SANGALANG vs INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. 71169 December 22, 1988

Facts:

Jose Sangalang and wife, herein petitioners are residents of Jupiter Street, Makati
Metro Manila. Sangalang and the other petitioners who are also residents of Jupiter
Street initially filed a case against Ayala to enforce by specific performance restrictive
easement upon property pursuant to stipulations embodied in the deeds of sale
covering the subdivision, and for damages. The other petitions were also for the
enforcement of the aforesaid restrictions stipulated in the deeds of sale executed by the
Ayala Corporation.

The lots which were acquired by the petitioners, were all sold by MDC subject to certain
conditions and easements contained in Deed Restrictions which formed a part of each
deed of sale. When MDC sold the above-mentioned lots to appellees' predecessors-in-
interest, the whole stretch of the commercial block between Buendia Avenue and
Jupiter Street, from Reposo Street in the west to Zodiac Street in the east, was still
undeveloped. Altough it was not part of the original plan, MDC constructed a fence or
wall on the commercial block along Jupiter.

In 1975, the municipal council of Makati enacted its ordinance No. 81, providing for the
zonification of Makati (Exh. 18). Under this Ordinance, Bel-Air Village was classified as
a Class A Residential Zone, with its boundary in the south extending to the center line of
Jupiter Street. Under the zoning classifications, Jupiter Street, therefore, is a common
boundary of Bel-Air Village and the commercial zone.

Gates had been installed by BAVA (Bell-Arat strategic locations across Jupiter Street
which were manned and operated by its own security guards who were employed to
maintain, supervise and enforce traffic regulations in the roads and streets of the village.
Then, on January 17, 1977, the Office of the Mayor of Makati directed that, in the
interest of public welfare and for the purpose of easing traffic congestion, the streets in
Bel-Air Village should be opened for public use. The other streets in Bel-Air Village
were voluntarily opened except Jupiter Street. The Municipal Engineer of Makati in a
letter addressed to BAVA advised the latter to open for vehicular and pedestrian traffic
the entire portion of Jupiter Street from Makati Avenue to Reposo Street. Finally, the
municipal officials of Makati concerned allegedly opened, destroyed and removed the
gates constructed/located at the corner of Reposo Street and Jupiter Street as well as
the gates/fences located/constructed at Jupiter Street and Makati Avenue forcibly, and
then opened the entire length of Jupiter Street to public traffic.

Petitioners brought the present action for damages against the defendant-appellant
Ayala Corporation predicated on both breach of contract and on tort or quasi-delict.
After trial on the merits, the then Court of First Instance favored the petitioners and
awarded damages. Defendant is further ordered to restore/reconstruct the perimeter
wall at its original position in 1966 from Reposo Street in the west to Zodiac Street in the
east, at its own expense,

On appeal, CA reversed the lower court, finding the decision appealed from as not
supported by the facts and the law on the matter, it was set aside and another one
entered dismissing the case for lack of a cause of action.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Ayala Corporation is liable for damages as a result of the destruction
of the perimeter wall.

2. Whether or not the exercise of police power is valid.

Held:

1. NO. Jupiter Street lies as the boundary between Bel-Air Village and Ayala
Corporation's commercial section, it had been considered as a boundary not as a part of
either the residential or commercial zones of Ayala Corporation's real estate
development projects, hence it cannot be said to have been "for the exclusive benefit"
of Bel-Air Village residents.

Jupiter Street lies as a mere boundary, a fact acknowledged by the authorities of Makati
and the National Government and, as a scrutiny of the records themselves reveals, by
the petitioners themselves, as the articles of incorporation of Bel-Air Village Association
itself would confirm. As a consequence, Jupiter Street was intended for the use by both
-the commercial and residential blocks. It was not originally constructed, therefore, for
the exclusive use of either block, least of all the residents of Bel-Air Village, but, we
repeat, in favor of both, as distinguished from the general public. When the wall was
erected in 1966 and rebuilt twice, in 1970 and 1972, it was not for the purpose of
physically separating the two blocks. According to Ayala Corporation, it was put up to
enable the Bel-Air Village Association "better control of the security in the area, and as
the Ayala Corporation's "show of goodwill". That maintaining the wall was a matter of a
contractual obligation on the part of Ayala, to be pure conjecture. In fine, we cannot
hold the Ayala Corporation liable for damages for a commitment it did not make, much
less for alleged resort to machinations in evading it.

2. Yes. While non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not

absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e.,
"the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety and general welfare of the people.' Invariably described as "the
most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers" and "in a sense, the greatest and
most powerful attribute of government," the exercise of the power may be judicially
inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable,
there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guarantee. Resolution No. 27, 1960 declaring the western part of High
way 54, now E. de los Santos Avenue (EDSA, for short) from Shaw Boulevard to the
Pasig River as an industrial and commercial zone, was obviously passed by the
Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to safeguard or
promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the
locality.

Far Eastern Shipping Company v. CA

May 24, 2018
Commercial Law. Transportation. Pilots. Compulsory Pilotage.
FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 130150; October 1998
FACTS:
M/V PAVLODAR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC),
arrived at the Port of Manila and was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port,
as its berthing space. Gavino, who was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots’
Association to conduct the docking maneuvers for the safe berthing, boarded the vessel
at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of the
vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the
particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine
anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was calm and the
wind was ideal for docking maneuvers. When the vessel reached the landmark, one-half
mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel was already
about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed
the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left anchor, with two (2) shackles,
were dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the
vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members.  After Gavino
noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana,
who was then on the pier apron, noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast.
Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the
“full-astern” code. Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be dropped, the
bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to
the pier as well as the vessel.
ISSUES:
(1) Is the pilot of a commercial vessel, under compulsory pilotage, solely liable for the
damage caused by the vessel to the pier, at the port of destination, for his negligence?;
(2) Would the owner of the vessel be liable likewise if the damage is caused by the
concurrent negligence of the master of the vessel and the pilot under a compulsory
pilotage?
HELD:
(1) Generally speaking, the pilot supersedes the master for the time being in the
command and navigation of the ship, and his orders must be obeyed in all matters
connected with her navigation. He becomes the master pro hac vice and should give all
directions as to speed, course, stopping and reversing anchoring, towing and the like.
And when a licensed pilot is employed in a place where pilotage is compulsory, it is his
duty to insist on having effective control of the vessel or to decline to act as pilot. Under
certain systems of foreign law, the pilot does not take entire charge of the vessel but is
deemed merely the adviser of the master, who retains command and control of the
navigation even in localities where pilotage is compulsory. It is quite common for states
and localities to provide for compulsory pilotage, and safety laws have been enacted
requiring vessels approaching their ports, with certain exceptions, to take on board
pilots duly licensed under local law. The purpose of these laws is to create a body of
seamen thoroughly acquainted with the harbor, to pilot vessels seeking to enter or
depart, and thus protect life and property from the dangers of navigation. Upon
assuming such office as a compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to the universally
accepted high standards of care and diligence required of a pilot, whereby he assumes
to have skill and knowledge in respect to navigation in the particular waters over which
his license extends superior to and more to be trusted than that of the master. He is not
held to the highest possible degree of skill and care but must have and exercise the
ordinary skill and care demanded by the circumstances, and usually shown by an expert
in his profession. Under extraordinary circumstances, a pilot must exercise
extraordinary care. In this case, Capt. Gavino failed to measure up to such strict
standard of care and diligence required of pilots in the performance of their duties. As
the pilot, he should have made sure that his directions were promptly and strictly
followed.
(2) The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino is evident; but Capt. Kabancov is no less
responsible for the allision. The master is still in command of the vessel notwithstanding
the presence of a pilot. A perusal of Capt. Kabankov’s testimony makes it apparent that
he was remiss in the discharge of his duties as master of the ship, leaving the entire
docking procedure up to the pilot, instead of maintaining watchful vigilance over this
risky maneuver. The owners of a vessel are not personally liable for the negligent acts
of a compulsory pilot, but by admiralty law, the fault or negligence of a compulsory pilot
is imputable to the vessel and it may be held liable therefor in rem. Where, however, by
the provisions of the statute the pilot is compulsory only in the sense that his fee must
be paid, and is not in compulsory charge of the vessel, there is no exemption from
liability. Even though the pilot is compulsory, if his negligence was not the sole cause of
the injury, but the negligence of the master or crew contributed thereto, the owners are
liable. But the liability of the ship in rem does not release the pilot from the
consequences of his own negligence. The master is not entirely absolved of
responsibility with respect to navigation when a compulsory pilot is in charge. Except
insofar as their liability is limited or exempted by statute, the vessel or her owners are
liable for all damages caused by the negligence or other wrongs of the owners or those
in charge of the vessel. As a general rule, the owners or those in possession and
control of a vessel and the vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damages
caused to persons or property by reason of her negligent management or navigation.

