
Some regt with S-75M Volkhov (SA-2 Guideline); S-125 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Neva (SA-3 Goa); S-300/S-300PS (SA-10/10B Grumble); PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 22
2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef); S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon); PBF 11: 1 Aibar (Project 0210); 8 FC-19; 2 Saygak
2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful) PB 11: 4 Almaty; 5 Sardar; 2 Zhuk (of which 1 may be
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE operational)
AIRCRAFT 106 combat capable
FTR 46: 12 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum; 32
MiG-31/MiG-31BM Foxhound DEPLOYMENT
FGA 46: 12 MiG-27 Flogger D; 2 MiG-23UB Flogger C; 20 MOLDOVA: OSCE • Moldova 2
Su-27 Flanker; 4 Su-27UB Flanker; 8 Su-30SM
ATK 14: 12 Su-25 Frogfoot; 2 Su-25UB Frogfoot UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 5
ISR 1 An-30 Clank WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 5 obs
 Russia and Eurasia 193

COMBAT SUPPORT
Kyrgyzstan KGZ 1 arty bde
1 AD bde
Kazakhstani Tenge t 2017 2018 2019
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
GDP t 521bn 551bn
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
US$ 7.57bn 8.01bn
MBT 150 T-72
per capita US$ 1,208 1,254
RECCE 30 BRDM-2
Growth % 4.6 2.8
IFV 320: 230 BMP-1; 90 BMP-2
Inflation % 3.2 2.9 APC • APC (W) 55: 25 BTR-70; 20 BTR-70M; 10 BTR-80
Def bdgt t n.k n.k ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
US$ n.k n.k MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111
US$1=t 68.86 68.79 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel)
RCL 73mm SPG-9
Population 5,849,296

Russia and Eurasia

GUNS 100mm 36: 18 MT-12/T-12; 18 M-1944
Ethnic groups: Kyrgyz 71.7%; Uzbek 14.3%; Russian 7.2%; Dungan
1.1%; Uyguy 0.9%; other or unspecified 4.8% ARTILLERY 228
SP 122mm 18 2S1 Gvozdika
TOWED 123: 122mm 107: 72 D-30; 35 M-30 (M-1938);
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
152mm 16 D-1
Male 15.6% 4.0% 4.3% 4.7% 18.4% 2.1% GUN/MOR 120mm 12 2S9 NONA-S
Female 14.8% 3.9% 4.1% 4.6% 20.2% 3.4% MRL 21: 122mm 15 BM-21; 220mm 6 9P140 Uragan
MOR 120mm 54: 6 2S12; 48 M-120
Capabilities AIR DEFENCE
Although Kyrgyzstan is generally dependent on Russian assistance SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
for its defence requirements, it has started to expand its ties with GUNS 48
regional countries on issues such as defence-industrial coop-
SP 23mm 24 ZSU-23-4
eration. A July 2013 military doctrine detailed reforms including
plans for enhanced command and control, more effective military TOWED 57mm 24 S-60
logistics and a modern air-defence system. As part of Kyrgyzstan’s
effort to counter terrorism, the government ordered the creation Air Force 2,400
of an inter-agency working group to devise an anti-extremism and
FORCES BY ROLE
anti-terrorism programme. There is a close strategic relationship
with Russia and Kyrgyzstan is a member of both the CSTO and the FIGHTER
SCO. Moscow maintains a military presence, including a squadron 1 regt with L-39 Albatros*
of Su-25SM ground-attack aircraft at Kant air base, which it has TRANSPORT
leased since 2003. Talk are ongoing over a possible second Russian 1 regt with An-2 Colt; An-26 Curl
base. In 2018, bilateral cooperation agreements were signed with
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Joint training is held with regional ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
countries, including on anti-terror drills, but combat readiness 1 regt with Mi-24 Hind; Mi-8 Hip
remains an issue. Kyrgyzstan has a limited capability to deploy AIR DEFENCE
externally, and personnel are deployed to OSCE and UN missions Some regt with S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa); S-75 Dvina
in Ukraine, Serbia and South Sudan. The armed forces possess
(SA-2 Guideline); 2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef)
ageing land equipment and limited air capabilities, relying instead
on Russian support, training and deployments. There is little local EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
defence industry, although in 2018 Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan dis- AIRCRAFT 4 combat capable
cussed defence-industrial cooperation and prospects for mutual TPT • Light 6: 4 An-2 Colt; 2 An-26 Curl
supplies of military products.
TRG 4 L-39 Albatros*
ACTIVE 10,900 (Army 8,500 Air 2,400) Paramilitary HELICOPTERS
9,500 ATK 2 Mi-24 Hind
Conscript liability 18 months TPT • Medium 8 Mi-8 Hip
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Medium-range 2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef); S-75 Dvina (SA-
2 Guideline)
Army 8,500 Short-range S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa)
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES Paramilitary 9,500
1 SF bde
MANOEUVRE Border Guards 5,000 (KGZ conscript, RUS
Mechanised officers)
2 MR bde
1 (mtn) MR bde Internal Troops 3,500
194 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

National Guard 1,000 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

DEPLOYMENT Army 1,300; 1,950 conscript (total 3,250)

FORCES BY ROLE
MOLDVOA: OSCE • Moldova 2
SPECIAL FORCES
SERBIA: OSCE • Kosovo 2 1 SF bn
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1 obs MANOEUVRE
SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 1 obs Light
3 mot inf bde
UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 26
1 lt inf bn
Other
FOREIGN FORCES 1 gd bn
Russia ε500 Military Air Forces: 13 Su-25SM Frogfoot; 2 COMBAT SUPPORT
Mi-8 Hip 1 arty bn
1 engr bn
Moldova MDA 1 NBC coy
1 sigs bn
Moldovan Leu L 2017 2018 2019 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
GDP L 177bn 192bn ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
US$ 9.56bn 11.4bn APC 163
per capita US$ 2,694 3,227 APC (T) 69: 9 BTR-D; 60 MT-LB (variants)
Growth % 4.5 3.8 APC (W) 94: 13 BTR-80; 81 TAB-71
ABCV 44 BMD-1
Inflation % 6.6 3.6
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Def bdgt L 566m 616m
MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1
US$ 30.6m 36.8m
Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel)
FMA (US) US$ 12.8m 0m RCL 73mm SPG-9
US$1=L 18.50 16.76 GUNS 100mm 37 MT-12
Population 3,437,720 ARTILLERY 221
TOWED 69: 122mm 17 (M-30) M-1938; 152mm 52: 21
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 2A36 Giatsint-B; 31 D-20
Male 9.4% 2.8% 3.3% 4.0% 24.1% 5.1% GUN/MOR • SP 120mm 9 2S9 NONA-S
Female 8.9% 2.6% 3.1% 3.8% 24.9% 7.9% MRL 220mm 11 9P140 Uragan
MOR 132: 82mm 75 BM-37; 120mm 57: 50 M-1989; 7
Capabilities PM-38
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 39: 23mm 28 ZU-23;
The primary role of Moldova’s armed forces is to maintain territorial
57mm 11 S-60
integrity, though their size means they would be unable to offer
more than token resistance to a determined adversary. The forces
are constitutionally neutral. In early 2017, a National Defence Strat- Air Force 600 (incl 250 conscripts)
egy for 2017–21 was approved, including border defence, airspace FORCES BY ROLE
control and protection, and improvements to the military-training TRANSPORT
system, as well as equipment-modernisation imperatives. Moldova 1 sqn with An-2 Colt; Mi-8MTV-1/PS Hip; Yak-18
continues to build relations with both European states and NATO. AIR DEFENCE
The country signed up to the NATO Defence Capacity Building Ini-
1 regt with S-125 Neva (SA-3 Goa)
tiative in September 2014. Moldova is aiming to end mandatory
conscription and develop professional armed forces. The Profes- EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
sional Army 2018–2021 programme was approved in June 2018. AIRCRAFT
The services exercise regularly with NATO states. Moldova has no TPT • Light 3: 2 An-2 Colt; 1 Yak-18
requirement or capability to independently deploy and support HELICOPTERS
its forces overseas. However, service members have deployed as TPT • Medium 6: 2 Mi-8PS Hip; 4 Mi-8MTV-1 Hip
part of KFOR. The country has no defence-industrial capabilities AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Short-range 3 S-125 Neva (SA-3
beyond the basic maintenance of front-line equipment.
Goa) 

ACTIVE 5,150 (Army 3,250 Air 600 Logistic Support
1,300) Paramilitary 900 Paramilitary 900
Conscript liability 12 months (3 months for university graduates)
OPON 900 (riot police)
RESERVE 58,000 (Joint 58,000) Ministry of Interior
 Russia and Eurasia 195

DEPLOYMENT and increasing Russia’s influence in the near abroad and further
afield. Russia is a leading member of both the CSTO and the SCO.
ALBANIA: OSCE • Albania 1 The armed forces comprise a mix of volunteers and conscripts.
ARMENIA/AZERBAIJAN: OSCE • Minsk Conference 2 Defence reforms launched in 2008 emphasised the shift from a
conscript-based mass-mobilisation army to smaller, more profes-
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: OSCE • Bosnia and sional ground forces. Morale has improved because of better pay,
Herzegovina 1 terms and conditions, and greater prestige associated with military
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 2; 3 obs service. The armed forces can independently deploy and sustain
forces on a global scale, although at extended distances force size
SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 41; OSCE • Kosovo 2; UN • would be modest. Its air-led intervention in Syria shows Russia can
UNMIK 1 obs deploy, sustain and maintain a high operational tempo for a fixed-
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1; 2 obs and rotary-wing air force, along with the required force-protection
package for the main operating base. Russia continues to moder-
UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 45
nise its nuclear and conventional weapons. The 2020 State Arma-
ment Programme (SAP) has been broadly successful, although
FOREIGN FORCES several of the more ambitious procurement goals were not met.

Russia and Eurasia

The follow-on programme, SAP 2027, continues the emphasis on
Armenia OSCE 1
modernisation, though some aims are more modest. Russia can
Austria OSCE 1 design, develop and manufacture advanced nuclear and conven-
Estonia OSCE 1 tional weaponry. Its defence-industrial base, however, suffered
Germany OSCE 1 from the lack of investment in the 1990s, and more recently from
Hungary OSCE 1 the loss of access to Ukrainian components. The defence-aero-
space sector has been particularly successful in terms of exports,
Ireland OSCE 1
with the sale of combat aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems.
Kazakhstan OSCE 2
Kyrgyzstan OSCE 2 ACTIVE 900,000 (Army 280,000 Navy 150,000 Air
Russia ε1,500 (including 400 peacekeepers) 7 Mi-24 Hind/ 165,000 Strategic Rocket Force 50,000 Airborne
Mi-8 Hip 45,000 Special Operations Forces 1,000 Railway
Ukraine 10 mil obs (Joint Peacekeeping Force) Troops 29,000 Command and Support 180,000)
United States OSCE 1 Paramilitary 554,000
Conscript liability 12 months (conscripts now can opt for contract
Russia RUS service immediately, which entails a 24-month contract)

Russian Rouble r 2017 2018 2019

RESERVE 2,000,000 (all arms)
Some 2,000,000 with service within last 5 years; reserve obligation
GDP r 92.0tr 98.4tr to age 50
US$ 1.58tr 1.58tr
per capita US$ 10,956 10,950 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Growth % 1.5 1.7
Inflation % 3.7 2.8 Strategic Deterrent Forces ε80,000 (incl
Def exp [a] r 3.71tr 3.93tr personnel assigned from the Navy and
US$ 63.6bn 63.1bn Aerospace Forces)
Def bdgt r 2.67tr 2.83tr 2.91tr
Navy
US$ 45.7bn 45.3bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$1=r 58.34 62.40
SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 10:
[a] Calculated to be comparable with the NATO definition of 1 Kalmar (Delta III) with 16 R-29RKU-02 Statsiya-02 (SS-
defence expenditure
N-18 Stingray) nuclear SLBM, 2 single 400mm TT
Population 142,122,776 with SET-72 LWT, 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K
Ethnic groups: Tatar 3.71%; Armenian 0.8%; Bashkir 1.1%; HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT
Chechen 1%; Chuvash 1% 6 Delfin (Delta IV) with 16 R-29RMU2 Sineva/R-
29RMU2.1 Layner (SS-N-23 Skiff) nuclear SLBM, 4
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/
Male 8.8% 2.4% 2.4% 3.5% 24.5% 4.6% USET-80K Keramika HWT
Female 8.4% 2.3% 2.3% 3.4% 27.3% 10.0% 3 Borey (Dolgorukiy) with 16 Bulava (SS-N-32) nuclear
SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with USET-80K Keramika
Capabilities HWT/UGST Fizikov HWT
Russia supports capable conventional military forces and retains (1 Akula (Typhoon)† in reserve for training with
the second-largest nuclear arsenal in the world. The armed forces capacity for 20 Bulava (SS-N-32) nuclear SLBM, 6
underpin an assertive foreign policy. Military aims are guar- single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/
anteeing sovereignty and territorial integrity and maintaining USET-80K Keramika HWT)
196 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Strategic Rocket Force Troops 50,000 Aerospace Defence Command

