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Anton Shekhovtsov

The No Longer Silent

Counter-Revolution
The rise of the new right must be seen as a reaction to the growth of post-material and
cosmopolitan attitudes since the Second World War. The washed up catch-all parties and post-
modernism have left an ideological vacuum that has been infiltrated by right-wing extremist
parties. Yet it is not they that primarily profit from the present crisis of the EU but national
conservative politicians such as Orbán or Kacýnski. – S. K.

In 1977, Ronald Inglehart published his widely acclaimed The The first phenomenon, “catch-all” political parties, is rooted in
Silent Revolution, in which he argued that a “silent revolution” the period of extraordinary peace for the Western capitalist world
had been occurring in the West as well as fundamentally chang- during the Cold War. The post-war European integration project
ing it.1 The unprecedented prosperity experienced by Western aimed specifically at preventing violent conflicts between Euro-
nations during the Cold War and the absence of total war, Ingle- pean states that were not part of the socialist bloc, and – partly
hart maintained, contributed to the process of gradual transfor- due to the fact that the majority of the capitalist European states
mation of individual values from materialist to post-materialist: were also members of NATO – they indeed succeeded in avoiding
once needs related to physical survival are met, people move to military clashes. The feeling of security and perception of peace
fulfil the needs for love, belonging and esteem, and then “intellec- as routine contributed to the rise of post-materialists, but also to
tual and aesthetic satisfaction take on central importance” – the the emergence of “catch-all” political parties. In 1966, Otto Kirch-
latter he termed “post-materialist values”. In the political sphere heimer described them as essentially mass-based election-oriented
of the Western nations, the “silent revolution” was underpinned organisations that appealed not to particular groups within a soci-
by two major trends: (1) “a shift from overwhelming emphasis ety, but to the society in general. 5 Due to the liberal-democrat-
on material consumption and security toward greater concern ic consensus in the larger part of the capitalist West, “catch-all”
with the quality of life”, and (2) “an increase in the political skills parties differed little in ideological sense and produced fewer and
of Western publics that enables them to play a more active role fewer big ideas, and as early as 1970s social movements “accused
in making important political decisions”. 2 Naturally, post-mate- the political parties, left and right, of operating without vision”. 6
rialists were only a minority among Western societies, but they Simultaneously, the extended peacetime of the Cold War era
were arguably best educated and most active in politics. Post-ma- allowed for the rise of yet another phenomenon: postmodern pol-
terialists were also the main drivers of European integration and itics. The latter renounced ideological master discourses, most
the fostering of cosmopolitan identity. importantly liberalism and Marxism, and claimed that no polit-
But there was also a “silent counter-revolution”, as Piero ical truth existed – only individual standpoints to interpret mul-
Ignazi termed it. 3 He argued that during the 1980s, against the tiple “realities”. Grand visions and big ideas were not necessarily
background of “a growing dissatisfaction vis-a-vis the political vital instruments of electoral mobilisation for “catch-all” parties,
system and a corresponding decline in confidence in its effica- but for political postmodernists they were anathema.
cy”, 4 a new movement emerged in Europe that was simultane- Both “catch-all” parties and political postmodernists, to a cer-
ously a result of, and a backlash against, the silent revolution tain degree, provided fertile ground for the rise of the far right
of the post-materialists; this movement was associated with the in the 1990s and, especially, in the 2000s. The former contribut-
rise of a new type of far-right parties that were different from ed to the growing perception of liberal democracy as a project
fascist organisations of the interwar period and the neo-fascist of the select few who allegedly lost touch with common people.
parties of the post-war era. In contrast to the “post-materialist For many in Europe, liberal democracy was no longer simply an
optimism” and cosmopolitanism of the presumably progressive ideology or a form of government; rather, it increasingly came to
silent revolution, silent counter-revolutionaries demanded law be perceived as a symbol, or even an embodiment of the causes,
and order enforcement and stricter immigration control. New of inequality.
