CASE People of the Philippines v.

Lugod
CASE BRIEF Appellant Clemente John Lood was accused of committing the complex crime
of Rape with Homicide after allegedly raping Nairube Ramos, an eight-year old
girl.

Appellant was arrested on the sole basis of the red slippers that were found
on the dwelling of the family of the victim, Nairube.

Floro Esguerra, the Vice-Mayor of Cavinti testified that when he visited the
appellant on his cell, the latter allegedly confessed to the commission of the
crime.
RULING There is no question that at the time of his apprehension, accused-appellant
was already placed under arrest and was suspected of having something to do
with the disappearance of Nairube. (Thus, starting the custodial
investigation.)

However, at the time of his arrest, the apprehending officers did not inform
the accused-appellant and in fact acted in a blatant and wanton disregard of
his constitutional rights specified in Section 12, Article III of the Constitution

Nachura:
It was held that the accused should have been entitled to the Miranda rights,
because even assuming that he was not yet under interrogation at the time he
was brought to the police station, his confession was elicited by a police
officer who promised to help him if he told the truth. Furthermore, when he
allegedly pointed out the body of the victim, the atmosphere was highly
intimidating and not conducive to a spontaneous response as the whole
police force and nearly 100 townspeople escorted him there. Not having the
benefit of counsel and not having been informed of his rights, the confession
is inadmissible.

CASE People of the Philippines v. Pasudag

CASE BRIEF SPO2 Pepito Calip saw marijuana plants in between corn plants and camote
tops in a garden owned by herein appellant Alberto Pasudag. Calip uprooted
the marijuana plants and brought appellant to the police station. Appellant
was then brought to the police station where he admitted to owning the
marijuana plants. A confiscation report was filed which the appellant signed.

Trial ensued and the appellant was found guilty of violating Sec. 9 of RA 6425.
Appellant appeals this decision on the ground that his constitutional rights
were being disregarded since he was not informed of his rights during the
time he was brought to the police station.

Solicitor General argues that when appellant was brought to station and made
to sign the confiscation papers was not a custodial investigation.

RULING The Court disagrees with the Solicitor General.

 It has been held repeatedly that custodial investigation commences when a
person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission
of a crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions
on the suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission.

"The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have
been more tha[t] mere passive conformity given under intimidating or
coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the
purview of the constitutional guarantee."
Even if the confession or admission were "gospel truth", if it was made
without assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver of such assistance,
the confession is inadmissible in evidence.

Nachura:
When the accused was brought to the station and made to sign the
confiscation (of the marijuana) report, he was already under custodial
investigation.

CASE People of the Philippines v. Amestuzo

CASE BRIEF Appellant was brought to the police station in a line-up for identification by
the victim of a robbery-rape.

Appellant avers that he was deprived of his right when he was not
represented by a counsel during the police line-up.
RULING The Court disagrees with the appellant.

The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called
Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial
investigation.

Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is no longer a

general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and
propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements.

Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to
counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage.
The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation
and cannot be claimed by the accused during identification in a police line-up
because it is not part of the custodial investigation process. This is because
during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the
investigatory to the accusatory and it is usually the witness or the
complainant who is interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of
the line-up.
 Hence, herein accused-appellant could not yet invoke his right to counsel
when he was presented for identification by the complainants because the
same was not yet part of the investigation process. Moreover, there was no
showing that during his identification by the complainants, the police
investigators sought to elicit any admission or confession from accused-
appellant.

Nachura:
In a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to
the accusatory stage, and it is usually the witness or the complainant who is
interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of the line-up

CASE People of the Philippines v. Dagpin

CASE BRIEF Appellant was brought to the police station for identification for killing the
uncle of Randy, Rona and Rena Labisig.

Upon arrival at the police station of the nieces and nephew of the victim, they
positively identified appellant as the one who shot their uncle. The trial court
then found appellant guilty of murder.

On appeal, appellant avers that he was not granted the right to a counsel
during the police lineup.

Nachura:
where three eyewitnesses identified the accused at the police station as the
person who shot the victim at the scene of the crime, the accused cannot
claim that he was deprived of his constitutional rights even if he was without
counsel at the time, because he was not yet then under custodial
investigation.
RULING The Court found that appellant was NOT on custodial investigation, as such,
no constitutional right was disregarded.

The evidence on record shows that even before the killing of Nilo on March
26, 1996, Randy and Rona had already seen the appellant, although they did
not know his name.

CASE People of the Philippines v. Escordial

CASE BRIEF Accused-appellant invokes Art. III, §12(1) of the Constitution which provides
that "[a]ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel." He contends that he was subjected to custodial interrogation
without being informed of his right to remain silent and to have independent
counsel preferably of his choice. Hence, he contends, the trial court erred in
 not excluding evidence obtained from him during such interrogation for
violation of accused-appellant's rights under this provision.
RULING
While it cannot be denied that accused-appellant was deprived of his right to
be informed of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel, he has not shown that, as a result of his custodial
interrogation, the police obtained any statement from him – whether
inculpatory or exculpatory - which was used in evidence against him. The
records do not show that he had given one or that, in finding him guilty, the
trial court relied on such statement. In fact, accused-appellant testified that at
no point, even when subjected to physical torture, did he ever admit
committing the crime with which he was charged. In other words, no
uncounseled statement was obtained from accused-appellant which should
have been excluded as evidence against him.

Of greater significance is the fact that accused-appellant was never assisted by

counsel, whether of his own choice or provided by the police officers, from
the time of his arrest in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental to the time of his
continued detention at the Bacolod police station. Although accused-
appellant made no statement during this time, this fact remains important
insofar as it affects the admissibility of the out-of-court identification of
accused-appellant by the prosecution witnesses, namely, Michelle Darunday,
Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Mark Esmeralda, and Jason Joniega.

As a rule, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police

line-up considering that such is usually not a part of the custodial inquest.
However, the cases at bar are different inasmuch as accused-appellant, having
been the focus of attention by the police after he had been pointed to by a
certain Ramie as the possible perpetrator of the crime, was already under
custodial investigation when these out-of-court identifications were
conducted by the police.

Difference between police lineup and custodial investigation:

In a police line-up, the suspect is identified by a witness from a group of
persons gathered for that purpose.

During custodial investigation, these types of identification have been

recognized as "critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution"
which necessitate the presence of counsel for the accused. This is because the
results of these pre-trial proceedings "might well settle the accused's fate and
reduce the trial itself to a mere formality." The Court have thus ruled that any
identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up, or in a
show-up for that matter, after the start of the custodial investigation is
inadmissible as evidence against him.

Here, accused-appellant was identified by Michelle Darunda in a show-up on

January 3, 1997 and by Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason Joniega, and
Mark Esmeralda in a police line-up on various dates after his arrest.
Having been made when accused-appellant did not have the assistance of
counsel, these out-of-court identifications are inadmissible in evidence against
him. Consequently, the testimonies of these witnesses regarding these
identifications should have been held inadmissible for being "the direct result
of the illegal lineup 'come at by exploitation of [the primary] illegality.”

Nachura:
Where the accused, having become the focus of attention by the police after
he had been pointed to by a certain Ramie as the possible perpetrator of the
crime, it was held that when the out-of-court identification was conducted by
the police, the accused was already under custodial investigation.