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    Lipton 2009

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    2008, Paying the price or «theory of explanation: De Regt Philosophy of Scence 73:298-208, 2007, The psvchology of ite explan cophy Compass 2:564-92, Yan Frassien, B,C. 198. The sclentc tmage. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ‘Watson, H.W. 876!1893.4 treatise onthe kinetic theary of gases. and el. Oxford NY (Clarendon Pres Understanding without Explanation PETER LIPTON W Explaining why and understanding why are closely connected. In- tempting to identify understanding with having an explanation. Ex. lonsareanswersto why questions, and understanding it seems is sirmply thoso answers. Equating understanding with explanation is also attrac. vn an analytic point of view, since an explanation is understanding in- ‘The explanation is propositional and explicit. It is also conveniently at shaped, if we take the premise to be the explanation proper and the lusion a description of the phenomenon that is being explained, So we are way to specifying the logic of understanding, Specifying the structure of explanation would not, however, tll us every- thing we want to know, Why should things of that shape be identified wich Wnderstanding? To understand why a phenomenon occurs is a cognitive Achlevement, and itis a greater cognitive achievement than simply knowing the phenomenon occurs—we all know that the sky is blue, but most of W do not understand why. What, then, are the extra cognitive benefits that 4 good explanation provides? How does having an explanation take us from Merely knowing that something isthe case to understanding why itis dhat way? is point of view, it is more natural to idently understanding with the (oynitive benefits that an explanation provides rather than wi Mon Itself. These benefits are various and include con Knowledge: of causes, of necessity, of possibilty and of unification. Explan: STANDING WITHOUT EXPLANATION 45 ig explanations themselves, do not work by means of generating explana- ‘that are then the proximate cause of the consequent understanding not immediately clear that the diverse sources of causal information this condition. Thus, while an eaperiment is not itself an explanation, susal information it provides seems tantamount to one. The case is per. Jits into a broader pattern the switch from identtying understanding with explanation to ide He ih some ofthe cognitive benefits ofan explanation may net seem dra but it makes this essay possible. For by distinguishing evplanarne tnderstanding they provide, we rake room for the possi propositions that do not explain but only ander investigation and ends with an understand. ton 2004). But this is not an interesting case of sscciation of understanding {rom explanation, since the understanding ines by means of the explanation inferred from the description, ‘The process equiting understanding does not begin with an explanation, but the under. ing is nevertheless a product of an explanation. which is not what we are i forhere. Explanation and causal information may thus seem too close to each ether apart. But this line of thought only seems compelling if we focus oc. "y on causel information that takes the form of propasitions exp Nerstancing and inference. willgo on to considera fith and rather dn, Sorseatence that consumers of good explanations enjoy. This isthe dist, saa ME feling of understanding the ‘aha’ fecling. 1 wil suggest jatough the sha’ fling isnot tse akin of understanding tes lay portant role Inthe way understanding is acquired Causation it understanding, but not tacit explanation, s provides the space we are looking for, where there can be undereane, without explanation, natural place to look for sources of causal infocmation that may yield tuct knowledges in the use ofimages and physical models. For example, stood the why of retrograde motion antil I saw it dem. rated visually in a planetarium. A physical model suchas an omery may cognitive work. These visual devices may convey causal information Frplanations often bridge the gap between knowing that a pheacs may be in no position to articulate. Ido not suggest that all the causal m thus acquired provides understanding. The causal history behind “ UNDERSTANDING WITHOUT EXPLANATION ar Kd most of it will not provide real und ‘sparticular cognitive interests. To accout for this, one needs a model of causal selection that shows which causes pr ‘vice understanding and which de not (Lipton 2004, 30-54). Bat thatis ano' Project. For my present purposes, al] suggest is thet some of the tacit cau ‘knowledge gained from manipulation provides understanding. Images, models, and manipalation are thus; any phenomenon is long and reek and twenty-two students in my dass, there is no way to arcango the thdays to avoid this tesule, That argument explains an outcome not by giv- «causes but by showing that it could not have been otherwise. Just how the evant action of necessity should be characterized is an interesting quest coald limit the necessity conception so that it can oaly apply to pheno, that occur in all possible worlds. The birthdey phenomenon docs not meet condition as it stands, though perhaps it would if reconfigured to be the ata class of twenty-two students has four birthdays on the same day of week. This is a necessary truth, and the day-filling considerations explain showing that itis necessary. On the other hand, any explanation that can, iched in terms of a deductively valid argument will show the conditional ty that the phenomenon In question must eccut given the explanation; we do not wish to say that every deductive argument provides understand- even that every deductive argument that is explanatory provides under- ng by showing necessity (rather than, for example, by providing causal Informetion mediated by causal laws that support the decuctior). Fortunately, {hr