radical right-wing parties rejected multiculturalism and insisted Political post-modernists, on the other hand, contributed to
on the active protection of what they considered to be national or the weakening of the post-war liberal-democratic consensus in
European traditional values. But despite their sometimes signifi- the West by deconstructive attacks on the foundations of liber-
cant electoral successes during the 1990s, the far right remained al thought. Political post-modernism also became a prominent
largely in the opposition. Since then, however, many things have element of what has become known as the “return of Realpoli-
changed, and counter-revolutionaries opposing the liberal-dem- tik” in the 2000s. Since liberal democracy was just one of many
ocratic consensus no longer appear to be silent. other forms of governance, relations between Western states and
between the Western world and non-Western nations could be
Reasons for the rise of right-wing extremism governed not by moral values but by moral relativism, not by lib-
In order to understand these changes, it seems important to brief- eral principles of justice, human rights and freedom, but by prag-
ly discuss two relatively recent political phenomena that both matic considerations and individual national interests. In other
reflect the inability or even unwillingness of modern mainstream words, international relations within the discourse of postmod-
liberal-democratic forces to articulate grand visions of a political ern Realpolitik should be governed by momentary assessments
future of the West and the world. of fluid, contextual and circumstantial “realities”. This principle
 I L L I B E R A L T E N D E N C I ES No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
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became toxic for the internal developments in the West, and its Austria, Hungary’s Jobbik, the French National Front or the Ital-
implementation resulted in the erosion of solidarity among West- ian Northern League, the “mainstream” counter-revolutionaries
ern states and the growth of isolationism. such as Orbán or Trump can draw on resources inaccessible to the
traditional radical right-wing populists, as well as implementing
The new and the old right policies that would not differ much from those that could poten-
When the liberal progressivist “end of history” ended with tially be implemented by the National Front or Jobbik were they
Al-Qaeda’s terrorist attacks on the United States in September to come to power.16
2001, 7 the collective West – despite being militarily and econom- The radical right-wing parties led the silent counter-revo-
ically superior to any other bloc – appeared weak in terms of lution against liberal democracy in the 1980 and 1990s, but in
philosophical and ideological opposition to the challenges posed the new century it is largely mainstream national-conservative
by the enemies of liberal democracy. Proceeding from bad to politicians who take the opportunities enabled by the philosoph-
worse, the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, the resulting Great ically sterile political space created by the ideologically exhausted
Recession (the worst since the Second World War) and austerity “catch-all” parties and cynical political post-modernists, and are
policies undermined the economic superiority of the West. More able not only to dramatically weaken the Western post-war liber-
recently, Islamist terrorist attacks and fear of them, migration al-democratic consensus, but also to undermine the international
and refugee crises, austerity policies, the Eurozone crisis and a security architecture.
perceived lack of effective leadership has produced an environ-
ment that fosters isolationist thinking even further. With liberal Notes
progressivism in retreat and few global visions articulated, many 1) Inglehart, Ronald: The Silent Revolution: Changing Values
citizens of Western nations started seeking existential refuge in and Political Styles among Western Publics. Princeton 1977.
local, regional, national and religious identities. 2) Ibid., p. 363.
The far right embraced the opportunities offered by the 3) Ignazi, Piero: The Silent Counter-revolution: Hypotheses on
spread of political, economic, cultural and existential anxieties the Emergence of Extreme Right-wing Parties in Europe. In:
in the West. In contrast to the intellectually exhausted main- European Journal of Political Research 22, 1 (1992), 3–34.
stream liberal democrats, the far right do possess an ability to 4) Ibid., p. 25.
offer global alternative visions for the world order. And unlike 5) Kirchheimer, Otto: The Transformation of Western Europe-
political post-modernists, the far right reject the idea of multiple an Party Systems. In: LaPalombara, Joseph; Weiner, Myron
“realities”: only one reality exists and they are prepared to stand (eds.): Political Parties and Political Development. Princeton
their ground. 1966, 177–200.
