THIRD DIVISION
But in 1985, defendant Noceda
[G.R. No. 119730. September 2, 1999]
RODOLFO NOCEDA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF
APPEALS and AURORA ARBIZO
DIRECTO, Respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court seeks to reverse the decision
dated March 31, 1995 of the respondent Court of
Appeals1 in CA GR CV No. 38126, affirming with
modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 71, of Iba, Zambales,2 in an action by private
respondent against petitioner for recovery of
possession and ownership and rescission/annulment
of donation.
The facts of the case as summarized by the
respondent Court are as follows:3cräläwvirtualibräry
On June 1, 1981, plaintiff Aurora Directo, defendant
Rodolfo Noceda, and Maria Arbizo, the daughter,
grandson, and widow, respectively, of the late
Celestino Arbizo, who died in 1956, extrajudicially
settled a parcel of land, Lot 1121, located at Bitaog,
San Isidro, Cabangan, Zambales, which was said to
have an area of 66,530 square meters. Plaintiff
Directos share was 11,426 square meters,
defendant Noceda got 13,294 square meters, and
the remaining 41,810 square meters went to Maria
Arbizo (Exhibit G). On the same date, plaintiff
Directo donated 625 square meters of her share to
defendant Noceda, who is her nephew being the son
of her deceased sister, Carolina (Exhibit D).
However, on August 17, 1981, another extrajudicial
settlement-partition of Lot 1121 was executed by
plaintiff Directo, defendant Noceda, and Maria
Arbizo. Three fifths of the said land went to Maria
Arbizo while plaintiff Directo and defendant Noceda
got only one-fifth each. In said extrajudicial
settlement-partition as well as in the Tax Declaration
16-0032 over Lot 1121 in the name of the late
Celestino Arbizo, the said parcel of land was said to
have an area of only 29,845 square meters (Exhibit
C). Sometime in 1981, defendant Noceda
constructed his house on the land donated to him by
plaintiff Directo. Plaintiff Directo fenced the portion
allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement,
excluding the donated portion, and constructed
thereon three huts.
removed the fence earlier constructed by plaintiff
Directo, occupied the three huts (3) and fenced the
entire land of plaintiff Directo without her consent.
Plaintiff Directo demanded from defendant Noceda
to vacate her land, but the latter refused. Hence,
plaintiff Directo filed the present suit, a complaint for
the recovery of possession and ownership and
rescission/annulment of donation, against defendant
Noceda before the lower court. During the trial, the
lower court ordered that a relocation survey of Lot
1121 be conducted by Engr. Edilberto Quejada of
the Bureau of Lands. After the survey of Lot 1121 in
the presence of both parties, Engr. Edilberto
Quejada reported that the area of Lot 1121 stated in
the extrajudicial settlement-partition of August 17,
1981 was smaller than the actual area of Lot 1121
which is 127,298 square meters. Engr. Quejada
subdivided Lot 1121, excluding the portions
occupied by third persons, known as Lot 8, the
salvage zone and the road lot, on the basis of the
actual occupancy of Lot 1121 by the heirs of the late
Celestino Arbizo and the extrajudicial settlement-
partition of August 17, 1981. The portion
denominated as Lot A, with an area of 12,957
square meters was the share of defendant Noceda;
Lot C, with the same area as that of Lot A, was the
share of plaintiff Directo, a portion of which was
donated to defendant Noceda; and Lot B, with an
area of 38,872 square meters, went to Maria Arbizo
(Exhibit E).
On November 6, 1991, the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 71, of Iba, Zambales rendered a decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:4cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
considerations, the Court hereby renders judgment:
(a) Declaring the Extra-Judicial Settlement-Partition
dated August 19, 1981, valid;
(b) Declaring the Deed of Donation dated June 1,
1981, revoked;
(c) Ordering the defendant to vacate and reconvey
that donated portion of Lot 2, Lot 1121 subject of the
Deed of Donation dated June 1, 1981 to the plaintiff
or her heirs or assigns;
(d) Ordering the defendant to remove the house built
inside the donated portion at the defendants
expense or pay a monthly rental of P300.00
Philippine Currency;
(e) Ordering the defendant to pay attorneys fees in
the amount of P5,000.00; and
(f) To pay the cost.
Rodolfo Nocedo appealed to the respondent Court
which affirmed the trial court as
follows:5cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered,
ORDERING defendant Rodolfo Noceda to VACATE
the portion known as Lot C of Lot 1121 per Exhibit E,
which was allotted to plaintiff Aurora Arbizo Directo.
Except for this modification, the Decision, dated
November 6, 1991, of the RTC-Iba, Zambales,
Branch 71, in Civil Case No. RTC-354-I, is hereby
AFFIRMED in all other respects. Costs against
defendant Rodolfo Noceda.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for
review with the following assignment of errors:6
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IDENTIFIED AS
LOT 1121 CONTAINS AN AREA IN EXCESS OF
THAT STATED IN ITS TAX DECLARATION.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT LOT 1121 SHOULD BE PARTITIONED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT DATED 17 AUGUST 1981.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
ADJUDICATING AND ALLOTING LOT C AS
APPEARING IN THE SURVEY PLAN PREPARED
BY GEODETIC ENGINEER EDILBERTO QUEJADA
TO THE RESPONDENT.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE PETITIONER USURPED AN AREA
ADJUDICATED TO THE RESPONDENT.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVOKING
THE DEED OF DONATION DATED 1 JUNE 1981.
The first issue raised refers to the actual area of the
subject lot known as Lot 1121, which was registered
under Tax Declaration No. 16-0032 under the name
of the late Celestino Arbizo. Petitioner claims that
Tax Declaration No. 16-0032 contains only an area
of 29,845 sq. meter; thus the respondent Court
exceeded its judicial authority when it sustained the
lower courts findings that the subject property
actually contains an area of 127,289 square meters.
We find the argument unmeritorious. The records
disclose that the trial court in an Order dated June 8,
1987 gave both parties to this case the chance to
have the subject property re-surveyed by a licensed
surveyor to determine the actual area of Lot
1121.7 Plaintiff Aurora Directo filed a
motion/compliance where she suggested that
Geodetic Engineer Edilberto V. Quejada of the
Bureau of Lands, Iba, Zambales be commissioned to
undertake the survey8 said motion was also sent to
defendants counsel, Atty. Eufracio Pagunuran for
Comment,9 but Atty. Pagunuran however failed to
file his Comment within the given period. Thus the
trial court designated Engineer Quejada to
undertake the survey of Lot 1121.10 Petitioner
Noceda through counsel belatedly filed his Comment
without any opposition to the appointment of
Engineer Quejada but proposed that the latter be
tasked to solely (a) re-survey, determine and identify
the metes and bounds of the lot covered by Tax
Declaration No. 16-0032; (b) to identify the areas
occupied by the parties therein; and (c) to conduct
the re-survey with notice and in the presence of the
parties therein and their respective counsels.11 The
Comment was not, however, acted upon by the trial
court in view of its earlier Order directing Engineer
Quejada to undertake the survey of the land.12 Engr.
Quejada conducted the survey with the conformity
and in the presence of both parties, taking into
consideration the extrajudicial partition dated August
17, 1981, deed of donation dated June 1, 1981
executed by plaintiff Aurora Directo in favor of
defendant Rodolfo Noceda and the actual area