3 Rocket Armies operating silo and mobile launchers FORCES BY ROLE
organised in 12 divs. Regt normally with 10 silos (6 for AIR DEFENCE
RS-20/SS-18), or 9 mobile lnchr, and one control centre 2 AD div HQ
FORCES BY ROLE 4 SAM regt with S-300PM1/PM2 (SA-20 Gargoyle)
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 5 SAM regt with S-400 (SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1
9 ICBM regt with RS-12M Topol (SS-25 Sickle) (SA-22 Greyhound)
8 ICBM regt with RS-12M2 Topol-M (SS-27 mod 1) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
3 ICBM regt with RS-18 (SS-19 Stiletto) AIR DEFENCE • SAM 222
9 ICBM regt with RS-20 (SS-18 Satan) Long-range 186: 90 S-300PM1/PM2 (SA-20 Gargoyle);
10 ICBM regt with RS-24 Yars (SS-27 mod 2)
 96 S-400 (SA-21 Growler)
4 ICBM regt (forming) with RS-24 Yars (SS-27 mod 2) Short-range 36 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)
MISSILE DEFENCE 68 53T6 (ABM-3 Gazelle)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
RADAR 1 ABM engagement system located at Sofrino
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
(Moscow)
ICBM • Nuclear 334: ε63 RS-12M Topol (SS-25 Sickle)
(mobile single warhead); 60 RS-12M2 Topol-M (SS- Army ε280,000 (incl conscripts)
27 mod 1) silo-based (single warhead); 18 RS-12M2 4 military districts (West (HQ St Petersburg), Centre (HQ
Topol-M (SS-27 mod 1) road mobile (single warhead); Yekaterinburg), South (HQ Rostov-on-Don) & East (HQ
30 RS-18 (SS-19 Stiletto) (mostly mod 3, 6 MIRV per Khabarovsk), each with a unified Joint Strategic Command
msl) (being withdrawn); 46 RS-20 (SS-18 Satan) (mostly
FORCES BY ROLE
mod 5, 10 MIRV per msl); 103 RS-24 Yars (SS-27 mod 2;
COMMAND
ε3 MIRV per msl) road mobile; 14 RS-24 Yars (SS-27 12 army HQ
mod 2; ε3 MIRV per msl) silo-based 1 corps HQ
SPECIAL FORCES
Long-Range Aviation Command 8 (Spetsnaz) SF bde
FORCES BY ROLE 1 (Spetsnaz) SF regt
BOMBER MANOEUVRE
1 sqn with Tu-160/Tu-160M1 Blackjack Reconnaissance
3 sqn with Tu-95MS/MS mod Bear 2 recce bde
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Armoured
AIRCRAFT 1 (4th) tk div (1 armd recce bn, 2 tk regt, 1 MR regt, 1 arty
BBR 76: 10 Tu-160 Blackjack with Kh-55SM (AS-15B regt, 1 AD regt)
Kent) nuclear LACM; 6 Tu-160M1 Blackjack with Kh- 1 (90th) tk div (1 armd recce bn, 2 tk regt, 1 MR regt, 1
55SM (AS-15B Kent)/Kh-102 (AS-23 Kodiak) nuclear arty regt)
LACM; 46 Tu-95MS Bear H with Kh-55SM (AS-15B 2 tk bde (1 armd recce bn, 3 tk bn, 1 MR bn, 1 arty bn,
Kent) nuclear LACM; 14 Tu-95MS mod Bear H with 1 MRL bn, 2 AD bn, 1 engr bn, 1 EW coy, 1 NBC coy)
Kh-55SM (AS-15B Kent)/Kh-102 (AS-23 Kodiak) nuclear 1 (3rd) MR div (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk regt, 2 MR regt, 1
LACM arty regt)
1 (144th) MR div (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk regt, 1 MR regt,
Space Command 1 arty regt)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 (150th) MR div (1 armd recce bn, 2 tk regt, 1 MR regt; 1
arty regt, 1 AD regt)
SATELLITES 101
14 (BMP) MR bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn, 3 armd inf
COMMUNICATIONS 59: 2 Blagovest; 2 Garpun; 13
bn, 2 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 AT bn, 2 AD bn, 1 engr bn, 1
Gonets-D/M (dual-use); 3 Mod Globus (Raduga-1M);
EW coy, 1 NBC coy)
4 Meridian; 3 Parus; 3 Raduga; 21 Rodnik (Strela-3M); 8
Mechanised
Strela-3
1 (2nd) MR div (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk regt, 2 MR regt, 1
EARLY WARNING 2 Tundra
arty regt, 1 AD regt)
NAVIGATION/POSITIONING/TIMING 25 1 (42nd) MR div (1 armd recce bn, 3 MR regt, 1 arty regt)
GLONASS 9 (BTR/MT-LB) MR bde (1 recce bn; 1 tk bn; 3 mech inf
ISR 10: 2 Bars-M; 1 GEO-IK 2; 1 Kondor; 1 Kosmos-2519; bn; 2 arty bn; 1 MRL bn; 1 AT bn; 2 AD bn; 1 engr bn; 1
2 Persona; 3 Resurs-P EW coy; 1 NBC coy)
ELINT/SIGINT 5: 4 Liana (Lotos-S); 1 Tselina-2 2 MR bde (4–5 mech inf bn; 1 arty bn; 1 AD bn; 1 engr bn)
RADAR 12; Russia leases ground-based radar stations 3 (lt/mtn) MR bde (1 recce bn; 2 mech inf bn; 1 arty bn)
in Baranovichi (Belarus) and Balkhash (Kazakhstan). 1 (18th) MGA div (2 MGA regt; 1 arty regt; 1 tk bn; 2 AD bn)
It also has radars on its own territory at Lekhtusi SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE
(St Petersburg); Armavir (Krasnodar); Olenegorsk 10 SRBM/GLCM bde with 9K720 Iskander-M (SS-26
(Murmansk); Mishelevka (Irkuts); Kaliningrad; Pechora Stone/SSC-7) (multiple brigades also with 9M729 (SSC-8
(Komi); Yeniseysk (Krasnoyarsk); Baranul (Altayskiy); Screwdriver))
Orsk (Orenburg) and Gorodets/Kovylkino (OTH) 1 SRBM bde with 9K79-1 Tochka-U (SS-21B Scarab)

COMBAT SUPPORT
9 arty bde
1 hy arty bde
4 MRL bde
4 engr bde
1 MP bde
5 NBC bde
10 NBC regt
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
10 log bde
AIR DEFENCE
14 AD bde
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 2,750: 750 T-72B/BA; 800 T-72B3; 400 T-73B3 mod;
450 T-80BV/U; 350 T-90/T-90A (10,200 in store: 7,000
T-72/T-72A/B; 3,000 T-80B/BV/U; 200 T-90)
RECCE 1,700: 1,000 BRDM-2/2A (1,000+ BRDM-2 in
store); 700 BRM-1K (CP)
IFV 5,140: 500 BMP-1; 3,000 BMP-2; 540 BMP-3; 100 BTR-
80A; 1,000 BTR-82A/AM (8,500 in store: 7,000 BMP-1;
1,500 BMP-2)
APC 6,100+
APC (T) 3,500+: some BMO-T; 3,500 MT-LB (2,000 MT-
LB in store)
APC (W) 2,600: 800 BTR-60 (all variants); 200 BTR-70
(all variants); 1,500 BTR-80; 100+ BPM-97 Dozor (4,000
BTR-60/70 in store)
PPV Typhoon-K
AUV 100+: 100+ GAZ Tigr; some IVECO LMV
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
AEV BAT-2; IMR; IMR-2; IMR-3; IRM; MT-LB
ARV BMP-1; BREM-1/64/K/L; BTR-50PK(B); M1977;
MTP-LB; RM-G; T-54/55; VT-72A
VLB KMM; MT-55A; MTU; MTU-20; MTU-72; PMM-2
MW BMR-3M; GMX-3; MCV-2 (reported); MTK; MTK-2;
UR-77
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL
SP BMP-T with 9K120 Ataka (AT-9 Spiral 2); 9P149
with 9K114 Shturm (AT-6 Spiral); 9P149M with 9K132
Shturm-SM (AT-9 Spiral-2); 9P157-2 with 9K123
Khrizantema (AT-15 Springer); 9P163-3 with 9M133
Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan); 9K128-1 Kornet-T (AT-14
Spriggan)
MANPATS 9K111M Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1
Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn);
9K115-1 Metis-M (AT-13 Saxhorn 2); 9K115-2 Metis-M1
(AT-13 Saxhorn 2); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan)
RCL 73mm SPG-9
GUNS • TOWED 100mm 526 MT-12 (100mm 2,000
T-12/MT-12 in store)
ARTILLERY 4,342+
SP 1,610: 122mm 150 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 1,400: 800 2S3
Akatsiya; 100 2S5 Giatsint-S; 500 2S19/2S19M1/2S19M2
Msta-S/SM; 203mm 60 2S7M Malka (4,260 in store: 122mm
2,000 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 2,000: 1,000 2S3 Akatsiya; 850
2S5 Giatsint-S; 150 2S19 Msta-S; 203mm 260 2S7 Pion)
TOWED 150: 152mm 150 2A65 Msta-B (12,415 in store:
122mm 8,150: 4,400 D-30; 3,750 M-30 (M-1938); 130mm
650 M-46; 152mm 3,575: 1,100 2A36 Giatsint-B; 600 2A65
Russia and Eurasia 197
Msta-B; 1,075 D-20; 700 D-1 (M-1943); 100 M-1937 (ML-
20); 203mm 40 B-4M)
GUN/MOR 180+
SP 120mm 80+: 30 2S23 NONA-SVK; 50+ 2S34
TOWED 120mm 100 2B16 NONA-K
MRL 862+ 122mm 550 BM-21 Grad/Tornado-G; 220mm
200 9P140 Uragan; some 9K512 Uragan-1M; some TOS-
1A; 300mm 112: 100 9A52 Smerch; 12 9A54 Tornado-S
(3,220 in store: 122mm 2,420: 2,000 BM-21 Grad; 420
9P138; 132mm 100 BM-13; 220mm 700 9P140 Uragan)
MOR 1,540+: 82mm 800+ 2B14; 120mm 700 2S12 Sani;
240mm 40 2S4 Tulpan (2,590 in store: 120mm 1,900: 1,000
2S12 Sani; 900 M-1938 (PM-38); 160mm 300 M-160; SP
240mm 390 2S4 Tulpan)
Russia and Eurasia
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
SRBM 144:
Dual-capable 120 9K720 Iskander-M (SS-26 Stone)
Conventional 24 9K79-1 Tochka-U (SS-21B Scarab)
(some Scud in store)
GLCM • Dual-capable Some 9M728 (SSC-7); some
9M729 (SSC-8 Screwdriver)
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
ISR • Heavy Tu-243 Reys/Tu-243 Reys D (service status
unclear); Light BLA-07; Pchela-1; Pchela-2
AIR DEFENCE
SAM 1,520+
Long-range S-300V (SA-12 Gladiator/Giant); S-300V4
(SA-23)
Medium-range 350: ε200 9K37M Buk-M1-2 (SA-11
Gadfly); ε90 9K317 Buk-M2 (SA-17 Grizzly); ε60 9K317M
Buk-M3 (SA-17 Grizzly)
Short-range 120+ 9K331/9K332 Tor-M/M1/M2/M2U
(SA-15 Gauntlet) (9M338 msl entering service)
Point-defence 1,050+: 250+ 2K22M Tunguska (SA-19
Grison); 400 9K33M3 Osa-AKM (SA-8B Gecko); 400
9K35M3 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16
Gimlet); 9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin); 9K38 Igla (SA-18
Grouse); 9K333 Verba; 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch)
GUNS
SP 23mm ZSU-23-4
TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm S-60
Reserves
Cadre formations
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
13 MR bde
Navy ε150,000 (incl conscripts)
4 major fleet organisations (Northern Fleet, Pacific Fleet,
Baltic Fleet, Black Sea Fleet) and Caspian Sea Flotilla
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SUBMARINES 58
STRATEGIC • SSBN 10:
1 Kalmar (Delta III) with 16 R-29RKU-02 Statsiya-02 (SS-
N-18 Stingray) nuclear SLBM, 2 single 400mm TT
with SET-72 LWT, 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K
HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT
198 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
6 Delfin (Delta IV) with 16 R-29RMU2 Sineva/R-
29RMU2.1 Layner (SS-N-23 Skiff) nuclear SLBM, 4
single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/
USET-80K Keramika HWT
3 Borey (Dolgorukiy) with 16 Bulava (SS-N-32) nuclear
SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with USET-80K Keramika
HWT/UGST Fizikov HWT
(1 Akula (Typhoon)† in reserve for training with
capacity for 20 Bulava (SS-N-32) nuclear SLBM, 6
single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/
USET-80K Keramika HWT)
TACTICAL 48
SSGN 9:
8 Antey (Oscar II) with 2 12-cell lnchr with 3M45
Granit (SS-N-19 Shipwreck) AShM, 2 single 650mm
TT each with T-65 HWT/RPK-7 (SS-N-16 Stallion)
ASW msl, 4 single 553mm TT with 53-65K HWT/
SET-65K HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT (of
which 2 in refit)
1 Yasen (Severodvinsk) with 1 octuple VLS with
3M54K (SS-N-27 Sizzler) AShM/3M55 Onyx (SS-N-
26 Strobile) AShM/3M14K (SS-N-30) dual-capable
LACM; 10 single 533mm TT with USET-80K
Keramika HWT/UGST Fizikov HWT
SSN 16:
9 Schuka-B (Akula I) with 4 single 533mm TT with 53-
65K HWT/TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K Keramika
HWT/3M10 Granat (SS-N-21 Sampson) nuclear
LACM (weapons in store), 4 single 650mm TT
with T-65 HWT/RPK-7 (SS-N-16 Stallion) ASW msl
(of which 6 in refit)
2 Schuka-B (Akula II) with 4 single 533mm TT
with 53-65K HWT/TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K
Keramika HWT/3M10 Granat (SS-N-21 Sampson)
nuclear LACM (weapons in store), 4 single 650mm
TT with T-65 HWT/RPK-7 (SS-N-16 Stallion) ASW
msl (of which 1 in refit)
2 Kondor (Sierra II) with 4 single 533mm TT with
TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT/3M10
Granat (SS-N-21 Sampson) nuclear LACM
(weapons in store), 4 single 650mm TT with T-65
HWT
3 Schuka (Victor III) with 4 single 533mm TT with
53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K Keramika
HWT/3M10 Granat (SS-N-21 Sampson) nuclear
LACM (weapons in store), 2 single 650mm TT
with T-65 HWT
(1 Barracuda (Sierra I) (in reserve) with 6 single
533mm TT with TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K
Keramika HWT/3M10 Granat (SS-N-21 Sampson)
nuclear LACM (weapons in store))
SSK 23:
16 Paltus (Kilo) (of which 2 in refit) with 6 single
533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/TEST-71M HWT/
USET-80K Keramika HWT
6 Varshavyanka (Kilo) with 6 single 533mm TT with 53-
65K HWT/TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K Keramika
HWT/3M54K (SS-N-27 Sizzler) AShM/3M14K (SS-
N-30) dual-capable LACM
1 Lada (Petersburg) (in test) with 6 single 533mm TT
with USET-80K Keramika HWT/3M54K (SS-N-
27 Sizzler) AShM/3M14K (SS-N-30) dual-capable
LACM
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 35
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CV 1 Admiral Kuznetsov
with 12 lnchr with 3M45 Granit (SS-N-19 Shipwreck)
AShM, 24 8-cell 3S95 VLS with 3K95 Kindzhal (SA-N-9
Gauntlet) SAM, 2 RBU 12000 Udav 1 A/S mor, 8 Kortik
CIWS with 3M11 (SA-N-11 Grison) SAM, 6 AK630M
CIWS (capacity 18–24 Su-33 Flanker D Ftr ac; MiG-
29KR FGA ac; 15 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel, 2 Ka-31R Helix
AEW hel) (in refit since 2018)
CRUISERS 4
CGHMN 1:
1 Orlan (Kirov) with 20 lnchr with 3M45 Granit (SS-
N-19 Shipwreck) AShM, 6 6-cell B-203A VLS with
S-300F Fort (SA-N-6 Grumble) SAM, 6 6-cell B-203A
VLS with S-300FM Fort-M (SA-N-20 Gargoyle)
SAM, 16 octuple 3S95 VLS with 3K95 Kindzhal
(SA-N-9 Gauntlet) SAM, 2 quintuple 533mm TT
with RPK-6M Vodopad-NK (SS-N-16 Stallion) A/S
msl, 1 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 RBU 1000
Smerch 3 A/S mor, 6 Kortik CIWS with 9M311 (SA-
N-11 Grison) SAM, 1 twin 130mm gun (capacity
3 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) (1 other non-operational;
undergoing extensive refit and planned to return
to service in 2021)
CGHM 3:
3 Atlant (Slava) with 8 twin lnchr with 3M70 Vulkan
(SS-N-12 mod 2 Sandbox) AShM, 8 octuple VLS
with S-300F Fort (SA-N-6 Grumble) SAM/S-300FM
Fort M (SA-N-20 Gargoyle) SAM, 2 twin lnchr with
Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 quintuple 533mm
ASTT with SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch
2 A/S mor, 6 AK630 CIWS, 1 twin 130mm gun
(capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel)
DESTROYERS 16
DDGHM 15:
5 Sarych (Sovremenny) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M80
Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn) AShM, 2 twin 3S90 lnchr
with 9K30 Uragan (SA-N-7 Gadfly) SAM, 2 twin
533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT, 2
RBU 1000 Smerch 3 A/S mor, 4 AK630M CIWS, 2
twin 130mm guns (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW
hel) (of which 1 in refit)
8 Fregat (Udaloy I) with 2 quad lnchr with URK-5
Rastrub-B (SS-N-14 Silex) AShM/ASW, 8 octuple
3S95 VLS with 3K95 Kindzhal (SA-N-9 Gauntlet)
SAM, 2 quad 533mm ASTT with 53-65K HWT/
SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 4
AK630M CIWS, 2 100mm guns (capacity 2 Ka-27
Helix ASW hel)
1 Fregat (Udaloy II) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M80
Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn) AShM, 8 octuple 3S95
VLS with 3K95 Kindzhal (SA-N-9 Gauntlet) SAM,
2 Kortik CIWS with 3M11 (SA-N-11 Grison) SAM,
2 quintuple 533mm ASTT with 53-65K HWT/SET-
65K HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 twin
130mm gun (capacity 2 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel)
1 Admiral Gorshkov (Project 22350) with 2 8-cell
UKSK VLS with 3M14T (SS-N-30) dual-capable
LACM/3M54T (SS-N-27 Sizzler) AShM/3M55

