G.R. No.
L-8936             October 2, 1915 for an adjustment and correction of the error
CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO
PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants,  without notice to the defendant, denied said petition
vs.
N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.
Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants.
D.R. Williams for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
From the record the following facts appear:
First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as
owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the
city of Manila.
Second. That there exists and has existed a number
of years a stone wall between the said lots. Said wall
is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.
Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March,
1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of their lot. After a
consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th
day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the
plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the
original certificate provided for under the torrens
system. Said registration and certificate included the
wall.
Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant
presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration
for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On
the 25th day of March, 1912, the court decreed the
registration of said title and issued the original
certificate provided for under the torrens system. The
description of the lot given in the petition of the
defendant also included said wall.
Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of
December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that the
wall which had been included in the certificate granted
to them had also been included in the certificate
granted to the defendant .They immediately
presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration
committed by including said wall in the registered title
of each of said parties. The lower court however,
upon the theory that, during the pendency of the
petition for the registration of the defendant's land,
they failed to make any objection to the registration of
said lot, including the wall, in the name of the
defendant.
Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered
in the name of each of the owners of the adjoining
lots. The wall is not a joint wall.
Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and
the land occupied by it?
The decision of the lower court is based upon the
theory that the action for the registration of the lot of
the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the
judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who
did not appear and oppose it. In other words, by
reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had not opposed
the registration of that part of the lot on which the wall
was situate they had lost it, even though it had been
theretofore registered in their name. Granting that
theory to be correct one, and granting even that the
wall and the land occupied by it, in fact, belonged to
the defendant and his predecessors, then the same
theory should be applied to the defendant himself.
Applying that theory to him, he had already lost
whatever right he had therein, by permitting the
plaintiffs to have the same registered in their name,
more than six years before. Having thus lost hid right,
may he be permitted to regain it by simply including it
in a petition for registration? The plaintiffs having
secured the registration of their lot, including the wall,
were they obliged to constantly be on the alert and to
watch all the proceedings in the land court to see that
some one else was not having all, or a portion of the
same, registered? If that question is to be answered
in the affirmative, then the whole scheme and
purpose of the torrens system of land registration
must fail. The real purpose of that system is to quiet
title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of
the legality of the title, except claims which were
noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or
which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the
purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is
registered the owner may rest secure, without the
necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or
sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the
possibility of losing his land. Of course, it can not be
denied that the proceeding for the registration of land
under the torrens system is judicial
(Escueta vs.  .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It
is clothed with all the forms of an action and the result
is final and binding upon all the world. It is an
action in rem. (Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra);
Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep., 49
Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31;
Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American Land
Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its
consequences than does an ordinary action. All the
world are parties, including the government. After the
registration is complete and final and there exists no
fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may
claim an interest. The rights of all the world are
foreclosed by the decree of registration. The
government itself assumes the burden of giving notice
to all parties. To permit persons who are parties in the
registration proceeding (and they are all the world) to
again litigate the same questions, and to again cast
doubt upon the validity of the registered title, would
destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The
registration, under the torrens system, does not give
the owner any better title than he had. If he does not
already have a perfect title, he can not have it
registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered.
The certificate of registration accumulates in open
document a precise and correct statement of the
exact status of the fee held by its owner. The
certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of
title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner.
The title  once registered, with very few exceptions,
should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed,
modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some
direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all
security in registered titles would be lost. A registered
title can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or
diminished in a collateral  proceeding and not even by
a direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period
prescribed by law.
For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act
(No. 496) providing for the registration of titles under
the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no
provision in said Act giving the parties relief under
conditions like the present. There is nothing in the Act
which indicates who should be the owner of land
which has been registered in the name of two
different persons.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree
ordering the registration of a particular parcel of land
is a bar to future litigation over the same between the
same parties .In view of the fact that all the world are
parties, it must follow that future litigation over the title
is forever barred; there can be no persons who are
not parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule,
except as to rights which are noted in the certificate or
which arise subsequently, and with certain other
exceptions which need not be dismissed at present. A
title once registered can not be defeated, even by an
adverse, open, and notorious possession. Registered
title under the torrens system can not be defeated by
prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once
registered, is notice to the world. All persons must
take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the
registration.
The question, who is the owner of land registered in
the name of two different persons, has been
presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some
jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has been
adopted, the difficulty has been settled by express
statutory provision. In others it has been settled by the
courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the
"Australian Torrens System," at page 823, says: "The
general rule is that in the case of two certificates of
title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in
date prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter
certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the
earlier certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193;
Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155; Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7
A.L.T. (V.) 48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152;
Register of Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R.,
118.)" Hogg adds however that, "if it can be very
clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of
construction relating to written documents, that the
inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior
date is a mistake, the mistake may be rectified by
holding the latter of the two certificates of title to be
conclusive." (See Hogg on the "Australian torrens
System," supra, and cases cited. See also the
excellent work of Niblack in his "Analysis of the
Torrens System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the
general question, said: "Where two certificates purport
to include the same land the earlier in date prevails. ...
In successive registrations, where more than one
certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or
interest in land, the person claiming under the prior
certificates is entitled to the estate or interest; and that
person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate
who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly
or indirectly from the person who was the holder of
the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. While
the acts in this country do not expressly cover the
case of the issue of two certificates for the same land,
they provide that a registered owner shall hold the
title, and the effect of this undoubtedly is that where
two certificates purport to include the same registered
land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold
the title" (p. 237).
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the
decree of registration) shall be conclusive upon and
against all persons, including the Insular Government
and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by
name in the application, notice, or citation, or included
in the general description "To all whom it may
concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason
of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any
person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any
court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject,
however, to the right of any person deprived of land or
of any estate or interest therein by decree of
registration obtained by fraud  to file in the Court of
Land Registration a petition for review within one
year  after entry of the decree (of registration),
provided no innocent purchaser for value has
acquired an interest.
It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of
registration" shall not be opened, for any reason, in
any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud,
after the lapse of one year. If then the decree of
registration can not be opened for any reason, except
for fraud, in a direct proceeding for that purpose, may
such decree be opened or set aside in a collateral
proceeding by including a portion of the land in a
subsequent certificate or decree of registration? We
do not believe the law contemplated that a person
could be deprived of his registered title in that way.
We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory
provision which governs the right of the ownership of
land when the same is registered in the ordinary
registry in the name of two persons. Article 1473 of
the Civil Code provides, among other things, that
when one piece of real property had been sold to two
different persons it shall belong to the person
acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry. This
rule, of course, presupposes that each of the vendees
or purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real
ownership in such a case depends upon priority of
registration. While we do not now decide that the
general provisions of the Civil Code are applicable to
the Land Registration Act, even though we see no
objection thereto, yet we think, in the absence of other
express provisions, they should have a persuasive
influence in adopting a rule for governing the effect of
a double registration under said Act. Adopting the rule
which we believe to be more in consonance with the
purposes and the real intent of the torrens system, we
are of the opinion and so decree that in case land has
been registered under the Land Registration Act in
the name of two different persons, the earlier in date
shall prevail.
In reaching the above conclusion, we have not
overlooked the forceful argument of the appellee. He
says, among other things; "When Prieto et al. were
served with notice of the application of Teus (the
predecessor of the defendant) they became
defendants in a proceeding wherein he, Teus, was
seeking to foreclose their right, and that of orders, to
the parcel of land described in his application.
Through their failure to appear and contest his right
thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default
judgment against them, they became irrevocably
bound by the decree adjudicating such land to Teus.
They had their day in court and can not set up their
own omission as ground for impugning the validity of
a judgment duly entered by a court of competent
jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would be to hold that
lands with torrens titles are above the law and beyond
the jurisdiction of the courts".
As was said above, the primary and fundamental
purpose of the torrens system is to quiet title. If the
holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this
registered title then the purpose of the law is
defeated. If those dealing with registered land cannot
rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been
gained by the registration and the expense incurred
thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose a
strip of his registered land by the method adopted in
the present case, he may lose it all. Suppose within
the six years which elapsed after the plaintiff had
secured their title, they had mortgaged or sold their
right, what would be the position or right of the
mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are bound to
occur cannot be denied, and sometimes the damage
done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts
to adjust the rights of the parties under such
circumstances so as to minimize such damages,
taking into consideration al of the conditions and the
diligence of the respective parties to avoid them. In
the present case, the appellee was the first negligent
(granting that he was the real owner, and if he was
not the real owner he can not complain) in not
opposing the registration in the name of the
appellants. He was a party-defendant in an action for
the registration of the lot in question, in the name of
the appellants, in 1906. "Through his failure to appear
and to oppose such registration, and the subsequent
entry of a default judgment against him, he became
irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such
land to the appellants. He had his day in court and
should not be permitted to set up his own omissions
as the ground for impugning the validity of a judgment
duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction."
Granting that he was the owner of the land upon
which the wall is located, his failure to oppose the
registration of the same in the name of the appellants,
in the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth
against impugning the validity of that judgment. There
is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the
appellee should be applied to the appellants than to
him.
We have decided, in case of double registration under
the Land Registration Act, that the owner of the
earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the
rule between original parties. May this rule be applied
to successive vendees of the owners of such
certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the
parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his
original certificate to an "innocent purchaser." The
general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater
right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires
the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule
the vendee of the earlier certificate would be the
owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later
certificate.
We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading,
seem to cast some doubt upon the rule that the
vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only.
Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that
the vendee may acquire rights and be protected
against defenses which the vendor would not. Said
sections speak of available rights in favor of third
parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of the
land to an "innocent purchaser." That is to say,
persons who had had a right or interest in land
wrongfully included in an original certificate would be
unable to enforce such rights against an "innocent
purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of said
sections. In the present case Teus had his land,
including the wall, registered in his name. He
subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is the
appellee an "innocent purchaser," as that phrase is
used in said sections? May those who have been
deprived of their land by reason of a mistake in the
original certificate in favor of Teus be deprived of their
right to the same, by virtue of the sale by him to the
appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold their lot,
including the wall, to an "innocent purchaser," would
such purchaser be included in the phrase "innocent
purchaser," as the same is used in said sections?
Under these examples there would be two innocent
purchasers of the same land, is said sections are to
be applied .Which of the two innocent purchasers, if
they are both to be regarded as innocent purchasers,
should be protected under the provisions of said
sections? These questions indicate the difficulty with
which we are met in giving meaning and effect to the
phrase "innocent purchaser," in said sections.
May the purchaser of land which has been included in
a "second original certificate" ever be regarded as an
"innocent purchaser," as against the rights or interest
of the owner of the first original certificate, his heirs,
assigns, or vendee? The first original certificate is
recorded in the public registry. It is never issued until
it is recorded. The record notice to all the world. All
persons are charged with the knowledge of what it
contains. All persons dealing with the land so
recorded, or any portion of it, must be charged with
notice of whatever it contains. The purchaser is
charged with notice of every fact shown by the record
and is presumed to know every fact which the record
discloses .This rule is so well established that it is
scarcely necessary to cite authorities in its support
(Northwestern National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S.,
620, 629; Delvin on Real Estate, sections 710, 710
[a]).
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such
record is constructive notice of its contents and all
interests, legal and equitable, included therein.
(Grandin vs.  Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286, 289;
Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97;
Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500;
Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y., 351; McCabe vs. Grey,
20 Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of
Lords Cases, 341.)
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the
purchaser has examined every instrument of record
affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He
is charged with notice of every fact shown by the
record and is presumed to know every fact which an
examination of the record would have disclosed. This
presumption cannot be overcome by proof of
innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose
and object of the law requiring a record would be
destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by
proof of want of knowledge of what the record
contains any more than one may be permitted to
show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the
law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the
facts which the public record contains is a rule of law.
The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead
to endless confusion and useless litigation.
While there is no statutory provision in force here
requiring that original deeds of conveyance of real
property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring
mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the
Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is
indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of
that statute would the courts allow a mortgage to be
valid which had not been recorded, upon the plea of
ignorance of the statutory provision, when third
parties were interested? May a purchaser of land,
subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead
ignorance of its existence, and by reason of such
ignorance have the land released from such lien?
Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded
mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by the
plea that he was a bona fide purchaser? May there be
a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the
sense that he had no knowledge of the existence of
the mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons
must take notice of what the public record contains in
just as obligatory upon all persons as the rule that all
men must know the law; that no one can plead
ignorance of the law. The fact that all men know the
law is contrary to the presumption. The conduct of
men, at times, shows clearly that they do not know
the law. The rule, however, is mandatory and
obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical
to allow the defense of ignorance of the existence and
contents of a public record.
In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may
the purchaser of land from the owner of the second
original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a
part or all of such land had theretofore been
registered in the name of another, not the vendor?
We are of the opinion that said sections 38, 55, and
112 should not be applied to such purchasers. We do
not believe that the phrase "innocent purchaser
should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be
regarded as an "innocent purchaser" because of the
facts contained in the record of the first original
certificate. The rule should not be applied to the
purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which is
not the owner of the original certificate, or his
successors. He, in nonsense, can be an "innocent
purchaser" of the portion of the land included in
another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of
what the record contains precludes the idea of
innocence. By reason of the prior registry there
cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in a
prior original certificate and in a name other than that
of the vendor, or his successors. In order to minimize
the difficulties we think this is the safe rule to
establish. We believe the phrase "innocent
purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited
only to cases where unregistered land has been
wrongfully included in a certificate under the torrens
system. When land is once brought under the torrens
system, the record of the original certificate and all
subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all the world.
That being the rule, could Teus even regarded as the
holder in good fifth of that part of the land included in
his certificate of the appellants? We think not.
Suppose, for example, that Teus had never had his
lot registered under the torrens system. Suppose he
had sold his lot to the appellee and had included in
his deed of transfer the very strip of land now in
question. Could his vendee be regarded as an
"innocent purchaser" of said strip? Would his vendee
be an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Certainly
not. The record of the original certificate of the
appellants precludes the possibility. Has the appellee
gained any right by reason of the registration of the
strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying the
rule of notice resulting from the record of the title of
the appellants, the question must be answered in the
negative. We are of the opinion that these rules are
more in harmony with the purpose of Act No. 496 than predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all other
the rule contended for by the appellee. We believe duplicate certificates issued.
that the purchaser from the owner of the later
certificate, and his successors, should be required to Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.
resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake
like the present, rather than to molest the holder of
the first certificate who has been guilty of no
negligence. The holder of the first original certificate
and his successors should be permitted to rest secure
in their title, against one who had acquired rights in
conflict therewith and who had full and complete
knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land
included in the second original certificate, by reason
of the facts contained in the public record and the
knowledge with which he is charged and by reason of
his negligence, should suffer the loss, if any, resulting
from such purchase, rather than he who has obtained
the first certificate and who was innocent of any act of
negligence.

The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to

solve, all the difficulties resulting from double
registration under the torrens system and the
subsequent transfer of the land. Neither do we now
attempt to decide the effect of the former registration
in the ordinary registry upon the registration under the
torrens system. We are inclined to the view, without
deciding it, that the record under the torrens system,
supersede all other registries. If that view is correct
then it will be sufficient, in dealing with land registered
and recorded alone. Once land is registered and
recorded under the torrens system, that record alone
can be examined for the purpose of ascertaining the
real status of the title to the land.

It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when

two persons have acquired equal rights in the same
thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and
who has complied with all the requirements of the law
should be protected.

In view of our conclusions, above stated, the

judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby
revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court
now having and exercising the jurisdiction heretofore
exercised by the land court, with direction to make
such orders and decrees in the premises as may
correct the error heretofore made in including the land
in the second original certificate issued in favor of the

G.R. No. 83383 May 6, 1991
SOLID STATE MULTI-PRODUCTS CORPORATION,
petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Sixth Division)
and THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF ANTENOR S.
VIRATA and the DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Antonio M. Chavez for petitioner.
Rodolfo M. Dela Rosa for respondent Intestate Estate
of Antenor S. Virata.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
decision of the trial court dismissing the complaint
filed by petitioner for quieting of title and declaring
Antenor Virata as the true and lawful owner of the
disputed property.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On September 28, 1982, petitioner, a domestic
corporation, filed an action for quieting of title against
the respondent estate of Virata alleging that it is the
registered owner of a parcel of land located at Imus,
Cavite, with an area of 48,182 sq. meters, covered by
Certificate of Title No. T-80889 of the Register of
Deeds of Cavite, which was issued on February 24,
1976; that Virata, during his lifetime thru the use of
fraud, caused the issuance of Certificate of Title No.
T-11520 RT 1660 on September 1, 1959 thru an
administrative reconstitution of a nonexistent original
title covering the same parcel of land; that by reason
of the said reconstitution and subsequent issuance of
TCT No. T-11520 RT 1660, there now exists a cloud
on the title of petitioner.
As gathered by the respondent appellate court and
trial court, the evidence for the petitioner consists of
the following:
Pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 32, as amended,
Julian Peñaranda submitted with the Bureau of
Lands, thru its District Land Office at Rosario, Cavite
an application dated November 22, 1968, in a verified
Indorsement dated November 25, 1968, to purchase
a friar land which was subscribed and sworn to before
Manuel Cupino, Acting District Land Officer (Exh.
"D"). The application covers Lot No. 7449 of the Imus
Friar Lands Estate, situated at Barrio Molino, Bacoor,
Cavite, containing an area of 4 hectares, 81 ares and
82 centares. Said application was accompanied by a
"SALAYSAY" (Exhibit "A") signed and sworn to by
one Mabini Legaspi before said District Land Officer
Cupino, purporting to transfer to, and to waive in favor
of, Julian Peñaranda, all the rights of executor to Lot
No. 7449.
Following the routine in cases of this nature, District
Land Officer Cupino referred to Land Investigator
Alberto Buhain for investigation and in a verified
Indorsement dated November 25, 1968, said
investigator made a Report (Exh. "B") on the result of
his investigation, to District Land Officer Cupino,
District Land Office No. III-8 Bureau of Lands,
Rosario, Cavite, certifying that applicant Julian
Peñaranda is the actual occupant of Lot No. 7449,
has introduced improvements consisting of upland
rice and other seasonal crops; that Peñaranda's
occupation of the land is derived through a voluntary
assignment of right of the former occupant, Mabini
Legaspi, and that the same is free from claims and
conflicts and that the said applicant has established
his rights over the subject land, in view of which, said
investigator recommended that said lot be awarded to
applicant Julian Peñaranda according to law.

Thereafter, the Report having been submitted to
Cupino, the latter directed investigator Buhain to
prepare an Information Sheet (Exh. "G" up to "G-3")
and Cupino made the Appraisal Report (Exh. "E-2").
The above requirements having been accomplished,
District Land Officer Cupino forwarded Peñaranda's
application to the Director of Lands, thru the Chief,
Land Management Division, recommending
disposition of Lot No. 7449 be made in accordance
with the findings of his office, to Julian Peñaranda,
pursuant to the provisions of C.A. of No. 32, as
amended.
By second Indorsement dated December 16, 1968,
Higinio P. Sunico, Chief, Land Management Division,
acting for and in behalf of the Director of Lands,
forwarded to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, the application of Julian Peñaranda,
recommending that Lot No. 7449 be sold to said
applicant without public auction for a sum of
P1,198.00 (Exh. "I") and by a 3rd Indorsement dated
December 16, 1969, the application of Julian
Peñaranda was returned by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, to the Director of
Lands, Manila, approving that sale without auction, to
Julian Peñaranda, of lot No. 7449. Pursuant to this
approval, the Director of Lands authorized the District
Land Officer, Rosario, Cavite, to sell without auction
to Julian Peñaranda, and directing that the sales
contract should be executed soonest (Exh- "I"). The
Director of Lands and Julian Peñaranda executed,
therefore, Sales Contract No. V-447 (Exh. "K"), on
February 28, 1969, for a consideration of P1,198.00,
to be paid in ten (10) monthly installments, the first
installment of P290.00 having been paid upon
execution of the sales contract and the payment of
the P1,198.00 was fully paid on August 6, 1969 (Exh.
"O").
The contract price of the land having been paid by
Peñaranda, Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources Isoceles Pascual, on August 13, 1969,
issued the final deed of conveyance of lot No. 7449
(Exh. "8") in favor of Julian Peñaranda and the said
deed of conveyance contains the physical and
technical description of the lot in question (See Exh.
"S-l").
xxx xxx xxx
On the basis of said Deed of Conveyance No. 10431,
the Register of Deeds of Cavite issued on November
14, 1969 in favor of Julian Peñaranda TCT No. T-
39631 (Exh. "Z-6") which on its face shows it to have
come from a direct transfer from OCT no. 1002, and
on February 17, 1976, the plaintiff, by way of a Deed
of Absolute Sale (Exh. "Z") bought said Lot No. 7449
as a consequence of which, TCT No. T-39631 was
cancelled and new TCT No. T-80889 was issued on
February 24, 1976 to the plaintiff, Solid State Multi
Products Corporation.
Plaintiff Solid State Multi-Products Corporation
enrolled Lot No. 7449 with the issuance of Tax
Declaration No. 20893 which was superseded by Tax
Declaration No. 10973 and continued to religiously
pay the realty taxes as covered by receipts of tax
payments (Exh. for 1977 and Exh. "7-19" for 1984)
and the subject property is in its actual possession
since its acquisition from Peñaranda up to the
present. (pp. 109-112, Rollo (Emphasis Ours)
On the other hand, respondent Virata denied the
allegations in the complaint and presented evidence
to prove his claim over the land. The appellate court
and trial court made the following findings:
. . . on March 20, 1943, the Director of Lands, Mr.
Jose F. Dans, gave authority to sell at public auction
Lot No. 7449 of the Imus Estate, containing an area of
4.8182 hectares at the price of not less than its
appraised value of P290.00 (Exh. X-33). Accordingly
on April 20, 1943, the Bureau of Friar Lands Agent
Severo Rivera issued a Notice fixing the public
auction of Lot No. 7449, among others, on May 5,
1943 at 10:00 a.m. (Exh. 1). On said date, Mabini
Legaspi (appellee Virata's predecessor-in-interest)
submitted a winning bid of P290.00 and paid P29.00
(10% of the purchase price) and even issued Bureau
of Lands Official Receipt No. 77735 dated May 5,
1943 (Exh. 7). The subsequent installments were paid
on January 14, 1944, April 24, 1944, August 17, 1944,
and September 20, 1944 in the amounts of P29.00,
P29.00, 87.00 and P116.00, respectively. The
payments were evidenced by Official Receipts Nos.
78396, 783392, 784704 and 78466 (Exhs. 7-A, 7-B,
7-C and V)
On December 12, 1944, the Bureau of Lands, through
Mr. Vicente Tordesillas, sent a letter to the Register of
Deeds at Imus, Cavite, requesting the issuance of the
corresponding certificates of title to eight persons,
among whom was Mabini Legaspi, specifying with
respect to him Lot No. 7449 with an area of 4.8182
located at Bacoor, Cavite Exh. 2). Accordingly, the
Register of Deeds of Cavite issued TCT No. A-2188
to Mabini Legaspi who held ownership of the property
up to December 6, 1957 when he executed a Deed of
Sale transferring it to Antenor S. Virata (Exh. 6). The
deed was registered with the Registry of Deeds on
December 10, 1957 . . . . On the same day,
December 10, 1957, the Register of Deeds issued
TCT No. 11520 (Exh. 12) to Antenor Virata . . .
However, on June 7, 1959, the Provincial Capitol
building of Cavite which housed the Registry of Deeds
was burned, destroying land records and titles in d
registry among which were the records relating to Lot
No. 7449.
On September 1, 1959, the Registry of Deeds
administratively reconstituted the original of TCT No.
T-11520 based on owner's duplicate certificate (Exh.
12) and renumbered the same as TCT No. (T-11520)
RT-1660.
xxx xxx xxx
The sentence of TCT No. 80889 issued in the name
of appellant on February 24, 1976 came to the
knowledge of Antenor Virata in August 1978 when he
received a subpoena from the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) in connection with its investigation
of the conflicting land titles on Lot No. 7449. Virata
presented Mabini Legaspi as his witness. NBI Agent
Manuel C. Dionisio took the sworn testimony of
Mabini Legaspi on August 27, 1978 (Exh. 10) and
submitted a written report (Exhs. 9 to 9-H) of his
investigation on October 27, 1978. Mabini Legaspi in
her sworn testimony (Exh. 10) declared that she
acquired Lot 7449 during the Japanese occupation
and in support of her acquisition, she presented to
NBI agent Dionisio the carbon or duplicate original of
the notice of public auction and the letters dated
December 12, 1944 of Vicente Tordesillas of the
Bureau of Lands to the Register of Deeds requesting
the issuance of a certificate of title in favor of Mabini
Legaspi, which documents were substituted on the
same occasion with xerox copies (Exh. 1 and 2) also
marked as Exhibits 10-C and 10-D, respectively, after
a comparison with the duplicate originals. Legaspi
also presented the originals of the receipts of
payment she made to the Bureau of Lands, which
were substituted with xerox copies (Exhs. 7, 7-A, 7-B
and 7-C, also marked as Exhibit 10-E, 10-F 10-G and
10-H) after comparison with the original. She (Mabini)
also testified on the sale of the lot in favor of Antenor
Virata on December 6, 1957, presenting as proof
thereof, the duplicate or carbon original of the
Absolute Deed of Sale of Agricultural Land, which
was likewise, substituted with xerox copies (Exhs. 6 to
6-F, inclusive, also marked Exh. 11).
Mabini Legaspi testified that the originals of Exhibits 1
and 2 got lost. She said she placed the documents on
the table in her house after returning from the NBI
investigation, thinking "all the while that those
documents will be useless because I had my property
sold." (Tsn., p. 17, December 19, 1984). She denied
having sold the land to Julian Peñaranda, nor having
waived her right over the land in his favor (tsn., p. 12,
March 18, 1985). (pp. 113-116, Rollo).
On June 15, 1985, the trial court rendered its
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, by preponderance of evidence,
judgment is hereby rendered for defendant Virata and
against the plaintiff, to wit:
a. Dismissing the complaint which states no
cause of action;
b. Recognizing that defendant Virata is the true
and lawful owner of the land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. (T-11520) RT 1660 of the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite and
holding that the same is valid;
c. Declaring that Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-80889 in the name of plaintiff, the Solid State
Multi Products Corporation is null and void and of no
force and effect and is, therefore, ordered cancelled;
d. Sentencing the plaintiff to pay the costs of
the proceeding.
SO ORDERED. (p. 70, Rollo).
Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court, the
petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. On July
13, 1987, the respondent appellate court rendered its
decision affirming the decision of the trial court.
Hence, this petition was filed with the petitioner
assigning the following errors:
THE RESPONDENT COURT GROSSLY ERRED
WHEN IT IGNORED THE BASIC CONSIDERATION
THAT THE CONTESTED PROPERTY CAME FROM
THE FRIAR LANDS ESTATE THE DISPOSITION OF
WHICH IS GOVERNED BY SPECIAL LAWS
SPECIFYING THE REQUIREMENTS FOR ITS
ACQUISITION FROM THE GOVERNMENT
THROUGH SALE, WHICH LAW AND SPECIAL
REQUIREMENTS SHOULD SERVE AS THE
MEASURE AGAINST WHICH THE EVIDENCE OF
THE PARTIES TO THIS CASE SHOULD BE
WEIGHED, SUCH GROSS ERROR LEADING THE
APPELLATE COURT TO—
(A) ERRONEOUSLY INFER THE EXISTENCE
AND/OR DUE ISSUANCE OF THE SUPPOSED TCT
NO. A-2188 (IN THE NAME OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS PREDECESSOR-IN INTEREST),
FROM DOCUMENTS THAT CAME AFTER WERE
BASED ON SUCH TCT NO. A-2188, CLEARLY
BEGGING THE ISSUE WHICH IS PRECISELY
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRANSFER
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE WAS IN FACT ISSUED IN
COMPLIANCE WITH THE FRIAR LANDS ACT AND
CA-32 TO COVER THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION;
(B) ERRONEOUSLY BASE ITS DECISION IN
FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT ON TCTs
ISSUED BY THE REGISTER OF DEEDS INSPITE
OF THE FACT THAT IT IS THE BUREAU OF LANDS
UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF
AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCE (NATURAL
RESOURCES) WHICH DISPOSES FRIAR LANDS
AND NOT THE REGISTER OF DEEDS WHOSE
RECORDS CAN BE NO BETTER THAN THE RIGHT
IT HAS REGISTERED;
(C) ERRONEOUSLY DISREGARD THE
PATENT INADMISSIBILITY OF THE
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT THE ORIGINALS OF
WHICH WERE NEVER PRESENTED BEFORE THE
TRIAL COURT;
(D) ERRONEOUSLY IGNORE THE LACK OF
PROBATIVE VALUE OF SUCH DOCUMENTARY
EVIDENCE SUCH LACK OF PROBATIVE VALUE
BEING PATENT ON THE FACE OF SUCH
DOCUMENT;
(E) ERRONEOUSLY IGNORE THE VERITY
THAT THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE COULD
SUPPORT NO MORE THAN THE FACT THAT THE
RESPONDENTS PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST
HAD MERELY A QUESTIONABLE INCHOATE AND
INCOMPLETE RIGHT TO ACQUIRE THE
PROPERTY IN QUESTION, WHICH
QUESTIONABLE INCHOATE AND IN FACT
UNCOMPLETED RIGHT CANNOT PREVAIL OVER
THE TITLE OF PETITIONER'S PREDECESSOR IN
INTEREST WHO WAS THE ACTUAL POSSESSOR
THAT APPLIED FOR THE PURCHASE OF THE
LAND EVERY NEEDED STEP FOR THE
PURCHASE HAVING BEEN PASSED UPON AND
RECORDED BY THE BUREAU OF LANDS WHOSE
RECORDS SHOW ONE AND ONLY TITLE ISSUED
OVER THE LAND, THAT IS, THE TITLE OF THE
PETITIONER'S PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST (pp.
20, 22, Rollo)
We find the petition impressed with merit.
Since the assigned errors were interrelated, it would
be well for this Court to discuss them jointly.
Petitioner does not question the factual findings made
by the respondent appellate court and supported by
the records (p. 22, Rollo). It does not however accept
the legal conclusion made by the appellate court and
trial court that the registered title of private respondent
to the land should prevail over its own title.
Petitioner contends that Act No. 1120, otherwise
known as the Friar Lands Act provides the procedure
for the sale and disposition of the friar lands to private
persons; that pursuant thereto, the acquisition by
petitioner's predecessor-in-interest Julian Peñaranda
of the disputed Lot 7449, which was formerly part of
the friar lands estate, was in compliance with all legal
requisites laid down in Act No. 1120, for the validity of
the sale by the government in favor of Peñaranda of
such friar lands.
It also argues that the sale of Lot No. 7449 to
respondent's predecessor, Mabini Legaspi, and the
issuance of a certificate of title in her favor was in
violation of the Friar Lands Act as there was no
required approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources.
There is no dispute here that the land involved in this
case is a friar land and that the laws which are
applicable are Act No. 1120, know as the Friar Lands
Act, providing for the administration and temporary
leasing and sale of certain haciendas and parcels of
land, commonly known as friar lands, and
Commonwealth Act No. 32 dated September 15,
1936 as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 316
dated June 9, 1938, which provided for the
subdivision and sale of all the portions of the friar
lands estated remaining undisposed of.
Sec. 12 of Act No. 1120 provides in part:
. . . the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall give
the said settler and occupant a certificate which shall
set forth in detail that the Government has agreed to
sell to such settler and occupant the amount of land
so held by him at the price so fixed payable as
provided in this Act at the Office of the Chief of the
Bureau of Public Lands . . . and that upon the
payment of the final installment together with all
accrued interest the Government will convey to such
settler and occupant the said land so held by him by
proper instrument of conveyance, which shall be
issued and become effective in the manner provided
in section one hundred and twenty two of the Land
Registration Act.
Also, Sec. 18 of the same Act provides:
No lease or sale made by the Chief of the Bureau of
Public Lands under the provisions of this Act shall be
valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
(Emphasis ours)