our present purposes we can leave this issue unresolved. since in what fol. ww, the necessity that provides the understanding is uaconditional. he cases I seek are arguments that are not explanations but do generate fanding by showing necessity. There are 2 number of plausible candi- nevertheless be able to say something, however ablique, about the causes. ‘may well be so, but what the knower can say in theso case: does not exh what the knower understands. The cases could also be resisted by either anding our notion of explanation or contracting our notion of understand ‘Bat neither maneuver is plausible here. A tacit explanation would bean ex nation one could not give, even to oneself, and this does violence to the no of explanation. And to deny that this tacit knowlodge constitutes understan ing would be Procrustean. We want a way of marking the difference betw: ‘someone who knows that the phenomenon occars bust has no inkling winy, someone who hes a deep and subtle appreciation ofits causes, though he she's not in a position to articulate that knowledge. “Understanding” seems be the right word for the differenco, It is not ad hoc to insist that expla ‘mast be verbal but that understanding need not be, *xpetiments are another promising source. For example, Galileo's ight experiment that demonstrates that gravitational acceleration is inde. \Cof mass gives one an understanding of why masses must Necessity ‘Manipulation, images, models, and other sources of tacit knowledge ms generale understending without passing through explanations. In these cas. the understanding co tacit knowledge of causal information. Moreov. in these eases, the route to understanding often essentially involves nonverh Processes, as in the case of manipulation, But can there also be cases of: information gonerating understanding without explanation, cases where erything Is propositional and out in the open? Such cases seem unlikely wh the understanding consists in causal knowledge, because the causal info ‘ion then is just an explanation. But there are other forms of understand that suggest routes that are propositional and explicit but still do not invol explanctions: Consider the necessity conception of understanding (Glymour 15980) this view, to understand why something occurs is to see that, in some sense, hhad to occur. Some explanations do seem to work this vay. I came to us stand why my class had four students whose last birthdays felon the sam of the week when it was explained to me that since there are only seven day the system is of course heavier than the heavy mass alone and so should We Zaster than the heavier mass alone. But the system cannot accelerate slower and faster, so acceleration must be independent of mass (Galileo 48/1914, 62-63; Brown 1991, 1-3) Is beautiful thought experiment does not itself seem to be an explana- mn. Not does it appear that the route to understanding passes subsequently ough an explanation that the thought experiment supports, Having absorbed Glllec's argument, 1 understand why acceleration must be independent of ‘twas; but if you ask me to explain why acceleration is independent of macs, 1 ‘0 give you the thought experiment so that you re sophisticated physicists may be able to give Mi explanation), So, if we maintain as I would that the thought experiment is, 8 not itself an explanation, then we seem to have an that bullding one square on the diagonal of snother doubles its area, Plato’ argument shows why the arca of the big square must be twice that of the sm: one by showing the big square to be made up of four triangular halves oft small square. That thought experiment shows necessity, provides understand. ing, and, moreover, in my judgment this argument is also an explanation. Gali Jeo's argument, by contrast, though it gives the necessity and the understanding Seems to me not an explanation. Why this difference? It cannot be because th Galllean argument is noncausal. giving no cause of the fact that acceleration is independent of mass, since Men's argument and the birthday argument ar not causal elther, yet those two are explanations. Thare are noncausal explana tions, but the Galilean argumentisnot one of those. It does not provide a direct answer the question, “Why is acceleration independent of mass?” Why not? Perhaps it ie because the Galilean argument is a reductio ad ab. surdam. Rather than saying directly why acceleration must be independent o the argument works by showing that the contrary assumption would en contradiction. My suggestion, ther, is that the Galilean argument provides understanding by showing necessity, but does not provide an explanation, be cause it works by redactio. We inay find the same contrast between explana tory and unexplanatory demonstrations in the case of mathematics. Meno’ argument is explanatory, but mathematical proofs by reductio may not be. seems that to explain by showing necessity requires a kind of constructive ar Bument that not all proofs or thought experiments sapply. Pechays we requit ofan explanation that it show one of the right kinds of “determination” of th phenomenon. ‘the right kinds are various: it maybe cause butit need notbe,. ‘mathematical explanations show. But. ‘ion will do, Thus, mere deductive determination is not suficient for expl tion, as the many valid arguments that are not good explanations show. Mj ‘Suggestion is that reductio arguments may fail to provide explanations bee: they fail to show the right kind of determination, But this does not mean the Provide no understanding. Galileo’ thought experiment is a wonderful dem nstration of the necessity of the mass independence of g nal acccleras tion ané, since secing necessity is one form of understanding, itis a source understanding, but it is not an explanation. If you ask me why acceleration independent of mass, ! cannot say, though Tcan show you that ft must be Reductio arguments are thus