Oniks  (SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM/91RT2 A/S msl,  4
8-cell VLS with 3K96-2 Poliment-Redut (SA-N-28)
SAM,  2 quad 324mm TT with Paket-NK LWT, 2
Palash CIWS, 1 130mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix
ASW hel)
DDGM 1:
1 Komsomolets Ukrainy (Kashin mod) with 2 quad
lnchr with 3M24 Uran (SS-N-25 Switchblade)
AShM, 2 twin lnchr with Volnya (SA-N-1 Goa)
SAM, 5 single 533mm ASTT with 53-65K HWT/
SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1
twin 76mm gun
FRIGATES 14
FFGHM 10:
3 Admiral Grigorovich (Krivak V) with 1 8-cell VLS
with 3M54 (SS-N-27 Sizzler) AShM/3M55 Oniks
(SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM/3M14 (SS-N-30) dual-
capable LACM, 2 12-cell VLS with 9M317E Shtil-1
SAM, 2 twin 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-
65K HWT, 1 RBU 6000 A/S mor, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1
100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel)
2 Jastreb (Neustrashimy) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M24
Uran (SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 4 octuple 3S95
VLS with 3K95 Kindzhal (SA-N-9 Gauntlet), 6 single
533mm ASTT with RPK-6M Vodopad-NK (SS-N-16
Stallion) A/S msl, 1 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor,
2 Kortik CIWS with 3M11 (SA-N-11 Grison), 1
100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) (of
which 1 in refit)
1 Steregushchiy (Project 20380) with 2 quad lnchr
with 3M24 Uran (SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM,
2 quad 324mm ASTT with Paket-NK LWT, 1
Kortik-M CIWS with 3M311 (SA-N-11 Grison)
SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1
Ka-27 Helix ASW hel)
4 Steregushchiy (Project 20380) with 2 quad lnchr
with 3M24 Uran (SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 3
4-cell 3S97 VLS with 3K96-3 Redut (SA-N-28) SAM
(in test), 2 quad 324mm ASTT with Paket-NK LWT,
2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27
Helix ASW hel)
FFGM 4:
1 Gepard with 2 quad lnchr with 3M24 Uran (SS-N-
25 Switchblade) AShM, 1 twin lnchr with Osa-M
(SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
1 Gepard with 1 8-cell VLS with 3M14T Kalibr-NK
(SS-N-30) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (SS-N-
27 Sizzler) AShM/3M5S Oniks (SS-N-26 Strobile)
AShM, 1 3K89 Palma CIWS with 9M337 Sasna-R
SAM, 1 76mm gun
1 Burevestnik (Krivak I mod)† with 1 quad lnchr with
URK-5 Rastrub-B (SS-N-14 Silex) AShM/ASW, 1
twin lnchr with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 quad
533mm ASTT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT, 2
RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm guns
1 Burevestnik M (Krivak II) with 1 quad lnchr with
URK-5 Rastrub-B (SS-N-14 Silex) AShM/ASW, 2
twin lnchr with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko SAM), 2
quad 533mm ASTT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K
HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 100mm
guns
Russia and Eurasia 199
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 105
CORVETTES 49
FSGM 20
6 Buyan-M (Sviyazhsk) with 1 octuple VLS with
3M54 (SS-N-27 Sizzler) AShM/3M14 (SS-N-30)
dual-capable LACM, 2 sextuple lnchr with 3M47
Gibka (SA-N-10 Grouse) SAM, 1 AK630-M2 CIWS,
1 100mm gun
2 Sivuch (Dergach) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M80
Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn) AShM, 1 twin lnchr with
4K33AM Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 AK630M
CIWS, 1 76mm gun
12 Ovod (Nanuchka III) with 2 triple lnchr with P-120
Malakhit (SS-N-9 Siren) AShM, 1 twin lnchr with
Osa-MA2 (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1
Russia and Eurasia
76mm gun
FSM 29:
2 Albatros (Grisha III) with 1 twin lnchr with Osa-M
(SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU
6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 twin 57mm gun
18 Albatros (Grisha V) with 1 twin lnchr with Osa-M
(SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 1 RBU
6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 76mm gun
3 Buyan (Astrakhan) with 1 sextuple lnchr with 3M47
Gibka (SA-N-10 Grouse) SAM, 1 A-215 Grad-M
122mm MRL, 2 AK306 CIWS, 1 100mm gun
6 Parchim II with 2 quad lnchr with Strela-2 (SA-N-
5 Grail) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000
Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
PCFG 23:
5 Molnya (Tarantul II) with 2 twin lnchr with P-22
Termit-R (SS-N-2D Improved Styx) AShM, 2 AK630
MCIWS, 1 76mm gun
17 Molnya (Tarantul III) with 2 twin lnchr with 3M80
Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn) AShM, 2 AK630M CIWS,
1 76mm gun
1 Molnya (Tarantul III) with 2 twin lnchr with 3M80
Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn) AShM, 1 Palma CIWS, 1
76mm gun
PCF 1 Molnya (Tarantul III) with 2 AK630M CIWS, 1
76mm gun
PBF 13: 11 Raptor (capacity 20 troops); 2 Mangust
PBR 4 Shmel with 1 76mm gun
PB 15 Grachonok
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 43
MCC 1 Alexandrit (Project 12700) with 1 AK306 CIWS
MHI 8: 7 Sapfir (Lida) with 1 AK306 CIWS; 1 Malakhit
(Olya)
MHO 2 Rubin (Gorya) with 2 quad lnchr with Strela-2
(SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
MSC 22: 20 Yakhont (Sonya) with 4 AK630 CIWS (some
with 2 quad lnchr with Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM); 2
Korund-E (Yevgenya) (Project 1258E)
MSO 10: 9 Akvamaren (Natya); 1 Agat (Natya II) (all with 2
quad lnchr (manual aiming) with Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail)
SAM, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 2 twin AK230 CIWS
AMPHIBIOUS
LANDING SHIPS • LST 20:
12 Project 775 (Ropucha I/II) with 2 twin 57mm guns
(capacity either 10 MBT and 190 troops or 24 APC
(T) and 170 troops)
200 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

3 Project 775M (Ropucha III) with 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 1 sqn with Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker
76mm gun (capacity either 10 MBT and 190 troops 1 regt with Su-33 Flanker D; Su-25UTG Frogfoot
or 24 APC (T) and 170 troops) FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
4 Tapir (Alligator) with 2-3 twin lnchr with Strela-2 1 regt with MiG-29KR/KUBR Fulcrum
(SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 twin 57mm guns (capacity 1 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound; Su-24M/M2/MR
20 tanks; 300 troops) Fencer
1 Ivan Gren (Project 11711) with 1 AK630M-2 CIWS, ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE/ISR
2 AK630M CIWS (capacity 1 Ka-29 Helix B hel; 13 1 regt with Su-24M/MR Fencer; Su-30SM
MBT/36 AFV; 300 troops) 1 sqn with Su-24M/MR Fencer
LANDING CRAFT 28 ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
LCM 26: 9 Akula (Ondatra) (capacity 1 MBT); 5 Dyugon 3 sqn with Il-38/Il-38N May*; Il-18D; Il-20RT Coot A;
(capacity 5 APC or 100 troops); 12 Serna (Project 11770 Il-22 Coot B
(capacity 2 APC or 100 troops) 8 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 Helix
LCAC 2 Pomornik (Zubr) with 2 22-cell 140mm MS-227 1 sqn with Mi-14 Haze A
Ogon’ MRL, 2 AK630 CIWS (capacity 230 troops; either 2 sqn with Tu-142MK/MZ/MR Bear F/J*
3 MBT or 10 APC(T)) 1 unit with Ka-31R Helix
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 267 MARITIME PATROL/TRANSPORT
SSAN 9: 1 Orenburg (Delta III Stretch); 1 Losharik; 1 Nelma 1 sqn with An-26 Curl; Be-12 Mail*; Mi-8 Hip
(X-Ray) (Project 1851); 2 Halibut (Paltus) (Project 18511); SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT
3 Kashalot (Uniform); 1 Podmoskovye (Project 09787) 1 sqn with An-12PS Cub; An-26 Curl; Tu-134
SSA 1 Sarov (Project 20120) TRANSPORT
ABU 12: 8 Kashtan; 4 Project 419 (Sura) 1 sqn with An-12BK Cub; An-24RV Coke; An-26 Curl;
AE 9: 7 Muna; 1 Dubnyak; Akademik Kovalev (Project An-72 Coaler; An-140
20181) with 1 hel landing platform 2 sqn with An-26 Curl; Tu-134
AEM 2: 1 Kalma-3 (Project 1791R); 1 Lama TRAINING
AFS 1 Longvinik (Project 23120) 1 sqn with L-39 Albatros; Su-25UTG Frogfoot
AG 1 Potok 1 sqn with An-140; Tu-134; Tu-154, Il-38 May
AGB 5: 1 Dobrynya Mikitich; 1 Ilya Muromets; 2 Ivan ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Susanin; 1 Vladimir Kavraisky 1 sqn with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip
AGE 1 Tchusovoy TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
AGI 14: 2 Alpinist; 2 Dubridium (Project 1826); 1 Moma; 7 1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip
Vishnya; 2 Yuri Ivanov AIR DEFENCE
AGM 1 Marshal Nedelin 1 SAM regt with S-300PM1 (SA-20 Gargoyle)
AGOR 8: 1 Akademik Krylov; 1 Igor Belousov; 1 Seliger; 2 1 SAM regt with S-300PM1 (SA-20 Gargoyle); S-300PS
Sibiriyakov; 2 Vinograd; 1 Yantar (SA-10B Grumble)
AGS 69: 8 Biya; 19 Finik; 7 Kamenka; 5 Moma; 9 Onega; 1 SAM regt with S-300PM1 (SA-20 Gargoyle); S-400
5 Baklan (Project 19920); 4 Baklan (Project 19920B); 2 (SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)
Vaygach; 10 Yug 1 SAM regt with S-300PS (SA-10B Grumble); S-400
AGSH 1 Samara (SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)
AH 3 Ob† EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AK 3: 2 Irgiz; 1 Pevek with 1 AK306 CIWS AIRCRAFT 217 combat capable
AOL 9: 2 Dubna; 3 Uda; 4 Altay (mod) FTR 67: 12 MiG-31B/BS Foxhound; 20 MiG-31BM
AOR 3 Boris Chilikin Foxhound; 17 Su-33 Flanker D; 18 Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker
AORL 2: 1 Kaliningradneft; 1 Olekma FGA 44: 19 MiG-29KR Fulcrum; 3 MiG-29KUBR
AOS 2 Luza Fulcrum; 22 Su-30SM
AR ε7 Amur ATK 46: 41 Su-24M Fencer; 5 Su-25UTG Frogfoot (trg
ARC 4: 3 Emba; 1 Improved Klasma role)
ARS 30: 1 Kommuna; 6 Goryn; 4 Mikhail Rudnitsky; 18 ASW 44: 12 Tu-142MK/MZ Bear F; 10 Tu-142MR Bear J
Project 23040; 1 Zvezdochka (Project 20180) (comms); 15 Il-38 May; 7 Il-38N May
AS 3 Project 2020 (Malina) MP 5: 4 Be-12PS Mail*; 1 Il-18D
ASR 1 Elbrus ISR 12 Su-24MR Fencer E*
ATF 55: 1 Okhotsk; 1 Baklan; ε3 Katun; 4 Ingul; 2 Neftegaz; SAR 3 An-12PS Cub
12 Okhtensky; 13 Prometey; 1 Prut; 4 Sliva; 14 Sorum ELINT 4: 2 Il-20RT Coot A; 2 Il-22 Coot B
AWT 1 Manych TPT 49: Medium 2 An-12BK Cub; Light 45: 1 An-24RV
AXL 10: 8 Petrushka; 2 Smolny with 2 RBU 2500 A/S mor, Coke; 24 An-26 Curl; 6 An-72 Coaler; 4 An-140; 9 Tu-134;
2 twin 76mm guns 1 Tu-134UBL; PAX 2 Tu-154M Careless
TRG 4 L-39 Albatros
Naval Aviation ε31,000 HELICOPTERS
FORCES BY ROLE ATK 8 Mi-24P Hind
FIGHTER ASW 83: 41 Ka-27PL Helix; 22 Ka-27M Helix; 20 Mi-14
1 sqn with MiG-31B/BS Foxhound Haze A
 Russia and Eurasia 201

EW 8 Mi-8 Hip J ARTILLERY 383

AEW 2 Ka-31R Helix
SAR 56: 16 Ka-27PS Helix D; 40 Mi-14PS Haze C
TPT 41: Medium 35: 27 Ka-29 Helix; 4 Mi-8T Hip; 4 Mi-
8MT Hip; Light 6 Ka-226T
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
Long-range 120: 56 S-300PM1 (SA-20 Gargoyle); 40
S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble); 24 S-400 (SA-21 Growler)
Short-range 12 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
AAM • IR R-27T/ET (AA-10B/D Alamo); R-60 (AA-8
Aphid); R-73 (AA-11A Archer); ARH R-77-1 (AA-12B
Adder); SARH R-27R/ER (AA-10A/C Alamo); R-33 (AA-
9A Amos)
ARM Kh-25MP (AS-12 Kegler); Kh-31P (AS-17A
SP 163: 122mm 95 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 68: 50 2S3
Akatsiya; 18 2S19 Msta-S
TOWED 152mm 100: 50 2A36 Giatsint-B; 50 2A65
Msta-B
GUN/MOR 66
SP 120mm 42: 12 2S23 NONA-SVK; 30 2S9 NONA-S
TOWED 120mm 24 2B16 NONA-K
MRL 54: 122mm 36 BM-21 Grad/Tornado-G; 220mm 18
9P140 Uragan
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHER
SRBM • Dual-capable 12 9K720 Iskander-M (SS-26
Stone)
GLCM • Dual-capable Some 9M728 (SSC-7)