occupied by the parties,13 as well as the sketch
plan14 and the technical description of Lot 1121
taken from the Records Section of the Bureau of
Lands, Manila.15 The report and the survey plan
submitted by Engr. Quejada were approved by the
Trial Court in an Order dated December 7,
1987.16 These circumstances show that the lower
court ordered the re-survey of the lot to determine
the actual area of Lot 1121 and such survey was
done with the conformity and in the presence of both
parties. The actual land area based on the survey
plan which was conducted in the presence of both
parties, showed a much bigger area than the area
declared in the tax declaration but such differences
are not uncommon as early tax declarations are,
more often than not, based on approximation or
estimation rather than on computation.17 We hold
that the respondent court did not err in sustaining the
trial courts findings that the actual area of Lot 1121
is 127,289 square meters.
Petitioner also contends that said judicial
determination improperly encroaches on the rights
and claims of third persons who were never
impleaded below; that the subject lot was also
declared in the name of one Cecilia Obispo and a
Free Patent over the said lot was also issued in her
name and that there are several residential houses
constructed and existing on Lot 8 of lot 1121, thus
these possessors/occupants of Lot 8 should be
joined as defendants for their non-inclusion would be
fatal to respondents cause of action.
We find no merit in this argument. The respondent
Court correctly ratiocinated on this issue as
follows:18cräläwvirtualibräry
The fact that Cecilia Obispo has tax declarations in
her name over Lot 1121 and several persons
occupied a portion thereof did not make them
indispensable parties in the present case. Defendant
Noceda merely presented the tax declarations in the
name of Cecilia Obispo without the alleged free
patent in her name. Moreover, no evidence was
presented showing that Cecilia Obispo possessed or
claimed possession of Lot 1121. Tax receipts and
declarations of ownership for tax purposes are not
conclusive evidence of ownership of property
(Republic vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 224
SCRA 285).
It was not necessary that the occupants of a portion
of Lot 1121, designated as Lot 8, be impleaded in
the present case. Lot 8, though part of Lot 1121, was
excluded by Engr. Quejada in determining the
respective portions of Lot 1121 occupied by plaintiff
Directo, defendant Noceda and Maria Arbizo
pursuant to the extrajudicial settlement which they
executed on August 17, 1981. The result of the
present suit shall not in any way affect the occupants
of Lot 8, since the issues involved in the present
case are the usurpation by defendant Noceda of the
land adjudicated to plaintiff Directo and the propriety
of the cancellation of the deed of donation in favor of
defendant Noceda due to his ingratitude to plaintiff
Directo.
Notably, defendants counsel requested for the
appearance of Cecilia Obispo and despite notice to
her to appear in court and bring with her the alleged
free patent in her name,19 she failed to appear and
even failed to intervene to protect whatever interest
and right she has over the subject lot. As to the other
possessors of residential houses in Lot 8 of Lot
1121, they are not considered as indispensable
parties to this case. A party is not indispensable to
the suit if his interest in the controversy or subject
matter is distinct and divisible from the interest of the
other parties and will not necessarily be prejudiced
by a judgment which does complete justice to the
parties in court.20 Private respondent is not claiming
the entire area of Lot 1121 but only a portion thereof
which was adjudicated to her based on the August
17, 1981 extrajudicial settlement and which was
denominated in the survey plan as Lot C of Lot
1121; thus there was no need to implead the
occupants of Lot 8.
Petitioner further claims that the subject property
could not be partitioned based on the extrajudicial
settlement-partition dated August 17, 1981, since the
distributive share of the heirs of the late Celestino
Arbizo and the area of Lot 1121 stated therein were
different from the extrajudicial settlement executed
on June 1, 1981; that the discrepancies between the
two deeds of partition with respect to the area of Lot
1121 and the respective share of the parties therein
indicated that they never intended that any of the
deeds to be the final determination of the portions of
Lot 1121 allotted to them; that the extrajudicial
settlement-partition of August 17, 1981 could not
effectively subdivide Lot 1121 because it partitioned
only 29,845 square meters, and not its actual area of
127,298 square meters.
We see no cogent reason to disturb the findings of
the respondent Court as follows:21cräläwvirtualibräry
The discrepancies between the extrajudicial
settlements executed by plaintiff Directo, defendant
Noceda and Maria Arbizo on June 1, 1981 and
August 17, 1981 only meant that the latter was
intended to supersede the former. The signature of
defendant Noceda in the extrajudicial settlement of
August 17, 1981 would show his conformity to the
new apportionment of Lot 1121 among the heirs of
the late Celestino Arbizo. The fact that defendant
Noceda occupied the portion allotted to him in the
extrajudicial settlement, as well as the donated
portion of the share of plaintiff Directo, presupposes
his knowledge of the extent of boundaries of the
portion of Lot 1121 allotted to him. Moreover, the
statement in the extrajudicial settlement of August
17, 1981 with respect to the area of Lot 1121, which
was 29,845 square meters, is not conclusive
because it was found out, after the relocation survey
was conducted on Lot 1121, that the parties therein
occupied an area larger than what they were
supposed to possess per the extrajudicial
settlement- partition of August 17, 1981.
Although in the extrajudicial settlement dated August
17, 1981 the heirs of Celestino Arbizo partitioned
only a 29,845 square meter lot to conform with the
area declared under tax declaration 16-0032 yet the
heirs were each actually occupying a bigger portion
the total area of which exceeded 29,845 square
meters. This was confirmed by Geodetic Engineer
Quejada in his report submitted to the trial court
where he stated among other
things:22cräläwvirtualibräry
7. that upon computation of actual survey, it is
informed (sic) that the area dated (sic) as per
extrajudicial settlement-partition in the name of
Celestino Arbizo was smaller than the computed lots
of their actual occupancy as per survey on the
ground;
8. The Lot A, Lot B, and Lot C as appearing on
prepared plan for ready reference was subdivided,
base (sic) on stated sharing as per EXTRA
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT-PARTITION base (sic) on
actual occupancy.
The survey conducted on Lot 1121 was only a
confirmation of the actual areas being occupied by
the heirs taking into account the percentage
proportion adjudicated to each heir on the basis of
their August 17, 1981 extrajudicial settlement.
Petitioner further alleges that the said partition tries
to vest in favor of a third person, Maria Arbizo, a
right over the said property notwithstanding the
absence of evidence establishing that she is an heir
of the late Celestino Arbizo since Maria Arbizo was
never impleaded as a party in this case and her
interest over Lot 1121 was not established.
Such contention deserves scant consideration. We
find no compelling basis to disturb the finding of the
trial court on this factual issue, as
follows:23cräläwvirtualibräry
In effect, the defendant denies the allegation of the
plaintiff that Maria Arbizo was the third wife of
Celestino Arbizo and Agripina is her half sister with a
common father. On this point, the Court believes the