MANILA PEST CONTROL V WCC

25 SCRA 700
October 29, 1968

FACTS:

Mario Abitria, an employee at the Research Division of Manila Pest

Control suffered pulmonary tuberculosis from inhaling dangerous fumes as
the atmosphere was polluted with poisonous chemical dusts. The working
condition of his place of work was also warm and humid in view of the
products being manufactured by the respondent. He was not extended any
protective device and he was also made to lift heavy objects in the painting
and soldering. In his soldering work muriatic acid and soldering paste [were]
used.

Respondent Workmen`s Compensation Commission filed a case to

Manila Pest Control. Motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner for
having failed to appear and that he be allowed to present evidence but was
denied. This is because a deci decision had already been rendered against
petitioner, as employer, awarding respondent Abitria P6,000.00 as his
disability compensation benefit. The City Sheriff of Manila, likewise made a
respondent, levied on petitioner’s properties, by virtue of the writ of
execution.
 A motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order was filed with the
averment that petitioner was not aware of any decision rendered in the case
as no copy of the same had theretofore been furnished to its counsel. It is
petitioner’s contention that in the light of the above alleged infringement of
procedural due process, the actuation of respondent Commission was either
in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

Manila Pest Control was required by the court to file, within 10 days
from notice hereof, an answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition for
prohibition.

It was raised by the petitioner that the decision was sent to a certain
Attorney Manuel Camacho but care of petitioner’s counsel, Attorney Manuel
Corpuz. Petitioner would emphasize that the one "officially furnished" with a
copy of such decision was not its counsel, who was without any connection
with the aforesaid Attorney Camacho. It would conclude, therefore, that it
had not received a copy of a decision which could not thereafter reach the
stage of finality calling for a writ of execution.

ISSUE:

WON Atty. Corpuz’s act unduly delays the case.

HELD:

Yes.

Mr. Guzman went to the office of Atty. Corpuz, the counsel of MPC to deliver
the copy of the decision. Atty. Corpuz refused to receive alleging that he was
no longer the lawyer of handling the case. Atty. Corpuz then instructed Mr.
Guzman to deliver it to Atty. Camacho because he was the one handling the
case. Guzman proceeded to the office of Atty. Camacho but he was not present so
he handed the copy of the decision to the receiving clerk.

Under the above circumstances, no due process question arose. What was
done satisfied such a constitutional requirement. An effort was made to
serve petitioner with a copy of the decision; that such effort failed was
attributable to the conduct of its own counsel. True, there was a denial; it is
far from persuasive, as already noted. It does not have the ring of truth.
There is no reason why the decision would have been served on some other
counsel if there were no such misinformation, if there were no such attempt
to mislead.

It is one thing to exert to the utmost one's ability to protect the interest of
one's client. It is quite another thing, and this is to put it at its mildest, to
take advantage of any unforeseen turn of events, if not to create one, to
delay if not to defeat the recovery of what is justly due and demandable,
especially so, when as in this case, the obligee is a necessitous and poverty-
stricken man suffering from a dreaded disease, that unfortunately afflicts so
many of our countrymen and even more unfortunately requires an outlay far
beyond the means of our poverty stricken masses.

The ancient and learned profession of the law stresses fairness and honor;
that must ever be kept in mind by everyone who is enrolled in its ranks and
who expects to remain a member in good standing. This Tribunal is rightfully
entrusted with the serious responsibility of seeing to it that no deviation from
such a norm should be countenanced. If what occurred here would not be
characterized for the shocking thing it was, then it could be said that the law
is less than fair and far from honorable. What happens then to the ideal that
only he is fit to belong to such a profession who remains a faithful votary at
the altar of justice? Such an ideal may be difficult to approximate. That is
true, but let it not be said that when such a notorious breach of its lofty
standard took place, as unfortunately it did in this case, this Court exhibited
magnificent unconcern.

The Philippine National Bank v. Uy Teng Piao |October 21, 1932| G.R. No. L-35252 | Justice Vickers
Nature of the Case: Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila
Plaintiff-Appellant: The Philippine National Bank
Defendant-Appellee: Uy Teng Piao

Summary: Uy Teng Piao was ordered by the CFI Manila to pay the sum of P17,232.42 with interest at 7%
per annum, plus 10% of the sum amount for attorney's fees and costs in favor of PNB. However, he
failed to comply and so the sheriff sold in a public auction 2 of his mortgaged properties to PNB.
Subsequently, PNB obtained a waiver of his right to redeem the 2 nd parcel of land before selling it to
another. After selling both properties, and crediting the sum of 11,300 PHP to Uy Teng Piao, PNB
brought the present action before the court to revive the judgment for the rest of the balance. Uy Teng
Piao opposed and argued that there was an agreement of condonation of the remaining balance
between PNB and him, which is why he agreed to sign the waiver. CFI ruled in favor of him and so the
appeal. In reversing its previous decision, the Court held that Uy Teng Piao failed to substantiate his
claim of an agreement. Plus, one of the attorneys of PNB testified that Uy Teng Piao only waived his
right because a friend of his was willing to pay the land. The court believed this testimony but still
invoked Canon 19 of the Code of Legal Ethics to remind lawyers that they should withdraw from
handling the case when they choose to testify.
Topic: Rule 12.08 – Not to Testify on Behalf of Client, Canon 12

FACTS:
 This case is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila which absolved Uy
Teng Piao from further paying the rest of the balance of the judgment amounting to 11, 574.33
PHP made by the same CFI Manila in a civil case rendered in favor of PNB.
  In said civil case, Uy Teng Piao was ordered by the court to pay the sum of P17,232.42 with
interest at 7% per annum from June 1, 1924, plus 10% of the sum amount for attorney's fees
and costs.
 The amount is to be deposited with the clerk of the court within 3 months from the date of the
judgment, and in case of his failure to do so that the 2 mortgaged properties (2 parcels of land)
will be sold at a public auction.
 Uy Teng Piao failed to comply with the order, so the sheriff of the City of Manila sold the 2
parcels of land at a public auction to the Philippine National Bank for P300 and P1,000
respectively.
 Subsequently, PNB secured from Uy Teng Piao a waiver of his right to redeem the 2 nd parcel of
land (situated at Ronquillo Street, Manila), and on the same date the bank sold said property to
Mariano Santos for P8,600
 Meanwhile, the 1st parcel of land was resold by the bank for P2,700, because the account of Uy
Teng Piao was credited with the sum of P11,300. In other words, the bank credited Uy Teng Piao
with the full amount realized by it when it resold the 2 parcels of land.
 The bank then brought the present action to revive the judgment for the balance of P11,574.33,
with interest at 7% per annum.
 However, Uy Teng Piao alleged as a special defense that he waived his right to redeem the land
described in the 2nd title because of an understanding between him and PNB that PNB would not
collect from him the balance of the judgment. It was on this ground that the trial court absolved
the defendant from the complaint.
 In detail, Uy Teng Piao alleged the following which the court favored:
a) That one Mr. Pecson gave a promise to him to condone the balance of the judgment
rendered against him and in favor of PNB
b) That the selling the 2nd property to Mariano Santos for P8,600 proved that PNB had
undoubtedly given the alleged promise of condonation to Uy Teng Piao.
c) that said Mr. Pecson, granting that the latter has actually given such promise to condone,
could bind PNB.
d) that the absence of demand for payment upon Uy Teng Piao for the balance of the said
judgment from February 11, 1925 up to the year 1930 is proof of the condonation of the
balance of the said judgment.
e) that the sale of the said property to Mariano Santos for the sum of P8,600, the judgment has
been more than fully paid.