Similarly, Sec. 2 of C.A. No. 32, as amended by C.A.
No. 316 provides in part:
. . . The persons who, at the time of the subdivision
survey are actual and bona fide occupants of any
portion of the Friar Lands Estates, not exceeding ten
hectares, shall be given preference to purchase the
portion occupied at a private sale and at a price to be
fixed in such case, by the Director of Lands, subject to
the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, after taking into consideration its location,
quality, and any other circumstances as may affect its
value, the provisions of section twelve of Act
Numbered Eleven hundred and twenty, as amended,
to the contrary, . . . (Emphasis ours)
It is clear from the foregoing provisions that the friar
lands were purchased by the government for sale to
actual settlers and occupants at the time said lands
are acquired by the government. The Bureau of
Lands shall first issue a certificate stating therein that
the government has agreed to sell the land to such
settler or occupant. The latter then shall accept the
certificate and agree to pay the purchase price so
fixed and in the installments and at the interest
specified in the certificate.
The conveyance executed in favor of a buyer or
purchaser, or the so called certificate of sale, is a
conveyance of the ownership of the property, subject
only to the resolutory condition that the sale may be
cancelled if the price agreed upon is not paid for in
full. The purchaser becomes the owner upon the
issuance of the certificate of sale in his favor subject
only to the cancellation thereof in case the price
agreed upon is not paid (Pugeda vs. Trias, No. L-
16925, March 31, 1962, 4 SCRA 849.)
Upon the payment of the final installment together
with all accrued interests, the government shall then
issue a final deed of conveyance in favor of the
purchaser. However, the sale of such friar lands shall
be valid only if approved by the Secretary of Interior
as provided in Act No. 1120. Later laws, however,
required that the sale shall be approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. In short, the
approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce is indispensable for the validity of the sale.
It is undisputed that petitioner's predecessor, Julian
Peñaranda was the actual occupant of Lot 7449 when
he filed his application to purchase the said lot on
November 22, 1968; that on December 16, 1989, the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
approved the sale of the lot without auction to
Peñaranda; that a sales contract was executed
between the Director of Lands and Peñaranda on
February 28, 1969 for a consideration of P 1,198.00
payable in 10 monthly installments; that upon the full
payment of the price, the Undersecretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources issued the final
deed of conveyance of Lot No. 7449 in favor of
Peñaranda. Subsequently, the Register of Deeds of
Cavite issued TCT No. 39631 in the name of
Peñaranda, and when the latter sold the land to
petitioner, TCT No. 39631 was cancelled and TCT
No. T-80889 was issued in favor of the latter.
Clearly, the purchase of the friar land made by
Peñaranda was in compliance with law. The
execution of the sales contract vested the right of
ownership in Peñaranda over the land. There is no
doubt whatsoever that the said sale was valid as it
was approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. Hence, the sale made by
Peñaranda in favor of the petitioner transferred the
ownership of the land in favor of the latter resulting in
the proper issuance of TCT No. T-80889 in its name.
On the other hand, the antecedents leading to the
acquisition of title by respondent Virata are clearly
shown in the records. The latter's predecessor, Mabini
Legaspi bought Lot 7449 in a sale by public auction
held on May 5, 1943 conducted by the Bureau of
Lands and friar lands agent Severino Rivera, and paid
the purchase price thereof in installments in 1943;
that on December 12, 1944, the Bureau of Lands sent
a letter to the Register of Deeds of Cavite requesting
the issuance of certificates of title to several persons
including Mabini Legaspi, in whose favor TCT A-2188
was issued; that subsequently on December 6, 1957,
she sold the disputed land to respondent Virata,
which was evidenced by a deed of sale registered
with the Registry of Deeds of Cavite on December 10,
1957; that on the same date, TCT No. 11520 was
issued in the name of Virata. Due to the fire which
gutted the building housing the Registry of Cavite on
June 7, 1959, the latter administratively reconstituted
the original of TCT No. 11520 on September 1, 1959,
based on the owner's duplicate certificate and
renumbered the same as TCT No. 1120 RT 1660.
Apparently, the sale of the lot to Mabini Legaspi
occurred much earlier than the date of acquisition of
same lot by petitioner's predecessor, and the
evidence presented by respondent Virata indicates
that the latter's predecessor paid the purchase price
of Lot No. 7449 on installments.
Nowhere in the evidence for the respondent or in the
records of this case however, would show that a
certificate of sale was ever issued by the Bureau of
Lands, which would vest ownership and title over the
land in favor of Mabini Legaspi. The existence of the
official receipts showing payment of the price of the
land by Legaspi does not prove that the land was
legally conveyed to her without any contract of sale
having been executed by the government in her favor.
Viewed from all angles, the acquisition of the lot by
Legaspi was highly irregular and void, and not in
compliance with the procedure mandated by law for
the sale of friar lands. For one thing, Mabini Legaspi
allegedly purchased the land in a sale at public
auction, which procedure is nowhere provided in Act
No. 1120 or in C.A. 32, as amended by C.A. 316. The
laws expressly state that an actual occupant of the
land shall purchase the lot occupied by him at a
private sale and not in a sale at public auction (Sec. 2,
C.A. 32 as amended). Further, neither was there any
deed of conveyance issued to Legaspi by the
government after the full payment of the installments
on the disputed lot.
Highly significant at this point is the fact that there
was neither allegation nor proof that the sale was with
the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce. The absence of such approval made the
supposed sale null and void ab initio. Without the
certificate of sale to prove the transfer of the
ownership of the land from the government Mabini
Legaspi and without the required approval of the sale
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, We
find that Mabini Legaspi did not in any manner
acquire ownership over the land in 1943. The
ownership or title over the friar land, specifically Lot
No. 7449 remained in the government until
Peñaranda, petitioners predecessor, lawfully acquired
ownership over the same lot on February 28, 1969 by
virtue of a sales contract executed in his favor.
The issuance of a certificate of title in favor of Mabini
Legaspi did not vest ownership upon her over the
land nor did it validate the alleged purchase of the lot,
which is null and void. Time and again, it has been
held that registration does not vest title. It is merely
evidence of such title over a particular property. Our
land registration laws do not give the holder any
better title than that what he actually has (De man et
al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. L- 46935 December 21,
1987, 156 SCRA 701; Cruz vs. Cabana, No. 56232,
June 22, 1984, 129 SCRA 656).
Although a period of one year has already expired
from the time the certificate of title was issued to
Mabini Legaspi pursuant to the alleged sale from the
government, said title does not become
incontrovertible but is null and void since the
acquisition of the property was in violation of law.
Further, the petitioner herein is in possession of the
land in dispute. Hence, its action to quiet title is
imprescriptible (Coronel vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, No. 70191, October 29, 1987, 155 SCRA
270).1âwphi1 In one case, this Court ruled that an
adverse claimant of a registered land who is in
possession thereof for a long period of time is not
barred from bringing an action for reconveyance
which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property
against a registered owner relying upon a Torrens title
which was illegally or wrongfully acquired (Caragay-
Layno vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 718). In
actions for reconveyance of property predicated on
the fact that the conveyance complained of was void
ab initio, a claim of prescription of the action would be
unavailing (Corpus, et al. vs. Beltran, et al., 97 Phil.
722; Agne vs. Director of Lands, G.R. L-40399,
February 6, 1990, 181 SCRA 793). Being null and
void, the sale made to Mabini Legaspi and the
subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto produced
no legal effects whatsoever. Quod nullum est nullum
producit affectum (Agnes vs. Director of Lands,
supra). There being no title to the land that Mabini
Legaspi acquired from the government, it follows that
no title to the same land could be conveyed by the
former to respondent Virata.

Even assuming that respondent Virata was a

purchaser in good faith and for value, the law is, as
between two persons both of whom are in good faith
and both innocent of any negligence, the law must
protect and prefer the lawful holder of registered title
over the transferee of a vendor bereft of any
transmissible rights (Baltazar vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. 78728, December 8, 1988, 168 SCRA 354,
emphasis ours). Further if a person happened to
obtain property by mistake or to the prejudice of
another with or without bad faith, the certificate of title
which may have been issued to him under the
circumstances may and should be cancelled or
corrected.

Our unavoidable conclusion in this case is that the

title of petitioner under the Torrens land system
should be upheld considering that no previous valid
title to the same land existed.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED

and the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
dated July 13, 1987 is hereby REVERSED. Petitioner
Solid State Multi-Products Corporation is hereby
declared the true owner of the land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-80889. The Register
of Deeds of Cavite is ordered to cancer transfer
Certificate of Title No. (T-11520) RT 1660 in the name
of respondent Antenor Virata.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 5246 September 16, 1910
MANUELA GREY ALBA, ET AL., petitioners-
appellants,
vs.
ANACLETO R. DE LA CRUZ, objector-appellee.
Ramon Salinas, for appellants.
Aniceto G. Reyes, for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
These petitioners, Manuela, Jose, Juan, and
Francisco, surnamed Grey y Alba, are the only heirs
of Doña Segunda Alba Clemente and Honorato Grey,
deceased. Remedios Grey y Alba, a sister of the
petitioners, was married on the 21st day of March,
1903, to Vicente Reyes and died on the 13th of July,
1905, without leaving any heirs except her husband.
The four petitioners, as coowners, sought to have
registered the following-described property:
A parcel of land situated in the barrio of Talampas,
municipality of Baliuag, Province of Bulacan, upon
which are situated three houses and one camarin of
light material, having a superficial area of 52 hectares,
51 ares, and 22 centares; bounded on the north by
the highway (calzada) of Talampas and the lands of
Rita Ruiz Mateo; on the east by the lands of the said
Rita Ruiz Mateo, Hermenegildo Prado, Policarpo de
Jesus, and a stream called Sapang Buslut; on the
south by the same stream and the lands of the
capellania; and on the west by the stream called
Sapang Buslut, and the lands of Vicente de la Cruz,
Jose Camacho and Domingo Ruiz Mateo.
This parcel of agricultural land is used for the raising
of rice and sugar cane and is assessed at $1,000
United States currency. The petition, which was filed
on the 18th of December, 1906, was accompanied by
a plan and technical description of the above-
described parcel of land.
After hearing the proofs presented, the court entered,
on the 12th of February, 1908, a decree in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6 of
section 54 of Act No. 926, directing that the land
described in the petitioner be registered in the names
of the four petitioners, as coowners, subject to the
usufructuary right of Vicente Reyes, widower of
Remedios Grey.
On the 16th of June, 1908, Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz
filed a motion in the Court of Land Registration asking
for a revision of the case, including the decision, upon
the ground that he is the absolute owner of the two
parcels of land which are described in said motion,
and which, according to his allegations, are included
in the lands decreed to the petitioners. He alleged that
the decree of February 12, 1908, was obtained
maliciously and fraudulently by the petitioners,
thereby depriving him of said two parcels of land. He
further alleged that he was the absolute owner of the
two parcels of land, having inherited them from his
father, Baldomero R. de la Cruz, who had a state
grant for the same. He therefore asked, under the
provisions of section 38 of the Land Registration Act
(No. 496), a revision of the case, and that the said
decree be modified so as to exclude the two parcels
of land described in said motion. The Land Court
upon this motion reopened the case, and after
hearing the additional evidence presented by both
parties, rendered, on the 23rd of November, 1908, its
decision modifying the former decree by excluding
from the same the two parcels of land claimed by
Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz. From this decision and
judgment the petitioners appealed and now insist,
first, that the trial court erred in reopening the case
and modifying its decree dated the 12th of February,
1908, for the reason that said decree was not
obtained by means of fraud; and, second, that the
court erred in holding that the two parcels of land
described in the appellee's motion are not their
property.
It was agreed by counsel that the two small parcels
now in dispute forma part of the land described in the
petition and were included in the decree of February
12, 1908, and that the petitioners are the owners of
the remainder of the land described in the said
decree.
The petitioners inherited this land from their parents,
who acquired the same, including the two small
parcels in question, by purchase, as is evidenced by a
public document dated the 26th of November, 1864,
duly executed before Francisco Iriarte, alcalde mayor
and judge of the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Bulacan.
Baldomero R. de la Cruz, father of the appellee,
obtained in march, 1895, a state grant for several
parcels of land, including the two parcels in question.
This grant was duly inscribed in the old register of
property in Bulacan on the 6th of April of the same
year.
It is admitted that at the time the appellants presented
their petition in this case the appellee was occupying
the two parcels of land now in question. It is also
admitted that the name of the appellee does not
appear in the said petition as an occupant of the said
two parcels. The petitioners insist that the appellee
was occupying these parcels as their tenant and for
this reason they did not include his name in their
petition, as an occupant, while the appellee contends
that he was occupying the said parcels as the
absolute owner under the estate grant by inheritance.
The court below held that the failure on the part of the
petitioners to include the name of the appellee in their
petition, as an occupant of these two parcels of land,
was a violation of section 21 of Act No. 496, and that
this constituted fraud within the meaning of section 38
of said Land Registration Act. The trial court further
held that the grant from the estate should prevail over
the public document of purchase of 1864.
The mother of the petitioners died on November 15,
1881; their father died prior to that time. Manuela, the
oldest of the petitioners, was about six years of age
when their mother died. So these children were
minors when the father of the appellee obtained the
estate grant.
On the 13th of June, 1882, Jose Grey, uncle and
representative of the petitioners, who were then
minors, rented the land owned by the petitioners'
deceased parents to one Irineo Jose for a period of
three years. On the 23d of March, 1895, the said Jose
Grey, as the representative of the petitioners, rented
the same land for a period of six years to Baldomero
R. de la Cruz, father of the appellee. This rental
contract was duly executed in writing. This land was
cultivated during these six years by Baldomero R. de
la Cruz and his children, one of whom is the appellee.
On the 14th of December, 1905, Jose Grey, for
himself and the other petitioners, rented the same
land to Estanislao R. de la Cruz for a period of two
years. Estanislao de la Cruz on entering into this
rental contract with Jose Grey did so for himself and
his brothers, one of whom is the appellee. While the
appellee admits that his father and brother entered
into these rental contracts and did, in fact, cultivate
the petitioners' land, nevertheless he insists that the
two small parcels in question were not included in
these contracts. In the rental contract between the
uncle of the petitioners and he father of the appellee
the land is not described. In the rental contract
between Jose Grey, one of the petitioners, and
Estanislao R. de la Cruz, brother of the appellee, the
two small parcels of land in question are included,
according to the description given therein. This was
found to be true by the court below, but the said court
held that as this contract was made by Estanislao R.
de la Cruz it was not binding upon Anacleto R. de la
Cruz, the appellee.
The two small parcels of land in question were
purchased by the parents of the petitioners in 1864,
as is evidenced by the public document of purchase
and sale of that year. The same two parcels of land
are included in the state grant issued in favor of
Baldomero Ratilla de la Cruz in 1895. This grant was
obtained after the death of the petitioners' parents
and while they were minors. So it is clear that the
petitioners honestly believed that the appellee was
occupying the said parcels as their lessee at the time
they presented their application for registration. They
did not act in bad faith, nor with any fraudulent intent,
when they omitted to include in their application the
name of the appellee as one of the occupants of the
land. They believed that it was not necessary nor
required that they include in their application the
names of their tenants. Under these circumstances,
did the court below commit an error in reopening this
case in June, 1908, after its decree had been entered
in February of the same year?
The application for the registration is to be in writing,
signed and sworn to by the applicant, or by some
person duly authorized in his behalf. It is to contain an
accurate description of the land. It shall contain the
name in full and the address of the applicant, and also
the names and addresses of all occupants of land and
of all adjoining owners, if known; and, if not known, it
shall state what search has been made to find them.
In the form of notice given by statute, which shall be
sworn to, the applicant is required to state and set
forth clearly all mortgages or encumbrances affecting
said land, if any, the rights and interests, legal or
equitable, in the possession, remainder, reversion, or
expectancy of all persons, with their names in full,
together with their place of residence and post office
addresses. Upon receipt of the application the clerk
shall cause notice of the filling to be published twice in
the Official Gazette. This published notice shall be
directed to all persons appearing to have an interest
in the land sought to be registered and to the
adjoining owners, and also "to all whom it may
concern." In addition to the notice in the Official
Gazette the Land Court shall, within seven days after
said publication, cause a copy of the notice, in
Spanish, to be mailed by the clerk to every person
named in the application whose address is known; to
cause a duly attested copy of the notice, in Spanish,
to be posted in a conspicuous place on every parcel
of land included in the application, and in a
conspicuous place on the chief municipal building of
the town in which the land is situated. The court may
also cause other or further notice of the application to
be given in such manner and to such persons as it
may deem proper. The certificate of the clerk that he
has served the notice as directed by the court by
publication or mailing shall be conclusive proof of
such service. Within the time allowed in the notices, if
no person appears and answers, the court may at
once, upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the
contrary appearing, order a general default. By the
description in the published notice "to all whom it may
concern," and by express provisions of law "all the
word are made parties defendant and shall be
concluded by the default an order." If the court, after
hearing, finds that the applicant has title, as stated in
his application, a decree or registration shall be
entered.
Every decree of registration shall bind the land and
quiet title thereto, subject only to the exceptions
stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive
upon and against all persons, including the Insular
Government, and all the branches thereof, whether
mentioned by name in the application, notice, or
citation, or included in the general description "to all
whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be
opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other
disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any
proceedings in any court for reversing judgments or
decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person
deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by
decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the
Court of Land Registration a petition for review within
one year. . . . (Sec. 38 of Act No. 496.)
The appellee is not included in any of the exceptions
named in section 38 referred to above.
It will be seen that the applicant is required to mention
not only the outstanding interest which he admits but
also all claims of interest, though denied by him. By
express provision of law the world are made parties
defendant by the description in the notice "to all whom
it may concern."
Although the appellee, occupying the two small
parcels of land in question under the circumstances
as we have set forth, was not served with notice, he
was made a party defendant by publication; and the
entering of a decree on the 12th of February, 1908,
must be held to be conclusive against all persons,
including the appellee, whether his (appellee's) name
is mentioned in the application, notice, or citation.
The said decree of February 12, 1908, should not
have been opened on account of the absence,
infancy, or other disability of any person affected
thereby, and could have been opened only on the
ground that the said decree had been obtained by
fraud. That decree was not obtained by fraud on the
part of the applicants, inasmuch as they honestly
believed that the appellee was occupying these two
small parcels of land as their tenant. One of the
petitioner went upon the premises with the surveyor
when the original plan was made.
Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient to
authorize the Court of Land Registration to reopen a
case and modify its decree. Specific, intentional acts
to deceive and deprive anther of his right, or in some
manner injure him, must be alleged and proved; that
is, there must be actual or positive fraud as
distinguished from constructive fraud.
The question as to the meaning of the word "fraud" in
the Australian statutes has been frequently raised.
Two distinctions have been noted by the Australian
courts; the first is the distinction between the meaning
of the word "fraud" in the sections relating to the
conclusive effect of certificates of title, and its
meaning in the sections relating to the protection of
bona fide purchasers from registered proprietors. The
second is the distinction between "legal," "equitable,"
or "constructive" fraud, and "actual" or "moral" fraud.
In none of the groups of the sections of the Australian
statutes relating to the conclusive effect of certificates
of title, and in which fraud is referred to, is there any
express indication of the meaning of "fraud," with the
sole exception of that of the South Australian group.
(Hogg on Australian Torrens System, p. 834.)
With regard to decisions on the sections relating to
the conclusive effect of certificates of title, it has been
held in some cases that the "fraud" there mentioned
means actual or moral fraud, not merely constructive
or legal fraud. In other cases "fraud" has been said to
include constructive, legal, and every kind of fraud. In
other cases, against, knowledge of other persons'
right, and the deliberate acquisition of registered title
in the face of such knowledge, has been held to be
"fraud" which rendered voidable the certificates of title
so obtained; and voluntary ignorance is, for this
purpose, the same as knowledge. But in none of
these three classes of cases was there absent the
element of intention to deprive another of just rights,
which constitutes the essential characteristics of
actual — as distinguished from legal-fraud. (Id., p.
835, and cases cited in notes Nos. 85, 86, 87, 88, and
89 at bottom of pages 835 and 836.)
By "fraud" is meant actual fraud-dishonesty of some
sort. (Judgment of Privy Council in Assets Co. vs.
Mere Roihi, and Assets Co. vs. Panapa Waihopi,
decided in March, 1905, cited by Hogg in his
Supplementary Addendum to his work on Australian
Torrens System, supra.) The same meaning should
be given to the word "fraud" used in section 38 of our
statutes (Act No. 496).
The question as to whether any particular transaction
shows fraud, within the meaning of the word as used
in our statutes, will in each case be a question of fact.
We will not attempt to say what acts would constitutes
this kind of fraud in other cases. This must be
determined from the fact an circumstances in each
particular case. The only question we are called upon
to determine, and have determined, is whether or not,
under the facts and circumstances in this case, the
petitioners did obtain the decree of February 12,
1908, by means of fraud.
It might be urged that the appellee has been deprived
of his property without due process of law, in violation
of section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
known as the Philippine Bill," which provides "that no
law shall be enacted in the said Islands which shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law."
The Land Registration Act requires that all occupants
be named in the petition and given notice by
registered mail. This did not do the appellee any
good, as he was not notified; but he was made a party
defendant, as we have said, by means of the
publication "to all whom it may concern." If this
section of the Act is to be upheld this must be
declared to be due process of law.
Before examining the validity of this part of the Act it
might be well to note the history and purpose of what
is known as the "Torrens Land Registration System."
This system was introduced in South Australia by Sir
Robert Torrens in 1857 and was there worked out in
its practicable form.
The main principle of registration is to make
registered titles indefeasible. As we have said, upon
the presentation in the Court of Land Registration of
an application for the registration of the title to lands,
under this system, the theory of the law is that all
occupants, adjoining owners, adverse claimants, and
other interested persons are notified of the
proceedings, and have have a right to appear in
opposition to such application. In other words, the
proceeding is against the whole word. This system
was evidently considered by the Legislature to be a
public project when it passed Act No. 496. The
interest of the community at large was considered to
be preferred to that of private individuals.
At the close of this nineteenth century, all civilized
nations are coming to registration of title to land,
because immovable property is becoming more and
more a matter of commercial dealing, and there can
be no trade without security. (Dumas's Lectures, p.
23.)
The registered proprietor will no longer have reasons
to fear that he may evicted because his vendor had,
unknown to him, already sold the and to a third
person. . . The registered proprietor may feel himself
protected against any defect in his vendor's title. (Id.,
p. 21.)
The following summary of benefits of the system of
registration of titles, made by Sir Robert Torrens, has
been fully justified in its use:
First. It has substituted security for insecurity.
Second. It has reduced the costs of conveyances
from pounds to shillings, and the time occupied from
months to days.
Third. It has exchanged brevity and clearness for
obscurity and verbiage.
Fourth. It has so simplified ordinary dealings that he
who has mastered the "three R's" can transact his
own conveyancing.
Fifth. It affords protection against fraud.
Sixth. It has restored to their just value many estates
held under good holding titles, but depreciated in
consequence of some blur or technical defect, and
has barred the reoccurrence of any similar faults.
(Sheldon on Land Registration, pp. 75, 76.)
The boldest effort to grapple with the problem of
simplification of title to land was made by Mr.
(afterwards Sir Robert) Torrens, a layman, in South
Australia in 1857. . . . In the Torrens system title by
registration takes the place of "title by deeds" of the
system under the "general" law. A sale of land, for
example, is effected by a registered transfer, upon
which a certificate of title is issued. The certificate is
guaranteed by statute, and, with certain exceptions,
constitutes indefeasible title to the land mentioned
therein. Under the old system the same sale would be
effected by a conveyance, depending for its validity,
apart from intrinsic flaws, on the correctness of a long
series of prior deeds, wills, etc. . . . The object of the
Torrens system, them, is to do away with the delay,
uncertainty, and expense of the old conveyancing
system. (Duffy & Eagleson on The Transfer of Land
Act, 1890, pp. 2, 3, 5, 7.)
By "Torrens" system generally are meant those
systems of registration of transactions with interest in
land whose declared object . . . is, under
governmental authority, to establish and certify to the
ownership of an absolute and indefeasible title to
realty, and to simplify its transfer. (Hogg on Australian
Torrens system, supra, pp. 1, 2.)
Compensation for errors from assurance funds is
provided in all countries in which the Torrens system
has been enacted. Cases of error no doubt will
always occur. The percentage of errors, as compared
with the number of registered dealings in Australia, is
very small. In New South Wales there were, in 1889,
209, 894 registered dealings, the average risk of error
being only 2 ½ cents for each dealing. In Queensland
the risk of error was only 1 ½ cents, the number of
registered dealings being 233,309. In Tasmania and
in Western Australia not a cent was paid for
compensation for errors during the whole time of
operation, (Dumas's Lectures, supra, p. 96.) This
system has been adopted in various countries of the
civilized world, including some of the States of the
American Union, and practical experience has
demonstrated that it has been successful as a public
project.
The validity of some of the provisions of the statutes
adopting the Torrens system has been the subject of
judicial decision in the courts of the United States.
(People vs. Chase, 165 Ill., 527; State vs. Guilbert, 56
Ohio St., 575; People vs. Simon, 176 Ill., 165; Tyler
vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71.)
Act No. 496 of the Philippine Commission, known as
the "Land Registration Act," was copied substantially
from the Massachussetts law of 1898.
The Illinois and Massachusetts statutes were upheld
by the supreme courts of those States.
It is not enough to show a procedure to be
unconstitutional to say that we never heard of it
before. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra; Hurtado vs.
California, 110 U. S., 516.)
Looked at either from the point of view of history or of
the necessary requirements of justice, a proceeding in
rem dealing with a tangible res may be instituted and
carried to judgment without personal service upon
claimants within the State or notice by name to those
outside of it, and not encounter any provision of either
constitution. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of
the court over the res. As we have said, such a
proceeding would be impossible, were this not so, for
it hardly would do to make a distinction between the
constitutional rights of claimants who were known and
those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the
proceeding is to bar all. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)
This same doctrine is annunciated in Pennoyer vs.
Neff (95 U. S., 714); The Mary (9 Cranch, 126);
Mankin vs. Chandler (2 Brock., 125); Brown vs. Levee
Commission (50 Miss., 468); 2 Freeman, Judgments,
4th ed., secs. 606, 611.
If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim
against some particular person, with a judgment
which generally, in theory at least, binds his body, or
to bar some individual claim or objection, so that only
certain persons are entitled to be heard in defense,
the action is in personam, although it may concern the
right to or possession of a tangible thing. If, on the
other hand, the object is to bar indifferently all who
might be minded to make an objection of any sort
against the right sought to be established, and if
anyone in the world has a right to be heard on the
strenght of alleging facts which, if true, show an
inconsistent interest, the proceeding is in rem. (Tyler
vs. Judges, supra.)

In the case of Hamilton vs. Brown (161 U. S., 256) a

judgment of escheat was held conclusive upon
persons notified by advertisement to all persons
interested. In this jurisdiction, by the provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, a decree
allowing or disallowing a will binds everybody,
although the only notice of the proceedings given is
by general notice to all persons interested.

The supreme court Massachusetts, in the case of

Tyler vs. Judges (supra), did not rest its judgment as
to the conclusive effect of the decree upon the ground
that the State has absolute power to determine the
persons to whom a man's property shall go at his
death, but upon the characteristics of a proceeding in
rem. So we conclude that the proceedings had in the
case at bar, under all the facts and circumstances,
especially the absolute lack on the part of the
petitioners of any dishonest intent to deprive the
appellee of any right, or in any way injure him,
constitute due process of law.

As to whether or not the appellee can succesfully

maintain an action under the provisions of sections
101 and 102 of the Land Registration Act (secs. 2365,
2366, Compilation) we do not decide.

For these reasons we are of the opinion, and so hold,

that the judgment appealed from should be, and the
same is hereby reversed and judgment entered in
favor of the petitioners in conformity with the decree
of the lower court of February 12, 1908, without
special ruling as to costs. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 81401 May 18, 1990
VIRGINIA FRANCO VDA. DE ARCEO, CARMELITA
ARCEO, ZENAIDA ARCEO, ROMEO ARCEO,
RODOLFO ARCEO and MANUEL ARCEO,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Former 16th Division),
PEDRO M. ARCEO, SOTERA ARCEO, LORENZO
ARCEO, and ANTONIO ARCEO, respondents.
Ricardo S. Inton and Jose F. Tiburcio for petitioners.
Hermin E. Arceo for private respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The Court grants this petition on a successful
demonstration of error committed by the Court of
Appeals.1
It appears that the spouses Abdon Arceo and
Escolastica Geronimo were the owners of four parcels
of unregistered land (six were involved but only four
were disputed) located in Pulilan, Bulacan, identified
as lots nos. 2582, 2595, 3054, and 8131. Escolastica
died on September 16, 1942 while Abdon passed
away in 1953. They had one son, Esteban, who died
on September 2, 1941. Esteban had five children,
Jose, Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera. Jose
married Virginia Franco, with whom he fathered six
children, Carmelita, Zenaida, Rodolfo, Manuel, Cesar,
and Romeo. 2 Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera
are the private respondents herein while Jose's
widow, Virginia (Jose died on March 8, 1970), and
their children are the petitioners.
It also appears that on October (or September) 27,
1941, the Arceos executed a deed of donation inter
vivos, marked as Exhibit "J", in which the spouses
bestowed the properties in favor of Jose. 3 Since
1942, Jose had been paying taxes thereon. 4 In 1949,
he took personal possession thereof, worked thereon,
and claimed them as owner thereof 5
It furthermore appears that on August 2, 1950, the
spouses executed another deed of donation inter
vivos, marked as exhibit "T" disposing of the
properties further in favor of Jose. 6
On October 3 (or 30), 1941, the Arceos supposedly
signed a deed of donation mortis causa, marked as
exhibit "1" revoking exhibit "J" and giving away the
properties in question in favor of all his grandchildren
including Jose. It seems however that it was notarized
only on November 3, 1944, after Escolastica had
died.
On January 12, 1972, Virginia, together with her
children, filed with the cadastral court 7 an application
for registration in their names of lots Nos. 2582, 2595,
3054, and 8131 on the strength of exhibits "J" and
"T". Pedro, Antonio, Lorenzo, and Sotera opposed the
application on the basis of exhibit "1". Pedro and
Lorenzo specifically contested the application on lots
Nos. 3054 and 8131 on claims that each of them were
entitled to one-third thereof. 8
The cadastral court rejected all three documents and
distributed the properties according to the law on
intestate succession. 9
Virginia and her children shortly went to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the decision of the cadastral
court and dismissed the appeal.
On February 15, 1988, Virginia, et al. petitioned this
Court.
The petitioners argue that the cadastral court was
bereft of the power to determine conflicting claims of
ownership, and that its authority was solely to confirm
an existing title, and that anyway, all the lots should
have been awarded to them by virtue of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
since 1941 (1942, when Jose took possession of the
parcels) or otherwise, by acquisitive prescription. 10
They also assert that exhibits "J" and "T" had validly
transferred the subject lands to them.
In their comment, Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and
Sotera contend that the cadastral court had the
jurisdiction to decide questions of ownership of
property; that the issue of prescription was never
ventilated below; and that exhibit "J" had been validly
rescinded by exhibit "1".
The parties do not quarrel over the genuineness of all
three exhibits but rather, over the dates thereof.
Pedro, et al. alleged that exhibit "J" was executed on
September 27, 1941, and not October 27, 1941, and
that exhibit "l", the instrument that revoked it, came
later, or on October 3, 1941. Virginia et al. maintain
on the other hand that exhibit "J' was actually made
on October 27, 1941, twenty-four days after the
execution of exhibit "1", and that assuming exhibit "1"
came earlier, it was notarized, and took effect, only on
November 3, 1944, after the death of Escolastica, one
of the donors.
Although the parties wrangle over dates, the Court
observes that there is no real question of fact to be
resolved in this case. The important question, so we
find, is, based on existing facts, legal in character:
Who has the right over lots Nos. 2582, 2595, 3054,
and 8131?
As we indicated, we find merit in this petition.
The first question must, however, be resolved against
the petitioners. We have held that under Section 2 of
the Property Registration Decree, the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a land registration
court, is no longer as circumscribed as it was under
Act No. 496, the former land registration law. 11 We
said that the Decree "has eliminated the distinction
between the general jurisdiction vested in the regional
trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it
by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral
court." The amendment was "aimed at avoiding
multiplicity of suits, the change has simplified
registration proceedings by conferring upon the
required trial courts the authority to act not only on
applications for 'original registration' 'but also 'over all
petitions filed after original registration of title, with
power to hear and determine all questions arising
from such applications or petitions.'" 12 At any rate,
we have also stated that the limited jurisdiction rule
governing land registration courts is subject to
recognized exceptions, to wit, (1) where the parties
mutually agreed or have acquiesced in submitting
controversial issues for determination; (2) where they
have been given full opportunity to present their
evidence; and (3) where the court has considered the
evidence already of record and is convinced that the
same is sufficient for rendering a decision upon such
controversial issues. 13 By the same token, it has
been held that the rule is not, in reality, one of
jurisdiction, but rather, of mere procedure, which may
be waived. 14 It is not amiss to state likewise that
where the issue, say, of ownership, is ineluctably tied
up with the question of right of registration, the
cadastral court commits no error in assuming
jurisdiction over it, as, for instance, in this case, where
both parties rely on their respective exhibits to defeat
one another's claims over the parcels sought to be
registered, in which case, registration would not be
possible or would be unduly prolonged unless the
court first decided it.
The next question refers to acquisitive prescription. In
support of their claims, Virginia, et al. cite four events:
(1) In 1941, Jose entered upon the properties and
until his death in 1970, worked thereon; (2) Upon his
death, they, Virginia, et al., divided the same by virtue
of an extrajudicial partition; (3) Ever since, Jose had
paid taxes thereon until he died; (4) Pedro, et al.,
have not lifted a finger to oust him, Jose, in
possession, or otherwise, to impugn his right. Virginia,
et al. now say that barring the above exhibits, they
have anyway acquired the parcels by prescription.
We also regret that one can not agree with this
proposition. The petitioners suppose that the parcels '
had come under the category of a co-ownership,
following the death of their grandparents, but in that
case, it has been held that in order for prescription to
set in, the following requisites must concur: (1) there
is a clear showing that the claimant has repudiated
the co-ownership; (2) he has made known to the rest
of the co-owners that he is assuming exclusive
ownership over the property; (3) there is clear and
convincing evidence thereof; and (4) his possession is
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious. 15
The evidence for Virginia et al. do not persuade us
that they (through Jose) have acquired the lots by
lapse of time. The fact that in 1941, Jose wrested
possession thereof, so we hold, does not amount to
adverse possession because as a co-owner, he had
the right of enjoyment, and his use thereof can not by
itself prejudice the right of his fellow co-owners. The
fact that he paid taxes thereon is not controlling either
because payment of real estate taxes does not
necessarily confer title upon a claimant. 16 The fact
finally that Virginia, et al. had sought to extrajudicially
divide the property is nothing conclusive because
there is no showing that they, Virginia, et al. had
made this known to Pedro, et al. Under these
circumstances, we can not validly say that the lands
had devolved on Virginia., et al., by way of
prescription.
We are granting the petition nonetheless on the
finding that the lots had been conferred to Jose by a
valid donation inter vivos, that is, exhibit "J".
Other than the claims by Pedro, et al., that exhibit "J"
had been revoked by exhibit "1", exhibit "J" appears
to have been executed in compliance with legal
requirements, i.e., as to form and acceptance. 17 It is
true that the cadastral court was supposed to have
attributed fraud on the part of Jose in making Abdon
sign the exhibit, 18 (according to Pedro, Abdon
affixed his signature thereon upon "the belief that it
was a deed of sale of the land purchased from one
Marciano Santos" 19) but as found by the Court of
Appeals, It is a theory that "must be received with a
'grain of salt', 20 because, for one thing, Jose is dead,
and for another, the petitioners have adduced
evidence that exhibit "J" was genuine. We are bound
by the factual finding of the Appellate Court and as we
averred, we are disposing of this question on pure
questions of law.
As to exhibit "T", the finding of the Court of Appeals
that it was defective is just as controlling on this
Court, that is, that "it was signed by Abdon Arceo after
the death of his wife on September 16, 1942 and
does not contain the acceptance ... by Jose Arceo."
21
We can not say that exhibit "1" had validly revoked
exhibit "J". The weight of authority is that a valid
donation, once accepted, becomes
irrevocable, 22 except on account of officiousness, 23
failure by the donee to comply with charges imposed
in the donation, 24 or by reason of ingratitude. 25
There is simply no proof that Abdon when he
executed exhibit "1", was in possession of a legal
ground for annulment.
We can not thus accept the Court of Appeals' holding
that exhibit "1" had "neutralized the force and effect"
26 of exhibit "J".
It is therefore this Court's ruling that the disposition
under exhibit "J" in favor of Jose (whose rights were
transmitted to Virginia, et al.) should be respected.
We find no need in settling the issue of true dates of
the parties' exhibits, because first, it is an issue of fact
and second, because whatever their true dates, there
is no obstacle to the validity of the claims of Virginia,
et al.