Russia and Eurasia

AIR DEFENCE
Krypton); Kh-58 (AS-11 Kilter) SAM
ASM Kh-59 (AS-13 Kingbolt); Kh-29T Long-range 48+: 48 S-400 (SA-21 Growler); S-300V4
AShM Kh-31A (AS-17B Krypton) (SA-23)
Short-range 12 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)
Naval Infantry (Marines) ε35,000 Point-defence 70+: 20 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); 50
FORCES BY ROLE 9K31 Strela-1/9K35 Strela-10 (SA-9 Gaskin/SA-13
COMMAND Gopher); 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch)
3 corps HQ GUNS 23mm 60 ZSU-23-4
SPECIAL FORCES
4 (OMRP) SF unit Coastal Missile and Artillery Troops 2,000
11 (PDSS) cbt diver unit FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE COASTAL DEFENCE
Reconnaissance 5 AShM bde
1 recce bde 1 AShM regt
Mechanised
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
3 MR bde
COASTAL DEFENCE
1 MR regt
6 naval inf bde ARTY • SP 130mm ε36 A-222 Bereg
1 naval inf regt AShM 76+: 36 3K60 Bal (SSC-6 Sennight); 40 3K55
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE Bastion (SSC-5 Stooge); some 4K44 Redut (SSC-1 Sepal);
1 SRBM/GLCM bde with 9K720 Iskander-M (SS-26 some 4K51 Rubezh (SSC-3 Styx)
Stone/SSC-7)
COMBAT SUPPORT Aerospace Forces ε165,000 (incl conscripts)
2 arty bde A joint CIS Unified Air Defence System covers RUS, ARM,
AIR DEFENCE BLR, KAZ, KGZ, TJK, TKM and UZB
2 SAM regt with 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); Strela-1/ FORCES BY ROLE
Strela-10 (SA-9 Gaskin/SA-13 Gopher) BOMBER
2 SAM regt with S-400 (SA-21 Growler); 96K6 3 regt with Tu-22M3 Backfire C
Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound) 3 sqn with Tu-95MS/MS mod Bear
1 SAM regt with S-300V4 (SA-23) 1 sqn with Tu-160/Tu-160M1 Blackjack
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE FIGHTER
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum (Armenia)
MBT 300: 50 T-72B; 200 T-72B3; 50 T-80BV 1 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound
IFV 1,061: 400 BMP-2; 661 BTR-82A 1 regt with MiG-31B/BS/BM Foxhound
APC 400 1 regt with MiG-31B/BS/BM Foxhound; Su-27/Su-27UB
APC (T) 300 MT-LB Flanker
APC (W) 100 BTR-80 1 regt with Su-27/Su-27SM/Su-27UB Flanker; Su-30M2
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE 2 regt with Su-30SM
MSL FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
SP 60 9P148 with 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 1 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound; Su-27SM Flanker; Su-
9P149 with 9K114 Shturm (AT-6 Spiral); 9P157-2 with 30M2; Su-30SM; Su-35S Flanker
9K123 Khrisantema (AT-15 Springer) 1 regt with Su-27SM Flanker; Su-35S Flanker
MANPATS 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K135 1 regt with Su-35S Flanker; Su-30SM
Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan) 1 regt with Su-27 Flanker; Su-27SM3 Flanker; Su-30M2
GUNS 100mm T-12 1 regt with Su-25 Frogfoot; Su-30SM
202 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
GROUND ATTACK
1 regt with Su-24M/M2 Fencer; Su-34 Fullback
1 regt with Su-24M Fencer; Su-25SM Frogfoot
3 regt with Su-25SM/SM3 Frogfoot
1 sqn with Su-25SM Frogfoot (Kyrgyzstan)
3 regt with Su-34 Fullback
ISR
2 regt with Su-24MR Fencer*
2 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer*
1 flt with An-30 Clank
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
1 sqn with A-50/A-50U Mainstay
TANKER
1 sqn with Il-78/Il-78M Midas
TRANSPORT
6 regt/sqn with An-12BK Cub; An-26 Curl; Tu-134
Crusty; Tu-154 Careless; Mi-8 Hip
1 regt with An-124 Condor; Il-76MD Candid
1 regt with An-12BK Cub; Il-76MD Candid
1 sqn with An-22 Cock
3 regt with Il-76MD Candid
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 bde with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-35
Hind; Mi-26 Halo; Mi-8MTV-5 Hip
1 bde with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-26 Halo; Mi-8 Hip
1 bde with Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-35 Hind; Mi-26 Halo;
Mi-8 Hip
2 regt with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-35
Hind; Mi-8 Hip
1 regt with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8PPA
Hip; Mi-8 Hip
1 regt with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-8 Hip
1 regt with Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-35 Hind; Mi-8 Hip
1 regt with Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-24P Hind; Mi-35 Hind;
Mi-8 Hip
2 regt with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip
2 sqn with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip
AIR DEFENCE
9 AD div HQ
4 regt with 9K37M Buk-M1-2/9K317 Buk-M2 (SA-11
Gadfly/SA-17 Grizzly); S-300V (SA-12 Gladiator/Giant)
1 bde with S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble)
4 regt with S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble)
7 regt with S-300PM1/PM2 (SA-20 Gargoyle)
9 regt with S-400 (SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-
22 Greyhound)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 1,223 combat capable
BBR 139: 61 Tu-22M3 Backfire C; 1 Tu-22M3M Backfire; 1
Tu-22MR Backfire (1 in overhaul); 46 Tu-95MS Bear; 14 Tu-
95MS mod Bear; 10 Tu-160 Blackjack; 6 Tu-160M1 Blackjack
FTR 222: 70 MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum; 12 MiG-
31B/31BS Foxhound; 80 MiG-31BM Foxhound; 50 Su-27
Flanker; 10 Su-27UB Flanker
FGA 412: 44 MiG-29SMT Fulcrum; 6 MiG-29UBT Fulcrum;
47 Su-27SM Flanker; 19 Su-27SM3 Flanker; 20 Su-30M2; 91
Su-30SM; 112 Su-34 Fullback; 73 Su-35S Flanker
ATK 264: 70 Su-24M/M2 Fencer; 40 Su-25 Frogfoot; 139 Su-
25SM/SM3 Frogfoot; 15 Su-25UB Frogfoot
ISR 87: 4 An-30 Clank; 79 Su-24MR Fencer*; 2 Tu-214ON;
2 Tu-214R
EW 3 Il-22PP
ELINT 31: 14 Il-20M Coot A; 5 Il-22 Coot B; 12 Il-22M Coot
B
AEW&C 18: 14 A-50 Mainstay; 4 A-50U Mainstay
C2 11: 4 Il-80 Maxdome; 2 Il-82; 4 Tu-214SR; 1 Tu-214PU-
SBUS
TKR 15: 5 Il-78 Midas; 10 Il-78M Midas
TPT 427: Heavy 111: 9 An-124 Condor; 2 An-22 Cock; 99
Il-76MD Candid; 1 Il-76MD-M Candid; Medium 65 An-
12BK Cub; Light 234: 114 An-26 Curl; 25 An-72 Coaler; 5
An-140; 9 An-148-100E; 27 L-410; 54 Tu-134 Crusty; PAX
17 Tu-154 Careless
TRG 227: 120 L-39 Albatros; 107 Yak-130 Mitten*
HELICOPTERS
ATK 375+: 117 Ka-52A Hokum B; 100 Mi-24D/V/P Hind;
90+ Mi-28N Havoc B; 8 Mi-28UB Havoc; 60+ Mi-35 Hind
EW 27: 20 Mi-8PPA Hip; 7 Mi-8MTRP-1 Hip
TPT 339: Heavy 33 Mi-26/Mi-26T Halo; Medium 306
Mi-8/Mi-8MT/Mi-8AMTSh/Mi-8AMTSh-VA/Mi-8MTV-5
Hip
TRG 69: 19 Ka-226U; 50 Ansat-U
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
ISR • Medium Forpost (Searcher II)
AIR DEFENCE • SAM 620:
Long-range 490: 160 S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble); 150
S-300PM1/PM2 (SA-20 Gargoyle); 20 S-300V (SA-12
Gladiator/Giant); 160 S-400 (SA-21 Growler)
Medium-range 80 9K37M Buk-M1-2/9K317 Buk-M2 (SA-
11 Gadfly/SA-17 Grizzly)
Short-range 50 96K6 Pantsir-S1/S2 (SA-22 Greyhound)
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
AAM • IR R-27T/ET (AA-10B/D Alamo); R-73 (AA-11
Archer); R-60T (AA-8 Aphid); SARH R-27R/ER (AA-
10A/C Alamo); R-33/33S (AA-9 Amos A/B); ARH R-77-1
(AA-12B Adder); R-37M (AA-13A Axehead); PRH R-27P/
EP (AA-10E/F Alamo)
ARM Kh-25MP (AS-12A Kegler); Kh-25M (AS-12B
Kegler); Kh-31P/PM (AS-17A/C Krypton); Kh-58 (AS-11
Kilter)
ASM Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge); Kh-38; Kh-59/Kh-59M (AS-
13 Kingbolt/AS-18 Kazoo); Kinzhal; 9M114 Kokon (AT-6
Spiral); 9M120 Ataka (AT-9 Spiral 2); 9M120-1 Vikhr (AT-
16 Scallion)
AShM Kh-22 (AS-4 Kitchen); Kh-31A/AM (AS-17B/D
Krypton); Kh-32 (entering service); Kh-35U (AS-20 Kayak)
LACM
Nuclear Kh-55SM (AS-15B Kent); Kh-102 (AS-23
Kodiak); Conventional Kh-101 (AS-23 Kodiak); Kh-555
(AS-22)
BOMBS
Laser-guided KAB-500; KAB-1500L
TV-guided KAB-500KR; KAB-1500KR; KAB-500OD;
UPAB 1500
INS/GLONASS-guided KAB-500S
Airborne Troops ε45,000
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
1 (AB Recce) SF bde
 Russia and Eurasia 203

MANOEUVRE MANOEUVRE
Air Manoeuvre Reconnaissance
2 AB div (1 tk coy; 2 para/air aslt regt; 1 arty regt; 1 AD 1 recce bde
regt) Armoured
2 AB div (2 para/air aslt regt; 1 arty regt; 1 AD regt) 1 tk div
1 indep AB bde 1 tk bde
3 air aslt bde 2 MR div
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Mechanised
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 1 MR div
MBT 60 T-72B3 3 MR bde
IFV 20 BTR-82AM SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE
APC • APC (T) 776: 700 BTR-D; 76 BTR-MDM 2 SRBM/GLCM bde with Iskander-M
AUV GAZ Tigr; UAMZ Toros 1 SRBM bde with Tochka-U
ABCV 1,291: 100 BMD-1; 1,000 BMD-2; 10 BMD-3; 30 COMBAT SUPPORT
BMD-4; 151 BMD-4M 2 arty bde

Russia and Eurasia

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES 1 (hy) arty bde

ARV BREM-D; BREhM-D 1 MRL bde
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE 1 engr bde
MSL 1 MP bde
SP 100 BTR-RD 1 NBC bde
MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 Konkurs 2 NBC regt
(AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn); 9K115- COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 Metis-M (AT-13 Saxhorn 2); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14 2 log bde
Spriggan) AIR DEFENCE
RCL 73mm SPG-9 3 AD bde
GUNS • SP 125mm 36+ 2S25 Sprut-SD Reserves
ARTILLERY 600+
FORCES BY ROLE
TOWED 122mm 150 D-30
MANOEUVRE
GUN/MOR • SP 120mm 250: 220 2S9 NONA-S; 30 2S9
Mechanised
NONA-SM; (500 2S9 NONA-S in store)
2 MR bde
MOR • TOWED 200+ 82mm 150 2B14; 120mm 50+ 2B23
NONA-M1 Northern Fleet
AIR DEFENCE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SAM • Point-defence 30+: 30 Strela-10MN; 9K310 Igla-
SUBMARINES 29
1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse); 9K333 Verba;
STRATEGIC 8 SSBN (of which 1 in refit and 1 in
9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch); 9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin)
reserve)
GUNS • SP 23mm 150 BTR-ZD
TACTICAL 21: 4 SSGN; 11 SSN (of which 3 in refit
and 1 in reserve); 6 SSK (of which 1 in refit)
Special Operations Forces ε1,000 PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 10: 1 CV
FORCES BY ROLE (in refit); 1 CGHMN (1 other in refit); 1 CGHM; 7
SPECIAL FORCES DDGHM
2 SF unit PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10: 2
FSGM; 6 FSM; 4 PB
Railway Troops ε29,000 MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES
4 regional commands 10: 1 MHO; 2 MSO; 7 MSC
FORCES BY ROLE AMPHIBIOUS 6: 4 LST; 2 LCM
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
10 (railway) tpt bde Naval Aviation

FORCES BY ROLE
Russian Military Districts FIGHTER
1 regt with Su-33 Flanker D; Su-25UTG Frogfoot
Western Military District FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
HQ at St Petersburg 1 regt with MiG-29KR/KUBR Fulcrum
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR
Army 1 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound; Su-24M/M2/MR
FORCES BY ROLE Fencer
COMMAND ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
3 army HQ 1 sqn with Il-38 May; Il-20RT Coot A; Tu-134
SPECIAL FORCES 3 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 Helix
2 (Spetsnaz) SF bde 1 sqn with Tu-142MK/MZ/MR Bear F/J
204 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

AIR DEFENCE ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

3 SAM regt with S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble); S- 1 sqn with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip
300PM1 (SA-20 Gargoyle); S-400 (SA-21 Growler); TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound) 1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT AIRCRAFT
FTR 38: 20 MiG-31BM Foxhound; 18 Su-33 Flanker FTR 18 Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker
D FGA 8 Su-30SM
FGA 25: 19 MiG-29KR Fulcrum; 4 MiG-29KUBR ATK 10 Su-24M Fencer
Fulcrum; 2 Su-30SM ISR 4 Su-24MR Fencer*
ATK 18: 13 Su-24M Fencer; 5 Su-25UTG Frogfoot TPT 8: 6 An-26 Curl; 2 Tu-134 Crusty
(trg role) HELICOPTERS
ASW 21: 10 Il-38 May; 11 Tu-142MK/MZ/MR Bear ATK Mi-24P Hind
F/J ASW Ka-27 Helix
ISR 4 Su-24MR Fencer* TPT • Medium Ka-29 Helix; Mi-8 Hip
ELINT 3: 2 Il-20RT Coot A; 1 Il-22 Coot B
TPT 9: 8 An-26 Curl; 1 Tu-134 Naval Infantry
HELICOPTERS FORCES BY ROLE
ASW Ka-27 Helix A COMMAND
TPT • Medium Ka-29 Helix B; Mi-8 Hip 1 corps HQ
AIR DEFENCE • SAM MANOEUVRE
Long-range S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble); S-300PM1 Mechanised
(SA-20 Gargoyle); S-400 (SA-21 Growler) 1 MR bde
Short-range 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound) 1 MR regt
1 naval inf bde
Naval Infantry SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE
FORCES BY ROLE 1 SRBM/GLCM bde with Iskander-M
COMMAND COMBAT SUPPORT
1 corps HQ 1 arty bde
MANOEUVRE AIR DEFENCE
Mechanised 3 SAM regt
2 MR bde

1 naval inf bde Coastal Artillery and Missile Troops
FORCES BY ROLE
Coastal Artillery and Missile Troops COASTAL DEFENCE
FORCES BY ROLE 1 AShM regt
COASTAL DEFENCE
1 AShM bde Military Air Force
Baltic Fleet 6th Air Force & Air Defence Army
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE FORCES BY ROLE
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 2 FIGHTER
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 8: 2 1 regt with Su-30SM
DDGHM; 6 FFGHM (of which 1 in refit) 1 regt with MiG-31B/BS/BM Foxhound; Su-27
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 25: 6 Flanker
FSGM; 6 FSM; 7 PCFG; 5 PBF; 1 PB 
 1 regt with Su-27SM Flanker; Su-35S Flanker
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES GROUND ATTACK
12: 1 MCC; 5 MSC; 6 MHI 1 regt with Su-34 Fullback
AMPHIBIOUS 13: 4 LST; 7 LCM; 2 LCAC ISR
1 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer
Naval Aviation
 1 flt with A-30 Clank
FORCES BY ROLE TRANSPORT
FIGHTER 1 regt with An-12 Cub; An-26 Curl; Tu-134 Crusty
1 sqn with Su-27 Flanker ATTACK HELICOPTER
ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE/ISR 1 bde with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-
1 sqn with Su-24M/MR Fencer; Su-30SM 35 Hind; Mi-26 Halo; Mi-8MTV-5 Hip
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 regt with with Mi-24P/Mi-35 Hind; Mi-28N
1 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 Helix Havoc B; Mi-8 Hip
TRANSPORT 1 regt with Mi-24P Hind; Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-8
1 sqn with An-26 Curl; Tu-134 Crusty Hip; Mi-8PPA Hip
 Russia and Eurasia 205