ISSUE + RULING:
1) WON CFI Manila rightfully absolved Uy Teng Piao from paying PNB the rest of the balance of
judgment?
HELD: No
a) Uy Teng Piao failed to prove any valid agreement on the part of the bank not to collect from
him the remainder of the judgment. His testimony of the agreement is uncorroborated.
 When asked on cross-examination if Pecson was not in Iloilo at the time of the
execution of defendant's waiver of his right to redeem, Uy Teng Piao answered that he
did not know; asked when Pecson had spoken to him about the matter, the defendant
replied that he did not remember.
 Uy Teng Piao should have presented Mr. Pecson as a witness.
 b) Plus, the court states that if Mr. Pecson had really made any such agreement to Uy Teng Piao, it
is only reasonable to suppose that he would have required Uy Teng Piao to waive his right to
redeem both parcels of land, and that Uy Teng Piano, a Chines business man, would have
insisted upon some evidence of the agreement in writing.
c) THERE IS EVEN NO SHOWING THAT MR. PECSON IS AUTHORIZED TO MAKE SUCH AGREEMENT
TO UY TENG PIAO.
 Only the board of directors or the persons empowered by the board of directors could
bind the bank by such an agreement.
d) one of the attorneys for PNB testified that Uy Teng Piao renounced his right to redeem the
parcel of land in Calle Ronquillo, because a friend of his was interested in buying it.
 The court believed this and held that Uy Teng Piao must have waived his right to
redeem the land in Calle Ronquillo, because a friend of his wished to purchase it and
was willing to pay therefor P8,600, and the bank agreed to credit the defendant with
the full amount of the sale.

In relation to such, comes this issue:

2) WON this testimony made by the lawyer of the PNB is admissible? YES, but…
 the court reminded that although the law does not forbid an attorney to be a witness
and at the same time an attorney in a cause, the courts prefer that counsel should not
testify as a witness unless it is necessary, and that they should withdraw from the
active management of the case. (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, p. 148.)
Canon 19 of the Code of Legal Ethics reads as follows:
“When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal matters, such as the
attestation or custody of an instrument and the like, he should leave the trial of the case to other
counsel. Except when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer should avoid testifying in court in
behalf of his client.”

With regard to the contention that since the bank accepted the benefit of the waiver it cannot now
repudiate the alleged agreement: The fact that the bank after having bought the land for P1,000 resold
it at
the instance of the defendant for P8,600 and credited the defendant with the full amount of the resale
was a
sufficient consideration for the execution of defendant's waiver of his right to redeem.

FINAL RULING:
Decision appealed from is reversed, and the defendant is condemned to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P11,574.38 with interest thereon at the rate of 7 per cent per annum from August 1, 1930, and the costs
of both instances.

IN RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA, ON LEGAL AND MORAL GROUNDS, FROM
BEING ELECTED IBP GOVERNOR FOR EASTERN MINDANAO IN THE MAY 31, IBP ELECTIONS

OLIVER OWEN L. GARCIA, EMMANUEL RAVANERA and TONY VELEZ vs. ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA AND
IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS

[A.C. No. 6052. December 11, 2003.]

Facts:

Petitioner lawyers Oliver L. Garcia, Emmanuel Ravanera and Tony Velez filed a petition seeking the
disqualification of respondent lawyer Leonard De Vera from being elected Governor of Eastern
Mindanao in the 16th Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Regional Governor's Elections.

Petitioner Garcia is the Vice-President of Bukidnon IBP Chapter, while petitioners Ravanera and Velez
are the past president and the incumbent President, respectively, of the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter.
Petitioners contended that respondent's transfer from Pasay, Parañaque, Las Piñas and Muntinlupa
(PPLM) Chapter to Agusan del Sur Chapter is a brazen abuse and misuse of the rotation rule, a mockery
of the domicile rule and a great insult to the lawyers of Eastern Mindanao for it implied that there is no
lawyer from the region qualified and willing to serve the IBP.

Petitioners also submitted that respondent De Vera lacks the requisite moral aptitude for the position.
According to petitioners, respondent De Vera was previously sanctioned by the Supreme Court for
irresponsibly attacking the integrity of the SC Justices during the deliberations of the plunder law. They
further alleged that respondent De Vera could have been disbarred in the United States for
misappropriating his client's funds had he not surrendered his California license to practice law.

Respondent De Vera argued that the Court has no jurisdiction over the present controversy contending
that the election of the officers of the IBP, including the determination of the qualification of those who
want to serve the organization, is purely an internal matter governed as it is by the IBP By-Laws and
exclusively regulated and administered by the IBP. Respondent also averred that an IBP member is
entitled to select, change or transfer his chapter or transfer his chapter membership under Section 19,
Article II and Section 29-2, Article IV of the IBP By-Laws. He also stressed that the right to

transfer membership is also recognized in Section 4, 139-A of the Rules of Court which is exactly the
same as the first of the above-quoted provision of the IBP By-Laws.

On the moral integrity question, respondent De Vera denies that he exhibited disrespect to the Court or
to any of its members during its deliberations on the constitutionality of the plunder law. As for the
administrative complaint filed against him by one of his clients when he was practicing law in California,
which in turn compelled him to surrender his California license to practice law, he maintains that it
cannot serve as basis for determining his moral qualification (or lack of it) to run for the position he is
aspiring for.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the Court has no jurisdiction over the IBP.

2. Whether or not the respondent is disqualified from being elected Governor in the IBP.
Held:

1. On the issue of jurisdiction, the Court affirmed its right to hear and decide the present controversy.
Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution conferred on the Supreme Court the power to promulgate
rules affecting the IBP and implicit in the constitutional grant is the power to supervise all the activities
of the IBP, including the election of its officers. The power of supervision over the IBP has been
demonstrated in the past when it looked into the irregularities which attended the 1989 elections of the
IBP National Officers. The Court likewise amended several provisions of the IBP By-Laws.

2. The Court upheld respondent De Vera in his contention that a member of the IBP is entitled to select,
change or transfer his chapter membership. Section 19 of the IBP By-Laws allows a member to change
his chapter membership, subject only to the condition that the transfer must be made not less than
three months prior to the election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer. In
the case at bar, respondent De Vera's transfer to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter is valid as it was done
more than three months ahead of the chapter elections held on February 27, 2003.

The Court also ruled that there is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be
morally fit before he can run for IBP governorship. The Court emphasized that the disqualification of a
candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or suspension from the
practice of law by the Court or conviction by final judgment of an offense which involves moral
turpitude.

In In Re: Published Alleged Threats Against Members of the Court in the Plunder Law Case Hurled by
Atty. Leonard De Vera, Respondent De Vera was found guilty of indirect contempt of court and was
imposed a fine in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos for his remarks contained in two newspaper
articles published in the Inquirer. The Court held that the statements were aimed at influencing and
threatening the Court to decide in favor of the constitutionality of the Plunder Law. The ruling cannot
serve as a basis to consider respondent De Vera immoral. The act for which he was found guilty of
indirect contempt does not involve moral turpitude. Moral turpitude as "an act of baseness, vileness or
depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man, or conduct
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals."

On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he was still practicing
law in California, he explained that no final judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court
finding him guilty of the charge. Bare allegations and unsubstantiated by evidence are not equivalent to
proof.
The Court also ruled that petitioners are not the proper parties to bring the suit under Section 40 of the
IBP By-Laws which provides that only nominees can file a written protest setting forth the ground
therefor. Petitioner Garcia is from Bukidnon IBP Chapter, while the other petitioners, Ravanera and
Velez, are from the Misamis Oriental IBP and are not qualified to run for IBP governorship of Eastern
Mindanao pursuant to the rotation rule enunciated in Sections 37 and 38 of the IBP By-Laws. The Court
also held that the instant petition was premature as no nomination of candidates has been made by the
members of the House of Delegates from Eastern Mindanao, and assuming that respondent De Vera
gets nominated, he can always opt to decline the nomination.

En Banc

NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. V. SANCHEZ

GR No. 75209 – September 30, 1987

KIMBERLY INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION FOR SOLIDARITY V. NLRC

GR No. 78791 – September 30, 1987

Per Curiam

SUBJECT: Canon 13 – Influencing or Giving appearance of Influencing Court

FACTS:

The Union of Filipro Employees and Kimberly Independent Union for Solidarity, Activism and
Nationalism-Olalia had been conducting pickets which intensified during the period of July 8-10, 1987
outside Padre Faura gate of the SC building. Since June 17, 1981

On July 10, the Court en banc issued a resolution giving the said unions the opportunity to withdraw
graciously and requiring the union leaders and their counsels and other individuals to appear before the
Court on July 14 and then and there to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court.
Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, was further required to show cause why
he should not be administratively dealt with.

Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court with an
assurance that such acts will not be repeated. He prayed for the Court’s leniency considering that the
picket was actually spearheaded by the leaders of the PAMANTIK, an unregistered loosed alliance of
about 75 unions in the southern Tagalog area and not by either the UFE or KILU.

ISSUE: WON the respondents should be held in contempt and Atty. Espinas be administratively dealt
with.

HELD:

Grievances, if any, should be ventilated to the proper channels, i.e., through appropriate petitions,
motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial administrator of
justice entitled to “proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside
interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice.

“It is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of
issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided
upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by
bias, prejudice or sympathies.” (In re Stolen).

The acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the dignity of the Court, but equally a
violation of the constitutional right of the adverse party and the citizenry at large to have their causes
tried fairly.

The right of free speech and of assembly of the individuals herein are not violated because any attempt
to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either rights amounts to an abuse
thereof and is no loner within the ambit of constitutional protection. However, being non-lawyers, the
duty and responsibility of advising them rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of
record, Atty. Espinas. It is the duty of all members of the legal profession as officers of the court to
properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice.

The contempt charges were dismissed.

CRUZ V SALVA
MONTEMAYOR; July 25, 1959
(chris capul)

NATURE
Original action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction.
FACTS
- A certain Manuel Monroy was murdered. CFI Pasay found Castelo, de Jesus, Bonifacio,
Mendoza, Berdugo et al. guilty of murder. They all appealed and Castelo sought new trial.
Castelo was again found guilty.
- Pres Magsaysay ordered reinvestigation. Philippine Constabulary questioned people and got
confessions pointing to persons other than those convicted.
- Castelo et al wrote to Fiscal Salva to conduct reinvestigation on basis of new confessions.
Fiscal conferred w/ SolGen and the Justice Sec decided to have the results of investigation
made available to counsel for appellants.
- Chief of Phil Constabulary furnished Fiscal Salva copies of the affidavits and confessions.
Salva organized a committee for reinvestigation and subpoenaed Timoteo Cruz, who was
implicated as instigator and mastermind in the new affidavits and confessions. Cruz’ counsel
questioned jurisdiction of the committee and of Salva to conduct preliminary investigation bec
the case was pending appeal in the SC. Counsel filed this present petition.
- Salva said he subpoenaed Cruz bec of Cruz’ oral and personal request to allow him to appear
at the investigation.
- SC issued writ of preliminary injunction stopping the prelim investigation.

ISSUES
1. WON Salva and his committee can push through with the investigation
2. WON Cruz can be compelled to appear and testify before Salva
3. WON Salva conducted the investigation property

HELD
1. Yes.
- SC believed Salva that it was Cruz who personally reqested to allow him to appear at the
investigation.
- Normally, when a criminal case handled by fiscal is tried and decided and appealed to a
higher court, functions of fiscal have terminated. However, Salva has justified his
reinvestigation bec in the orig case, one of the defendants (Salvador Realista y de Guzman)
was not included in the trial.
- The duty of a prosecuting attorney is not only to prosecute and secure conviction of the guilty
but also to protect the innocent.
- Writ of preliminary injunction dissolved. Investigation may continue.
- Petition for certiorari and prohibition granted in part, denied in part.
2. No
- Under the law, Cruz had right to be present at the investigation but he need not be present.
His presence is more of a right than a legal obligation.
3. No
- Salva shld have done investigation privately in his office and not publicly in the session hall of
Municipal Court of Pasay where microphones were installed and media people were present.
He should also not have made the media people ask questions. SC was disturbed and
annoyed by such publicity.
- Salva is publicly reprehended and censured.

In re: Gomez

43 Phil 376 – Legal Ethics – Contemptuous Language 

In 1921, Atty. Feliciano Gomez lost an election protest case for the governorship of Laguna filed
by Juan Cailles which reached the Supreme Court. Thereafter, Gomez remarked in a
newspaper that the Supreme Court sided with Cailles as a favor to then Governor-General
Wood who was a friend of Cailles.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gomez is guilty of contempt.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court let this one go. The Supreme Court felt at that time that
declaring Gomez in contempt will only seem to vindicate his accusations against the high court.
The Supreme Court however emphasized that it is more proper to criticize the courts in relation
to pending cases – such was not the case when Gomez criticized the high court. The Supreme
Court said “litigants and lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for words said in the
heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court to
condone even contemptuous language.” The rule in the more progressive jurisdictions is, that
courts, when a case is finished, are subject to the same criticism as other people. Judges may
not vindicate a private wrong by a public method. Although the honor and integrity of the court
may be assailed, judges, like other persons, are relegated to the courts for redress.

MARTELINO vs. ALEJANDRO

FACTS:

Major Eduardo Martelino is charged with the violation of the 94th and 97th
Articles of War, as a result of the alleged shooting on March 18, 1968 of some
Muslim recruits then undergoing commando training on the island of Corregidor.

On August 12, 1969 Martelino sought the disqualification of the President of

the general court-martial, following the latter's admission that he read newspaper
stories of the Corregidor incident. Martelino contended that the case had received
such an amount of publicity in the press and other news media and in fact was
being exploited for political purposes in connection with the presidential election on
November 11, 1969 as to imperil his right to a fair trial. After deliberating, the
military court denied the challenge.
 Respondents assert that despite the publicity which the case had received,
no proof has been presented showing that the court-martial's president's fairness
and impartiality have been impaired. On the contrary, they claim, the petitioner's
own counsel expressed confidence in the "integrity, experience and background" of
the members of the court.

ISSUE:

Whether the publicity given to the case against the petitioners was such as to
prejudice their right to a fair trial?

HELD:

NO, the spate of publicity in this case did not focus on the guilt of the
petitioners but rather on the responsibility of the Government for what was claimed
to be a "massacre" of Muslim trainees.

If there was a "trial by newspaper" at all, it was not of the petitioners but of
the Government. Absent here is a showing of failure of the court-martial to protect
the accused from massive publicity encouraged by those connected with the
conduct of the trial either by a failure to control the release of information or to
remove the trial to another venue or to postpone it until the deluge of prejudicial
publicity shall have subsided. Indeed we cannot say that the trial of the petitioners
was being held under circumstances which did not permit the observance of those
imperative decencies of procedure which have come to be identified with due
process.

Granting the existence of "massive" and "prejudicial" publicity, since the

petitioners here do not contend that the respondents have been unduly influenced
but simply that they might be by the "barrage" of publicity, we think that the
suspension of the court-martial proceedings has accomplished the purpose sought
by the petitioners' challenge for cause, by postponing the trial of the petitioner until
calmer times have returned. The atmosphere has since been cleared and the
publicity surrounding the Corregidor incident has so far abated that we believe the
trial may now be resumed in tranquility.

Quilban vs. Robinol, 171 SCRA 768 , April 10, 1989

Legal Ethics; Lawyers; Atty. Robinol is guilty of ethical infractions and grave misconduct for having
retained in his possession his clients’ funds intended for a specific purpose.—Atty. Robinol has, in fact,
been guilty of ethical infractions and grave misconduct that make him unworthy to continue in the
practice of the profession. After the Court of Appeals had rendered a Decision favorable to his clients
and he had received the latter’s funds, suddenly, he had a change of mind and decided to convert the
payment of his fees from a portion of land equivalent to that of each of the plaintiffs to P50,000.00,
which he alleges to be the monetary value of that area. Certainly, Atty. Robinol had no right to
unilaterally appropriate his clients’ money not only because he is bound by a written agreement but
also because, under the circumstances, it was highly unjust for him to have done so. His clients were
mere squatters who could barely eke out an existence. They had painstakingly raised their respective
quotas of P2,500.00 per family with which to pay for the land only to be deprived of the same by one
who, after having seen the color of money, heartlessly took advantage of them. Atty. Robinol has no
basis to claim that since he was unjustly dismissed by his clients he had the legal right to retain the
money in his possession. Firstly, there was justifiable ground for his discharge as counsel. His clients
had lost confidence in him for he had obviously engaged in dilatory tactics to the detriment of their
interests, which he was duty-bound to protect. Secondly, even if there were no valid ground, he is
bereft of any legal right to retain his clients’ funds intended for a specific purpose—the purchase of
land. He stands obliged to return the money immediately to their rightful owners.