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is SET

ASIDE. The court a quo is ORDERED to distribute the
properties covered by the donation inter vivos, dated
October (or September) 27, 1941, exhibit "J",
according to the terms and conditions set forth
therein, and in the proportions indicated thereby. No
costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
 AFFIRMING in part and REVERSING in part the
judgment appealed from, as follows:

"1. Declaring [Respondent] Romana de Vera the

rightful owner and with better right to possess the
property in question, being an innocent purchaser for
G.R. No. 154409 June 21, 2004 value therefor;

Spouses NOEL and JULIE ABRIGO, petitioners, "2. Declaring Gloria Villafania [liable] to pay the
vs. following to [Respondent] Romana de Vera and to
[Petitioner-]Spouses [Noel and Julie] Abrigo, to wit:
ROMANA DE VERA, respondent.

As to [Respondent] Romana de Vera:

DECISION

1. ₱300,000.00 plus 6% per annum as actual

PANGANIBAN, J.: damages;

Between two buyers of the same immovable property 2. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;
registered under the Torrens system, the law gives
ownership priority to (1) the first registrant in good
faith; (2) then, the first possessor in good faith; and 3. ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(3) finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the
oldest title. This provision, however, does not apply if
the property is not registered under the Torrens
system. 4. ₱30,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and

The Case 5. Cost of suit.

Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of As to [Petitioner-]Spouses [Noel and Julie] Abrigo:
the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the March 21,
2002 Amended Decision2 and the July 22, 2002
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR
CV No. 62391. The Amended Decision disposed as 1. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;
follows:

2. ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages;

"WHEREFORE, the dispositive part of the original D E
C I S I O N of this case, promulgated on November
19, 2001, is SET ASIDE and another one is entered 3. ₱30,000.00 as attorney’s fees;

4. Cost of suit."4
The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration.
The Facts
Quoting the trial court, the CA narrated the facts as
follows:
"As culled from the records, the following are the
pertinent antecedents amply summarized by the trial
court:
‘On May 27, 1993, Gloria Villafania sold a house and
lot located at Banaoang, Mangaldan, Pangasinan and
covered by Tax Declaration No. 1406 to Rosenda
Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go. The said sale
became a subject of a suit for annulment of
documents between the vendor and the vendees.
‘On December 7, 1993, the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 40 of Dagupan City rendered judgment
approving the Compromise Agreement submitted by
the parties. In the said Decision, Gloria Villafania was
given one year from the date of the Compromise
Agreement to buy back the house and lot, and failure
to do so would mean that the previous sale in favor of
Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go shall
remain valid and binding and the plaintiff shall
voluntarily vacate the premises without need of any
demand. Gloria Villafania failed to buy back the house
and lot, so the [vendees] declared the lot in their
name.
‘Unknown, however to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and
Rosita Cave-Go, Gloria Villafania obtained a free
patent over the parcel of land involved [on March 15,
1988 as evidenced by OCT No. P-30522]. The said
free patent was later on cancelled by TCT No. 212598
on April 11, 1996.
‘On October 16, 1997, Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and
Rosita Cave-Go, sold the house and lot to the herein
[Petitioner-Spouses Noel and Julie Abrigo].
‘On October 23, 1997, Gloria Villafania sold the same
house and lot to Romana de Vera x x x. Romana de
Vera registered the sale and as a consequence, TCT
No. 22515 was issued in her name.
‘On November 12, 1997, Romana de Vera filed an
action for Forcible Entry and Damages against
[Spouses Noel and Julie Abrigo] before the Municipal
Trial Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan docketed as
Civil Case No. 1452. On February 25, 1998, the
parties therein submitted a Motion for Dismissal in
view of their agreement in the instant case that
neither of them can physically take possession of the
property in question until the instant case is
terminated. Hence the ejectment case was
dismissed.’5
"Thus, on November 21, 1997, [petitioners] filed the
instant case [with the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan
City] for the annulment of documents, injunction,
preliminary injunction, restraining order and damages
[against respondent and Gloria Villafania].
"After the trial on the merits, the lower court rendered
the assailed Decision dated January 4, 1999,
awarding the properties to [petitioners] as well as
damages. Moreover, x x x Gloria Villafania was
ordered to pay [petitioners and private respondent]
damages and attorney’s fees.
"Not contented with the assailed Decision, both
parties [appealed to the CA]."6
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its original Decision promulgated on November 19,
2001, the CA held that a void title could not give rise
to a valid one and hence dismissed the appeal of
Private Respondent Romana de Vera.7 Since Gloria
Villafania had already transferred ownership to
Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, the
subsequent sale to De Vera was deemed void.
The CA also dismissed the appeal of Petitioner-
Spouses Abrigo and found no sufficient basis to
award them moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees.
On reconsideration, the CA issued its March 21, 2002
Amended Decision, finding Respondent De Vera to
be a purchaser in good faith and for value. The
appellate court ruled that she had relied in good faith
on the Torrens title of her vendor and must thus be
protected.8
Hence, this Petition.9
Issues
Petitioners raise for our consideration the issues
below:
"1. Whether or not the deed of sale executed by
Gloria Villafania in favor of [R]espondent Romana de
Vera is valid.
"2. Whether or not the [R]espondent Romana de Vera
is a purchaser for value in good faith.
"3. Who between the petitioners and respondent has
a better title over the property in question."10
In the main, the issues boil down to who between
petitioner-spouses and respondent has a better right
to the property.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is bereft of merit.
Main Issue:
Better Right over the Property
Petitioners contend that Gloria Villafania could not
have transferred the property to Respondent De Vera
because it no longer belonged to her.11 They further
claim that the sale could not be validated, since
respondent was not a purchaser in good faith and for
value.12
Law on Double Sale
The present case involves what in legal contemplation
was a double sale. On May 27, 1993, Gloria Villafania
first sold the disputed property to Rosenda Tigno-
Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, from whom petitioners,
in turn, derived their right. Subsequently, on October
23, 1997, a second sale was executed by Villafania
with Respondent Romana de Vera.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code states the law on double
sale thus:

"Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to
different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred
to the person who may have first taken possession
thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
"Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall
belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in the Registry of Property.
"Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall
pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the
possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the
person who presents the oldest title, provided there is
good faith."
Otherwise stated, the law provides that a double sale
of immovables transfers ownership to (1) the first
registrant in good faith; (2) then, the first possessor in
good faith; and (3) finally, the buyer who in good faith
presents the oldest title.13 There is no ambiguity in
the application of this law with respect to lands
registered under the Torrens system.
This principle is in full accord with Section 51 of PD
152914 which provides that no deed, mortgage, lease
or other voluntary instrument -- except a will --
purporting to convey or affect registered land shall
take effect as a conveyance or bind the land until its
registration.15 Thus, if the sale is not registered, it is
binding only between the seller and the buyer but it
does not affect innocent third persons.16
In the instant case, both Petitioners Abrigo and
respondent registered the sale of the property. Since
neither petitioners nor their predecessors (Tigno-
Salazar and Cave-Go) knew that the property was
covered by the Torrens system, they registered their
respective sales under Act 3344.17 For her part,
respondent registered the transaction under the
Torrens system18 because, during the sale, Villafania
had presented the transfer certificate of title (TCT)
covering the property.19
Respondent De Vera contends that her registration
under the Torrens system should prevail over that of
petitioners who recorded theirs under Act 3344. De
Vera relies on the following insight of Justice Edgardo
L. Paras:
"x x x If the land is registered under the Land
Registration Act (and has therefore a Torrens Title),
and it is sold but the subsequent sale is registered not
under the Land Registration Act but under Act 3344,
as amended, such sale is not considered
REGISTERED, as the term is used under Art. 1544 x
x x."20
We agree with respondent. It is undisputed that
Villafania had been issued a free patent registered as
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-30522.21 The
OCT was later cancelled by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 212598, also in Villafania’s name.22
As a consequence of the sale, TCT No. 212598 was
subsequently cancelled and TCT No. 22515
thereafter issued to respondent.
Soriano v. Heirs of Magali23 held that registration
must be done in the proper registry in order to bind
the land. Since the property in dispute in the present
case was already registered under the Torrens
system, petitioners’ registration of the sale under Act
3344 was not effective for purposes of Article 1544 of
the Civil Code.
More recently, in Naawan Community Rural Bank v.
Court of Appeals,24 the Court upheld the right of a
party who had registered the sale of land under the
Property Registration Decree, as opposed to another
who had registered a deed of final conveyance under
Act 3344. In that case, the "priority in time" principle
was not applied, because the land was already
covered by the Torrens system at the time the
conveyance was registered under Act 3344. For the
same reason, inasmuch as the registration of the sale
to Respondent De Vera under the Torrens system
was done in good faith, this sale must be upheld over
the sale registered under Act 3344 to Petitioner-
Spouses Abrigo.
Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo25 explained the
difference in the rules of registration under Act 3344
and those under the Torrens system in this wise:
"Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments
affecting unregistered lands is ‘without prejudice to a
third party with a better right.’ The aforequoted phrase
has been held by this Court to mean that the mere
registration of a sale in one’s favor does not give him
any right over the land if the vendor was not anymore
the owner of the land having previously sold the same
to somebody else even if the earlier sale was
unrecorded.
"The case of Carumba vs. Court of Appeals26 is a
case in point. It was held therein that Article 1544 of
the Civil Code has no application to land not
registered under Act No. 496. Like in the case at bar,
Carumba dealt with a double sale of the same
unregistered land. The first sale was made by the
original owners and was unrecorded while the second
was an execution sale that resulted from a complaint
for a sum of money filed against the said original
owners. Applying [Section 33], Rule 39 of the Revised
Rules of Court,27 this Court held that Article 1544 of
the Civil Code cannot be invoked to benefit the
purchaser at the execution sale though the latter was
a buyer in good faith and even if this second sale was
registered. It was explained that this is because the
purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriff’s execution
sale only steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor,
and merely acquires the latter’s interest in the
property sold as of the time the property was levied
upon.
"Applying this principle, x x x the execution sale of
unregistered land in favor of petitioner is of no effect
because the land no longer belonged to the judgment
debtor as of the time of the said execution sale."28
Petitioners cannot validly argue that they were
fraudulently misled into believing that the property
was unregistered. A Torrens title, once registered,
serves as a notice to the whole world.29 All persons
must take notice, and no one can plead ignorance of
the registration.30
Good-Faith Requirement
We have consistently held that Article 1544 requires
the second buyer to acquire the immovable in good
faith and to register it in good faith.31 Mere
registration of title is not enough; good faith must
concur with the registration.32 We explained the
rationale in Uraca v. Court of Appeals,33 which we
quote:
"Under the foregoing, the prior registration of the
disputed property by the second buyer does not by
itself confer ownership or a better right over the
property. Article 1544 requires that such registration
must be coupled with good faith. Jurisprudence
teaches us that ‘(t)he governing principle is primus
tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right).
Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second
sale cannot defeat the first buyer’s rights except
where the second buyer registers in good faith the
second sale ahead of the first, as provided by the Civil
Code. Such knowledge of the first buyer does not bar
her from availing of her rights under the law, among
them, to register first her purchase as against the
second buyer. But in converso, knowledge gained by
the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights
even if he is first to register the second sale, since
such knowledge taints his prior registration with bad
faith. This is the price exacted by Article 1544 of the
Civil Code for the second buyer being able to displace
the first buyer; that before the second buyer can
obtain priority over the first, he must show that he
acted in good faith throughout (i.e. in ignorance of the
first sale and of the first buyer’s rights) ---- from the
time of acquisition until the title is transferred to him
by registration, or failing registration, by delivery of
possession.’"34 (Italics supplied)
Equally important, under Section 44 of PD 1529,
every registered owner receiving a certificate of title
pursuant to a decree of registration, and every
subsequent purchaser of registered land taking such
certificate for value and in good faith shall hold the
same free from all encumbrances, except those noted
and enumerated in the certificate.35 Thus, a person
dealing with registered land is not required to go
behind the registry to determine the condition of the
property, since such condition is noted on the face of
the register or certificate of title.36 Following this
principle, this Court has consistently held as regards
registered land that a purchaser in good faith acquires
a good title as against all the transferees thereof
whose rights are not recorded in the Registry of
Deeds at the time of the sale.37
Citing Santiago v. Court of Appeals,38 petitioners
contend that their prior registration under Act 3344 is
constructive notice to respondent and negates her
good faith at the time she registered the sale.
Santiago affirmed the following commentary of Justice
Jose C. Vitug:
"The governing principle is prius tempore, potior jure
(first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge by the first
buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first
buyer's rights except when the second buyer first
registers in good faith the second sale (Olivares vs.
Gonzales, 159 SCRA 33). Conversely, knowledge
gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats
his rights even if he is first to register, since such
knowledge taints his registration with bad faith (see
also Astorga vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No 58530, 26
December 1984) In Cruz vs. Cabana (G.R. No.
56232, 22 June 1984; 129 SCRA 656), it was held
that it is essential, to merit the protection of Art. 1544,
second paragraph, that the second realty buyer must
act in good faith in registering his deed of sale (citing
Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 99,
Crisostomo vs. CA, G.R. 95843, 02 September 1992).
xxx xxx xxx
"Registration of the second buyer under Act 3344,
providing for the registration of all instruments on land
neither covered by the Spanish Mortgage Law nor the
Torrens System (Act 496), cannot improve his
standing since Act 3344 itself expresses that
registration thereunder would not prejudice prior rights
in good faith (see Carumba vs. Court of Appeals, 31
SCRA 558). Registration, however, by the first buyer
under Act 3344 can have the effect of constructive
notice to the second buyer that can defeat his right as
such buyer in good faith (see Arts. 708-709, Civil
Code; see also Revilla vs. Galindez, 107 Phil. 480;
Taguba vs. Peralta, 132 SCRA 700). Art. 1544 has
been held to be inapplicable to execution sales of
unregistered land, since the purchaser merely steps
into the shoes of the debtor and acquires the latter's
interest as of the time the property is sold (Carumba
vs. Court of Appeals, 31 SCRA 558; see also Fabian
vs. Smith, Bell & Co., 8 Phil. 496) or when there is
only one sale (Remalante vs. Tibe, 158 SCRA
138)."39 (Emphasis supplied)
Santiago was subsequently applied in Bayoca v.
Nogales,40 which held:
"Verily, there is absence of prior registration in good
faith by petitioners of the second sale in their favor.
As stated in the Santiago case, registration by the first
buyer under Act No. 3344 can have the effect of
constructive notice to the second buyer that can
defeat his right as such buyer. On account of the
undisputed fact of registration under Act No. 3344 by
[the first buyers], necessarily, there is absent good
faith in the registration of the sale by the [second
buyers] for which they had been issued certificates of
title in their names. x x x."41
Santiago and Bayoca are not in point. In Santiago, the
first buyers registered the sale under the Torrens
system, as can be inferred from the issuance of the
TCT in their names.42 There was no registration
under Act 3344. In Bayoca, when the first buyer
registered the sale under Act 3344, the property was
still unregistered land.43 Such registration was
therefore considered effectual.
Furthermore, Revilla and Taguba, which are cited in
Santiago, are not on all fours with the present case. In
Revilla, the first buyer did not register the sale.44 In
Taguba, registration was not an issue.45
As can be gathered from the foregoing, constructive
notice to the second buyer through registration under
Act 3344 does not apply if the property is registered
under the Torrens system, as in this case.
We quote below the additional commentary of Justice
Vitug, which was omitted in Santiago. This omission
was evidently the reason why petitioner
misunderstood the context of the citation therein:
"The registration contemplated under Art. 1544 has
been held to refer to registration under Act 496 Land
Registration Act (now PD 1529) which considers the
act of registration as the operative act that binds the
land (see Mediante vs. Rosabal, 1 O.G. [12] 900,
Garcia vs. Rosabal, 73 Phil 694). On lands covered
by the Torrens System, the purchaser acquires such
rights and interest as they appear in the certificate of
title, unaffected by any prior lien or encumbrance not
noted therein. The purchaser is not required to
explore farther than what the Torrens title, upon its
face, indicates. The only exception is where the
purchaser has actual knowledge of a flaw or defect in
the title of the seller or of such liens or encumbrances
which, as to him, is equivalent to registration (see
Sec. 39, Act 496; Bernales vs. IAC, G.R. 75336, 18
October 1988; Hernandez vs. Sales, 69 Phil 744;
Tajonera vs. Court of Appeals, L-26677, 27 March
1981),"46
Respondent in Good Faith
The Court of Appeals examined the facts to determine
whether respondent was an innocent purchaser for
value.47 After its factual findings revealed that
Respondent De Vera was in good faith, it explained
thus:
"x x x. Gloria Villafania, [Respondent] De Vera’s
vendor, appears to be the registered owner. The
subject land was, and still is, registered in the name of
Gloria Villafania. There is nothing in her certificate of
title and in the circumstances of the transaction or
sale which warrant [Respondent] De Vera in
supposing that she need[ed] to look beyond the title.
She had no notice of the earlier sale of the land to
[petitioners]. She ascertained and verified that her
vendor was the sole owner and in possession of the
subject property by examining her vendor’s title in the
Registry of Deeds and actually going to the premises.
There is no evidence in the record showing that when
she bought the land on October 23, 1997, she knew
or had the slightest notice that the same was under
litigation in Civil Case No. D-10638 of the Regional
Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 40, between
Gloria Villafania and [Petitioners] Abrigo. She was not
even a party to said case. In sum, she testified clearly
and positively, without any contrary evidence
presented by the [petitioners], that she did not know
anything about the earlier sale and claim of the
spouses Abrigo, until after she had bought the same,
and only then when she bought the same, and only
then when she brought an ejectment case with the x x
x Municipal Court of Mangaldan, known as Civil Case
No. 1452. To the [Respondent] De Vera, the only
legal truth upon which she had to rely was that the
land is registered in the name of Gloria Villafania, her
vendor, and that her title under the law, is absolute
and indefeasible. x x x."48
We find no reason to disturb these findings, which
petitioners have not rebutted. Spouses Abrigo base
their position only on the general averment that
respondent should have been more vigilant prior to
consummating the sale. They argue that had she
inspected the property, she would have found
petitioners to be in possession.49
This argument is contradicted, however, by the
spouses’ own admission that the parents and the
sister of Villafania were still the actual occupants in
October 1997, when Respondent De Vera purchased
the property.50 The family members may reasonably
be assumed to be Villafania’s agents, who had not
been shown to have notified respondent of the first
sale when she conducted an ocular inspection. Thus,
good faith on respondent’s part stands.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the
assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178906 February 18, 2009
ELVIRA T. ARANGOTE, petitioner,
vs.
SPS. MARTIN MAGLUNOB and LOURDES S.
MAGLUNOB, and ROMEO SALIDO, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 dated 27 October 2006 and Resolution2
dated 29 June 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 64970. In its assailed Decision, the
appellate court affirmed the Decision3 dated 12
September 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
6th Judicial Region, Branch 1, Kalibo, Aklan, in Civil
Case No. 5511, which reversed the Decision4 dated 6
April 1998 of the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Ibajay-Nabas, Ibajay, Aklan, in Civil Case
No. 156; and declared5 the herein respondent-
Spouses Martin and Lourdes Maglunob (Spouses
Maglunob) and respondent Romeo Salido (Romeo)
as the lawful owners and possessors of Lot 12897
with an area of 982 square meters, more or less,
located in Maloco, Ibajay, Aklan (subject property). In
its assailed Resolution, the appellate court denied
herein petitioner Elvira T. Arangote’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
Elvira T. Arangote, herein petitioner married to Ray
Mars E. Arangote, is the registered owner of the
subject property, as evidenced by Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. CLOA-1748.6 Respondents Martin
(Martin II) and Romeo are first cousins and the
grandnephews of Esperanza Maglunob-Dailisan
(Esperanza), from whom petitioner acquired the
subject property.
The Petition stems from a Complaint7 filed by
petitioner and her husband against the respondents
for Quieting of Title, Declaration of Ownership and
Possession, Damages with Preliminary Injunction,
and Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order before
the MCTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 156.
The Complaint alleged that Esperanza inherited the
subject property from her uncle Victorino Sorrosa by
virtue of a notarized Partition Agreement8 dated 29
April 1985, executed by the latter’s heirs. Thereafter,
Esperanza declared the subject property in her name
for real property tax purposes, as evidenced by Tax
Declaration No. 16218 (1985).9
The Complaint further stated that on 24 June 1985,
Esperanza executed a Last Will and Testament10
bequeathing the subject property to petitioner and her
husband, but it was never probated. On 9 June 1986,
Esperanza executed another document, an
Affidavit,11 in which she renounced, relinquished,
waived and quitclaimed all her rights, share, interest
and participation whatsoever in the subject property in
favor of petitioner and her husband. On the basis
thereof, Tax Declaration No. 16218 in the name of
Esperanza was cancelled and Tax Declaration No.
1666612 (1987) was issued in the name of the
petitioner and her husband.
In 1989, petitioner and her husband constructed a
house on the subject property. On 26 March 1993,
OCT No. CLOA-1748 was issued by the Secretary of
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in the
name of petitioner, married to Ray Mars E. Arangote.
However, respondents, together with some hired
persons, entered the subject property on 3 June 1994
and built a hollow block wall behind and in front of
petitioner’s house, which effectively blocked the
entrance to its main door.
As a consequence thereof, petitioner and her
husband were compelled to institute Civil Case No.
156.
In their Answer with Counterclaim in Civil Case No.
156, respondents averred that they co-owned the
subject property with Esperanza. Esperanza and her
siblings, Tomas and Inocencia, inherited the subject
property, in equal shares, from their father Martin
Maglunob (Martin I). When Tomas and Inocencia
passed away, their shares passed on by inheritance
to respondents Martin II and Romeo, respectively.
Hence, the subject property was co-owned by
Esperanza, respondent Martin II (together with his
wife Lourdes), and respondent Romeo, each holding
a one-third pro-indiviso share therein. Thus,
Esperanza could not validly waive her rights and
interest over the entire subject property in favor of the
petitioner.
Respondents also asserted in their Counterclaim that
petitioner and her husband, by means of fraud, undue
influence and deceit were able to make Esperanza,
who was already old and illiterate, affix her
thumbmark to the Affidavit dated 9 June 1986,
wherein she renounced all her rights and interest over
the subject property in favor of petitioner and her
husband. Respondents thus prayed that the OCT
issued in petitioner’s name be declared null and void
insofar as their two-thirds shares are concerned.
After trial, the MCTC rendered its Decision dated 6
April 1998 in Civil Case No. 156, declaring petitioner
and her husband as the true and lawful owners of the
subject property. The decretal portion of the MCTC
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
A. Declaring the [herein petitioner and her husband]
the true, lawful and exclusive owners and entitled to
the possession of the [subject property] described and
referred to under paragraph 2 of the [C]omplaint and
covered by Tax Declaration No. 16666 in the names
of the [petitioner and her husband];
B. Ordering the [herein respondents] and anyone
hired by, acting or working for them, to cease and
desist from asserting or claiming any right or interest
in, or exercising any act of ownership or possession
over the [subject property];
C. Ordering the [respondents] to pay the [petitioner
and her husband] the amount of ₱10,000.00 as
attorney’s fee. With cost against the [respondents].13
The respondents appealed the aforesaid MCTC
Decision to the RTC. Their appeal was docketed as
Civil Case No. 5511.
Respondents argued in their appeal that the MCTC
erred in not dismissing the Complaint filed by the
petitioner and her husband for failure to identify the
subject property therein. Respondents further faulted
the MCTC for not declaring Esperanza’s Affidavit
dated 9 June 1986 -- relinquishing all her rights and
interest over the subject property in favor of petitioner
and her husband -- as null and void insofar as
respondents’ two-thirds share in the subject property
is concerned.
On 12 September 2000, the RTC rendered its
Decision reversing the MCTC Decision dated 6 April
1998. The RTC adjudged respondents, as well as the
other heirs of Martin Maglunob, as the lawful owners
and possessors of the entire subject property. The
RTC decreed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1) The appealed [D]ecision is REVERSED;
2) [Herein respondents] and the other heirs of Martin
Maglunob are declared the lawful owners and
possessors of the whole [subject property] as
described in Paragraph 2 of the [C]omplaint, as
against the [herein petitioner and her husband].
3) [Petitioner and her husband] are ordered to
immediately turn over possession of the [subject
property] to the [respondents] and the other heirs of
Martin Maglunob; and
4) [Petitioner and her husband] are ordered to pay
[respondents] attorney’s fees of ₱5,000.00, other
litigation expenses of ₱5,000.00, moral damages of
₱10,000.00 and exemplary damages of P5,000.00.14
Petitioner and her husband filed before the RTC, on
26 September 2000, a Motion for New Trial or
Reconsideration15 on the ground of newly discovered
evidence consisting of a Deed of Acceptance16 dated
23 September 2000, and notice17 of the same, which
were both made by the petitioner, for herself and in
behalf of her husband,18 during the lifetime of
Esperanza. In the RTC Order19 dated 2 May 2001,
however, the RTC denied the aforesaid Motion for
New Trial or Reconsideration.
The petitioner and her husband then filed a Petition
for Review, under Rule 42 of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure, before the Court of Appeals, where
the Petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 64970.
In their Petition before the appellate court, petitioner
and her husband raised the following errors
committed by the RTC in its 12 September 2000
Decision:
I. It erred in reversing the [D]ecision of the [MCTC];
II. It erred in declaring the [herein respondents] and
the other heirs of Martin Maglunob as the lawful
owners and possessors of the whole [subject
property];
III. It erred in declaring [OCT] No. CLOA-1748 in the
name of [herein petitioner] Elvie T. Arangote as null
and void;
IV. It erred in denying [petitioner and her husband’s]
[M]otion for [N]ew [T]rial or [R]econsideration dated
[26 September 2000; and
V. It erred in not declaring the [petitioner and her
husband] as possessors in good faith.20
On 27 October 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision denying the Petition for Review of petitioner
and her husband and affirming the RTC Decision
dated 12 September 2000. Petitioner and her
husband’s subsequent Motion for Reconsideration
was similarly denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution dated 29 June 2007.
Hence, petitioner21 now comes before this Court
raising in her Petition the following issues:
I. Whether the [RTC] acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it declared the [petitioner and her husband’s title
to the subject property] null and void;
II. Whether the [RTC] acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
declared the Affidavit of Quitclaim null and void; and
III. Whether the [RTC] and the Honorable Court of
Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
rejected petitioner’s claim as possessors (sic) in good
faith, hence, entitled to the rights provided in [Article]
448 and [Article] 546 of the Civil Code.22
Petitioner contends that the aforesaid OCT No.
CLOA-1748 was issued in her name on 26 March
1993 and was registered in the Registry of Deeds of
Aklan on 20 April 1993. From 20 April 1993 until the
institution of Civil Case No. 156 on 10 June 1994
before the MCTC, more than one year had already
elapsed. Considering that a Torrens title can only be
attacked within one year after the date of the issuance
of the decree of registration on the ground of fraud
and that such attack must be through a direct
proceeding, it was an error on the part of the RTC and
the Court of Appeals to declare OCT No. CLOA-1748
null and void.
Petitioner additionally posits that both the RTC and
the Court of Appeals committed a mistake in declaring
null and void the Affidavit dated 9 June 1986
executed by Esperanza, waiving all her rights and
interest over the subject property in favor of petitioner
and her husband. Esperanza’s Affidavit is a valid and
binding proof of the transfer of ownership of the
subject property in petitioner’s name, as it was also
coupled with actual delivery of possession of the
subject property to petitioner and her husband. The
Affidavit is also proof of good faith on the part of
petitioner and her husband.
Finally, petitioner argues that, assuming for the sake
of argument, that Esperanza’s Affidavit is null and
void, petitioner and her husband had no knowledge of
any flaw in Esperanza’s title when the latter
relinquished her rights to and interest in the subject
property in their favor. Hence, petitioner and her
husband can be considered as possessors in good
faith and entitled to the rights provided under Articles
448 and 546 of the Civil Code.
This present Petition is devoid of merit.
It is a hornbook doctrine that the findings of fact of the
trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and
should not be disturbed except for strong and valid
reasons, because the trial court is in a better position
to examine the demeanor of the witnesses while
testifying. It is not a function of this Court to analyze
and weigh evidence by the parties all over again. This
Court’s jurisdiction is, in principle, limited to reviewing
errors of law that might have been committed by the
Court of Appeals.23 This rule, however, is subject to
several exceptions,24 one of which is present in this
case, i.e., when the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals and the trial court are contradictory.
In this case, the findings of fact of the MCTC as
regards the origin of the subject property are in
conflict with the findings of fact of both the RTC and
the Court of Appeals. Hence, this Court will have to
examine the records to determine first the true origin
of the subject property and to settle whether the
respondents have the right over the same for being
co-heirs and co-owners, together with their grand
aunt, Esperanza, before this Court can resolve the
issues raised by the petitioner in her Petition.
After a careful scrutiny of the records, this Court
affirms the findings of both the RTC and the Court of
Appeals as regards the origin of the subject property
and the fact that respondents, with their grand aunt
Esperanza, were co-heirs and co-owners of the
subject property.
The records disclosed that the subject property was
part of a parcel of land25 situated in Maloco, Ibajay,
Aklan, consisting of 7,176 square meters and
commonly owned in equal shares by the siblings
Pantaleon Maglunob (Pantaleon) and Placida
Maglunob-Sorrosa (Placida). Upon the death of
Pantaleon and Placida, their surviving and legal heirs
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and
Partition of Estate in July 1981,26 however, the Deed
was not notarized. Considering that Pantaleon died
without issue, his one-half share in the parcel of land
he co-owned with Placida passed on to his four
siblings (or their respective heirs, if already
deceased), namely: Placida, Luis, Martin I, and
Victoria, in equal shares.
According to the aforementioned Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement and Partition of Estate, the surviving and
legal heirs of Pantaleon and Placida agreed to have
the parcel of land commonly owned by the siblings
declared for real property tax purposes in the name of
Victorino Sorrosa (Victorino), Placida’s husband.
Thus, Tax Declarations No. 5988 (1942),27 No. 6200
(1945)28 and No. 7233 (1953)29 were all issued in
the name of Victorino.
Since Martin I already passed away when the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition of Estate was
executed, his heirs30 were represented therein by
Esperanza. By virtue of the said Deed, Martin I
received as inheritance a portion of the parcel of land
measuring 897 square meters.
After the death of Victorino, his heirs31 executed
another Partition Agreement on 29 April 1985, which
was notarized on the same date. The Partition
Agreement mentioned four parcels of land. The
subject property, consisting of a portion of the
consolidated parcels 1, 2, and 3, and measuring
around 982 square meters, was allocated to
Esperanza. In comparison, the property given to
Esperanza under the Partition Agreement is bigger
than the one originally allocated to her earlier under
the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition of
Estate dated July 1981, which had an area of only
897 square meters. It may be reasonably assumed,
however, that the subject property, measuring 982
square meters, allocated to Esperanza under the
Partition Agreement dated 29 April 1985, is already
inclusive of the smaller parcel of 897 square meters
assigned to her under the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement and Partition of Estate dated July 1981. As
explained by the RTC in its 12 September 2000
Decision:
The [subject property] which is claimed by the [herein
petitioner and her husband] and that which is claimed
by the [herein respondents] are one and the same,
the difference in area and technical description being
due to the repartition and re-allocation of the parcel of
land originally co-owned by Pantaleon Maglunob and
his sister Placida Maglunob and subsequently
declared in the name of [Victorino] under Tax
Declaration No. 5988 of 1949.32
It is clear from the records that the subject property
was not Esperanza’s exclusive share, but also that of
the other heirs of her father, Martin I. Esperanza
expressly affixed her thumbmark to the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of July 1981 not only for
herself, but also on behalf of the other heirs of Martin
I. Though in the Partition Agreement dated 29 April
1985 Esperanza affixed her thumbmark without
stating that she was doing so not only for herself, but
also on behalf of the other heirs of Martin I, this does
not mean that Esperanza was already the exclusive
owner thereof. The evidence shows that the subject
property is the share of the heirs of Martin I. This is
clear from the sketch33 attached to the Partition
Agreement dated 29 April 1985, which reveals the
proportionate areas given to the heirs of the two
siblings, Pantaleon and Placida, who were the original
owners of the whole parcel of land34 from which the
subject property was taken.
Further, it bears emphasis that the Partition
Agreement was executed by and among the son,
grandsons, granddaughters and cousins of Victorino.
Esperanza was neither the granddaughter nor the
cousin of Victorino, as she was only Victorino’s
grandniece. The cousin of Victorino is Martin I,
Esperanza’s father. In effect, therefore, the subject
property allotted to Esperanza in the Partition
Agreement was not her exclusive share, as she holds
the same for and on behalf of the other heirs of Martin
I, who was already deceased at the time the Partition
Agreement was made.
To further bolster the truth that the subject property
was not exclusively owned by Esperanza, the Affidavit
she executed in favor of petitioner and her husband
on 6 June 1985 was worded as follows:
That I hereby renounce, relinquish, waive and
quitclaim all my rights, share, interest and
participation whatsoever in the [subject property] unto
the said Sps. Ray Mars Arangote and Elvira T.
Arangote, their heirs, successors, and assigns
including the improvement found thereon;35
Logically, if Esperanza fully owned the subject
property, she would have simply waived her rights to
and interest in the subject property, without
mentioning her "share" and "participation" in the
same. By including such words in her Affidavit,
Esperanza was aware of and was limiting her waiver,
renunciation, and quitclaim to her one-third share and
participation in the subject property.
Going to the issues raised by the petitioner in this
Petition, this Court will resolve the same concurrently
as they are interrelated.
In this case, the petitioner derived her title to the
subject property from the notarized Affidavit executed
by Esperanza, wherein the latter relinquished her
rights, share, interest and participation over the same
in favor of the petitioner and her husband.
A careful perusal of the said Affidavit reveals that it is
not what it purports to be. Esperanza’s Affidavit is, in
fact, a Donation. Esperanza’s real intent in executing
the said Affidavit was to donate her share in the
subject property to petitioner and her husband.
As no onerous undertaking is required of petitioner
and her husband under the said Affidavit, the
donation is regarded as a pure donation of an interest
in a real property covered by Article 749 of the Civil
Code.36 Article 749 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable
may be valid, it must be made in a public document,
specifying therein the property donated and the value
of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of
donation or in a separate public document, but it shall
not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of
the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument,
the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic
form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.
From the aforesaid provision, there are three
requisites for the validity of a simple donation of a real
property, to wit: (1) it must be made in a public
instrument; (2) it must be accepted, which acceptance
may be made either in the same Deed of Donation or
in a separate public instrument; and (3) if the
acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the
donor must be notified in an authentic form, and the
same must be noted in both instruments.
This Court agrees with the RTC and the Court of
Appeals that the Affidavit executed by Esperanza
relinquishing her rights, share, interest and
participation over the subject property in favor of the
petitioner and her husband suffered from legal
infirmities, as it failed to comply with the aforesaid
requisites of the law.