But while the far right has obviously gained momentum in 6) Aronowitz, Stanley: Postmodernism and Politics. In: Social
the last decade, this was not the radical right-wing parties that Text 18 (1987/88), 99–115 (101).
became the embodiment of the no longer silent counter-revo- 7) Kagan, Robert: The Return of History and the End of Dreams.
lution. Rather, it is Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán’s New York 2008.
promise to build “an illiberal state” in Hungary; 8 it is the harsh 8) Full Text of Viktor Orbán’s Speech at Băile Tuşnad (Tusnád-
anti-immigrant rhetoric of the Czech president Miloš Zeman,9 fürdő) of 26 July 2014, The Budapest Beacon, 29 July 2014,
the Slovak prime minister Robert Fico10 and the leader of the http://budapestbeacon.com/public-policy/full-text-of-vik-
Polish ruling party Law and Justice Jarosław Kaczyński;11 it is the tor-orbans-speech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-ju-
Brexit referendum that “has taken the shame out of racism”12 and ly-2014/10592.
led to a surge of hate crimes in the UK after the majority of voters 9) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/14/milos-
decided to withdraw from the EU; it is the high-level appeasement zeman-czech-leader-refugees.
of Russia’s president Vladimir Putin’s right-wing authoritarian 10) http://w w w.express.co.uk /news/world/610923/Slova-
regime after the Russian invasion of Ukraine;13 it is the popularity kia-Robert-Fico-Refugee-Crisis-European-Union-Quo-
of the racist US presidential candidate Donald Trump. ta-Member-states.
Meeting with Jarosław Kaczyński in September 2016, Vik- 11) http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/poland-
tor Orbán declared that Brexit was “a fantastic opportunity”, “a refuses-to-take-a-single-refugee-because-of-security-
historic cultural movement” that allowed for “a cultural count- fears-a7020076.html.
er-revolution”.14 Kaczyński replied that they needed to “take the 12) http://www.irr.org.uk/email/brexit-and-xeno-racism-help-
initiative” and change the EU. While their idea of a counter-rev- us-to-build-the-national-picture/.
olution may simply be interpreted as the EU’s decentralisation 13) https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/tighten-eu-
and devolving more power to national parliaments, it cannot be sanctions-on-russia-by-guy-verhofstadt-2016-06.
ignored that both Orbán and Kaczyński see European nations 14) www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e825f7f4-74a3-11e6-bf48-b372cdb1043a.
as ethnically and religiously homogeneous entities. Their parties html.
skilfully exploited ethnic and religious nationalism to mobilise 15) Mudde, Cas: Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cam-
the voters, and after they came to power, they took steps to secure bridge 2007, pp. 22–23.
full control over their states by transforming and degrading their 16) The Budapest-based Political Capital Institute noted that by,
institutions, especially constitutional courts and public media. spring 2015, Fidesz had “implemented several measures that
If radical right-wing parties  – despite the ongoing de-rad- were originally part of Jobbik’s program”. See “Jobbik’s Policy
icalisation process  – still struggle to present themselves as a Proposals Realized by Fidesz: A Summary in 10 Points”, Polit-
legitimate and respectable part of the political process, neither ical Capital Institute, May 15 (2015), http://www.riskandfore-
Orbán, nor Kaczyński, nor Zeman, nor Trump, nor the leaders cast.com/post/flash-report/jobbik-s-policyproposals-real-
of the “Leave the EU” campaign in the UK need to prove the ized-by-fidesz-a-summary-in-10-points_818.html.
political eligibility of their ideas that combine ultra-nationalism
and populism – ideological elements that are considered major Anton Shekhovtsov, PhD, political scientist, cur-
elements of radical right-wing ideology.15 Moreover, in contrast rently a Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute
to the traditional far-right parties such as the Freedom Party of for Human Studies in Vienna.