version of the plaintiff. The Court observes that in
the Extra-Judicial Settlement-Partition(Exhibit C),
Maria Arbizo is named one of the co-heirs of the
defendant, being the widow of his grandfather,
Celestino Arbizo. The names of Anacleto and
Agripina do not also appear in the Extra-judicial
Settlement and Partition because according to the
plaintiff, they had sold their shares to Maria Arbizo.
And the defendant is one of the signatories to the
said Deed of Extra-judicial Settlement-Partition
acknowledged before Notary Public Artemio
Maranon. Under the circumstances, the Court is
convinced that the defendant knew that Maria Arbizo
was the widow of Celestino Arbizo and he knew of
the sale of the share of Anacleto Arbizo his share, as
well as that of Agripina. When the defendant signed
the Extra-Judicial Settlement, he was already an
adult since when he testified in 1989, he gave his
age as 50 years old. So that in 1981, he was already
41 years old. If he did not know all of these, the
defendant would have not agreed to the sharing and
signed this document and acknowledged it before
the Notary Public. And who could have a better
knowledge of the relationship of Agripina and Maria
Arbizo to Celestino Arbizo than the latters daughter?
Besides, at the time of the execution of the Extra-
Judicial Settlement-Partition by the plaintiff and
defendant, they were still in good terms. There was
no reason for the plaintiff to favor Maria Arbizo and
Agripina Arbizo over the defendant. Furthermore, the
defendant had failed to support his allegation that
when his grandfather died he had no wife and child.
We likewise find unmeritorious petitioners claim that
there exist no factual and legal basis for the
adjudication of Lot C of Lot 1121 to private
respondent Aurora Directo. It bears stress that the
relocation survey plan prepared by Geodetic
Engineer Quejada was based on the extrajudicial
settlement dated August 17, 1981, and the actual
possession by the parties and the technical
description of Lot 1121. It was established by the
survey plan that based on the actual possession of
the parties, and the extrajudicial settlement among
the heirs the portion denominated as Lot C of Lot
1121 of the survey plan was being occupied by
private respondent Aurora Directo and it was also
shown that it is in Lot C where the 625 square meter
area donated by private respondent Directo to
petitioner is located. There is no obstacle to
adjudicate Lot C to private respondent as her rightful
share allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement.
Petitioner argues that he did not usurp the property
of respondent Directo since, to date, the metes and
bounds of the parcel of land left by their predecessor
in interest, Celestino Arbizo, are still undetermined
since no final determination as to the exact areas
properly pertaining to the parties herein; hence they
are still considered as co-owners thereof.
We do not agree.
In this case the source of co-ownership among the
heirs was intestate succession. Where there are two
or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is,
before its partition, owned in common by such heirs
subject to the payment of debts of the
deceased.24 Partition, in general, is the separation,
division and assignment of a thing held in common
among those to whom it may belong.25 The purpose
of partition is to put an end to co-ownership. It seeks
a severance of the individual interest of each co-
owner, vesting in each a sole estate in specific
property and giving to each one a right to enjoy his
estate without supervision or interference from the
other.26 And one way of effecting a partition of the
decedents estate is by the heirs themselves
extrajudicially. The heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo
namely Maria Arbizo, Aurora A. Directo (private
respondent) and Rodolfo Noceda (petitioner)
entered into an extrajudicial settlement of the estate
on August 17, 1981 and agreed to adjudicate among
themselves the property left by their predecessor-in-
interest in the following manner:
To Rodolfo Noceda goes the northern one-fifth (1/5)
portion containing an area of 5,989 sq. meters;
To Maria Arbizo goes the middle three-fifths (3/5)
portion;
and To Aurora Arbizo goes the southern one-fifth
(1/5) portion.27
In the survey plan submitted by Engineer Quejada,
the portions indicated by red lines and numbered
alphabetically were based on the percentage
proportion in the extrajudicial settlement and the
actual occupancy of each heir which resulted to
these divisions as follows:28cräläwvirtualibräry
Lot A; the area is 2,957 sq.m.- goes to Rodolfo A.
Noceda (1/5)
Lot B; 38,872 sq.m Maria Arbizo (3/5)
Lot C 12,957 sq.m. Aurora Arbizo (1/5)
Thus, the areas allotted to each heir are now
specifically delineated in the survey plan. There is no
co-ownership where portion owned is concretely
determined and identifiable, though not technically
described, or that said portions are still embraced in
one and the same certificate of title does not make
said portions less determinable or identifiable, or
distinguishable, one from the other, nor that
dominion over each portion less exclusive, in their
respective owners.29 A partition legally made confers
upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the
property adjudicated to him.30cräläwvirtualibräry
We also find unmeritorious petitioners argument that
since there was no effective and real partition of the
subject lot there exists no basis for the charge of
usurpation and hence there is also no basis for
finding ingratitude against him. It was established
that petitioner Noceda occupied not only the portion
donated to him by private respondent Aurora Arbizo-
Directo but he also fenced the whole area of Lot C
which belongs to private respondent Directo, thus
petitioners act of occupying the portion pertaining to
private respondent Directo without the latters
knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation which
is an offense against the property of the donor and
considered as an act of ingratitude of a donee
against the donor.31 The law does not require
conviction of the donee; it is enough that the offense
be proved in the action for
revocation.32cräläwvirtualibräry
Finally, petitioner contends that granting revocation
is proper, the right to enforce the same had already
prescribed since as admitted by private respondent,
petitioner usurped her property in the first week of
September 1985 while the complaint for revocation
was filed on September 16, 1986, thus more than
one (1) year had passed from the alleged usurpation
by petitioner of private respondents share in Lot
1121. We are not persuaded. The respondent Court
rejected such argument in this wise:
Article 769 of the New Civil Code states that: The
action granted to the donor by reason of ingratitude
cannot be renounced in advance. This action
prescribes within one year to be counted from the
time the donor had knowledge of the fact and it was
possible for him to bring the action. As expressly
stated, the donor must file the action to revoke his
donation within one year from the time he had
knowledge of the ingratitude of the donee. Also, it
must be shown that it was possible for the donor to
institute the said action within the same period. The
concurrence of these two requisites must be shown
by defendant Noceda in order to bar the present
action. Defendant Noceda failed to do so. He
reckoned the one year prescriptive period from the
occurrence of the usurpation of the property of
plaintiff Directo in the first week of September, 1985,
and not from the time the latter had the knowledge of
the usurpation. Moreover, defendant Noceda failed
to prove that at the time plaintiff Directo acquired
knowledge of his usurpation, it was possible for
plaintiff Directo to institute an action for revocation of
her donation.

