“ Understanding and Scientific Explanation HENK W, DE REGT Mi In 1948, physicist Erwin Sduddinger delivered the Shearman Lec- 'sat University College London. In rasa, these lectures were Inger then poses the following question: "What are the peculiar, spe- traits of our scientific wordd-picture?” and he answers 9f these fundamental features there can be n in be understood. stic, the non-superstitios said about it, One would in this context have to cal descriptionsof observable facts, which do not supply expla- view, which was endorsed by most of Schrodinger’ physicist col- hypothesis of science, that ave any positive content ews, Schriidinger ’s point of view 8" Scieny summarize facts but also ipso facto uncover relations between ‘e's (Sometimes from quite different domains of knowledge), and our grasping ‘of these relations may legitimately be called “understanding” From a hindsight perspective, Scheédinger's words appear to be very ‘ightful. The carly 290s were the time when the subject of explanation was b Coming respectable again, after having been condemacd by the nineteenth. and catly-twentieth. contury positivist philosophers of science (see, for exam Mach 1910/1970, Pearson 1912/1957). It was omly in 1948 that Carl 1 and Paul Oppenheim put the topic on the philosophical agenda egain, with thet: pioneering paper “Studies in the Logic of Scientific Explanati But Hempel, whose deductive:nomological model of explanation was dominate the debate for the next two decades, was still reluctant to talk about understanding. The reason was that “such expressions as ‘realm of understan ing’ and ‘comprehensible’ do not belong to the vocabulary of log refer tothe psychological and pragmatic aspects of explanation” (Hempel 196 413). In Hempel’ logical-empiticist view, the aim of philosophy of science is ty give an account ofthe objective nature of science by means of logical analy of its concepts. Its psychological and pragmatic aspects may be of interest to torians, sociologists, and psychologists of science (in short, to those whe Study the phenomenon of science empirically) but should be igacred by ph {osophers. Since Hempel, philosophers of science have gracially become more willing to discuss the topic of scientiic undorstanding, but it has remained out side the focus of philosophical attention until quite recently. Jn this chapter argue that understanding is an important philosoptuea topic and L off: an account of the role ofunderstanding in science. The ot ofthe chapter i as follows. In the next section, I discuss objectivist views of ‘elation between explanation and understanding, in particular those of Hempel and [. D. Trout. challenge these views by arguing that pragmatic aspects of case study from the history of physi ‘von of the proposed account of scientific understanding, Obje ist Views of Explanation and Understanding While scientific explenation has been a legitimate topic for philosophers Of science since 1048, the notion of scientific understanding has been largely ignored until recently because logical empiricists such as Hempel emphasized thatonly explanation is ofphilosophical interest. According to Hempel, notions Such as understancling and intelligiblty are pragmatic and thereby subjective Very broadly speaking, to explain something to & person is to make it plain and intelligible to him, to make him understand it. "Thus con- strued, the word “explanation” and its cognates are pragmatic terms: theie use requices reference to the persons invelved in the process of ‘explaining. In a pragmatic context we might cay, for example, that a given account A explains fact X to person P,, Weill then have to bear inomind shat the same account may ell not constitute an explanstion OFX for another person P, who might not even regard X as requiring aan explanation, or who might find the accouatA unintelligible or unil- luminating, or irrelevant to what puzzles him about X. Explanation in this pragmatic sease is thus a relative notion: something can be sig- nificantly said to constitute an explanation in this sense only for this or that individual. (Hempel 1965, 425-26) Imark of scientific knowledge is, in Hempel view, its objective nature, losophers of science should therefore try to give an objectivist account e, and of scientific explanation in particular—and therefore they should e pragmatic aspects such as understanding and intelligibility. It should he stressed that Hempel was right thatthe notion of understanding atic in the sense thatt fs concerned with a three-term relation between explanation, the phenomenon, and the person who uses the explanation ichieve understanding of the phenomenon. One can use the term “under- icing” only with—implicit or explicit—reference to human agents: scientist nderstands phenomenon P by means of explanation £, That understanding ragmatic in this sense implies the possibility of disagreement and variation ssed on contextual differences But, as will urgue below, Hempel was wrong he stated that pragmatic notions are philosophically irrelevant, Hempel sometimes used the term “scientific (or theoretical) understand: which he associated with scientiic explanation in the deductive-nomo. al sense.