Nationalism Ethnic - Presuresand - The - Breakup - of - The - Soviet - Union

Nationalism, Ethnic Pressures, and the Breakup
of the Soviet Union
The Soviet Union lasted as long as it did because it disciplined (often through
terror) most, rewarded many, and attracted a strategically loyal few for at least
ªfty of [its] seventy-four years.
Ken Jowitt, 1997 1
T he rise and fall of empires has been a repeated refrain in world

history. Hardy creatures though they might be—often lasting hundreds of
years—empires have disintegrated after internal and external pressures have
grown too severe. These pressures might include the defection from the center
by elites in the periphery, the consolidation of ethnic identities and the rise of
nationalism among constituent units of the empire, military deterioration in
the center, internal revolution, and conquest and division by external forces.
The past two centuries witnessed the weakening and dismantling of numer-
ous empires: the British, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, Belgian, Ital-
ian, Ottoman, Habsburg, and Russian. Much of the literature analyzing these
deceased political organisms highlights nationalism as one of the main inter-
nal causes of their demise. This nationalism usually entails ethnic consolida-
tion and mass mobilization among populations concentrated on a particular
territory or territories. The mobilized groups attempt to escape central rule,
secede from the imperial state, and create new, independent political entities.
Such was the case, for example, with Serbian, Czech, Greek, Romanian, and
Bulgarian nationalist movements in the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman em-
pires; with Indian nationalism in the British empire; with Croatian,
Slovenian, and Albanian nationalist groups in Yugoslavia; and with Estonian,
Latvian, and Lithuanian nationalist movements in the Soviet Union.2
1. Ken Jowitt, “Really Imaginary Socialism,” East European Constitutional Review, Vol. 6, No. 2–3
(Spring–Summer 1997), p. 45.
2. Some of the literature that highlights nationalism as a factor in the breakup of empires includes
Journal of Cold War Studies
Vol. 5, No. 4, Fall 2003, pp. 81–136
© 2003 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology
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If the conjuncture of nationalism and imperial breakup has been evident

numerous times over the past two centuries in different parts of the world,
can we readily assume a causal linkage between nationalist outbreaks and im-
perial demise? In the most recent instance of imperial disintegration—that of
the Soviet Union—did nationalism and ethnic pressures play a central, causal
role? How much weight should we give to nationalism and ethnic pressures as
explanatory variables in the dissolution of the USSR?
This article suggests that nationalism and ethnic pressures were facilitat-
ing and precipitating variables in the breakup of the Soviet Union, rather than
the primary cause.3 A qualiªed exception was the separatist nationalism
among the Russian elites, a factor that had a fatal impact on the Soviet state.
Russian nationalism, however, was qualitatively different from other separatist
nationalisms in the USSR. It was concentrated among elites and did not lead
to direct mass separatist mobilization. Moreover, it overlapped with, and was
largely a consequence of, the power rivalry and personal animosity between
Boris Yeltsin and Mikhail Gorbachev.4 By late 1990 Yeltsin was intent on dis-
placing Gorbachev as the top leader in Moscow, but he did not fully grasp the
implications of his maneuvers for the cohesion of the Soviet federal state.
Ukrainian separatist nationalism increased in the latter half of 1991 and was
crucial in sealing the formal demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991,
but it did not exert irresistible pressure on the Soviet state during most of
Gorbachev’s rule. It was a facilitating and precipitating, rather than primary,
cause of Soviet disintegration.
Bohdan Nahaylo and Victor Swoboda, Soviet Disunion: A History of the Nationalities Problem in the
USSR (New York: Free Press, 1990); Richard L. Rudolph and David F. Good, eds., Nationalism and
Empire: The Habsburg Empire and the Soviet Union (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992); Rupert Em-
erson, From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-assertion of Asian and African Peoples (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1960); Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, The End of the Soviet Empire: The Triumph of the Nations
(New York: Basic Books, 1993); William W. Haddad and William Ochsenwald, eds., Nationalism in a
Non-National State: The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire (Columbus: Ohio State University Press,
1977); Charles Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism: Russian Inºuence in the Internal Affairs
of Bulgaria and Serbia, 1879–1886 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958); Susan L. Wood-
ward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institu-
tion, 1995); John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994); and
Walter C. Clemens, “Who or What Killed the Soviet Union? How Three Davids Undermined Goli-
ath,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Spring 1997), p. 136–158.
3. This argument contradicts the assertion that nationalism was the central cause of Soviet disintegra-
tion. See, for example, Ben Fowkes, The Disintegration of the Soviet Union: The Triumph of National-
ism (London: Macmillan, 1997). It is also more nuanced than analyses that regard the disintegration
of the Soviet Union as somehow inevitable. This latter tendency has become all too common in recent
years, even among sophisticated observers such as Victor Zaslavsky, “The Soviet Union,” in Karen
Barkey and Mark von Hagen, eds., After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1996), pp. 73–74.
4. For a thorough discussion of this topic, see Marc Zlotnik, “Yeltsin and Gorbachev: The Politics of
Confrontation,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Winter 2003), pp. 128–164.
82
Nationalism, Ethnic Pressures, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union
The Soviet Union throughout its history suffered from deeply en-
trenched problems in what was traditionally called the “nationalities” sphere.
In particular, the fateful decision to set up a federal structure along ethno-
territorial lines and to maintain strong linguistic and cultural distinctions
among many of the constituent units, created an inherent weakness in the
state. When the Soviet Union broke apart, it did so precisely along the lines
that divided its former union republics. Until the late 1980s this inherent
structural weakness was of little importance, but the political and ideological
liberalization under Gorbachev allowed nationalism and ethnic pressures to
reach a level of intensity unprecedented since the federated union was formed
in 1922.
Even so, it is important to emphasize that nationalist and ethnic factors
were not sufªcient to cause the Soviet state to fall apart. These factors, in iso-
lation, would not have created an immediate, inexorable force for disintegra-
tion. Although nationalist ªssures seriously challenged the cohesion of the So-
viet Union, other variables ultimately made the Soviet state untenable. These
other factors included Gorbachev’s failure to create and implement a renewed
compact between center and periphery early in the period of perestroika, his
aversion to using decisive force to quell nationalist demands, and his inability
to stave off the challenge from Yeltsin.
The article is divided into four main sections. The ªrst section deªnes
key terms used throughout the article—nation, nationalism, ethnic pressures,
and empire—and explains why the multiethnic Soviet state can be regarded as
an empire. The second section describes developments in the Soviet nationali-
ties sphere prior to Gorbachev, highlighting the compact between center and
periphery that helped maintain stability in the Soviet Union for many dec-
ades. This section also emphasizes two factors that undermined Soviet cohe-
sion over time:
1. the Bolshevik policy of creating and reinforcing ethnic and nationalist

identities, if only inadvertently. This policy undercut ofªcial claims
about proletarian unity and the irresistible triumph of a supranational
Soviet identity.
2. Soviet policies of unequal treatment and repression of various nation-
alities. These policies contravened the ofªcial notion that all nationali-
ties were “equal” and would “blossom” under Communist rule.
The ªrst factor led to the structural vulnerability of the Soviet state, and the
second produced grievances against the center that fueled separatist national-
ism under the vastly more open regime of Gorbachev. After brieºy discussing
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these factors, the second section gives an overview of the most salient ethnic
and nationalist disturbances before Gorbachev’s rule and assesses their cumu-
lative impact on the integrity of the Soviet state.
The third section focuses on the intensiªcation of nationalism and ethnic
pressures in 1988–1991. It describes the character and impact of separatist
nationalism (in the Baltic states, Georgia, Armenia, Moldova, and Ukraine);
ethnic conºicts (in Nagorno-Karabakh, Moldova, Central Asia, and the re-
gions of South Ossetia and Abkhaziya in Georgia); and demographic, reli-
gious, and linguistic pressures. How did the state respond to these challenges,
and to what extent did they erode Soviet cohesion? This section also describes
the nature of Russia’s defection from the Soviet fold, a defection that was a key
variable in the unraveling of the state. The section concludes by brieºy tracing
a related phenomenon that contributed to imperial disintegration—namely,
the breakdown of the economic linkage between center and periphery.
The fourth section discusses the cumulative effect of ethnic and national-
ist pressures in weakening the Soviet state. These pressures were signiªcant,
but the article points to a number of other factors that were instrumental in
the demise of the Soviet Union: the failure to achieve a viable compact be-
tween center and periphery during Gorbachev’s initial years in power, Gorba-
chev’s general unwillingness to use force decisively and efªciently to quell un-
rest and other challenges to the Soviet regime, and the deliberate steps taken
by Yeltsin and the Russian government.5
Nations, Nationalism, and Empires
Some concepts inevitably provoke scholarly quarrels. Such is the case with na-
tion, nationalism, and empires. There are numerous deªnitions of national-
ism,6 but in this chapter it refers to a political ideology7 consisting of three ba-
5. There were, of course, other factors that contributed to the demise of the Soviet Union—economic
problems, external pressures such as the arms race with the United States, as well as the process of po-
litical liberalization and glasnost’—but these are not the focus of this chapter. Also, I do not argue that
the Soviet Union could have survived indeªnitely (though I do not rule out the possibility). Instead, I
contend that it did not have to collapse when it did, whether because of nationalist and ethnic pres-
sures or for other reasons. Stronger resolve from the center to maintain the empire, including through
the consistent use of force in the late 1980s, 1990, or even as late as early 1991 (during the crackdown
in the Baltic republics), could have preserved its life certainly beyond 1991.
6. For example, Ernest Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm deªne nationalism as a “political principle which
holds that the political and national unit should be congruent,” and Hans Kohn deªnes it as a “state of
mind” in which the individual’s supreme loyalty is to the nation-state. Echoing Kohn, Liah Greenfeld
asserts that nationalism is a “particular perspective or a style of thought” based on the idea of the “na-
tion.” See Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 1; Eric
J. Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (New York: Cambridge
84
sic propositions: 1) that there exists a “nation” with identiªable members;

2) that the nation is distinct or special compared to other national units; and
3) that the nation must exist as an independent political entity. Nationalism
becomes most powerful in the political arena when its adherents are mobi-
lized en masse for political action such as the preservation or destruction of a
state or the creation of new states.8 Related to nationalism are ethnic pres-
sures, which include ethnic conºicts; demographic change; and religious or
linguistic demands. These pose challenges to the state’s ability to govern its
constituent units. Ethnic groups within a state can create ethnic pressures
without engaging in nationalism. However, when the pressures culminate in
demands for a separate and independent state, the mobilized groups are ap-
propriately called nationalist.
The term nation, as used here, refers to a community of people who share
kinship based on culture, race, ancestry, language, ethnicity, religion, or citi-
zenship, and are the self-professed repository of legitimate political authority.
This deªnition reºects the idea that nations are not “real entities [or] . . . sub-
stantial, enduring collectivities.” 9 For the purposes of this article, the interest-
ing question is not “what is a nation”, instead, we need to consider how “na-
tionhood [is] institutionalized within and among states” and what “makes the
use of [national categories] by or against states more or less resonant or effec-
tive.”10 These questions are particularly relevant to the Soviet Union, where
nations were constructed, deªned, and redeªned over decades.
University Press, 1990), p. 9; Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Back-
ground (New York: Macmillan, 1944), p. 10; and Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Moder-
nity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 3. On deªnitions of nationalism, see Astrid
S. Tuminez, Russian Nationalism Since 1856: Ideology and the Making of Foreign Policy (Boulder:
Rowman & Littleªeld, 2000), ch. 1, esp. pp. 1–12.
7. An ideology is a set of ideas, beliefs, and concepts (invented, factual, or normative) that purport to
explain or justify a speciªc social order. If that order does not exist, the ideology “may constitute a be-
lieved strategy for its attainment.” This deªnition derives in part from Eric Carlton, War and Ideology
(London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 18–21.
8. Nationalist ideologies always include a national mission—the highest good for which members of
the nation must strive and sacriªce. The particular nationalist mission relevant to this article is sepa-
ratism, or the dismemberment of an existing state in order to create a new state or several new states.
9. See Rogers Brubaker, “Rethinking Nationhood: Nation as Institutionalized Form, Practical Cate-
gory, Contingent Event,” Contention, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Fall 1994), pp. 3–19; Katherine Verdery,
“Whither ‘Nation’ and ‘Nationalism?’” Daedalus, Vol.122, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 37–46; and
Craig Calhoun, “Nationalism and Ethnicity,” Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 19 (1993),
pp. 222–224. On the issue of the “people” as the repository of political power, see Greenfeld, Nation-
alism; and Kohn, Idea of Nationalism. A more common deªnition of nation is a “group of people who
believe that they are ancestrally related.” See Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Under-
standing (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. xi, 75; and Robert J. Kaiser, The Geog-
raphy of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 6.
10. Brubaker, “Rethinking Nationhood,” pp. 3, 6.
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Nationalism is a highly normative ideology with powerful legitimating

effects that can determine the fate of states and their ruling elites.11 It is nor-
mative because it deªnes who is “in” and “out” of the nation, and because it
advocates particular courses of action for the nation’s well-being. It has legiti-
mating effects because it anchors political power in the “nation.” The ruling
elites are deemed to be legitimate only if they successfully claim to represent
the nation and defend its interests. The integrity of a state may be jeopardized
when mobilized groups, claiming to be members of a particular nation, assert
that the state does not articulate or defend their interests and that, therefore,
they ought to secede and become independent. 12
An empire is an organized political community consisting of multiple na-
tional-territorial units, with one unit (the “center”) that exercises control over
the effective sovereignty of two or more subordinate units (the “periphery”).
This deªnition includes empires with contiguous territories (e.g., the Russian
and Ottoman empires) and those with peripheral components situated away
from the “center” (e.g., the British and French colonial empires).13 A host of
formal and functional links between center and periphery are required for the
maintenance of central control. If these links are eliminated, the empire will
soon break apart.
Control by the center over the effective sovereignty of the periphery (re-
gardless, for example, of codiªed equal legal status between them) is the
deªning feature of empires. Three related points deserve emphasis here.
First, the center need not, and often does not, exercise direct and com-
plete (“totalitarian”) rule over peripheral segments. Instead, the center may re-
tain or establish formal and informal compacts with intermediaries who gov-
ern these segments with some autonomy in exchange for “the delivery of
compliance, tribute, and military collaboration with the center.”14 Although
the threat or use of force is important to ensure that the periphery complies
with central edicts, it is never sufªcient for maintaining long-term control of
an empire. Central powers throughout history have ruled their domains using
a mix of instruments, including collaboration with, and cooptation of, sectors
11. Verdery, “Whither ‘Nation’ and ‘Nationalism?’” pp. 38–44.

12. The notion that state power is the ultimate goal of nationalists can be found in Breuilly, National-
ism and the State; Paul A. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison (Newbury Park,
CA: Sage Publications, 1991); and James G. Kellas, The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 54–57.
13. This deªnition is similar to the one used in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, The End of Empire?
The Transformation of the USSR in Comparative Perspective (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997). See also
Alexander J. Motyl, Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2001), p. 15.
14. Charles Tilly, “How Empires End,” in Barkey and von Hagen, eds., After Empire, p. 3.
86
of elites in the subordinate societies and the delivery of certain goods to

publics in the periphery.15
Second, the society that wields central power must create and maintain
an internal consensus—a consensus within the center—about the desirability
of its role and the value of empire. Without such a consensus, the center will
be unable to wield effective control over the periphery. If a consensus on im-
perial arrangements weakens, imperial rulers may be hampered from acting
decisively in the face of peripheral actors’ demands for independence. This
notion is borne out by Crane Brinton, who, in his classic Anatomy of Revolu-
tion, argues that a ruling class jeopardizes its rule when many of its members
begin to believe that they hold power unjustly, that beliefs they took for
granted were false or silly, and that they should help those who are challenging
the status quo.16
Third, if forceful challenges by the periphery to imperial organization do
arise, leaders at the center must have at their disposal sufªcient instruments of
coercion and the will to use them. Again, referring to Brinton’s work on revo-
lutions (nationalist secessionism in an empire is akin to revolution), regimes
have been overthrown not when they were most oppressive but when rulers
were “more than half ashamed to use force, and therefore used it badly, so that
on the whole those on whom force was inºicted were stimulated rather than
repressed.” 17 The three features just described here—an effective center-
periphery compact, consensus at the center regarding imperial rule and ar-
rangements, and rulers’ will and competence to use force—are prerequisites
for empire maintenance. If these factors are eroded or absent, the very exis-
tence of an empire will be in jeopardy.18
Was the Soviet Union an empire? The answer to this question, as Mark
Beissinger has pointed out, has varied over time.19 The term “empire” in some
15. Mark N. Katz, “Collapsed Empires,” in Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson, eds., Man-
aging Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conºict (Washington: U.S. Institute of
Peace, 1996), pp. 26–28. For examples of imperial powers’ collaboration or alliance with select elites
in the periphery, see Percival Spear, India: A Modern History (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1961); Bernal Diaz, The Conquest of New Spain, trans. by J. M. Cohen (Baltimore: Penguin Books,
1963); Motyl, Imperial Ends; and Nahaylo and Swoboda, Soviet Disunion, chs. 2–6.
16. Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952), pp. 56–60.
17. Ibid., p. 57, 94–99. On this important point, see also Reinhard Bendix, Kings or People: Power and
the Mandate to Rule (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 582–604. My thanks to Mark
Kramer for these references.
18. The relationship of control between center and periphery is present in all deªnitions of empire.
For deªnitions other than the one I use, see Michael W. Doyle, Empires (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1986), pp. 19–20; David A. Lake, “The Rise, Fall and Future of the Russian Empire,” in
Dawisha and Parrott, eds., End of Empire? pp. 32–36; and Tilly, “How Empires End,” pp. 3–4.
19. Mark R. Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2002).
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periods has carried a stigma and in other periods has not. Normative implica-
tions aside, however, there are several reasons for arguing that the Soviet
Union was in fact an empire. First, the USSR had a controlling center and a
controlled periphery. The center was Moscow, and the central rulers were
(primarily, though not exclusively) the Russian and Russiªed elites who
wielded power in key Soviet institutions. The periphery was the rest of the
country, especially the republics outside Russia. Second, although Russians
did not always beneªt from policies implemented by the center—and at
times, especially under Josif Stalin, they were treated brutally (as were other
ethnic groups)—the Russians nonetheless constituted a society that, in many
measurable (though not absolute) ways, dominated over other ethnic groups.
Russian culture and Russian language were most salient in the USSR; the au-
thorities treated expressions of Russian chauvinism or ethnic assertiveness
with greater leniency than they did similar expressions by other ethnic groups;
and ethnic Russians occupied the bulk of senior appointments in pivotal in-
stitutions of authority.20 Third, the Soviet Union was organized along na-
tional-territorial lines, thereby maintaining and emphasizing the distinct cul-
tural, linguistic, and territorial heritage and features of Russian and major
non-Russian populations.21 This administrative structure helped to sustain
the division between center and periphery, and it reinforced the imperial or-
ganization of the state.
National and Ethnic Policies Before Gorbachev
Leonid Brezhnev declared in 1972 that “the national question, as we inherited

it from the past, has been fully, deªnitively, and irreversibly resolved.”22 Simi-
larly, a scholar from the Soviet Academy of Sciences declared in 1986:
20. See, for example, Lowell Tillett, The Great Friendship: Soviet Historians on the Non-Russian Nation-
alities (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969); Brian D. Taylor, “Red Army Blues:
The Future of Military Power in the Former Soviet Union,” Breakthroughs, No. 2 (Spring 1992),
pp. 1–8; and Simon Dixon, “The Russians: The Dominant Nationality,” in Graham Smith, ed., The
Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union (New York: Longman Publishing Group, 1990), pp. 21–39.
Philip G. Roeder discusses the mixed nature of Russian dominance in the Soviet Union in “Soviet
Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization,” World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 1 (January 1991), pp. 196–232.
21. My use of the term “major” does not necessarily imply that these were the largest ethnic groups. In
a few cases the titular ethnic groups of the USSR’s fourteen non-Russian republics were smaller than
certain ethnic groups that did not have their own republics. There were, for example, far more Tatars
than Lithuanians, Estonians, or Latvians, but the Tatars did not have their own union republic,
whereas each of the Baltic nations did.
22. Quoted in S. V. Cheshko, Raspad Sovetskogo Soyuza: Etnopoliticheskii analiz (Moscow: Rossiiskaya
Akademiya Nauk, 1996), p. 65.
88
In the course of socialist construction, the formerly backward national hinter-

lands have long ago vanished; socialist nations have joined together to form an
interethnic community—the Soviet people—that is new in its social parameters.
Common cultural traits have developed, . . . [and] national discord is a thing of
the past.23
Statements like these, however, concealed a more problematic reality. Al-

though peace generally characterized interethnic relations in the Soviet Union
from the mid-1950s on, and although separatist movements were largely dor-
mant before Gorbachev came to power (especially after the postwar insurgen-
cies in western Ukraine and the Baltic states were crushed in the early to
mid-1950s), there was little basis for proclaiming the triumph of socialist val-
ues and the disappearance of national differences.
What was the state of ethnic groups and nationalities in the Soviet Union
before 1985? What factors helped create relative stability between center and
periphery? To answer these questions, I will describe key features of the com-
pact between center and periphery that allowed the Soviet regime to rule rela-
tively peacefully for many years. Then I will discuss two factors that contrib-
uted to the weakening of center-periphery cohesion over time.
The Compact between Center and Periphery