The action to revoke by reason of ingratitude

prescribes within one (1) year to be counted from the
time (a) the donor had knowledge of the fact; (b)
provided that it was possible for him to bring the
action. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show proof
of the concurrence of these two conditions in order
that the one (1) year period for bringing the action be
considered to have already prescribed. No
competent proof was adduced by petitioner to prove
his allegation. In Civil Cases, the party having the
burden of proof must establish his case by
preponderance of evidence.33 He who alleges a fact
has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is
not evidence.34cräläwvirtualibräry

Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, supported

by substantial evidence on record are final and
conclusive on the parties and carry even more
weight when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual
findings of the trial court;35 for it is not the function of
this Court to re-examine all over again the oral and
documentary evidence submitted by the parties
unless the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are not supported by the evidence on record or the
judgment is based on the misapprehension of
facts.36 The jurisdiction of this court is thus limited to
reviewing errors of law unless there is a showing
that the findings complained of are totally devoid of
support in the record or that they are so glaringly
erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of
discretion.37 We find no such showing in this case.

We find that both the trial court and the respondent

Court had carefully considered the questions of fact
raised below and the respondent Courts conclusions
are based on the evidence on record. No cogent
reason exists for disturbing such findings.38 We also
note that petitioner in this petition merely rehashed
the same issues and arguments raised in the
respondent Court in whose decision we find no
reversible error. Clearly, petitioner failed to present
any substantial argument to justify a reversal of the
assailed decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby

DENIED. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION deceased parents and to alienate their shares
thereto in favor of their sister Asuncion Teves. The
[G.R. No. 109963. October 13, 1999.] validity of these settlements executed pursuant to
section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the
HEIRS OF JOAQUIN TEVES: RICARDO TEVES, primary issue in the present case.
ARCADIA TEVES,TOMAS ZAMORA, FELICIA
TEVES, HELEN TEVES, ALFREDO OSMEÑA, On May 9, 1984, plaintiffs-appellants Ricardo and
ROBERTO TEVES, JOAQUIN TEVES, III, PETER Arcadia Teves filed a complaint with the Regional
TEVES, MILDRED TEVES, WILSON MABILOG, Trial Court of Negros Oriental for the partition and
LEONILO PATIGAYON, EDUARDO PATIGAYON, reconveyance of two parcels of land located in
ALEXANDER PATIGAYON, ALDRIN PATIGAYON, Dumaguete, designated as Lots 769-A and 6409,
NOEL PATIGAYON, VICTOR PATIGAYON, MA. against the heirs of Asuncion Teves. The complaint
TEVES PATERNO OCHOTORENA, EXEQUILA was subsequently amended to include Maria Teves
TEVES, EMILIO JO, EMILIANA TEVES, and the heirs of Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, and
MILAGROS TEVES, EDSEL PINILI, VICENTE Gorgonio Teves as plaintiffs and the spouses
TEVES, EMILIANA ISO, ALBERTO TEVES, Lucresio Baylosis and Pacita Nocete, and Cecilia
ERLINDA TEVES, DIOSDADO TEVES, VICTORIA Cimafranca-Gamos and Cecilia Flor Cimafranca as
TEVES AND VIVENCIO NARCISO, Petitioners, v. defendants. 3 Plaintiffs-appellants alleged that
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF ASUNCION IT- defendants-appellees, without any justifiable reason,
IT NAMELY: ELISA IT-IT, SUSANA IT-IT, refused to partition the said parcels of land and to
NORBERTO IT-IT, ISA-AC IT-IT, JR., JAIME IT-IT, convey to plaintiffs their rightful shares. 4
FELICITAS IT-IT, TERESITA IT-IT, ANTONIO
NODADO, CORAZON IT-IT, JIMMY LERO, Lot 769, covered by Original Certificate of Title
DANILO IT-IT, EDITA GAMORA, PACITA (OCT) No. 4682-A, 5 is registered in the names of
VAILOCES, CRIS VAILOCES, CECILIA Urbana Cimafranca, one-fourth (1/4) share,
CIMAFRANCA and CECILIA FLOR Marcelina Cimafranca, the wife of Joaquin Teves,
CIMAFRANCA, Respondents.chanrobles one-fourth (1/4) share, Domingo Villahermosa, one-
lawlibrary : rednad eight (1/8) share, Antero Villahermosa, one-eight
(1/8) share, Cecilia Cimafranca, one-eight (1/8)
DECISION share and Julio Cimafranca, one-eight (1/8) share.
The present controversy involves only Marcelina
Cimafranca’s one-fourth (1/4) share in the land,
GONZAGA-REYES, J.: designated as Lot 769-A.