Same; Same; Same; Lawyer’s Oath; For having violated his oath not to delay any man for money and
to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients, Atty. Robinol has rendered himself unfit to
continue in the practice of law.—Inevitable, therefore, is the conclusion that Atty. Robinol has
rendered himself unfit to continue in the practice of law. He has not only violated his oath not to delay
any man for money and to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He has also brought the
profession into disrepute with people who had reposed in it full faith and reliance for the fulfillment of
a life-time ambition to acquire a homelot they could call their own.

Same; Same; It is the prerogative of clients to change their counsel in a pending case at any time, and
thereafter to employ another lawyer.—There is no gainsaying that clients are free to change their
counsel in a pending case at any time (Section 26, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and thereafter employ
another lawyer who may then enter his appearance. In this case, the plaintiffs in the civil suit below
decided to change their lawyer, Atty. Robinol, for loss of trust and confidence. That act was well
within their prerogative.

Attorney’s Fees; Quantum Meruit; The principle of quantum meruit does not apply in the instant case
there being an express contract and a stipulated mode of compensation.—The principle of quantum
meruit applies if a lawyer is employed without a price agreed upon for his services in which case he
would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services, as much as he has earned. In this case,
however, there was an express contract and a stipulated mode of compensation. The implied assumpsit
on quantum meruit, therefore, is inapplicable. [Quilban vs. Robinol, 171 SCRA 768(1989)]

ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER v. ATTY. LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., et al.

477 SCRA 634 (2005)

A lawyer is prohibited from representing an interest contrary to that earlier espoused

by his firm.

Erlinda K. Ilusorio-Bildner filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Luis Lokin, Jr..
This sprung from the time that her father, the late Potenciano Ilusorio, engaged the
services of the law office of Lokin to represent him in the Sandiganbayan where the
Republic was claiming, among other properties, shareholdings in Philippine Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC) and Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT).

Ilusorio, with the assistance of Lokin, entered into a Compromise Agreement where
Ilusorio was to get 673 POTC shares. Ilusorio-Bildner alleges that the informal
gathering, through the “high-handed and deceitful maneuvers” of Lokin, was suddenly
and without notice transformed into a Special Stockholders Meeting at which directors
and officers of PHILCOMSAT were elected. Her father contested the validity of the
meeting by filing before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against Manuel
Nieto, et al. who were purportedly elected directors and officers of PHILCOMSAT, in
which SEC case Lokin appeared as the counsel of Nieto, et al., contrary to his oath not to
represent conflicting interests.
Ilusorio, had earlier filed with the IBP a disbarment complaint. However, on account of
the death of Ilusorio, his complaint was dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a
new complaint by Ilusorio’s children. Ilusorio-Bildner now filed the complaint but the
IBP Board of Governors dismissed it. No copy of the notice of resolution was served
upon petitioner. Ilusorio-Bildner, nonetheless, learned about the matter.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lokin was personally barred by the rules of ethics from representing an
interest contrary to that earlier espoused by his firm

HELD:

Notwithstanding his acknowledged involvement in both the Sandiganbayan and SEC

cases, respondent denies that he was guilty of representing conflicting interests, he
proffering that, in the first place, the case of Ilusorio in the Sandiganbayan “has been the
personal account of Atty. Raval, separate and apart from the accounts of the law
partnership.” Not only is this claim unsubstantiated, however. It is contradicted by
respondent’s own evidence and statements.

As earlier noted, respondent has stated that Ilusorio was represented by his firm in the
Sandiganbayan case. In light thereof, respondent was personally barred by the rules of
ethics from representing an interest contrary to that earlier espoused by his firm.

Plainly, when Lokin represented Nieto, et al. in the SEC, he was advocating an interest
hostile to the implementation of the same Compromise Agreement that he had priorly
negotiated for Ilusorio.

The Board thus erred when, while acknowledging that Ilusorio was represented by
respondent’s firm in his negotiations with the PCGG, it nonetheless maintained that
there was no conflict of interest upon a finding that the subsequent SEC case “did not in
any way involve the validity of the compromise agreement forged with the PCGG.”

ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER v. ATTY. LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., et al.

477 SCRA 634 (2005)

FACTS:
Petitioner alleges that on 1991, her father, the late Potenciano Ilusorio (Ilusorio), engaged the services of
the law office of Lokin to represent him in the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0009, of which he was one
of the defendants.
 
In that civil case, the Republic was claiming shareholdings in Philippine Overseas Telecommunications
Corporation (POTC) and Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) 99% of the
shares in the latter corporation of which appeared to be owned by POTC. Respondent, together with his
law firm partners, actively handled the case for Ilusorio.
 
While the case was pending, Ilusorio, with the assistance of the law firm of Lokin, entered into a
Compromise Agreement with the Republic in the settlement of their claims. The Republic was to get
4,727 POTC shares while Ilusorio was to get 673 POTC shares.
 
Petitioner alleges that during the informal gathering of PHILCOMSAT held on 1998 to introduce the newly
appointed government nominees for PHILCOMSAT to the private stockholders of POTC, the gathering,
through deceitful maneuvers of Lokin, was suddenly and without notice transformed into a Special
Stockholders Meeting at which directors and officers of PHILCOMSAT were elected.
 
Ilusorio contested the validity of the meeting by filing before the SEC a complaint against Manuel Nieto, et
al. who were purportedly elected directors and officers of PHILCOMSAT, in which SEC case respondent
appeared as the counsel of Nieto, et al., contrary to his oath not to represent conflicting interests.
   
 Ilusorio had earlier filed with the IBP a disbarment complaint against respondent on the same
grounds as those raised in the present case. However, on account of the death of Ilusorio and the
failure of his children to establish their qualification to substitute for him, his complaint was
dismissed.

 On a new complaint, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found merit in petitioners complaint and
recommended that respondent be suspended for three months.

 In the assailed Resolution of February 27, 2004, the IBP Board set aside this recommendation
and dismissed the complaint.
 
 No copy of the notice of resolution was served upon petitioner. He learned about the
recommendation of Commissioner and the setting aside thereof by the Board, prodding her to
write a March 10, 2004 letter to the Board requesting that the Board take up the matter once
more. Petitioner stated that the very brief time it took the Board to review the case and resolve it
in respondents favor confirms the information she received that a former IBP official had been
intervening for respondent.
 
  On letter of April 16, 2004, the Board denied what it considered as petitioners malicious and
reckless allegations, stating that there was no provision for a reconsideration of any such case
either in Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court or in the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar
Discipline.
 
 Counsel for petitioner, Atty. Divina, then wrote a letter of July 19, 2004 to the Chairman of the
Board informing him that petitioner had not been notified of any final action on her
complaint.
 
 Replying by letter on August 11, 2004, the Board Chairman stated that the Board could no
longer act on petitioners July 19, 2004 letter, otherwise it would, in effect, be considering the
letter as a motion for reconsideration which is not provided for by the rules of procedure for cases
of the kind. And the Chairman referred to the Board April 16, 2004 letter to her.
 
 Atty. Divina sent a letter dated August 18, 2004 to the National Director for Bar Discipline of the
IBP, requesting for a copy of the Notice of Resolution of the Board and of the Investigation Report
of Commissioner, so that petitioner may appeal the case to the Supreme Court.
 
 Atty. Divina later sent such director another letter, dated August 27, 2004, stating that upon
further reading of the August 11 letter of the IBP Board Chairman, it appeared that it was the
Chairmans intention that the said letter be treated as a Notice of Resolution and, therefore,
petitioner had until September 2, 2004 to file a Petition for Review (since the August 11 letter was
received on August 17, 2004).

 Instead of asking for the Notice of Resolution as in his previous letter, Atty. Divina only requested
in his August 24, 2004 letter for a copy of Recommendation of Commissioner and records of the
deliberations of the IBP indicating the basis for reversing her findings. This letter, according to
petitioner, was simply ignored.
 
 Petitioner thus filed the present petition on September 2, 2004.