Imperial regimes do not sustain their rule exclusively through the threat or use
of force. Force is critical in creating an empire and deterring its enemies, but
serious problems would arise if other instruments were not available to up-
hold imperial rule. In the Soviet case a center-periphery compact was a crucial
supplement to the threat and use of force. The compact helped ensure relative
peace and stability for decades, in part because it was ºexible enough to ac-
commodate changing circumstances. The compact had a formal dimension,
based on treaties and constitutional guarantees codiªed originally under the
Bolshevik government of Vladimir Lenin.24 More important, however, were
the informal dimensions of the compact.
Underlying the arrangement between center and periphery was the policy
of korenizatsiya (the use of local cadres), which was practiced as early as 1918
and ofªcially approved at the Twelfth Congress of the Communist Party in
1923. The purpose of korenizatsiya was to woo non-Russians into the Soviet
camp and to improve Soviet administrative operations among non-Russians.
The policy emphasized two elements: (1) the learning and use of local lan-
23. Yu. V. Bromlei, “Sovershenstvovanie natsional’nykh otnoshenii v SSSR,” Kommunist (Moscow),

No. 8 (1986), pp. 78–87.
24. Nahaylo and Swoboda, Soviet Disunion, pp. 44–59.
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guages in government, education, literature, political propaganda, and other

social communication; and (2) the active recruitment and training of non-
Russians to work in the government, Communist Party, and local Soviet
organs. Lenin also argued that korenizatsiya would counter Great Russian
chauvinism and would assist nationalities that had been victimized by Russian
“ethnic arrogance and insensitivity” and had remained “stateless” and “back-
ward” under tsarism.25
Korenizatsiya dominated Soviet policy in the 1920s. Non-Russian lan-
guages ºourished and literacy grew rapidly among the empire’s multiple
nationalities. Titular nationalities, in particular, beneªted by increasing their
numbers in the power structures of the Communist Party and seeing their
languages used in books, newspapers, and journals.26 Although Stalin subse-
quently shifted toward a policy of assimilation and fought the “small
nationalisms” that the earlier policies helped engender, korenizatsiya ulti-
mately survived. After a period of Russiªcation in the late 1930s, ofªcial
support for local languages resumed. Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev,
korenizatsiya evolved into an institutionalized cadre policy involving the ap-
pointment of a local ofªcial to the top position (ªrst secretary) in each
republic’s Communist Party, and the simultaneous appointment of an ethnic
Russian to the second position (known informally as the second secretary).
This practice made center-periphery politics fairly predictable, as Russian
and native ofªcials were able to monitor each other to ensure the fulªllment
of central edicts. In some instances, korenizatsiya evolved into nepotism,
entrenched corruption, cronyism, illegal activity, and the virtual creation of
ªefdoms in republics whose leaders ruled for as long as they pleased with al-
most no restraints, provided that they displayed proper obedience to Moscow,
including the suppression of overt expressions of “anti-Soviet nationalism.” 27
Local cadres enjoyed leadership positions not only in the Soviet Union’s
ethnonational territories, but on occasion even in the highest bodies of Soviet
25. See Desyatyi s”ezd Rossiiskoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii. Stenograªcheskii otchet (Moscow:
Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo, 1921), p. 101.
26. Fowkes, Disintegration of the Soviet Union, pp. 47–61; and Nahaylo and Swoboda, Soviet Disunion,
pp. 64–66.
27. Those who failed to suppress ethnic nationalism were punished. In 1972, for example, Ukrainian
Communist Party First Secretary Petro Shelest was removed from his position because he tolerated
manifestations of ethnic Ukrainian nationalism. See “Dnevnik P. E. Shelesta,” in Rossiiskii
Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial’no-Politicheskoi Istorii, Fond (F.) 666, Delo (D.) 2, Listy (Ll.)
333–48 (I am grateful to Mark Kramer for this citation); Shelest’s interview in Argumenty i fakty, No. 2
(January 1989), p. 14; and Nahaylo and Swoboda, Soviet Disunion, pp. 177–179. See also Ronald
Suny, “State, Civil Society, and Ethnic Cultural Consolidation in the USSR—Roots of the National
Question,” in Gail Lapidus et al., eds. From Union to Commonwealth: Nationalism and Separatism in
the Soviet Republics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 43 n. 12. Longevity in
ofªce—in some cases for more than twenty-ªve years—was especially evident among ªrst secretaries
in the Central Asian republics, Georgia, Moldova, Belarus, and the Baltic states.
90
power. This was particularly true under Brezhnev when, at one point, as many
as six non-Russians sat on the Politburo. In the Central Committee of the
Soviet Communist Party (CPSU), Ukrainians and Kazakhs established a
signiªcant presence. The powers and privileges given to elites in the periphery
cemented linkages needed for imperial rule. These linkages were particularly
important in relations between the central leadership and the USSR’s four-
teen non-Russian union republics.28 A Soviet-wide elite emerged, consisting
of Russians and co-opted non-Russians in the periphery.
A second component of the center-periphery compact was the economic
modernization of the outlying republics. This push for modernization created
many opportunities for upward mobility among economic, political, social,
and intellectual elites. National and ethnic groups within the USSR (Russian
and non-Russian alike) paid an enormous price for the Soviet policies of
forced collectivization and crash industrialization, but these policies did lead
over time to higher standards of living in the periphery.
The Soviet government transformed the social landscape of the former
Russian empire through education, industrialization, and urbanization.
Whereas four out of ªve people in Tsarist Russia were illiterate, literacy rates
in the Soviet Union (in at least two languages, for many) became high by
world standards. Opportunities for higher education also expanded greatly,
and titular nationalities beneªted from quota systems that gave them privi-
leged access to higher education and, subsequently, to white-collar jobs and
administrative and leadership posts. This process resulted in the concentra-
tion of non-Russian elites in urban industrialized areas and contributed to the
consolidation of national identity in Georgia, Armenia, Lithuania, and other
republics. Such consolidation, however, did not produce attacks against the
center during the years when the center was cohesive and the threat of force
was credible. Indigenous elites who beneªted from opportunities for political,
social, and intellectual mobility opted instead to be loyal to the Soviet system
and cooperated with the center to suppress dissident nationalism whenever it
emerged.29
28. Steven Burg, “Nationality Elites and Political Change in the Soviet Union,” in Lubomyr Hajda
and Mark Beissinger, eds., The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and Society (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1990), pp. 25–26; and Roman Laba, “How Yeltsin’s Exploitation of Ethnic Nationalism
Brought Down an Empire,” Transition, Vol. 2, No. 1 (12 January 1996), p. 9. Peripheral elites’ de-
pendence on the center for their privileges and powers is a central theme in Roeder, “Soviet Federal-
ism.” For an account of the extensive corruption in Uzbekistan and the way it was tolerated by the
central authorities, see Telman Gdlyan and Nikolai Ivanov, Kremlevskoe delo (Moscow: Gramota,
1996).
29. Zvi Gitelman, “Development and Ethnicity in the Soviet Union,” in Alexander J. Motyl, ed., The
Post-Soviet Nations: Perspectives on the Demise of the USSR (New York: Columbia University Press,
1992), p. 228; Zaslavsky, “The Soviet Union,” p. 86; Fowkes, Disintegration of the Soviet Union,
pp. 79–82, 100–104; Seweryn Bialer, Stalin’s Successors: Leadership, Stability and Change in the Soviet
91
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The Soviet regime also implemented economic policies favoring the pe-
riphery. Underdeveloped republics in Central Asia received a “larger than pro-
portional share of investment resources” and direct subsidies from the cen-
ter.30 To help stabilize nationality relations, Moscow undertook comprehen-
sive regional development projects and provided supplementary ªnancing to
poorer regions and areas with harsh climates. Statistical data from 1961 to
1985 reºect the overall improvement of economic well-being in the periphery
as a result of these policies. National income and industrial production grew
consistently during the 25-year period, although rates of growth were higher
in 1961–1970 than in 1971–1985. Per-capita consumption also rose almost
consistently during the two-and-a-half decades, leading one economist to
conclude that, despite uneven rates, living standards as a whole “improved
markedly in all republics” from 1961 to 1985. 31
Along with the credible threat of force, the compact between center and
periphery helped forge Soviet imperial cohesion. Many elites favored the
maintenance of the Soviet Union, and the populations in outlying republics
could see steady (if slow) material improvements in their lives. At the same
time, a consensus in the center, among Russians and Russiªed Slavs who sup-
ported Russian hegemony, also helped maintain the Soviet order. This con-
sensus was sufªciently strong in the late 1970s and early 1980s to preclude
any Russian support for separatism in the periphery or for any steps that
would weaken the integrity of the Soviet state. Most Russians viewed the en-
tire Soviet Union as their homeland. For example, in the late 1980s when the
Institute of Ethnology in Moscow polled Russians in the Russian Federation
on what they considered their motherland (rodina), 70 percent responded
“the Soviet Union.” 32
Erosion of the Center-Periphery Compact

Korenizatsiya was a double-edged sword. Although it helped Soviet leaders
maintain their imperial holdings, it also consolidated ethnic and national
Union (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 214–216; and Roeder, “Soviet Federal-
ism,” pp. 196–232.
30. Gertrude Schroeder, “Nationalities and the Soviet Economy,” in Hajda and Beissinger, eds., Na-
tionalities Factor, p. 50. See also Richard E. Ericson, “Soviet Economic Structure and the National Ques-
tion,” in Motyl, Post-Soviet Nations, p. 250; Jonathan F. Schiffer, Soviet Regional Economic Policy: The
East-West Debate over Paciªc Siberian Development (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1989); and David A.
Dyker, The Process of Investment in the Soviet Union (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
31. Schroeder, “Nationalities and the Soviet Economy,” p. 50; for statistics on income, industrial pro-
duction, and per capita consumption from 1961 to 1985, see pp. 45–51.
32. In Tallinn, Estonia, a comparatively lower percentage of Russians (53 percent) claimed the Soviet
Union as their motherland. See Leokadia Drobyzheva, “Perestroika and the Ethnic Consciousness of
Russians,” in Lapidus et al., eds., From Union to Commonwealth, pp. 101, 112 n. 8.
92
identities among many groups. This process contradicted the ideal of Com-
munist proletarian solidarity, which was at the core of Bolshevik ideology.
Shortly after coming to power in 1917, the Bolsheviks realized that any plan
to save the “October Revolution” by reconstituting the great expanse of the
Tsarist Russian empire would require concessions to national groups that had
been independent to one extent or another from 1917 to 1921. Lenin himself
expressed sympathy for ethnic and national groups that, in his view, had suf-
fered under the hand of Russian national chauvinism during Tsarist rule and
were thus justiªably wary of rejoining a state that resembled the former em-
pire. He and his followers had long insisted that nationalism would eventually
disappear as socialism itself developed. 33
In developing a political and legal framework for the new Bolshevik state,
Stalin ªrst proposed a federation with autonomy—but not sovereignty—for
constituent parts of the state, with control centralized in the Russian Soviet
Federated Socialist Republic. Lenin opposed this, however, and Stalin revised
his plan to respond better to the sensitivities of the non-Russian nationalities.
In 1922 the Russian Republic, Ukraine, Belarus, and the Transcaucasus Re-
public signed the Union Treaty that created the Soviet Union. Two years later,
in 1924, a Soviet Constitution was adopted, declaring the USSR an “integral,
federal, multinational state formed on the principle of socialist federalism as a
result of the free self-determination of nations.” 34 Fifteen union republics
eventually constituted the federation, each organized along ethnoterritorial
lines—that is, each republic had a titular nationality representing the repub-
lic’s dominant ethnic group, which then received nominal control over the re-
public’s territory. To reinforce self-determination, the Soviet constitution also
granted the ªfteen republics the right to secede from the union, a right that
meant more on paper than in practice.
The legal framework of the Soviet Union, along with korenizatsiya, vali-
dated and reinforced the idea of nations and their legitimacy as bases for state
administration and organization. This was evident not only at the union-
republic level, but at all levels of state administration in the early Soviet years.
The result was what might be called “ethnic afªrmative action run amuck”
from 1918 through the 1920s. Nearly all nationalities, differentiated mainly
by language, established their own administrative and territorial units. From
33. Yuri Slezkine, “The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic
Particularism,” Slavic Review, Vol. 53, No. 2 (Summer 1994), p. 425; Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, De-
cline of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics, trans. by Martin Sokolinsky and Henry A. LaFarge
(New York: Harper and Row, 1979), pp. 13–46; and Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, “The Right of Nations to
Self-determination,” in Omar Dahbour and Micheline R. Ishay, eds., The Nationalism Reader (Atlan-
tic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1995), pp. 208–214.
34. “The Constitution of the USSR,” in Martha B. Olcott, ed., The Soviet Multinational State: Read-
ings and Documents (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1990), p. 8.
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1918 to 1922, for example, Stalin, who was then Soviet commissar for na-
tionalities, brought into being the self-governing republics and administra-
tions of Bashkiriya, Tatarstan, Kirgiziya, Dagestan, Kareliya, and Yakutiya. By
the late 1920s, union republics contained national okrugs, national raions, na-
tional soviets, native executive committees, native soviets, village (aul) soviets,
clan soviets, and nomadic soviets. In addition, the regime encouraged the de-
velopment of distinct written languages for all ethnic groups, even when this
did not seem entirely rational or efªcient, as with groups that previously had
not used a written language.35 By 1928, newspapers were being published in
at least forty-seven languages (increasing to ªfty-nine by 1933 and sixty-six by
1938) and books in sixty-six languages. The regime also required ofªcial busi-
ness and education to be conducted in the languages of the various ethnic
communities. National consolidation accelerated when Soviet leaders en-
dorsed and supported the cultural development of ethnic groups through in-
digenous libraries, literary organizations, theaters, academies, and associa-
tions. The Communist Party established ethnic quotas at all levels of
administration, creating an “exuberant national carnival” in which Ukraine,
for example, had Russian, German, Polish, Jewish, Moldovan, Chechen, Bul-
garian, Greek, Belarusan, and Albanian soviets.36
Under Stalin, and especially in the 1930s, Soviet policy shifted from
widespread cultivation of ethnic and national culture and administration to
the forcible suppression of non-Russian or “bourgeois” nationalism. Although
the regime continued to support the use of multiple languages, it began to
combat the nationalism of smaller nations and openly promoted Russian na-
tionalist ideas. Stalin ordered the systematic removal of local ethnic Commu-
nist leaders, cultural luminaries, and literary ªgures. These purges decimated
local elites not only in union republics such as Azerbaijan and Ukraine but
also in non-union republics including the Crimean and Tatar autonomous re-
publics.37 The promotion of Russian nationalism was consistent with Stalin’s
inclinations toward Russian chauvinism from the earliest years after he be-
came the top Soviet leader.38 When the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Re-
35. In Central Asia and Azerbaijan, for example, where people communicated mainly in Turkish
(Turki) for business, the Soviet regime accentuated the differences in extant languages and encouraged
the development of separate Uzbek, Turkmen, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Azerbaijani languages. See Isaac
Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography, 2nd Ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 211;
Fowkes, Disintegration of the Soviet Union, pp. 55–59; and Suny, “State, Civil Society,” p. 29.
36. Slezkine, “USSR as a Communal Apartment,” pp. 426–439; Fowkes, Disintegration of the Soviet
Union, pp. 35–52; Terry Martin, The Afªrmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet
Union, 1923–1939 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), chs. 2–6; and Cheshko, Raspad
Sovetskogo Soyuza, pp. 142–165.
37. Fowkes, Disintegration of the Soviet Union, pp. 47–61; and Nahaylo and Swoboda, Soviet Disunion,
pp. 64–80.
38. In 1921 Stalin exhorted his fellow Georgians to ªght against local nationalism in favor of union
94
public (RSFSR) adopted its new constitution (modeled on the Soviet consti-
tution) in 1937, a Pravda editorial rhapsodized:
Russian culture enriches the culture of other peoples. The Russian language has
become the language of world revolution. Lenin wrote in Russian. Stalin writes
in Russian. Russian culture has become international, for it is the most ad-
vanced, the most humane. Leninism is its offspring, the Stalin constitution its
expression.39
During World War II, Russian nationalism infused Stalin’s rhetoric as he

sought to mobilize the population to repulse Germany’s attacks.
Nation-building did not end under Stalin, however. Although ofªcial en-
thusiasm for ethnonational development waned, the authorities retained the
principle of nationality as a fundamental part of individual identity and polit-
ical organization. This was consistent with Lenin’s and Stalin’s belief that na-
tions were real, objective, and enduring entities—at least until Communism
was fully built. In 1932 the regime introduced individual passports that
speciªed every citizen’s nationality at birth, creating a national and ethnic
identity for the rest of that person’s life. These passports remained in use even
when ofªcial policy stopped emphasizing the development of non-Russian
ethnic and national identities. Larger nationalities continued to be reinforced
and consolidated, particularly at the union-republic level, and smaller groups
were encouraged to merge with larger ones with whom they shared common
features. Nationalities whose experience of statehood and political independ-
ence was scant or non-existent (including Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Ukraine, and the Central Asian republics) gained the trappings of
pseudo-statehood within the Soviet Union. As Yuri Slezkine puts it, under
Stalin’s reversal, Soviet policy
cut down on the number of national units but . . . never questioned the national
essence of those units. . . . [The] ethnic groups that already had their own repub-
lics and their own extensive bureaucracies were actually told to redouble their ef-
forts at building distinct national cultures. . . . [N]ationality policy had aban-
doned the pursuit of countless rootless nationalities in order to concentrate on a
few full-ºedged, fully-equipped “nations.”40
with great Russia. In his 1924 speech proclaiming “socialism in one country,” he excoriated Trotsky
and others for their insufªcient faith in the Russian proletariat. During the period of New Economic
Policy he also acknowledged and tacitly supported the nationalism of those Russian elites who had
joined the party as a means of restoring great Russia. See Deutscher, Stalin, pp. 238–244, 489–490.
39. Robert C. Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928–1941 (New York: W. W.
Norton, 1990), p. 568.
40. Slezkine, “USSR as a Communal Apartment,” pp. 442 and 445. See also Cheshko, Raspad
Sovetskogo Soyuza, pp. 156–65; and Suny, “State, Civil Society,” pp. 22–43. The cooling of Soviet en-
thusiasm for ethnic development is reºected in the declining number of peoples registered as
“ethnoses” in the Soviet Union: from 194 in 1926 to 101 in 1979. Among the ethnic groups that were
95
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The building and reinforcement of nations in the Soviet Union created

intrinsic fragility in the makeup of the USSR. Over time, Soviet policies con-
solidated ethnic identities, especially at the union-republic level. These repub-
lics evolved into building blocks for the possible—but certainly not inevita-
ble—attainment of separate states in the future. The second half of Lenin’s
axiom of developing units that were “national in form, socialist in content”
was never realized in any systematic way. Although Lenin also correctly ar-
gued that nations were “historically contingent,” Soviet policy allowed con-
tingency to evolve into near permanence. Thus, throughout the existence of
the Soviet Union, national and ethnic identities in many cases did not give
way to a higher, supranational Soviet Communist loyalty or to a single
Russiªed national identity.41
The Inequality and Repression of Nationalities