AIR DEFENCE Reserves

1 SAM regt with 9K37M Buk-M1-2 (SA-11 Gadfly); FORCES BY ROLE
S-300V (SA-12 Gladiator/Giant) MANOEUVRE
5 SAM regt with S-300PM1 (SA-20 Gargoyle) Mechanised
1 SAM regt with S-400 (SA-21 Growler); 96K6 3 MR bde
Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Military Air Force
AIRCRAFT
14th Air Force & Air Defence Army
FTR 61: 31 MiG-31B/BS/BM Foxhound; 30 Su-27/
Su-27UB Flanker FORCES BY ROLE
FGA 85: 12 Su-27SM Flanker; 24 Su-30SM; 24 Su- FIGHTER
34 Fullback; 25 Su-35S Flanker 1 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound
1 regt with MiG-31B/BS/BM Foxhound
ISR 19: 4 An-30 Clank; 15 Su-24MR Fencer*
GROUND ATTACK
TPT 12 An-12/An-26/Tu-134
1 regt with Su-34 Fullback
HELICOPTERS

Russia and Eurasia

1 sqn with Su-25SM Frogfoot (Kyrgyzstan)
ATK 64+: 24 Ka-52A Hokum B; 16 Mi-24P Hind; 24
ISR
Mi-28N Havoc B; 12+ Mi-35 Hind
1 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer E
EW 10 Mi-8PPA Hip
TRANSPORT
TPT • Medium 50 Mi-8 Hip
1 regt with An-12 Cub; An-26 Curl; Tu-134 Crusty;
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
Tu-154; Mi-8 Hip
Long-range S-300PM1 (SA-20 Gargoyle); S-300V
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
(SA-12 Gladiator/Giant); S-400 (SA-21 Growler)
1 regt with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip
Medium-range 9K37M Buk-M1-2 (SA-11 Gadfly)
1 sqn with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip (Tajikistan)
Short-range 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)
AIR DEFENCE
Airborne Troops 3 regt with S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble)
1 bde with S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble)
FORCES BY ROLE
1 regt with S-300PM1 (SA-20 Gargoyle)
SPECIAL FORCES
2 regt with S-400 (SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1
1 (AB Recce) SF bde
(SA-22 Greyhound)
MANOEUVRE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Air Manoeuvre
AIRCRAFT
3 AB div
FTR 40 MiG-31B/BS/BM Foxhound
Central Military District FGA 12 Su-34 Fullback
HQ at Yekaterinburg ATK 25: 12 Su-24M Fencer; 13 Su-25SM Frogfoot
ISR 9 Su-24MR Fencer E
Army TPT 36 An-12 Cub/An-26 Curl/Tu-134 Crusty/Tu-
FORCES BY ROLE 154 Careless
COMMAND HELICOPTERS
ATK 24 Mi-24 Hind
2 army HQ
TPT 46: 6 Mi-26 Halo; 40 Mi-8 Hip
SPECIAL FORCES
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
2 (Spetsnaz) SF bde
Long-range S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble); S-300PM1
MANOEUVRE
(SA-20 Gargoyle); S-400 (SA-21 Growler)
Armoured
Short-range 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)
1 tk div
3 MR bde Airborne Troops
Mechanised
FORCES BY ROLE
2 MR bde
MANOEUVRE
2 (lt/mtn) MR bde
Air Manoeuvre
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE
1 AB bde
2 SRBM/GLCM bde with Iskander-M
COMBAT SUPPORT Southern Military District
2 arty bde HQ located at Rostov-on-Don
1 MRL bde
1 engr bde Army
2 NBC bde FORCES BY ROLE
2 NBC regt COMMAND
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 3 army HQ
2 log bde SPECIAL FORCES
AIR DEFENCE 3 (Spetsnaz) SF bde
3 AD bde 1 (Spetsnaz) SF regt
206 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

MANOEUVRE Naval Infantry

Reconnaissance
FORCES BY ROLE
1 recce bde
COMMAND
Armoured
1 corps HQ
1 MR div
MANOEUVRE
3 MR bde
Mechanised
1 MR bde (Armenia)
2 naval inf bde
1 MR bde (South Ossetia)
COMBAT SUPPORT
Mechanised
1 arty bde
1 MR div
AIR DEFENCE
1 MR bde
1 SAM regt
1 MR bde (Abkhazia)
1 (lt/mtn) MR bde Coastal Artillery and Missile Troops
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE FORCES BY ROLE
2 SRBM/GLCM bde with Iskander-M
COASTAL DEFENCE
COMBAT SUPPORT
2 AShM bde
2 arty bde
1 MRL bde Caspian Sea Flotilla
1 engr bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 NBC bde PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 2 FFGM
2 NBC regt PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 8: 1
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FSGM; 3 FSM; 1 PCFG; 1 PB; 2 PBR
2 log bde MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 3:
AIR DEFENCE 2 MSC; 1 MHI
4 AD bde AMPHIBIOUS 9 LCM
Black Sea Fleet Naval Infantry
The Black Sea Fleet is primarily based in Crimea, at
FORCES BY ROLE
Sevastopol, Karantinnaya Bay and Streletskaya Bay
MANOEUVRE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Mechanised
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 7 SSK (of which 1 in 1 naval inf regt
refit)
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 7: 1 CGHM; Military Air Force
1 DDGM; 3 FFGHM; 2 FFGM
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 35: 4 4th Air Force & Air Defence Army
FSGM; 6 FSM; 5 PCFG; 6 PB; 9 PBF; 2 PBR FORCES BY ROLE
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES FIGHTER
10: 1 MHO; 6 MSO; 2 MSC; 1 MHI 1 regt with Su-30SM
AMPHIBIOUS 10: 7 LST; 3 LCM 1 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum (Armenia)
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
Naval Aviation 1 regt with Su-27/Su-27SM Flanker; Su-30M2
FORCES BY ROLE 1 regt with Su-27/Su-27SM3 Flanker; Su-30M2
FIGHTER GROUND ATTACK
ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE/ISR 1 regt with Su-24M Fencer; Su-25SM Frogfoot
1 regt with Su-24M/MR Fencer; Su-30SM 2 regt with Su-25SM/SM3 Frogfoot
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 regt with Su-34 Fullback
1 sqn with Ka-27 Helix ISR
1 sqn with Mi-14 Haze
 1 regt with Su-24MR Fencer E
MARITIME PATROL/TRANSPORT TRANSPORT
1 sqn with An-26 Curl; Be-12PS Mail*; Mi-8 1 regt with An-12 Cub/Mi-8 Hip
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
AIRCRAFT 1 bde with Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-35 Hind; Mi-8 Hip;
FGA 12 Su-30SM Mi-26 Halo
ATK 13 Su-24M Fencer 1 regt with Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-35 Hind; Mi-8 Hip
ISR 4 Su-24MR Fencer E 2 regt with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-28N Havoc B;
MP 3 Be-12PS Mail* Mi-35 Hind; Mi-8AMTSh Hip
TPT 6 An-26 1 sqn with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip (Armenia)
HELICOPTERS AIR DEFENCE
ASW Ka-27 Helix 1 regt with 9K317 Buk-M2 (SA-17 Grizzly)
TPT • Medium Mi-8 Hip (MP/EW/Tpt) 1 regt with S-300PM1 (SA-20 Gargoyle)
 Russia and Eurasia 207

3 regt with S-400 (SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1 Pacific Fleet

(SA-22 Greyhound)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 22
AIRCRAFT STRATEGIC 4 SSBN
FTR 46: 12 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 34 Su-27 Flanker TACTICAL 18: 5 SSGN (of which 3 in refit); 5 SSN
FGA 95: 12 Su-27SM Flanker; 12 Su-27SM3 Flanker; (of which 4 in refit); 8 SSK
14 Su-30M2; 21 Su-30SM; 36 Su-34 Fullback PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 8: 1 CGHM;
ATK 97: 12 Su-24M Fencer; 85 Su-25SM/SM3 Frogfoot
6 DDGHM (of which 2 in refit); 1 FFGHM
ISR 24 Su-24MR Fencer*
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 25: 4
TPT 12 An-12 Cub
FSGM; 8 FSM; 10 PCFG; 3 PB
HELICOPTERS
MINE WARFARE 8: 2 MSO; 6 MSC
ATK 117: 25 Ka-52A Hokum B; 44 Mi-28N Havoc
AMPHIBIOUS 9: 4 LST; 5 LCM
B; 8 Mi-24P Hind; 40 Mi-35 Hind
TPT 72: Heavy 10 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 62 Mi-8 Hip
Naval Aviation

AIR DEFENCE • SAM

Russia and Eurasia

Long-range S-300PM1 (SA-20 Gargoyle); S-400 FORCES BY ROLE
(SA-21 Growler) FIGHTER
Medium-range 9K317 Buk-M2 (SA-17 Grizzly) 1 sqn with MiG-31B/BS Foxhound
Short-range 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound) ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
3 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 Helix
Airborne Troops 2 sqn with Il-38 May*; Il-18D; Il-22 Coot B
FORCES BY ROLE 1 sqn with Tu-142MK/MZ/MR Bear F/J*
MANOEUVRE TRANSPORT
Air Manoeuvre 2 sqn with An-12BK Cub; An-26 Curl; Tu-134
1 AB div EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 air aslt bde AIRCRAFT
FTR 12 MiG-31B/BS Foxhound
Eastern Military District ASW 23: 11 Tu-142MK/MZ/MR Bear F/J; 12 Il-38
HQ located at Khabarovsk May
EW • ELINT 1 Il-22 Coot B
Army
TPT 6: 2 An-12BK Cub; 3 An-26 Curl; 1 Tu-134
FORCES BY ROLE
HELICOPTERS
COMMAND
ASW Ka-27 Helix
4 army HQ
TPT • Medium Ka-29 Helix; Mi-8 Hip
SPECIAL FORCES
1 (Spetsnaz) SF bde Naval Infantry
MANOEUVRE
FORCES BY ROLE
Armoured
1 tk bde MANOEUVRE
6 MR bde Mechanised
Mechanised 2 naval inf bde
4 MR bde AIR DEFENCE
1 MGA div 1 SAM regt
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE
4 SRBM/GLCM bde with Iskander-M/K Coastal Artillery and Missile Troops
COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES BY ROLE
3 arty bde COASTAL DEFENCE
1 MRL bde 2 AShM bde
1 engr bde
1 NBC bde Military Air Force
4 NBC regt
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
11th Air Force & Air Defence Army
4 log bde FORCES BY ROLE
AIR DEFENCE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
4 AD bde 1 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound; Su-27SM
Flanker; Su-30M2; Su-30SM; Su-35S Flanker
Reserves 1 regt with Su-35S Flanker; Su-30SM
FORCES BY ROLE 1 regt with Su-25 Frogfoot; Su-30SM
MANOEUVRE GROUND ATTACK
Mechanised 1 regt with Su-24M/M2 Fencer; Su-34 Fullback
8 MR bde 1 regt with Su-25SM Frogfoot
208 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

ISR PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS

1 regt with Su-24MR Fencer E FRIGATES • FFHM 3 Nerey (Krivak III) with 1 twin
TRANSPORT lnchr with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 quad
2 sqn with An-12 Cub/An-26 Curl/Tu-134 Crusty/ 533mm TT lnchr, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1
Tu-154 Careless 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix A ASW hel)
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 191
1 bde with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-26 Halo PSO 5: 4 Komandor; 1 Okean (Project 22100) with 1
1 regt with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-26 Halo 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
1 regt with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip PCO 23: 8 Alpinist (Project 503); 1 Sprut; 12 Okhotnik
AIR DEFENCE (Project 22460) with 1 AK630M CIWS, 1 hel landing
2 regt with 9K37M Buk-M1-2 (SA-11 Gadfly); platform; 2 Purga with 1 hel landing platform
9K317 Buk-M2 (SA-17 Grizzly); S-300V (SA-12 PCC 35: 5 Molnya II (Pauk II); 3 Svetlyak (Project 10410)
Gladiator/Giant) with 2 AK306 CIWS; 18 Svetlyak (Project 10410) with
1 regt with S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble) 1 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun; 8 Svetlyak (Project
3 regt with S-400 (SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1 10410) with 2 AK630M CIWS; 1 Yakhont with 2
(SA-22 Greyhound) AK306 CIWS
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PCR 1 Slepen (Yaz) with 1 AK630 CIWS, 2 100mm
AIRCRAFT guns
FTR 20 MiG-31B/BS/BM Foxhound PBF 85: 55 Mangust; 3 Mirazh (Project 14310); 4
Mustang-2 (Project 18623); 21 Sobol; 2 Sokzhoi with 1
FGA 120: 23 Su-27SM Flanker; 6 Su-30M2; 31 Su-
AK306 CIWS
30SM; 26 Su-34 Fullback; 34 Su-35S Flanker
PBR 30: 2 Ogonek with 1 AK306 CIWS; 2 Ogonek with
ATK 102: 20 Su-24M Fencer; 10 Su-24M2 Fencer; 72
2 AK306 CIWS; 8 Piyavka with 1 AK630 CIWS; 18
Su-25/Su-25SM Frogfoot
Moskit (Vosh) with 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun
ISR 28 Su-24MR Fencer E
PB 12: 2 Morzh (Project 1496M; 10 Lamantin (Project
TPT 24: 22 An-12 Cub/An-26 Curl; 1 Tu-134
1496M1)
Crusty; 1 Tu-154 Careless
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 37
HELICOPTERS
AE 1 Muna
ATK 36: 24 Ka-52A Hokum B; 12 Mi-24P Hind
AGB 3 Ivan Susanin (primarily used as patrol ships)
TPT 60: Heavy 4 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 56 Mi-8
with 2AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing
Hip
platform
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
AK 8 Pevek with 1 AK306 CIWS
Long-range S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble); S-300V (SA-
AKSL 5 Kanin 

12 Gladiator/Giant); S-400 (SA-21 Growler)
AO 3: 1 Ishim (Project 15010); 2 Envoron
Medium-range 9K317 Buk-M1-2 (SA-11 Gadfly);
ATF 17: 16 Sorum (primarily used as patrol ships) with
9K317 Buk-M2 (SA-17 Grizzly)
2 AK230M CIWS; 1 Sorum (primarily used as patrol
Short-range 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)
ship) with 2 AK306 CIWS
Airborne Troops AIRCRAFT • TPT ε86: 70 An-24 Coke/An-26 Curl/An-72
Coaler/Il-76 Candid/Tu-134 Crusty/Yak-40 Codling; 16 SM-
FORCES BY ROLE
92
MANOEUVRE
HELICOPTERS: ε200 Ka-28 (Ka-27) Helix ASW/Mi-24
Air Manoeuvre
Hind Atk/Mi-26 Halo Spt/Mi-8 Hip Spt
2 air aslt bde
Federal Guard Service ε40,000–50,000
Paramilitary 554,000 Org include elm of ground forces (mech inf bde and AB
regt)
Border Guard Service ε160,000
FORCES BY ROLE
Subordinate to Federal Security Service
MANOEUVRE
FORCES BY ROLE Mechanised
10 regional directorates 1 mech inf regt
MANOEUVRE Air Manoeuvre
Other 1 AB regt
7 frontier gp Other
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 (Presidential) gd regt
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
IFV/APC (W) 1,000 BMP/BTR Federal Security Service Special Purpose
ARTILLERY 90: Centre ε4,000
SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika FORCES BY ROLE
GUN/MOR • SP 120mm 2S9 NONA-S SPECIAL FORCES
MOR 120mm 2S12 Sani 2 SF unit (Alfa and Vympel units)