On June 13, 1956, Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro,

Before us is a petition for review Asuncion, Gorgonio and Arcadia Teves executed a
on certiorari assailing the decision 1 of the Court of document entitled "Settlement of Estate and Sale," 6
Appeals which was promulgated on August 18, 1992 adjudicating unto themselves, in equal shares, Lot
affirming the July 11, 1991 decision. 2 of Branch 38 769-A and conveying their shares, interests and
of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental in participations over the same in favor of Asuncion
favor of defendants-appellees. Teves for the consideration of P425.00. A similar
deed denominated "Extrajudicial Settlement and
The facts, as culled from the pleadings of the parties Sale" 7 was signed by Maria Teves on April 21,
herein and the decision of the lower courts, are as 1959. Under such deed, Maria conveys her own
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library share over Lot 769-A in favor of Asuncion Teves for
the consideration of P80.00. The two settlements
Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves had nine were denounced by the plaintiffs as spurious. The
children, namely Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, Andres, trial court summarized the claims of the plaintiffs, viz
Asuncion, Gorgonio, Cresenciano, Arcadia and —
Maria. Andres, however, predeceased both his
parents and died without issue. After Marcelina . . . Maria Teves Ochotorena herself, denied having
Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves died, intestate and executed this Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale over
without debts, in 1943 and 1953, respectively, their her share or interest in Lot 769 claiming that her
children executed extrajudicial settlements signature in said document is a forgery. She disowns
purporting to adjudicate unto themselves the her signature declaring that as a married woman she
ownership over two parcels of land belonging to their always signs a document in her husband’s family
name. Further, she declared that on the date she
purportedly signed said document in Dumaguete
City before the notary public, she was in her home in
Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte.
On Exhibit "G" which is likewise offered as Exhibit
"3" for the defendants, plaintiffs hold that said
document is spurious claiming that the signatures of
Pedro Teves, Felicia Teves and Gorgonio Teves are
all forgeries. To support this allegation, Helen T.
Osmena, daughter of Felicia Teves and Erlinda
Teves, daughter of Gorgonio Teves were presented
as witnesses. Being allegedly familiar with the style
and character of the handwriting of their parents
these witnesses declared unequivocally that the
signatures of their parents appearing on the
document are forgeries.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In sum, plaintiffs argue that these fraudulent
documents which defendants rely in claiming
ownership to the disputed properties are all nullities
and have no force in law and could not be used as
basis for any legal title. Consequently, in their view,
they are entitled to the reliefs demanded particularly,
to their respective shares of the disputed properties.
8 4. The thumbmark imposed on the name of
The other property in dispute is Lot 6409 which was
originally covered by OCT No. 9091 9 and was
registered in the name of Joaquin Teves and his two
sisters, Matea and Candida Teves. However, Matea
and Candida died without issue, causing the entire
property to pass to Joaquin Teves. On December
14, 1971, Lot 6409 was adjudicated and divided in
equal shares in a "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement &
Sale" 10 executed by Joaquin Teves’ children —
Asuncion, Teotimo, Felisia, Gorgonio, Arcadia and
Maria Teves. In the same deed, the shares of these
same heirs in Lot 6409 were sold to Asuncion Teves
for P100.00. Asuncion Teves took possession of the
land and acquired title. 11 over the same on March
22, 1972. After her death in 1981, her children,
defendants-appellees It-it herein, extrajudicially
settled Asuncion Teves’ property, adjudicating unto
themselves Lot 6409. 12 On July 20, 1983 a new
transfer certificate of title. 13 was issued in the
names of Asuncion Teves’ children, namely Elisa,
Susana, Norberto, Isaac, Jaime, Felicitas, Teresita,
Corazon, and Danilo, all surnamed It-it. On July 2,
1984, the It-its sold Lot 6409 to defendants-
appellees Lucrecio Baylosis, Sr. and Pacita Nocete-
Baylosis for P20,000.00. 14 and a transfer certificate
of title. 15 was issued in the name of the Baylosis
couple.
Plaintiffs-appellants claim that the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement & Sale covering Lot 6409 is
also spurious. Their arguments were discussed in
the trial court’s decision as follows —
Presented as Exhibit "D" and "1" for both the
plaintiffs and defendants respectively, is a document
denominated as "Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale"
executed on December 4, 1971 by and among the
heirs of Joaquin Teves and Marcelina Cimafranca.
This document which gave birth to TCT No. 5761
over Lot 6409 registered in the name of Asuncion
Teves It-it is questioned by the plaintiffs as spurious
for the following reasons:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
1. Erasure of the word "quitclaim" is superimposed
with the word "sale" in handwriting.
2. The consideration of "One peso" stated in the
document is intercalated with the word "hundred" in
handwriting.
3. The signature of Maria Teves Ochotorena, Pedro
Teves and Felicia Teves are forgeries.
Gorgonio Teves does not actually belong to
Gorgonio Teves who was an educated man and
skilled in writing according to his daughter.
Aside from these defects which would make said
document null and void, Arcadia Teves who is one of
the living sisters of the mother of the principal
defendants although confirming the authenticity of
her signature averred that in reality no consideration
was ever given to her and that her impression of the
said document was that she was only giving her
consent to sell her share of the land.
Plaintiffs likewise contend that as regards the share
of Ricardo Teves, son of Crescenciano Teves who
predeceased Joaquin and Marcelina, it was not at all
affected in that extrajudicial settlement and sale
since neither Crescenciano Teves nor his son
Ricardo Teves participated in its execution.
x           x          x
Likewise, plaintiffs offered TCT No. 5761 for Lot
6409 registered in the name of Asuncion Teves It-it
as Exhibit "B" as proof that said property was later
titled in trust for all the heirs of Joaquin Teves and
which was used later as basis in effecting a deed of
sale in favor of co-defendant Lucresio Baylosis. In
this light, the plaintiffs argue that the sale of said
property is a nullity for it was not only attended with
bad faith on the part of both the vendor and the
vendee but primarily the vendor had no right at all to
part with said property which is legally owned by
others. 16
In answer to plaintiffs-appellants’ charges of fraud,
defendants-appellees maintained that the assailed
documents were executed with all the formalities
required by law and are therefore binding and legally
effective as bases for acquiring ownership or legal
title over the lots in question. Furthermore, it is
contended that plaintiffs-appellants have slept on
their rights and should now be deemed to have
abandoned such rights. 17
The trial court ruled in favor of defendants-appellees
and rendered judgment dismissing the complaint
with costs against plaintiffs-appellants. As regards
Lot 6409, the court declared that the Extrajudicial
Settlement and Sale executed by the heirs of
Joaquin Teves and Marcelina Cimafranca was duly
executed with all the formalities required by law,
thus, validly conveying Lot 6409 in favor of Asuncion
Teves. Moreover, it stated that, even granting the
truth of the imputed infirmities in the deed, the right
of plaintiffs-appellants to bring an action for partition
and reconveyance was already barred by
prescription. An action for the annulment of a
partition must be brought within four years from the
discovery of the fraud, while an action for the
reconveyance of land based upon an implied or
constructive trust prescribes after ten years from the
registration of the deed or from the issuance of the
title. The complaint in this case was filed on May 9,
1984, exactly 12 years, 1 month and 17 days after
the issuance of the transfer certificate of title in the
name of Asuncion Teves on March 22, 1972. Thus,
ownership over Lot 6409 rightfully belonged to
defendants-appellees It-it.
Moreover, the trial court held that the extrajudicial
settlements over both Lots 6409 and 769, having
been prepared and acknowledged before a notary
public, are public documents, vested with public
interest, the sanctity of which deserves to be upheld
unless overwhelmed by clear and convincing
evidence. The evidence presented by the plaintiffs to
support their charges of forgery was considered by
the court insufficient to rebut the legal presumption
of validity accorded to such documents. 18
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s
decision affirming the validity of the extrajudicial
statements, with a slight modification. It disposed of
the case, thus —
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED with the modification in
that herein defendant-appellees are hereby
ORDERED to partition Lot 769-A and deliver to
plaintiff-appellant Ricardo Teves one-eight (sic) (1/8)
portion thereof corresponding to the share of his
deceased father Cresenciano Teves. No costs.
The appellate court said that plaintiffs-appellants’
biased and interested testimonial evidence
consisting of mere denials of their signatures in the
disputed instruments is insufficient to prove the
alleged forgery and to overcome the evidentiary
force of the notarial documents. It also ruled that the
plaintiffs-appellants’ claim over Lot 6409 was barred
by prescription after the lapse of ten years from the
issuance of title in favor of Asuncion Teves, while
their claim over Lot 769-A is barred by laches since
more than 25 years has intervened between the sale
to Asuncion Teves and the filing of the present case
in 1984.
The appellate court noted that the conveyance of Lot
769-A in favor of Asuncion Teves did not affect the
share of Cresenciano Teves as he was not a
signatory to the settlements. It also found that
Ricardo Teves, Cresenciano’s heir, is in possession
of a portion of Lot 769-A and that defendants-
appellees do no not claim ownership over such
portion. Thus, the defendants-appellees It-it were
ordered to partition and convey to Ricardo Teves his
one-eight share over Lot 769-A.
As regards the extrajudicial settlement involving Lot
6409, although it was found by the appellate court
that Cresenciano Teves was also not a signatory