Another factor that weakened the center-periphery compact over time was the
contradictory declaration of the equality of nations and the practice of un-
equal treatment and cruel repression. The inequitable treatment and cruelty
inºicted on many groups created a powerful focus for grievances that were
vented fully under Gorbachev—grievances that undermined Soviet legiti-
macy. Russians and non-Russians alike expressed these grievances. In the pe-
riphery bitter memories of deception, abuse, and terror under Soviet rule
prompted dissent and strained the center-periphery compact. Among Rus-
sians similar memories fueled popular discontent and eroded enthusiasm for
imperial rule.
Early on Lenin advanced the idea of the “equality of all nations.” Only by
letting nations fully develop, he argued, would “backward” peoples overcome
their primitive national consciousness and move to a higher proletarian con-
sciousness. Article 70 of the Soviet constitution trumpeted the equality of the
amalgamated into larger ones were the Yomuds, Tekinsks, Goklens, and others who became the
Turkmen nation, and Altai-Kizhi, Telengits, Teleuts, and others who were encompassed by the Altai
people. See Yu. V. Bromlei, “Etnicheskie protsessy v SSSR,” Kommunist (Moscow), No. 5 (February
1983), pp. 56–65.
41. As Slezkine argues, Soviet policy created tension in “the coexistence of republican statehood and
passport nationality. The former assumed that territorial states made nations, the latter suggested that
primordial nations might be entitled to their own states. The former presupposed that all residents of
Belorusssia would (and should) some day become Belorussian, the latter provided the non-
Belorusssian residents with arguments against it. The Soviet government endorsed both deªnitions
without ever attempting to construct an ethnically meaningful Soviet nation or turn the USSR into a
Russian nation-state, so that when the non-national Soviet state had lost its Soviet meaning, the na-
tional non-states were the only possible heirs.” Cited from Slezkine, “USSR as a Communal Apart-
ment,” p. 451. On problems and resistance that the regime encountered in attempting to create a su-
pranational “Soviet” identity, see Nahaylo and Swobodnik, Soviet Disunion, pp. 174–198.
96
union republics of the USSR. In late 1982 the newly appointed head of the
CPSU, Yurii Andropov, reafªrmed Lenin’s approach:
What is the essence of the path established by Lenin? Brieºy, it could be put this
way—it is the fully voluntary union of free peoples as the guarantee of maxi-
mum durability of the federation. . . . It is the full equality of all nations and na-
tional groups, and the concomitant attempt to liquidate inequality among
them, not only legally but in fact. It is the free development of every republic,
every national group. 42
In practice, however, blatant injustice and coercion often made a mock-

ery of ofªcial declarations of equality and fairness. Under Stalin, in particular,
the Soviet regime practiced what Valerii Tishkov calls “ethnocide,” claiming
millions of victims through forced collectivization, dekulakization, and mass
deportations. In Ukraine the latest demographic evidence indicates that up to
four million people died in a famine created by Stalin’s effort to crush the
peasantry.43 (Up to a million people in Kazakhstan and another million in
southern Russia also died from the famine.) When Ukrainians tried en masse
to ºee to other regions to ªnd food, Stalin ordered that they be forcibly barred
from leaving. Mass deportations of ethnic groups began in the late-1930s, es-
pecially in the Far East and in the western territories occupied by Soviet
troops in 1939 and 1940 under the terms of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. During
World War II Stalin diverted hundreds of thousands of troops to carry out
wholesale deportations of nationalities whom he accused (groundlessly) of
having collaborated with the Nazis. Entire nations were removed from their
homelands and were not permitted to return until many years or even decades
later.44 Although Khrushchev rehabilitated some of the deported peoples and
released large numbers of deportees from forced-labor camps, he failed to re-
dress many of the wrongs inºicted on them. In particular, the Crimean Tatars
were not allowed to return to their historical homeland, despite repeated
pleas. The Soviet authorities attempted to suppress any discussion of the terri-
ble costs of Stalin’s ethnic cleansing, but these attempts never fully succeeded.
Dissidents in the periphery and in Moscow, including prominent human
42. Yu. V. Andropov, “Sixty Years of the USSR,” in Olcott, ed., Soviet Multinational State, p. 13.
43. For an excellent account of the famine, drawing on newly released archival evidence, see Nicolas
Werth, “The Great Famine,” in Stéphane Courtois, ed., The Black Book of Communism, trans.
by Mark Kramer and Jonathan Murphy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999),
pp. 159–168.
44. See the detailed accounts in Nicolas Werth, “The Other Side of Victory,” in Courtois, ed., The
Black Book of Communism, pp. 216–231; J. Otto Pohl, Ethnic Cleansing in the USSR, 1937–1949
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999); and Svetlana Alieva, ed., Tak eto bylo: Natsional’nye repressii v
SSSR 1919–1952 gody, 3 Vols. (Moscow: Insan, 1993), esp. Vols. 2–3.
97
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rights advocates, used the issue of deported peoples to delegitimize the Soviet
regime.45
Among Russians, numerous political leaders, members of the intelligen-
tsia, and ordinary people died in the Stalinist repressions, which wiped out
millions of people. Toward the eve of World War II Stalin slaughtered as
many as 40,000 Red Army ofªcers, the majority of them Russians. Because
Russians were not exempted from the horrors of Stalinism, many of them
subsequently objected to the equation of the Soviet regime with Russia. Dur-
ing the Gorbachev era, some Russians began to voice demands for independ-
ence from the Soviet Union.46
After Stalin died, Soviet policy toward nationalities returned to a more
even-handed, but still unequal, basis. Although korenizatsiya and informal
quotas (e.g., a certain number of seats in the Politburo were reserved
for the Ukrainian party ªrst secretary, for the ªrst secretary from one of
the Baltic states, for the ªrst secretary from one of the Caucasus states, and
for the ªrst secretary from one of the Central Asian states) devolved some
power to elites in the periphery and helped cultivate their loyalty to the
center, power in the most important union institutions remained concen-
trated in the hands of Russians and Russiªed Slavs. This was true of the Com-
munist Party, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet,47 the various ministries
and state committees, and the armed forces and security apparatus.48 Many
of the legal rights accorded to the republics, notably the right to secede, be-
came but a meaningless provision on paper. In essence, the Soviet Union
functioned more like an imperial hierarchy than a federation of equals. The
three Baltic states—Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania—were incorporated into
45. See, for example, Aleksandr M. Nekrich, The Punished Peoples: The Deportation and Fate of Soviet
Minorities at the End of the Second World War (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1978),
pp. 181–191; and Edward J. Lazzerini, “Crimean Tatars,” in Smith, ed., Nationalities Question,
pp. 322–338. For decades, the Crimean Tatars engaged in peaceful demonstrations and mass petition-
ing of Moscow ofªcials to allow them to return to their traditional homeland.
46. One Russian scholar rejects the term “ethnocide” to depict what happened in the 1920s and
1930s. Because Russians themselves were repressed and killed, he prefers to use the term “civil war” to
describe the state’s wanton destruction of any and all who might oppose it. See Cheshko, Raspad
Sovetskogo Soyuza, p. 106. See also Nahaylo and Swoboda, Soviet Disunion, p. 74.
47. In the Supreme Soviet itself, a body with largely symbolic powers, non-Russians and non-Slavs
were more than adequately represented. In 1970 they comprised 26.1 percent of the population of the
Soviet Union but held 40.3 percent of seats in the Supreme Soviet. See Carrère d’Encausse, Decline of
an Empire, p. 125.
48. In the late 1970s Russians accounted for 61.37 percent of the Soviet ofªcer corps, and Ukrainians
for 26.25 percent. See U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Ethnic Composition of the Soviet Ofªcer Corps,
DIA–7900037, Washington DC, 1979, p. 3; report authored by Allen Hetmanek, Bruce Thompson,
and Richard Trout. For an analysis that minimizes the Russians’ political comparative advantage,
claiming that Russian representation in the CPSU exceeded their ratio in the population as a whole by
only 8 percent, see Cheshko, Raspad Sovetskogo Soyuza, p. 115. This might be true of Communist
Party membership overall, but certainly not of the party leadership.
98
the union via the Nazi-Soviet Pact, but the populations in those republics
(and, to a lesser extent, in other republics such as Moldova, Azerbaijan, and
western Ukraine) never fully accepted their status as constituent units of the
USSR.
The Soviet policy of suppressing historical memory in the Baltic states
meant that the incorporation of those republics into the Soviet Union was a
taboo subject. When Gorbachev ªnally allowed public discussion of this piece
of history, Baltic separatist nationalism intensiªed as a result. Disregard for
history also accounted for such measures as Khrushchev’s transfer of the Cri-
mean peninsula—an area tightly linked to Russian history and collective
memory of Russian heroism and greatness—from the Russian Federation to
Ukraine in 1954, a gesture that at the time (when republic borders were of lit-
tle import) seemed largely inconsequential. Similarly, Soviet authorities took
industrial territories that were populated predominantly by Russians and in-
corporated them into the Kazakh Republic, formed in 1936. During the
Gorbachev era, Russian nationalists referred to Sevastopol and the northern
territories of Kazakhstan to discredit the Soviet state on the grounds that it
did not serve Russian interests.49
Rampant negligence and exploitation also marked Soviet policies in the
ecological sphere, giving rise to anti-Soviet sentiments and movements. Many
citizens in the periphery blamed the Soviet Union for such disasters as the
pollution of Lake Baikal, the drying and shrinking of the Aral Sea (which
caused the deaths of many in Karakalpak and continues to jeopardize the lives
and livelihoods of about four million people), and the catastrophic accident at
the Chornobyl nuclear plant that claimed many lives and contaminated large
portions of western Ukraine and Belarus. In Russia, Soviet plans to divert
rivers from north to south to irrigate the arid southern regions of the RSFSR
became a focal point for Russian anti-Soviet nationalism and the discrediting
of the Soviet system.50 Economic subsidization of the periphery at the expense
of the Russian republic was yet another “unfair” policy cited by many
Russians when demanding separation from the union. Finally, repressive poli-
cies in the religious sphere—policies that intensiªed under Khrushchev—
cultivated anti-Soviet sentiments among such groups as the Uniates (Byzan-
49. See, for example, “Rossiiskii parlament usilivaet davlenie na Ukrainu,” Nezavisimaya gazeta (Mos-
cow), 23 May 1992, p. 1.
50. Valery Tishkov, “The Soviet Empire Before and After Perestroika,” in Rudolph and Good, eds.,
Nationalism and Empire, p. 204; and Nicolai N. Petro, “‘The Project of the Century’: A Case Study of
Russian National Dissent,” Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. 22 (Autumn/Winter 1987),
pp. 235–252. Central Asian republics, which stood to beneªt from the river-diversion project and
which received subsidies from the center, tended to favor Soviet policies as a whole. Not surprisingly,
these republics did not wish to secede from the USSR and were opposed to the breakup of the Soviet
state.
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tine Catholics) in western Ukraine, Roman Catholics in Lithuania, Suª Mus-

lims in Central Asia, and Russian Orthodox believers in Russia.51
Nationalist and Ethnic Challenges to Soviet Rule

To assess the role of nationalism and ethnic pressures in the demise of the So-
viet Union, it is important to ascertain their impact in the years before
Gorbachev came to power. Although center-periphery relations were gener-
ally stable under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, problems occasionally arose
when discontented national and ethnic groups expressed opposition to the
central regime. What was the cumulative impact of such opposition?
In the immediate post-1945 era the Soviet Union confronted armed in-
surgencies in several of the territories it had annexed during or immediately
after World War II—notably, in western Ukraine, western Belarus, Lithuania,
Latvia, and Estonia. Stalin ordered the secret police (NKVD) and army to
crush these insurgencies, but the process took considerably longer than ex-
pected. Some of the nationalist groups were able to continue putting up resis-
tance until the early- to mid-1950s. 52 Eventually, however, through the use of
unrelenting violence and terror, the combined NKVD and army forces man-
aged to put down the rebellions. The suppression of these insurgencies ce-
mented Soviet rule in the western republics and forestalled any further armed
uprisings.
From the mid-1950s until the late 1980s the Soviet authorities’ willing-
ness (both perceived and real) to use force against opposition groups deterred
any sustained outbreaks of mass nationalist unrest. On a smaller scale, how-
ever, some groups did attempt to seek redress for nationalist grievances. Their
51. Although Khrushchev stepped up the intensity of anti-religious campaigns and atheistic propa-
ganda in the USSR, the Soviet regime never uniformly implemented an anti-religious policy. Instead,
it co-opted religious institutions and leaders where possible and persecuted mainly those whose reli-
gious beliefs were closely tied to anti-Soviet nationalist feelings. See Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, “National-
ities and Soviet Religious Policies,” in Hajda and Beissinger, eds., Nationalities Factor, pp. 148–174.
On Russian Orthodox dissent in the USSR, see Jane Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church: A Contempo-
rary History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986).
52. A vast amount of documentary evidence about the armed uprisings in western Ukraine, western
Belarus, and the Baltic states is now available in the archives of those former Soviet republics. Special-
ists in the Baltic states and Ukraine have published many collections of declassiªed documents and
lengthy accounts of the uprisings. Of particular importance in Ukraine have been documents pub-
lished in the semi-annual journal Z arkhiviv VUChK, HPU, NKVD, KHB, put out by the Instytut
Istorii Ukrainy. For a comparison of the nationalist resistance movements in Ukraine with those in
western Belarus and the Baltic states, see Anatolii Rusnachenko, Narod zburenyi: Natsional’no
vyzvol’nyi rukh v Ukraini i natsional’ni rukhy oporu v Bilorusii, Lytvi, Latvii, Estonii u 1940–50-kh
rokakh (Kyiv: Universytets’ke vyd-vo Pulsary, 2002). I am grateful to Mark Kramer for alerting me to
these sources and for providing copies of thousands of pages of photocopied documents he obtained
from the Ukrainian, Baltic, and Russian archives.
100
actions included literary and other cultural expressions of ethnic identities,

underground nationalist publications that criticized the Soviet regime, mass
petitions by (and for) aggrieved minorities, public demonstrations, and, in a
few instances, violent resistance.53 Some discontented groups, particularly
Jews and Volga Germans, expressed their dissatisfaction by literally exiting the
system through the emigration option that was available to them (but not to
other nationalities).
It is not necessary here to describe in detail the various forms of national
opposition and resistance during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras, but it is
worth brieºy mentioning the most signiªcant incidents from the mid-1950s
through the advent of Gorbachev. Table 1 lists mass disturbances from 1957
to 1986 that were linked to ethnic and national issues and center-periphery
relations.54
It is difªcult to pin down the exact numbers of all dead and wounded
from the mass disturbances listed in Table 1. The available data suggest, how-
ever, that nationalist and ethnic violence in the post-Stalin era was minimal
and highly manageable. The Soviet regime kept nationalism and ethnic agita-
tion under control, and the State Security (KGB) and Internal Affairs Minis-
try (MVD) troops arrested and punished “troublemakers” and nationalist agi-
tators before they could seriously challenge the authorities. Of the more than
8,000 people who were arrested and imprisoned for “anti-Soviet agitation and
propaganda” from 1956 to 1985, a considerable number were nationalist dis-
sidents. Many of them received sentences of ten years or more. Others, in-
cluding indigenous leaders and military ofªcers whose loyalty to the Soviet
Union was thought to be dubious, were dismissed from their posts or incar-
cerated in psychiatric hospitals.55 Soviet repression and punitive measures eas-
ily kept nationalist and ethnic pressures contained. Incidents of ethnic nation-
alist mobilization tended to be isolated, and at no point was the mobilization
from below sufªcient to pose a decisive challenge to the top. The cumulative
impact of nationalism and ethnic pressures on the Soviet imperial state from
53. See Fowkes, Disintegration of the Soviet Union, ch. 4, on the varieties of national resistance in the
Soviet Union.
54. For further documentation of ethnic unrest in the pre-Gorbachev era, see “Ne dopustim kritiki
Stalina,” Istochnik (Moscow), No. 6 (1995), pp. 41–43 (my thanks to Mark Kramer for this source
and the next one); “Dokladnaya zapiska. O raskrytii antisovetskikh proyavlenii, imevshikh mesto v g.
Vilnyuse,” 11 June 1966, in Lietuvos Ypatingasis Archyvas (LYA), Fondas (F.) K-1, Apyrasas (Ap.) 3,
Byla (B.) 51, Lapai (La.) 1–3; Nahaylo and Swoboda, Soviet Disunion; Fowkes, Disintegration of the
Soviet Union; and Elizabeth Fuller, “Georgia, Stalin, and the Demonstrations of 1956,” Radio Liberty
Report 190/86, 3 May 1988.
55. Nahaylo and Swoboda, Soviet Disunion, pp. 110–220; and the chapters on Estonians, Latvians,
Lithuanians, and Ukrainians in Smith, ed., Nationalities Question, pp. 40–108.
101
Table 1: Mass Ethnic Disturbances in the Soviet Union, 1957–1986 (Partial List)
Date Place/No. Of Participants Nature Of Disturbance Ofªcial Response Casualties

Initially, a protest against rumors of
Khrushchev’s impending repudiation Troops and tanks sent to stop mass
Tbilisi, Sukhumi, Gori, and 106 dead,
March 1956 of Stalin; evolved into anti-Soviet demonstrations;, KGB arrested dem-
Batumi, Georgia 100s wounded
nationalist demonstrations and de- onstrators
mands for Georgian independence
Russians massacre an undisclosed
1958 Groznyi, Checheno-Ingushetiya number of Chechens trying to return
to their original homes
102
Citizens carrying Stalin portraits an- Police use force; 6 held for criminal
Tuminez
1963 Sumgait, Azerbaijan; 800 1 wounded

gered by police removal of portraits responsibility
Conºict between Chechens and Laks
1964 Khasavyurt, Dagestan; 700 over rape of a Lak woman by a 9 held for criminal responsibility
Chechen
Commemoration of 50th anniver- militia volunteers sent; ªre hoses
1965 Erevan, Armenia; 100,000
sary of “Turkish genocide” used on demonstrators
Distribution and posting of anti-
Authorities arrest six people and
1966 Lithuania; unknown Soviet, nationalist leaºets and posters
charge them with criminal behavior
in Vilnius
Table 1: Continued
Date Place/No. Of Participants Nature Of Disturbance Ofªcial Response Casualties