one plausible route to understanding that wo RSTANDING WITHOUT EXPLANATION 2. but without providing an explanation, and there are likely Possibility My stratepy so far has been to look at two characteristic benefits of expla- on that we plausibly identify with underscanding, and to see whether these 's may also accrue without « prior explanation. I have suggested thet the Jossession of causel information and apprehension of necessity are both forms standing that may be aoquited without the help of explanation, Causal mation may be acquired by various nonverbal mechanisms, such as ma- lation and use of images and models, and necessity may be apprehended ‘means of thought experiments and other arguments that are not theraselves nations. want now to considera different s01 isibility rather than of necessity. Descartes provides a suiking example of one way actual understanding ight come from merely potential explanations: For there is no doubt that the world was created right from the start with all he perfection which itnow has. ... This is the doctrine of the Christian faith, and our natural reason convinces us thet it was 50... Nevertheless, if we want to understand the nature of plants or of men, it is much beter to consider how they can gradually grow from seeds than to consider how they were created by God at the very beginning of the world, Thus we may be able to think up certain very simple and easily known principles which can serve. as it were, as the seeds from which wecan demonstrate that the stars the earth and indeed every. thing we observe in this visible world could have sprung. Foralthough ‘we know for sure that they never did acise in this way, we shall be able to provide a much beter explanation of their nature by this method than if we merely describe them as they now are or as we beliewe them to have been created. (Descaries 1644/1985, 256) 3 ERSTANDING WITHOUT EXPLANATION s3 planation. The understanding involves a kind of cognitive gain about the act phenomenon, even though the proffered explanation is not true of th phenomenon, ‘There is still ¢ way for skeptical readers to insist that the explanations plrs These are concrete problem solutions in te specs. very macy actual afterall: they can change the explanandum. They may tak «the solutions to the problems tn the student’ problem sets—that are shared 4s explained in these cases is not the original phenomenon, bat rather members of the community and serve as « guide to future work. Unlike sibility. The effect of this explanandum switch is to conver wer to this maneuver is that it isnot to the point. For even if it prov acceptable gloss on how these explanations work, it stil supports the & gap between explanation and understanding. Since now explanation thing provides understanding of another, a counterfactual explanation the phenomenon could have come about (but did not) provides underst of how it actually happened. To deny the gap in these cases, one would. deny that these explanations of how the phenomenon is possible provi ‘understanding of the actual phenomenon. ity relations, and normal scientists go on to choose new problems that similar to the exemplars, to attempt solutions that scem similar to those orked in the exemplars, and to judge the adequacy of proposed solations ference to the standards the exemplars represent. Shared exemplars thus rm the same function as would shared rules, the exemplar mechanism provides a plausible exemple of a route to une ‘standing without explanation, Kuhn is here providing an account of sci. knowledge, of the scie evaluate Unificati { have so fac considered how understanding inthe form of causal and mo: knowledge might bo acquired without reiying on actual explanations. Ano ‘equally familiar conception of explanatory benefit is unification (Fried 1974). Itfs an ancient ides that we come to understand the world by sec unity thot underlies the apparent diversity of superficial phenomena, and wl philosophers have found this idea difficult to analyze, itis clear that one of ays science improves our understanding of the world is by showing how verse phenomena can share underlying similarities. Unification is a signal achievement of many great sclentific explanatio can it also be achieved in other ways? Thomas Kuhns account of the dynami of normal science provides a important instance (Kahn 1970). His central ‘mechanism suggests that sclentfic understanding through anifiat ‘out explanation is ubiquitous. The formative power of exemplars central theme in Kuhn's account of sclence, and appreciating its force sho not just that the acquisition of theoretical know-how is a route to knowledge: what a theory says and so to the nature of the world that the theory describ but also drat what is gained from this process goes beyond the explicit conte of the theory. ns that the exemplars support provide a taxonomy that gives informa. about the structure ofthe world. They thus have the effct of unifying the mena and so provide understanding, and they do this by analogy, not by lanation. For Kuhn himself the unifying structure hat exemplars forge is not some- i antecedenty present in nature, waiting for scientists to disclose. Kubn is alist. Like Kant, he holds that the world that scie int product for the things in themselves and the onpani tigators. But where Kant holds that the human coat empiri- ld can only take one form, Kuhn maintains that the contribution varies 3s sclentific revolutions, as the exemplars change. Kua is Kant on wheels, empl world up any way they please; recalcitrance—play a central role in the Kehnian jects is to account for the coordinated behavior, researchers in a given specialty during periods of normal science, How can o1 lain rulelike behavior in the absence of rules? What gives the problem 's the extent o! that coordination, involving not just agreement on accept *

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