thereto, it held that it could not order the
reconveyance of the latter’s share in such land in
favor of his heir Ricardo Teves because
Cresenciano had predeceased Joaqin Teves.
Moreover, Ricardo Teves, by a deed simply
denominated as "Agreement" executed on
September 13, 1955 wherein he was represented by
his mother, authorized the heirs of Joaquin Teves to
sell his share in Lot 6409. 19
Plaintiffs-appellants assailed the appellate court’s
decision upon the following grounds —
I. IN CONSIDERING RICARDO TEVES AS BOUND
BY THE SIGNATURE OF HIS MOTHER, INSPITE
OF DEATH OF CRESENCIANO TEVES IN 1944;
AND UNDER THE OLD CIVIL CODE THE SPOUSE
CANNOT INHERIT EXCEPT THE USUFRUCT;
II. IN UPHOLDING SWEEPINGLY THE
PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY OF NOTARIZED
DEED, DESPITE CLEAR, CONVINCING,
SUBSTANTIAL AND SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
THAT MARIA OCHOTORENA WAS IN MINDANAO;
THE NOTARY PUBLIC DID NOT KNOW MARIA
OCHOTORENA AND THE SIGNATURES OF THE
OTHER HEIRS IN THE QUESTIONED DOCUMENT
ARE BELIED BY COMPARISON WITH THE
GENUINE SIGNATURE IN EXH. "E" ; convincing as to exclude all reasonable dispute as to
III. IN VALIDATING THE ONE PESO
CONSIDERATION, INSPITE OF NO OTHER
VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, THE
SUPERIMPOSED P100 WAS UNILATERALLY
INSERTED, SHOWING FICTITIOUS AND
SIMULATED CONSIDERATION; AND
IV. PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT START FROM A
VOID CONTRACT. 20
We affirm that the extrajudicial settlements executed
by the heirs of Joaquin Teves and Marcelina
Cimafranca are legally valid and binding.
The extrajudicial settlement of a decedent’s estate is
authorized by section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court, which provides in pertinent part that —
If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs
are all of age, or the minors are represented by their
judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for
the purpose, the parties may, without securing
letters of administration, divide the estate among
themselves as they see fit by means of a public
instrument filed in the office of the register of
deeds, . . .
x           x          x
Thus, for a partition pursuant to section 1 of Rule 74
to be valid, the following conditions must concur: (1)
the decedent left no will; (2) the decedent left no
debts, or if there were debts left, all had been paid;
(3) the heirs are all of age, or if they are minors, the
latter are represented by their judicial guardian or
legal representatives; (4) the partition was made by
means of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed
with the Register of Deeds. 21
We uphold, finding no cogent reason to reverse, the
trial and appellate courts’ factual finding that the
evidence presented by plaintiffs-appellants is
insufficient to overcome the evidentiary value of the
extrajudicial settlements. The deeds are public
documents and it has been held by this Court that a
public document executed with all the legal
formalities is entitled to a presumption of truth as to
the recitals contained therein. 22 In order to
overthrow a certificate of a notary public to the effect
that the grantor executed a certain document and
acknowledged the fact of its execution before him,
mere preponderance of evidence will not suffice.
Rather, the evidence must be so clear, strong and
the falsity of the certificate. When the evidence is
conflicting, the certificate will be upheld. 23 The
appellate court’s ruling that the evidence presented
by plaintiffs-appellants does not constitute the clear,
strong, and convincing evidence necessary to
overcome the positive value of the extrajudicial
settlements executed by the parties, all of which are
public documents, being essentially a finding of fact,
is entitled to great respect by the appellate court and
should not be disturbed on appeal. 24
It is noted that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement &
Sale covering Lot 6409 purports to divide Joaquin
Teves’ estate among only six of his heirs, namely
Asuncion, Teotimo, Felisia, Gorgonio, Arcadia and
Maria Teves. 25 It does not mention nor bear the
signatures of either Pedro or Cresenciano Teves
although they are both intestate heirs of Joaquin
Teves and as such, are entitled to a proportionate
share of the decedent’s estate. Contrary to the ruling
of the appellate court, the fact that Cresenciano
predeceased Joaquin Teves does not mean that he
or, more accurately, his heirs, lose the right to share
in the partition of the property for this is a proper
case for representation, wherein the representative
is raised to the place and degree of the person
represented and acquires the rights which the latter
would have if he were living. 26
However, notwithstanding their non-inclusion in the
settlement, the action which Pedro and Cresenciano
might have brought for the reconveyance of their
shares in the property has already prescribed. An
action for reconveyance based upon an implied trust
pursuant to article 1456 of the Civil Code prescribes
in ten years from the registration of the deed or from
the issuance of the title. 27 Asuncion Teves acquired
title over Lot 6409 in 1972, but the present case was
only filed by plaintiffs-appellants in 1984, which is
more than 10 years from the issuance of title. 28
The division of Lot 769-A, on the other hand, was
embodied in two deeds. The first extrajudicial
settlement was entered into by Teotimo, Felicia,
Pedro, Gorgonio, Arcadia and Asuncion Teves in
1956 29 , while the second deed was executed in
1959 by Maria Teves. 30 Cresenciano was not a
signatory to either settlement. However, in contrast
to the extrajudicial settlement covering Lot 6409, the
two extrajudicial settlements involving Lot 769-A do
not purport to exclude Cresenciano from his
participation in Lot 769-A or to cede his share
therein in favor of Asuncion. The settlement clearly
adjudicated the property in equal shares in favor of
the eight heirs of Marcelina Cimafranca. Moreover,
the deeds were intended to convey to Asuncion
Teves only the shares of those heirs who affixed
their signatures in the two documents. The pertinent
portions of the extrajudicial settlement executed in
1956, of which substantively identical provisions are
included in the 1959 deed, provide —
x           x          x
5. That by virtue of the right of succession the eight
heirs above mentioned inherit and adjudicate unto
themselves in equal shares Lot No. 769-A and our
title thereto is evidenced by the O.C. of Title No.
4682-A of the Land Records of Negros Oriental.
THAT FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the sum of
FOUR HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE (P425.00)
PESOS, Philippine Currency which we have
received from ASUNCION TEVES; WE, Teotimo,
Felicia, Pedro, Gorgonio and Arcadia, all surnamed
Teves, do hereby sell, transfer and convey unto
Asuncion Teves, married to Isaac Itit, Filipino, of
legal age and resident of and with postal address in
the City of Dumaguete, all our shares, interests and
participations over Lot 769-A of the subdivision plan,
Psd, being a portion of Lot No. 769 of the Cadastral
Survey of Dumaguete, her heirs, successors and
assigns, together with all the improvements thereon.
x           x          x
It has even been admitted by both parties that
Ricardo Teves is in possession of an undetermined
portion of Lot 769-A and defendants-appellees It-it
do not claim ownership over his share in the land. 31
Thus, contrary to the appellate court’s ruling, there is
no basis for an action for reconveyance of Ricardo
Teves’ share since, in the first place, there has been
no conveyance. Ricardo Teves is entitled to the
ownership and possession of one-eight of Lot 769-A.
Neither does Ricardo Teves have a right to demand
partition of Lot 769-A because the two extrajudicial
settlements have already effectively partitioned such
property. Every act which is intended to put an end
to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or
devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it
should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise, or any other transaction. 32 The
extrajudicial settlements executed in 1956 and 1959
adjudicated Lot 769-A in equal shares unto the eight
heirs of Marcelina Cimafranca. Such a partition,
which was legally made, confers upon each heir the
exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to
him. 33 Although Cresenciano, Ricardo’s
predecessor-in-interest, was not a signatory to the
extrajudicial settlements, the partition of Lot 769-A
among the heirs was made in accordance with their
intestate shares under the law. 34
With regards to the requisite of registration of
extrajudicial settlements, it is noted that the
extrajudicial settlements covering Lot 769-A were
never registered. However, in the case of Vda. de
Reyes v. CA, 35 the Court, interpreting section 1 of
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, upheld the validity of
an oral partition of the decedent’s estate and
declared that the non-registration of an extrajudicial
settlement does not affect its intrinsic validity. It was
held in this case that —
[t]he requirement that a partition be put in a public
document and registered has for its purpose the
protection of creditors and at the same time the
protection of the heirs themselves against tardy
claims. The object of registration is to serve as
constructive notice to others. It follows then that the
intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the
prescribed formalities does not come into play when
there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are
not affected. Where no such rights are involved, it is
competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an
agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a
plan different from those provided by law.
Thus, despite its non-registration, the extrajudicial
settlements involving Lot 769-A are legally effective
and binding among the heirs of Marcelina
Cimafranca since their mother had no creditors at
the time of her death.
Except for the portion of Lot 769-A occupied by
Ricardo Teves, both parcels of land have been and
continue to be in the possession of Asuncion Teves
and her successors-in-interest. 36 Despite this, no
explanation was offered by plaintiffs-appellants as to
why they instituted the present action questioning
the extrajudicial settlements only in 1984, which is
more than 25 years after the assailed conveyance of
Lot 769-A and more than 10 years after the issuance
of a transfer certificate of title over Lot 6409, both in
favor of Asuncion Teves. Such tardiness indubitably
constitutes laches, which is the negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it. 37 Thus, even assuming that plaintiffs-
appellants had a defensible cause of action, they are
barred from pursuing the same by reason of their
long and inexcusable inaction.