1981 Tbilisi and Mtskheta, Georgia; Student protests against ªring of pro- Shevardnadze speaks to protesters in
1,000 and 2,000 fessor of Georgian literature; protests Tbilisi and agrees to meet with their
in defense of Georgian rights and representatives
language
Mass nationalist “hysteria” roused by
103
1981 North Ossetia; 4500 26 held under criminal charges
funeral of a murdered driver
Fight between Tajiks and non-titular
1985 Dushanbe, Tajikistan; 700 nationality at a movie theatre; Tajiks 5 held under criminal charges
beat up ethnic Russians at the theatre
Source: “O massovykh besporyadkakh s 1957 goda.” This highly classiªed document, compiled by KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov at Gorbachev’s request, was declassiªed in 1995
and published in Istochnik (Moscow), No. 6 (1995), pp. 146–153. I am grateful to Mark Kramer for providing me with this document.
Tuminez
the mid-1950s through the mid-1980s was minimal and did not threaten the
viability of the USSR.
Nationalism and Ethnic Pressures, 1988–1991
The experience of the Habsburg empire suggests that political liberalization

(or “enlightened absolutism” in the case of the Habsburgs), including the in-
troduction of civil liberties, can facilitate the rise of breakaway nationalism
and undermine the hegemony of ruling nations and regimes.56 Liberalization
provides much greater opportunities for aggrieved individuals and groups to
voice their discontent against the state, to propagandize their ideas, and, gen-
erally, to discredit state authority. In the Soviet case, Gorbachev’s policies of
glasnost and perestroika, and the attendant removal of fear and repression in
the Soviet Union, facilitated the growth of assertive ethnic nationalism among
the empire’s constituent units. The extent and intensity of nationalism and
ethnic pressures under Gorbachev soon reached unprecedented levels. Did the
central authorities respond to these challenges effectively? Did the center ªght
hard enough to keep the union? I will address these questions by looking at
the experiences of particular nationalities that tried to secede from the Soviet
Union. The most active separatist movements under Gorbachev were in the
Baltic republics57 and, to a lesser extent, in Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova.
Ukraine also eventually became separatist (especially in the western provinces
of the republic), but at a much later point than the others, and not chieºy be-
cause of ethnic nationalism. By February 1991 the Baltic republics, Armenia,
Moldova, and Georgia all had declared their intent to become independent
states and refused to participate in Gorbachev’s referendum on preserving the
union.58
56. In the Austro-Hungarian empire, reforms that culminated in the abolition of serfdom reinforced
the nationalism of peasant nations directed against the imperial center. See John-Paul Himka, “Na-
tionality Problems in the Habsburg Monarchy and the Soviet Union: The Perspective of History,” in
Rudolph and Good, eds., Nationalism and Empire, pp. 80–84.
57. For overviews of Baltic history and the ªrst years of Gorbachev’s rule, see Romuald Misiunas and
Rein Taagepera, The Baltic States: Years of Dependence, 1940–1990, Rev. and Exp. Ed. (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1993); Riina Kionka, “Estonians,” in Smith, ed., Nationalities Question,
pp. 40–94; and R. Kh. Simonyan, “Strany Baltii v gody Gorbachevskoi perestroiki,” Novaya i
noveishaya istoriya (Moscow), No. 2 (March–April 2003), pp. 44–65. Besides the Baltic states and
other union republics, some autonomous republics also declared sovereignty by the latter half of 1990.
These included Komi, Kareliya, Tatarstan, Udmurtiya, Yakutiya, Bashkiriya, Mari El, and Buryatiya
in Russia, Transnistria in Moldova, and South Ossetia in Georgia.
58. Moldova, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, and Belarus all declared independence in
the latter half of 1991, following the aborted coup in August.
104
Separatist Nationalism
The Baltic States

The Soviet Union forcibly incorporated the three Baltic republics in 1940 af-
ter they had enjoyed two decades of independence between the world wars.
From the time of Stalin’s death through the ascendance of Gorbachev, nation-
alist unrest and protests in the Baltic republics often beleaguered Communist
authorities.
In Lithuania nationalist sentiments burgeoned in the context of Gorba-
chev’s reforms. In June 1988, Lithuanian intellectuals and other activists
joined forces with some members of the Lithuanian Communist Party to
form Sájudis, the Lithuanian Movement for Reconstruction. Initially Sájudis
did not voice demands for independence and operated strictly within the
bounds permitted by Gorbachev’s reforms and by the CPSU. Early demands
included Lithuania’s economic self-management, the restoration of national
traditions and symbols, greater ofªcial status for the Lithuanian language, hu-
man and civil rights, and military service in Lithuania for Lithuanians.59
Shortly after the Nineteenth CPSU Conference in July 1988 adopted a
resolution on the democratization of Soviet interethnic relations (mezh-
natsional’nye otnosheniya), Lithuanian Communist Party ofªcials adopted
some of the demands of Sájudis in a document submitted to the CPSU Cen-
tral Committee under the title “On Perfecting Interethnic Relations in the
USSR.”60 The document recommended extensive cultural, budgetary, legal,
and other rights for the republics, but within the context of a renewed union
treaty and a more genuine Soviet federation. Radical nationalist demands
were not voiced until after members of Sájudis soundly defeated the Commu-
nists in elections to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies in Moscow in
March 1989. Sájudis thereafter pushed for a reexamination of the “Secret Pro-
tocols” to the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 (protocols that governed the division
of Eastern Europe and other regions between the Soviet Union and Nazi Ger-
many). By highlighting the pact’s illegality, they hoped to show that the incor-
poration of Lithuania into the Soviet state was invalid and, therefore, that
Lithuania’s independent statehood should be restored.
In Latvia and Estonia, the Estonian and Latvian Popular Fronts, formed
in 1988, were the locus of nationalist activity. Latvian and Estonian griev-
59. Alfred Erich Senn, Gorbachev’s Failure in Lithuania (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995).
60. See TsK KPSS, “Predlozhenie Tsentral’nogo Komiteta Kompartii Litvy Plenumu TsK KPSS ‘O
sovershenstvovanii mezhnatsional’nykh otnoshenii v SSSR,’” 5 January 1989, in Lietuvos Visuomene.s
Organizacijú Archyvas (LVOA), F. 1771, Ap. 272, B. 153, Ll. 1–21 (my thanks to Mark Kramer for
giving me a copy of this document).
105
Tuminez
ances against the USSR centered on environmental, cultural, and human

rights issues, on the Russiªcation of the republics’ populations, and on the il-
legitimacy of the “Secret Protocols.” In 1989 the Baltic republics jointly peti-
tioned Moscow to establish a parliamentary commission to examine the
Nazi-Soviet Pact. Gorbachev eventually acceded to this demand and estab-
lished a special body chaired by his reform-minded adviser Aleksandr
Yakovlev. Hearings on the “Secret Protocols” emboldened Baltic nationalist
groups, and anti-Soviet demonstrations ensued. Most dramatic was the for-
mation of a “human chain”—linking as many as two million people—from
Tallinn to Vilnius in August 1989. These demonstrations put pressure on So-
viet authorities to acknowledge that the incorporation of the Baltic states into
the Soviet Union had been illegal.61 From 1988 to 1990 the Baltic republics
took further steps emphasizing their resolve to become independent: declara-
tions of sovereignty (Estonia in November 1988 and Lithuania in May 1989),
laws of economic independence (Estonia and Lithuania in May 1989), laws
that made the local language the ofªcial or state language of the republic (Lat-
via in October 1988, Lithuania in November 1988, and Estonia in January
1989), and declarations calling for independence or a transition period lead-
ing to independence (Estonia and Lithuania in March 1990, and Latvia in
May 1990).
Local Communist authorities in the Baltic states began warning as early
as 1988 of the threat posed by the growth of nationalism. With support from
local KGB forces they sought to quell the tide of separatism, but managed to
adopt only a number of weak measures toward this end. Some of these mea-
sures in 1988 and 1989 included more open discussion of historical symbols
such as the Latvian ºag and hymn; the use of Soviet historical organizations
such as the All-Union Society for the Preservation of Historical Monuments
and Culture to highlight pre-Soviet Lithuanian culture and history (and
thereby gain the sympathy of Lithuanian youth); and recommendations to
urge the United States to refrain from assisting Baltic nationalists.62
61. Dzintra Bungs, “Latvia,” RFE/RL Report on the USSR, Vol. 1, No. 52 (29 December 1989), p. 27.
I have documented the conºict between Moscow and the Baltic republics over the Nazi-Soviet Pact in
Astrid S. Tuminez, “Soviet Politics in Transition: Two Case Studies,” manuscript, Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology, 1990.
62. See, for example, Tsentral’nyi Komitet KPSS, “O gosudarstvennoi i natsional’noi simvolike
Latviiskoi SSR,” 2 August 1988, pp. 1–4, in Latvijas Valsts Arhivs (LVA), (Fonds) (F.) 101, Apridos
(Apr.) 61, Lietas (Lie.) 117, Ll. 26–29; TsK KPSS, “Informatsiya o vypolnenii postanovleniya TsK
KPSS ‘O merakh po dal’neishemu sovershenstvovaniyu deyatel’nosti Vserossiiskogo obshchestva
okhrany pamyatnikov istorii i kul’tury,’” 31 May 1989, in LVOA, F. 1771, Ap. 272, B. 153; TsK KP
Litvy, “O planakh administratsii SShA i zarubezhnykh natstsentrov ispol’zovat’ 16 fevralya v
antisovetskikh kampaniyakh,” 18 January 1988, in LYA, F. K-1, Ap. 49, B. 273, La. 4–6, 15–16; and
“Otvety ‘G’ na voprosy organov KGB,” n.d., in LYA, F. K-1, Ap. 49, B. 281, La. 2–6. My thanks to
Mark Kramer for giving me copies of all these documents.
106
Other largely ineffective measures taken by the Soviet authorities to re-

spond to events in the Baltic republics included Gorbachev’s visits to Latvia
and Estonia in 1987 and to Lithuania in early 1990. In between these visits
Gorbachev frequently sent emissaries to the region to listen to Baltic demands
and seek a modus vivendi with nationalist leaders. The Soviet leader initially
tried to obstruct Baltic demands for a review of the “Secret Protocols” but
eventually agreed to set up the Yakovlev commission, which released an un-
precedented ofªcial acknowledgment of the existence of the protocols. In
general, Soviet policy toward the Baltic states, until early 1990 (after the col-
lapse of Communism in Eastern Europe), remained largely tolerant.63 No re-
prisals were taken against Baltic declarations of sovereignty or Baltic assem-
blies that branded Soviet troops as “occupiers.” The center relied mostly on
public statements and meetings to defend the Soviet Union against Baltic sep-
aratism. Even when the situation became critical after Lithuania passed a law
on the restoration of independence in March 1990, Gorbachev responded by
holding more meetings between Baltic leaders and the Politburo in Moscow.
At one Politburo meeting, Army-General Valentin Varennikov, the hardline
commander-in-chief of Soviet Ground Forces, suggested that emergency rule
be introduced in Lithuania and that tens of thousands of additional troops be
brought in under the pretext that they were invited by “patriotic” forces. This
idea, however, was rejected.64
Perhaps the most forceful early response by local Communist authorities
to Baltic nationalism was the directive issued by the hardline Lithuanian party
ªrst secretary, Ringaudas Songaila, ordering the army and police to prevent
celebrations of the seventieth anniversary of Lithuanian independence in Feb-
ruary 1988. Such displays of force, however, were extremely rare. Far more
common was the exodus of Baltic Communists to the reform-minded nation-
alist camp, a move that became particularly attractive under Moscow’s new
policy of popularly contested elections. After a few embarrassing setbacks
Communist elites quickly realized that only by taking on the nationalist man-
tle could they hope to remain in power.65 For example, after the victory of na-
63. Mark Kramer’s article “The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions
within the Soviet Union (Part 1),” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Fall 2003), pp. 178–256,
convincingly shows that the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe had an important effect on
Gorbachev’s policy vis-à-vis the Baltic states.
64. Tuminez, “Soviet Politics in Transition”; and Gorbachev Foundation, Soyuz mozhno bylo sokhranit’:
Dokumenty i fakty o politike M. S. Gorbacheva po reformirovaniyu i sokhraneniyu mnogonatsional’nogo
gosudarstva (Moscow: Aprel’-85, 1995), p. 98.
65. In the March 1989 elections to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies, leaders of nationalist
movements won 36 out of 42 seats in Lithuania, 24 of 29 seats in Latvia, and 26 of 30 seats in Estonia.
See Lyudmila Alekseeva, Nyeformaly: Civil Society in the USSR (New York: Helsinki Watch Commit-
tee, 1990), p. 105.
107
Tuminez
tionalists in the March 1989 elections for the USSR Congress of People’s
Deputies, Latvian Party First Secretary Alfred Rubiks wrote a pithy document
to the Politburo outlining the Communist Party’s loss of control and author-
ity in his republic, the inªltration of Latvian nationalists into the party hierar-
chy, and the rise of the Latvian National Front as a real alternative to the
Communist Party.66 Nonetheless, despite Rubiks’s pleas and warnings, Mos-
cow did not take any decisive measures to halt Baltic nationalism.
Ultimately, the central authorities did resort to coercive measures against
the Baltic states.67 In April 1990 Moscow turned off oil and gas pipelines to
Lithuania, and Vilnius retaliated by blocking natural gas transfers to the Rus-
sian exclave of Kaliningrad. In May 1990, Lithuanian leaders sought to ward
off Moscow’s onslaught by offering to suspend the recently adopted laws on
independence. But they made clear that they would not suspend the declara-
tion of independence itself. In June, Lithuania further agreed to a moratorium
on its declaration of independence, and Moscow ended its economic block-
ade, bringing to an end the ªrst standoff.
During a second standoff in Lithuania between Baltic nationalists and
union supporters in January 1991, the Soviet regime sought to make a stron-
ger show of resolve. Soviet riot troops and KGB forces stormed several build-
ings in Vilnius to remove the elected government of Vytautas Landsbergis (the
leader of Sájudis) and to install the so-called Lithuanian National Salvation
Committee, an entity created by the KGB to reassert control of the republic.
Fourteen people were killed, prompting worldwide condemnation, including
a strong protest from the United States and a threat to cancel a summit and
U.S. aid to the Soviet Union. Days later Soviet riot troops and KGB units in
Latvia attacked the republic’s Ministry of Internal Affairs headquarters, killing
ªve people. Despite these initial thrusts, Gorbachev declined to follow
through on plans to impose full states of emergency in Lithuania and Latvia
and to dissolve the local governments in those republics.
Although force was used in January 1991, there was no indication of con-
sensus, resolve, or ªrm leadership at the center on this matter.68 The use of
66. Byuro TsK Kompartii Latvii, “Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot chlena TsK Kompartii Latvii Rubiksa
Alfreda Petrovicha,” 12 October 1989, in LVA, F. 101, Ap. 63, Lie. 17, Lapa (La.) 105–108. By Janu-
ary 1991 Rubiks and his colleagues in the Latvian Central Committee indicated their readiness for
Moscow to impose martial law in their republic. See “Postanovlenie X Plenuma Tsentral’nogo
Komiteta Kompartii Latvii,” 13 January 1991, in LVA, F. 101. Ap. 67, Lie. 1, La. 9–10. My thanks
again to Mark Kramer for providing copies of these documents.
67. Gorbachev has consistently denied that he ordered the use of force in Lithuania and Latvia in Jan-
uary 1991, but, as Brian Taylor shows, there is ample reason to be skeptical about these denials. See
Brian Taylor, “The Soviet Military and the Disintegration of the USSR,” Journal of Cold War Studies,
Vol. 5, No. 1 (Winter 2003), pp. 40–42. For Gorbachev’s denials, see Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs
(New York: Doubleday, 1996), pp. 575–581.
68. In another show of force in May 1991—when MVD troops took down unsanctioned customs
108
force in Latvia and Lithuania appeared half-hearted at best, and the only last-
ing effect within the Baltic states (as well as in Russia and several other repub-
lics) was to radicalize the opponents of the Soviet Union and the CPSU. The
crackdowns in Vilnius and Riga stirred vigorous protests in Russia, legiti-
mized Yeltsin’s call for Gorbachev’s resignation, and became a focal point for
the founding conference of the Democratic Congress in Kharkiv on 26–27
January 1991. The Congress demanded that the CPSU be removed from
power, encouraged the republics to ºout Gorbachev’s “anti-constitutional”
decrees, and recommended the transfer of control over industrial enterprises
and the army to the republics. Russian political groups that were active in the
Congress subsequently helped Yeltsin gain election to the Russian presidency,
thereby pushing along factors and events that would ultimately spell the end
of the Soviet Union.69
The use of force in January 1991 to prevent Baltic secession was a case of
“too little, too incompetent, too late.” By that point public sentiment in the
Baltic republics had taken on a much more radical edge than in either 1988 or
1989. No longer would the Baltic peoples be satisªed by anything short of
outright independence. Gorbachev, for his part, seemed determined never to
permit independence for the Baltic states, but if that was the case, he should
have used force more decisively and effectively, and at an earlier stage, against
the Baltic separatist movements. Deliberations in the highest bodies of Soviet
power were consistently irresolute from 1987 to 1991. Given the ambivalence
and indecision at the center, as well as the solid determination in the periph-
ery (plus external support from the West and from Eastern Europe for Baltic
independence), the secession of the Baltic republics increasingly moved closer
to reality.70
points between Latvia and Lithuania—the Soviet internal affairs minister, Boris Pugo, publicly
claimed that this action took place without the knowledge and authorization of the central MVD. His
statement, though disingenuous, underscores the lack of central resolve, consensus, and consistency
on the use of force to hold the Soviet Union together. See Pugo’s letter to USSR Supreme Soviet Chair-
man Anatolii Lukyanov, 27 May 1991, in LVA, F. 101, Apr. 67, B. 40, La. 1–2. I am grateful to Mark
Kramer for giving me a copy of this document.
69. For a chronology of these events, see Ed A. Hewett and Victor H. Winston, eds., Milestones in
Glasnost and Perestroika: Politics and People, Vol. 2 (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1991),
pp. 526–529. On the Democratic Congress in Kharkiv, see TsK KPSS, “Ob uchreditel’noi
konferentsii ‘Demokraticheskogo kongressa,’” 5 February 1991, in LVA, F. 101, Ap. 67, B. 35, La.
121–126 (my thanks again to Mark Kramer for this document).
70. As late as August 1990 the U.S. Senate’s consideration of a measure to grant $10 million in hu-
manitarian aid to Lithuania created consternation among Soviet authorities. Understanding the threat
of Lithuania’s separatist nationalism, and knowing that Western aid could only advance this cause, the
Central Committee of the CPSU instructed the Soviet Foreign Ministry to oppose the pending U.S.
measure as interference in Soviet internal affairs and to link the issue to defense negotiations between
the two countries. Again, this illustrates a response that addressed only slim margins of the Baltic se-
cessionist problem and failed utterly to add any variable favorable to keeping the Soviet Union intact.
See TsK KPSS, “K voprosu o gumanitarnoi pomoshchi SShA Litve,” 23 August 1990, Rossiiskii
109
Tuminez
Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova

Like the Baltic states, Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova also had strong nation-
alist movements. In Georgia nationalism dated back to the early 1920s, after
Bolshevik Russia invaded the republic and reincorporated it into the Soviet
Union. Georgian nationalists at ªrst deªed the Bolsheviks and, in 1924, at-
tempted to restore Georgian independence. However, Soviet troops crushed
the rebellion and imposed Soviet rule there. Two other major outbreaks of na-
tionalist unrest occurred in Georgia, in 1956 and 1978, but these, too, did
not alter Georgia’s status as a constituent part of the Soviet Union.
In the ªrst years of Gorbachev’s rule Georgian nationalists expressed con-
cern over ecological, historical, and religious issues. By 1988–1989 however,
Georgian nationalist groups had begun to adopt a more exclusivist ethnic
stance and an anti-Soviet orientation. Some informal groups demonstrated
against other nationalities residing in the republic, especially Abkhaziyans and
Azeris who, they argued, mistreated Georgians. In February 1989 thousands
of Georgians marched in Tbilisi to commemorate the Soviet invasion of
Georgia. Two months later, calls by Abkhaziyan nationalists to separate from
Georgia incited a ªerce popular and ofªcial reaction. Massive demonstrations
ensued in Tbilisi, as protesters demanded that Abkhaziya remain part of
Georgia and that Georgia itself break away from the Soviet Union. At the
time, Gorbachev and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze were on a
state visit to Britain, but someone in Moscow (it is not clear who it was and
with what authorization the person acted) ordered troops and police to quell
the demonstration. Nineteen people died and thousands were injured when
the security forces opened ªre. After this incident mass demonstrations for
Georgian independence ebbed, 71 but anti-Soviet feelings intensiªed, as be-
came evident in March 1991 when a republic-wide referendum on Georgian
independence yielded an almost unanimous vote in favor. A month later, the
Georgian Supreme Soviet declared the republic’s independence.
Armenia, unlike Georgia, was incorporated into the Soviet Union under
relatively auspicious circumstances. Faced with the threat of a powerful and
genocidal Turkey at the close of World War I, Armenians opted to align them-
selves with Russia under the banner of the Soviet state. From the 1950s
through the mid-1980s Armenian nationalism was relatively quiescent, and
the republic as a whole maintained a Russophile orientation. One issue that
aggrieved Armenians deeply, however, was the mass slaughter of Armenians
perpetrated by the Turks in 1915–1916. When the Bolsheviks sought to gloss
Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii (RGANI), F. 89, Op. 21, D. 23, Ll. 1–2. I am grateful to
Mark Kramer for this document.
71. Robert Parsons, “Georgians,” in Smith, ed., Nationalities Question, pp. 190–191.
110
over this episode in Armenian history, it caused deep resentment in Arme-

nia—resentment that lasted all through the Stalin era and afterward. In 1965
Armenians took to the streets to commemorate the ªftieth anniversary of the
genocide, and from then on the Soviet authorities allowed the republic to ob-
serve the event ofªcially each year. They also permitted Armenia to build a
monument to the victims of the genocide.
Under Gorbachev Armenian nationalism ºared as a result of conºict over
Nagorno-Karabakh, an autonomous oblast located in Azerbaijan but inhab-
ited predominantly by Armenians. For historical and symbolic reasons the
Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) loomed large in the Arme-
nian national consciousness.72 In early 1988 tens of thousands of Armenians
signed a petition requesting the transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia.
Shortly thereafter the local NKAO administration formally requested transfer
of the region to Armenian jurisdiction. Hundreds of thousands of Armenians
took part in demonstrations in Armenia, Moscow, and Nagorno-Karabakh to
express support for this demand. Later, when the Armenian government in
Erevan formally declared Nagorno-Karabakh a part of Armenia and the
Azerbaijani government made a counterdeclaration, Gorbachev and other
leaders basically abdicated central responsibility by asking the two republics to
resolve the problem themselves. Eventually, Moscow refused to incorporate
Nagorno-Karabakh into Armenia. This decision, followed by anti-Armenian
pogroms in the Azerbaijani city of Sumgait in 1988 that killed at least
thirty-two Armenians and wounded hundreds catalyzed the transformation of
the Armenian national movement into an anti-Moscow and anti-Soviet cru-
sade.73
The conºict over Nagorno-Karabakh continued to fester in 1988–1990,
producing more violence and mutual expulsions of populations by Armenia
and Azerbaijan. The Soviet government took the NKAO under its direct ad-
ministration in the early part of 1989, but this action provided only a tempo-
rary respite. The central authorities allocated money for the development of
Nagorno-Karabakh, and Gorbachev met with prominent members of the Ar-
menian intelligentsia to seek their help in resolving Armenian-Azeri differ-
72. At least one scholar notes that the Azeri Communist Party had ceded Nagorno-Karabakh to Arme-
nia in 1920, but the Soviet government never formalized this cession. In 1923 the region was ofªcially
reincorporated into Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh symbolizes several things to Armenians: Turkish
genocide against Armenia (many Armenians equate Azeris with Turks), Western betrayal of Armenia
because British forces helped Azerbaijan acquire Nagorno-Karabakh in 1918, and objectionable bor-
der arrangements created by the Soviet regime. See Edmund M. Herzig, “Armenians,” in Smith, ed.,
Nationalities Question, p. 152.
73. Herzig, “Armenians,” p. 156; Human Rights Watch, Seven Years of Conºict in Nagorno-Karabakh
(Helsinki: Human Rights Watch, December 1994); and Gorbachev Foundation, Soyuz mozhno bylo
sokhranit’, p. 25.
111
Tuminez
ences. These measures, however, were insufªcient to resolve a conºict that

had already led to considerable bloodshed. In addition to making conciliatory
gestures, Soviet ofªcials used force—albeit on a limited basis—against both
Azeri and Armenian nationalists. In January 1990, Soviet troops stormed
Baku and killed as many as 150 Azeris aligned with the Azerbaijani Popular
Front. The ostensible aim of the intervention was to stop Azeri massacres of
Armenians, but the real goal was to prevent the Azerbaijani Popular Front
from taking power.74 In May 1990, Soviet troops also killed twenty-nine dem-
onstrators in Erevan and elsewhere in Armenia. These actions and the contin-
ued stalemate over Nagorno-Karabakh caused Armenian dissatisfaction to in-
tensify. In August 1990 the Armenian parliament declared the republic’s
transition to independence from the Soviet Union.75
Moldova, like Georgia and Armenia, also developed a powerful national-
ist movement under Gorbachev. Historically, linguistically, and culturally,
Moldovans were part of the Romanian nation, and the bulk of Soviet
Moldova’s territory was traditionally known as Bessarabia. Russia acquired
Bessarabia in 1812, but after the Bolshevik revolution the territory became
part of the independent state of Romania. The Soviet regime never accepted
the transfer of Bessarabia to Romania and set up a Moldovan Autonomous
Soviet Socialist Republic to the east of the Dnestr River, with an eye to re-
claiming Bessarabia (which lay to the west of the Dnestr). Under the secret
protocols to the Nazi-Soviet Pact, Soviet forces moved into Bessarabia and
reannexed it. Although Romania, backed by Germany, brieºy regained con-
trol of Bessarabia during World War II, the Soviet Union reasserted control of
the territory in 1944 and soon thereafter incorporated it into a new Moldovan
Soviet Socialist Republic.
Except for a few brief periods, Soviet leaders throughout the pre-
Gorbachev era sought to create and preserve a Moldovan national identity
that would be distinct from Romanian identity. The authorities prohibited
the use of the Latin script for Moldova’s Romanian language, replacing it with
Cyrillic. After a rift emerged between the Soviet Union and Romania in the
mid-1960s, the Soviet regime imposed restrictions on Romanian publications
74. Soviet troops largely stood by during the worst of the anti-Armenian pogroms in Baku in January
1990, but they ªnally moved to suppress the Azerbaijani Popular Front when it became apparent that
the Front was close to seizing power in the republic. Subsequent Azeri reports on the events of January
1990 squarely blame what happened on conspiracies and provocations by Soviet authorities. See
“Troops Still Tense in Baku; Talks in Riga,” Current Digest of the Soviet Press (hereinafter referred to as
CDSP), Vol. 42, No. 5 (1990), pp. 7–10; “Baku: Anti-Army Fury, Russians Evacuated,” CDSP,
Vol. 42, No. 4 (1990), pp. 5–10; Elizabeth Fuller, “The Azerbaijani Presidential Election: A
One-Horse Race,” Report on the USSR, Vol. 3, No. 2 (13 September 1991), pp. 12–14; and “Probe of
1990 Baku Tragedy Faults Center,” CDSP, Vol. 44, No. 9 (1992), pp. 8–10.
75. Gorbachev Foundation, Soyuz mozhno bylo sokhranit’, pp. 16–25; Hewett and Winston, eds., Mile-
stones, Vol. 2, p. 521; and Human Rights Watch, Seven Years of Conºict, p. 2.
112
that could be brought into Moldova. By the 1970s, however, partly as a result
of the rise of a Moldovan intelligentsia and partly because of the continued
tensions between Bucharest and Moscow, pan-Romanian sentiment began to
reemerge in Moldova. This sentiment was expressed far more openly under
the political liberalization implemented by Gorbachev. By 1989, demands
for reuniªcation with Romania began to surface in Moldova. In August
1989 nearly half a million demonstrators, led by the Popular Front of
Moldova, held a rally in Chiqinäu demanding that Romanian be made the re-
public’s ofªcial language. In April 1990 Moldova replaced its Soviet ºag, and
in June 1990 the Moldovan parliament passed a declaration of sovereignty.
Tensions between Moscow and Chiqinäu continued to grow over the next sev-
eral months. In December 1990 hundreds of thousands of Moldovans gath-
ered to demand independence and to express opposition to any new union
treaty. After the failed August 1991 coup, Moldova declared its independ-
ence.76
As with other refractory groups in the Soviet Union, the central authori-
ties did not respond forcefully to quell Moldovan nationalism. In 1989 Soviet
ofªcials eased travel restrictions between Romania and Moldova and prom-
ised to grant greater cultural rights to the Moldovans. In September 1990
Moscow sent Soviet MVD troops to protect a congress organized by pro-
Soviet activists in Moldova’s Transnistria region (a strip of land along the east
bank of the Dnestr). According to one participant, Moscow wanted to warn
the Popular Front of Moldova that unless it relinquished its bid for independ-
ence, the republic might be dismembered.77 Although this action may have
generated some concern that force would be used on a wider scale, very little
actually came of it. In the end Gorbachev refrained from taking any decisive
steps to crush Moldovan separatism.
Ukraine
Unlike the Baltic republics, Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova, Ukraine did not
have a mass separatist movement during most of the Gorbachev years. There
were certainly organized Ukrainian nationalist groups such as Rukh (formed
in 1989), but none of them approximated the inºuence and numbers of the
76. Charles King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture (Stanford, CA: Hoover
Institution Press, 2000); Cheshko, Raspad Sovetskogo Soyuza, pp. 222–23; Jonathan Eyal,
“Moldavians,” in Smith, ed., Nationalities Question, pp. 123–45; and Hewett and Winston, eds.,
Milestones, p. 526. The December 1990 demonstration occurred after Gorbachev refused the
Moldovan government’s offer for Moscow to stop supporting separatist Transnistrian forces in
Moldova in return for Moldova’s support for a union treaty. See the coverage in Izvestiya (Moscow),
5 November 1990, p. 3; and Izvestiya (Moscow), 15 November 1990, p. 5.
77. Stuart J. Kaufman, “Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses and Moscow in Moldova’s Civil War,”
International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), p. 130.
113
Tuminez
popular fronts in other republics. One of the factors that tempered Ukrainian
nationalism was the presence of roughly 11 million ethnic Russians in
Ukraine, nearly a quarter of the republic’s population. Although the Russian
minority was concentrated in eastern Ukraine and the Crimea, Ukrainian ac-
tivists were aware that expressions of vehement Ukrainian nationalism might
stimulate an irredentist response from the Russian government, possibly lead-
ing to civil conºict or the dismemberment of the republic. The Ukrainian
population’s ambivalence regarding independence from the Soviet Union was
apparent in the results of the referendum held in March 1991. With an 80.2
percent turnout of registered voters, Ukraine yielded a 70.5 percent afªrm-
ative response to the all-union question regarding the desirability of preserv-
ing the USSR as a “renewed federation.” At the same time, 80.2 percent said
yes to an additional republic question regarding the use of the Ukrainian dec-
laration of sovereignty as the basis for deªning the republic’s status in any fu-
ture federative association.78
By the summer of 1991, especially after the aborted coup d’état in Au-
gust, public sentiment in Ukraine shifted strongly in favor of separatism. On
24 August the Ukrainian parliament adopted a declaration of independence,
and on 1 December 1991 the republic conducted a national referendum on
independence. Over 90 percent of voters, including those in heavily Rus-
sian-populated areas of the republic, voted in favor of Ukrainian independ-
ence. Subsequent analyses show that the majority of voters in Ukraine came
to support independence because they believed that a separate existence from
the USSR might be the best guarantee for their economic well-being. Most of
the Ukrainian political elites who campaigned for independence did not do so
in the name of ethnic Ukrainian nationalism, but in the name of potential
economic advancement. Because Ukrainian politicians (even outspoken na-
tionalists such as Volodymyr Chornovil) did not embrace an ethnic exclusivist
platform, it was much easier for Russians in Ukraine to support the campaign
for independence in the belief that they, too, would enjoy the expected eco-
nomic beneªts.79 The case of Ukraine illustrated less the power of ethnic na-
tionalism than the widespread belief among elites and publics in the periph-
ery that the center was increasingly unable to deliver requisite goods. This
78. Roman Solchanyk, “Centrifugal Movements in Ukraine on the Eve of the Independence Referen-
dum,” Report on the USSR, Vol. 3, No. 48 (29 November 1991), pp. 8–13; and Roman Solchanyk,
“The Referendum in Ukraine: Preliminary Results,” Report on the USSR, Vol. 3, No. 13 (29 March
1991), pp. 5–7.
79. Peter J. Potichnyj, “The Referendum and Presidential Elections in Ukraine,” Canadian Slavonic
Papers, Vol. 33, No. 2 (June 1991), pp. 122–38; Roman Solchanyk, “Ukraine: From Sovereignty to
Independence,” RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 1 (3 January 1992), pp. 35–38; and Bohdan
Nahaylo, “The Birth of an Independent Ukraine,” Report on the USSR, Vol. 3, No. 50 (13 December
1991), pp. 1–4.
114
point will be further discussed in the section below on the failure of the center
to uphold the economic aspect of the center-periphery compact.
Net Assessment
From the preceding account we can determine whether ethnic challenges were
sufªciently grave to threaten Soviet dismemberment by 1991. My answer is a
qualiªed no. Ethnic separatism was strongest in the Baltic republics, and,
given that region’s history and the support voiced by Western countries (espe-
cially the Scandinavian countries) for Baltic independence, the Baltic govern-
ments were unlikely to yield on secession from mid-1990 on. In the early
years of perestroika, however, when Baltic leaders were strongly supportive of
Gorbachev, a union treaty offered with real autonomy would have sufªced for
some time, perhaps indeªnitely.80 By late 1990, however, the Soviet Union
could have kept Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia only at great human and mili-
tary cost and at the risk of alienating the West.81
The declarations of independence by Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova
also seemed amenable to negotiation by the center, particularly because all
three of these republics were dealing with conºicts (internal and otherwise)
that Moscow could have manipulated to its advantage. Georgia and Moldova
were confronted by secessionist movements on their territory, and Armenia
was embroiled in the conºict over Nagorno-Karabakh. In Moldova, President
Mircea Snegur actually expressed willingness to support Gorbachev’s union
treaty in late 1990 in exchange for Moscow’s termination of support for sepa-
ratists in Transnistria.82 With regard to Armenia, an early resolution of the sta-
tus of Nagorno-Karabakh (either reestablishing it as an Autonomous Soviet
Socialist Republic [ASSR] or putting it under Moscow’s long-term jurisdic-
tion), coupled with the consistent use of force against any potential Armenian
and Azeri violations of such an arrangement, undoubtedly could have kept
Russia’s longtime ally in the Soviet fold.
Mass mobilizations, disturbances, and deaths associated with separatist
nationalism indicated cracks in the Soviet state ediªce, but these were not se-
vere enough to destroy the state. From September 1985 to August 1989,
80. This point is stressed in Simonyan, “Strany Baltii v gody Gorbachevskoi perestroiki,” pp. 56–60
81. Even if the USSR let the Baltic republics go, the loss would have been small in terms of territory
and population (2 percent). The center, however, would have faced a serious challenge of credibly
drawing the separatist line with the Baltics and effectively using force and other means to prevent
other republics from following suit. My arguments in this paper imply that strong political resolve at
the center could have dealt with this challenge, but the absence of such resolve dictated the fate of the
Soviet Union.
82. See Hewett and Winston, eds., Milestones, pp. 525, 532; and Kaufman, “Spiraling to Ethnic War,”
p. 125.
115
Tuminez
forty-seven large demonstrations took place in the Soviet Union, but almost
all of them occurred in the six separatist republics. These demonstrations,
though attended by vast numbers of people, were peaceful and did not fatally
threaten Soviet power. During this same period, deaths resulting from actions
to quell nationalist separatism numbered in the low hundreds (predominantly
in the Caucasus) and did not increase dramatically even by 1991. It is worth
noting that, elsewhere in the world, when states have sought to quell armed
ethnic separatism, they have been able to do so for long periods of time (even
if they ultimately fail), as long as they are willing to tolerate great costs in lives
and resources. This has been the case with the Kashmiris in India, the Kurds
in Turkey, the Moros in the Philippines, the Timorese in Indonesia, the
Eritreans in Ethiopia (who managed to break away only after thirty years of
ªerce civil war), the Tamils in Sri Lanka, and other groups.83 In another in-
stance, when the Ottoman empire faced ethnic separatist revolts from thou-
sands of its subjects in the 1870s in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria (aided
by Serbia and Montenegro), the empire used brutal force and continued to
survive for another four decades.84 Under Gorbachev, by contrast, the Soviet
government treated nationalist groups in a civilized way, taking such measures
as the passage of a Law on Secession in April 1990 and even creating legal ob-
stacles to the center’s blatant use of force.85 As a whole, the central authorities’
indecision and civility were a weightier cause of Soviet disintegration than the
strength of nationalist separatism itself.
Ethnic Conflicts
This section will discuss the severity of a number of ethnic conºicts, including
intercommunal violence and ethnically grounded protests against the center.
To what extent did these events threaten the cohesion of the Soviet state? The
ªrst signiªcant ethnic conºict under Gorbachev occurred in 1986 in Kaz-
akhstan, when Moscow replaced the First Secretary of the republic’s Commu-
nist Party with an ethnic Russian. Thousands of young people rioted and van-
dalized Communist Party property in Alma-Ata, the capital.86 Soviet troops
83. See Morton M. Halperin and David J. Scheffer, Self-Determination in the New World Order (Wash-
ington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992); and Alexis Heraclides, The Self-
Determination of Minorities in International Politics (London: Frank Cass, 1991).
84. Tuminez, Russian Nationalism since 1856, pp. 156–158.
85. For example, the Soviet law on emergency presidential power could be applied only with the con-
sent of republic leaders, making it more difªcult for Moscow to exercise arbitrary authority in the re-
publics.
86. Alma-Ata was later renamed Almaty. In the post-Soviet era it ceased to be the capital of
Kazakhstan (a status now enjoyed by Agmola), but it remains the informal capital.
116
met the rioters with force, killing two people. According to a KGB account,
some of those who were wounded and taken to hospitals also subsequently
died. The ofªcial death toll from this incident remains at two, but the actual
number who died may be as high as ten.87
The most serious ethnic conºict during Gorbachev’s rule was the war
over Nagorno-Karabakh. Although full-scale war between Armenia and
Azerbaijan did not erupt until after the Soviet Union disintegrated, more than
eight hundred people were killed in this conºict during the Gorbachev era.
Among the dead were at least thirty-two Armenians killed in pogroms in
Sumgait in 1988, sixty-eight or more Armenians killed in pogroms in Baku in
January 1990, and approximately 150 Azeris killed by Soviet troops in Baku
the same month. In addition, from 1988 to January 1990 as many as 600,000
people were forcibly displaced by the conºict.88
Nagorno-Karabakh had the makings of an intractable conºict and
proved to be one in the post-Soviet period.89 However, as is true of most
conºicts, actions taken at an earlier stage to prevent escalation could have
made the task of conºict management easier. In 1988, when the conºict
turned violent and Armenian and NKAO ofªcials formally announced that
the region had been incorporated into Armenia, Soviet leaders could have de-
fused (or at least contained) the dispute by decisively settling the status of
Nargorno-Karabakh, most likely by making it an ASSR or putting it under
direct presidential rule, with the promise of swift and harsh punishment for
paramilitary groups on either side who might violate the arrangement. Far
from being decisive, however, the Soviet government’s response to Nagorno-
Karabakh was slow and irresolute, reºecting naïveté and a partial abdication
of central responsibility.90 In early 1988 Gobachev recommended more glas-
nost between Armenia and Azerbaijan and asked both sides to adhere to the
spirit of “socialist internationalism.” Others, such as KGB Chairman Viktor
87. See the data in Table 1.