In Sumipat v. Banga,37 this Court declared that title to
immovable property does not pass from the donor to
the donee by virtue of a Deed of Donation until and
unless it has been accepted in a public instrument
and the donor duly notified thereof. The acceptance
may be made in the very same instrument of
donation. If the acceptance does not appear in the
same document, it must be made in another. Where
the Deed of Donation fails to show the acceptance, or
where the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a
separate instrument, is either not given to the donor
or else not noted in the Deed of Donation and in the
separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.38
In the present case, the said Affidavit, which is
tantamount to a Deed of Donation, met the first
requisite, as it was notarized; thus, it became a public
instrument. Nevertheless, it failed to meet the
aforesaid second and third requisites. The
acceptance of the said donation was not made by the
petitioner and her husband either in the same Affidavit
or in a separate public instrument. As there was no
acceptance made of the said donation, there was also
no notice of the said acceptance given to the donor,
Esperanza. Therefore, the Affidavit executed by
Esperanza in favor of petitioner and her husband is
null and void.
The subsequent notarized Deed of Acceptance39
dated 23 September 2000, as well as the notice40 of
such acceptance, executed by the petitioner did not
cure the defect. Moreover, it was only made by the
petitioner several years after the Complaint was filed
in court, or when the RTC had already rendered its
Decision dated 12 September 2000, although it was
still during Esperanza’s lifetime. Evidently, its
execution was a mere afterthought, a belated attempt
to cure what was a defective donation.
It is true that the acceptance of a donation may be
made at any time during the lifetime of the donor. And
granting arguendo that such acceptance may still be
admitted in evidence on appeal, there is still need for
proof that a formal notice of such acceptance was
received by the donor and noted in both the Deed of
Donation and the separate instrument embodying the
acceptance.41 At the very least, this last legal
requisite of annotation in both instruments of donation
and acceptance was not fulfilled by the petitioner.
Neither the Affidavit nor the Deed of Acceptance
bears the fact that Esperanza received notice of the
acceptance of the donation by petitioner. For this
reason, even Esperanza’s one-third share in the
subject property cannot be adjudicated to the
petitioner.
With the foregoing, this Court holds that the RTC and
the Court of Appeals did not err in declaring null and
void Esperanza’s Affidavit.
The next issue to be resolved then is whether the
RTC, as well as the Court of Appeals, erred in
declaring OCT No. CLOA-1748 in the name of
petitioner and her husband null and void.
Again, this Court answers the said issue in the
negative.
Section 48 of Presidential decree No. 1529 states:
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. -
A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
Such proscription has long been enshrined in
Philippine jurisprudence. The judicial action required
to challenge the validity of title is a direct attack, not a
collateral attack.42
The attack is considered direct when the object of an
action is to annul or set aside such proceeding, or
enjoin its enforcement. Conversely, an attack is
indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a
different relief, an attack on the proceeding is
nevertheless made as an incident thereof. Such
action to attack a certificate of title may be an original
action or a counterclaim, in which a certificate of title
is assailed as void.43
A counterclaim is considered a new suit in which the
defendant is the plaintiff and the plaintiff in the
complaint becomes the defendant. It stands on the
same footing as, and is to be tested by the same rules
as if it were, an independent action.44
In their Answer to the Complaint for Quieting of Title
filed by the petitioner and her husband before the
MCTC, respondents included therein a Counterclaim
wherein they repleaded all the material allegations in
their affirmative defenses, the most essential of which
was their claim that petitioner and her husband -- by
means of fraud, undue influence and deceit -- were
able to make their grand aunt, Esperanza, who was
already old and illiterate, affix her thumbmark to the
Affidavit, wherein she renounced, waived, and
quitclaimed all her rights and interest over the subject
property in favor of petitioner and her husband. In
addition, respondents maintained in their Answer that
as petitioner and her husband were not tenants either
of Esperanza or of the respondents, the DAR could
not have validly issued in favor of petitioner and her
husband OCT No. CLOA-1748. Thus, the
respondents prayed, in their counterclaim in Civil
Case No. 156 before the MCTC, that OCT No. CLOA-
1748 issued in the name of petitioner, married to Ray
Mars E. Arangote, be declared null and void, insofar
as their two-thirds shares in the subject property are
concerned.
It is clear, thus, that respondents’ Answer with
Counterclaim was a direct attack on petitioner’s
certificate of title. Furthermore, since all the essential
facts of the case for the determination of the validity of
the title are now before this Court, to require
respondents to institute a separate cancellation
proceeding would be pointlessly circuitous and
against the best interest of justice.
Esperanza’s Affidavit, which was the sole basis of
petitioner’s claim to the subject property, has been
declared null and void. Moreover, petitioner and her
husband were not tenants of the subject property. In
fact, petitioner herself admitted in her Complaint filed
before the MCTC that her husband is out of the
country, rendering it impossible for him to work on the
subject property as a tenant. Instead of cultivating the
subject property, petitioner and her husband
possessed the same by constructing a house thereon.
Thus, it is highly suspicious how the petitioner was
able to secure from the DAR a Certificate of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA) over the subject property.
The DAR awards such certificates to the grantees
only if they fulfill the requirements of Republic Act No.
6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).45 Hence, the
RTC and the Court of Appeals did not err in declaring
null and void OCT No. CLOA-1748 in the name of the
petitioner, married to Ray Mars E. Arangote.
Considering that Esperanza died without any
compulsory heirs and that the supposed donation of
her one-third share in the subject property per her
Affidavit dated 9 June 1985 was already declared null
and void, Esperanza’s one-third share in the subject
property passed on to her legal heirs, the
respondents.
As petitioner’s last-ditch effort, she claims that she is
a possessor in good faith and, thus, entitled to the
rights provided for under Articles 448 and 546 of the
Civil Code.
This claim is untenable.
The Civil Code describes a possessor in good faith as
follows:
Art. 526. He is deemed a possessor in good faith who
is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.

He is deemed a possessor in bad faith who
possesses in any case contrary to the foregoing.
Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law
may be the basis of good faith.
Art. 1127. The good faith of the possessor consists in
the reasonable belief that the person from whom he
received the thing was the owner thereof, and could
transmit his ownership.
Possession in good faith ceases from the moment
defects in the title are made known to the possessor
by extraneous evidence or by a suit for recovery of
the property by the true owner. Every possessor in
good faith becomes a possessor in bad faith from the
moment he becomes aware that what he believed to
be true is not so.46
In the present case, when respondents came to know
that an OCT over the subject property was issued and
registered in petitioner’s name on 26 March 1993,
respondents brought a Complaint on 7 August 1993
before the Lupon of Barangay Maloco, Ibajay, Aklan,
challenging the title of petitioner to the subject
property on the basis that said property constitutes
the inheritance of respondent, together with their
grandaunt Esperanza, so Esperanza had no authority
to relinquish the entire subject property to petitioner.
From that moment, the good faith of the petitioner had
ceased.
Petitioner cannot be entitled to the rights under
Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, because the
rights mentioned therein are applicable only to
builders in good faith and not to possessors in good
faith.
Moreover, the petitioner cannot be considered a
builder in good faith of the house on the subject
property. In the context that such term is used in
particular reference to Article 448 of the Civil Code, a
builder in good faith is one who, not being the owner
of the land, builds on that land, believing himself to be
its owner and unaware of any defect in his title or
mode of acquisition.47
The various provisions of the Civil Code, pertinent to
the subject, read:
Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything
has been built, sown, or planted in good faith, shall
have the right to appropriate as his own the works,
sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the
one who built or planted to pay the price of the land,
and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However,
the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the
land if its value is considerably more than that of the
building or trees. In such a case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not
choose to appropriate the building or trees after
proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the
terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the
court shall fix the terms thereof.1avvphi1
Article 449. He who builds, plants, or sows in bad faith
on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or
sown without right to indemnity.
Article 450. The owner of the land on which anything
has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may
demand the demolition of the work, or that the
planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace
things in their former condition at the expense of the
person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel
the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and
the sower the proper rent.
Under the foregoing provisions, the builder in good
faith can compel the landowner to make a choice
between appropriating the building by paying the
proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the
price of the land. The choice belongs to the owner of
the land, a rule that accords with the principle of
accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the
principal and not the other way around. Even as the
option lies with the landowner, the grant to him,
nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one. He
cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the building
to instead remove it from the land. In order, however,
that the builder can invoke that accruing benefit and
enjoy his corresponding right to demand that a choice
be made by the landowner, he should be able to
prove good faith on his part.48
a tax declaration does not prove ownership. It is
merely an indicium of a claim of ownership. Payment
of taxes is not proof of ownership; it is, at best, an
indicium of possession in the concept of ownership.
Neither tax receipts nor a declaration of ownership for
taxation purposes is evidence of ownership or of a
right to possess realty when not supported by other
effective proofs.50
With the foregoing, the petitioner is not entitled to the
rights under Article 448 and 546 as the petitioner is
not a builder and possessor in good faith.

Good faith, here understood, is an intangible and WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision and
definition, and it encompasses, among other things, Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
an honest belief, the absence of malice and the 64970, dated 27 October 2006 and 29 June 2007,
absence of design to defraud or to seek an respectively, affirming the RTC Decision dated 12
unconscionable advantage. An individual’s personal September 2000 in Civil Case No. 5511 and declaring
good faith is a concept of his own mind and, the respondents the lawful owners and possessors of
therefore, may not conclusively be determined by his the subject property are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
protestations alone. It implies honesty of intention,
and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which
ought to put the holder upon inquiry. The essence of SO ORDERED.
good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of
one’s right, ignorance of a superior claim, and
absence of intention to overreach another. Applied to
possession, one is considered in good faith if he is not
aware that there exists in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.49

In this case, the subject property waived and

quitclaimed by Esperanza to the petitioner and her
husband in the Affidavit was only covered by a tax
declaration in the name of Esperanza. Petitioner did
not even bother to look into the origin of the subject
property and to probe into the right of Esperanza to
relinquish the same. Thus, when petitioner and her
husband built a house thereon in 1989 they cannot be
considered to have acted in good faith as they were
fully aware that when Esperanza executed an
Affidavit relinquishing in their favor the subject
property the only proof of Esperanza’s ownership over
the same was a mere tax declaration. This fact or
circumstance alone was enough to put the petitioner
and her husband under inquiry. Settled is the rule that

G.R. No. 160132 April 17, 2009
SERAFIN, RAUL, NENITA, NAZARETO,
NEOLANDA, all surnamed NARANJA, AMELIA
NARANJA-RUBINOS, NILDA NARANJA-LIMANA,
and NAIDA NARANJA-GICANO, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, LUCILIA P. BELARDO,
represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, REBECCA
CORDERO, and THE LOCAL REGISTER OF
DEEDS, BACOLOD CITY, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This petition seeks a review of the Court of Appeals
(CA) Decision1 dated September 13, 2002 and
Resolution2 dated September 24, 2003 which upheld
the contract of sale executed by petitioners’
predecessor, Roque Naranja, during his lifetime, over
two real properties.
Roque Naranja was the registered owner of a parcel
of land, denominated as Lot No. 4 in Consolidation-
Subdivision Plan (LRC) Pcs-886, Bacolod Cadastre,
with an area of 136 square meters and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-18764.
Roque was also a co-owner of an adjacent lot, Lot
No. 2, of the same subdivision plan, which he co-
owned with his brothers, Gabino and Placido Naranja.
When Placido died, his one-third share was inherited
by his children, Nenita, Nazareto, Nilda, Naida and
Neolanda, all surnamed Naranja, herein petitioners.
Lot No. 2 is covered by TCT No. T-18762 in the
names of Roque, Gabino and the said children of
Placido. TCT No. T-18762 remained even after
Gabino died. The other petitioners — Serafin Naranja,
Raul Naranja, and Amelia Naranja-Rubinos — are the
children of Gabino.3
The two lots were being leased by Esso Standard
Eastern, Inc. for 30 years from 1962-1992. For his
properties, Roque was being paid ₱200.00 per month
by the company.4
In 1976, Roque, who was single and had no children,
lived with his half sister, Lucilia P. Belardo (Belardo),
in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental. At that time, a
catheter was attached to Roque’s body to help him
urinate. But the catheter was subsequently removed
when Roque was already able to urinate normally.
Other than this and the influenza prior to his death,
Roque had been physically sound.5
Roque had no other source of income except for the
₱200.00 monthly rental of his two properties. To
show his gratitude to Belardo, Roque sold Lot No. 4
and his one-third share in Lot No. 2 to Belardo on
August 21, 1981, through a Deed of Sale of Real
Property which was duly notarized by Atty. Eugenio
Sanicas. The Deed of Sale reads:
I, ROQUE NARANJA, of legal age, single, Filipino
and a resident of Bacolod City, do hereby declare that
I am the registered owner of Lot No. 4 of the
Cadastral Survey of the City of Bacolod, consisting of
136 square meters, more or less, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-18764 and a co-owner of Lot
No. 2, situated at the City of Bacolod, consisting of
151 square meters, more or less, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-18762 and my share in the
aforesaid Lot No. 2 is one-third share.
That for and in consideration of the sum of TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (₱10,000.00), Philippine
Currency, and other valuable consideration, receipt of
which in full I hereby acknowledge to my entire
satisfaction, by these presents, I hereby transfer and
convey by way of absolute sale the above-mentioned
Lot No. 4 consisting of 136 square meters covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18764 and my one-
third share in Lot No. 2, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-18762, in favor of my sister
LUCILIA P. BELARDO, of legal age, Filipino citizen,
married to Alfonso D. Belardo, and a resident of
Pontevedra, Negros Occidental, her heirs, successors
and assigns.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my
hand this 21st day of August, 1981 at Bacolod City,
Philippines.
(SGD.)
ROQUE NARANJA6
Roque’s copies of TCT No. T-18764 and TCT No. T-
18762 were entrusted to Atty. Sanicas for registration
of the deed of sale and transfer of the titles to
Belardo. But the deed of sale could not be registered
because Belardo did not have the money to pay for
the registration fees.7
Belardo’s only source of income was her store and
coffee shop. Sometimes, her children would give her
money to help with the household expenses, including
the expenses incurred for Roque’s support. At times,
she would also borrow money from Margarita Dema-
ala, a neighbor.8 When the amount of her loan
reached ₱15,000.00, Dema-ala required a security.
On November 19, 1983, Roque executed a deed of
sale in favor of Dema-ala, covering his two properties
in consideration of the ₱15,000.00 outstanding loan
and an additional ₱15,000.00, for a total of
₱30,000.00. Dema-ala explained that she wanted
Roque to execute the deed of sale himself since the
properties were still in his name. Belardo merely
acted as a witness. The titles to the properties were
given to Dema-ala for safekeeping.9
Three days later, or on December 2, 1983, Roque
died of influenza. The proceeds of the loan were used
for his treatment while the rest was spent for his
burial.10
In 1985, Belardo fully paid the loan secured by the
second deed of sale. Dema-ala returned the
certificates of title to Belardo, who, in turn, gave them
back to Atty. Sanicas.11
Unknown to Belardo, petitioners, the children of
Placido and Gabino Naranja, executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs12 on October
11, 1985, adjudicating among themselves Lot No. 4.
On February 19, 1986, petitioner Amelia Naranja-
Rubinos, accompanied by Belardo, borrowed the two
TCTs, together with the lease agreement with Esso
Standard Eastern, Inc., from Atty. Sanicas on account
of the loan being proposed by Belardo to her.
Thereafter, petitioners had the Extrajudicial
Settlement Among Heirs notarized on February 25,
1986. With Roque’s copy of TCT No. T-18764 in their
possession, they succeeded in having it cancelled
and a new certificate of title, TCT No. T-140184,
issued in their names.13
In 1987, Belardo decided to register the Deed of Sale
dated August 21, 1981. With no title in hand, she was
compelled to file a petition with the RTC to direct the
Register of Deeds to annotate the deed of sale even
without a copy of the TCTs. In an Order dated June
18, 1987, the RTC granted the petition. But she only
succeeded in registering the deed of sale in TCT No.
T-18762 because TCT No. T-18764 had already been
cancelled.14
On December 11, 1989, Atty. Sanicas prepared a
certificate of authorization, giving Belardo’s daughter,
Jennelyn P. Vargas, the authority to collect the
payments from Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. But it
appeared from the company’s Advice of Fixed
Payment that payment of the lease rental had already
been transferred from Belardo to Amelia Naranja-
Rubinos because of the Extrajudicial Settlement
Among Heirs.
On June 23, 1992, Belardo,15 through her daughter
and attorney-in-fact, Rebecca Cordero, instituted a
suit for reconveyance with damages. The complaint
prayed that judgment be rendered declaring Belardo
as the sole legal owner of Lot No. 4, declaring null
and void the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs,
and TCT No. T-140184, and ordering petitioners to
reconvey to her the subject property and to pay
damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
7144.
Subsequently, petitioners also filed a case against
respondent for annulment of sale and quieting of title
with damages, praying, among others, that judgment
be rendered nullifying the Deed of Sale, and ordering
the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City to cancel the
annotation of the Deed of Sale on TCT No. T-18762.
This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 7214.
On March 5, 1997, the RTC rendered a Decision in
the consolidated cases in favor of petitioners. The trial
court noted that the Deed of Sale was defective in
form since it did not contain a technical description of
the subject properties but merely indicated that they
were Lot No. 4, covered by TCT No. T-18764
consisting of 136 square meters, and one-third portion
of Lot No. 2 covered by TCT No. T-18762. The trial
court held that, being defective in form, the Deed of
Sale did not vest title in private respondent. Full and
absolute ownership did not pass to private respondent
because she failed to register the Deed of Sale. She
was not a purchaser in good faith since she acted as
a witness to the second sale of the property knowing
that she had already purchased the property from
Roque. Whatever rights private respondent had over
the properties could not be superior to the rights of
petitioners, who are now the registered owners of the
parcels of land. The RTC disposed, thus:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is
hereby rendered:
1. Dismissing Civil Case No. 7144.
2. Civil Case No. 7214.
a) Declaring the Deed of Sale dated August 21, 1981,
executed by Roque Naranja, covering his one-third
(1/3) share of Lot 2 of the consolidation-subdivision
plan (LRC) Pcs-886, being a portion of the
consolidation of Lots 240-A, 240-B, 240-C and 240-D,
described on plan, Psd-33443 (LRC) GLRO Cad.
Rec. No. 55 in favor of Lucilia Belardo, and entered
as Doc. No. 80, Page 17, Book No. XXXVI, Series of
1981 of Notary Public Eugenio Sanicas of Bacolod
City, as null and void and of no force and effect;
b) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City to
cancel Entry No. 148123 annotate at the back of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18762;
c) Ordering Lucilia Belardo or her successors-in-
interest to pay plaintiffs the sum of ₱20,000.00 as
attorney’s fees, the amount of ₱500.00 as
appearance fees.
Counterclaims in both Civil Cases Nos. 7144 and
7214 are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.16
On September 13, 2002, the CA reversed the RTC
Decision. The CA held that the unregisterability of a
deed of sale will not undermine its validity and
efficacy in transferring ownership of the properties to
private respondent. The CA noted that the records
were devoid of any proof evidencing the alleged
vitiation of Roque’s consent to the sale; hence, there
is no reason to invalidate the sale. Registration is only
necessary to bind third parties, which petitioners,
being the heirs of Roque Naranja, are not. The trial
court erred in applying Article 1544 of the Civil Code
to the case at bar since petitioners are not purchasers
of the said properties. Hence, it is not significant that
private respondent failed to register the deed of sale
before the extrajudicial settlement among the heirs.
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision dated March 5, 1997 in
Civil Cases Nos. 7144 and 7214 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof,
judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Civil Case No. 7214 is hereby ordered DISMISSED
for lack of cause of action.
2. In Civil Case No. 7144, the extrajudicial settlement
executed by the heirs of Roque Naranja adjudicating
among themselves Lot No. 4 of the consolidation-
subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs – 886 of the Bacolod
Cadastre is hereby declared null and void for want of
factual and legal basis. The certificate of title issued to
the heirs of Roque Naranja (Transfer Certificate of
[T]i[t]le No. T-140184) as a consequence of the void
extra-judicial settlement is hereby ordered cancelled
and the previous title to Lot No. 4, Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-18764, is hereby ordered reinstated.
Lucilia Belardo is hereby declared the sole and legal
owner of said Lot No. 4, and one-third of Lot No. 2 of
the same consolidation-subdivision plan, Bacolod
Cadastre, by virtue of the deed of sale thereof in her
favor dated August 21, 1981.
SO ORDERED.17
The CA denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration
on September 24, 2003.18 Petitioners filed this
petition for review, raising the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IS CORRECT
IN IGNORING THE POINT RAISED BY
[PETITIONERS] THAT THE DEED OF SALE WHICH
DOES NOT COMPL[Y] WITH THE PROVISIONS OF
ACT NO. 496 IS [NOT] VALID.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED DEED OF
SALE [OF REAL PROPERTIES] IS VALID
CONSIDERING THAT THE CONSENT OF THE
LATE ROQUE NARANJA HAD BEEN VITIATED; x x
x THERE [IS] NO CONCLUSIVE SHOWING THAT
THERE WAS CONSIDERATION AND THERE [ARE]
SERIOUS IRREGULARITIES IN THE
NOTARIZATION OF THE SAID DOCUMENTS.19
In her Comment, private respondent questioned the
Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping
attached to the Petition for Review, which was signed
by a certain Ernesto Villadelgado without a special
power of attorney. In their reply, petitioners remedied
the defect by attaching a Special Power of Attorney
signed by them.
Pursuant to its policy to encourage full adjudication of
the merits of an appeal, the Court had previously
excused the late submission of a special power of
attorney to sign a certification against forum-
shopping.20 But even if we excuse this defect, the
petition nonetheless fails on the merits.
The Court does not agree with petitioners’ contention
that a deed of sale must contain a technical
description of the subject property in order to be valid.
Petitioners anchor their theory on Section 127 of Act
No. 496,21 which provides a sample form of a deed of
sale that includes, in particular, a technical description
of the subject property.
To be valid, a contract of sale need not contain a
technical description of the subject property.
Contracts of sale of real property have no prescribed
form for their validity; they follow the general rule on
contracts that they may be entered into in whatever
form, provided all the essential requisites for their
validity are present.22 The requisites of a valid
contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code
are: (1) consent or meeting of the minds; (2)
determinate subject matter; and (3) price certain in
money or its equivalent.
The failure of the parties to specify with absolute
clarity the object of a contract by including its
technical description is of no moment. What is
important is that there is, in fact, an object that is
determinate or at least determinable, as subject of the
contract of sale. The form of a deed of sale provided
in Section 127 of Act No. 496 is only a suggested
form. It is not a mandatory form that must be strictly
followed by the parties to a contract.
In the instant case, the deed of sale clearly identifies
the subject properties by indicating their respective lot
numbers, lot areas, and the certificate of title covering
them. Resort can always be made to the technical
description as stated in the certificates of title covering
the two properties.
On the alleged nullity of the deed of sale, we hold that
petitioners failed to submit sufficient proof to show
that Roque executed the deed of sale under the
undue influence of Belardo or that the deed of sale
was simulated or without consideration.1avvphi1
A notarized document carries the evidentiary weight
conferred upon it with respect to its due execution,
and documents acknowledged before a notary public
have in their favor the presumption of regularity. It
must be sustained in full force and effect so long as
he who impugns it does not present strong, complete,
and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity on account
of some flaws or defects provided by law.23
Petitioners allege that Belardo unduly influenced
Roque, who was already physically weak and senile
at that time, into executing the deed of sale. Belardo
allegedly took advantage of the fact that Roque was
living in her house and was dependent on her for
support.
There is undue influence when a person takes
improper advantage of his power over the will of
another, depriving the latter of a reasonable freedom
of choice.24 One who alleges any defect, or the lack
of consent to a contract by reason of fraud or undue
influence, must establish by full, clear and convincing
evidence, such specific acts that vitiated the party’s
consent; otherwise, the latter’s presumed consent to
the contract prevails.25 For undue influence to be
present, the influence exerted must have so
overpowered or subjugated the mind of a contracting
party as to destroy his free agency, making him
express the will of another rather than his own.26
Petitioners adduced no proof that Roque had lost
control of his mental faculties at the time of the sale.
Undue influence is not to be inferred from age,
sickness, or debility of body, if sufficient intelligence
remains.27 The evidence presented pertained more
to Roque’s physical condition rather than his mental
condition. On the contrary, Atty. Sanicas, the notary
public, attested that Roque was very healthy and
mentally sound and sharp at the time of the execution
of the deed of sale. Atty. Sanicas said that Roque
also told him that he was a Law graduate.28
Neither was the contract simulated. The late
registration of the Deed of Sale and Roque’s
execution of the second deed of sale in favor of
Dema-ala did not mean that the contract was
simulated. We are convinced with the explanation
given by respondent’s witnesses that the deed of sale
was not immediately registered because Belardo did
not have the money to pay for the fees. This
explanation is, in fact, plausible considering that
Belardo could barely support herself and her brother,
Roque. As for the second deed of sale, Dema-ala,
herself, attested before the trial court that she let
Roque sign the second deed of sale because the title
to the properties were still in his name.

Finally, petitioners argue that the Deed of Sale was

not supported by a consideration since no receipt was
shown, and it is incredulous that Roque, who was
already weak, would travel to Bacolod City just to be
able to execute the Deed of Sale.

The Deed of Sale which states "receipt of which in full

I hereby acknowledge to my entire satisfaction" is an
acknowledgment receipt in itself. Moreover, the
presumption that a contract has sufficient G.R. No. 85240 July 12, 1991
consideration cannot be overthrown by a mere
assertion that it has no consideration.29

HEIRS OF CECILIO (also known as BASILIO)

Heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their
predecessors-in-interest.30 As heirs of Roque,
petitioners are bound by the contract of sale that
Roque executed in favor of Belardo. Having been sold
already to Belardo, the two properties no longer
formed part of Roque’s estate which petitioners could
have inherited. The deed of extrajudicial settlement
that petitioners executed over Lot No. 4 is, therefore,
void, since the property subject thereof did not
become part of Roque’s estate.
CLAUDEL, namely, MODESTA CLAUDEL, LORETA
HERRERA, JOSE CLAUDEL, BENJAMIN CLAUDEL,
PACITA CLAUDEL, CARMELITA CLAUDEL, MARIO
CLAUDEL, ROBERTO CLAUDEL, LEONARDO
CLAUDEL, ARSENIA VILLALON, PERPETUA
CLAUDEL and FELISA CLAUDEL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF MACARIO,
ESPERIDIONA, RAYMUNDA and CELESTINA, all
surnamed CLAUDEL, respondents.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is

DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated Ricardo L. Moldez for petitioners.
September 13, 2002 and Resolution dated September
24, 2003 are AFFIRMED. Juan T. Aquino for private respondents

SO ORDERED.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal
of the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 044291 and the reinstatement of the
decision of the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Rizal, Branch CXI, in Civil Case No. M-5276-P,
entitled. "Heirs of Macario Claudel, et al. v. Heirs of
Cecilio Claudel, et al.," which dismissed the complaint
of the private respondents against the petitioners for
cancellation of titles and reconveyance with
damages.2
As early as December 28, 1922, Basilio also known
as "Cecilio" Claudel, acquired from the Bureau of
Lands, Lot No. 1230 of the Muntinlupa Estate
Subdivision, located in the poblacion of Muntinlupa,
Rizal, with an area of 10,107 square meters; he
secured Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 7471
issued by the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Rizal in 1923; he also declared the lot in his name,
the latest Tax Declaration being No. 5795. He dutifully
paid the real estate taxes thereon until his death in
1937.3 Thereafter, his widow "Basilia" and later, her
son Jose, one of the herein petitioners, paid the
taxes.
The same piece of land purchased by Cecilio would,
however, become the subject of protracted litigation
thirty-nine years after his death.
Two branches of Cecilio's family contested the
ownership over the land-on one hand the children of
Cecilio, namely, Modesto, Loreta, Jose, Benjamin,
Pacita, Carmelita, Roberto, Mario, Leonardo, Nenita,
Arsenia Villalon, and Felisa Claudel, and their children
and descendants, now the herein petitioners
(hereinafter referred to as HEIRS OF CECILIO), and
on the other, the brother and sisters of Cecilio,
namely, Macario, Esperidiona, Raymunda, and
Celestina and their children and descendants, now
the herein private respondents (hereinafter referred to
as SIBLINGS OF CECILIO). In 1972, the HEIRS OF
CECILIO partitioned this lot among themselves and
obtained the corresponding Transfer Certificates of
Title on their shares, as follows:
TCT No. 395391 1,997 sq. m. –– Jose
Claudel
TCT No. 395392 1,997 sq. m. –– Modesta
Claudel and children
TCT No. 395393 1,997 sq. m. –– Armenia
C. Villalon
TCT No. 395394 1,997 sq. m. –– Felisa
Claudel4
Four years later, on December 7, 1976, private
respondents SIBLINGS OF CECILIO, filed Civil Case
No. 5276-P as already adverted to at the outset, with
the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, a "Complaint
for Cancellation of Titles and Reconveyance with
Damages," alleging that 46 years earlier, or sometime
in 1930, their parents had purchased from the late
Cecilio Claudel several portions of Lot No. 1230 for
the sum of P30.00. They admitted that the transaction
was verbal. However, as proof of the sale, the
SIBLINGS OF CECILIO presented a subdivision plan
of the said land, dated March 25, 1930, indicating the
portions allegedly sold to the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO.
As already mentioned, the then Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch CXI, dismissed the complaint,
disregarding the above sole evidence (subdivision
plan) presented by the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO, thus:
Examining the pleadings as well as the evidence
presented in this case by the parties, the Court can
not but notice that the present complaint was filed in
the name of the Heirs of Macario, Espiridiona,
Raymunda and Celestina, all surnamed Claudel,
without naming the different heirs particularly
involved, and who wish to recover the lots from the
defendants. The Court tried to find this out from the
evidence presented by the plaintiffs but to no avail.
On this point alone, the Court would not be able to
apportion the property to the real party in interest if
ever they are entitled to it as the persons indicated
therein is in generic term (Section 2, Rule 3). The
Court has noticed also that with the exception of
plaintiff Lampitoc and (sic) the heirs of Raymunda
Claudel are no longer residing in the property as they
have (sic) left the same in 1967. But most important of
all the plaintiffs failed to present any document
evidencing the alleged sale of the property to their
predecessors in interest by the father of the
defendants. Considering that the subject matter of the
supposed sale is a real property the absence of any
document evidencing the sale would preclude the
admission of oral testimony (Statute of Frauds).
Moreover, considering also that the alleged sale took
place in 1930, the action filed by the plaintiffs herein
for the recovery of the same more than thirty years
after the cause of action has accrued has already
prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment
dismissing the complaint, without pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.5
On appeal, the following errors6 were assigned by the
SIBLINGS OF CECILIO:
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT DESPITE
CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE SHOWING THE
PORTION SOLD TO EACH OF PLAINTIFFS'
PREDECESSORS.
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PROVE ANY
DOCUMENT EVIDENCING THE ALLEGED SALE.
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
GIVING CREDIT TO THE PLAN, EXHIBIT A,
SHOWING THE PORTIONS SOLD TO EACH OF
THE PLAINTIFFS' PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST.
4. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING PLAINTIFFS AS OWNERS OF THE
PORTION COVERED BY THE PLAN, EXHIBIT A.
5. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLE
NOS. 395391, 395392, 395393 AND 395394 OF THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL AS NULL AND
VOID.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court on the following grounds:
1. The failure to bring and prosecute the action
in the name of the real party in interest, namely the
parties themselves, was not a fatal omission since the
court a quo could have adjudicated the lots to the
SIBLINGS OF CECILIO, the parents of the herein
respondents, leaving it to them to adjudicate the
property among themselves.
2. The fact of residence in the disputed
properties by the herein respondents had been made
possible by the toleration of the deceased Cecilio.
3. The Statute of Frauds applies only to
executory contracts and not to consummated sales as
in the case at bar where oral evidence may be
admitted as cited in Iñigo v. Estate of Magtoto7 and
Diana, et al. v. Macalibo.8
In addition,
. . . Given the nature of their relationship with one
another it is not unusual that no document to
evidence the sale was executed, . . ., in their blind
faith in friends and relatives, in their lack of
experience and foresight, and in their ignorance, men,
in spite of laws, will make and continue to make
verbal contracts. . . .9
4. The defense of prescription cannot be set up
against the herein petitioners despite the lapse of
over forty years from the time of the alleged sale in
1930 up to the filing of the "Complaint for Cancellation
of Titles and Reconveyance . . ." in 1976.
According to the Court of Appeals, the action was not
for the recovery of possession of real property but for
the cancellation of titles issued to the HEIRS OF
CECILIO in 1973. Since the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO
commenced their complaint for cancellation of titles
and reconveyance with damages on December 7,
1976, only four years after the HEIRS OF CECILIO
partitioned this lot among themselves and obtained
the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Titles, then
there is no prescription of action yet.
Thus the respondent court ordered the cancellation of
the Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 395391,
395392, 395393, and 395394 of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal issued in the names of the HEIRS OF
CECILIO and corollarily ordered the execution of the
following deeds of reconveyance:
To Celestina Claudel, Lot 1230-A with an area of 705
sq. m.
To Raymunda Claudel, Lot 1230-B with an area of
599 sq. m.
To Esperidiona Claudel, Lot 1230-C with an area of
597 sq. m.
To Macario Claudel, Lot 1230-D, with an area of 596
sq. m.10
The respondent court also enjoined that this
disposition is without prejudice to the private
respondents, as heirs of their deceased parents, the
SIBLINGS OF CECILIO, partitioning among
themselves in accordance with law the respective
portions sold to and herein adjudicated to their
parents.
The rest of the land, lots 1230-E and 1230-F, with an
area of 598 and 6,927 square meters, respectively
would go to Cecilio or his heirs, the herein petitioners.
Beyond these apportionments, the HEIRS OF
CECILIO would not receive anything else.
The crux of the entire litigation is whether or not the
Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
disposing the question of the true ownership of the
lots.
And the real issues are:
1. Whether or not a contract of sale of land may
be proven orally:
2. Whether or not the prescriptive period for
filing an action for cancellation of titles and
reconveyance with damages (the action filed by the
SIBLINGS OF CECILIO) should be counted from the
alleged sale upon which they claim their ownership
(1930) or from the date of the issuance of the titles
sought to be cancelled in favor of the HEIRS OF
CECILIO (1976).
The rule of thumb is that a sale of land, once
consummated, is valid regardless of the form it may
have been entered into.11 For nowhere does law or
jurisprudence prescribe that the contract of sale be
put in writing before such contract can validly cede or
transmit rights over a certain real property between
the parties themselves.
However, in the event that a third party, as in this
case, disputes the ownership of the property, the
person against whom that claim is brought can not
present any proof of such sale and hence has no
means to enforce the contract. Thus the Statute of
Frauds was precisely devised to protect the parties in
a contract of sale of real property so that no such
contract is enforceable unless certain requisites, for
purposes of proof, are met.
The provisions of the Statute of Frauds pertinent to
the present controversy, state:
Art. 1403 (Civil Code). The following contracts are
unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
xxx xxx xxx
2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of
Frauds as set forth in this number. In the following
cases, an agreement hereafter made shall be
unenforceable by action unless the same, or some
note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and
subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent;
evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be
received without the writing, or a secondary evidence
of its contents:
xxx xxx xxx
e) An agreement for the leasing for a longer
period than one year, or for the sale of real property
or of an interest therein;
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied.)
The purpose of the Statute of Frauds is to prevent
fraud and perjury in the enforcement of obligations
depending for their evidence upon the unassisted
memory of witnesses by requiring certain enumerated
contracts and transactions to be evidenced in
Writing.12
The provisions of the Statute of Frauds originally
appeared under the old Rules of Evidence. However
when the Civil Code was re-written in 1949 (to take
effect in 1950), the provisions of the Statute of Frauds
were taken out of the Rules of Evidence in order to be
included under the title on Unenforceable Contracts in
the Civil Code. The transfer was not only a matter of
style but to show that the Statute of Frauds is also a
substantive law.
Therefore, except under the conditions provided by
the Statute of Frauds, the existence of the contract of
sale made by Cecilio with his siblings13 can not be
proved.
On the second issue, the belated claim of the
SIBLINGS OF CECILIO who filed a complaint in court
only in 1976 to enforce a light acquired allegedly as
early as 1930, is difficult to comprehend.
The Civil Code states:
Art. 1145. The following actions must be
commenced within six years:
(1) Upon an oral contract . . . (Emphasis
supplied).