* In the concluding section of his 1965 essay he remarks that the derstanding conveyed by scientific explanation “lies rather in the insight that 'e explanandum fits into, or can be subsumed under, a system of uniformities presented by empirical laws or theoretical principles,’ and that“ll scientific planation .... seeks to provide a systematic understanding of empirical phe- omena by showing that they fit into a nomic nexus” (Hempel 1965, 488), In 1974, Michael Friedman argued thet philosophical accounts of scie ‘explanation should make it clear how explanations provide us with under inding, ond he claimed that Hempel’ D-N model of explanation failed to do Tobe sure, Hempel had suggested how science may lead to understanding: the [D-N] argument shows thet, given the particular circumstances and the ‘question, the occurrence of the phenomenon was to be expected; andi {8 not areliable cue to it being a cor- ie sons» of undarstanding will lead while itis typically a product of the 44s inthis serse that the explanation enables us to wderstand why the phe- el 1965, 337; italics in original; compare 364). In i reduced to rational expectation. Bu nomenon occurred (1974, 8) observes, wel show that ri ing: we do occurrence of a storm by merely referring to the baromo- he argues that Hempel 'ed “pragmatic as psychological” with “pragm: Friedman (1974, 7-8) psychological vist concept ‘understanding is the state pro- and only produced, by grasping a true explanation” where “one migh¢, ample, treat grasping as kind of knowing” But there is more to under. ing than ts admitted in Hempel and Trout's objectivist view. A nonobjec- kind of understanding does exist that has a crucial epistemic funct ly philosophically relevant, c understanding based o developed by Kitcher 1989), Since Friedman's pioneering es been less reluctant to The Epistemic Relevance of Skills | do agree with Trout that the phenomenology of understanding has no mic function: the experience of a feeling of understanding nce) is neither necessary nor sufficient for scies will argue that the strict éeductive-nomel planation fails as an acc‘ ves akind of understanding that is progmatie id thereby nonobjective. This type of understanding is associated with skill id judgments of scientists and cannot be captured in objective algorithmic focedures. It is therefore incompatible with the objectvist conception of ex- mn and understanding favored by Hempel and ‘Trout the pr kind of understanding that I claim is crucial for scientific ‘not a product of explanation. There isa clear distinction between ce different ways in which the term “understanding” is used in co: th scientific explanation: 27). Therefore, Trout claims, ld eschew subjective notions such asintel ‘The latter are epistemically irrelevant ifnot danger overconfidence biases show that feelings of understanding are typically misguided), Trou! * philosophers of explanation such as Eriedman and. jective sense of ist the tempta- produce ig us that ‘Trout, we should not to alleged understa Being explanation of a phenomenon e et Having an adequat of the pheromeron Feeling of understanding (FU) The phenom an explanation louse the theory anationunskilled, rather than of a skilled, performance” While the novice con- fellows rules, the expert immediately recognizes which steps are valid hich ones are not: this “leaps to the eye” Thus, deductive reasoning —and accordingly deductive nomolo; above, it corresponds to what Hempel calls scientific understanding, UP can be accompanied by fe I cannot be acquired from textbooks 1, this volume) because|skills cannot be translated in exp! but only in practice (compare knowledge" (olan 1995), that tacit knowledge involves implictlesrning, that unconscious and wnintentional adoption of rule-following procedures ~ct, Reber's conclusion is not uncontroversial. According to Shanks (200s, thas yet to be proved beyond doubt that there exists a form of learning ‘of understanding. And the pragmatic concit ay and unconsciously” Athough experiments the epistemic aim UP. can achieve unconscious knowledge of res, there native incerprecations of these experiments, in which rule knowledge he explanandunt from cover: one can explain the f jects Une idea that developing skills is equivalent g rules, because it would require the (for naturalistic philoso- follows the rules. Brown argues that learn we to leaming physical skills and involves training the nervous system. (2002, 221-22) also emphasizes the role of skills and implicit know!- He uses it as an argument against the relevance of the psychological ght that FU is neither necessaty nos sulficient for UP, and that (im- skills ae crucially important for achieving UP. It does not imme- achieving UP can be captured in an. internalization of rule-following procedures, as suggests. On the contrary, the arguments of Brown and Shanks render aim implausible. ‘ond, the factthat particular skills of the subject are crucial for construct. evaluating explanations and for achieving scientific understanding en- explanation has a pragmatic dimension that is episterically relevant ves not only en explanans and the explanandum but also an Many philosophers of science hold that the pragmatic and the epis- w dimension of science can and should be kept separate, Thus, Hempel cking proofs, which +. 