88. Conºict in the Soviet Union: Black January in Azerbaijan (New York: Helsinki Watch/Memorial
Watch Report, May 1991); Bruce Seymour II, ed., The ACCESS Guide to Ethnic Conºicts in Europe
and the Former Soviet Union (Washington, DC: ACCESS, 1994), p. 58; Gorbachev Foundation, Soyuz
mozhno bylo sokhranit’, p. 91; Fiona Hill, Report on Ethnic Conºict in the Russian Federation and
Transcaucasia (Cambridge, MA: Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, Harvard University,
1993), p. 65; Elizabeth Fuller, “Gorbachev’s Dilemma in Azerbaijan,” RFE/RL Research Bulletin, Vol.
2, No. 5 (5 February 1990), pp. 14–16; and Hewett and Winston, eds., Milestones, Vol. 2, pp. 518,
521, and 525. The ªgure of 600,000 refugees and internally displaced people in Azerbaijan and Arme-
nia had increased to roughly 1.3 million by 1996. See Cooperation and Conºict in the Former Soviet
Union: Implications for Migration (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1996), pp. 143, 158–159.
89. As of 1994 the estimated number of deaths from the Nagorno-Karabakh conºict had risen to
nearly 10,000, the large majority of which occurred after the Soviet Union broke apart. See Seymour,
ed., ACCESS Guide, p. 57.
90. For a thorough overview of the conºict, see Erik Melander, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conºict Re-
visited: Was the War Inevitable?” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Spring 2001), pp. 48–75.
117
Tuminez
Chebrikov, proposed using the army at an early stage, but the CPSU Polit-
buro rejected his suggestion. Others in the Politburo preferred granting more
economic aid to Nagorno-Karabakh and creating a special commission to re-
solve the territory’s status. In top-level meetings at the Kremlin Gorbachev
constantly eschewed military solutions in favor of vague political measures.
He said he understood that people’s frustration was rising and that many were
asking, “Where is Soviet power? How much more can we take?” But he in-
sisted that the only answer was “reconciliation” (primirenie). 91
The Soviet government’s eventual use of force in Baku in January 1990
was ostensibly intended to stop interethnic ªghting, but in reality it was de-
signed to crush the Azerbaijani Popular Front, which had already seized power
in the Lenkoran and Dzhalilabad districts of the republic and taken down the
border posts between Azerbaijan and Iran. The invasion of Azerbaijan marked
the apex of the central government’s resolve to use force to hold the union to-
gether (spurred perhaps by the immediate precedent of the collapse of Com-
munist power in Eastern Europe and the USSR’s loss of its “outer empire”).92
After Soviet troops intervened, the central government imposed emergency
rule in Azerbaijan, forcing the Azerbaijani Popular Front into retreat. Some of
the Front’s extremist leaders went underground, and the Azerbaijani Commu-
nist Party was able to reconstitute itself and resume its functions under the
new leadership of Ayaz Mutalibov, who could rely on Soviet troops for protec-
tion. The center’s use of force did not end the ethnic conºict over
Nagorno-Karabakh, but it effectively stemmed Azerbaijan’s separatist crisis.
Only in late 1991, after the failed August coup and the precipitous decline of
authority and consensus at the center, did Azeri leaders reassert their inde-
pendence against Moscow.93
91. Gorbachev Foundation, Soyuz mozhno bylo sokhranit’, pp. 23–30; and Gorbachev’s address to Ar-
menia and Azerbaijan in Moskovskii komosomolets (Moscow), 27 February 1988, p. 1. The Azerbaijani
leader, Ayaz Mutalibov, indicated in a report in 1992 that a “crisis of power,” characterized in large
part by the center’s “indecisiveness” and the disappearance of trust in the center’s ability to govern, was
a key factor in the crises that struck Azerbaijan in January 1990. See “Probe of 1990 Baku Tragedy
Faults Center,” p. 8.
92. See Kramer, “Collapse of Communism,” pp. 178–256.
93. Mutalibov, who supported the August 1991 coup, had to restore his legitimacy and credibility as
leader of Azerbaijan by stepping down as head of the party, lifting the Moscow-imposed state of emer-
gency in the republic, and agreeing to hold presidential elections in September 1991. In his campaign
for the presidency he promised to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh problem and to implement eco-
nomic reform, and he also portrayed himself as the champion of the Azerbaijani nation against inter-
nal and external sowers of discord. See “Breaking Up the Empire?” Newsweek, 5 February 1990,
pp. 28–29; Elizabeth Fuller, “Will Azerbaijan Be the Next ‘Domino’?” Report on the USSR, Vol. 2,
No. 2 (12 January 1990), pp. 17–18; V. Savichev, “Democracy or Stability?” Argumenty i fakty, No. 39
(29 September–5 October 1990), p. 4, in CDSP, Vol. 42, No. 40 (1990), pp. 23–24; Aidyn Mekhtiev,
“Azerbaijan: Communist Party Dissolved,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 17 September 1991, p. 3, in CDSP,
Vol. 43, No. 37 (1991), p. 31; “President Mutalibov Elected President,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 10 Sep-
tember 1991, p. 3, in CDSP, Vol. 43, No. 36 (1991), p. 35; and Vladimir Sergeev, “Mutalibov Tries to
118
Although the use of force in Baku effectively (if temporarily) parried a

serious challenge to the center, an analysis of elite decision-making on the is-
sue indicates that the center had not come to a strong consensus on the desir-
ability of using force to hold the union together. Soviet leaders did not devise
clear procedures for dealing with future challenges similar to the Azerbaijani
Popular Front. High-ranking Soviet ofªcials, notably Shevardnadze and Egor
Ligachev, were openly wrangling about who had authorized the use of troops
in Tbilisi the previous year. In April 1991, Moscow relied on force again,
this time to assist Azeris in expelling Armenians from settlements outside
Nagorno-Karabakh.94 These actions were far too limited to strengthen the
cohesion of the Soviet Union. The central government did not use enough
force to produce a durable settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh, and its actions
only added to the resentment felt by both Azeris and Armenians against
Moscow.
Ethnic conºicts also buffeted the neighboring republic of Soviet Georgia.
The rise of a Georgian nationalist government under Zviad Gamsakhurdia
sparked a backlash and led to the formation of two secessionist movements in
the republic. One of these movements emerged in South Ossetia, where only
14 percent of the native population (Ossetians) were ºuent in Georgian. In
August 1990 the South Ossetians adopted a declaration of sovereignty and
asked to be incorporated into the Soviet Union. Fighting that broke out
between South Ossetian and Georgian forces in February 1991 killed nearly
thirty people. The conºict also generated 100,000 refugees by early 1991. 95
The other secessionist movement in Georgia was formed in Abkhazia, a
region that had experienced periodic unrest in earlier decades (especially in
1956 and 1978). In 1988 the Abkhazians petitioned the Soviet government
to restore Abkhaziya to the status of a union-republic, a designation it had en-
joyed in 1921–1930. As many as 30,000 Abkhaziyans subsequently demon-
strated for the right to secede from Georgia. In response, ethnic Georgians or-
ganized mass protests in Tbilisi against the Abkhaziyans, who constituted
only 18 percent of the population in Abkhaziya. (Most of the rest of the pop-
ulation in Abkhaziya was Georgian.) In April 1989 twenty civilians were
killed in Tbilisi when (as mentioned above) Soviet troops moved against dem-
onstrators. In Abkhaziya three months later, eighteen people died in a clash
between Georgians and Abkhaziyans over the status of Abkhaziyan State Uni-
versity. In August 1990, Abkhaziya declared its sovereignty in response to
Justify Himself,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 24 August 1991, p. 3, in CDSP, Vol. 43, No. 34 (1991),
pp. 38–39.
94. Hill, Report on Ethnic Conºict, p. 74.
95. Ibid.; and John Lloyd, “The Guns Come Out Again in Georgia,” Financial Times (London),
19 February 1991, p. 4.
119
Tuminez
Georgia’s own declaration of sovereignty vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.96 The sit-
uation remained at an impasse until after the Soviet Union broke up, when
armed hostilities resumed between Georgia and Abkhaziya.
The conºicts in Georgia posed a challenge to Soviet authority by 1991
but were not so unmanageable as to threaten the cohesion of the Soviet
Union. Because it seemed likely that Georgia itself would be dismembered if
it broke away from the USSR, the Soviet government could easily have ex-
ploited the Abkhaziyan and South Ossetian conºicts to its own beneªt.97
However, most of the actions taken by the central authorities were too late or
too timid to make any difference. In January 1991 Gorbachev issued an ulti-
matum for Tbilisi either to restore South Ossetia’s status as an autonomous re-
public (a designation that Gamsakhurdia had annulled) or to face the entry of
Soviet troops into the republic. The Georgian authorities simply ignored this
ultimatum, without suffering reprisals. After ªghting broke out between
Ossetians and Georgians in the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali in 1991,
Soviet MVD troops came to keep the peace. But the peace did not last long,
and renewed skirmishes continued long after the Soviet Union disintegrated
in December 1991.
In Central Asia the most intense ethnic conºict during the Gorbachev era
erupted in June 1990 between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in the Osh region of
Kyrgyzstan (along the Ferghana Valley). Several days of interethnic rioting,
and a crackdown by Soviet troops, resulted in 148 deaths and more than a
thousand serious injuries. The immediate cause of the violence was a dispute
between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks over the distribution of homestead land. Many
Uzbeks were angered by the Soviet government’s decision to grant land to eth-
nic Kyrgyz, a program that seemed to exclude the Uzbeks.98 A related conºict
arose between Uzbeks and Meshkhetian Turks, an ethnic group that had been
deported en masse to Central Asia by Stalin. To curb the bloodshed, Soviet
ofªcials ended up evacuating 4,500 Meshkhetian Turks to Russia for resettle-
ment. These violent incidents, though problematic for Soviet authorities,
tended to be contained and did not lead to chronic instability. Moreover, the
union republics involved, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, remained strong sup-
porters of the preservation of the USSR.99
96. Hill, Report on Ethnic Conºict, pp. 95–107; and Seymour, ed., ACCESS Guide, pp. 44–46 and
61–62.
97. Indeed, by 1992 the post-Soviet Russian government was regularly exploiting Georgia’s internal
divisions to keep the newly independent Georgian state within Russia’s sphere of inºuence in the
Commonwealth of Independent States.
98. “40 Reported Dead in Soviet Clashes,” The New York Times, 7 June 1990, pp. 1, 8; and Hewett
and Winston, eds., Milestones, p. 521.
99. Other ethnic clashes also produced fatalities in Central Asia, including the killing of 18 people in
Dushanbe in February 1990 after rumors spread that Armenian refugees were getting preferential
120
Separatist conºicts in Moldova—one pitting the Moldovan authorities

in Chiqinäu against a hardline pro-Soviet movement in Transnistria (led
mainly by ethnic Russians), and another between the Moldovan authorities
and the Gagauz (Turkic-speaking) minority in southern Moldova—were not
entirely ethnic in nature, but they did have an ethnic dimension. In Novem-
ber 1989, soon after the Moldovan parliament adopted laws enshrining
Moldovan/Romanian as the ofªcial language, the Gagauz minority issued a
demand for autonomy. In October 1990 the local Gagauz government pre-
pared a referendum on autonomy, without the approval of the Moldovan au-
thorities.100 Members of the Popular Front of Moldova, seeking to block the
referendum, were prevented by Soviet troops from moving southward, so they
instead confronted and attacked a group of Transnistrian loyalists. In another
clash that same day between Transnistrian rebels and Moldovan nationalists
in Dubosari, six people died. The violence in Moldova, like that in Georgia,
was an irritant and distraction for Moscow, but it did not threaten the integ-
rity of the Soviet state. The Moldovan authorities even claimed that they
would support Gorbachev’s new union treaty if Moscow ceased helping the
hardliners in Transnistria. Until the coup in Moscow in August 1991—an
event denounced by the Chiqinäu government but applauded by the
Transnistrians—Moldovan ofªcials were more inclined to stay in the union
than to risk a full-ºedged civil war in their republic.
By 1990 ethnic conºicts and the use of the Soviet army and MVD to re-
spond to them had caused 1,049 deaths, 8,951 casualties, and over half a mil-
lion refugees. The largest numbers of refugees came from Armenia (173,000),
Azerbaijan (330,000) and Uzbekistan (64,000). 101 Did these disturbances and
their effects fatally threaten the integrity of the Soviet Union? At times the
warring groups did directly challenge Soviet authority, leading to problems of
governance and law and order. However, these pressures from below were not
severe enough to destroy the state.102 The much more important problem was
the failure of Soviet leaders to act early or consistently enough—and above all
their failure to use force decisively and in a sustained, consistent manner—to
treatment in housing. Another was a confrontation in western Kazakhstan between Kazakhs and im-
migrants from the Caucasus, resulting in ªve deaths and numerous injuries. These, however, do not
modify the assessment that ethnic conºicts did not directly threaten the integrity of the Soviet Union.
See Hewett and Winston, eds., Milestones, p. 519; Annette Bohr, “Violence Erupts in Uzbekistan,” Re-
port on the USSR, Vol. 1, No. 24 (16 June 1989), pp. 23–25; and Ann Sheehy, “Interethnic Distur-
bances in Western Kazakhstan,” Report on the USSR, Vol. 1, No. 27 (7 July 1989), pp. 11–14.
100. On the Gagauz question, see the articles by Dmitrii Gamain, R. Yunku, ed., K voprosu o
Gagauzskoi avtonomii (Chiqinäu: Kartia Moldoveniaske, 1990).
101. Tishkov, “Soviet Empire,” p. 214.
102. For a contrasting view, see Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet
State.x
121
Tuminez
curb the demands of ethnic groups and to prevent the outbreak or escalation
of ethnic conºicts.103 The fact that mass killings, ethnic wars, refugee ºows,
and other disturbances intensiªed after the Soviet Union broke apart, and yet
none of the post-Soviet states collapsed as a result, further bolsters the conclu-
sion that the Soviet Union could have survived the challenge of ethnic
conºicts on its territory.
Demographic, Religious, and Linguistic Pressures

The impact of demographic, religious, and linguistic factors on the breakup
of the Soviet Union also deserves examination. The results of the countrywide
census in the Soviet Union in 1970 and other statistical studies have
prompted some scholars to argue that changes in the demographic makeup of
the Soviet Union threatened the stability of the Soviet empire. Scholars point,
in particular, to the decreasing rate of Russian and Slavic population growth
relative to the high growth rates among the Turkic-Muslim peoples of Central
Asia and Azerbaijan. In 1959, Russians accounted for 54.65 percent of the
Soviet population, but that ªgure declined to 53.37 percent by 1970. Al-
though this decrease is not highly signiªcant at ªrst glance, it becomes more
so when discrepancies in birth rates between the Slavs and Muslims of the So-
viet Union are taken into account. Fertility statistics compiled in 1960 and
1974 show that the Turkic-Muslim groups had average birth rates of 38.7 per
thousand and 30.2 per thousand in those two years—ªgures well above the
average in the USSR. In contrast, Slavs had birth rates well below the average
in the same years, at 22.7 per thousand and 15.5 per thousand. Statistics for
1979–1989 further indicate that the main Slavic groups increased by only
around ªve percent—the Russian population by 5.6 percent, Belarusans by 6
percent, and Ukrainians by 4.2 percent—whereas the trends for the Muslim
populations were sharply upward (34 percent for Uzbeks, 32 percent for
Kyrgyz, 45 percent for Tajiks, 34 percent for Turkmen, and 24 percent for
Azeris). By the late-1980s the average family size was 3.1 for Russians and
Belarusans, 3.2 for Ukrainians, 5.0 for Azeris, 5.4 for Kyrgyz, 7.0 for Tajiks,
6.2 for Turkmen, 4.9 for Kazakhs, and 6.1 for Uzbeks.104
103. Galina Starovoitova, who was involved in negotiations on Nagorno-Karabakh, notes that the
Soviet regime never had a “real plan” for addressing the conºict in Nagorno-Karabakh or any other re-
gions of the Soviet Union. Galina Starovoitova, “Nationality Policies in the Period of Perestroika:
Some Comments from a Political Actor,” in Lapidus et al., eds., From Union to Commonwealth,
p. 116. Ronald Suny similarly underlines the ineptness of Soviet responses to Nagorno-Karabakh, not-
ing that Armenia was not at all anti-Moscow at the beginning of the conºict. See Ronald Grigor Suny,
“Nationalism and Democracy in Gorbachev’s Soviet Union: The Case of Karabagh,” in Rachel
Denber, ed., The Soviet Nationality Reader: The Disintegration in Context (Boulder: Westview Press,
1992), pp. 485–508.
104. I calculated the ªrst set of birth rates from ªgures in Carrère d’Encausse, Decline of an Empire,
122
Western analysts drew several conclusions from the Soviet demographic