If the parties SIBLINGS OF CECILIO had allegedly
derived their right of action from the oral purchase
made by their parents in 1930, then the action filed in
1976 would have clearly prescribed. More than six
years had lapsed.
We do not agree with the parties SIBLINGS OF
CECILIO when they reason that an implied trust in
favor of the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO was established
in 1972, when the HEIRS OF CECILIO executed a
contract of partition over the said properties.
But as we had pointed out, the law recognizes the
superiority of the torrens title.
Above all, the torrens title in the possession of the
HEIRS OF CECILIO carries more weight as proof of
ownership than the survey or subdivision plan of a
parcel of land in the name of SIBLINGS OF CECILIO.
The Court has invariably upheld the indefeasibility of
the torrens title. No possession by any person of any
portion of the land could defeat the title of the
registered owners thereof.14
A torrens title, once registered, cannot be defeated,
even by adverse, open and notorious possession. A
registered title under the torrens system cannot be
defeated by prescription.1âwphi1 The title, once
registered, is notice to the world. All persons must
take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the
registration.15
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore, a private individual may not bring an
action for reversion or any action which would have
the effect of cancelling a free patent and the
corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis
thereof, with the result that the land covered thereby
will again form part of the public domain, as only the
Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead may
do so.16
It is true that in some instances, the Court did away
with the irrevocability of the torrens title, but the
circumstances in the case at bar varied significantly
from these cases.
In Bornales v. IAC, 17 the defense of indefeasibility of
a certificate of title was disregarded when the
transferee who took it had notice of the flaws in the
transferor's title. No right passed to a transferee from
a vendor who did not have any in the first place. The
transferees bought the land registered under the
torrens system from vendors who procured title
thereto by means of fraud. With this knowledge, they
can not invoke the indefeasibility of a certificate of title
against the private respondent to the extent of her
interest. This is because the torrens system of land
registration, though indefeasible, should not be used
as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful
owner of real property.
Mere registration of the sale is not good enough, good
faith must concur with registration. Otherwise
registration becomes an exercise in futility.18
In Amerol v. Bagumbaran,19 we reversed the
decision of the trial court. In this case, the title was
wrongfully registered in another person's name. An
implied trust was therefore created. This trustee was
compelled by law to reconvey property fraudulently
acquired notwithstanding the irrevocability of the
torrens title.20
In the present case, however, the facts belie the claim
of ownership.
For several years, when the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO,
namely, Macario, Esperidiona Raymunda, and
Celestina were living on the contested premises, they
regularly paid a sum of money, designated as "taxes"
at first, to the widow of Cecilio, and later, to his
heirs.21 Why their payments were never directly
made to the Municipal Government of Muntinlupa
when they were intended as payments for "taxes" is
difficult to square with their claim of ownership. We
are rather inclined to consider this fact as an
admission of non-ownership. And when we consider
also that the petitioners HEIRS OF CECILIO had
individually paid to the municipal treasury the taxes
corresponding to the particular portions they were
occupying,22 we can readily see the superiority of the
petitioners' position.
Renato Solema and Decimina Calvez, two of the
respondents who derive their right from the SIBLINGS
OF CLAUDEL, bought a portion of the lot from Felisa
Claudel, one of the HEIRS OF CLAUDEL.23 The
Calvezes should not be paying for a lot that they
already owned and if they did not acknowledge Felisa
as its owner.
In addition, before any of the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO
could stay on any of the portions of the property, they
had to ask first the permission of Jose Claudel again,
one of the HEIRS OF CECILIO.24 In fact the only
reason why any of the heirs of SIBLINGS OF
CECILIO could stay on the lot was because they were
allowed to do so by the HEIRS OF CECILIO.25
In view of the foregoing, we find that the appellate
court committed a reversible error in denigrating the
transfer certificates of title of the petitioners to the
survey or subdivision plan proffered by the private
respondents. The Court generally recognizes the
profundity of conclusions and findings of facts
reached by the trial court and hence sustains them on
appeal except for strong and cogent reasons
inasmuch as the trial court is in a better position to
examine real evidence and observe the demeanor of
witnesses in a case.
No clear specific contrary evidence was cited by the
respondent appellate court to justify the reversal of
the lower court's findings. Thus, in this case, between
the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate
court, those of the trial court must prevail over that of
the latter.26
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED We
REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision rendered in
CA-G.R. CV No. 04429, and we hereby REINSTATE
the decision of the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal (Branch 28, Pasay City) in Civil Case No. M-
5276-P which ruled for the dismissal of the Complaint
for Cancellation of Titles and Reconveyance with
Damages filed by the Heirs of Macario, Esperidiona
Raymunda, and Celestina, all surnamed CLAUDEL.
Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 154953 : June 26, 2008]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v.
T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review 1 assailing
the 21 August 2002 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658. The Court of Appeals
affirmed in toto the 16 December 1999 Decision3 of
the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas,
Branch 6 (trial court) in Land Registration Case No. T-
635.
The Antecedent Facts
This case originated from an Application for Original
Registration of Title filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc.
covering Lot 10705-B of the subdivision plan Csd-04-
019741 which is a portion of the consolidated Lot
10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre. The land, with
an area of 564,007 square meters, or 56.4007
hectares, is located at San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas,
Batangas.
On 31 August 1999, the trial court set the case for
initial hearing at 9:30 a.m. on 11 November 1999. The
Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the Official
Gazette, 20 September 1999 issue, Volume 95, No.
38, pages 6793 to 6794,4 and in the 18 October 1999
issue of People's Journal Taliba,5 a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines. The Notice of
Initial Hearing was also posted in a conspicuous place
on the bulletin board of the Municipal Building of Sto.
Tomas, Batangas, as well as in a conspicuous place
on the land.6 All adjoining owners and all government
agencies and offices concerned were notified of the
initial hearing.7
On 11 November 1999, when the trial court called the
case for initial hearing, there was no oppositor other
than the Opposition dated 7 October 1999 of the
Republic of the Philippines represented by the
Director of Lands (petitioner). On 15 November 1999,
the trial court issued an Order8 of General Default
against the whole world except as against petitioner.
During the hearing on 19 November 1999, Ceferino
Carandang (Carandang) appeared as oppositor. The
trial court gave Carandang until 29 November 1999
within which to file his written opposition.9 Carandang
failed to file his written opposition and to appear in the
succeeding hearings. In an Order10 dated 13
December 1999, the trial court reinstated the Order of
General Default.
During the hearings conducted on 13 and 14
December 1999, respondent presented three
witnesses: Anthony Dimayuga Torres (Torres),
respondent's Operations Manager and its authorized
representative in the case; Primitivo Evangelista
(Evangelista), a 72-year old resident of San
Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas since birth; and
Regalado Marquez, Records Officer II of the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), Quezon City.
The testimonies of respondent's witnesses showed
that Prospero Dimayuga (Kabesang Puroy) had
peaceful, adverse, open, and continuous possession
of the land in the concept of an owner since 1942.
Upon his death, Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by
his son Antonio Dimayuga (Antonio). On 27
September 1960, Antonio executed a Deed of
Donation covering the land in favor of one of his
children, Fortunato Dimayuga (Fortunato). Later,
however, Antonio gave Fortunato another piece of
land. Hence, on 26 April 1961, Antonio executed a
Partial Revocation of Donation, and the land was
adjudicated to one of Antonio's children, Prospero
Dimayuga (Porting).11 On 8 August 1997, Porting
sold the land to Respondent.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its 16 December 1999 Decision, the trial court
adjudicated the land in favor of respondent.
The trial court ruled that a juridical person or a
corporation could apply for registration of land
provided such entity and its predecessors-in-interest
have possessed the land for 30 years or more. The
trial court ruled that the facts showed that
respondent's predecessors-in-interest possessed the
land in the concept of an owner prior to 12 June 1945,
which possession converted the land to private
property.
The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, and upon previous confirmation of the
Order of General Default, the Court hereby
adjudicates and decrees Lot 10705-B, identical to Lot
13637, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre, on plan Csd-
04-019741, situated in Barangay of San Bartolome,
Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of Batangas,
with an area of 564,007 square meters, in favor of
and in the name of T.A.N. Properties, Inc., a domestic
corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws with principal office at 19th Floor,
PDCP Bank Building, 8737 Paseo de Roxas, Makati
City.
Once this Decision shall have become final, let the
corresponding decree of registration be issued.
SO ORDERED.12
Petitioner appealed from the trial court's Decision.
Petitioner alleged that the trial court erred in granting
the application for registration absent clear evidence
that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest
have complied with the period of possession and
occupation as required by law. Petitioner alleged that
the testimonies of Evangelista and Torres are general
in nature. Considering the area involved, petitioner
argued that additional witnesses should have been
presented to corroborate Evangelista's testimony.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its 21 August 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals
affirmed in toto the trial court's Decision.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Evangelista's
knowledge of the possession and occupation of the
land stemmed not only from the fact that he worked
there for three years but also because he and
Kabesang Puroy were practically neighbors. On
Evangelista's failure to mention the name of his uncle
who continuously worked on the land, the Court of
Appeals ruled that Evangelista should not be faulted
as he was not asked to name his uncle when he
testified. The Court of Appeals also ruled that at the
outset, Evangelista disclaimed knowledge of
Fortunato's relation to Kabesang Puroy, but this did
not affect Evangelista's statement that Fortunato took
over the possession and cultivation of the land after
Kabesang Puroy's death. The Court of Appeals
further ruled that the events regarding the acquisition
and disposition of the land became public knowledge
because San Bartolome was a small community. On
the matter of additional witnesses, the Court of
Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to cite any law
requiring the corroboration of the sole witness'
testimony.
The Court of Appeals further ruled that Torres was a
competent witness since he was only testifying on the
fact that he had caused the filing of the application for
registration and that respondent acquired the land
from Porting.
Petitioner comes to this Court assailing the Court of
Appeals' Decision. Petitioner raises the following
grounds in its Memorandum:
The Court of Appeals erred on a question of law in
allowing the grant of title to applicant corporation
despite the following:
1. Absence of showing that it or its predecessors-in-
interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation in the concept
of an owner since 12 June 1945 or earlier;
andcralawlibrary
2. Disqualification of applicant corporation to acquire
the subject tract of land.13
The Issues
The issues may be summarized as follows:
1. Whether the land is alienable and disposable;
2. Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest
had open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in the concept
of an owner since June 1945 or earlier;
andcralawlibrary
3. Whether respondent is qualified to apply for
registration of the land under the Public Land Act.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
Respondent Failed to Prove
that the Land is Alienable and Disposable
Petitioner argues that anyone who applies for
registration has the burden of overcoming the
presumption that the land forms part of the public
domain. Petitioner insists that respondent failed to
prove that the land is no longer part of the public
domain.
The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not
appearing to be clearly of private dominion
presumably belong to the State.14 The onus to
overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the
presumption that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable and disposable rests with the
applicant.15
In this case, respondent submitted two certifications
issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). The 3 June 1997 Certification by
the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Offices (CENRO), Batangas City,16 certified that "lot
10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre situated at
Barangay San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas with
an area of 596,116 square meters falls within the
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ZONE under Project
No. 30, Land Classification Map No. 582 certified [on]
31 December 1925." The second certification17 in the
form of a memorandum to the trial court, which was
issued by the Regional Technical Director, Forest
Management Services of the DENR (FMS-DENR),
stated "that the subject area falls within an alienable
and disposable land, Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas,
Batangas certified on Dec. 31, 1925 per LC No. 582."
The certifications are not sufficient. DENR
Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20,18 dated 30 May
1988, delineated the functions and authorities of the
offices within the DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series of
1988, the CENRO issues certificates of land
classification status for areas below 50 hectares. The
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Offices (PENRO) issues certificate of land
classification status for lands covering over 50
hectares. DAO No. 38,19 dated 19 April 1990,
amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No. 38,
series of 1990 retained the authority of the CENRO to
issue certificates of land classification status for areas
below 50 hectares, as well as the authority of the
PENRO to issue certificates of land classification
status for lands covering over 50 hectares.20 In this
case, respondent applied for registration of Lot
10705-B. The area covered by Lot 10705-B is over 50
hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO
certificate covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area
of 596,116 square meters which, as per DAO No. 38,
series of 1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO
to certify as alienable and disposable.
The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no
authority under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to issue
certificates of land classification. Under DAO No. 20,
the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor
products (OM) permits except rattan;
2. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
3. Approves renewal of special use permits covering
over five hectares for public infrastructure projects;
andcralawlibrary
4. Issues renewal of certificates of registration for
logs, poles, piles, and lumber dealers.
Under DAO No. 38, the Regional Technical Director,
FMS-DENR:
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor
[products] (OM) permits except rattan;
2. Issues renewal of certificate of registration for logs,
poles, and piles and lumber dealers;
3. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
4. Issues public gratuitous permits for 20 to 50 cubic
meters within calamity declared areas for public
infrastructure projects; andcralawlibrary
5. Approves original and renewal of special use
permits covering over five hectares for public
infrastructure projects.
Hence, the certification issued by the Regional
Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in the form of a
memorandum to the trial court, has no probative
value.
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to
certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The
applicant for land registration must prove that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classification
and released the land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of
the application for registration falls within the
approved area per verification through survey by the
PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land
registration must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records. These facts must be established to
prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Respondent failed to do so because the certifications
presented by respondent do not, by themselves,
prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Only Torres, respondent's Operations Manager,
identified the certifications submitted by respondent.
The government officials who issued the certifications
were not presented before the trial court to testify on
their contents. The trial court should not have
accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of
the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are
presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence,
they have no probative value in establishing that the
land is alienable and disposable.
Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule
132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as follows:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official
acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public
except last wills and testaments; andcralawlibrary
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private
documents required by law to be entered therein.
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public
documents referred to in Section 19(a), when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy x x x. The CENRO is not the official repository
or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR
Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and
disposable. The CENRO should have attached an
official publication21 of the DENR Secretary's
issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence provides:
Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents
consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other
public documents are evidence, even against a third
person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution
and of the date of the latter.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-
DENR, certifications do not fall within the class of
public documents contemplated in the first sentence
of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not
reflect "entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer," such as
entries made by the Civil Registrar22 in the books of
registries, or by a ship captain in the ship's
logbook.23 The certifications are not the certified
copies or authenticated reproductions of original
official records in the legal custody of a government
office. The certifications are not even records of public
documents.24 The certifications are conclusions
unsupported by adequate proof, and thus have no
probative value.25 Certainly, the certifications cannot
be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-
DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B
falls within the alienable and disposable land as
proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such government
certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the
facts stated therein.26 Such government certifications
may fall under the class of documents contemplated
in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As
such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of
their due execution and date of issuance but they do
not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein.
The Court has also ruled that a document or writing
admitted as part of the testimony of a witness does
not constitute proof of the facts stated therein.27
Here, Torres, a private individual and respondent's
representative, identified the certifications but the
government officials who issued the certifications did
not testify on the contents of the certifications. As
such, the certifications cannot be given probative
value.28 The contents of the certifications are
hearsay because Torres was incompetent to testify on
the veracity of the contents of the certifications.29
Torres did not prepare the certifications, he was not
an officer of CENRO or FMS-DENR, and he did not
conduct any verification survey whether the land falls
within the area classified by the DENR Secretary as
alienable and disposable.
Petitioner also points out the discrepancy as to when
the land allegedly became alienable and disposable.
The DENR Secretary certified that based on Land
Classification Map No. 582, the land became
alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925.
However, the certificate on the blue print plan states
that it became alienable and disposable on 31
December 1985.
We agree with petitioner that while the certifications
submitted by respondent show that under the Land
Classification Map No. 582, the land became
alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925, the
blue print plan states that it became alienable and
disposable on 31 December 1985. Respondent
alleged that "the blue print plan merely serves to
prove the precise location and the metes and bounds
of the land described therein x x x and does not in any
way certify the nature and classification of the land
involved."30 It is true that the notation by a surveyor-
geodetic engineer on the survey plan that the land
formed part of the alienable and disposable land of
the public domain is not sufficient proof of the land's
classification.31 However, respondent should have at
least presented proof that would explain the
discrepancy in the dates of classification. Marquez,
LRA Records Officer II, testified that the documents
submitted to the court consisting of the tracing cloth
plan, the technical description of Lot 10705-B, the
approved subdivision plan, and the Geodetic
Engineer's certification were faithful reproductions of
the original documents in the LRA office. He did not
explain the discrepancy in the dates. Neither was the
Geodetic Engineer presented to explain why the date
of classification on the blue print plan was different
from the other certifications submitted by Respondent.
There was No Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and
Notorious
Possession and Occupation in the Concept of an
Owner
Petitioner alleges that the trial court's reliance on the
testimonies of Evangelista and Torres was misplaced.
Petitioner alleges that Evangelista's statement that
the possession of respondent's predecessors-in-
interest was open, public, continuous, peaceful, and
adverse to the whole world was a general conclusion
of law rather than factual evidence of possession of
title. Petitioner alleges that respondent failed to
establish that its predecessors-in-interest had held the
land openly, continuously, and exclusively for at least
30 years after it was declared alienable and
disposable.
We agree with petitioner.
Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy had been
in possession of the land before 1945. Yet,
Evangelista only worked on the land for three years.
Evangelista testified that his family owned a lot near
Kabesang Puroy's land. The Court of Appeals took
note of this and ruled that Evangelista's knowledge of
Kabesang Puroy's possession of the land stemmed
"not only from the fact that he had worked thereat but
more so that they were practically neighbors."32 The
Court of Appeals observed:
In a small community such as that of San Bartolome,
Sto. Tomas, Batangas, it is not difficult to understand
that people in the said community knows each and
everyone. And, because of such familiarity with each
other, news or events regarding the acquisition or
disposition for that matter, of a vast tract of land
spreads like wildfire, thus, the reason why such an
event became of public knowledge to them.33
Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy was
succeeded by Fortunato. However, he admitted that
he did not know the exact relationship between
Kabesang Puroy and Fortunato, which is rather
unusual for neighbors in a small community. He did
not also know the relationship between Fortunato and
Porting. In fact, Evangelista's testimony is contrary to
the factual finding of the trial court that Kabesang
Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio, not by
Fortunato who was one of Antonio's children. Antonio
was not even mentioned in Evangelista's testimony.
The Court of Appeals ruled that there is no law that
requires that the testimony of a single witness needs
corroboration. However, in this case, we find
Evangelista's uncorroborated testimony insufficient to
prove that respondent's predecessors-in-interest had
been in possession of the land in the concept of an
owner for more than 30 years. We cannot consider
the testimony of Torres as sufficient corroboration.
Torres testified primarily on the fact of respondent's
acquisition of the land. While he claimed to be related
to the Dimayugas, his knowledge of their possession
of the land was hearsay. He did not even tell the trial
court where he obtained his information.
The tax declarations presented were only for the
years starting 1955. While tax declarations are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute
proof of claim of ownership.34 Respondent did not
present any credible explanation why the realty taxes
were only paid starting 1955 considering the claim
that the Dimayugas were allegedly in possession of
the land before 1945. The payment of the realty taxes
starting 1955 gives rise to the presumption that the
Dimayugas claimed ownership or possession of the
land only in that year.
Land Application by a Corporation
Petitioner asserts that respondent, a private
corporation, cannot apply for registration of the land of
the public domain in this case.
We agree with petitioner.
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
Sec. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and
national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain
may be further classified by law according to the uses
to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the
public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands.
Private corporations or associations may not hold
such alienable lands of the public domain except by
lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and
not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens
of the Philippines may lease not more than five
hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve
hectares thereof by purchase, homestead or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation,
ecology, and development, and subject to the
requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall
determine, by law, the size of lands of the public
domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or
leased and the conditions therefor.
The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land
of the public domain. In Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority,35 the Court traced the law on disposition of
lands of the public domain. Under the 1935
Constitution, there was no prohibition against private
corporations from acquiring agricultural land. The
1973 Constitution limited the alienation of lands of the
public domain to individuals who were citizens of the
Philippines. Under the 1973 Constitution, private
corporations, even if wholly owned by Filipino citizens,
were no longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of
the public domain. The present 1987 Constitution
continues the prohibition against private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.36 The Court explained in Chavez:
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in
the 1973 Constitution banning private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987
Constitution allows private corporations to hold
alienable lands of the public domain only through
lease. x x x x
[I]f the constitutional intent is to prevent huge
landholdings, the Constitution could have simply
limited the size of alienable lands of the public domain
that corporations could acquire. The Constitution
could have followed the limitations on individuals, who
could acquire not more than 24 hectares of alienable
lands of the public domain under the 1973
Constitution, and not more than 12 hectares under the
1987 Constitution.
If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic
family-size farms, placing the land in the name of a
corporation would be more effective in preventing the
break-up of farmlands. If the farmland is registered in
the name of a corporation, upon the death of the
owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the
corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the
farmland. This would prevent the continuing break-up
of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one
generation to the next.
In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens
the constitutional limitation on individuals from
acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable
lands of the public domain. Without the constitutional
ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum
area of alienable lands of the public domain could
easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable
public lands. An individual could own as many
corporations as his means would allow him. An
individual could even hide his ownership of a
corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders
of the corporation. The corporation is a convenient
vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation on
acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the
public domain.
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of only a limited
area of alienable land of the public domain to a
qualified individual. This constitutional intent is
safeguarded by the provision prohibiting corporations
from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain,
since the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional
intent is removed. The available alienable public lands
are gradually decreasing in the face of an ever-
growing population. The most effective way to insure
faithful adherence to this constitutional intent is to
grant or sell alienable lands of the public domain only
to individuals. This, it would seem, is the practical
benefit arising from the constitutional ban.37
In Director of Lands v. IAC,38 the Court allowed the
land registration proceeding filed by Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc. (Acme) for five parcels of land with
an area of 481,390 square meters, or 48.139
hectares, which Acme acquired from members of the
Dumagat tribe. The issue in that case was whether
the title could be confirmed in favor of Acme when the
proceeding was instituted after the effectivity of the
1973 Constitution which prohibited private
corporations or associations from holding alienable
lands of the public domain except by lease not to
exceed 1,000 hectares. The Court ruled that the land
was already private land when Acme acquired it from
its owners in 1962, and thus Acme acquired a
registrable title. Under the 1935 Constitution, private
corporations could acquire public agricultural lands
not exceeding 1,024 hectares while individuals could
acquire not more than 144 hectares.39
In Director of Lands, the Court further ruled that open,
exclusive, and undisputed possession of alienable
land for the period prescribed by law created the legal
fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the
requisite period, ipso jure and without the need of
judicial or other sanction ceases to be public land and
becomes private property. The Court ruled:
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical
inevitability of considering possession of public land
which is of the character and duration prescribed by
statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the
State than the dictum of the statute itself that the
possessor(s) "x x x shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title x x x." No proof being admissible to overcome
a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings
would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the
most limited to ascertaining whether the possession
claimed is of the required character and length of
time; and registration thereunder would not confer
title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The
proceedings would not originally convert the land from
public to private land, but only confirm such a
conversion already effected by operation of law from
the moment the required period of possession
became complete.
x x x [A]lienable public land held by a possessor,
personally or through his predecessors-in-interest,
openly, continuously and exclusively for the
prescribed statutory period of (30 years under The
Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private
property by the mere lapse or completion of said
period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis
of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal
was already private property at the time it was
acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby
acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no
prohibition against said corporation's holding or
owning private land. x x x.40 (Emphasis
supplied)cralawlibrary
Director of Lands is not applicable to the present
case. In Director of Lands, the "land x x x was already
private property at the time it was acquired x x x by
Acme." In this case, respondent acquired the land on
8 August 1997 from Porting, who, along with his
predecessors-in-interest, has not shown to have
been, as of that date, in open, continuous, and
adverse possession of the land for 30 years since 12
June 1945. In short, when respondent acquired the
land from Porting, the land was not yet private
property.
For Director of Lands to apply and enable a
corporation to file for registration of alienable and
disposable land, the corporation must have acquired
the land when its transferor had already a vested right
to a judicial confirmation of title to the land by virtue of
his open, continuous and adverse possession of the
land in the concept of an owner for at least 30 years
since 12 June 1945. Thus, in Natividad v. Court of
Appeals,41 the Court declared:
Under the facts of this case and pursuant to the
above rulings, the parcels of land in question had
already been converted to private ownership through
acquisitive prescription by the predecessors-in-
interest of TCMC when the latter purchased them in
1979. All that was needed was the confirmation of the
titles of the previous owners or predecessors-in-
interest of TCMC.
Being already private land when TCMC bought them
in 1979, the prohibition in the 1973 Constitution
against corporations acquiring alienable lands of the
public domain except through lease (Article XIV,
Section 11, 1973 Constitution) did not apply to them
for they were no longer alienable lands of the public
domain but private property.
What is determinative for the doctrine in Director of
Lands to apply is for the corporate applicant for land
registration to establish that when it acquired the land,
the same was already private land by operation of law
because the statutory acquisitive prescriptive period
of 30 years had already lapsed. The length of
possession of the land by the corporation cannot be
tacked on to complete the statutory 30 years
acquisitive prescriptive period. Only an individual can
avail of such acquisitive prescription since both the
1973 and 1987 Constitutions prohibit corporations
from acquiring lands of the public domain.
Admittedly, a corporation can at present still apply for
original registration of land under the doctrine in
Director of Lands. Republic Act No. 917642 (RA
9176) further amended the Public Land Act43 and
extended the period for the filing of applications for
judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles
to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain until 31 December 2020. Thus:
Sec. 2. Section 47, Chapter VIII of the same Act, as
amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 47. The persons specified in the next following
section are hereby granted time, not to extend beyond
December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the
benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period
shall apply only where the area applied for does not
exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That
the several periods of time designated by the
President in accordance with Section Forty-five of this
Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the
provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not
be construed as prohibiting any of said persons from
acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the
period fixed by the President.

Sec. 3. All pending applications filed before the

effectivity of this amendatory Act shall be treated as
having been filed in accordance with the provisions of
this Act.

Under RA 9176, the application for judicial

confirmation is limited only to 12 hectares, consistent
with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution that
a private individual may only acquire not more than 12
hectares of alienable and disposable land. Hence,
respondent, as successor-in-interest of an individual
owner of the land, cannot apply for registration of land
in excess of 12 hectares. Since respondent applied
for 56.4007 hectares, the application for the excess
area of 44.4007 hectares is contrary to law, and thus
void ab initio. In applying for land registration, a
private corporation cannot have any right higher than
its predecessor-in-interest from whom it derived its
right. This assumes, of course, that the corporation
acquired the land, not exceeding 12 hectares, when
the land had already become private land by
operation of law. In the present case, respondent has
failed to prove that any portion of the land was
already private land when respondent acquired it from G.R. No. L-17652 June 30, 1962
Porting in 1997.

IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners,

WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 21 August 2002
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. vs.
66658 and the 16 December 1999 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO
in Land Registration Case No. T-635. We DENY the CALALUNG, and ESTEBAN CALALUNG,
application for registration filed by T.A.N. Properties, respondents.
Inc.

Bartolome Guirao and Antonio M. Orara for

SO ORDERED. petitioners.

Gonzales and Fernandez for respondents.