National Guard ε340,000
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Other
10 paramilitary div (2–5 paramilitary regt)
17 paramilitary bde (3 mech bn, 1 mor bn)
36 indep paramilitary rgt
90 paramilitary bn (incl special motorised units)
Aviation
8 sqn
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty regt
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
RECCE some BRDM-2A
IFV/APC (W) 1,650 BMP-2/BTR-70M/BTR-80/BTR-
82A/BTR-82AM
ARTILLERY 35
TOWED 122mm 20 D-30
MOR 120mm 15 M-1938 (PM-38)
AIRCRAFT
TPT 29: Heavy 9 Il-76 Candid; Medium 2 An-12 Cub;
Light 18: 12 An-26 Curl; 6 An-72 Coaler
HELICOPTERS
TPT 71: Heavy 10 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 60+: 60 Mi-8
Hip; some Mi-8AMTSh Hip; Light 1 Ka-226T
Cyber
The first official doctrinal statement on the role of the
Russian military in cyberspace, the ‘Conceptual Views
on the Activity of the Russian Federation Armed Forces
in Information Space’, was released at the end of 2011,
and described cyber-force tasks with little correlation to
those of equivalent commands in the West. In particular,
the document contains no mention of the possibility of
offensive cyber activity. It is also entirely defensive in
tone and focuses on force protection and the prevention of
information warfare, including allowing for a military role
in negotiating international treaties governing information
security. In January 2012, then chief of the general staff
Makarov gave a different picture of the three main tasks
in this area: ‘disrupting adversary information systems,
including by introducing harmful software; defending
our own communications and command systems’; and
‘working on domestic and foreign public opinion using
the media, Internet and more’. The third task is a reminder
that, unlike some other nations with advanced cyber
capabilities, Russia considers cyber warfare as an integral
component of information warfare. Operations in Crimea
from early 2014, in the wider information space concerning
the conflict in Ukraine and allegations of influence activity
in Western countries’ elections demonstrate that Russian
thinking and capacity has matured in these areas. In
February 2017, Defence Minister Shoigu provided the first
official acknowledgement that Russia had formed a new
information-warfare branch of the armed forces.
Russia and Eurasia 209
DEPLOYMENT
ARMENIA: 3,300: 1 mil base with (1 MR bde; 74 T-72; 80
BMP-1; 80 BMP-2; 12 2S1; 12 BM-21); 1 sqn with 18 MiG-
29 Fulcrum; 1 sqn with 8 Mi-24P Hind; 4 Mi-8MT Hip; 2
AD bty with S-300V (SA-12 Gladiator/Giant); 1 AD bty with
2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful)
BELARUS: 1 radar station at Baranovichi (Volga system;
leased); 1 naval comms site
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: OSCE • Bosnia and
Herzegovina 2
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
MONUSCO 2; 14 obs
GEORGIA: 7,000; Abkhazia 1 mil base with (1 MR bde;
Russia and Eurasia
40 T-90A; 120 BTR-82A; 18 2S3; 12 2S12; 18 BM-21; some
S-300 SAM; some atk hel); South Ossetia 1 mil base with (1
MR bde; 40 T-72; 120 BMP-2; 36 2S3; 12 2S12)
KAZAKHSTAN: 1 radar station at Balkash (Dnepr system;
leased)
KYRGYZSTAN: ε500; 13 Su-25SM Frogfoot; 2 Mi-8 Hip spt
hel
MEDITERRANEAN SEA: 2 SSK; 1 FFGHM; 1 FFGM; 1 AGI
MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 5 obs
MOLDOVA/TRANSDNIESTR: ε1,500 (including 441
peacekeepers); 2 MR bn; 100 MBT/AIFV/APC; 7 Mi-24
Hind; some Mi-8 Hip
SERBIA: OSCE • Kosovo 1
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 3; 2 obs
SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 1 obs
SYRIA: 5,000: 1 inf BG; 3 MP bn; 1 engr unit; ε10
T-72B3/T-90; ε20 BTR-82A; Typhoon-K; Tigr; 12 2A65;
4 9A52 Smerch; TOS-1A; 9K720 Iskander-M; 10 Su-24M
Fencer; 6 Su-34; 4 Su-35S; 1 A-50 Mainstay; 1 Il-20M; 12
Mi-24P/Mi-35M Hind; 4 Mi-8AMTSh Hip; 1 AShM bty
with 3K55 Bastion; 1 SAM bty with S-400; 1 SAM bty with
S-300V4; 1 SAM bty with Pantsir-S1/S2; air base at Latakia;
naval facility at Tartus
TAJIKISTAN: 5,000; 1 (201st) mil base with (40 T-72B1; 60
BMP-2; 80 BTR-82A; 40 MT-LB; 18 2S1; 36 2S3; 6 2S12; 12
9P140 Uragan); 4 Mi-24P Hind; 4 Mi-8MTV Hip
UKRAINE: Crimea: 28,000; 1 recce bde, 2 naval inf bde; 1
arty bde; 1 NBC regt; 40 T-72B3 MBT; 80 BMP-2 AIFV; 200
BTR-82A; 20 BTR-80 APC: 150 MT-LB; 18 2S1 arty; 18 2S19
arty; 12 BM-21 MRL; 1 AShM bde with 3K60 Bal; 3K55
Bastion; 1 FGA regt with Su-24M/MR; Su-30SM; 1 FGA
regt with Su-27SM/SM3; Su-30M2; 1 FGA regt with Su-
24M/Su-25SM; 1 atk/tpt hel regt; 1 ASW hel regt; 2 AD regt
with S-400; Pantsir-S1; 1 Fleet HQ located at Sevastopol;
2 radar stations located at Sevastopol (Dnepr system)
and Mukachevo (Dnepr system); Donetsk/Luhansk: 3,000
(reported); OSCE • Ukraine 39
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 16 obs
210 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Tajikistan TJK ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 37: 30 T-72; 7 T-62
Tajikistani Somoni Tr 2017 2018 2019 IFV 23: 8 BMP-1; 15 BMP-2
GDP Tr 61.1bn 67.4bn APC • APC (W) 23 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-80
US$ 7.14bn 7.35bn ARTILLERY 23
per capita US$ 801 807
TOWED 122mm 10 D-30
MRL 122mm 3 BM-21 Grad
Growth % 7.1 5.0
MOR 120mm 10
Inflation % 7.3 5.8 AIR DEFENCE • SAM
Def bdgt Tr 1.66bn 1.99bn Medium-range S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline); S-125
US$ 194m 217m Pechora-2M (SA-26)
US$1=Tr 8.55 9.16
Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡

Population 8,604,882 Air Force/Air Defence 1,500

Ethnic groups: Tajik 84.2%; Uzbek 12.2%; Kyrgyz 0.8%; Russian FORCES BY ROLE
0.5%; other or unspecified 2.3% TRANSPORT
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 1 sqn with Tu-134A Crusty
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Male 16.3% 4.8% 4.5% 4.9% 17.9% 1.4%
1 sqn with Mi-24 Hind; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17TM Hip H
Female 15.7% 4.6% 4.4% 4.7% 18.8% 2.0%
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT
Capabilities TPT • Light 1 Tu-134A Crusty
The Tajik armed forces have little capacity to deploy other than TRG 4+: 4 L-39 Albatros; some Yak-52
token forces and almost all equipment is of Soviet-era origin. HELICOPTERS
Regional security and terrorism are concerns, due to the possi- ATK 4 Mi-24 Hind
bility that violence could spill over from Afghanistan. Tajikistan TPT • Medium 11 Mi-8 Hip/Mi-17TM Hip H
has been building its capability in this area by hosting a CSTO
counter-terrorism exercise, and by taking part in stability and Paramilitary 7,500
counter-terror exercises organised by US CENTCOM, hosting the
2017 iteration. Tajikistan is a member of the CSTO and there is Internal Troops 3,800
a large Russian military presence at the 201st military base. In
2018, India and Tajikistan agreed to strengthen defence coopera- National Guard 1,200
tion, in particular on counter-terrorism. Tajikistan has little capac-
ity to deploy other than token forces but border deployments Emergencies Ministry 2,500
have been stepped up recently in response to regional security
and terrorism concerns. In late 2016, a Military Cooperation Plan Border Guards
was signed with Russia. Moscow has indicated that Tajikistan is
to receive military equipment, including aircraft. Some donations DEPLOYMENT
of personal equipment have been received from the US. Barring
maintenance facilities, Tajikistan only has minimal defence- SERBIA: OSCE • Kosovo 1
industrial capacity. UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 17
ACTIVE 8,800 (Army 7,300 Air Force/Air Defence
1,500) Paramilitary 7,500 FOREIGN FORCES
Conscript liability 24 months Russia 5,000; 1 (201st) mil base with (40 T-72B1; 60 BMP-2;
80 BTR-82A; 40 MT-LB; 18 2S1; 36 2S3; 6 2S12; 12 9P140
Uragan); 4 Mi-24P Hind; 4 Mi-8MTV Hip
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 7,300
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
3 MR bde
Air Manoeuvre
1 air aslt bde
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty bde
AIR DEFENCE
1 SAM regt
 Russia and Eurasia 211

Mechanised
Turkmenistan TKM 1 (3rd) MR div (1 tk regt; 3 MR regt, 1 arty regt)
1 (22nd) MR div (1 tk regt; 1 MR regt, 1 arty regt)
Turkmen New Manat TMM 2017 2018 2019
4 MR bde
GDP TMM 133bn 150bn 1 naval inf bde
US$ 37.9bn 42.8bn Other
per capita US$ 6,643 7,412 1 MR trg div
Growth % 6.5 6.2 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE
1 SRBM bde with SS-1 Scud
Inflation % 8.0 9.4
COMBAT SUPPORT
Def exp TMM n.k n.k 1 arty bde
US$ n.k n.k 1 (mixed) arty/AT regt
USD1=TMM 3.50 3.50 1 MRL bde
1 AT regt
Population 5,411,012
1 engr regt

Russia and Eurasia

Ethnic groups: Turkmen 77%; Uzbek 9%; Russian 7%; Kazak 2%
AIR DEFENCE
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 2 SAM bde
Male 13.0% 4.2% 4.7% 4.9% 20.5% 2.1%
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Female 12.7% 4.1% 4.7% 4.9% 21.3% 2.8%
MBT 654: 4 T-90S; 650 T-72/T-72UMG
Capabilities RECCE 260+: 200 BRDM-2; 60 BRM-1; Nimr Ajban
IFV 1,038: 600 BMP-1/BMP-1M; 430 BMP-2; 4 BMP-3; 4
Turkmenistan has concerns over potential regional spillover from BTR-80A
the security situation in Afghanistan, but its armed forces lack
significant capabilities and equipment. Turkmenistan has main-
APC 902+
tained a policy of neutrality since 1995 and confirmed this com- APC (W) 874+: 120 BTR-60 (all variants); 300 BTR-70;
mitment in its 2016 military doctrine. This aimed to increase the 450 BTR-80; 4+ Cobra
armed forces’ defensive capability in order to safeguard national PPV 28+ Kirpi
interests and territorial integrity. Turkmenistan is not a member AUV 8 Nimr Ajban 440A
of the CSTO. While the ground forces are shifting from a Soviet-
ABCV 8 BMD-1
era divisional structure to a brigade system, progress is slow. The
armed forces are largely conscript-based and reliant on Soviet- ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
era equipment and doctrine, and the government has stated a MSL
requirement to improve conditions of service. Turkmenistan has SP 58+: 8 9P122 Malyutka-M (AT-3 Sagger on BRDM-2);
participated in multinational exercises but has limited capacity to 8 9P133 Malyutka-P (AT-3 Sagger on BRDM-2); 2 9P148
deploy externally and maintains no international deployments. Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel on BRDM-2); 36 9P149 Shturm
The air force has a modest capability; however, most of the aircraft (AT-6 Spiral on MT-LB); 4+ Baryer (on Karakal)
are of Soviet-era origin and have been stored or scrapped, and no
MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot
significant new procurement has occurred. The 2016 military doc-
trine was intended to partly redress these issues. There are plans (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115
to strengthen the border guard with new equipment and facilities. Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn)
Plans to bolster the naval forces have resulted in some procure- GUNS 100mm 60 MT-12/T-12
ments, leading to a modest improvement in the naval presence in ARTILLERY 765
the Caspian Sea. Barring maintenance facilities, Turkmenistan has SP 122mm 40 2S1
little domestic defence industry, but is building a number of patrol
TOWED 457: 122mm 350 D-30; 130mm 6 M-46; 152mm
vessels of Turkish design under licence.
101: 17 D-1; 72 D-20; 6 2A36 Giatsint-B; 6 2A65 Msta-B
ACTIVE 36,500 (Army 33,000 Navy 500 Air 3,000) GUN/MOR 120mm 17 2S9 NONA-S
Paramilitary 5,000 MRL 154+: 122mm 88: 18 9P138; 70 BM-21 Grad; RM-70;
Conscript liability 24 months 220mm 60 9P140 Uragan; 300mm 6 9A52 Smerch
MOR 97: 82mm 31; 120mm 66 M-1938 (PM-38)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
SRBM • Conventional 16 SS-1 Scud
Army 33,000 UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
5 Mil Districts CISR • Heavy CH-3A; WJ-600
FORCES BY ROLE ISR • Medium Falco
SPECIAL FORCES AIR DEFENCE
1 spec ops regt SAM
MANOEUVRE Short-range: FM-90; 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful)
Armoured Point-defence 53+: 40 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); 13 9K35
1 tk bde Strela-10 mod (SA-13 Gopher); 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse);
212 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

9K32M Strela-2M (SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14 PCGM 8 Arkadag (TUR Tuzla) with 2 twin lnchr with
Gremlin); Mistral (reported); QW-2 Otomat AShM, 2 twin Simbad-RC lnchr with Mistral
GUNS 70 SAM, 1 Roketsan A/S mor