An extrajudicial settlement is a contract and it is a

well-entrenched doctrine that the law does not
relieve a party from the effects of a contract, entered
into with all the required formalities and with full
awareness of what he was doing, simply because
the contract turned out to be a foolish or unwise
investment. 38 Therefore, although plaintiffs-
appellants may regret having alienated their
hereditary shares in favor of their sister Asuncion,
they must now be considered bound by their own
contractual acts.

WHEREFORE, the August 18, 1992 decision of the

Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. No
pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION In the same year, Patronicio Recasa, representing
the heirs of the first marriage, sold the share of the
[G.R. No. 135602. April 28, 2000.] heirs in the estate to Dominador Recasa, an heir of
the second marriage. On June 15, 1950, Dominador,
HEIRS OF QUIRICO SERASPI AND representing the heirs of the second marriage, in
PURIFICACION R. SERASPI, Petitioners, v. turn sold the share of the heirs to Quirico and
COURT OF APPEALS AND SIMEON Purificacion Seraspi whose heirs are the present
RECASA, Respondents. petitioners. Included in this sale was the property
sold by Patronicio to Dominador.
DECISION
In 1958, the Seraspis obtained a loan from the
Kalibo Rural Bank, Inc. (KRBI) on the security of the
MENDOZA, J.: lands in question to finance improvements on the
lands. However, they failed to pay the loan for which
reason the mortgage was foreclosed and the lands
This case is here for review of the decision 1 of the were sold to KRBI as the highest bidder.
Court of Appeals, dated May 15, 1998, reversing the Subsequently, the lands were sold by KRBI to
decision of Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Manuel Rata, brother-in-law of Quirico Seraspi. It
Kalibo, Aklan and dismissing, on the ground of appears that Rata, as owner of the property, allowed
prescription, the complaint filed by petitioners for the Quirico Seraspi to administer the property.
recovery of possession and ownership of two
parcels of land in Banga, Aklan. In 1974, private respondent Simeon Recasa,
Marcelino’s child by his third wife, taking advantage
The facts are as follows:chanrobles.com : of the illness of Quirico Seraspi, who had been
chanrobles.com.ph paralyzed due to a stroke, forcibly entered the lands
in question and took possession thereof.
Marcelino Recasa was the owner of two parcels of
land described as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw In 1983, the Seraspis purchased the lands from
library Manuel Rata and afterwards filed a complaint
against Simeon Recasa for recovery of possession
PARCEL I: A parcel of cocal land located at of the lands.
Barangay Lapnag, Banga, Aklan, with an area of
770 square meters, more or less; bounded North by The trial court ruled in favor of the Seraspis, stating
Lazaro Navarra, now Flocerfina Ibit; South by Celsa that they had acquired the property through a sale
Retis; East by Banga-Libacao Provincial Road; and and acquisitive prescription. However, on appeal,
West by Aklan River, which parcel of land declared the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the
in the name of Marcelino Recasa under Tax action of the Seraspis was barred by the statute of
Declaration No. 3721, Series of 1984, with an limitations. Hence, this petition filed by Quirico
assessed value of P2,440.00; Seraspi who, in the meantime, had passed away
and was thus substituted by his heirs.
PARCEL II: A parcel of cocal land with an area of
3,648 square meters, more or less, located in Two issues are presented: (1) whether petitioners’
Barangay Lapnag, Banga, Aklan; bounded North by action is barred by extinctive prescription; and (2)
Concepcion Navarra; South by Diosdado Navarra; whether private respondent Simeon Recasa
East by Gabriel Reloj; and West by National Road; acquired ownership of the properties in question
covered by Tax Declaration No. 11079 in the name through acquisitive prescription.
of Purificacion Seraspi, Series of 1984, and having
an assessed value of P1,650.00. We rule, for Petitioners.