ISSUES: 1. W/N the present petition be dismissed for failing to file within the period provided in Section
12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court
2. W/N respondent was barred by the rules of ethics from representing an interest contrary to that
earlier espoused by his firm

HELD:
1. the procedural issues raised by respondent against the petition
 
  Respondent contends that the petition was filed (September 2, 2004) beyond the 15-day
reglementary period, as petitioner should be deemed to have received notice of the challenged
IBP resolution, not on August 17, 2004 when her counsel received the August 11, 2004 letter of
the IBP Board Chairman, but on March 10, 2004 when she wrote the Board admitting having
acquired knowledge of the reversal of Commissioner recommendation. Hence, respondent
claims, petitioner had only until March 25, 2004 to file a petition for review.
 
 Respondent further contends that even though the petition was timely filed, the same should be
dismissed for being based not on a resolution of the IBP Board, but merely on a letter of the IBP
President, contrary to Section 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which states:
 
xxx
 
(c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it
is less than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall
issue a decision exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be
deemed terminated unless upon petition of the complaint or other interested party filed
with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Boards resolution , the
Supreme Court orders otherwise. (Underscoring supplied)
 
This Court finds that the letter of the Board Chairman to petitioners counsel may not be deemed to be the
notice of resolution required by above-quoted Section 12, Rule 139-B, paragraph (c). The notice of
resolution referred to in said paragraph (c) refers not to an unofficial information that may be gathered
by the parties, nor to any letter from the IBP Board Chairman or even of the Board, but to the official
notice of resolution that is supposed to be issued by the Board, copy of which is given to all parties and
transmitted to this Court. As paragraph (d) which immediately follows paragraph (c) states:
 
(d) Notice of the resolution or decision of the Board shall be given to all parties through
their counsel. A copy of the same shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court.

Respondent IBP admits that no such notice has been sent to petitioner for the reason that all the
relevant records have yet to be completed for transmittal to the Supreme Court. The complainant will be
formally furnished a copy of the resolution upon transmittal of the records to the Supreme Court.
 
The IBP eventually transmitted to this Court on July 6, 2005 the Notice of Resolution. A copy was
supposedly furnished the petitioner; however, the IBP has not submitted any proof of service.
 
Since no notice has been sent to petitioner, as the August 11, 2004 letter from the IBP Board cannot
be deemed a notice of resolution, the present petition has been timely filed.
 
Parenthetically, the IBP Board Chairman erred when he stated that the Board may not act on motions for
reconsideration as there is no provision for such motions under the rules of procedure for disbarment
cases. For Pimentel, Jr. vs. Atty. Llorente[5]  instructs:
 
x x x The question of whether a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading or not
under Rule 139-B, 12(c) has been settled in Halimao v. Villanueva, in which this Court
held:
 
Although Rule 139-B, 12(C) makes no mention of a motion for
reconsideration, nothing in its text or in its history suggests that such
motion is prohibited. It may therefore be filed within 15 days from notice
to a party. Indeed, the filing of such motion should be encouraged before
resort is made to this Court as a matter of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, to afford the agency rendering the judgment an opportunity to
correct any error it may have committed through a misapprehension of
facts or misappreciation of the evidenced. (Underscoring supplied)
 
While, generally, a party who desires to appeal from the IBPs dismissal of a disciplinary case should
await the notice of resolution, it bears noting that the Board, despite issuing a resolution on the subject
complaint on February 27, 2004, failed to send a notice of resolution to petitioner. As borne out by the
IBPs statement noted earlier, there was still no notice to petitioner as of February 9, 2005 almost one year
after the dismissal of the subject complaint. In view thereof, petitioner cannot be faulted for appealing to
this Court notwithstanding the absence of an official notice of resolution (dated February 27, 2004).
 
2. Respondent’s challenge on the qualification of petitioner to file this case on the ground of her
purported lack of personal knowledge of the facts alleged in the complaint.
 
Personal knowledge is not a requisite for filing a disbarment complaint. Section 1, Rule 139-B states:
 
SECTION 1. How instituted. Proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of
attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of  any person. The complaint shall
state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of
persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such
documents as may substantiate said facts. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 
Clearly, personal knowledge is required, not of the complainant, but of her witnesses, if there are any.
 
While this Court notes petitioners claim that she herself has personal knowledge of the facts alleged in
her complaint, a ruling on such allegation is unnecessary in light of the foregoing discussion.
 
3. On the merits of the petition
Respondent admits that his firm represented Ilusorio in Sandiganbayan and that he represented Manuel
Nieto, Jr. et. al in SEC Case.   Notwithstanding his acknowledged involvement in both the Sandiganbayan
and SEC cases, respondent denies that he was guilty of representing conflicting interests, he proffering
that, in the first place, the case of Ilusorio in the Sandiganbayan has been the personal account of Atty.
Raval (his law firm partner), separate and apart from the accounts of the law partnership.

His reason was contradicted by his own evidence and statements. He attached to his comment
documentary evidence consisting of two letters to the PCGG, in one of which he signed on behalf of his
firm, and in the other his name appeared as counsel on behalf of his firm. The subject of both letters was
the then pending negotiations between the PCGG and Ilusorio who was therein identified as the client of
respondents firm.

Respondent claims that his signature is only because, in good faith, he accommodated his partner Atty.
Raval upon his request, as he was then Deputy Secretary of the Senate of the Philippines, is not
authorized to engage in the private practice. This claim shows that both he and Atty. Raval collaborated
on said case.
 
 In light thereof, respondent was personally barred by the rules of ethics from representing an interest
contrary to that earlier espoused by his firm. So this Court held in Hilado v. David:[15]
 
x x x An information obtained from a client by a member or assistant of a law firm
is information imparted to the firm. 
 
Respondent denies, however, representing conflicting interests on the ground that Sandiganbayan case
and SEC Case are totally distinct from each other as these cases involve different parties and causes of
action.
 
(In Sandiganbayan Case, the opposing parties are the PCGG as plaintiff; Atty.
Potenciano Ilusorio, as Defendant and Third party Plaintiff; and Independent Realty
Corporation (IRC) and Mid-Pasig Land Development Corp. (MLDC).
 
The subject matter in 1st case are shares owned by the National Government, through
IRC and MLDC, in the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC).
 
SEC Case involves a dispute regarding the PHILCOMSAT election of its Board of
Directors and corporate officers.)
  
Nowhere is the conflict of interest clearer than in respondents Memorandum dated September 28, 1998
filed with the SEC wherein he argued in behalf of Nieto, et al. as follows:
 
A continued exercise of jurisdiction and a subsequent disposition of the instant Petition by
this Honorable Commission would pre-empt the resolution by the Sandiganbayan of the
disputed shares. It would in fact affirm the ownership by the Petitioners of the said shares
subject of the Sandiganbayan case. This Petition is a premature action to enforce the
Compromise Agreement entered into by Mr. Ilusorio.  Clearly, this is beyond the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Commission. Any right to be derived from the Compromise
Agreement is clearly inchoate at this point in time.[18] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
 
Plainly, when respondent represented Nieto, et al. in the SEC, he was advocating an interest hostile to
the implementation of the same Compromise Agreement that he had priorly negotiated for Ilusorio.
 

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors dated February 27, 2004 is SET ASIDE.
Respondent Luis K. Lokin, Jr. is found guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the CPR and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Three (3) Months, with WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS

In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial
difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital
Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account
with Central Bank. Despite the mega loans GENBANK failed to recover from its
financial woes. The Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and
unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public,
and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held where
Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a
petition with the CFI praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in
GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino
established the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his
family and cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a
complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al.
PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by them by
taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former Pres. Marcos. The
abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are represented as their counsel, former
Solicitor General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as
counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza as
then Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively intervened in the liquidation of
GENBANK which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which
subsequently became Allied Banking Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits former government
lawyers from accepting “engagement” or employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in the said service. The Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution denyting PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove
the existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former function as
SolGen and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse
to this court assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE

Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent

Mendoza. The prohibition states: “A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service,
accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in the said service.”

