I.

THE CULTURAL RELATIVIST CRITIQUE OF HUMAN

RIGHTS

A commitment to human rights connotes a promise to the claim that there exists a solitary, worldwide
moral society of human beings. Past the cultural, religious, ethnic, and national differences a standardized
world is visualized in which everyone holds a fundamental and equal moral acknowledgement for each
other and enjoys the same in the eyes of the individuals who embrace and exercise power.[ CITATION
and03 \l 1033 ] Nonetheless, the doctrine of human rights is often contradicted by the actuality of cultural
diversity, which in a few regards, constitutes a challenge to this vision of a solitary worldwide family.

“Human rights are not what they claim to be”, cultural relativists say.[ CITATION Eva15 \l 1033 ] Human
rights are a result of the privileged and dominant Western parts of the world, framed in their dialect,
presenting their demands and aspirations. With the intention to maintain the universality for human rights
(which is perceived to be the basic rights everyone inherits simply because one is a ‘human being’), the
utmost priority is given to the needs and aspirations of the cosmopolitan moral society at the cost of all
the other ("lower") moral communities. Although, the "rights of man" as initially conceived by the great
liberal scholars were not intended to incorporate slaves and native inhabitants of the colonies, even today
the apparent "universal human rights" seems unfamiliar to the non-Westerners as a matter of fact.
[ CITATION Eva15 \l 1033 ] Overall, the appeal of human rights is both undeniably global and
cosmopolitan. The essence of the arguments derived by the cultural relativists lies within the exclusion of
non- western people from the international human rights protection system.

A. LIBERAL CULTURALISTS

In order to advocate respect for non-Western cultures, some supporters try to bring protection for rights of
cultural communities, which includes minority rights and rights of indigenous beings, within the
prevailing human rights provisions or to improve human rights foundations in order to advance their
cause. These groups of people can be recognized as "liberal culturalists" and can also be explained as
Doctrinalists and institutionalists, respectively. Nevertheless, such activists usually don’t get labeled as
"cultural relativists." That name generally associates with those who question or attack the human rights
framework from their culturalist position or point of view.

B. DOMINANCE THEORISTS

Critiques of a Western dominance within the frameworks of human rights occasionally use a "dominance
theory" which has the comparable edge with the radical feminist argument[ CITATION Eva15 \l 1033 ]. In
the first instance, the economic field seems to be the locus of Western dominance and non-Western
suppression[ CITATION sha90 \t \l 1033 ]. In this view, human rights are utilized as a part of the remote
strategy of Western states as instruments of neocolonialism and of monetary rivalry. This position, which
has been known as the "conspiracy theory,"[ CITATION Fer85 \l 1033 ] has an overwhelmingly political
and financial, as opposed to cultural, character. However, the theory takes another step by shedding the
light on the ethical segment carried by Western imperialism, since Westerners force their standards on
whatever is left of the world through their emphasis on human rights. It is not just that some societies
claim to be essentially unable to provide for certain rights to all their citizens, but rather that they see the
“universal” origination of human rights as little more than an endeavor to enforce unfamiliar Western
values on them[ CITATION sha00 \t \l 1033 ]. Through this forefront, the argument comes within the
locus of the cultural relativist critique of human rights.
After the fiftieth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration was celebrated, the critics from nations that
were still provinces in 1948 recommended that its provisions reveal the ethnocentric predisposition of the
time. They go ahead to contend that the idea of human rights is actually a cover for Western
interventionism in the dealings of the developing countries, and that "human rights" are simply a weapon
for Western political neocolonialism.

C. CULTURAL RELATIVISTS

The first step is to define “Human rights” as an idea developed by the dominant western states serving as
a flag of convenience for other, far more questionable political agendas, accounts for the degree to which
the very idea of human rights is being questioned and resisted by most of the cultural critics. Apart from
the common, theoretical question of whether something in our pluri-cultural, multipolar world is actually
universal, the issue is whether human rights is basically a Western idea which disregards the altogether
different social, economic, and political actualities of the alternate parts of the world? [ CITATION
sha00 \t \l 1033 ]. In the next step, various issues of the non- western states are highlighted and
contradicted with those of the western states or with the universal concept of Human rights. These
cultural contrasts, to the degree that they are genuine, have reasonable ramifications. Many in Non-
Western world argue for the irrelevance of few human rights with their culture. The end result or
conclusion of these premises is the rejection of the Human Rights framework by the flag bearers of
Cultural Relativism.