25-26) argues that since explanation in a pragmatic sense is relative textof discovery but 10 ‘annat be relevant to the philosophical analysis of science, because lowing of rules is characteristic ser should be obje available knowledge. Harold Brown shows this com fe proofs in formal logic. Brown (: that although each ste fage—is not governed by any comparable sct of rules." ‘One learns to construct prootsby developing a skill, by practicing while guided by someone who already possesses the skill In other words, one develops the to proceed w algorithm. Brownle the pragmatic a theory ind al hese reasons ty ony (van Fraassen 1 and the pragmatic as sn Fraassen see the epistom ished domains. The pragmat he theory and sion that seems to be excluded fro and pragmatic can ald be kept separate mic status of a theory only and uniquely deponds on a th Uke phenomena it purports to describe or explain. such as virtues of a theory that lly between the epistemic intertwined in scientific practice: epist ind assessment of knowledge elaims) are pragmatic, the two are inextrical activitiesand ev: possible only STANDING AND SCLENTIFIC EXPLANATION 29 laws and initial conditions) and explanandum (dhe phenomenon or ological laws). Instead, as Carcwright (1983), Morgan and Morrison and others have shown, in scientific practice the connection between phenomena is usually made through models (compare Knuuttila +7; Boumans, this volume). isconventionally taken asa representation of the object or system wants to understand Scientifically In order to see what the role of in achieving understanding we should first clarify the relation be els, theory, and empirical data, Morgan and Morrison (1999, 10-11) they are not derived from theory, ‘empirical data, They typically contain both to draw a 2007). For he Kinetic theory of gases represents real gases (its target systems) {es of particles that behave according to the laws of Newtonian me- is, Thus, the theory already provides a general model of gases. In order particalar gas phenomena on the besis of the kinetic theory, more odels (such as of particle structure) have to be constructe: smenological law or this phenomenon phenomenon (described in terms of a ph ata), the specific model required for expl imply derived from the kinetic theory. In ch a way that the theory can be applied to idols replace the bridge principles that traditionally connect theory phenomena. In the terminology of Morgan and Morrison (1999), ite’ between theory and phenomena. The crucial difference be sdiating models is that the former establish a and phenomenon (explanans and ex- scientific explanation has been analyzed extensively 982). She defends the simulacram account of expla- explain a phenomenon is to corstruct a model wenomencn intoa theory” (Cartwright 1983, +7). Inthe modeling et system Is presented in such a way that the theory can be ap- decide to describe system Sas ifitisan M (where Misa model of 2s of the theory). The construc n and idealization (compare Morrison, this volume). There até 10 formal principles that tell us how to get from the description of a1c EXPLANATION 31 UNDERSTANDING AND scrENT involves making suitable idealizations and approximations: scientists to make the right judgments regarding idealization and approximation, assess the right skills to build a model on this basis. ‘what aro the right skills? This depends oa which theory the scientist is with, in particular on which pragmatic virtues the theory possesses cular virtues of theories, for example, visualizability or simplicity, may be wed by scientists because thdy facilitate the use of the theory in constructing this sense they are pragmatic virtues. But not all scientists value the e qualities: their preferences are related to their skills, acquired by train- g and experience, and are related to other contextual factors sach as their which skills have to be |, provide tools for achieving understanding. For example, a theery (or a lar kepresentation of it) may possess the virtue of visualizability, which for visualization, which in turn may be a useful tool to construct mod- fs of the phenomena. Visualization is an important tool for understanding, Yalued by many scientists, but itis nota necessary condition and there may be Aelentists who prefer abstract theories over visualizable ones (see do Rogt 200: for oxampl nations on the basis ofthis theory have to meet accepted logical and empi requirements. Second, note that CUP is implicitly pragmatic (that is, it refs to the scientists involved in the process of explanation) because it involves ; which is pragmatic for reasons explained above, insic property of theories but acontext-d pendent valueascribed to theories. one cannot specify universally valid cr for intelligibility. But this does not entail tha intelligibility and the Kinetic Theory of Gases ‘A case study from the history of physics can illustrate the above account of entific understanding. The case