data. Although none argued that the Turkic-Muslims would soon overwhelm
Russians demographically and politically, some claimed that the most demo-
graphically dynamic groups might seek political power commensurate with
their growing share of the Soviet population. In addition, some scholars ar-
gued that population growth might generate economic demands in the pe-
riphery that the center would be unable to satisfy, possibly leading to distur-
bances and mass unrest. According to this view, the strength of empire would
wane as the percentage of Russians steadily declined in the governing bodies
of republics such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan, all of which were
becoming more ethnically homogenized through the growth of the titular na-
tionalities and the out-migration of Russians.105
As it turned out, the demographic trends, disparate though they might
have been, did not create strong centrifugal pressures. The Muslim republics
of Central Asia were stalwart supporters of the Soviet regime, irrespective of
their demographic advances. Admittedly, some demography-related factors
(such as competition over fertile land) led to conºicts that challenged the So-
viet government, but these were neither massive nor sustained. In the Cauca-
sus Azerbaijan turned against Moscow not because of demographic pressures
but because of dissatisfaction with the center’s response to the conºict over
Nagorno-Karabakh. Neither in the Caucasus nor in Central Asia did demo-
graphics equal politics. The argument that the “indigenization” of governing
bodies could cause problems for the Soviet Union was borne out to some ex-
tent in the western Soviet republics, but only when Gorbachev’s introduction
of competitive elections paved the way for popular fronts to dominate the lo-
cal governments. This facilitated various declarations of sovereignty and inde-
pendence, and contributed to ethnic pressures against the center. Nonethe-
less, as discussed above, these pressures were not fatal and could have been
contained if the central authorities had responded more decisively.
One ªnal point worth noting about the demographic trends is that the
fastest growing titular nationalities did not necessarily exert the strongest pres-
sure on the center. On the contrary, some of the strongest pressure came from
groups like the Estonians and Latvians, who believed that their numbers were
diminishing as Russians and other nationalities settled in their republics.
Many Estonians and Latvians resented the Soviet regime, whose policies they
blamed for their unfavorable demographic situation. Moreover, demographics
p. 69. The other ªgures come from Tishkov, “Soviet Empire,” pp. 204–207; and CIS Statistical Com-
mittee, 1989 USSR Population Census, Vol. 3, (Minneapolis: East View Publications, 1996), table 8.
My thanks to Henry Hale for the census data.
105. Tishkov, “Soviet Empire,” pp. 204–207; Nahaylo and Swoboda, Soviet Disunion, p. 174; Carrère
d’Encausse, Decline of an Empire, pp. 47–120; and Bromlei, “Etnicheskie protsessy,” pp. 56–65.
123
Tuminez
was not the core element in the Baltic peoples’ opposition to the Soviet
Union. The perceived illegitimacy of Soviet rule in the Baltic states was a his-
torical reality aggravated, but not caused, by demographic factors.
Linguistic pressures in the Soviet Union proved only slightly more
difªcult to contain than the demographic trends. In some cases language
grievances facilitated the rise of ethnic nationalism. Some of the titular groups
wanted their own language to predominate over Russian, which had long
been the lingua franca in the Soviet Union. In addition, many of the
non-Slavic nationalities were irritated that the Russians who had settled in
their republics never bothered to learn the local language. According to the
1970 census, for example, only 3 percent of some 20 million Russians living
outside the RSFSR had learned the native languages of their republics.106
In 1989 and 1990, almost every republic of the Soviet Union passed a
law or constitutional amendment conferring ofªcial status on the language of
the titular nationality. The three republics that did not do this—Georgia,
Armenia, and Azerbaijan—already had provisions in their 1978 constitutions
establishing their languages as the ofªcial ones in their republics. The lan-
guage laws passed in 1989 and 1990 fell into two categories: those intended
to facilitate the predominance of the indigenous language over Russian (in Es-
tonia, Lithuania, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan; and those that
sought to accommodate multiple languages and to designate each language’s
functions within the republic (Latvia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus).107
No strict correlation exists between the republics that passed the strictest lan-
guage laws and those that were most intent on separating from the Soviet
Union. One reason that language was not a particularly salient factor in the
breakup of the Soviet Union was that Soviet language laws and practices were
generally liberal. The Soviet regime pursued a dual policy that, on the one
hand, developed Russian as a means of efªcient communication for an empire
in which more than a hundred languages were spoken, and that, on the other
hand, also preserved the distinctiveness of many non-Russian languages. So-
viet language policy never sought to extirpate the use of non-Russian lan-
guages; instead, it was adjusted to take account of the political status of a na-
tionality and the size and population density of an ethnic group.108
106. Nahaylo and Swoboda, Soviet Disunion, p. 175.

107. M. N. Guboglo, Perelomnye gody (Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences, 1993), pp. 34–53; and
Roeder, “Soviet Federalism,” p. 198.
108. Jonathan Pool, “Soviet Language Planning: Goals, Results, Options,” in Denber, ed., Soviet Na-
tionality Reader, pp. 331–352; and Barbara A. Anderson and Brian D. Silver, “Equality, Efªciency, and
Politics in Soviet Bilingual Education Policy, 1934–1980,”in Denber, ed., Soviet Nationality Reader,
pp. 353–386.
124
Even more than demographic and linguistic trends, religion was only a
peripheral factor in the breakup of the Soviet Union. Contrary to the expecta-
tions of some, Islam in Azerbaijan and Central Asia did not serve as a catalyst
for mass discontent with, or rebellion against, Soviet rule. The Soviet regime
over time had implemented policies to prevent the rise of pan-Islamic solidar-
ity among the republics of Central Asia, to siphon Islamic activities into four
ofªcially approved muftiates in the country, and to keep “the religious fervor
of believers within limits prescribed by Soviet laws.”109 The CPSU Central
Committee acknowledged in 1990 that its approach to Islam had been nar-
row and simplistic, and that under the pretext of ªghting “reactionary Islamic
traditions” it had quelled legitimate national traditions and caused the es-
trangement of Muslims from the Soviet regime.110 Nonetheless, even when
Gorbachev decreed freedom of conscience and religion, this opening did not
rouse Muslims in the USSR to rally around Islam and to ªght against Mos-
cow. Similarly, among the Christian denominations that were long identiªed
with nationalist causes—the Armenian Gregorian Church, the Georgian Or-
thodox Church, the Catholic Church in Lithuania, and the Uniate Church in
western Ukraine—only the Catholic Church in Lithuania (and, to a lesser ex-
tent, the Uniate Church in Ukraine) became a signiªcant factor in the rise of
anti-Soviet ethnonationalism. Underground publications of the Catholic
Church and its adherents, protests against Soviet religious oppression, and in-
ternational petitions on behalf of the Church over the years helped forge Lith-
uanian national identity and strengthen sentiments against the empire.111
Russian Nationalism: Yeltsin’s Revenge, and Public Apathy toward

Empire
The Russian republic historically, territorially, demographically, and organiza-
tionally was by far the most important component of the Soviet state. The So-
viet Union inherited most of what was the Tsarist Russian empire, and the
RSFSR accounted for three-quarters of Soviet territory and the bulk of Soviet
economic and natural resources. Moreover, the population of the RSFSR,
more than 80 percent of which was ethnic Russian, constituted over half of
the Soviet population. All the main Soviet power structures—the CPSU, the
109. Bociurkiw, “Nationalities and Soviet Religious Policies,” p. 157; and Alexandre Bennigsen and
S. Enders Wimbush, Muslims of the Soviet Empire: A Guide (London: Hurst, 1985), pp. 14–35.
110. TsK KPSS, “O postanovlenii TsK KPSS ‘Ob usilenii bor’by s vliyaniem islama’ (no. P24/54 ot 18
avgusta 1986 goda),” 7 August 1990, in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 11, D. 5, Ll. 1–3; and TsK KPSS, “Ob
izmenenii soderzhaniya ateisticheskoi raboty v regionakh traditsionnogo rasprostraneniya islama,” 20
July 1990, in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 11, D. 5, Ll. 4–5. My thanks to Mark Kramer for these documents.
111. Bociurkiw, “Nationalities and Soviet Religious Policies,” pp. 148–176; and Nahaylo and
Swoboda, Soviet Disunion, p. 163.
125
Tuminez
army, the KGB, the MVD, the economic and military-industrial ministries,
and other organizations—were concentrated in Moscow. Because of the dom-
inant role of Russia in the maintenance of the Soviet imperial state, a consen-
sus among Russians on the value of empire was needed to hold the Soviet
Union together.
In 1990 and 1991, Russian support for the maintenance of the Soviet
state critically wavered. This was partly a result of Russian nationalism. How-
ever, unlike other nationalisms in the Soviet republics, Russian nationalism
did not involve mass ethnic mobilization against the center. Instead, it was
conªned to a narrow circle of elites, especially Yeltsin and his supporters, who
used nationalist rhetoric and arguments to wrest legitimacy from Gorbachev
as head of the Soviet Union and to argue for a preponderant Russian state that
would eclipse the Soviet regime. As discussed below, Yeltsin and his entourage
did not realize until too late that their espousal of Russian nationalism and a
preponderant role for Russia would deal a fatal blow to the Soviet state (as op-
posed to the Soviet regime). Yeltsin managed to exact his revenge against
Gorbachev, but at the cost of losing the Soviet Union. The wider popula-
tion in the RSFSR—though not mobilized in opposition to the Soviet
Union—was also pivotal in the disintegration of the empire. The large major-
ity of Russians proved indifferent to the cause of empire, being unconvinced
of its value and unwilling to act or make sacriªces for its maintenance. In es-
sence, Russian elites and masses both lost the will to preserve the empire and
ended up defecting from it.
At the elite level, consensus broke down as rival centers of power—one
led by Gorbachev and the other by Yeltsin—vied for supremacy in Moscow. A
strong element of personal animosity marked this rivalry, arising from
Gorbachev’s decision in October 1987 to humiliate Yeltsin and remove him
from the Politburo.112 Yeltsin was intent on seeking revenge. He effectively
used Russian nationalist rhetoric to challenge Gorbachev and wrest central
power from him. When seeking to become chair of the Russian Supreme So-
viet in 1990 and to win election to the Russian presidency in 1991, Yeltsin
adopted populist and nationalist themes. Initially he called for economic, po-
litical, and cultural independence for all peoples of the USSR; then he sharp-
ened his rhetoric to identify Russia’s “spiritual, national, and economic re-
birth” as the main task of Russians. He argued that Russia for too long had
been an appendage of the Soviet center and had lost its independence. He
co-opted symbols used by his more strident nationalist opponents, and he or-
dered the restoration of the Russian tricolor ºag. For his inauguration as Rus-
sian president, he invited the head of the Russian Orthodox Church to speak,
112. See Zlotnik, “Yeltsin and Gorbachev,” pp. 128–164.
126
and he subsequently promoted Mikhail Glinka’s “A Life for the Tsar” as the
national anthem.113
If only inadvertently, Yeltsin and his colleagues repeatedly thwarted
Gorbachev’s efforts to save the Soviet Union. For example, at the ªrst Russian
Congress of People’s Deputies in May 1990, Yeltsin urged the parliament to
pursue bilateral treaties with other union-republics. In August 1990, in a
speech to the Latvian parliament, he further urged the destruction of the hier-
archical core of the Soviet Union, cast doubts on the viability of a new union
treaty, and proposed a loose confederative grouping of Soviet republics in a
“commonwealth of sovereign states.”114 Under Yeltsin’s leadership, Russia
signed bilateral treaties with other union-republics, including Ukraine and
Kazakhstan in 1990, creating a network of pseudo-interstate relations within
the Soviet Union.
Throughout 1991, members of Yeltsin’s team, especially Gennadii Bur-
bulis, worked to create a new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
that would replace the Soviet Union. At the same time, Yeltsin himself main-
tained the appearance of cooperating with Gorbachev on a new union treaty.
This dual approach was evident when Russia participated in the referendum
on the union in March 1991 but added a separate question on the desirability
of holding popular elections for the Russian presidency (a step that would un-
dermine the legitimacy of Gorbachev, who had not been popularly elected as
president of the Soviet Union). Yeltsin also campaigned against a “yes” vote
for the union, arguing that the proponents of the measure wanted to “preserve
the imperial, unitary essence of the Union.” 115 Similarly, although he signed
with Gorbachev (and eight other republic leaders) what journalists hailed as a
“landmark agreement” on a union treaty in April 1991, he simultaneously
was negotiating with Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan on his proposal to
form the CIS. In the ultimate betrayal of Gorbachev, Yeltsin joined with the
leaders of Belarus and Ukraine on 8 December 1991 in announcing the cre-
ation of the CIS and the demise of the Soviet Union, precluding any further
consideration of Gorbachev’s draft union treaty. Yeltsin and his aides pursued
the CIS option in the belief that it would provide a means for keeping most of
the Soviet Union together, with Russia at the head. They planned to consign
Gorbachev and other Soviet institutions to a purely ªgurehead role. It is tell-
ing, in this regard, that just ten days before the Ukrainian referendum on in-
113. Laba, “How Yeltsin’s Exploitation,” pp. 5–13; John B. Dunlop, The Rise of Russia and the Fall of
the Soviet Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 38–62; and John Morrison,
Boris Yeltsin: From Bolshevik to Democrat (New York: Dutton, 1991), pp. 142–143.
114. Gorbachev Foundation, Soyuz mozhno bylo sokhranit’, pp. 106–108.
115. Radio Rossiya, 15 March 1991, quoted in Ann Sheehy, “The All-Union and RSFSR Referendums
of March 17,” Report on the USSR, Vol. 3, No. 13 (29 March 1991), p. 20.
127
Tuminez
dependence, Yeltsin refused to believe expert data and analyses indicating that
Ukraine would likely vote for independence. 116
The breakdown of consensus at the mass level regarding the value of em-
pire manifested itself in several ways: in electoral support for Yeltsin; in the
growing unpopularity of Gorbachev; in the absence of a mass movement fa-
voring the maintenance of empire and Russia’s leading role in it; and in Rus-
sian public support for secessionist movements outside Russia. Yeltsin, as al-
ready mentioned, used nationalist rhetoric in his successful campaigns for
parliamentary chair in 1990 and for the Russian presidency in 1991, an elec-
tion he won handily. When Soviet troops moved against Lithuania and Latvia
in January 1991, large crowds of Muscovites expressed solidarity with the Bal-
tic governments by signing petitions at the “embassies” that Yeltsin had al-
lowed the Baltic states to open in Moscow in 1990. On 20 January more than
150,000 people took part in a protest rally in Moscow organized by Yeltsin’s
allies in the “Democratic Russia” movement, an event that dismayed Soviet
leaders because of the “anti-Soviet” and “anti-Communist” condemnations of
Soviet policy in the Baltics.117 The outpouring of Russian public support for
the Baltic republics came as a surprise even to the Baltic representatives them-
selves.118 A month later when the Russian parliament tried to oust Yeltsin (a
move backed at least indirectly by Gorbachev), some 400,000 people showed
up in a demonstration on the Russian leader’s behalf. The only major groups
in the RSFSR that strongly supported the maintenance of empire were the ex-
treme Russian nationalists. However, they fared poorly in all the elections in
1989–1991—the 1989 Soviet parliamentary elections, the 1990 Russian par-
liamentary campaign, and the 1991 Russian presidential election. Leading
116. Galina Starovoitova, then adviser to Yeltsin, said that Yeltsin was shocked when told that approxi-
mately 75 percent of Ukrainian voters would likely say “yes” to independence. Yeltsin said that out-
come was impossible. See tape of Galina Starovoitova comments, “Seminar on Russia, the Caucasus,
Central Asia, and Ukraine,” Carnegie Corporation of New York, 5 November 1997. Adam Ulam, in
contrast, claims (incorrectly) that Yeltsin realized “just in time [after the August 1991 coup] that the
system . . . could not be preserved, and it was he who delivered the ªnal blow to both the Soviet Union
and to the political career of his one-time boss and tormentor.” See Adam B. Ulam, “Charting the
Communist Collapse,” Washington Post Book World, 5 January 1997, p. 2 and Laba, “How Yeltsin’s
Exploitation,” pp. 5–13. Because Yeltsin’s team had been pursuing a CIS-type option as early as 1990
(as indicated by Burbulis himself), it is difªcult to accept Ulam’s argument that the CIS indicated
Yeltsin’s foresight in light of the near impossibility of saving the union after August 1991. For
Burbulis’s account of Russian negotiations with other republics, see Gorbachev Foundation, Soyuz
mozhno bylo sokhranit’, pp. 290–292, 289–306; “Gorbachev and Yeltsin Agree to Union Treaty,”
Financial Times (London), 25 April 1991, p. 1; and “Sideshow to Soviet Votes: Gorbachev vs. Yeltsin,”
The New York Times, 17 March 1991, p. 10.
117. “Zapiska o manifestatsii 20 yanvarya 1991 goda,” Memorandum No. 8 (Top Secret) from Yurii
Prokof ’ev, 22 January 1991, ªrst secretary of the municipal CPSU committee in Moscow, to the
CPSU Politburo and Secretariat, in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 12, D. 31, Ll. 1–2. My thanks to Mark
Kramer for giving me a copy of this document.
118. See Simonyan, “Strany Baltii v Gorbachevskoi perestroika,’” p. 65.
128
ªgures in the pro-empire camp fared so dismally in 1990 that they received
less than the minimum threshold of 4 percent of the vote.119
Outside electoral politics there was no evident mass movement in Russia
for the preservation of the Soviet Union (not to mention for the continued
leadership of Gorbachev, who was the strongest articulator and supporter of a
renewed union). The closest perhaps that Russians came to saying they still
wanted the USSR to continue in some form was during the March 1991 ref-
erendum. Of the nearly 76 percent of eligible Russian voters who turned out,
roughly 71 percent cast ballots in favor of the union. But this afªrmative vote
was not as enthusiastic as it might appear. The 71 percent reºected barely half
(53.5 percent) of the eligible voters in Russia. In nearly equal numbers (69.85
percent) they said “yes” to Yeltsin’s question regarding elections for a new Rus-
sian presidency, a measure opposed by Gorbachev.120 Several months later,
when Ukraine voted for independence and the Belovezhskaya Pushcha ac-
cords became a fait accompli, no mass protests ensued in Russia against the
CIS or Yeltsin, whose team had engineered the demise of the USSR.
Many Russians, reacting to glasnost’s revelations about past injustices
inºicted by the Soviet regime on Russians (as well as other nationalities) in the
Soviet Union, resented the blame heaped on the RSFSR by those who
equated Russia with the Soviet regime. Many of them also were angered by
the country’s impoverishment and other ills that, in their view, stemmed from
Moscow’s imperial burdens. As a result they disavowed the Soviet empire and
even supported (or at least did not oppose) secessionist movements. Some ar-
gued that the Soviet regime had discriminated against Russians as an ethnic
group in terms of resource allocation, educational opportunities, occupational
support, and representation in the Communist Party.121 The nationalist writer
Valentin Rasputin was the ªrst to propose (jokingly, some have said) in 1989
that Russia should “secede from the union.” Legislators in the Russian Con-
119. Tuminez, Russian Nationalism since 1856, pp. 207–208; Laba, “How Yeltsin’s Exploitation,” p. 9;
and Carrère d’Encausse, End of the Soviet Empire, p. 188.
120. Sheehy, “All-Union and RSFSR Referendums,” pp. 19–23.
121. In an evocative phrase Carrère d’Encausse characterizes Russian nationalism under Gorbachev as
“not the triumphalist nationalism of a people that have had a revelation of their power, but a national-
ism of suffering and shame.” See Carrère d’Encausse, End of the Soviet Empire, p. 175. See also Mikhail
Shirokii, “Perestroika, natsional’naya problema v SSSR i russkoe patrioticheskoe dvizhenie,” Vestnik
Russkogo Khristianskogo Dvizheniya, No. 153 (1988), p. 192; Vladimir Balakhonov, “Sokhranenie
imperii ili samosokhranenie na puti natsional’nogo suveriniteta—glavnaya natsional’ naya problema
russkogo naroda segodnya,” Russkaya mysl’, (Paris), 23 June 1989, p. 7; Leon Onikov, KPSS:
Anatomiya raspada. Vzglyad iznutri apparata TsK (Moscow: Respublika, 1996), pp. 115–17; Igor
Shafarevich, Russofobia (Munich: Rossiiskoe natsional’noe ob”edinenie, 1989); Galina Starovoitova,
“Deti Rossii,” Literaturnaya gazeta, 9 October 1991, p. 2; Lidia Grafova, “Stalinskie igry,” Literatur-
naya gazeta, 9 October 1991, p. 2; and V. Kozlov, “Russkii vopros: Istoriya, soveremennost’,
budushchee,” Vesti gorodov yuga Rossii and Krasnodarskie izvestiya [joint issue], 27 February 1993,
p. 17.
129
Tuminez
gress of People’s Deputies followed in 1990 with a call for Russian sovereignty
and even independent statehood. In March 1990 the Moscow City Soviet
sent a telegram to Vytautas Landsbergis in Lithuania to support the republic’s
drive for independence and self-determination. In April 1990, 50 percent of
Russians polled in Vilnius supported Lithuanian secession. Yeltsin, with mass
support behind him, also went to Lithuania in 1991 to exhibit solidarity with
the Baltic cause after Soviet force was used in Vilnius and Riga in January
1991. 122 The extent of public support for Yeltsin’s stance became evident
when many Russians signed petitions pledging solidarity with Lithuania and
Latvia. In plebiscites on Estonian and Latvian independence in March 1991,
many (though not all) Russians in these republics came out in support of in-
dependence. In Riga, Latvia, for example, with a population that was only
one-third Latvian, 60.7 percent voted for independence. In every election
district in Latvia (a republic with a population that was only half Latvian)
the majority of voters favored Latvian independence. In Estonia, Russian-
dominated cities like Sillamae and Narva did vote against independence; but
in urban areas overall—the areas in which 92 percent of Estonia’s Russians
lived—the vote afªrming independence was 65 percent (with a 78 percent
voter turnout). Because Estonians as a whole constituted only half the popu-
lation in urban centers, one can assume that a signiªcant percentage of ethnic
Russians in the cities voted in support of Estonian independence. 123
Without a ªrm consensus in the center regarding the value and desirabil-
ity of empire, the Soviet Union could not continue to exist. Indeed, after Rus-
sia declared its sovereignty in June 1990, other republics followed, including
Ukraine, Belarus, and the Central Asian republics, which did not have strong
national-separatist movements. By the end of 1990 all ªfteen union republics
had declared sovereignty, and the end of the Soviet Union began to loom
large.
Economic Failure in the Center-Periphery Compact
Economic advances were one of the Soviet state’s instruments for keeping cen-
ter-periphery relations intact. Under Gorbachev, however, this part of the
compact also unraveled. Although a full discussion of Soviet economic devel-
122. Kionka, “Estonians,” p. 51; Tishkov, “Soviet Empire,” p. 206; and Suzanne Crow, “Support
within USSR for Lithuania’s Independence Drive,” Report on the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 15 (13 April
1990), pp. 3–4.
123. Dzintra Bungs, “Poll Shows Majority in Latvia Endorses Independence,” Report on the USSR,
Vol. 3, No. 12 (15 March 1991), pp. 22–25; and Riina Kionka, “Estonia Says ‘Yes’ to Independence,”
Report on the USSR, Vol. 3, No. 12 (15 March 1991), pp. 25–26.
130
opments under Gorbachev is beyond the scope of this article, several points
are worth emphasizing.124
First, the Soviet Union was not in a state of economic crisis when
Gorbachev came to power in 1985. From 1985 to 1988 most economic indi-
cators—agricultural production, industrial production, food output, retail-
trade volumes, consumer-goods production, and volume of services—in
Russia and other Soviet republics actually improved.125
Second, only after Gorbachev’s introduction of economic reforms did
centrifugal tensions, strikes, and interethnic conºicts arise and expose the
weakness of the centralized economy. In the face of these problems the center
had little independent wherewithal to generate economic resources from a pe-
riphery that was no longer bound by rigid discipline and fear. Republics, in-
cluding Russia under the increasingly deªant Yeltsin, failed to fulªll produc-
tion plans or simply withheld resources from the center. By the ªrst half of
1990, republic budgets overall were running a surplus, whereas the center’s
budget was in deªcit, causing wide macroeconomic instability.126 The center
at this very time needed extra resources to provide ªnancial aid to troubled re-
gions such as Nagorno-Karabakh (to dampen the conºict there), but no funds
were available.
Third, by 1990–1991 clear signs of an economic crisis had appeared, but
the center under Gorbachev failed to devise and implement policies that
would restore economic cohesion, discipline, and productivity. The crisis
took the form of sharp drops in food and other production, in availability of
housing, and in popular consumption. The available data suggest that the
supply of all products in the USSR was halved in 1985–1990, coinciding
with the period of perestroika. In some cases staple foods were rationed, as
prices (especially in non-state stores) rose, and reports of hunger and poverty
in places like Ukraine circulated.127 In the summer of 1990, having promised
124. The economic dimension of the Soviet collapse is examined in depth in Gertrude Schroeder,
“The Soviet Economy and the Fate of the USSR,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Summer
2004), forthcoming.
125. The point here is a general one: There were problems in the Soviet economy, but it was not an
economy in crisis. For the statistics cited here, see Alan B. Pollard, ed., USSR Facts and Figures Annual
(Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press): Vol. 12 (1988), pp. 488–93; Vol. 13 (1989),
pp. 495–99; Vol. 14 (1990), pp. 396–99; and Vol. 15 (1991), pp. 486–487.
126. John Tedstrom, “Economic Slide Continues,” Report on the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 37 (14 September
1990), pp. 9–12; and John Tedstrom, “Disintegration of the Soviet Economy,” Report on the USSR,
Vol. 3, No. 1 (4 January 1991), pp. 3–4.
127. Theodore W. Karasik, ed., USSR Facts and Figures Annual, Vol. 17 (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic
International Press, 1992), pp. 208–109; Stephen K. Wegren, “Food Prices in the USSR,” Report on
the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 12 (23 March 1990), pp. 13–14; William Moskoff, “Popular Attitudes to Food
Shortages,” Report on the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 21 (25 May 1990), pp. 9–12; David Marples, “Poverty
131
Tuminez
to take decisive steps to improve the Soviet economy, Gorbachev ªnally as-
sembled a four-man economic reform team to devise a comprehensive pro-
gram. But he ended up settling for a watered-down compromise proposal
rather than adopting the “500-Day Plan” that the economists proposed. (It is
worth noting that the 500-Day Plan was far from perfect, was belatedly put
together, and might not have resulted in any appreciable improvement even if
Gorbachev had stuck with it.)
Finally, the center not only failed to respond effectively to economic
problems but in the end facilitated secession by agreeing to delegate many
economic prerogatives and powers to the republics in the name of economic
independence (ekonomicheskyia samostoyatel’nost’). This was particularly true
in the Baltic republics, which seemed to cope best with the economic chal-
lenges in the Soviet Union.128 Because the republics that were most intent on
gaining independence were, in relative terms, faring better economically than
the rest of the Soviet Union, the center’s devolution of economic functions in-
advertently reinforced the message that independence from the USSR was a
good thing.
“Not with a Bang but a Whimper”: The Fall of the