HELD

The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent
Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as SOlGen and
later as counsel of respondents et.al. before the Sandiganbayan. However there is still
the issue of whether there exists a “congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify
respondent Mendoza from representing respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the
meaning of “matter” and the metes and bounds of “intervention” that he made on the
matter. Beyond doubt that the “matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as SolGen
involved in the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said
bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation in CFI of Manila. The
Court held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate
GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that “drafting,
enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations and laws, or
briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term
“matter” and cannot disqualify. Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the
decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. He also did not participate in the
sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an
issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include
the dissolution and liquidation of banks. Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention
while SolGen is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in the
Civil case of sequestration. In the metes and bounds of the “intervention”. The
applicable meaning as the term is used in the Code of Professional Ethics is that it is an
act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. The evil sought
to be remedied by the Code do not exist where the government lawyer does not act
which can be considered as innocuous such as “ drafting, enforcing, or interpreting
government or agency procedures, regulations or laws or briefing abstract principles of
law.” The court rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not significant and substantial.
He merely petitions that the court gives assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. The
role of court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank
in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding the role of the SolGen is not
that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.
Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.
Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:
Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: “ A lawyer,
having once held public office or having been in the public employ, should not after his
retirement accept employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated
or passed upon while in such office or employ.”
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a vehicle
to promote or advance his private interests extends beyond his tenure on certain
matters in which he intervened as a public official. Rule 6.03 makes this restriction
specifically applicable to lawyers who once held public office.” A plain reading shows
that the interdiction 1. applies to a lawyer who once served in the government and 2.
relates to his accepting “engagement or employment” in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in the service.

DE GUZMAN VS. DE DIOS 350 SCRA 320 [2001]

Saturday, February 21, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes 
Labels: Case Digests, Legal Ethics

FACTS: Diana De Guzman filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. De Dios

for representing conflicting interests. Complainant averred that she engaged the
services of respondent in 1995 as counsel in order to form a hotel and
restaurant corporation. With the assistance of respondent, said corporation was
registered with the SEC. Respondent also represented complainant in one case
involving a property of the corporation. Respondent however averred that since
the action involved a property of the corporation, she represented complainant
to protect the interests of the corporation, she being its legal counsel.
Complainant also averred that while respondent rose to become president of the
corporation, she lost all her investments when her delinquent shares were sold
by the corporation in a public auction upon the advise of respondent. The IBP
dismissed the complaint on the ground that there was no attorney – client
relationship. 

ISSUE: Whether there was attorney – client relationship which may justify

holding respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests.

HELD: Yes. It was complainant who retained respondent to form a

corporation. She appeared as counsel in behalf of the complainant. There was
also evidence of collusion between the board of directors and respondent.
Indeed, the board of directors now included respondent as the president. It was
also upon her advice that the delinquent shares of complainant were sold at
public auction. The present situation shows a clear case of conflict of interests of
the respondent.

LEGAL ETHICS Irene Gie S. Dormile LLB-1 Estrellado

HORNILLA VS. ATTY. SALUNAT

BENEDICTO HORNILLA and ATTY. FEDERICO D. RICAFORT, complainants vs. ATTY.ERNESTO S. SALUNAT, respondents A.C. No.
5804. July 1, 2003

TOPIC: Conflict of Interest.

Rule 15.03- A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except bywritten consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.

FACTS:

 This administrative case is filed by Benedicto Hornilla and Federico Ricafort against
Atty.Ernesto Salunat for illegal and unethical practice and conflict of interest.

 Complainants alleged that respondent is a member of the ASSA Law and Associates, which
was the retained counsel of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association (PPSTA).

 Complainants, who are members of the PPSTA, filed an intra-corporate case against its
members of the Board of Directors before the Securities and Exchange Commission, which
was docketed as SEC Case No. 05-97-5657, and a complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman, docketed as OMB Case No. 0-97-0695, for unlawful spending and the
undervalued sale of real property of the PPSTA.

 Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the PPSTA Board members in the said
cases.

 Complainants contend that respondent was guilty of conflict of interest because he was
engaged by the PPSTA, of which complainants were members, and was being paid out of its
corporate funds where complainants have contributed. Despite being told by PPSTA members
of the said conflict of interest, respondent refused to withdraw his appearance in the said
cases.

 In his Answer, respondent stressed that he entered his appearance as counsel for the PPSTA
Board Members for and in behalf of the ASSA Law and Associates.

 Respondent claims that it was complainant Atty. Ricafort who instigated, orchestrated and
 indiscriminately filed the said cases against members of the PPSTA and its Board. He denied
that he ensured the victory of the PPSTA Board in the case he was handling. He merely
assured the Board that the truth will come out and that the case before the Ombudsman will be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,considering that respondents therein are not public officials,
but private employees.

 Anent the SEC case, respondent alleged that the same was being handled by the law firm of
Atty. Eduardo de Mesa, and not ASSA.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) when he represented the assailed directors of the corporation of which he is a
retained counsel. Yes.

RULING: There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an
issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client.

Respondent Atty. Ernesto Salunat is found GUILTY of representing conflicting interests and is
admonished to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession. He is further
warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

ROLANDO B. PACANA, JR., Complainant, 

vs.
ATTY. MARICEL PASCUAL-LOPEZ, Respondent.

A.C. No. 8243               July 24, 2009

FACTS:

Rolando Pacana, Jr. (complainant) filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Maricel
Pascual-Lopez (respondent) charging the latter with flagrant violation of the provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant worked for Multitel (later renamed as Precedent) and earned the ire of investors
after becoming the assignee of majority of the shares of stock of Precedent and after being
appointed as trustee of a fund amounting to Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) deposited at
Real Bank.
Complainant sought the advice of respondent but no Retainer Agreement was executed. Atty.
Lopez gave regular advice, helped prepare standard quitclaims, solicited money and properties
from complainant to pay the creditors and even discussed a collection case for the company.
Soon, complainant noticed that respondent began to avoid communicating with him.
Complainant then wrote to respondent a letter formally asking for a full accounting of all the
money, documents and properties given to the latter but respondent failed to provide a clear
audited financial report of all the properties turned over by the complainant to the respondent.
Complainant filed an affidavit-complaint against respondent before the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking the disbarment of respondent.
ISSUE: WON a lawyer-client relationship was created.

RULING: YES.

After due hearing, IBP Investigating Commissioner Patrick M. Velez issued a Report and
Recommendation finding that a lawyer-client relationship was established between respondent
and complainant despite the absence of a written contract. The absence of a written contract
will not preclude the finding that there was a professional relationship between the parties.
Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the
contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and
assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession.

Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which respondent should have done was
either to advise complainant to engage the services of another lawyer since she was already
representing the opposing parties, or to desist from acting as representative of Multitel investors
and stand as counsel for complainant. She cannot be permitted to do both because that would
amount to double-dealing and violate our ethical rules on conflict of interest.

Adm. Case No. 6475 January 30, 2013

FE A. YLAYA, Complainant,
vs.ATTY. GLENN CARLOS GACOTT, Respondent.

DUTY TO CLIENT
Fe A. Ylaya filed a complaint against Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott who allegedly deceived the complainant
and her late husband, Laurentino L. Ylaya, into signing a "preparatory" Deed of Sale that the respondent
converted into a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his relatives.

Ylaya alleged that she and her late husband are the registered owners 2 parcels of land covered by TCT
Nos. 162632 and 162633 located at Barangay Sta. Lourdes, Puerto Princesa City. Prior to the acquisition
of these properties, TCT No. 162632 (property) was already the subject of expropriation proceedings
filed by the City Government of Puerto Princesa (City Government) on May 23, 1996 against its former
registered owner, Cirilo Arellano. The expropriation case was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Palawan and Puerto Princesa, Branch 95, and was docketed as Civil Case No. 2902. The RTC already fixed
the price and issued an order for the City Government to deposit P6,000,000.00 as just compensation
for the property.

The respondent briefly represented the complainant and her late husband in the expropriation case as
intervenors for being the new registered owners of the property. The complainant alleged that the
respondent convinced them to sign a "preparatory deed of sale", but he left blank the space for the
name of the buyer and for the amount of consideration.

Issues
(2) whether the evidence presented supports a finding that the respondent is administratively liable for
violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Section 3(c),
Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.

The Court’s Ruling

We set aside the findings and recommendations of the IBP Commissioner and those of the IBP Board of
Governors finding the respondent liable for violating Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and Section 3(c), Rule IV of
A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.34
We however hold the respondent liable for violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
for being remiss in his obligation to hold in trust his client’s properties. We likewise find him liable for
violation of (1) Canon 15, Rule 15.03 for representing conflicting interests without the written consent of
the represented parties, thus, violating the rule on conflict of interests; and (2) Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for
neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him.

c. Liability under Canons 15, 16 and 18 We find the respondent liable under Canon 15, Rule 15.03 for
representing conflicting interests without the written consent of all concerned, particularly the
complainant; under Canon 16 for being remiss in his obligation to hold in trust his client’s properties;
and under Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him.
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 states:

A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts.