SP 23mm 48 ZSU-23-4 PBF 24: 10 Bars-12; 6 Nazya (Dearsan 33); 5 Grif-T; 3
TOWED 22+: 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm 22 S-60 Sobol
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES PB 1 Point
ASM CM-502KG; AR-1 AMPHIBIOUS • LCM 1 Dearsan LCM-1
HELICOPTERS
Navy 500 MRH 2 AW139
TPT 3+: Medium some Mi-8 Hip; Light 3 AW109
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4
PCFG 2 Edermen (RUS Molnya) with 4 quad lnchr with Ukraine UKR
3M24E Uran-E (SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 2 AK630
Ukrainian Hryvnia h 2017 2018 2019
CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PCGM 2 Arkadag (TUR Tuzla) with 2 twin lnchr with GDP h 2.98tr 3.42tr
Otomat AShM, 2 twin Simbad-RC lnchr with Mistral US$ 112bn 126bn
SAM, 1 Roketsan A/S mor per capita US$ 2,656 2,964
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT• AGHS 1 (Dearsan 41m) Growth % 2.5 3.5
Inflation % 14.4 10.9
Air Force 3,000 Def bdgt [a] h 74.4bn 88.6bn
FORCES BY ROLE US$ 2.80bn 3.27bn
FIGHTER
FMA (US) US$ 99m 0m
2 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum; MiG-29UB Fulcrum;
USD1=h 26.60 27.07
GROUND ATTACK
1 sqn with Su-25 Frogfoot [a] Including military pensions
1 sqn with Su-25MK Frogfoot Population 43,952,299
TRANSPORT
1 sqn with An-26 Curl; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-24 Hind Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
TRAINING Male 8.2% 2.2% 2.7% 3.6% 24.1% 5.5%
1 unit with L-39 Albatros Female 7.7% 2.1% 2.6% 3.4% 26.9% 10.9%
AIR DEFENCE
Some sqn with S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline); S-125 Pechora Capabilities
(SA-3 Goa); S-125 Pechora-2M (SA-26); S-200 Angara
Ukraine’s overriding security concern is Russia’s support for sepa-
(SA-5 Gammon); FD-2000 (HQ-9); KS-1A (HQ-12)
ratists in the east of the country. The armed forces were unable to
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE offer any credible resistance to the Russian annexation of Crimea
AIRCRAFT 55 combat capable and struggled to combat the Russian-backed separatist forces.
FTR 24: 22 MiG-29A/S Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum Defence policy is centred on maintaining sovereignty and ter-
ATK 31: 19 Su-25 Frogfoot; 12 Su-25MK Frogfoot ritorial integrity. Ukraine adopted a revised doctrine in 2015 that
TPT • Light 3: 1 An-26 Curl; 2 An-74TK Coaler identified Moscow as a ‘military adversary’, called for ‘comprehen-
sive reform’ of the security sector and revoked the country’s ’non-
TRG 2 L-39 Albatros
block status’. Military reforms since 2015 have addressed the weak-
HELICOPTERS nesses exposed in 2014. Ukraine joined the NATO Partnership for
ATK 10 Mi-24P Hind F Peace programme in 1994, followed in 1997 by the creation of the
MRH 2+ AW139 NATO–Ukraine commission. In 2017, parliament identified NATO
TPT 11: Medium 8: 6 Mi-8 Hip; 2 Mi-17V-V Hip; Light membership as a strategic goal. There are two conscript intakes
3+ AW109 per year, but the longer-term ambition is to professionalise the
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES armed forces. The defence ministry’s development programme
AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer) aims to improve training, eventually aligning to NATO standards.
The armed forces participate in bilateral and multinational exer-
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
cises. Ukraine retains the notional capacity at least to deploy and
Long-range S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon); FD-2000 (HQ- sustain a modest force by air. Poor logistics capacity was exposed
9) after 2014 and addressing this is a priority. The equipment inven-
Medium-range S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline); S-125 tory still consists predominantly of Soviet-era weaponry. Sustain-
Pechora-2M (SA-26); KS-1A (HQ-12) ing and in some cases upgrading these systems is a near-term
Short-range S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa); S-125-2BM Pechora concern, although much will need to be replaced over the coming
decade. If not, the armed forces will face increasing problems with
obsolescence. The country has a broad defence industry, though
Paramilitary 5,000 its capabilities remain shaped, and limited, by its Soviet heritage.
Ukraine was a key provider of guided-weapons technologies in
Federal Border Guard Service ε5,000 the Soviet Union. It retains the capability to build Soviet-era land
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE systems and can maintain and modestly upgrade Soviet-era tacti-
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 33 cal combat aircraft.
 Russia and Eurasia 213

ACTIVE 209,000 (Army 145,000 Navy 11,000 Air IFV 1,137: 193 BMP-1/BMP-1AK; 890 BMP-2; 4
Force 45,000 Airborne 8,000 Special Operations BMP-3; 50+ BTR-3DA; some BTR-3E1; some BTR-4E
Bucephalus
Forces n.k.) Paramilitary 88,000
APC 338
Conscript liability Army, Air Force 18 months, Navy 2 years.
Minimum age for conscription raised from 18 to 20 in 2015
APC (T) 15+: 15 BTR-D; some MT-LB
APC (W) 313: 5 BTR-60; 215 BTR-70; 93 BTR-80
RESERVE 900,000 (Joint 900,000) 
 PPV 10 Kozak-2 

Military service within 5 years ABCV 30: 15 BMD-1, 15 BMD-2
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
AEV 53 BAT-2; MT-LB
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
ARV BREM-1; BREM-2; BREM-64; T-54/T-55
VLB MTU-20
Army 145,000 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
4 regional HQ MSL
FORCES BY ROLE SP 9P149 with 9K114 Shturm (AT-6 Spiral)

Russia and Eurasia

MANOEUVRE MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113
Reconnaissance Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); FGM-148 Javelin; Stugna-P;
5 recce bn Corsar
Armoured GUNS 100mm ε500 MT-12/T-12
3 tk bde ARTILLERY 1,770
Mechanised SP 565+: 122mm 271 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 288: 235 2S3
9 mech bde Akatsiya; 18 2S5 Giatsint-S; 35 2S19 Msta-S; 203mm 6+
2S7 Pion (up to 90 2S7 Pion in store)
2 mtn bde
TOWED 515+: 122mm 75 D-30; 152mm 440: 180 2A36
Light
Giatsint-B; 130 2A65 Msta-B; 130+ D-20
4 mot inf bde
GUN/MOR • 120mm • TOWED 2 2B16 NONA-K
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES
MRL 348: 122mm 203: 18 9P138; 185 BM-21 Grad;
1 SSM bde
220mm 70 9P140 Uragan; 300mm 75 9A52 Smerch
COMBAT SUPPORT
MOR 120mm 340: 190 2S12 Sani; 30 M-1938 (PM-38);
5 arty bde
120 M120-15
3 MRL regt
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
1 engr regt SRBM • Conventional 90 9K79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab)
1 EW regt HELICOPTERS
1 EW bn ATK ε35 Mi-24 Hind
2 EW coy MRH 1 Lev-1
1 CBRN regt TPT • Medium ε24 Mi-8 Hip
4 sigs regt AIR DEFENCE
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT SAM
3 maint regt Long-range Some S-300V (SA-12 Gladiator)
1 maint coy Short-range 6 9K330 Tor-M
HELICOPTERS Point-defence 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); 9K33
4 avn bde Osa-AKM (SA-8 Gecko)
AIR DEFENCE GUNS
4 AD regt SP 30mm 70 2S6
TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm S-60
Reserves AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM Barrier-V
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE Navy 11,000 (incl Naval Aviation and Naval
Armoured Infantry)
3 tk bde After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, HQ shifted to Odessa.
Mechanised Several additional vessels remain in Russian possession in
3 mech bde Crimea
COMBAT SUPPORT 2 Regional HQ
1 arty bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 1
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES FRIGATES • FFHM 1 Hetman Sagaidachny (RUS Krivak
MBT 854: 720 T-64/T-64BV/BM; 100 T-72AV/B1; 28 III) with 1 twin lnchr with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM,
T-80BV; 6 T-84 Oplot; (94 T-80; 530 T-72; 578 T-64; 20 2 quad 533mm ASTT with SET-65 HWT/53-65K HWT,
T-55 all in store) 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1
RECCE 548: 433 BRDM-2; 115 BRM-1K (CP) 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel)
214 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7 TRAINING

CORVETTES • FS 1 Grisha (II) with 2 twin 533mm ASTT Some sqn with L-39 Albatros
with SAET-60 HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
57mm guns Some sqn with Mi-8; Mi-9; PZL Mi-2 Hoplite
PHG 1 Matka (FSU Vekhr) with 2 single lnchr with P-15 AIR DEFENCE
Termit-M/R (SS-N-2C/D Styx) AShM, 1 AK630M CIWS, 6 bde with 9K37M Buk-M1 (SA-11 Gadfly); S-300P/PS/PT
1 76mm gun (SA-10 Grumble)
PBG 4 Gyurza-M (Project 51855) with 2 Katran-M IFV 4 regt with 9K37M Buk-M1 (SA-11); S-300P/PS/PT (SA-
turret with 1 twin lnchr with Baryer ATGM 10)
PB 1 Zhuk (FSU Grif) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 1 AIRCRAFT ε125 combat capable
MHI 1 Korund (Yevgenya) (Project 1258) FTR 71: ε37 MiG-29 Fulcrum; ε34 Su-27 Flanker
AMPHIBIOUS FGA ε14 Su-24M Fencer
LANDING SHIPS • LSM 1 Polnochny C (capacity 6 ATK ε31 Su-25 Frogfoot
MBT; 180 troops)
ISR 12: 3 An-30 Clank; ε9 Su-24MR Fencer E*
LANDING CRAFT • LCM 1 Akula (Ondatra)
TPT 30: Heavy 5 Il-76 Candid; Medium 1 An-70; Light
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 10
ε24: 3 An-24 Coke; ε20 An-26 Curl; 1 Tu-134 Crusty
ABU 1 Project 419 (Sura)
TRG ε32 L-39 Albatros
AG 1 Bereza
HELICOPTERS
AGI 1 Muna
C2 ε14 Mi-9
AKL 1
TPT 32: Medium ε30 Mi-8 Hip; Light 2 PZL Mi-2
AO 2 Toplivo
Hoplite
AWT 1 Sudak
AIR DEFENCE • SAM 322:
AXL 3 Petrushka
Long-range 250 S-300P/PS/PT (SA-10 Grumble)
Naval Aviation ε1,000 Medium-range 72 9K37M Buk-M1 (SA-11 Gadfly)
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer)
ASW (2 Be-12 Mail non-operational) SARH R-27 (AA-10A Alamo)
TPT • Light (2 An-26 Curl in store) ASM Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen); Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge)
HELICOPTERS ARM Kh-25MP (AS-12 Kegler); Kh-58 (AS-11 Kilter); Kh-
ASW 7+: 4+ Ka-27 Helix A; 3 Mi-14PS/PL Haze A/C 28 (AS-9 Kyle) (likely WFU)
TPT • Medium 1 Ka-29 Helix-B
High-Mobility Airborne Troops ε8,000
Naval Infantry ε2,000 FORCES BY ROLE
FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE
MANOEUVRE Air Manoeuvre
Light 1 AB bde
1 nav inf bde 4 air mob bde
1 nav inf bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES IFV 75+: 30 BMD-1; 45 BMD-2; some BTR-3E1; some
MBT 31 T-80BV BTR-4 Bucephalus
IFV some BMP-1 APC 180+
APC • APC (W) some BTR-60; some BTR-80 APC (T) 25 BTR-D
ARTILLERY APC (W) 155+: 1 BTR-60; 2 BTR-70; 122 BTR-80; 30+
SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika Dozor-B
TOWED 152mm some 2A36 Giatsint-B ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1
Air Forces 45,000 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel)
3 Regional HQ ARTILLERY 118
FORCES BY ROLE TOWED • 122mm 54 D-30
FIGHTER GUN/MOR • SP • 120mm 40 2S9 NONA-S
4 bde with MiG-29 Fulcrum; Su-27 Flanker; L-39 Albatros MOR 120mm 24 2S12 Sani
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • SP 23mm some ZU-23-2 (truck
2 bde with Su-24M Fencer; Su-25 Frogfoot mounted)
ISR
2 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer E* Special Operations Forces n.k.
TRANSPORT SPECIAL FORCES
3 bde with An-24; An-26; An-30; Il-76 Candid; Tu-134 Crusty 2 SF regt
 Russia and Eurasia 215

Paramilitary 88,000 Cyber

Ukraine remains the target of persistent and damaging
National Guard ε46,000 cyber attacks, which have prompted greater state attention
Ministry of Internal Affairs; 5 territorial comd and international support. In June 2016, a National Cyber
FORCES BY ROLE Security Coordination Centre was established, a year after
MANOEUVRE the publication of the National Cyber Security Strategy.
Armoured This centre is an agency of the National Security and
Some tk bn Defence Council and consists of representatives from the
Mechanised defence ministry, the armed forces and the SBU (security
Some mech bn service), among others. In early 2018, a Cyberthreats
Light Response Center was opened, providing inter-agency
Some lt inf bn coordination between the State Service of Special
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine,
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES the state-security service and the national police. Through

Russia and Eurasia

MBT T-64; T-64BV; T-64BM; T-72 a Cyber Defence Trust Fund, NATO states are extending
help to Ukraine in developing its technical capability to
IFV 83: BTR-3; 32+ BTR-3E1; ε50 BTR-4 Bucephalus; 1
counter cyber attacks. According to NATO, this help will
BMP-2
include establishing two Incident Management Centres.
APC 22+
NATO members visited the Serhiy Korolylov Zhytomyr
APC (W) BTR-70; BTR-80
Military Institute in 2018, with a view to establishing a
PPV 22+: Streit Cougar; Streit Spartan; 22 Kozak-2 

course on cyber security. Laboratory exercises as part of
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
this visit included defensive and offensive cyber operations
RCL 73mm some SPG-9
in support of a military scenario. Ukraine has also received
ARTILLERY
bilateral assistance from a number of NATO member states
TOWED 122mm some D-30
in addressing cyber threats.
MOR 120mm some
AIRCRAFT
TPT • Light 24: 20 An-26 Curl; 2 An-72 Coaler; 2 Tu- DEPLOYMENT
134 Crusty AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 11
HELICOPTERS • TPT 8: Medium 7 Mi-8 Hip; Light 1
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
Mi-2MSB
MONUSCO 255; 8 obs; 2 atk hel sqn
AIR DEFENCE
SAM • Point-defence 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse) MOLDOVA: 10 obs
GUNS • SP 23mm some ZU-23-2 (truck mounted) SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 40; OSCE • Kosovo 1; UN •
UNMIK 3 obs
Border Guard ε42,000 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1; 3 obs
FORCES BY ROLE
SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 2; 3 obs
MANOEUVRE
Light
some mot inf gp FOREIGN FORCES
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Albania OSCE 9
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Armenia OSCE 2
APC • PPV 17 Kozak-2 Austria OSCE 14
Azerbaijan OSCE 1
Maritime Border Guard Belarus OSCE 7
The Maritime Border Guard is an independent
Belgium OSCE 1
subdivision of the State Commission for Border
Bosnia-Herzegovina OSCE 50
Guards and is not part of the navy
Bulgaria OSCE 43
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Canada OSCE 35 • Operation Unifier 200
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 21
Croatia OSCE 11
PCT 1 Pauk I with 4 single 406mm TT, 2 RBU-1200
Czech Republic OSCE 14
A/S mor, 1 76mm gun
Denmark OSCE 8
PCC 4 Stenka
PB 12: 11 Zhuk; 1 Orlan Estonia OSCE 3
PBR 4 Shmel with 1 76mm gun Finland OSCE 23
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGF 1 France OSCE 18
AIRCRAFT • TPT Medium An-8 Camp; Light An-24 Georgia OSCE 22
Coke; An-26 Curl; An-72 Coaler Germany OSCE 28
HELICOPTERS • ASW: Ka-27 Helix A Greece OSCE 23
216 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Hungary OSCE 28 COMBAT SUPPORT

Ireland OSCE 11 1 arty bde
Italy OSCE 26 1 engr coy
Kazakhstan OSCE 5 1 EW coy
Kyrgyzstan OSCE 26 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Latvia OSCE 7 1 log bn
AIR DEFENCE
Lithuania OSCE 2 • JMTG-U 40
1 AD bn
Macedonia (FYROM) OSCE 31
Moldova OSCE 45 Luhansk People’s Republic ε14,000
Montenegro OSCE 3 FORCES BY ROLE
Netherlands OSCE 6 MANOEUVRE
Norway OSCE 12 Reconnaissance
Poland OSCE 41 1 recce bn
Portugal OSCE 2 Armoured
Romania OSCE 36 1 tk bn
Russia OSCE 39 Light
4 mot inf bde
Serbia OSCE 16
COMBAT SUPPORT
Slovakia OSCE 12
1 arty bde
Slovenia OSCE 1
1 engr coy
Spain OSCE 16 1 EW coy
Sweden OSCE 11 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Switzerland OSCE 8 1 log bn
Tajikistan OSCE 17 AIR DEFENCE
Turkey OSCE 10 1 AD bn
United Kingdom OSCE 65 • Operation Orbital 53 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
United States OSCE 70 • JMTG-U 220 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT T-64BV; T-64B; T-64BM†; T-72B1; T-72BA
TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT RECCE BDRM-2
DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL IFV BMP-1; BMP-2; BTR-4
APC
In late February 2014, Russian forces occupied Crimea. The APC (T) BTR-D; MT-LB; GT-MU
region then requested to join the Russian Federation after a APC (W) BTR-60; BTR-70; BTR-80
referendum, in March, regarded as unconstitutional by the
ABCV BMD-1, BMD-2
government in Kiev. Months after Russia’s annexation of
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Crimea, fighting began in Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk
MSL 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14
oblasts, with separatist forces there allegedly operating
Spriggan)
with Russian support. Conflict in the east has persisted
RCL 73mm SPG-9
since that date. The information displayed for these forces
GUNS 100mm MT-12
reflects equipment that has been observed as employed in
ARTILLERY
support of the separatist cause in eastern Ukraine. Data
SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 2S3 Akatsiya; 2S19
presented here represents the de facto situation and does
Msta-S†; 203mm 2S7 Pion
not imply international recognition.
TOWED 122mm D-30; 152mm 2A65 Msta-B
EASTERN UKRAINE SEPARATIST FORCES GUN/MOR
SP 120mm 2S9 NONA-S
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE TOWED 120mm 2B16 NONA-K
MRL 122mm BM-21 Grad
Donetsk People’s Republic ε20,000 MOR 82mm 2B14; 120mm 2B11 Sani
FORCES BY ROLE AIR DEFENCE
SPECIAL FORCES SAM
2 (Spetsnaz) SF bn Short-range 9K332 Tor-M2 (SA-15 Gauntlet)
MANOEUVRE Point-defence 2K22 Tunguska (SA-19 Grison); 9K32M
Reconnaissance Strela-2M (SA-7B Grail); 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); 9K35
1 recce bn Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse);
Armoured GROM
1 tk bn GUNS
Light SP 23mm ZU-23-2 (tch/on MT-LB)
6 mot inf bde TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-2; 57mm S-60
 Russia and Eurasia 217