Soviet Union
On 8 December 1991 the presidents of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine sealed

the fate of the Soviet Union when they signed the Belovezhskaya Pushcha
agreement establishing the CIS and declaring the end of the USSR. The
parliaments of eleven union-republics approved the agreement despite Gorba-
chev’s vehement protests. The situation for the Soviet regime thus became un-
tenable. Even if Gorbachev had been willing to resort to “bloody slaughter”
(as he put it in his memoirs), he ªnally had to concede that nothing more
could be done either peacefully or through force. Without his knowledge, sev-
eral of his aides and the Soviet defense minister, Evgenii Shaposhnikov, were
and Hunger Becoming Widespread in Ukraine,” Report on the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 21 (25 May 1990),
pp. 13–15; Keith Bush, “The Economic Problems Remain,” Report on the USSR, Vol. 3, No. 36
(6 September 1991), pp. 37–39; and Mark Rhodes, “Food Supply in the USSR,” Report on the USSR,
Vol. 3, No. 41 (11 October 1991), pp. 10–16.
128. See Karasik, ed., USSR Facts and Figures Annual, Vol. 17, p. 151; Sovet Ministrov SSSR, “O
preobrazovanii gosudarstvennykh soyuznykh predpriyatii, ob”edinenii, i organizatsii, ras-
polozhennykh na territorii Litovskoi SSR, v aktsionernye obshchestva,” 23 October 1990, in LVOA,
F. 1706, Ap. 1, B. 10, La. 11–12; and a Gosplan document, “O formirovanii ekonomicheskikh
vzaimootnoshenii mezhdu Soyuzom SSR i soyuznymi respublikami Pribaltiki, na dogovornoi
osnove,” 29 March 1990, in LVOA, F. 17626, Ap. 1, B. 10, La. 4–7. My thanks to Mark Kramer for
copies of these two documents.
132
already engaged in negotiations with signatories of the CIS agreement. Their

loyalties clearly were not tied to the old center.129
Why did the Soviet Union break up in 1991? Why did an imperial struc-
ture that withstood war and revolution disintegrate during what was a rela-
tively peaceful time in Soviet history? The preceding analysis highlighted
three aspects of imperial control: (1) a compact between center and periphery;
(2) consensus at the center regarding the desirability and maintenance of em-
pire; and (3) the ability and will to use force against challengers to imperial
rule. In Gorbachev’s Soviet Union the center failed to uphold these compo-
nents of control, allowing nationalist and ethnic pressures to become a greater
force than warranted, and ultimately causing the demise of the Soviet Union.
The compact between center and periphery clearly needed to be changed
when Gorbachev came to power with the aim of reinvigorating the Soviet
economy. The compact had already undergone various metamorphoses in
earlier stages of Soviet history, from Lenin to Brezhnev. Under Gorbachev sev-
eral measures could have helped make the compact tenable and operational.
Instead of greater Russiªcation of central cadres, as had been the trend since
the late Brezhnev period,130 Gorbachev could have introduced a countrywide
reform at the beginning of his tenure that would have strengthened the prac-
tice of having strong peripheral representation in central institutions of
power. Such a step at an early stage could have welded ties between central
and peripheral elites, allowing all of them to focus on economic troubles. The
initial target of the major nationalist movements (Sájudis, the Popular Front
of Moldova, the Armenian National Front, and others) was not Moscow. Fur-
thermore, Gorbachev could have opted for minimal or extremely slow politi-
cal liberalization and focused greater attention on economic reform. As Philip
Roeder has argued, it was primarily political reform (i.e., the center’s abdica-
tion of control over ethnic mobilization assets) that allowed nationalists to or-
ganize, propagate their ideas, and enlist supporters of their causes, thereby
creating major problems of governance.131
The breakdown of consensus in Russia, especially at the elite level, re-
garding the value of empire and the need for Russian unity in support of the
USSR was a determining factor in the demise of the Soviet state.132 This
129. Gorbachev, Memoirs, pp. 658–669. This is also evident from the episode recounted in the second
edition of Shaposhnikov’s memoirs, Vybor, 2nd ed. (Moscow: PIK, 1995), pp. 137–138. My thanks to
Mark Kramer for this reference.
130. Burg, “Nationality Elites,” pp. 25–27; and Onikov, KPSS, p. 118.
131. Roeder, “Soviet Federalism.”
132. This point is well made in Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970–2000
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
133
Tuminez
breakdown was especially evident in the dynamics of the Gorbachev-Yeltsin

rivalry. It also manifested itself in the aftermath of the Soviet crackdown in
Lithuania and Latvia in January 1991. Large numbers of Russians protested
the Soviet use of force, and prominent experts (e.g., Gorbachev’s economic
adviser, Nikolai Petrakov) abandoned the Gorbachev camp. Other visible
Russian ªgures, such as the university rector Yurii Afanasev, openly con-
demned the repression and bloodshed. In these circumstances it is difªcult to
see how Gorbachev could have convinced Yeltsin and his closest colleagues to
take his side in the ªght for the union. To be sure, Gorbachev could have pur-
sued one obvious option—namely, to manage more adeptly his relations with
the elites of several key republics. Had Gorbachev done so, Yeltsin might have
found it harder to create a fait accompli at Belovezhskaya Pushcha, the action
that codiªed the demise of the Soviet Union. As it was, Yeltsin and his team
had problems getting the Kazakh leader, Nursultan Nazarbaev, to sign the
CIS document, and Kazakhstan abandoned what Yeltsin’s entourage had orig-
inally envisioned as a four-republic agreement.133 The two other signers,
Ukraine and Belarus, were not the most secessionist republics in the union,
and the center could have done more to cultivate and retain the loyalty of
their elites. As for ordinary citizens in Russia, very few were inclined to
sacriªce much for imperial maintenance, and some even supported secession-
ist movements in the USSR (as well as Russia’s own break with the Soviet re-
gime). Most citizens, however, were not actively mobilized either against or in
favor of breaking up the Soviet Union. Although Russians on the whole may
not have been willing to back the center, they were not the key force pushing
for Soviet disintegration.
Ultimately, Gorbachev’s unwillingness to use large-scale coercive violence
on a consistent basis, was the most critical factor in the collapse of imperial
control. He himself, however, was not the only one responsible for the center’s
eschewal of the decisive use of force. As Victor Zaslavsky notes, over decades
“the coercive apparatus [of the Soviet Union had] became less harsh and less
visible, even though it remained a major instrument of intimidation” that
shaped people’s perceptions of the likely consequences of acts that crossed the
line of acceptable behavior.134 Gorbachev only completed the process by re-
moving fear itself from the minds of Soviet citizens. His last chance to use
massive coercion and impose presidential rule to keep the Soviet Union to-
133. Gorbachev Foundation, Soyuz mozhno bylo sokhranit’, p. 291.

134. Zaslavsky, “The Soviet Union,” pp. 77–78. In a related point, one former elite worker in the
party apparatus has argued that Gorbachev’s weakening and emasculation of the CPSU, the “core of
the system,” was the main reason for the Soviet collapse. See Onikov, KPSS, p. 114.
134
gether might have been shortly after the March 1991 referendum. In all nine
republics that ofªcially participated in the referendum, voters strongly sup-
ported the union (though, admittedly, the results were likely inºuenced by
the wording of the question). Even in the six republics in which voting was
held only at military bases and certain state enterprises (the Baltic states,
Georgia, Moldova, and Armenia), a majority of those who voted were sup-
portive of the union.135 If Gorbachev had needed a legal pretext to institute
presidential rule and use force to preserve the union, this would have been the
moment. But, being a ruler with “a blessedly paciªc turn of mind, he refused
to do so.”136
The Soviet Union did not have to disintegrate in 1991. It might well
have fallen apart eventually, given the inherent weakness of its imperial struc-
ture resulting from the ofªcially encouraged construction and consolidation
of ethnic identities, the center’s growing inability to bring about continued
material improvements in the lives of its citizens, and the rising disillusion-
ment and cynicism in Soviet society. But the downfall need not have occurred
when it did. The Soviet empire could have lasted for many more years, per-
haps even decades, had there been a different leader or set of leaders deter-
mined to maintain imperial control, even at great military, social, and human
cost. Without such leaders in power, the center failed to assert its authority in
a decisive manner. The loss of will at the top ultimately allowed nationalist
and ethnic pressures to rise to the fore, contributing to the destruction of
what only recently had seemed (in the words of the Soviet anthem) “an indis-
soluble union.”
135. Among the nine republics fully participating in the referendum, those that favored the union
treaty ranged from a low of 70 percent in Ukraine to a high of 97 percent in Turkmenistan. See the
data in Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Referendum in the Soviet Union: Com-
pendium of Reports on the March 17, 1991 Referendum on the Future of the USSR (Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Ofªce, 1991); Gorbachev Foundation, Soyuz mozhno bylo sokhranit’,
pp. 148–149; and Cheshko, Raspad Sovetskogo Soyuza, p. 263.
136. John Lloyd, “When Gorby Went West,” The Observer (London), 17 November 1996, Review
sec., p. X. Gorbachev and his colleagues understood the gravity of the March 1991 referendum. The
CPSU leadership gave strict instructions for all party bodies to do everything possible to ensure that
most voters participated in the referendum and voted afªrmatively. The challenges were clear as
well—as when the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet resolved in January 1991 to conduct its own poll and
not that of the center. But instead of showing an iron ªst, neither the CPSU instructions on the March
referendum nor Gorbachev’s response to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet indicated that strong and
swift punitive measures would be meted out against those who deªed central orders. In other words,
Soviet leaders knew that the risk of imperial collapse was real, yet they hesitated even at the most cru-
cial moments to wield the brutal power of the state. See “Lithuania Polls Citizens on Preserving
USSR,” CDSP, Vol. 43, No. 3 (1991), pp. 7–8; and “O vsenarodnom golosovanii (referendume) o
sokhranenii Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik,” CPSU Secretariat resolution (Top Se-
cret), 1 March 1991, in LVA, F. 101, Ap. 67, B. 36, La. 53–56. My thanks to Mark Kramer for giving
me a copy of this document.
135
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Acknowledgments
I want to thank Vicky Dorfman and Cameron Hall for research assistance;
Henry Hale for useful comments; and Mark Kramer for his blunt criticism,
valuable guidance, generous assistance with archival sources, and witty e-mail
correspondence.
136
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Nationalism, Ethnic Pressures, and the Breakup

of the Soviet Union

Ken Jowitt, 1997 1

T he rise and fall of empires has been a repeated refrain in world

If the conjuncture of nationalism and imperial breakup has been evident

1. the Bolshevik policy of creating and reinforcing ethnic and nationalist

Nations, Nationalism, and Empires

sic propositions: 1) that there exists a “nation” with identiªable members;

Nationalism is a highly normative ideology with powerful legitimating

11. Verdery, “Whither ‘Nation’ and ‘Nationalism?’” pp. 38–44.

of elites in the subordinate societies and the delivery of certain goods to

National and Ethnic Policies Before Gorbachev

Leonid Brezhnev declared in 1972 that “the national question, as we inherited

In the course of socialist construction, the formerly backward national hinter-

Statements like these, however, concealed a more problematic reality. Al-

The Compact between Center and Periphery

23. Yu. V. Bromlei, “Sovershenstvovanie natsional’nykh otnoshenii v SSSR,” Kommunist (Moscow),

guages in government, education, literature, political propaganda, and other

Erosion of the Center-Periphery Compact

During World War II, Russian nationalism infused Stalin’s rhetoric as he

The building and reinforcement of nations in the Soviet Union created

The Inequality and Repression of Nationalities

In practice, however, blatant injustice and coercion often made a mock-

tine Catholics) in western Ukraine, Roman Catholics in Lithuania, Suª Mus-

Nationalist and Ethnic Challenges to Soviet Rule

actions included literary and other cultural expressions of ethnic identities,

Date Place/No. Of Participants Nature Of Disturbance Ofªcial Response Casualties

1963 Sumgait, Azerbaijan; 800 1 wounded

Date Place/No. Of Participants Nature Of Disturbance Ofªcial Response Casualties

Mass nationalist “hysteria” roused by

Nationalism and Ethnic Pressures, 1988–1991

The experience of the Habsburg empire suggests that political liberalization

The Baltic States

ances against the USSR centered on environmental, cultural, and human

Other largely ineffective measures taken by the Soviet authorities to re-

Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova

over this episode in Armenian history, it caused deep resentment in Arme-

ences. These measures, however, were insufªcient to resolve a conºict that

87. See the data in Table 1.

Although the use of force in Baku effectively (if temporarily) parried a

Separatist conºicts in Moldova—one pitting the Moldovan authorities

Demographic, Religious, and Linguistic Pressures

Western analysts drew several conclusions from the Soviet demographic

106. Nahaylo and Swoboda, Soviet Disunion, p. 175.

Russian Nationalism: Yeltsin’s Revenge, and Public Apathy toward

112. See Zlotnik, “Yeltsin and Gorbachev,” pp. 128–164.

Economic Failure in the Center-Periphery Compact

“Not with a Bang but a Whimper”: The Fall of the

On 8 December 1991 the presidents of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine sealed

already engaged in negotiations with signatories of the CIS agreement. Their

breakdown was especially evident in the dynamics of the Gorbachev-Yeltsin

133. Gorbachev Foundation, Soyuz mozhno bylo sokhranit’, p. 291.

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