There are many levels on which the framework is rejected. The first and foremost is the western influence
of human rights and its incompatibility with the cultures of the Non-western societies. Though, this is the
most radical and consistent standpoint of the cultural relativists, it is not encountered very often in
time[ CITATION Eva15 \l 1033 ].

Frequently, Cultural relativists either dismiss particular rights, or reject the particular substance or
understanding of those rights. At last, on a significantly more definite level, cultural relativists may
acknowledge a right with all its segments and with its general understanding however dismisses the
categorization of a specific cultural practice as an infringement of that right. For example, in a culture
where female circumcision is a tradition, the restriction of torment and inhuman, barbaric, or derogatory
treatment (prohibited under Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article7 of the
International agreement Civil and Political Rights) may get the complete acknowledgement while the
categorization of female circumcision under such a treatment is rejected [ CITATION Har84 \l 1033 ]
[ CITATION Eva15 \l 1033 ].

With a deeper observation, just the principal, most radical, approach goes for the rejection of non-
Western societies from the human rights framework. The other, more reasonable standpoints can be
interpreted as demands for incorporation into the framework, provisional on its alteration so as to
accommodate cultural differences. Depending upon the amount of the international human rights system
is fused into the portrayal of the alternate framework, this argument boils down to either a complete or a
fractional dismissal of human rights. It is, however, a rather problematic position. If the human rights
framework is just scrutinized on some ground, it can respond to the feedback and a productive discourse
is at least conceivable. But if the concept of human rights is appropriated by the critics and given an
alternate stance, this leads to a impasse, on the grounds that the fundamental clash is denied and no
opening for discourse is given. These critics don't talk about how their claims could be answered with a
change in the human rights framework. Their argument is truly one of exclusion.
 D. CRITCISM AND DEMANDS FOR TRANSFROMATION.

What are the consistent criticisms that cultural relativists direct towards the Human rights framework?
The aspects of human rights frequently addressed as Western are its independence, its relevancy, and the
idea of rights itself. From about every non-Western culture comes the contention that its individuals don't
characterize themselves in any case as sovereign people, yet rather encounter themselves as having a
"endorsed status" as individuals from a bigger community or group, for example, family, clan, class,
country, or other group[ CITATION Eva15 \l 1033 ]. The utilization of conceptual ideas and classifications
in human rights is argued to be the result of Western reasonability, not shared by non-Westerners. They
are persuaded that it is vital to put all issues in their cultural setting and to inspect them at a concrete
level. One aphorism of cultural relativism is the claim that judgments of behavior or of circumstances
don't bode well outside the culture in which they happen. The idea of rights itself is contended to be
normal for a general public that thinks in the terms of atomized people and theoretical thoughts.

As for the demands for change of the human rights framework, the communitarian evaluation proposes
that more consideration ought to be paid to communal rights, and to putting impediments on individual
rights for communal interests. One of the methods for developing such restrictions is to fixate them on the
ideas of commitments and duties. To the degree that the cultural relativist critique is against legalism in
human rights, it could sustain a status quo. Currently, the international society, without the best possible
foundations for universal legal authorization, tries to uphold human rights primarily through political
weight and embarrassment in the eyes of the general population. Considering that the current power
irregularities in the international community get free play in this framework, while they may be more
contained in a more legalistic framework, it might be more astute for the non-Western world to parallel
the feminist options i.e., to set aside their Cultural complaints to "rightism" and play the rights game as a
technique to promote their different claims inside the human rights framework.

Finally, a persistent argument derives from the concept of the existence of a foundation and a periphery in
human rights. The foundation is crucial and universal, while the periphery should allow social varieties.
At the point when this foundation/periphery model is connected to the framework of human rights, it
contends for a decrease of the list of universal human rights to those not challenged anywhere, leaving the
rest discretionary with the goal that human rights records fluctuate as indicated by cultures. The
core/periphery model can likewise be connected to each right individually and used to contend for the
compact detailing of the embodiment of what is to be ensured inside each right, consequently leaving
space for logical variety in the understanding and utilization of the right inside each culture[ CITATION
sha90 \t \l 1033 ].