BARRERA, J.:

This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio,
Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia Grande, from the
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 25169-
R) reversing that of the Court of First Instance of
Isabela (Civil Case No. 1171), and dismissing
petitioners' action against respondents Domingo and
Esteban Calalung, to quiet title to and recover
possession of a parcel of land allegedly occupied by
the latter without petitioners' consent.
The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly
are: Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land,
with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio
Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay (formerly
Tumauini), province of Isabela, by inheritance from
their deceased mother Patricia Angui (who inherited it
from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in
whose name said land appears registered, as shown
by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982, issued on
June 9, 1934). Said property is identified as Lot No. 1,
Plan PSU-83342. When it was surveyed for purposes
of registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern
boundary was the Cagayan River (the same boundary
stated in the title). Since then, and for many years
thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern
side took place, by action of the current of the
Cagayan River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank
thereof had receded to a distance of about 105
meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of
19,964 square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or
less, had been added to the registered area (Exh. C-
1).
On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the
present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela
against respondents, to quiet title to said portion
(19,964 square meters) formed by accretion, alleging
in their complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 1171)
that they and their predecessors-in-interest, were
formerly in peaceful and continuous possession
thereof, until September, 1948, when respondents
entered upon the land under claim of ownership.
Petitioners also asked for damages corresponding to
the value of the fruits of the land as well as attorney's
fees and costs. In their answer (dated February 18,
1958), respondents claim ownership in themselves,
asserting that they have been in continuous, open,
and undisturbed possession of said portion, since
prior to the year 1933 to the present.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on
May 4, 1959, rendered a decision adjudging the
ownership of the portion in question to petitioners,
and ordering respondents to vacate the premises and
deliver possession thereof to petitioners, and to pay to
the latter P250.00 as damages and costs. Said
decision, in part, reads:
It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in
this action was formed by the gradual deposit of
alluvium brought about by the action of the Cagayan
River, a navigable river. We are inclined to believe
that the accretion was formed on the northeastern
side of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 2982 after the survey of the registered land in
1931, because the surveyors found out that the
northeastern boundary of the land surveyed by them
was the Cagayan River, and not the land in question.
Which is indicative of the fact that the accretion has
not yet started or begun in 1931. And, as declared by
Pedro Laman, defendant witness and the boundary
owner on the northwest of the registered land of the
plaintiffs, the accretion was a little more than one
hectare, including the stony portion, in 1940 or 1941.
Therefore, the declarations of the defendant Domingo
Calalung and his witness, Vicente C. Bacani, to the
effect that the land in question was formed by
accretion since 1933 do not only contradict the
testimony of defendants' witness Pedro Laman, but
could not overthrow the incontestable fact that the
accretion with an area of 4 hectare more or less, was
formed in 1948, reason for which, it was only declared
in that same year for taxation purposes by the
defendants under Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") when
they entered upon the land. We could not give
credence to defendants' assertion that Tax Dec. No.
257 (Exh. "2") cancelled Tax Dee. No. 28226 (Exh.
"1"), because Exh. "2" says that "tax under this
declaration begins with the year 1948. But, the fact
that defendants declared the land for taxation
purposes since 1948, does not mean that they
become the owner of the land by mere occupancy, for
it is a new provision of the New Civil Code that
ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by
occupation (Art. 714, New Civil Code). The land in
question being an accretion to the mother or
registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion belongs
to the plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil Code; Art. 366,
Old Civil Code). Assuming arguendo, that the
accretion has been occupied by the defendants since
1948, or earlier, is of no moment, because the law
does not require any act of possession on the part of
the owner of the riparian owner, from the moment the
deposit becomes manifest (Roxas v. Tuason, 9 Phil.
408; Cortez v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Further,
no act of appropriation on the part of the reparian
owner is necessary, in order to acquire ownership of
the alluvial formation, as the law does not require the
same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp. 321-326).
This brings us now to the determination of whether
the defendants, granting that they have been in
possession of the alluvium since 1948, could have
acquired the property by prescription. Assuming that
they occupied the land in September, 1948, but
considering that the action was commenced on
January 25, 1958, they have not been in possession
of the land for ten (10) years; hence, they could not
have acquired the land by ordinary prescription (Arts.
1134 and 1138, New Civil Code). Moreover, as the
alluvium is, by law, part and parcel of the registered
property, the same may be considered as registered
property, within the meaning of Section 46 of Act No.
496: and, therefore, it could not be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession by another
person.
Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which rendered, on September 14, 1960, the
decision adverted to at the beginning of this opinion,
partly stating:
That the area in controversy has been formed through
a gradual process of alluvium, which started in the
early thirties, is a fact conclusively established by the
evidence for both parties. By law, therefore, unless
some superior title has supervened, it should properly
belong to the riparian owners, specifically in
accordance with the rule of natural accession in
Article 366 of the old Civil Code (now Article 457),
which provides that "to the owner of lands adjoining
the banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters." The defendants, however, contend that they
have acquired ownership through prescription. This
contention poses the real issue in this case. The
Court a quo, has resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs,
on two grounds: First, since by accession, the land in
question pertains to the original estate, and since in
this instance the original estate is registered, the
accretion, consequently, falls within the purview of
Section 46 of Act No. 496, which states that "no title
to registered land in derogation to that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession"; and, second, the adverse
possession of the defendant began only in the month
of September, 1948, or less than the 10-year period
required for prescription before the present action was
instituted.
As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by
the trial court, is not quite correct. An accretion to
registered land, while declared by specific provision of
the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land as a
natural accession thereof, does not ipso jure become
entitled to the protection of the rule of imprescriptibility
of title established by the Land Registration Act. Such
protection does not extend beyond the area given and
described in the certificate. To hold otherwise, would
be productive of confusion. It would virtually deprive
the title, and the technical description of the land
given therein, of their character of conclusiveness as
to the identity and area of the land that is registered.
Just as the Supreme Court, albeit in a negative
manner, has stated that registration does not protect
the riparian owner against the erosion of the area of
his land through gradual changes in the course of the
adjoining stream (Payatas Estate Development Co. v.
Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so registration does not entitle
him to all the rights conferred by Land Registration
Act, in so far as the area added by accretion is
concerned. What rights he has, are declared not by
said Act, but by the provisions of the Civil Code on
accession: and these provisions do not preclude
acquisition of the addition area by another person
through prescription. This Court has held as much in
the case of Galindez, et al. v. Baguisa, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19249-R, July 17, 1959.

We now proposed to review the second ground relied
upon by the trial court, regarding the length of time
that the defendants have been in possession.
Domingo Calalung testified that he occupied the land
in question for the first time in 1934, not in 1948 as
claimed by the plaintiffs. The area under occupancy
gradually increased as the years went by. In 1946, he
declared the land for purposes of taxation (Exhibit 1).
This tax declaration was superseded in 1948 by
another (Exhibit 2), after the name of the municipality
wherein it is located was changed from Tumauini to
Magsaysay. Calalung's testimony is corroborated by
two witnesses, both owners of properties nearby.
Pedro Laman, 72 years of age, who was Municipal
president of Tumauini for three terms, said that the
land in question adjoins his own on the south, and
that since 1940 or 1951, he has always known it to be
in the peaceful possession of the defendants. Vicente
C. Bacani testified to the same effect, although, he
said that the defendants' possession started
sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area thereof, he said,
was then less than one hectare.
We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to
much greater weight and credence than that of the
plaintiff Pedro Grande and his lone witness, Laureana
Rodriguez. The first stated that the defendants
occupied the land in question only in 1948; that he
called the latter's attention to the fact that the land
was his, but the defendants, in turn, claimed that they
were the owners, that the plaintiffs did not file an
action until 1958, because it was only then that they
were able to obtain the certificate of title from the
surveyor, Domingo Parlan; and that they never
declared the land in question for taxation purposes or
paid the taxes thereon. Pedro Grande admitted that
the defendants had the said land surveyed in April,
1958, and that he tried to stop it, not because he
claimed the accretion for himself and his co-plaintiffs,
but because the survey included a portion of the
property covered by their title. This last fact is
conceded by the defendants who, accordingly,
relinquished their possession to the part thus
included, containing an area of some 458 square
meters.1äwphï1.ñët
The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the
period of their possession — from 1933 to 1958 — is
not only preponderant in itself, but is, moreover,
supported by the fact that it is they and not the
plaintiffs who declared the disputed property for
taxation, and by the additional circumstance that if the
plaintiff had really been in prior possession and were
deprived thereof in 1948, they would have
immediately taken steps to recover the same. The
excuse they gave for not doing so, namely, that they
did not receive their copy of the certificate of title to
their property until 1958 for lack of funds to pay the
fees of the surveyor Domingo Parlan, is too flimsy to
merit any serious consideration. The payment of the
surveyor's fees had nothing to do with their right to
obtain a copy of the certificate. Besides, it was not
necessary for them to have it in their hands, in order
to file an action to recover the land which was legally
theirs by accession and of which, as they allege, they
had been illegally deprived by the defendants. We are
convinced, upon consideration of the evidence, that
the latter, were really in possession since 1934,
immediately after the process of alluvion started, and
that the plaintiffs woke up to their rights only when
they received their copy of the title in 1958. By then,
however, prescription had already supervened in
favor of the defendants.
It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which
petitioners seek to be reviewed by us.
The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether
respondents have acquired the alluvial property in
question through prescription.
There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of
the New Civil Code and Article 366 of the old,
petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial
property, as they are the registered owners of the
land which it adjoins. The question is whether the
accretion becomes automatically registered land just
because the lot which receives it is covered by a
Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property
imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of Appeals
that it does not, just as an unregistered land
purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining
land does not, by extension, become ipso facto Appeals that the respondents acquired alluvial lot in
registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one question by acquisitive prescription is in accordance
thing, and registration under the Torrens system of with law.
that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the
accretion received by the land adjoining a river is
governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of
registered land is provided in the registration law. The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is
Registration under the Land Registration and hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners. So
Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, ordered.
but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title
already possessed by the owner, making it
imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to
obtain this protection, the land must be placed under
the operation of the registration laws wherein certain
judicial procedures have been provided. The fact
remain, however, that petitioners never sought
registration of said alluvial property (which was
formed sometime after petitioners' property covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 was registered
on June 9, 1934) up to the time they instituted the
present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela
in 1958. The increment, therefore, never became
registered property, and hence is not entitled or
subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed
by registered property under the Torrens system.
Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through
prescription by third persons.

G.R. No. L-40912 September 30, 1976

The next issue is, did respondents acquire said
alluvial property through acquisitive prescription? This
is a question which requires determination of facts:
physical possession and dates or duration of such REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by
possession. The Court of Appeals, after analyzing the the MINDANAO MEDICAL CENTER, petioner,
evidence, found that respondents-appellees were in
possession of the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, vs.
openly, continuously and adversely, under a claim of
ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958. This HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJANDRO Y DE
finding of the existence of these facts, arrived at by JESUS, respondents.
the Court of Appeals after an examination of the
evidence presented by the parties, is conclusive as to
them and can not be reviewed by us. Office of the Solicitor for petitioner.

The law on prescription applicable to the case is that Ananias C. Ona for private respondent.
provided in Act 190 and not the provisions of the Civil
Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934
when the pertinent articles of the old Civil Code were
not in force and before the effectivity of the new Civil
Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the Court of
MARTIN, J.:têñ.£îhqwâ£
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the
Court of Apiwals in its CA-G.R. No. 39577-R, raising
the question of whether or not petitioner Mindanao
Medical Center has registerable title over a full
12.8081-hectare land by virtue of an executive
proclamation in 1956 reserving the area for medical
center site purposes.
Application No. 5436 were in accordance with law and
existing regulations, the land covered thereby is
herebyawarded to the said applicant, Eugenio de
jesus, at P100.50 per hectare or P2,211.00 for the
whole tract.
This application should be entered in the records of
this office as Sales Application No. 3231, covering the
tract herein awarded, which is more particularly
described as follows:

On January 22, 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, the father of

respondent Alejandro de Jesus, applied with the Location: Central, Davao,ñé+.£ªwph!1
Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent (Sales Application
No. 5436) of a 33-hectare situated in barrio Libaron,
Municipality of Davao (now Davao City). 1 The
property applied for was a portion of what was then Davao
known as Lot 522 of the Davao Cadastre.

Area: 22 hectares
On January 23, 1934, the Bureau of Lands, through
its Davao District Land Officer, accepted sealed bids
for the purchase of the subject land. One Irineo Jose Boundaries:ñé+.£ªwph!1
bidded for P20.00 per hectare, while a certain Dr.
Josc Ebro submitted a bid of P100.50 per hectare The
Director of Lands, however, annulled the auction sale
for the reason that the sales applicant, Eugenio de N—Maria Villa Abrille and Arenio Suazo;
Jesus, failed to participate in the bidding for non-
service of notice on him of the scheduled bidding.
SE—Provincial Road and Mary Gohn;

In lieu of that sale, another bidding was held on

October 4, 1934. Sales applicant Eugenio de Jesus SW—Public Land;
was the lone bidder. He equalled the bid previously
submitted by Dr. Jose Ebro and made a deposit of
P221.00 representing 10% of the price of the land at
P100.50 per hectare. W—Municipal Road;

On November 23, 1934, the Director of Lands issued
to Eugenio de Jesus an Order of Award, the
dispositive portion of which reads: 2ñé+.£ªwph!1
In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the
proceedings had in connection with the Sales
Because the area conveyed had not been actually
surveyed at the time Eugenio de Jesus filed his Sales
Application, the Bureau of Lands conducted a survey
under Plan Bsd-1514. On July 29, 1936, the plan was
approved and the land awarded to Eugenio de Jesus
was designated as Lot Nos. 1176-A, 1176-B-1-A and
1176-B-1-B with an aggregate area of 20.6400
hectares, Bsd-10153, City of Davao.

On August 28, 1936, the Director of Lands ordered an
amendment of the Sales Application of Eugenio de
Jesus stating that "a portion of the land covered by
Sales Application No. 5436 (E-3231) of Eugenio de
Jesus is needed by the Philippine Army for military
camp site purposes, the said application is amended
so as to exclude therefrom portion "A" as shown in
the sketch on the back thereof, and as thus amended,
it will continue to be given due course." The area
excluded was Identified as Lot 1176-B-2, the very
land in question, consisting of 12.8081 hectares.
On September 7, 1936, President Manuel L. Quezon
issued Proclaimation No. 85 withdrawing Lot No.
1176-B-2 from sale and settlement and reserving the
same for military purposes, under the administration
of the Chief of Staff, Philippine Army.
On November 29, 1939, Eugenio de Jesus paid
P660.45 covering the 8th and 10th installment for
20.6400 hectares, the remaining area after his Sales
Application was amended. This payment did not
include the military camp site (Lot No. 1176-B-2) as
the same had already been excluded from the Sales
Application at the time the payment was made. 3
Thereafter, or on May 15, 1948, then Director of
Lands Jose P. Dans ordered the issuance of patent to
Eugenio de Jesus, pursuant to his Sales Application
for "a tract of land having an area of 20.6400
hectares, situated in the barrio of Poblacion, City of
Davao. 4 On the same date, then Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources Mariano
Garchitorena granted a Sales Patent to Eugenio de
Jesus for "a tract of agricultural public land situated in
the City of Davao, Island of Mindanao, Philippines,
containing an area of 20 hectares, 64 ares, and 00
centares. 5
On August 11, 1956, President Ramon Magsaysay
revoked Proclamation No. 85 and declared the
disputed Lot 1176-B-2 open to disposition under the
provisions of the Public land Act for resettlement of
the squatters in the Piapi Beach, Davao City. 6 In the
following October 9, President Magsaysay revoked
this Proclamation No. 328 and reserved the same Lot
No. 1176-B-2 for medical center site purposes under
the administration of the Director of Hospital. 7
Whereupon, on December 6, 1969, petitioner
Mindanao Medical Center applied for the Torrens
registration of the 12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 with
the Court of First Instance of Davao. The Medical
Center claimed "fee simple" title to the land on the
strength of proclamation No. 350 reserving the area
for medical center site purposes.
Respondent Alejandro de Jesus, the son and
successor-in-interest of sale applicant Eugenio de
Jesus, opposed the registration oil the ground that his
father, Eugenio de Jesus, had aquired a vested right
on the subject lot by virtue of the Order of Award
issued to him by the Director of Lands.
A certain Arsenio Suazo likewise filed his opposition
to the registration on the claim that the 2-hectare
portion on the northeastern part of Lot 1176-B-2
belongs to him.
After due hearing, the Court of First Instance of
Davao rendered judgment on September 2, 1966,
directing "the registration of the title to Lot No. 1176-
B-2 of Subdivision Plan Bsd-5134, shown on Plan Ap-
6512, situated in the Barrio of Central, City of Davao,
and containing an area of 128,081 square meters in
the name of the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of
Medical Services, Department of Health.
The two oppositors, Alejandro de Jesus and Arsenio
Suazo, excepted from this judgment of the trial court
and appealed the case to the respondent Court of
Appeals.
On July 2, 1974, the Appellate Court held: ñé+.£ªwph!
1

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby
modified insofar as it denies the claim of appellant
Arsenio Suazo, the same is hereby affirmed, in regard
the appeal of appellant Alejandro Y. de Jesus,
registration Lot 1176-B-2, situated in Barrio Central,
Davao City, and containing an area of 12.8081 square
meters, is hereby decreed in the name of said
appellants, but said appellant is hereby ordered to
relinquish to the appellee that portion of Lot 1176-B-2
which is occupied by the medical center and nervous
disease pavilion and their reasonable appartenances,
no costs.
On July 5, 1974, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center
moved for reconsideration, maintaining ownership
over the entire area of 12.8081 hectares, but the
Appellate Court in a Special Division of Five denied
the motion on June 17, 1975. 8
Forthwith, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center
elevated the matter to Us thru the present appeal.
We find petitioner's appeal to b meritorious.
1. Petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has
registerable title over the whole contested area of
12.8081 hectares, designated Lot No. 1176-B-2, and
not only on a portion thereof occupied by the Medical
Center, its nervous disease pavilion and their
reasonable appurtenances. Proclamation No. 350,
dated October 9, 1956, of President Magsaysay
legally effected a land grant to the Mindanao Medical
Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of
Health, of the whole lot, validity sufficient for initial
registration under the Land Registration Act. Such
land grant is constitutive of a "fee simple" tile or
absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical
Center. Thus, Section 122 of the Act, which governs
the registration of grants or patents involving public
lands, provides that "Whenever public lands in the
Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the
Philippines are alienated, granted, or conveyed to
persons or to public or private corporations, the same
shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this
Act [Land Registration Act, Act 496] and shall become
registered lands." 9 It would be completely absurd to
rule that, on the basis of Proclamation No. 350, the
Medical Center has registerable title on the portion
occupied by it, its nervous disease pavilion and the
reasonable appurtenances, and not on the full extent
of the reservation, when the proclamation explicitly
reserved the entire Lot 1176-B-2 of 12.8081 hectares
to the Center.
Certainly, proclamation no. 350 is free of any legal
infirmity. It proceeds from the recognized competence
of the president to reserve by executive proclamation
alienable lands of the public domain for a specific
public use or service. 10 section 64 (e) of the Revised
Administrative Code empowers the president "(t)o
reserve from sale oe other disposition and for specific
public uses for service, any land belonging to the
private domain of the Government of the Philippines,
the use of which is not otherwise directed by law. the
land reserved "shall be used for the specific purposes
directed by such executive order until otherwise
provided by law." Similarly, Section 83 of the Public
Land Act (CA 141) authorizes the President to
"designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land
of the public domain as reservations for the use ofthe
commonwealth of the Philippines or of any of its
branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, ... or for quasi-
public uses or purposes when the public interest
requires it, including reservations for ... other
improvements for the public benefit.
2. Respondent Appellate Court erroneously
ruled that Alejabdro's father, Eugenio de jesus, had
acquired ownership over the whole 12.8081-hectare
Lot 1176-B-2 because the Sales Award issued to him
on November 23, 1934 by then Director of Lands
Simeon Ramos covered the 33 hectares applied for,
including the 12.8081 hectares. We fail to see any
reasonable basis on record for the Appellate Court to
draw such conclusion. On the contrary, the very Sales
Award describes the tract awarded as located in
Central, Davao, Davao, with an area of 22 hectares,
and bounded on the north by Maria Villa Abrille and
Arsenio Suazo; on the southeast by a provincial road
and Mary Gohn; on the southwest by a public land;
and on the west by a municipal road. 11 This area of
22 hectares was even reduced to 20.6400 hectares
upon actual survey made by the Bureau of Lands.
The same area was reckoned with by then Lands
Director Jose P. Dans when he directed the issuance
of a patent to Eugenio de Jesus on May 15, 1948 for
his application filed on January 22, 1921 covering "a
tract of land having an area of 20.6400 hectares,
situated in the barrio of Poblacion, City of Davao." 12
In like manner, the Sales Patent issued to Eugenio de
Jesus on the same date, May 15, 1948, by then
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
Mariano Garchitorena indicated therein the sale to
Eugenio de Jesus of "a tract of agricultural public land
situated in the City of Davao, Island of Mindanao,
Philippines, containing an area of 20 hectares 64,
ares 00 centares." Seen in the light of Patent, and
Sales Order for Issuance of Patent, and Sales Patent,
invariably bearing the area awarded to sales applicant
Eugenio de Jesusas 20.6400 hectares, it becomes
imperative to conclude that what was really awarded
to Eugenio de jesus was only 20.6400 hectares and
not 33 hectares as applied for by him.
However, We observe that in the public bidding of
october 4, 1934, the succesful bidder, submitted a bid
of 100.50 per hectare and made a cash deposit of
only P221.00, which amount represents 10% of the
purchase price of the land. 13 At P100.50 per
hectare, the purchase would be P2,221.00 for 22
hectares, 10% deposit of which amounts to P221.00.
For 33 hectares, the total purchase price would be
P3,316.50 at P100.50 per hectare and the 10%
deposit would be P331.65, not P221.00, as what was
actually deposited by sales applicant Eugenio de
Jesus. Withal, if Eugenio de Jesus was really
awarded 33 hectares in that public bidding, he should
have made the required 10% deposit of P331.65.
That he merely deposited P221.00 strongly suggests
that what was bidden for and awarded to him was
only 22 hectares and not 33 hectares as applied for.
As a matter of fact, his last payment of P660.45 on
November 29, 1939 for the 8th te 10th installment
intended only to cover 20.6400 hectares, the
remaining area after the amendment of the Sales
Application on August 28, 1936, excluding "the
military camp site [Lot 1176B-2 of 12.8081 hectares]
for the reason that the said site, at the time of last
installment was already excluded from Sale
Application SA-5436 of Eugenio de Jesus, as ordered
... by the Director of Lands." 14
But, respondent Appellate Court reasons out that if
the area bidden for and awarded in 1934 ws only 22
hectares and since two years thereafter the Director
of Lands ordered an amendment excluding the
military camp site of 12.8081 hectares, then only 10
hectares, then would have been left to applicant
Eugenio de Jesus and not 20.6400 hectares would
have been left in the Sales Patent. The Appellate
Court's reasoning is premised on wrong assumption.
What was ordered amended was the Sales
Application for 33 hectares and not the Order of 22
hectares or 20.6400 hectares. The Order states:
"Order: Amendment of Application." Necessarily so,
because the amendment was already reflected in the
Order of Award, since only an area of 22 hectares
was awarded.
3. The phrase "whole tract" in the Sales Award 15
cannot be licitly seized upon as basis for the
conclusion that the area awarded to applicant
Eugenio de Jesus was the applied area of 33
hectares. Such general description of "whole tract"
cannot prevail over the specific description delineating
the area in quantity and in boundaries. Thus, the
Sales Award specifies the area awarded as 22
hectares, located at Central, Davao, Davao, and
bounded on the north by the property of Maria Villa
Abrille and Arsenio Suazo; on the southwest by a
provincial road and the property by Mary Gohn on the
southwest by a public land; and on the west by a
municipal road. 16 Specific description is ordinarily
preferred to general description, or that which is more
certain to what which is less certain. 17 More so,
when it is considered that the series of executive
proclamations (Proclamation Nos. 85, 328, 350)
continuously maintained the intent of the Government
to reserve the subject land for a specific purpose or
service.
Besides, patents and land grants are construed
favorably to the Governement, and most strongly
against the grantee. 18 Any doubt as to the intention
or extent of the grant, or the intention of the
Government, is to be resolved in its favor. 19 In
general, the quantity of the land granted must be
ascertained from the description in the patent is
exclusive evidence of the land conveyed. 20 And
courts do not usually go beyond a description of a
tract in a patent and determine the tract and quantity
of land apart from the patent itself. 21
4. We cannot share the view of respondent
Appellate Court that eugenio de jesus's alleged
occupation, cultivation and improvement of the 33-
hectare land (including the 12-hectare camp site)
since 1916 vested in him a right of preference or pre-
empive right in the acquisition of the land, which right
was controverted into "a special propriety right" when
the Sales Award was issued to him in 1934. Not only
for the earlier reasons that the Sales Award was only
for 22 hectares (later found to be 20,6400 fectares
upon actual survey) and not for 33 hectares, the
privilege of occupying public lands a view to
preemption confers np contractual or vested right in
the lands occupied and the authority of the President
to withdraw suchlands for sale or acquisition by the
public, or to reserve them for public use, prior to the
divesting by the government of title threof stands,
even though this may defeat the imperfect right of a
settler. 22 Lands covered by reservation are not
subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can
be acquired. 23 The claims o0f persons who have
settled on occupied, and improved a parcel of public
land which is later included in a reservation are
considered worthy of protection and are usually
respected, but where the President, as authorized by
law, issuesa proclamation reserving certain lands and
warning all persons to depart therefrom, this
terminates any rights previously avquired in such
lands by a person who was settled thereon in order to
obtain a preferential right of purchase. 24 And patents
for lands which have been previously granted,
reserved from sale, or appropriate, are void. 25
It is true that Proclamation No. 350 states that the
same is subject to "privilege rights, if any there be,"
but Eugenio de Jesus or his son Alejandro de Jesus
failed to prove any private rights over the property
reserved. Wee-settled is the rule that unless the
applicant has shown by clear and convincing
evidence that a certain portion of the public domain
was acquired by him or his ancestors either by
composition title from the Spanish Government or by
possessory information title, or any other means for
the acquisition of public lands, such as grants or
patents, the property must be held to be part of the
public domain. 26 Nor could respondent Alejandro de
Jesus legetimately claim to have obtained title by
prescription over the disputed 12.8081 hectares,
inasmuch as by applying for the sale thereof
(assuming hypothetically that the 12.8081-hectare lot
was included in the original sales application for 33
hectares), his father, Eugenio de Jesus, necessarily
admits that the portions applied for are part of the
public domain, against which no acquisitive
prescription may lie 27 except as provided in Section
48(b) of C.A. 141, as amended.
5. Respondent Appellate Court mistakenly
sustained Eugenio de Jesus's pretense that the
military "camp site" (Lot 176-B-2) had been donated
by him to the Philippine Army, thru Secretary Serafin
Marabut of the Department of National Defense,
sometime in 1936 subject to the condition that it
would be returned to him when the Philippine Army
would no longer need it. As found by the trial court in
1936, the Department of National Defense was not
yet in existence, so that no Defense Secretary by the
name of Serafin Marabut could have entered into a
deed of donation with Eugenio de Jesus over Lot
1176-B-2 consisting of 12.8081 hectares. The
Department of National Defense was only organized
in 1939. Nonetheless, respondent Alejandro de
Jesus, would prove by secondary evidence the
existence of such donation thru the testimony of
persons who supposedly saw it. In this regard, the
Rules provides that before the terms of a transaction
in realty may be established by secondary evidence, it
is n that the due execution and subsequent loss of the
original instrument evidencing the transaction be
proved. For it is the due execution of the document
and its subsequent loss that would constitute the
foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence
to prove the contents of such document. And the due
of the execution of the document would be proved
through the testimony of (1) the person or persons
who executed it; (2) the person before whom its
execution was acknowledged, or (3) any who was
present and saw it executed and delivered, or who,
after its execution and delivery, saw it and recognized
the signatures, or by a person to whom the parties to
the instrument had previously confessed the
execution thereof. 28 None of these modes of proof
was ever followed by respondent Alejandro de Jesus.
His predecessor- in-interest, Eugenio de Jesus,
merely made a broad statement that he executed a
deed f donation in 1936 with Defense Secretary
Marabut when at hat time the Defense Department
was not yet in existence. The notary public who
presumptively acknowledged the donation or the
witnesses to the instrument were never presented. It
has been ruled that the failure of the party to present
the notary Public and thore s who must have seen the
signing of the document as witnesses to testify on its
execution interdicts the admission of a secondary
evidence of the terms of the deed. 29 This is
especially true in realty donations where Art. 748 of
the new Civil Code requires the accomplishment
thereof in a public document in order to be valid. The
testimony of Marcelo Belendres that Sesinando de
jesus, brother of Eugenio de Jesus showed him a
copy of the "paper" signed by Secretary Marabut and
Eugenio de Jesus; of Jose Tinio, Acting Register of
Deeds of Davao, that in May or June 1937, Col.
Simeon de jesus went to his office to register a
document" executed by Eugenio de Jesus and
Secretary Marabut; of former Secretary Brigido
Valencia that Col. Simeon de Jesus showed him a
deed of donation signed by Eugenio de Jesus and
Serafin Marabut. hardly suffer to satisfy the requisites
of the Rules, as to which very strict compliance is
imposed because of the importance of the document
involved. 30 First none of these persons was a
witness to the instrument, nor any of them saw the
document after its execution and delivery ind
recognized the signatures of the parties nor to whom
the parties to the instrument had previously confessed
the execution; second, the reference to a "paper" or
"document" ambigous as to be synonymous with a
"deed of donation;" and third, the persons who
showed the deed, Sesinando de Jesus and Col.
Simeon de Jesus were not parties to the instrument.
Respondent Alejandro de Jesus's narration of the
existence and loss of the document equally deserves
no credence. As found by the trial court, he testified
that the copy of the deed which his father kept was
sent to him in Manila thru his uncle, Sesinando de
Jesus in July 1942, while his father himself, Eugenio
de Jesus, declared that his copy of the deed was
burned in Davao during the Japanese occupation.
The replies of the Undersecretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and the Acting Executive
Secretary that the property was "still needed for
military purposes" and may not therefore be released
from the reservation cannot substitute the proof so
required. These replies are not confirmatory of the
existence of such donation much less official
admissions thereof.
Even on the gratuitous assumption that a donation of
the military "camp site" was executed between
Eugenior de jesus and Serafin Marabut, such
donation would anyway be void, because Eugenior de
jesus held no dominical rights over the site when it
was allegedly donated by him in 1936. In that year,
proclamation No. 85 of President Quezon already
withrew the area from sale or settlement and reserved
it for military purposes. Respondent Appellate Court,
however, rationalizes that the subject of the donation
was not the land itself but "the possessory and special
proprietary rights" of Eugenio de jesus over it. We
disagree. It is true that the gratiuitous disposal in
donation may consist of a thing or right. 31 But the
term "right" must be understood in a "propriety"
sense, over which the processor has the jus
disponendi. 32 This is because, in true donations,
there results a consequent impoverishment of the
donor or diminution of his assets. 33 Eugenio de
Jesus cannot be said to be possessed of that
"proprietary " right over the whole 33 hectares in 1936
including the disputed 12.8081 hectares for at that
time this 12.8081-hectare lot had already been
severed from the mass of disposable public lands by
Proclamation No. 85 and excluded in the Sales
Award. Impoverishment of Eugenio's assets as a
consequence of such donation is therefore farfetehed.
In fact, even if We were to assume in gratia argumenti
that the 12.8081-hectare lot was included in the Sales
Award, still the same may not be the subject of
donation. In Sales Award, what is conferred on the
applicant is merely the right "to take possession of the
land so that he could comply with the requirements
prescribed by law." 34 In other words, the right
granted to the sales awardee is only "possessory
right" as distinguished from "proprietary right," for the
fundamental reason that prior to the issuance of the
sales patent and registration thereof, title to the land
is retained by the State. 35 Admittedly, the land
applied for may be considered "disposed of by the
Government" upon the issuance of the Sales Award,
but this has the singular effect of withdrawing the land
from the public domian that is "disposable" by the
Director of Lands under the Public Land Act.
Moreover, the dsiposition is merely provisional
because the applicant has still to comply with the
requirements of the law before any patent is issued. It
is only after compliance with such requirements to the
satisfaction of the Director of Lands, that the patent is
issued and the land applied for considered
"permanently disposed of by the Government." This
again is a circumstance that demeans the irrevocable
nature donation, because the mere desistance of the
sales applicant to pursue the requirements called for
would cause the virtual revocation of the donation.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgement of the
Court of Appeals, promulgated on July 2, 1974, and
its resolution of Jane 17, 1975, denying petitioner's
motion for reconsiderations, are hereby reversed and
set aside. The disputed Lot 1176-B-2, Plan Bsd-1514
of Davao Cadastre and containing an area of 12.8081
hectares, is hereby adjudicated in favor of petitioner
Mindanao Medical Center. The urgent motion of the
petitioner for leave to construct essential hospitawl
buildings, namely: (a) communicable and contagious
diseas pavilion; (b) hospital motorpool; and (c)
physician's quarters, is hereby granted. With costs
against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME
PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC., respondents.
D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.
NARVASA, J.:
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by
certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate
Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of
First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in
favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five
parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters,
more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer
Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.
The registration proceedings were for confirmation of
title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141
(The Public Land Act). as amended: and the appealed
judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said
proceedings in this wise:
1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc.,
represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation
duly organized in accordance with the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines and registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on December
23, 1959;
2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc.,
represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real
properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of
Incorporation particularly on the provision of its
secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');
3. That the land subject of the Land
Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29,
1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both
members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are
cultural minorities;
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took
place on October 29, 1962;