FOREIGN FORCES ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Russia Crimea: 28,000; 1 recce bde, 2 naval inf bde; 1 arty
bde; 1 NBC bde; 40 T-72B3 MBT; 80 BMP-2 AIFV; 200 Army 24,500
BTR-82A; 20 BTR-80 APC: 150 MT-LB; 18 2S1 arty; 18 2S19 4 Mil Districts; 2 op comd; 1 Tashkent Comd
arty; 12 BM-21 MRL; 1 AShM bde with 3K60 Bal; 3K55 FORCES BY ROLE
Bastion; 1 FGA regt with Su-24M/MR; Su-30SM; 1 FGA SPECIAL FORCES
regt with Su-27SM/SM3; Su-30M2; 1 FGA regt with Su- 1 SF bde
24M/Su-25SM; 1 atk/tpt hel regt; 1 ASW hel regt; 1 AD regt MANOEUVRE
with S-300PM; 1 AD regt with S-400; 1 Fleet HQ located at Armoured
Sevastopol; 2 radar stations located at Sevastopol (Dnepr 1 tk bde
system) and Mukachevo (Dnepr system) • Donetsk/ Mechanised
Luhansk: 3,000 (reported) 11 MR bde
Air Manoeuvre
Uzbekistan UZB 1 air aslt bde

Russia and Eurasia

1 AB bde
Uzbekistani Som s 2017 2018 2019 Mountain
GDP s 254tr 338tr 1 lt mtn inf bde
COMBAT SUPPORT
US$ 48.8bn 43.3bn
3 arty bde
per capita US$ 1,520 1,326 1 MRL bde
Growth % 5.3 5.0 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Inflation % 12.5 19.2 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Def exp s n.k n.k MBT 340: 70 T-72; 100 T-64; 170 T-62 

US$ n.k n.k RECCE 19: 13 BRDM-2; 6 BRM-1
IFV 270 BMP-2
US$1=s 5203.03 7815.54
APC 359
Population 30,023,709 APC (T) 50 BTR-D
Ethnic groups: Uzbek 73%; Russian 6%; Tajik 5%; Kazakh 4%; APC (W) 259: 24 BTR-60; 25 BTR-70; 210 BTR-80
Karakalpak 2%; Tatar 2%; Korean <1%; Ukrainian <1% PPV 50 Maxxpro+
ABCV 129: 120 BMD-1; 9 BMD-2
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
AUV 11+: 7 Cougar; 4+ M-ATV
Male 12.1 4.2% 4.9% 5.2% 21.0% 2.3% ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Female 11.5% 4.0% 4.7% 5.2% 21.7% 3.1% ARV 20 Maxxpro ARV
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Capabilities MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111
Fagot (AT-4 Spigot)
Uzbekistan enacted a new military doctrine in early 2018, stress-
ing heightened security concerns over terrorism and the poten- GUNS 100mm 36 MT-12/T-12
tial spillover of instability from regional conflicts, particularly ARTILLERY 487+
from Afghanistan. It also noted a requirement for military mod- SP 83+: 122mm 18 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 17+: 17 2S3
ernisation. The new doctrine also focuses on border security and Akatsiya; 2S5 Giatsint-S (reported); 203mm 48 2S7 Pion
hybrid-warfare concerns. Uzbekistan is a member of the SCO, but TOWED 200: 122mm 60 D-30; 152mm 140 2A36 Giatsint-B
suspended its CSTO membership in 2012. It maintains bilateral GUN/MOR 120mm 54 2S9 NONA-S
defence ties with Moscow and in late 2018 a defence cooperation MRL 108: 122mm 60: 36 BM-21 Grad; 24 9P138; 220mm
agreement was reported with India. The armed forces are army 48 9P140 Uragan
dominated and conscript-based. Uzbekistan has a limited capacity
MOR 120mm 42: 5 2B11 Sani; 19 2S12 Sani; 18 M-120
to deploy its forces externally and does not have any international
deployments. The armed forces use mainly Soviet-era equipment.
A sizeable air capability was inherited from the Soviet Union, but Air Force 7,500
minimal recapitalisation in the intervening period has substan- FORCES BY ROLE
tially reduced the active inventory. Logistical and maintenance FIGHTER
shortcomings hinder aircraft availability. In recent years, there 1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum;
has been some procurement of rotary- and fixed-wing transport 1 sqn with Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker
assets. Uzbekistan is reliant on foreign suppliers for advanced mili- GROUND ATTACK
tary equipment. A State Committee for the Defence Industry was
1 sqn with Su-24 Fencer
established in late 2017 to organise domestic industry and defence
orders. The 2018 defence doctrine calls for improvements to the
1 sqn with Su-25/Su-25BM Frogfoot
domestic defence industry. ELINT/TRANSPORT
1 regt with An-12/An-12PP Cub; An-26/An-26RKR
ACTIVE 48,000 (Army 24,500 Air 7,500 Joint 16,000) Curl
Paramilitary 20,000 TRANSPORT
Conscript liability 12 months Some sqn with An-24 Coke; C295W; Tu-134 Crusty
218 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

TRAINING TPT 69: Heavy 9: 8 H225M Caracal; 1 Mi-26 Halo; Medium

1 sqn with L-39 Albatros 52 Mi-8 Hip; Light 8 AS350 Ecureuil
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER AIR DEFENCE • SAM 45
1 regt with Mi-24 Hind; Mi-26 Halo; Mi-8 Hip; Long-range S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon); FD-2000
1 regt with Mi-6 Hook; Mi-6AYa Hook C (HQ-9)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Medium-range S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline)
AIRCRAFT 41 combat capable Short-range S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa)
FTR 12 MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum (18 more in store) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
FGA 13 Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker (11 more in store) (26 Su- AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer); IR/
SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo)
17M (Su-17MZ)/Su-17UM-3 (Su-17UMZ) Fitter C/G non-
ASM Kh-23 (AS-7 Kerry); Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen)
operational)
ARM Kh-25P (AS-12 Kegler); Kh-28 (AS-9 Kyle); Kh-58
ATK 16: 12 Su-25/Su-25BM Frogfoot; 4 Su-24 Fencer
(AS-11 Kilter)
EW/Tpt 26 An-12 Cub (med tpt)/An-12PP Cub
(EW)
ELINT/Tpt 13 An-26 Curl (lt tpt)/An-26RKR Curl
(ELINT)
Paramilitary up to 20,000
TPT 7: Heavy 1 Il-76 Candid; Light 6: 1 An-24 Coke; 4 Internal Security Troops up to 19,000

C295W; 1 Tu-134 Crusty Ministry of Interior
TRG 14 L-39 Albatros
HELICOPTERS National Guard 1,000
ATK 29 Mi-24 Hind Ministry of Defence
 Russia and Eurasia 219

Arms procurements and deliveries – Russia and Eurasia

Significant events in 2018

„„ Production of the S-500 Prometey ballistic-missile-
defence and air-defence system began in March at
the Nizhny Novgorod Machine-Building Plant (NMZ)
and the Kirov Machine-Building Enterprise (KMP).
US media reported in May that the S-500 managed
to intercept a target at a range of 480 kilometres (a
new record). Russia wants to begin S-500 deliveries
the new engine are planned to be delivered from
2023.
„„ In September, Russia’s Rostec sold 60% of NPO
Molniya to Kalashnikov (51% of which is owned by
Rostec). NPO Molniya is an aerospace design firm
that supplies target drones to the Russian defence
ministry and led the Buran space-shuttle programme,

Russia and Eurasia

to front-line units in 2020.
„„ Ukrainian aerospace firm Antonov signed an
agreement with Boeing in July that will see the latter
supply parts enabling Antonov to resume aircraft
production. Prior to Russia’s annexation of Crimea
in 2014, Antonov sourced the majority of parts from
Russia.
„„ In August, Russia contracted Sukhoi for the first two
series-production Su-57 combat aircraft, which are
planned to be delivered by the end of 2020. They
will be fitted with the AL-41F-1 engine (Izdeliye 117)
used by the Su-35S while development of the Su-
57’s new engine (Izdeliye 30) continues. Su-57s with
which was cancelled in 1993. In 2014, NPO Molniya
was facing bankruptcy and unable to meet delivery
deadlines but has since been revived. Kalashnikov
hopes to expand into the space sector through the
acquisition.
„„ President Vladimir Putin authorised the takeover
of United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) by Rostec
in October. This will consolidate all of Russia’s
military-aerospace industry into one entity and
should make easier the funding of large aerospace
projects. However, unlike UAC, Rostec is currently
under sanctions by the US and the takeover could
negatively affect Russian aerospace exports.

▼ Figure 13 Russian Air Force: new tactical fighter deliveries, 2010–17

70
Su-27SM3
60 Su-30M2
Su-30SM
50
Su-34
Number of aircraft

40 Su-35S
MiG-29SMT
30

20

10

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

© IISS
220 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

▼ Figure 14 Russian next-generation armoured-vehicle programmes: progress as of late 2018

Armata

Prime contractor Planned in-service dates

T-14 MBT UralVagonZavod (UVZ) (2015) (late 2018)
2018 2020
Selected subcontractor/s
 Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant (2B-12-3A Stage:
1,500 hp engine) Low-rate initial production and
state tests
 Factory No. 9 (2A82-1M 125 mm
cannon) Notes:
T-15 IFV  KBP Instrument Design Bureau Deliveries of low-rate initial
(Epokha turret with 2A42 production batch ordered in 2015
30 mm gun) (82 T-14, 41 T-15, 9 T-16) expected to
complete in 2022
 KB Mashinostroyeniya (Afganit
active-protection system) High costs may result in limited
 NII Stali (Malakhit passive armour production run
complex)
T-16 ARV
 JSC Concern Sozvezdie (integrated
tactical command-and-control
system)

Kurganets

B-10 APC Prime contractor Planned in-service dates

KuganMashZavod (KMZ) (2015) (late 2018)
2018 2021
Selected subcontractor/s
 Yaroslavl Motor Plant (YaMZ-7801 Stage:
700 hp engine) Low-rate initial production and
factory tests
 KBP Instrument Design Bureau
(Epokha turret with 2A42 Notes:
B-11 IFV 30 mm gun) Delays caused by technical issues
 JSC Concern Sozvezdie (integrated and KMZ’s financial difficulties
tactical command-and-control
system)
 NII Stali (passive armour complex)

Bumerang

K-16 APC Prime contractor Planned in-service dates

Military Industrial Group (VPK) (2015) (late 2018)
2019 2020
Selected subcontractor/s
 Arzamas Machine-Building Plant Stage:
(AMZ) (vehicle manufacturer) Factory tests

 Yaroslavl Motor Plant (YaMZ-780 Notes:

K-17 IFV 700 hp engine) Factory tests planned to be
 KBP Instrument Design Bureau completed in 2019
(Epokha turret with 2A42
30 mm gun)
 NII Stali (passive armour complex)
 Russia and Eurasia 221

▼ Figure 15 Admiralty Shipyards: Project 636 Varshavyanka (Improved Kilo) and Project 677 Lada (St Petersburg)
attack submarines

In 1975 the Rubin Design Bureau began work on a replacement for

the Project 641/B (Foxtrot and Tango) submarines. The hull shape of Project 636
the 641/B displayed a lineage from wartime-era submarines, but with
the Paltus Project 877 (Kilo), Soviet designers opted for the more
hydrodynamically efficient ‘teardrop’ shape that was becoming
prevalent.
Between 1980 and 1997, over 40 Kilo submarines were built for the
Soviet Union (and Russia) and other customers. The 877 design
continued the Soviet preference for double-hulled submarines. Project 677
Subsequently, 18 export variants (877EKM) optimised for warmer
waters were sold. The incorporation of design refinements led to the

Russia and Eurasia

production of a further model, the Varshavyanka Project 636
(Improved Kilo), intended for export, primarily to Warsaw Pact
nations. Of these, two were sold to China, though a follow-on batch
of ten improved Project 636Ms were delivered to Algeria and China.
A subsequent variant, the Project 06361, was designed for Vietnam.
Both 636M and 06361 can operate the Klub family of cruise Prime contractor
missiles. Work began in the late 1980s on a replacement for Paltus, Admiralty Shipyards (RUS)
although construction of the resulting Project 677 Lada boat did not
Selected subcontractors
begin until 1996. Lada is the first Russian conventionally powered
submarine to have hydroplanes on the fin and, unlike Kilo, has a Gidropribor** (RUS)
single hull. Lada has a smaller displacement than Kilo, with improved Granit-Elektron (RUS)
manoeuvrability.
Kolomensky Zavod (RUS)
However, the project has suffered from problems relating to the
power plant and the air-independent propulsion (AIP) system. AIP NPO Avrora (RUS)
will not be fitted onto those Lada boats that remain to be built under NPO Novator* (RUS)
the contract. Likely because of the challenges with Lada builds, the
Okeanpribor (RUS)
Russian Navy ordered six domestic standard Project 06363 Kilo
submarines in 2010 and 2011, which were delivered on schedule in Rubin Design Bureau (RUS)
2014–16. The Russian Navy’s decision to order a second batch may *Klub/Kalibr cruise missiles ** Torpedoes
indicate confidence in the type, as well as a lack of available
alternatives.

Admiralty Shipyards Project 636 and 677 submarines: production rates, 1995–2017

Sep 2017

Dec 2014

Apr 2012

Jul 2009

Oct 2006

Jan 2004 Keel laid

Launched
Apr 2001 Commissioned

Jul 1998

Oct 1995
)

(6 )
2)

(6 3)

(6 -1)

(6 -2)

(6 -3)

(6 -4)

(6 -5)

VN (636 )

VN (063 )

VN (063 )

VN (063 )

VN (063 )

VN (063 )
(0 5)

(0 -6)

(0 -1)

(0 -2)

(0 -3)

(0 -4)

(0 -5)

)
)

-1
-2

-6
-1

-
RU 77-

7-

M M-

M 61-

M 61-

M 61-

M 61-

M 61-
77

PR 36M

PR 36M

PR 36M

PR 36M

AL 36M

AL 36M

3
63
36

36

PR (67

RU 636

RU 636

RU 636

RU 636

RU 636

RU 636
(6

(6

(6

63
C

S
PR

PR

RU

RU

© IISS