study concernsnineteenth-century attempts 10 explain experimentally observed properties of gases on the basis of the ki Hetic theory of gases. The kinetic theory, developed in the 1850s, was besed on and notall of them may be appl cable in all cases of forall disciplines. As one way of testing the intelig theories, I want to suggest the following criterion:4 HENK W. DE REG the idea that heat is mechanical motion, and that gases co in motion behaving in accordance with the laws of Newt ‘order to explain and predict experimental facts, one needed specific mod ‘of molecules. Among the phenomena to be explained were the well-knovt ‘experimental ges laws (Boyle-Cherlos, Gay-Lussac), transport phenomena ( cosity, heat conduction, and diffusion), temperature independence of specifi heats, and ratios of specific heats at constant volume and pressure. Later, in th 28708, still more experimental knowledge was accumulated, most importantly regarding spectr ry were published by Rud '860/1986). In both eases th cote of the theory consisted in an application of the laws of dlassical mechan. ics to aggregates of particles (molecules), where the description of the syste did not consist in tracing the motion of each particle individually but ina sta Ustical treatment. The elementary model used by both Clausius and Maxwel was that of the molecule as a hard elastie sphere." Having modeled molecule in this way, kinetic theory supplies equations for the behavior of the syste (One of these equations concerns the specific heat rato y that is, the ratio be. tween the specific heat at constant pressure and the specific heat at constant volume. The observed variation in specific heat ratios for different gases c: be explained by modeling these gases os polyatomic molecules with different energies of translation and/or rotation (see de Regt 1996). In 1860, Maxwel based his theoretical predictions on his equipartition theorem, which assort that there is a constant equal distribution of Kinetic energy over the vario possible (translational, rotational, and/or vibrational) “modes of motion” of th molecule, However, Maxwell discovered that for many common gases (oxyge nitcogen) the equation led to a discrepancy between theoretical predictio ‘and experimental results for specific heat ratios: theoretically, the ratio of tot kinetic energy to energy of translation was B = 2, while the experimental value: = 1.408 implied that B = 1.634 (Maxwell 1860/2086, 318). This problem becamé known as the “specific heat anomal ‘Some years late, in 1875, Maxwell introduced the idea of “degree of free dom which provided a new way of modeling molecules.” Maxwell assum¢ that “the position and configuration of the mclecule can be completely e: pressed by a certain number of variables? and adde¢: “Let us call this numb 1. Of these variables, three are required to determine the pesition of the ce ‘of mass of the molecule, and the remaining - to determine its configucati relative to its centre of mass. To each of the variables corresponds a differe kind of motion’ (Maxwell 1875/1086, 230). Subsequently, Maxwell (233) pret sented a new formula for the specific heat ratio UNDERSTANDING AND SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 35 yr ne a er of degrees of freedom, and eis quantity depending on the the molecule; e accounts for the relative amount of heat that ‘with experimental 1s of specific heats led Maxwell to conclude that 1 + e “for air and several er gases cannot be more than 49/ since the experiments have determined Y = 1.408. Furthermore, these gases cannot consist of monatomic mol- such molecules have no internal structure and therefore only three de 1s of freedom (= 3), which yields y = 1.6 +6. Moteover, around 1870 it was known that most gases emit spectral lines, tho best explanation of which med to lie in internal vibration of the molecules. These additional degrees jreedom entail that n > 6 and thereby y-< 1.23. The observed ratio of y = 08 was thus unexplainable. Maxwell (232) concluded that this anomaly is, sreatest difficalty yet encountered by the molecular theory” One year later, Ludwig Boltzmann proposed a solution of the problem. zmann. (1876/1968, 103) used the notion of “degrees of freedom” and posed to model the molecules as systems with five degrees of freedom. assumed that the anomalous gases were diatomic molecules that could be resented as two rigidly connected sess only five degrees of freeclom (three of translation an¢ \ce x = 5. Moreover, since the molecules are absolutely potential energy, hence e = o. Consequently, y = 1.4, almost precisely in ordance with the measured value. Figure 2. Boltzmann's dumbbell ‘mode! of diatomic molecules. le model thus provides an explanation, and thereby scientific un- lerstanding, of the anomalous specitic heat ratios. However, as Boktzmana, 1876/1968, 107) admits, the dumbbell model cannot be @ completely reelistic Wescription of diatomic molecules because real gas molecules do have vibra- tlonal degrees of freedom, as is already shown by the fact that they are capeble (emitting spectral lines, Boltzmann's dumbbell model nicely illustrates that del building is a