5. That the possession of the Infiels over the
land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer
Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was
discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels
have possessed and occupied the land from
generation to generation until the same came into the
possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse
and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the
possession of the Infiels who were granted from
whom the applicant bought said land on October 29,
1962, hence the possession is already considered
from time immemorial.
7. That the land sought to be registered is a
private land pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act
No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of
the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or
their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or
disposable public land or within the public domain;
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.
Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five Million
(P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said
improvements were seen by the Court during its
ocular investigation of the land sought to be
registered on September 18, 1982;
9. That the ownership and possession of the
land sought to be registered by the applicant was duly
recognized by the government when the Municipal
Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for
the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to reality
when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land
bought by the Company from the Infiels for the
townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on
November 15, 1979, and which donation was
accepted by the Municipal Government of
Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their special
session on November 22, 1979.
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of
these findings except as to the applicability of the
1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning
this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings
have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long
after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the
latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section
11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or
associations from holding alienable lands of the public
domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares
(a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which
was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands
in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to
decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48,
paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended, reads:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of
the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is located for confirmation
of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership,
for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities
who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open. continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of lands of the
public domain suitable to agriculture, whether
disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of
ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the
rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in
view of the quoted findings of the trial court which
were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate
Court, it can no longer controvert before this Court-the
fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme
purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962,
are members of the national cultural minorities who
had, by themselves and through their progenitors,
possessed and occupied those lands since time
immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year
period and were, by reason thereof, entitled to
exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public
Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is
there any pretension that Acme, as the successor-in-
interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and
register ownership of said lands under any provisions
of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its
Article XIV already referred to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is
whether or not the title that the Infiels had transferred
to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the
latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the
1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in
mind the prohibition therein against private
corporations holding lands of the public domain
except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the
character of the lands at the time of institution of the
registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still
part of the public domain, it must be answered in the
negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already
private lands, the constitutional prohibition against
their acquisition by private corporations or
associations obviously does not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila
Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et al, 1
where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case,
Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation
more than 60% of the capital stock of which is
Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in
Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had
been possessed by the vendors and, before them, by
their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since
prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On
December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for
confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming
that the lots were public land, dismissed the
application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical
person, was not qualified to apply for registration
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which
allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons to
apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to
public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this
Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that:
..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to
be public land only upon the issuance of the
certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it
under section 48(b). Because it is still public land and
the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to
apply for its registration under section 48(b),
Meralco's application cannot be given due course or
has to be dismissed.
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional
prohibition makes no distinction between (on the one
hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which
no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other
hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to
which an occupant has on imperfect title subject to
judicial confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish,
we should not make any distinction or qualification.
The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to
which a Torrens title may be secured under section
48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b)
'presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs.
Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA
641, 644).
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent,
tracing the line of cases beginning with Carino in 1909
2 thru Susi in 1925 3 down to Herico in 1980, 4 which
developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that
open, exclusive and undisputed possession of
alienable public land for the period prescribed by law
creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon
completion of the requisite period ipso jure and
without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases
to be public land and becomes private property. That
said dissent expressed what is the better — and,
indeed, the correct, view-becomes evident from a
consideration of some of the principal rulings cited
therein,
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in
Carino involving the Decree/Regulations of June 25,
1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully
occupied by private individuals in the Philippine
Islands. It was ruled that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5
attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession for
the necessary time and we do not overlook the
argument that this means may prove in registration
proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer
would have recommended an application under the
foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to
convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that
ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had
read every word of it. The words 'may prove'
(acrediten) as well or better, in view of the other
provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon
to do so in any litigation. There are indications that
registration was expected from all but none sufficient
to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained
would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made,
was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier
law. ...
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character
because expressed in more categorical language, in
Susi:
.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the
presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph
(b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No.
926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by
the Government were complied with, for he has been
in actual and physical possession, personally and
through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of
the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively
and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a
certificate of title to said land under the provisions of
Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon
applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had
already acquired, by operation of law not only a right
to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not
necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in
order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts,
an application therefore is sufficient, under the
provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal
fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in
question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased
to be of the public domain and had become private
property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi,
beyond the control of the Director of Lands.
Consequently, in selling the land in question of
Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a
land over which he had no longer any title or control,
and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and
Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be
mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 7
Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs.
Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of Appeals 10 and
Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the
Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely
affirmative: 11
.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No.
1942, which the respondent Court held to be
inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's
proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30
years since 1914, by himself and by his
predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has
vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from
the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer
disposable under the Public Land Act as by free
patent. ....
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions
as specified in the foregoing provision are complied
with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by
operation of law, a right to a grant, a government
grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title
being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the
public domain and beyond the authority of the
Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for
confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does
not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be
evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be
issued upon the strength of said patent. 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical
inevitability of considering possession of public land
which is of the character and duration prescribed by
statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the
State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that the
possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a
conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings
would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the
most limited to ascertaining whether the possession
claimed is of the required character and length of
time; and registration thereunder would not confer
title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The
proceedings would not originally convert the land from
public to private land, but only confirm such a
conversion already affected by operation of law from
the moment the required period of possession
became complete. As was so well put in Carino, "...
(T)here are indications that registration was expected
from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it,
ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of
the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but
simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
decree, if not by earlier law."
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was
already private land to which the Infiels had a legally
sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962
when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also
be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make
such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935
Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the
1973 Constitution which came into effect later)
prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning
private lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained
technically "public" land, despite immemorial
possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title
in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate
proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be
no serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land
at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935
Constitution that might be construed to prohibit
corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in
public land to which the vendor had already acquired
that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title.
The only limitation then extant was that corporations
could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural
lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely
accidental circumstance that confirmation
proceedings were brought under the aegis of the
1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from
owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a
right already vested before that law came into effect,
or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and
proper. This Court has already held, in analogous
circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair
vested rights.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has
no retroactive application to the sales application of
Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already
acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the
time the 1973 Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be
abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article
XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private
corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not
exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares.
Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine
of vested rights in constitutional law.
xxx xxx xxx
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of
vested rights. 'A state may not impair vested rights by
legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the
subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a
change in the constitution of the State, except in a
legitimate exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S.
1177-78).
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of the
corporation to purchase the land in question had
become fixed and established and was no longer
open to doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public
Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect
of segregating the said land from the public domain.
The corporation's right to obtain a patent for the land
is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right
without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123
Phil. 919).<äre||anº•1àw> 15
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings
were instituted by Acme in its own name must be
regarded as simply another accidental circumstance,
productive of a defect hardly more than procedural
and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of
the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said
proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's
entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in
the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under
either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have
had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only
a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would
deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-
interest by valid conveyance which violates no
constitutional mandate.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view,
and so holds, that the majority ruling in Meralco must
be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding
precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line
of cases already referred to, is that alienable public
land held by a possessor, personally or through his
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and
exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30
years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is
converted to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that
rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land
subject of this appeal was already private property at
the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme.
Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being
at the time no prohibition against said corporation's
holding or owning private land. The objection that, as
a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for
judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial
and, again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco:
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of
Meralco's application on the technicality that the
Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines
who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of
their title would be impractical and would just give rise
to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there
was a technical error not having filed the application
for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as
the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded
that there is no prohibition against their sale of the
land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any
prohibition against the application being refiled with
retroactive effect in the name of the original owners
and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under
result of their application being granted, because of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the
their indisputable acquisition of ownership by 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was
operation of law and the conclusive presumption only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main
therein provided in their favor. It should not be opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as
necessary to go through all the rituals at the great essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no
cost of refiling of all such applications in their names constitutional question.
and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when
the Court can after all these years dispose of it here
and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao)
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the
appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, this instance.
by considering the applications for confirmation as
amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in
the names of the original persons who as natural
persons are duly qualified to apply for formal SO ORDERED.
confirmation of the title that they had acquired by
conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public
Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein
corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations
duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and
granting the applications for confirmation of title to the
private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.

There is also nothing to prevent Acme from

reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter from
themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after
issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names,
deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be
merely indulging in empty charades, whereas the
same result is more efficaciously and speedily
obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal
application of the rule on amendment to conform to
the evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.
G.R. No. L-46729 November 19, 1982

While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling
of comparatively recent vintage, in a real sense, it
breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-
established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of
which has passed the test of searching examination
and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth
noting that the majority opinion, as well as the
concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and
Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the
proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical
person, was disqualified from applying for
LAUSAN AYOG, BENITO AYOG, DAMASO AYOG,
JULIO AYOG, SEGUNDA AYOG, VICENTE
ABAQUETA, BERNARDINO ADORMEO, VIDAL
ALBANO, FELICIANO ARIAS, ANTONIO BALDOS,
MAXIMO BALDOS, ROMERO BINGZON, EMILIO
CADAYDAY, FRUCTUOSO CHUA, SR., HERACLEO
CHUA, GUILLERMO DAGOY, ABDON DEIMOS,
NICASIO DE LEON, JULIANA VDA. DE DIANNA,
DEMOCRITO DEVERO, ALFREDO DIVINAGRACIA,
ESTEBAN DIVINAGRACIA, LEODEGARDIO
DIVINAGRACIA, NELLO DIVINAGRACIA,
MERQUIADES EMBERADOR, JESUS EMPERADO,
PORFERIO ENOC, SOFRONIO ENOC, RAFAEL
GAETOS, NICOLAS GARLET, TRINIDAD GARLET,
FORTUNATA GEONZON, NICOLADA NAQUILA,
TORIBIO NAQUILA, EFREN OKAY, ELPIDIO OKAY,
SR., DIEGO ONGRIA, ERNESTO PANARES,
VICENTE PATULOT, IGNACIA RIBAO, JUANO
RICO, JESUS ROSALITA, ARMANDO TANTE and
ANSELMO VALMORES, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Court of First
Instance of Davao, Branch I, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF
OF DAVAO, and BINAN DEVELOPMENT CO., INC.,
respondents. MINISTER OF NATURAL
RESOURCES and DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
intervenors.
The Director found that the protestants (defendants in
the 1961 ejectment suit, some of whom are now
petitioners herein) entered the land only after it was
awarded to the corporation and, therefore, they could
not be regarded as bona fide occupants thereof. The
Director characterized them as squatters. He found
that some claimants were fictitious persons (p. 30,
Rollo of L-43505, Okay vs. CA). He issued a writ of
execution but the protestants defied the writ and
refused to vacate the land (p. 28, Rollo of L-43505,
Okay vs. CA). **
Because the alleged occupants refused to vacate the
land, the corporation filed against them on February
27, 1961 in the Court of First Instance of Davao, Civil
Case No. 3711, an ejectment suit (accion publiciana).
The forty defendants were Identified as follows:

AQUINO, J.:
1. Vicente Abaqueta 21. Eniego Garlic

This case is about the application of section 11,

Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution (disqualifying a 2. Candido Abella 22. Nicolas Garlic
private corporation from purchasing public lands) to a
1953 sales award made by the Bureau of Lands, for
which a sales patent and Torrens title were issued in
1975, and to the 1964 decision of the trial court, 3. Julio Ayog 23. Rufo Garlic
ejecting some of the petitioners from the land
purchased, which decision was affirmed in 1975 by
the Court of Appeals. That legal question arises under 4. Arcadio Ayong 24. Alfonso Ibales
the following facts:

5. Generoso Bangonan 25. Julian Locacia

On January 21, 1953, the Director of Lands, after a
bidding, awarded to Biñan Development Co., Inc. on
the basis of its 1951 Sales Application No. V-6834
Cadastral Lot No. 281 located at Barrio Tamugan, 6. Lomayong Cabao 26. Filomeno Labantaban
Guianga (Baguio District), Davao City with an area of
about two hundred fifty hectares. Some occupants of
the lot protested against the sale. The Director of 7. Jose Catibring 27. Arcadio Lumantas
Lands in his decision of August 30, 1957 dismissed
the protests and ordered the occupants to vacate the
lot and remove their improvements. No appeal was
made from that decision. 8. Teodolfo Chua 28. Santos Militante

9. Guillermo Dagoy 29. Toribio Naquila


10. Anastacia Vda. de Didal 30. Elpidio Okay
11. Alfredo Divinagracia 31. Guillermo Omac
12. Silverio Divinagracia 32. Emilio Padayday
13. Galina Edsa 33. Marcosa Vda. de Rejoy
14. Jesus Emperado 34. Lorenzo Rutsa
15. Porfirio Enoc 35. Ramon Samsa
16. Benito Ente 36. Rebecca Samsa
17. German Flores 37. Alfeao Sante
18. Ciriaco Fuentes 38. Meliton Sante
19. Pulong Gabao 39. Amil Sidaani
20. Constancio Garlic 40. Cosme Villegas
That ejectment suit delayed the issuance of the
patent. The trial court found that the protests of twenty
of the abovenamed defendants were among those
that were dismissed by the Director of Lands in his
1957 decision already mentioned.
On July 18, 1961 the purchase price of ten thousand
pesos was fully paid by Binan Development Co., Inc.
On November 10, 1961, an official of the Bureau of
Lands submitted a final investigation report wherein it
was stated that the corporation had complied with the
cultivation and other requirements under the Public
Land Law and had paid the purchase price of the land
(p. 248, Rollo).
It was only more than thirteen years later or on
August 14, 1975 when Sales Patent No. 5681 was
issued to the corporation for that lot with a reduced
area of 175.3 hectares. The patent was registered.
Original Certificate of Title No. P-5176 was issued to
the patentee.
The Director of Lands in his memorandum dated June
29, 1974 for the Secretary of Natural Resources,
recommending approval of the sales patent, pointed
out that the purchaser corporation had complied with
the said requirements long before the effectivity of the
Constitution, that the land in question was free from
claims and conflicts and that the issuance of the
patent was in conformity with the guidelines
prescribed in Opinion No. 64, series of 1973, of
Secretary of Justice Vicente Abad Santos and was an
exception to the prohibition in section 11, Article XIV
of the Constitution (p. 258, Rollo).
Secretary of Natural Resources Jose J. Leido, Jr., in
approving the patent on August 14, 1975, noted that
the applicant had acquired a nested right to its
issuance (p. 259, Rollo).
Before that patent was issued, there was a trial in the
ejectment suit. Fifteen defendants (out of forty),
namely, Julio Ayog, Guillermo Bagoy, Generoso
Bangonan, Jose Catibring, Porfirio Enoc, Jose
Emperado, Arcadio Lomanto, Toribio Naquila, Elpidio
Okay, Alfeo Sante, Meliton Sante, Ramon Samsa,
Rebecca Samsa, Arcadio Sarumines and Felix
Tahantahan, testified that they entered the disputed
land long before 1951 and that they planted it to
coconuts, coffee, jackfruit and other fruit trees. (p. 28,
Record on Appeal).
The trial court did not give credence to their
testimonies. It believed the report of an official of the
Bureau of Lands that in 1953 the land was free from
private claims and conflicts and it gave much weight
to the decision of the Director of Lands dismissing the
protests of the defendants against the sales award (p.
30, Record on Appeal).
Furthermore, the trial court during its ocular inspection
of the land on November 8, 1964 found that the
plantings on the land could not be more than ten
years old, meaning that they were not existing in 1953
when the sales award was made. Hence, the trial
court ordered the defendants to vacate the land and
to restore the possession thereof to tile company. The
Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment on December
5, 1975 in its decision in Binan Development Co., Inc.
vs, Sante, CA-G.R. No. 37142- R. The review of the
decision was denied by this Court on May 17, 1976 in
Elpidio Okay vs. Court of Appeals, L-43505.
After the record was remanded to the trial court, the
corporation filed a motion for execution. The
defendants, some of whom are now petitioners
herein, opposed the motion. They contended that the
adoption of the Constitution, which took effect on
January 17, 1973, was a supervening fact which
rendered it legally impossible to execute the lower
court's judgment. They invoked the constitutional
prohibition, already mentioned, that "no private
corporation or association may hold alienable lands of
the public domain except by lease not to exceed one
thousand hectares in area."
The lower court suspended action on the motion for
execution because of the manifestation of the
defendants that they would file a petition for
prohibition in this Court. On August 24, 1977, the
instant prohibition action was filed. Some of the
petitioners were not defendants in the ejectment case.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition has no
retroactive application to the sales application of
Biñan Development Co., Inc. because it had already
acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the
time the 1973 Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. lt could not be
abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article
XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private
corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not
exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares.
Petitioners' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine
of vested rights in constitutional law.
"A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has
become the property of some particular person or
persons as a present interest" (16 C.J.S. 1173). It is
"the privilege to enjoy property legally vested, to
enforce contracts, and enjoy the rights of property
conferred by the existing law" (12 C.J. 955, Note 46,
No. 6) or "some right or interest in property which has
become fixed and established and is no longer open
to doubt or controversy" (Downs vs. Blount 170 Fed.
15, 20, cited in Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498,
502).
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of
vested rights. "A state may not impair vested rights by
legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the
subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a
change in the constitution of the State, except in a
legitimate exercise of the police power" (16 C.J.S.
1177-78).
It has been observed that, generally, the term "vested
right" expresses the concept of present fixed interest,
which in right reason and natural justice should be
protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately
just and imperative right which an enlightened free
society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable
individual rights, cannot deny (16 C.J.S. 1174, Note
71, No. 5, citing Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc.
vs. Rosenthal, 192 Atl. 2nd 587).
Secretary of Justice Abad Santos in his 1973 opinion
ruled that where the applicant, before the Constitution
took effect, had fully complied with all his obligations
under the Public Land Act in order to entitle him to a
sales patent, there would seem to be no legal or
equitable justification for refusing to issue or release
the sales patent (p. 254, Rollo).
In Opinion No. 140, series of 1974, he held that as
soon as the applicant had fulfilled the construction or
cultivation requirements and has fully paid the
purchase price, he should be deemed to have
acquired by purchase the particular tract of land and
to him the area limitation in the new Constitution
would not apply.
In Opinion No. 185, series of 1976, Secretary Abad
Santos held that where the cultivation requirements
were fulfilled before the new Constitution took effect
but the full payment of the price was completed after
January 17, 1973, the applicant was, nevertheless,
entitled to a sales patent (p. 256, Rollo).
Such a contemporaneous construction of the
constitutional prohibition by a high executive official
carries great weight and should be accorded much
respect. It is a correct interpretation of section 11 of
Article XIV.
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of the
corporation to purchase the land in question had
become fixed and established and was no longer
open to doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public
Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect
of segregating the said land from the public domain.
The corporation's right to obtain a patent for that land
is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right
without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123
Phil. 919).
As we cannot review the factual findings of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals, we cannot entertain
petitioners' contention that many of them by
themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest
have possessed portions of land even before the war.
They should have filed homestead or free patent
applications.
Our jurisdiction is limited to the resolution of the legal
issue as to whether the 1973 Constitution is an
obstacle to the implementation of the trial court's 1964
final and executory judgment ejecting the petitioners.
On that issue, we have no choice but to sustain its
enforceability.
Nevertheless, in the interest of social justice, to avoid
agrarian unrest and to dispel the notion that the law
grinds the faces of the poor, the administrative
authorities should find ways and means of
accommodating some of the petitioners if they are
landless and are really tillers of the soil who in the
words of President Magsaysay deserve a little more
food in their stomachs, a little more shelter over their
heads and a little more clothing on their backs. The
State should endeavor to help the poor who find it
difficult to make both ends meet and who suffer
privations in the universal struggle for existence.
A tiller of the soil is entitled to enjoy basic human
rights, particularly freedom from want. The common
man should be assisted in possessing and cultivating
a piece of land for his sustenance, to give him social
security and to enable him to achieve a dignified
existence and become an independent, self-reliant
and responsible citizen in our democratic society.
To guarantee him that right is to discourage him from
becoming a subversive or from rebelling against a
social order where, as the architect of the French
Revolution observed, the rich are choking with the
superfluities of life but the famished multitude lack the
barest necessities.
Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition
against purchases of public agricultural lands by
private corporations is to equitably diffuse land
ownership or to encourage "owner-cultivatorship and
the economic family- size farm" and to prevent a
recurrence of cases like the instant case. Huge
landholdings by corporations or private persons had
owned social unrest.
Petitioners' counsel claims that Biñan Development
Co., Inc. seeks to execute the judgment in Civil Case
No. 3711, the ejectment suit from which this
prohibition case arose, against some of the petitioners
who were not defendants in that suit (p. 126, Rollo).
Those petitioners are not successors-in-interest of the
defendants in the ejectment suit. Nor do they derive
their right of possession from the said defendants.
Those petitioners occupy portions of the disputed land
distinct and separate from the portions occupied by
the said defendants.
We hold that judgment cannot be enforced against
the said petitioners who were not defendants in that
litigation or who were not summoned and heard in
that case. Generally, "it is an axiom of the law that no
man shall be affected by proceedings to which he is a
stranger" (Ed. A. Keller & Co. vs Ellerman & Bucknall
Steamship Co., 38 Phil. 514, 520).
To enforce the judgment against those who were not
parties to the case and who occupy portions of the
disputed land distinct and separate from the portions
occupied by the defendants in the ejectment suit,
would be violative of due process of law, the law
which, according to Daniel Webster in his argument in
the Dartmouth College case, is the law of the land, a
law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds
upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.
"The meaning is, that every citizen shall hold his life,
liberty, property, and immunities, under the protection
of the general rules which govern society." (Cited in
Lopez vs. Director of Lands, 47 Phil. 23, 32. See
Gatchalian vs. Arlegui, L-35615 and Tang Tee vs.
Arlegui, L-41360, February 17, 1977, 75 SCRA 234
and Berses vs. Villanueva, 25 Phil. 473.)
Contempt incident.-During the pendency of this case,
or at about four o'clock in the morning of December
12, 1978, Ciriaco Tebayan, Domingo Nevasca,
Rogelio Duterte and Sofronio Etac, employees of the
Crown Fruits and Cannery Corporation, plowed or
bulldozed with their tractors a portion of the disputed
land which was occupied by Melquiades Emberador,
one of the petitioners herein. The disputed land was
leased by Biñan Development Co., Inc. to the canning
corporation.
The four tractor drivers destroyed the improvements
thereon worth about five thousand pesos consisting of
coffee, coconut and banana plants. Emberador was in
the hospital at the time the alleged destruction of the
improvements occurred. However, it should be noted
that Emberador was not expressly named as a
defendant in the ejectment suit. Apparently, he is not
included in the trial court's decision although he was
joined as a co-petitioner in this prohibition case.
The petitioners in their motion of January 11, 1979
asked that the four tractor drivers and Honesto
Garcia, the manager of Biñan Development Co., Inc.,
be declared in contempt of court for having
disregarded the restraining order issued by this Court
on August 29, 1977, enjoining specifically Judge
Vicente N. Cusi and the provincial sheriff from
enforcing the decision in the ejectment suit, Civil Case
No. 3711 (pp. 46-47, 138- 141, Rollo).
Garcia and the four drivers answered the motion. The
incident was assigned for hearing to Judge Antonio
M. Martinez of the Court of First Instance of Davao.
Judge Martinez found that the plowing was made at
the instance of Garcia who told the barrio captain,
petitioner Lausan Ayog, a Bagobo, that he (Garcia)
could not wait anymore for the termination of this
case.
The record shows that on April 30, 1979 or four
months after the said incident, Emberador, in
consideration of P3,500, as the value of the
improvements on his land, executed a quitclaim in
favor of the Crown Fruits and Cannery Corporation
(Exh. 1, 2 and 3).
We hold that no contempt was committed. The
temporary restraining order was not directed to Biñan
Development Co., Inc. its officers, agents or privies.
Emberador was not named specifically in the trial
court's judgment as one of the occupants to be
ejected.
For the redress of whatever wrong or delict was
committed against Emberador by reason of the
destruction of his improvements, his remedy is not in
a contempt proceeding but in some appropriate civil
and criminal actions against the destroyer of the
improvements.
In resume, we find that there is no merit in the instant
prohibition action. The constitutional prohibition relied
upon by the petitioners as a ground to stop the
execution of the judgment in the ejectment suit has no
retroactive application to that case and does not
divest the trial court of jurisdiction to enforce that
judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of
merit but with the clarification that the said judgment
cannot be enforced against those petitioners herein
who were not defendants in the ejectment case, Civil
Case No. 3711, and over whom the lower court did
not acquire jurisdiction. The contempt proceeding is
also dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-19535 July 10, 1967
HEIRS OF PELAGIO ZARA; PIO, CLEMENTE,
SERAFIA, PORFIRIO and ESTEBAN, all surnamed
MINDANAO; MARIA and GLICERIA, both surnamed
SEDARIA; DULCE CORDERO, VICTORIA DE LOS
REYES and JOSE GARCIA, applicants-appellants,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY,
Government oppositor-appellees.
VICENTE V. DE VILLA, JR., and VICENTE S. DE
VILLA, SR., private oppositors-appellees.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Batangas (Lipa City) dismissing appellants'
"application for registration of the parcel of land
consisting of 107 hectares, more or less, situated in
the barrio of Sampiro, Municipality of San Juan,
Province of Batangas, and designated in amended
plan PSU-103696 as Lot A."
The proceedings in the court a quo are not disputed.
On August 4, 1960 appellants filed an application for
registration of the land above described pursuant to
the provisions of Act 496. They alleged that the land
had been inherited by them from their grandfather,
Pelagio Zara, who in turn acquired the same under a
Spanish grant known as "Composicion de Terrenos
Realengos" issued in 1888. Alternatively, should the
provisions of the Land Registration Act be not
applicable, applicants invoke the benefits of the
provisions of Chapter VIII, Section 48, subsection (b)
of C.A. 141 as amended, on the ground that they and
their predecessor-in-interest had been in continuous
and adverse possession of the land in concept of
owner for more than 30 years immediately preceding
the application.
Oppositions were filed by the Director of Lands, the
Director of Forestry and by Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. The
latter's opposition recites:
x x x that the parcel of land sought to be registered by
the applicants consisting of 107 hectares, more or
less, was included in the area of the parcel of land
applied for registration by Vicente S. de Villa, Sr. in
Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 in this Court,
which was decided by this same Court through the
then incumbent Judge, the Honorable Juan P.
Enriquez, on September 30, 1949; that the parcel
sought to be registered by the applicants was
declared public land in said decision; that they (the
oppositors Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. and Vicente S. de
Villa, Sr.) have an interest over the land in question
because for a period more than sixty (60) years, the
de Villas have been in possession, and which
possession, according to them, was open continuous,
notorious and under the claim of ownership; that the
proceeding being in rem, the failure of the applicants
to appear at the case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 to
prove their imperfect and incomplete title over the
property, barred them from raising the same issue in
another case; and that as far as the decision in Civil
Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 which was affirmed
in the appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 5847-R is
concerned, there is already "res-adjudicata" — in
other words, the cause of action of the applicant is
now barred by prior judgment; and that this Court has
no more jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
decision of the Court in said case having transferred
to the Director of Lands.
On November 15, 1960 the De Villas (De Villa, Sr.
was subsequently included as oppositor) filed a
motion to dismiss, invoking the same grounds alleged
in its opposition, but principally the fact that the land
applied for had already been declared public land by
the judgment in the former registration case.
The trial court, over the objection of the applicants,
granted the motion to dismiss by order dated January
27, 1961, holding, inter alia, that "once a parcel of
land is declared or adjudged public land by the court
having jurisdiction x x x it cannot be the subject
anymore of another land registration proceeding x x x
(that) it is only the Director of Lands who can dispose
of the same by sale, by lease, by free patent or by
homestead."
In the present appeal from the order of dismissal
neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of
Forestry filed a brief as appellee. The decisive issue
posed by applicants-appellants is whether the 1949
judgment in the previous case, denying the
application of Vicente S. de Villa, Sr., and declaring
the 107 hectares in question to be public land,
precludes a subsequent application by an alleged
possessor for judicial confirmation of title on the basis
of continuous possession for at least thirty years,
pursuant to Section 48, subsection (b) of the Public
Land Law, C.A. 141, as amended. This provision
reads as follows:
The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to
own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title, except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this Chapter.1äwphï1.ñët
The right to file an application under the foregoing
provision has been extended by Republic Act No.
2061 to December 31, 1968.
It should be noted that appellants' application is in the
alternative: for registration of their title of ownership
under Act 496 or for judicial confirmation of their
"imperfect" title or claim based on adverse and
continuous possession for at least thirty years. It may
be that although they were not actual parties in that
previous case the judgment therein is a bar to their
claim as owners under the first alternative, since the
proceeding was in rem, of which they and their
predecessor had constructive notice by publication.
Even so this is a defense that properly pertains to the
Government, in view of the fact that the judgment
declared the land in question to be public land. In any
case, appellants' imperfect possessory title was not
disturbed or foreclosed by such declaration, for
precisely the proceeding contemplated in the
aforecited provision of Commonwealth Act 141
presupposes that the land is public. The basis of the
decree of judicial confirmation authorized therein is
not that the land is already privately owned and hence
no longer part of the public domain, but rather that by
reason of the claimant's possession for thirty years he
is conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant.
On the question of whether or not the private
oppositors-appellees have the necessary personality
to file an opposition, we find in their favor, considering
that they also claim to be in possession of the land,
and have furthermore applied for its purchase from
the Bureau of Lands.1äwphï1.ñët
Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and
the case is remanded to the Court a quo for trial and
judgment on the merits, with costs against the private
oppositors-appellees.
G.R. No. L-67399 November 19, 1985
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (The Director of
Lands), petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
AVELINO LEYCO, LEANDRO LEYCO, ZARA
LEYCO, JUSTINA LEYCO and FELIPA LEYCO,
represented by LEANDRO LEYCO, respondents.
Solicitor General for petitioner.
Restituto L. Opis for respondents.
MAKASIAR, C.J.:
Petition to review a decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court which affirmed in toto that of the trial
court.
In LRC No. N-173 of the then Court of First Instance
of Marinduque, Avelino, Leandro, Justina, Zara and
Felipa all surnamed LEYCO applied for judicial
confirmation of their title to two (2) parcels of land with
a combined area of 138.5413 hectares (pp. 1-9,
ROA).
The Director of lands for the Republic of the
Philippines opposed the petition.
Respondent applicants' alleged possession of Lots 1
and 2 of Psu-133612 (consisting of 138.5413
hectares) from 1962 up to the filing of their application
for registration in 1976 — about 14 years only — does
not constitute possession under claim of ownership so
as to entitle them to a State grant under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act (Com. Act No. 141), as
amended.
Respondent applicants failed to establish conclusively
that they and their predecessor-in-interest were in
continuous possession and occupancy of the lots in
question under bona fide claim of ownership. Even
the alleged long-time possession by respondent
applicants' mother, Fausta de Jesus, who claimed to
have entered into possession of the land in question
in 1911 until her death in 1962, does not appear to be
indubitable.
The tax declarations presented as evidence by
respondent applicants are not by themselves
conclusive proof of their alleged possession under
claim of ownership over the lots in question. The
earliest tax declaration is dated 1927 while the others
are recent tax declarations.
Respondent applicants presented the following
exhibits:
Exh. M-2" — Tax Declaration No. 3431 (1966) in the
name of Fausta de Jesus. Declared as coconut
(15.4182 has.) and cogon (40000 has.) lands. Planted
to 1512 coconut bearing trees. Value of land
assessed at P3,590.00 and value of improvements
assessed at P9,070.00 or a total value of P12,660.00.
This TD cancelled TD No. 664.
Exh. M-3" — Tax Declaration No. 664 (1966) in the
name of Fausta de Jesus. Declared as coconut
(15.4182 has.) and cogon (40000 has.) lands. Planted
to 1512 coconut bearing trees. Value of land
assessed at 114,360 and value of improvements
assessed at P11,340 or a total value of P15,700. This
TD cancelled TD No. 4023.
Exh. M-4" — Tax Declaration No. 4023 (1958) in the
name of Fausta de Jesus. Declared as coconut and
cogon lands, with a total area of 19.4182 has. .
Planted to 1,012 coconut fruit bearing trees. Total
value of land assessed at P 2,900.00 while value of
improvements assessed at P 5,570.00 or a total
assessed value of P 8,470.00. This TD cancelled TD
No. 3480.
Exh. M-5" — Tax Declaration No. 3480 (1958) in the
name of Fausta de Jesus. Declared as coconut land
with a total area of 19.4182 has. . Planted to 1364
coconut trees (fruit bearing). Value of land assessed
at P 3,500.00 and value of improvements thereon
assessed at P7,500.00 or a total value of P11,900.00.
This declaration cancelled TD No. 2778.
Exh. M-6" — Tax Declaration No. 2778 (1955) in the
name of Fausta de Jesus. Declared as coconut land
with a total area of 19.4182 has. . Planted to 620
coconut trees fruit bearing. Value of land assessed at
P2,330.00 and value of improvements assessed at
P2,920.00 or a total assessed value of P5,250.00.
This declaration cancelled TD No. 475.
Exh. M-7" — Tax Declaration No. 475 (1949) in the
name of Fausta de Jesus. Declared as coconut
(6.0000 has.) and cogon (17.0000 has.) lands.
Planted to 500 coconut trees bearing fruits and 120
coconut trees not bearing fruits. Total value of land
assessed at P940.00 and improvements at P1550.00
or a total value of P2490.00. This TD cancelled TD
No. 5319.
Exh. M-8" — Tax Declaration No. 5319 (1928) in the
name of Fausta de Jesus. Declared as "Cogonalos
para cocal, cogonalos para paste," with an area of
23.0000 has . . Planted to 150 "ponos de cocos
frutales." Value of land assessed at P690 and
improvements thereon at P300 or a total assessed
value of P990.00.
Exh. 0-2" — Tax Declaration No. 3432 (1966) in the
name of Fausta de Jesus. Declared as coconut
(19.1231 has.) and cogon (100.0000 has.) lands, or
with a total area of 119.1231. Planted to 1685 coconut
trees. Total value of land assessed at P9210.00 while
total value of improvements assessed at P10,110.00
or a total assessed value of P19,320.00. This
declaration cancelled TD No. 665.
Exh. 0-3" — Tax Declaration No. 665 (1966) in the
name of Fausta de Jesus. Declared as coconut
(19.1231 has.) and cogon (100.0000 has.) lands.
Planted to 1,685 coconut fruit bearing trees. Land
assessed at P10,120 while improvements thereon at
P12,640 or a total assessed value of P22,760. This
declaration cancelled TD No. 4022.
Exh. 0-4" — Tax Declaration No. 4022 (1958) in the
name of Fausta de Jesus. Declared as coconut
(19.1231 has.) and cogon (P100.00 has.) lands.
Planted to 1,685 coconut trees bearing fruits. Land
assessed at P5,840.00 and improvements thereon at
P9,270.00. This declaration cancelled TD No. 3543.
Exh. 0-5" — Tax Declaration No. 3543 (1958) in the
name of Fausta de Jesus. Declared as coconut land
with a total area of 119.1231 has. . Planted to 1843
coconut trees fruit bearing. Land assessed at
P21,440.00 while improvements thereon at
P10,140.00 or a total value of P31,580.00. This
declaration cancelled TD No. 2779.
Exh. 0-6" — Tax Declaration No. 2779 (1955) in the
name of Fausta de Jesus. Declared as coconut land
with a total area of 119.1231 has. . Planted to 2,190
coconut trees fruit bearing and 200 coconut trees not
bearing fruit (3 years old). Land assessed at
P14,290.00 while improvements thereon at
P10,290.00 or a total value of P24,590.00. This TD
cancelled TD No. 4476
Exh. 0-7" — Tax Declaration No. 476 (1949) in the
name of Fausta de Jesus. Declared as coconut
(20.8595 has.) and pasture (642042 has.) lands or a
total area of 85.0637 has. . Planted to 2,190 coconut
trees fruit bearing. Land assessed at P3370.00 while
improvements thereon valued at P660.00 or a total
assessed value of P10,030.00. This TD cancelled TD
No. 5321.
Exh. 0-8" — Tax Declaration No. 5321 (1941) on the
name of Fausta de Jesus. Declared as "Llani cocal"
with an area of 88.0637 has. . Planted to "2191 cocos
frutales." Land assessed at P2320 and improvements
there at P4380 or a total assessed value of P6700.00.
This declaration cancelled TD No. 3231.
Likewise, respondent applicants herein presented the
following tax declarations:
Exh. L" — Tax Declaration No. 2485 (1974) in the
name of Avelino Leandro, Justina, Zara & Felipe, all
surnamed Leyco. Classified as coconut land with an
area of P5.0000 has. . Planted to 140 coconut bearing
trees. Value of land assessed at P5280 and value or
improvements therein at P8020 or a total assessed
value of P13,300.00. This declaration cancelled TD
No. 4166.
Exh. M" — Tax Declaration No. 4166 (1970) in the
name of Avelino, Leandro, Justina and Felipa Leyco.
Declared as coconut (15.4182 has.) and cogon
(4.0000 has,) lands, or with a total area of has. .
Planted to 1512 coconut fruit bearing trees. Value of
land is assessed at P3590 while value of
improvements at P9070 or a total assessed value of
P12,660. This declaration cancelled TD No. 3431.
Exh. N" — Tax Declaration No. 2484 (1974) in the
name of Avelino, Leandro, Justina, Zara and Felipa
Leyco. Classified as coconut (19.0000 has.) and
cogon (50.0000 has.) lands. Planted to 1425 coconut
bearing trees and 550 coconut not bearing fruits.
Land assessed at P13.730 and improvements
thereon assessed at P9,860 or a total assessed value
of P24,590. This declaration cancelled TD No. 4165.
Exh. O" — Tax Declaration No. 4165 (1970) in the
name of Avelino Alejandro, Justina, Zara and Felipa
Leyco. Declared as coconut (19.1231 has.) and
cogon (100.0000 has.) lands. Planted to 1685
coconut trees fruit bearing. Value of land assessed at
P9,210 and thereon at P10,111 or a total assessed
value of P19,320. This declaration cancelled TD No.
3432.
A cursory look at the exhibits (tax declarations)
presented by respondent applicants herein reveals a
number of discrepancies that cast serious doubts on
respondents' claim over the lots in question:
1. Tax Declaration No. 5319 dated 1928 (Exh.
M-8) declared in the name of Fausta de Jesus with an
area of 23.0000 hectares, specifies its boundaries as
follows:
North: Sapa
East: Florencio Corral
South: Fausta de Jesus
West: Mar.
In 1949, Fausta de Jesus filed Tax Declaration No.
475 (Exh. M-7) which cancelled Tax Declaration 475
(Exh. M-7) which cancelled Tax Declaration No. 5319
over the same parcel of land. A close examination,
however, of Tax Declaration No. 475 shows that the
listing of the adjoining owners therein was at variance
with what was previously stated in Tax Declaration
No. 5319, thus:
North. Brook
East: Aurelia de Jesus
South: Seashore (before Fausta de Jesus)
West: Hrs. of Florencio Corral
This anomaly in the listing of adjoining owners in the
two aforestated tax declarations over the same parcel
of land only reveals the flaw that apparently attended
the acquisition of the lots in question by respondent
applicants and their predecessor-in-interest.
2. Under Tax Declaration No. 5321 dated 1941 (Exh.
0-8), respondent applicants' predecessor-in-interest,
Fausta de Jesus, declared a parcel of land in her
name with an area of 88.0637 hectares.
Later, in 1949, Fausta de Jesus filed Tax Declaration
No. 476 (Exh. 0-7) which cancelled Tax Declaration
No. 5321 over the same parcel of land. However,
under Tax Declaration No. 476, the total area of the
land declared was only 85.0637 hectares (84.0637 as
erroneously stated in Tax Declaration No. 476).
Again, the foregoing disparity in the size of the land
as declared in the two tax declarations is a clear
indication that respondent applicants herein and their
predecessor-in-interest were uncertain and
contradictory as to the exact or actual size of the land
they purportedly possessed.
Likewise, it is noteworthy to mention that six years
after Fausta de Jesus filed Declaration No. 476 in
1949, Tax Declaration No. 2779 was filed —
cancelling Tax Declaration No. 476 — showing this
time a whopping land area of 119.1231 hectares. As
to how Fausta de Jesus managed to increase her
landholdings in so short a span of time intrigues one
no end, considering that from 1949 up to her death in
1962, she listed Manila as her place of residence.
3. Tax Declaration No. 3432 (1966), 665 (1966), and
4022 (1958) presented as Exhibits 0-2, 0-3, and 0-4,
respectively, show that of the total declared area of
119.1231 hectares, only about 19.1231 hectares were
planted to coconuts and the remaining 100.000,00
hectares were cogonal or uncultivated lands.
The unjustifiable award of this vast tract of land —
which are cogon lands and therefore pasture lands
still forming part of the public domain and released by
the Bureau of Lands for disposition — to the
respondent applicants herein, who are undeserving, is
tantamount to putting a premium on absentee
landlordism.
The record shows that even the taxes due o the
litigated lots were not paid regularly. As per
certification of the municipal treasurer of Buenavista,
Marinduque, it was shown that the taxes due on the
land registered in the name of Fausta de Jesus were
paid only from 1949 until 1957 — an indication that
respondent applicants and their predecessor-in-
interest did not pay taxes to the government from
1928 to 1940, and from 1958 until July 6, 1978 when
the respondent applicants closed their evidence — a
total of 32 years. The respondent applicants
presented their evidence on April 19, 1977, October
12, 1977, March 29, 1978 and July 6, 1978.
The testimonies of respondent applicants' alleged
overseers and hired tenants should not be accorded
weight and significance; because it is only natural for
the overseers and hired tenants to testify as they did
in respondent applicants' favor as they stand to
benefit from a decision favorable to their supposed
landlords and benefactors.
But even granting that the witnesses presented by
herein respondent applicants were indeed bona fide
overseers and tenants or workers of the land in
question, it appears rather strange why only about
3,000 coconut trees and some fruit trees were planted
(2,000 coconut trees on Lot 1 which is 119 hectares.
and 1,000 coconut trees on Lot 2 which is 19
hectares) on the vast tract of land subject of the
instant petition. In a practical and scientific way of
planting, a one- hectare land can be planted to about
144 coconut trees. In the instant case, if the hired
tenants and workers of respondent applicants
managed to plant only 3,000 coconut trees, it could
only mean that about only 25 hectares out of the 138
hectares claimed by herein respondent applicants
were cleared, cultivated and planted to coconut trees
and fruit trees. Once planted, a coconut is left to grow
and need not be tended or watched. This is not what
the law considers as possession under claim of
ownership. On the contrary, it merely showed casual
or occasional cultivation of portions of the land in
question. In short, possession is not exclusive nor
notorious, much less continuous, so as to give rise to
a presumptive grant from the government.
Moreover, respondent applicants herein have not
shown nor clearly their right to inherit from their
predecessor-in-interest. The observation of the
Solicitor General on this point is thus well taken:
Even assuming that applicants' deceased mother
acquired registerable title over the parcels in question,
applicants cannot be said to have acquired the same
right proper for registration. They have not presented
any evidence of value to prove that they have the
right to inherit whatever portion of the properties left
by Fausta de Jesus. They have first to show their right
to succeed Fausta, testate or intestate; to establish
who Fausta's legal heirs are or that applicants. and no
other, are Fausta's sole heirs. But all these should be
threshed out in a proper proceeding, certainly not in a
land registration case.
Finally, this is a clear case of land-grabbing of over
100 hectares of land, which could be divided among
the landless and the poor to defuse the seething
unrest among the underprivileged. At this point in time
in our country's history, land-grabbing by the powerful,
moneyed and influential absentee claimants should
not be tolerated nor condoned if only to avoid fanning
further the fires of discontent, dissidence or
subversion which menacingly threaten the very
survival of our nation.
WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY
GRANTED. THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT IS HEREBY
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.

