expressly or impliedly, as the law does not require any particular form of notice.

It is, indeed,
C’s right to be notified of D’s choice. Once the notice of election had been given to C, the
obligation ceases to be alternative and becomes simple. Such choice once properly made and
communicated is irrevocable and cannot be renounced. The concurrence of C with regards
to D’s choice is also not required. If the choice was not communicated to the creditor, the
choice will produce no effect.

Once the chosen object, in its entirety, has been delivered by D, C is obliged to accept it.

B. D destroyed his car and house – In this case, D is left with only one choice which is to
deliver the gold wristwatch to C. The obligation had become a simple one, as supported by
Article 1202 of the New Civil Code, due to the loss of the right of D to choose which to deliver
because all of the prestations, except one, have become impossible or unlawful to deliver.

D, as the debtor, shall have no right to choose to deliver those prestations which are
impossible, unlawful or which could not have been the object of the obligation. The
destruction of both the car and the house made them impossible to be delivered to C.
However, C should be notified that the obligation had become a simple one to avoid
unfairness.

When the obligation matures on the stipulated time, March 30, 2020, D is obliged to deliver
the gold wristwatch, in its entirety, to C as the latter has the right to compel D to deliver its
entirety, as per the second paragraph of Article 1199 of the New Civil Code.

C. D destroyed his car, house and wristwatch – In this case, all the prestations to the
obligations were lost. However, this does not extinguish D’s obligation because C has the
right to indemnity for damages, as per the first paragraph of Article 1204 of the New Civil
Code, because the loss of the objects was because of D’s fault (D deliberately destroyed
them). The indemnity shall be fixed taking as a basis the value of the last thing which
disappeared. Damages other than the value of the last thing may also be awarded.

D, in this scenario, was rendered incapable of performing the obligation as he had

deliberately destroyed all the prestations. Thus, C can ask for damages through the value of
the last thing that was lost.

If, for instance, assuming the gold wristwatch was the last thing lost and it cost about
P100,000.00, C can collect the amount of P100,000.00 plus any damages C had incurred, as
stipulated in the second and third paragraphs of Article 1204 of the New Civil Code. Any
disagreement by C as to the value of the loss object will have to be proven by him.

D. A typhoon destroyed D’s car – In this case, D is still bound to deliver either the house or
the gold wristwatch. Even if the loss of one prestation is due to a fortuitous event, there are
still other prestations to which D can choose from on which to deliver.

As a general rule, loss of the object in an obligation by fortuitous event should extinguish
any liability. However, even if the car was lost due to a fortuitous event, there are still, as a
matter of fact, remaining prestations to which D can deliver. The right to choose which
object to deliver still rests upon D as there is no stipulation that says otherwise. It then
follows that D can either deliver the house or the gold wristwatch. C, in turn, has the right
to demand for the delivery of the entirety of the object chosen by the debtor, as per the
second paragraph of Article 1199 of the New Civil Code.

E. An earthquake destroyed D’s car and house – In this case, D still has one prestation left
to deliver as the obligation became a simple one, as per Article 1202 of the New Civil Code,
due to the fact that he lost the two other prestations due to a fortuitous event.

As a general rule, loss of the object in an obligation by fortuitous event should extinguish
any liability. However, it did not extinguish D’s obligation as he is still capable of delivering
the remaining object: the gold wristwatch and shall deliver it upon the maturity of the
obligation on March 30, 2020.

C has the right to be notified that the obligation transformed into a simple one to avoid
prejudice. C is also obliged to accept the remaining object which happened to be the gold
wristwatch and has the right to receive the gold wristwatch in its entirety, as per the second
paragraph of Article 1199 of the New Civil Code.

F. C destroyed D’s car – In this case, when C, the creditor, destroyed D’s car, D has the right
and option to either continue to enforce the contract or rescind the same due to the fact that
his right of choice as a debtor had been lost or impaired through C’s fault.

Article 1203 of the New Civil Code is clear when it stated that, if through the creditor’s acts
the debtor cannot make a choice according to the terms of the obligation, the latter may
rescind the contract with damages.

The contract is not automatically rescinded; the law says that the debtor “may rescind,”
implying that he may allow it to remain in force insofar as the possible choice or choices are
involved.

In this case, D can choose to continue enforcing the contract by delivering either the house
or the gold wristwatch; the delivery of such upon the maturity of the contract will then
extinguish D’s obligation. C has no obligation other than to accept if D delivers either of the
two prestations. C won’t be liable for damages in this situation.

However, if, for instance, D chooses to rescind the contract, there must be mutual
restitution. D must return whatever benefits he had received from C in relation to their
contract and C must, in turn, pay D the value of the item that he destroyed, along with the
sum of damages that D incurred. Mutual restitution is required in a rescission in order to
bring back the parties to their original situation prior to the inception of the contract.

G. D instead obliged himself to deliver his only car and agreed to deliver as substitute
his house. Later, D burned his house. – In this case, the obligation became a facultative
one.

Under the first paragraph of Article 1206 of the New Civil Code, when only one prestation
had been agreed upon, but the obligor may render another in substitution, the obligation is
called facultative.

In the given case, it is a facultative obligation because a substitution had been made. The
word “agreed” in the given situation implies that both parties, C and D, have agreed to the
substitution and that C had been notified of the same; the communication with regards to
the substitution had been made. The substitution is valid because the choice to substitute
another prestation only lies with the debtor.

There are two components of a facultative obligation: (1) the object or prestation of the
obligation (principal) and (2) the substitute of the object or prestation (substitute). In this
case, the principal object was the car. However, after they have agreed on the substitution,
it is now the house that should be delivered by D to C.

Assuming arguendo that there was no substitution made, the destruction of the house,
through the negligence or fault of D, will not make him liable. The loss of the thing intended
as a substitute, with or without the fault of the debtor, does not render him liable because
the thing intended as a substitute is not due; the effect of loss is merely to extinguish
facultative character of the obligation, as supported by the first sentence of the second
paragraph of Article 1206 of the New Civil Code.
However, it had already been established and explained above that in the situation given, a
substitution had been made due to the phrase “agreed to deliver as substitute his house”,
which entails that D had decided to substitute the car with the house. The right of choice in
facultative obligations, that is, whether to make a substitution or not, pertains to the debtor
alone, the creditor is never given this right. Consequently, substitution also became
effective because it can be inferred in the situation given that D had already communicated
with C that he “agreed” to deliver the substitute prestation. Therefore, the object that is due
and demandable now is the house. Once the substitution is made, the obligation is
converted into a simple one to deliver or to perform the substituted thing or prestation (the
house).

The deliberate burning by D of the house, which is now the substitute and is the object that
is due, demandable, and should be delivered, would render D liable for the loss of the
substitute on account of his delay, negligence or fraud, as stated in the second sentence of
the second paragraph of Article 1206 of the New Civil Code, as it is now impossible and
unlawful to deliver the house because it was already deliberately burned by D. Thus, C has
the right to indemnity for damages that he incurred due to D’s actions.