Based on the records, we find substantial evidence to hold the respondent liable for violating Canon 15,
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The facts of this case show that the respondent
retained clients who had close dealings with each other. The respondent admits to acting as legal
counsel for Cirilo Arellano, the spouses Ylaya and Reynold at one point during the proceedings in Civil
Case No. 2902.80 Subsequently, he represented only Reynold in the same proceedings,81 asserting
Reynold’s ownership over the property against all other claims, including that of the spouses Ylaya.

We find no record of any written consent from any of the parties involved and we cannot give the
respondent the benefit of the doubt in this regard. We find it clear from the facts of this case that the
respondent retained Reynold as his client and actively opposed the interests of his former client, the
complainant. He thus violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
We affirm the IBP Commissioner’s finding that the respondent violated Canon 16. The respondent
admits to losing certificates of land titles that were entrusted to his care by Reynold. According to the
respondent, the complainant "maliciously retained" the TCTs over the properties sold by Laurentino to
Reynold after she borrowed them from his office. Reynold confirms that the TCTs were taken by the
complainant from the respondent’s law office.

The respondent is reminded that his duty under Canon 16 is to "hold in trust all moneys and properties
of his client that may come into his possession." Allowing a party to take the original TCTs of properties
owned by another – an act that could result in damage – should merit a finding of legal malpractice.
While we note that it was his legal staff who allowed the complainant to borrow the TCTs and it does
not appear that the respondent was aware or present when the complainant borrowed the TCTs, we
nevertheless hold the respondent liable, as the TCTs were entrusted to his care and custody; he failed to
exercise due diligence in caring for his client’s properties that were in his custody.

We likewise find the respondent liable for violating Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for neglecting a legal matter
entrusted to him. Despite the respondent’s admission that he represented the complainant and her late
husband in Civil Case No. 2902 and that he purportedly filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene in their
behalf, the records show that he never filed such a motion for the spouses Ylaya. The complainant
herself states that she and her late husband were forced to file the Motion for Leave to Intervene on
their own behalf. The records of the case, which include the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by the
spouses Ylaya, support this conclusion.87
Canon 18, Rule 18.03 requires that a lawyer "shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection [therewith] shall render him liable." What amounts to carelessness or
negligence in a lawyer’s discharge of his duty to his client is incapable of an exact formulation, but the
Court has consistently held that the mere failure of a lawyer to perform the obligations due his client is
per se a violation.88
In Canoy v. Ortiz,89 we held that a lawyer’s failure to file a position paper was per se a violation of Rule
18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Similar to Canoy, the respondent clearly failed in this
case in his duty to his client when, without any explanation, he failed to file the Motion for Leave to
Intervene on behalf of the spouses Ylaya. Under the circumstances, we find that there was want of
diligence; without sufficient justification, this is sufficient to hold the respondent liable for violating
Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we set aside Resolution No. XVIII-.2007-302 dated December 14,
2007 and Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated October 8, 2010 of the IBP Board of Governors, and find
respondent Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott GUILTY of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15, Canon 16, and Rule
18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As a penalty, he is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt
with more severely.
EN BANC

A.C. No. 6664               July 16, 2013

FERDINAND A. SAMSON, Complainant, vs.
ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA, Respondent.

The complainant and his relatives were among the investors who fell prey to the pyramiding scam
perpetrated by ICS Corporation led by Emilia Sison and several others. They engaged the services of
Atty. Era to represent and assist him and his relatives in the prosecution of criminal case against Sison
and her group.

Pursuant to the engagement, Atty. Era prepared the demand letter demanding the return or refund of
the money subject of their complaints. He also prepared the complaint-affidavit that Samson signed and
swore to and subsequently presented to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City (OCPQC). After
the preliminary investigation, the OCPQC formally charged Sison and the others with several counts of
estafa in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96 (RTC), in Quezon City.

In April 2003, Atty. Era called a meeting with Samson and his relatives to discuss the possibility of an
amicable settlement with Sison and her cohorts. He told Samson and the others that undergoing a trial
of the cases would just be a waste of time, money and effort for them, and that they could settle the
cases with Sison and her group, with him guaranteeing the turnover to them of a certain property
located in Antipolo City belonging to ICS Corporation in exchange for their desistance. They acceded and
executed the affidavit of desistance he prepared, and in turn they received a deed of assignment
covering land registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. R-4475 executed by Sison in behalf of ICS
Corporation.
After an amicable settlement and several negotiations with Sison and her cohorts, Atty. Era expressed
that he already accomplished his professional responsibility towards Samson. They also later found out
that they could not liquidate the property subject to the amicable settlement. During the hearings in the
RTC, Atty. Era did not anymore appear for Samson and his group. They found out that Atty. Era had
already been entering his appearance as the counsel for Sison in her other criminal cases involving the
same pyramiding scam.

On January 20, 2005, Samson executed an affidavit alleging the foregoing antecedents and prayed for
Atty. Era’s disbarment on the ground of his violation of the trust, confidence and respect reposed in him
as their counsel.

Atty. Era was required to file his Comment. After several extensions, Atty. Era finally filed his Comment on
April 11, 2006 in the OBC. He alleged that the lawyer-client relationship ended when Samson and
his group entered into the compromise settlement.

The case was referred to IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.

IBP Recommendation: the Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Era guilty of misconduct for
representing conflicting interests, failing to serve his client with competence and diligence and champion
the latter’s cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion – suspended from the practice of law
for 6 months

IBP Board of Governors: adopted and approved the IBP recommendation with modification that Atty.
Era be suspended from the practice of law for 2 years.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Era violated the Code of Professional Responsibility on conflict of interests.

Ruling.
YES. The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the IBP.

The lawyer-client relationship did not terminate when the parties entered into a compromise settlement,
for the fact remained that he still needed to oversee the implementation of the settlement as well as to
proceed with the criminal cases until they were dismissed or otherwise concluded by the trial court. It is
also relevant to indicate that the execution of a compromise settlement in the criminal cases did not ipso
facto cause the termination of the cases not only because the approval of the compromise by the trial
court was still required, but also because the compromise would have applied only to the civil aspect, and
excluded the criminal aspect pursuant to Article 2034 of the Civil Code.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that: "A lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts." Atty. Era thus owed to Samson and his group entire devotion to their genuine interest, and warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of their rights. He was expected to exert his best efforts and ability
to preserve the clients’ cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his clients likewise served the ends
of justice.

Contrary to Atty. Era’s ill-conceived attempt to explain his disloyalty to Samson and his group, the
termination of the attorney-client relationship does not justify a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to
or in conflict with that of the former client. The spirit behind this rule is that the client’s confidence once
given should not be stripped by the mere expiration of the professional employment. Even after the
severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do anything that will injuriously affect his former client in
any matter in which the lawyer previously represented the client. Nor should the lawyer disclose or use
any of the client’s confidences acquired in the previous relation. In this regard, Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility expressly declares that: "A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and
he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him."

The lawyer’s highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all hazards and costs even to
himself. The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the
litigation, nor is it affected by the client’s ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any
other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.

In the absence of the express consent from Samson and his group after full disclosure to them of the
conflict of interest, therefore, the most ethical thing for Atty. Era to have done was either to outrightly
decline representing and entering his appearance as counsel for Sison, or to advice Sison to engage
another lawyer for herself. Unfortunately, he did neither, and should now suffer the proper sanction.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA guilty of violating Rule
15.03 of Canon 15, and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from
the practice of law for two years effective upon his receipt of this decision, with a warning that his
commission of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

NOTES:
Prohibition against conflict of interest rests on 5 rationales, rendered as follows:

1st : the law seeks to assure clients that their lawyers will represent them with undivided loyalty

2nd : the prohibition against conflicts of interest seeks to enhance the effectiveness of legal
representation

3rd : a client has a legal right to have the lawyer safeguard the client’s confidential information
4th : conflicts rules help ensure that lawyers will not exploit clients, such as by inducing a client to make
a gift to the lawyer

5th : some conflict-of-interest rules protect interests of the legal system in obtaining adequate
presentations to tribunals.

Reason: the rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty. The nature of their relationship is,
therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.