This is a letter-motion praying for reconsideration (for

the third time) of the June 16, 2008 resolution of this
Court denying the petition for review filed by petitioner
Florencia G. Diaz.

Petitioner’s late mother, Flora Garcia (Garcia), filed an

application for registration of a vast tract of land1
located in Laur, Nueva Ecija and Palayan City in the
then Court of First Instance (CFI), Branch 1, Nueva
Ecija on August 12, 1976.2 She alleged that she
possessed the land as owner and worked, developed
and harvested the agricultural products and benefits
of the same continuously, publicly and adversely for
more or less 26 years.

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the

Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the
application because the land in question was within
the Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation (FMMR),
established by virtue of Proclamation No. 237
(Proclamation 237)3 in 1955. Thus, it was inalienable
as it formed part of the public domain.

Significantly, on November 28, 1975, this Court

already ruled in Director of Lands v. Reyes4 that the
property subject of Garcia’s application was
inalienable as it formed part of a military reservation.
Moreover, the existence of Possessory Information
Title No. 216 (allegedly registered in the name of a
G.R. No. 181502 February 2, 2010 certain Melecio Padilla on March 5, 1895), on which
therein respondent Parañaque Investment and
Development Corporation anchored its claim on the
land, was not proven. Accordingly, the decree of
FLORENCIA G. DIAZ, Petitioner, registration issued in its favor was declared null and
void.
vs.

REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Reyes notwithstanding, the CFI ruled in Garcia’s favor
in a decision5 dated July 1, 1981.
RESOLUTION

The Republic eventually appealed the decision of the

CFI to the Court of Appeals (CA). In its decision6
CORONA, J.:
dated February 26, 1992, penned by Justice Vicente
V. Mendoza (Mendoza decision),7 the appellate court
reversed and set aside the decision of the CFI. The
CA found that Reyes was applicable to petitioner’s
case as it involved the same property.
The CA observed that Garcia also traced her
ownership of the land in question to Possessory
Information Title No. 216. As Garcia’s right to the
property was largely dependent on the existence and
validity of the possessory information title the
probative value of which had already been passed
upon by this Court in Reyes, and inasmuch as the
land was situated inside a military reservation, the CA
concluded that she did not validly acquire title thereto.
During the pendency of the case in the CA, Garcia
passed away and was substituted by her heirs, one of
whom was petitioner Florencia G. Diaz.81avvphi1
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Mendoza decision. While the motion was pending in
the CA, petitioner also filed a motion for recall of the
records from the former CFI. Without acting on the
motion for reconsideration, the appellate court, with
Justice Mendoza as ponente, issued a resolution9
upholding petitioner’s right to recall the records of the
case.
Subsequently, however, the CA encouraged the
parties to reach an amicable settlement on the matter
and even gave the parties sufficient time to draft and
finalize the same.
The parties ultimately entered into a compromise
agreement with the Republic withdrawing its claim on
the more or less 4,689 hectares supposedly outside
the FMMR. For her part, petitioner withdrew her
application for the portion of the property inside the
military reservation. They filed a motion for approval
of the amicable settlement in the CA.10
On June 30, 1999, the appellate court approved the
compromise agreement.11 On January 12, 2000, it
directed the Land Registration Administration to issue
the corresponding decree of registration in petitioner’s
favor.12
However, acting on a letter written by a certain Atty.
Restituto S. Lazaro, the OSG filed a motion for
reconsideration of the CA resolution ordering the
issuance of the decree of registration. The OSG
informed the appellate court that the tract of land
subject of the amicable settlement was still within the
military reservation.
On April 16, 2007, the CA issued an amended
resolution (amended resolution)13 annulling the
compromise agreement entered into between the
parties. The relevant part of the dispositive portion of
the resolution read:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolves to:
(1) x x x x x x
(2) x x x x x x
(3) x x x x x x
(4) x x x x x x
(5) x x x x x x
(6) REVERSE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 of
this Court approving the Amicable Settlement dated
May 18, 1999 executed between the Office of the
Solicitor General and Florencia Garcia Diaz[;]
(7) ANNUL and SET ASIDE the Amicable Settlement
dated May 18, 1999 executed between the Office of
the Solicitor General and Florencia Garcia Diaz; the
said Amicable Settlement is hereby DECLARED to be
without force and effect;
(8) GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
the Office of the Solicitor General and, consequently,
SET ASIDE the Resolution dated January 12, 2000
which ordered, among other matters, that a certificate
of title be issued in the name of plaintiff-appellee
Florencia Garcia Diaz over the portion of the subject
property in consonance with the Amicable Settlement
dated May 18, 1999 approved by the Court in its
Resolution dated June 30, 1999;
(9) SET ASIDE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999
approving the May 18, 1999 Amicable Settlement and
the Resolution dated September 20, 1999 amending
the aforesaid June 30, 1999 Resolution; and
(10) REINSTATE the Decision dated February 26,
1992 dismissing applicant-appellee Diaz’ registration
herein.
SO ORDERED.
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. For the first
time, she assailed the validity of the Mendoza
decision – the February 26, 1992 decision adverted to
in the CA’s amended resolution. She alleged that
Justice Mendoza was the assistant solicitor general
during the initial stages of the land registration
proceedings in the trial court and therefore should
have inhibited himself when the case reached the CA.
His failure to do so, she laments, worked an injustice
against her constitutional right to due process. Thus,
the Mendoza decision should be declared null and
void. The motion was denied.14
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review on
certiorari15 in this Court. It was denied for raising
factual issues.16 She moved for reconsideration.17
This motion was denied with finality on the ground
that there was no substantial argument warranting a
modification of the Court’s resolution. The Court then
ordered that no further pleadings would be
entertained. Accordingly, we ordered entry of
judgment to be made in due course.18
Petitioner, however, insisted on filing a motion to lift
entry of judgment and motion for leave to file a
second motion for reconsideration and to refer the
case to the Supreme Court en banc.19 The Court
denied20 it considering that a second motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading.21
Furthermore, the motion to refer the case to the banc
was likewise denied as the banc is not an appellate
court to which decisions or resolutions of the divisions
may be appealed.22 We reiterated our directive that
no further pleadings would be entertained and that
entry of judgment be made in due course.
Not one to be easily deterred, petitioner wrote
identical letters, first addressed to Justice Leonardo
A. Quisumbing (then Acting Chief Justice) and then to
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno himself.23 The body of
the letter, undoubtedly in the nature of a third motion
for reconsideration, is hereby reproduced in its
entirety:
This is in response to your call for "Moral Forces" in
order to "redirect the destiny of our country which is
suffering from moral decadence," that to your mind, is
the problem which confronts us. (Inquirer, January 15,
2009, page 1)[.]
I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R.
N[o]. 181502, and my lawyer has done all that is
humanly possible to convince the court to take a
second look at the miscarriage of justice that will
result from the implementation of the DISMISSAL in a
MINUTE RESOLUTION of our Petition for Review.

Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last
plea for justice so that the case may be elevated to
the Supreme Court en banc. I hope the Court
exercises utmost prudence in resolving the last plea.
For ready reference, a copy of the Motion is hereto
attached as Annex "A".
The issue that was brought before the Honorable
Supreme Court involves the Decision of then Justice
Vicente Mendoza of the Court of Appeals, which is
NULL and VOID, ab initio.
It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice
Vicente Mendoza in a position in which it became
possible for him to discharge the minimum
requirement of due process, [i.e.] the ability of the
court to render "impartial justice," because Mr. Justice
Mendoza became the ponente of the Court of
Appeals Decision, reversing the findings of the trial
court, notwithstanding the fact that he, as Assistant
Solicitor General, was the very person who appeared
on behalf of the Republic, as the oppositor in the very
same land registration proceedings in which he lost.
In other words, he discharged the duties of prosecutor
and judge in the very same case.
In the case of the "Alabang Boys[,]" the public was
outraged by the actions of Atty. Verano who admitted
having prepared a simple resolution to be signed by
the Secretary of Justice.
In my case, the act complained of is the worst kind of
violation of my constitutional right. It is simply
immoral, illegal and unconstitutional, for the
prosecutor to eventually act as the judge, and reverse
the very decision in which he had lost.
If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly
evoke even greater spite from the public, and put the
Supreme Court in bad light. I must confess that I was
tempted to pursue such course of action. I however
believe that such an action will do more harm than
good, and even destroy the good name of Hon.
Justice Mendoza.
I fully support your call for "moral force" that will
slowly and eventually lead our country to redirect its
destiny and escape from this moral decadence, in
which we all find ourselves.
I am content with the fact that at least, the Chief
Justice continues to fight the dark forces that
surround us everyday.
I only ask that the Supreme Court endeavor to ensure
that cases such as mine do not happen again, so that
the next person who seeks justice will not experience
the pain and frustration that I suffered under our
judicial system.
Thank you, and more power to you, SIR. (Emphasis
in the original).
The language of petitioner’s letter/motion is
unmistakable. It is a thinly veiled threat precisely
worded and calculated to intimidate this Court into
giving in to her demands to honor an otherwise legally
infirm compromise agreement, at the risk of being
vilified in the media and by the public.
This Court will not be cowed into submission. We
deny petitioner’s letter/third motion for
reconsideration.
APPLICABILITY OF REYES
The Court agrees with the Republic’s position that
Reyes is applicable to this case.
To constitute res judicata, the following elements
must concur:
(1) the former judgment or order must be final;
(2) the judgment or order must be on the merits;
(3) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and
(4) there must be between the first and second
actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of
causes of action. 24
The first three requisites have undoubtedly been
complied with. However, petitioner takes exception to
the fourth requisite, particularly on the issue of identity
of parties. In her petition for review filed in this Court,
she contends that since the applicants in the two
cases are different, the merits of the two cases
should, accordingly, be determined independently of
each other.25
This contention is erroneous.
The facts obtaining in this case closely resemble
those in Aquino v. Director of Lands.26 In that case,
Quintin Tañedo endeavored to secure title to a
considerable tract of land by virtue of his possession
thereof under CA 141. When the case eventually
reached this Court, we affirmed the trial court’s
decision to dismiss the proceedings as the property in
question was part of the public domain. Quintin’s
successor-in-interest, Florencia Tañedo, who despite
knowledge of the proceedings did not participate
therein, thereafter sold the same property to Benigno
S. Aquino. The latter sought to have it registered in
his name. The question in that case, as well as in this
one, was whether our decision in the case in which
another person was the applicant constituted res
judicata as against his successors-in-interest.
We ruled there, and we so rule now, that in
registration cases filed under the provisions of the
Public Land Act for the judicial confirmation of an
incomplete and imperfect title, an order dismissing an
application for registration and declaring the land as
part of the public domain constitutes res judicata, not
only against the adverse claimant, but also against all
persons.27
We also declared in Aquino that:
From another point of view, the decision in the first
action has become the "law of the case" or at least
falls within the rule of stare decisis. That adjudication
should be followed unless manifestly erroneous. It
was taken and should be taken as the authoritative
view of the highest tribunal in the Philippines. It is
indispensable to the due administration of justice
especially by a court of last resort that a question
once deliberately examined and decided should be
considered as settled and closed to further argument.
x x x28
Be that as it may, the fact is that, even before the CFI
came out with its decision in favor of petitioner on July
1, 1981, this Court, in Reyes, already made an earlier
ruling on November 28, 1975 that the disputed realty
was inalienable as it formed part of a military
reservation. Thus, petitioner’s argument that the
findings of fact of the trial court on her registrable title
are binding on us – on the principle that findings of
fact of lower courts are accorded great respect and
bind even this Court – is untenable. Rather, it was
incumbent upon the court a quo to respect this
Court’s ruling in Reyes, and not the other way around.
However, despite having been apprised of the Court's
findings in Reyes (which should have been a matter
of judicial notice in the first place), the trial court still
insisted on its divergent finding and disregarded the
Court's decision in Reyes, declaring the subject land
as forming part of a military reservation, and thus
outside the commerce of man.
By not applying our ruling in Reyes, the trial judge
virtually nullified the decision of this Court and
therefore acted with grave abuse of discretion.29
Notably, a judgment rendered with grave abuse of
discretion is void and does not exist in legal
contemplation.30
All lower courts, especially the trial court concerned in
this case, ought to be reminded that it is their duty to
obey the decisions of the Supreme Court. A conduct
becoming of inferior courts demands a conscious
awareness of the position they occupy in the
interrelation and operation of our judicial system. As
eloquently declared by Justice J.B. L. Reyes, "There
is only one Supreme Court from whose decision all
other courts should take their bearings."31
ACQUISITION OF PRIVATE RIGHTS
Petitioner, however, argues that Proclamation 237
itself recognizes that its effectivity is "subject to
private rights, if any there be."
By way of a background, we recognized in Reyes that
the property where the military reservation is situated
is forest land. Thus:
Before the military reservation was established, the
evidence is inconclusive as to possession, for it is
shown by the evidence that the land involved is
largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact,
at the time of the hearing, it was conceded that
approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of
public forest. x x x (Emphasis supplied)32
Concomitantly, we stated therein, and we remind
petitioner now, that forest lands are not registrable
under CA 141.
[E]ven more important, Section 48[b] of CA No. 141,
as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural
land. Forest lands or area covered with forest are
excluded. It is well-settled that forest land is incapable
of registration; and its inclusion in a title, whether such
title be one issued using the Spanish sovereignty or
under the present Torrens system of registration,
nullifies the title. (Emphasis supplied).33
However, it is true that forest lands may be registered
when they have been reclassified as alienable by the
President in a clear and categorical manner (upon the
recommendation of the proper department head who
has the authority to classify the lands of the public
domain into alienable or disposable, timber and
mineral lands)34 coupled with possession by the
claimant as well as that of her predecessors-in-
interest. Unfortunately for petitioner, she was not able
to produce such evidence. Accordingly, her
occupation thereof, and that of her predecessors-in-
interest, could not have ripened into ownership of the
subject land. This is because prior to the conversion
of forest land as alienable land, any occupation or
possession thereof cannot be counted in reckoning
compliance with the thirty-year possession
requirement under Commonwealth Act 141 (CA 141)
or the Public Land Act.35 This was our ruling in
Almeda v. CA.36 The rules on the confirmation of
imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land
classified as forest land is released through an official
proclamation to that effect. Then and only then will it
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain.37
Coming now to petitioner’s contention that her "private
rights" to the property, meaning her and her
predecessors’ possession thereof prior to the
establishment of the FMMR, must be respected, the
same is untenable. As earlier stated, we had already
recognized the same land to be public forest even
before the FMMR was established. To reiterate:
Before the military reservation was established, the
evidence is inconclusive as to possession, for it is
shown by the evidence that the land involved is
largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact,
at the time of the hearing, it was conceded that
approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of
public forest. x x x
Therefore, even if possession was for more than 30
years, it could never ripen to ownership.
But even assuming that the land in question was
alienable land before it was established as a military
reservation, there was nevertheless still a dearth of
evidence with respect to its occupation by petitioner
and her predecessors-in-interest for more than 30
years. In Reyes, we noted:
Evidently, Melecio Padilla, having died on February 9,
1900, barely five (5) years after the inscription of the
informacion possessoria, could not have converted
the same into a record of ownership twenty (20) years
after such inscription, pursuant to Article 393 of the
Spanish Mortgage Law.
xxx
During the lifetime of Melecio Padilla, only a small
portion thereof was cleared and cultivated under the
‘kaingin’ system, while some portions were used as
grazing land. After his death, his daughter, Maria
Padilla, caused the planting of vegetables and had
about forty (40) tenants for the purpose. During the
Japanese occupation, Maria Padilla died. x x x
xxx
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by
the claimant, and the raising thereon of cattle, do not
constitute possession under claim of ownership. In
that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious
as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State.
While grazing livestock over land is of course to be
considered with other acts of dominion to show
possession, the mere occupancy of land by grazing
livestock upon it, without substantial inclosures, or
other permanent improvements, is not sufficient to
support a claim of title thru acquisitive prescription.
The possession of public land, however long the
period may have extended, never confers title thereto
upon the possessor because the statute of limitations
with regard to public land does not operate against
the State unless the occupant can prove possession
and occupation of the same under claim of ownership
for the required number of years to constitute a grant
from the State.38
xxx
Furthermore, the fact that the possessory information
title on which petitioner also bases her claim of
ownership was found to be inexistent in Reyes,39
thus rendering its probative value suspect, further
militates against granting her application for
registration.
NULLITY OF COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
On the compromise agreement between the parties,
we agree with the CA that the same was null and
void.
An amicable settlement or a compromise agreement
is in the nature of a contract and must necessarily
comply with the provisions of Article 1318 of the New
Civil Code which provides:

Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following
requisites concur:
(1) Consent of the contracting parties;
(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the
contract;
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.
Petitioner was not able to provide any proof that the
consent of the Republic, through the appropriate
government agencies, i.e. the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Land
Management Bureau, Land Registration Authority,
and the Office of the President, was secured by the
OSG when it executed the agreement with her.40 The
lack of authority on the part of the OSG rendered the
compromise agreement between the parties null and
void because although it is the duty of the OSG to
represent the State in cases involving land
registration proceedings, it must do so only within the
scope of the authority granted to it by its principal, the
Republic of the Philippines.41
In this case, although the OSG was authorized to
appear as counsel for respondent, it was never given
the specific or special authority to enter into a
compromise agreement with petitioner. This is in
violation of the provisions of Rule 138 Section 23, of
the Rules of Court which requires "special authority"
for attorneys to bind their clients.
Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. –
Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any
case by any agreement in relation thereto made in
writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of
ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without
special authority, compromise their client’s litigation,
or receive anything in discharge of a client’s claim but
the full amount in cash. (Emphasis supplied).
Moreover, the land in question could not have been a
valid subject matter of a contract because, being
forest land, it was inalienable. Article 1347 of the Civil
Code provides:
Art. 1347. All things which are not outside the
commerce of men, including future things, may be the
object of a contract. All rights which are not
intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future
inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by
law.
All services which are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy may
likewise be the object of a contract. (Emphasis
supplied)
Finally, the Court finds the cause or consideration of
the obligation contrary to law and against public
policy. The agreement provided that, in consideration
of petitioner’s withdrawal of her application for
registration of title from that portion of the property
located within the military reservation, respondent
was withdrawing its claim on that part of the land
situated outside said reservation. The Republic could
not validly enter into such undertaking as the subject
matter of the agreement was outside the commerce of
man.
PETITIONER’S CONTEMPT OF COURT
This Court, being the very institution that dispenses
justice, cannot reasonably be expected to just sit by
and do nothing when it comes under attack.

That petitioner’s letter-motion constitutes an attack
against the integrity of this Court cannot be denied.
Petitioner started her letter innocently enough by
stating:
This is in response to your call for "Moral Forces" in
order to "redirect the destiny of our country which is
suffering from moral decadence," that to your mind, is
the problem which confronts us. (Inquirer, January 15,
2009, page 1)[.]
It, however, quickly progressed into a barely
concealed resentment for what she perceived as this
Court’s failure to exercise "utmost prudence" in
rendering "impartial justice" in deciding her case.
Petitioner recounted:
I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R.
N[o]. 181502, and my lawyer has done all that is
humanly possible to convince the court to take a
second look at the miscarriage of justice that will
result from the implementation of the DISMISSAL in a
MINUTE RESOLUTION of our Petition for Review.
Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last
plea for justice so that the case may be elevated to
the Supreme Court en banc. I hope the Court
exercises utmost prudence in resolving the last plea.
For ready reference, a copy of the Motion is hereto
attached as Annex "A".
The issue that was brought before the Honorable
Supreme Court involves the Decision of then Justice
Vicente Mendoza of the Court of Appeals, which is
NULL and VOID, ab initio.
It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice
Vicente Mendoza in a position in which it became
possible for him to discharge the minimum
requirement of due process, [i.e.] the ability of the
court to render "impartial justice," because Mr. Justice
Mendoza became the ponente of the Court of
Appeals Decision, reversing the findings of the trial
court, notwithstanding the fact that he, as Assistant
Solicitor General, was the very person who appeared
on behalf of the Republic, as the oppositor in the very
same land registration proceedings in which he lost.
(Emphasis supplied).
Petitioner then indirectly hints that, when push comes
to shove, she has no choice but to expose the
irregularity concerning the Mendoza decision to the
media. This is evident in her arrogant declaration that:
If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly
evoke even greater spite from the public, and put the
Supreme Court in bad light.
But she hastens to add in the same breath that:
I must confess that I was tempted to pursue such
course of action. I however believe that such an
action will do more harm than good, and even destroy
the good name of Hon. Justice Mendoza.
Petitioner ends her letter by taking this Court to task:
. . . endeavor to ensure that cases such as mine do
not happen again, so that the next person who seeks
justice will not experience the pain and frustration that
I suffered under our judicial system.
When required to show cause why she should not be
cited for contempt for her baseless charges and
veiled threats, petitioner answered:
xxx

The Letter of January 26, 2009 is not a "veiled
threat[.] It was written in response to the call of the
Chief Justice for a moral revolution. Juxtaposed
against the factual backdrop of the "Alabang Boys"
case and the Meralco [c]ase, involving Mr. Justice
Jose L. Sabio which also enjoyed wide publicity over
the tri-media, petitioner felt that the facts of the said
cases pale in comparison to the facts of her case
where the lawyer of her opponent eventually became
justice of the appellate court and ended up reversing
the very decision in which he lost, in clear violation of
her [c]onstitutional [r]ight to fundamental fair play – for
no contestant in any litigation can ever serve as a
judge without transgression of the due process
clause. This is basic.
Petitioner confesses that she may have been
emotional in the delivery of her piece, because
correctly or incorrectly[,] she believes they are
irrefutable. If in the course of that emotional delivery,
she has offended your honors’ sensibilities, she is
ready for the punishment, and only prays that his
Court temper its strike with compassion – as her letter
to the Chief Justice was never written with a view of
threatening the Court.
xxx
Petitioner wrote the Chief Justice in order to obtain
redress and correction of the inequity bestowed upon
her by destiny. It was never meant as a threat.
The Court now puts an end to petitioner’s
irresponsible insinuations and threats of "going public"
with this case. We are not blind to petitioner’s clever
and foxy interplay of threats alternating with false
concern for the reputation of this Court.
It is well to remind petitioner that the Court has
consistently rendered justice with neither fear nor
favor. The disposition in this case was arrived at after
a careful and thorough deliberation of the facts of this
case and all the matters pertaining thereto. The
records of the case, in fact, show that all the pertinent
issues raised by petitioner were passed upon and
sufficiently addressed by the appellate court and this
Court in their respective resolutions.
As to petitioner’s complaint regarding this Court’s
denial of her petition through a mere minute resolution
(which allegedly deprived her of due process as the
Court did not issue a full-blown decision stating the
facts and applicable jurisprudence), suffice it to say
that the Court is not duty-bound to issue decisions or
resolutions signed by the justices all the time. It has
ample discretion to formulate ponencias, extended
resolutions or even minute resolutions issued by or
upon its authority, depending on its evaluation of a
case, as long as a legal basis exists. When a minute
resolution (signed by the Clerk of Court upon orders
of the Court) denies or dismisses a petition or motion
for reconsideration for lack of merit, it is understood
that the assailed decision or order, together with all its
findings of fact and legal conclusions, are deemed
sustained.42
Furthermore, petitioner has doggedly pursued her
case in this Court by filing three successive motions
for reconsideration, including the letter-motion subject
of this resolution. This, despite our repeated warnings
that "no further pleadings shall be entertained in this
case." Her unreasonable persistence constitutes utter
defiance of this Court’s orders and an abuse of the
rules of procedure. This, alongside her thinly veiled
threats to leak her case to the media to gain public
sympathy – although the tone of petitioner’s
compliance with our show-cause resolution was
decidedly subdued compared to her earlier letters –
constitutes contempt of court.
In Republic v. Unimex,43 we held:
A statement of this Court that no further pleadings
would be entertained is a declaration that the Court
has already considered all issues presented by the
parties and that it has adjudicated the case with
finality. It is a directive to the parties to desist from
filing any further pleadings or motions. Like all orders
of this Court, it must be strictly observed by the
parties. It should not be circumvented by filing
motions ill-disguised as requests for clarification.
A FEW OBSERVATIONS
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading and the plea
utterly lacks merit.
Petitioner is found GUILTY of contempt of court.
Accordingly, a FINE of Five Thousand Pesos is
hereby imposed on her, payable within ten days from
receipt of this resolution. She is hereby WARNED that
any repetition hereof shall be dealt with more
severely.

If petitioner was, as she adamantly insists, only

guarding her constitutional right to due process, then Treble costs against petitioner.
why did she question the validity of the Mendoza
decision late in the proceedings, that is, only after her
motion for reconsideration in the CA (for its
subsequent annulment of the compromise SO ORDERED.
agreement) was denied? It is obvious that it was only
when her case became hopeless that her present
counsel frantically searched for some ground, any
ground to resuscitate his client’s lost cause,
subsequently raising the issue. This is evident from a
statement in her petition to this Court that:

It is this fresh discovery by the undersigned counsel

of the nullity of the proceedings of the Court of
Appeals that places in doubt the entire proceedings it
previously conducted, which led to the rendition of the
February 26, 1992 Decision, a fact that escaped the
scrutiny of applicant for registration Flora L. Garcia,
as well as her lawyer, Atty. Cayetano Dante Diaz,
who died in 1993, and the late Justice Fernando A.
Santiago, who stood as counsel for Flora L. Garcia’s
successor-in-interest, herein petitioner, Florencia G.
Garcia.44 (Emphasis supplied).

The above cited statement does not help petitioner’s

cause at all. If anything, it only proves how desperate
the case has become for petitioner and her counsel.

WHEREFORE, the letter-motion dated January 26,

2009 of petitioner is NOTED and is hereby treated as
a third motion for reconsideration. The motion is
DENIED considering that a third motion for