During his lifetime, Marcelino contracted three (3) The Court of Appeals, while ruling that petitioners
marriages. At the time of his death in 1943, he had were able to establish the identity of the property as
fifteen (15) children from his three marriages. In well as the credibility of their title ¾ the elements
1948, his intestate estate was partitioned into three required to prove one’s claim for recovery of
parts by his heirs, each part corresponding to the property 2 ¾ nonetheless held that the action was
share of the heirs in each marriage. barred by prescription. Citing Arradaza v. Court of
Appeals, 3 it held that an action for recovery of title
or possession of real property or an interest therein
can only be brought within ten (10) years after the
cause of action has accrued. Since the action for
recovery of possession and ownership was filed by
petitioners only on April 12, 1987, i.e., thirteen (13)
years after their predecessor-in-interest had been
allegedly deprived of the possession of the property
by private respondent, it was held that the action had
prescribed.
Arradaza involves acquisitive, not extinctive,
prescription. What is more, the facts in that case
arose before the effectivity of the Civil Code.
Accordingly, what was applied was §41 of the Code
of Civil Procedure which provides that title by
prescription is acquired after ten (10) years, in
whatever manner possession may have been
commenced or continued, and regardless of good
faith or with just title. On the other hand, what is
involved here is extinctive prescription, and the
applicable law is Art. 1141 of the Civil Code which
provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty
years.
This provision is without prejudice to what is
established for the acquisition of ownership and
other real rights by prescription.
The question, therefore, is whether private
respondent has acquired the ownership of the two
lands by prescription. On this point, the Civil Code
provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
ARTICLE 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion
and other real rights may be ordinary or
extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession
of things in good faith and with just title for the time
fixed by law.
ARTICLE 1134. Ownership and other real rights
over immovable property are acquired by ordinary
prescription through possession of ten years.
ARTICLE 1137. Ownership and other real rights
over immovables also prescribe through
uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty
years, without need of title or of good
faith.chanrobles virtua| |aw |ibrary
Thus, acquisitive prescription of dominion and other
real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary,
depending on whether the property is possessed in
good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.
4 Private respondent contends that he acquired the
ownership of the questioned property by ordinary
prescription through adverse possession for ten (10)
years.
The contention has no merit, because he has neither
just title nor good faith. As Art. 1129
provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
For the purposes of prescription, there is just title
when the adverse claimant came into possession of
the property through one of the modes recognized
by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real
rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not
transmit any right.
In the case at bar, private respondent did not acquire
possession of the property through any of the modes
recognized by the Civil Code, to wit: (1) occupation,
(2) intellectual creation, (3) law, (4) donation, (5)
succession, (6) tradition in consequence of certain
contracts, and (7) prescription. 5
Private respondent could not have acquired
ownership over the property through occupation
since, under Art. 714 of the Civil Code, the
ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by
occupation. Nor can he base his ownership on
succession for the property was not part of those
distributed to the heirs of the third marriage, to which
private respondent belongs. It must be remembered
that in the partition of the intestate estate of
Marcelino Recasa, the properties were divided into
three parts, each part being reserved for each group
of heirs belonging to one of the three marriages
Marcelino entered into. Since the contested parcels
of land were adjudicated to the heirs of the first and
second marriages, it follows that private respondent,
as heir of the third marriage, has no right over the
parcels of land. While, as heir to the intestate estate
of his father, private respondent was co-owner of all
of his father’s properties, such co-ownership rights
were effectively dissolved by the partition agreed
upon by the heirs of Marcelino Recasa.
Neither can private respondent claim good faith in
his favor. Good faith consists in the reasonable
belief that the person from whom the possessor
received the thing was its owner but could not
transmit the ownership thereof. 6 Private respondent
entered the property without the consent of the
previous owner. For all intents and purposes, he is a
mere usurper.
Like private respondent, petitioners have not
acquired the property through any of the modes
recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership.
The basis of petitioners’ claim of ownership is the
contract of sale they had with Rata, but this by itself
is insufficient to make them owners of the property.
For while a contract of sale is perfected by the
meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object
of the contract and upon the price, 7 the ownership
of the thing sold is not transferred to the vendee until
actual or constructive delivery of the property. 8
Hence, the maxim non nudis pactis, sed traditione
dominia dominica rerum transferuntur (not mere
agreements but tradition transfers the ownership of
things).

Consequently, petitioners are not the owners of the

property since it has not been delivered to them. At
the time they bought the property from Rata in 1983,
the property was in the possession of
private Respondent.

However, this does not give private respondent a

right to remain in possession of the property.
Petitioners’ title to the property prevails over private
respondents’ possession in fact but without basis in
law. As held in Waite v. Peterson, 9 when the
property belonging to a person is unlawfully taken by
another, the former has the right of action against
the latter for the recovery of the property. Such right
may be transferred by the sale or assignment of the
property, and the transferee can maintain such
action against the wrongdoer.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court

of Appeals is hereby REVERSED, and private
respondent Simeon Recasa is ordered to return the
possession of the contested parcels of land to
petitioners as heirs of Quirico and Purificacion
Seraspi.

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 141882             March 11, 2005
J.L.T. AGRO, INC., represented by its Manager,
JULIAN L. TEVES, Petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO BALANSAG and HILARIA
CADAYDAY, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Once again, the Court is faced with the perennial
conflict of property claims between two sets of heirs,
a conflict ironically made grievous by the fact that
the decedent in this case had resorted to great
lengths to allocate which properties should go to
which set of heirs.
This is a Rule 45 petition assailing
the Decision1  dated 30 September 1999 of the Court
of Appeals which reversed the Decision2 dated 7
May 1993 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
45, of Bais City, Negros Oriental.
The factual antecedents follow.
Don Julian L. Teves (Don Julian) contracted two
marriages, first with Antonia Baena (Antonia), and
after her death, with Milagros Donio Teves (Milagros
Donio). Don Julian had two children with Antonia,
namely: Josefa Teves Escaño (Josefa) and Emilio
Teves (Emilio). He had also four (4) children with
Milagros Donio, namely: Maria Evelyn Donio Teves
(Maria Evelyn), Jose Catalino Donio Teves (Jose
Catalino), Milagros Reyes Teves (Milagros Reyes)
and Pedro Reyes Teves (Pedro).3
The present controversy involves a parcel of land
covering nine hundred and fifty-four (954) square
meters, known as Lot No. 63 of the Bais Cadastre,
which was originally registered in the name of the
conjugal partnership of Don Julian and Antonia
under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 5203 of
the Registry of Deeds of Bais City. When Antonia
died, the land was among the properties involved in
an action for partition and damages docketed as
Civil Case No. 3443 entitled "Josefa Teves Escaño
v. Julian Teves, Emilio B. Teves, et al."4 Milagros
Donio, the second wife of Don Julian, participated as
an intervenor. Thereafter, the parties to the case
entered into a Compromise Agreement5 which
embodied the partition of all the properties of Don
Julian.
On the basis of the compromise agreement and
approving the same, the Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Negros Oriental, 12th Judicial District, rendered
a Decision6 dated 31 January 1964. The CFI
decision declared a tract of land known as Hacienda
Medalla Milagrosa as property owned in common by
Don Julian and his two (2) children of the first
marriage. The property was to remain undivided
during the lifetime of Don Julian.7 Josefa and Emilio
likewise were given other properties at Bais,
including the electric plant, the "movie property," the
commercial areas, and the house where Don Julian
was living. The remainder of the properties was
retained by Don Julian, including Lot No. 63.
Paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement, at the
heart of the present dispute, lays down the effect of
the eventual death of Don Julian vis-à-vis his heirs:
13. That in the event of death of Julian L.
Teves, the properties hereinafter
adjudicated to Josefa Teves Escaňo and
Emilio B. Teves, (excluding the properties
comprised as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa
together with all its accessories and
accessions) shall be understood as
including not only their one-half share which
they inherited from their mother but also the
legitimes and other successional rights
which would correspond to them of the other
half belonging to their father, Julian L.
Teves. In other words, the properties now
selected and adjudicated to Julian L.
Teves (not including his share in the
Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa) shall
exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in
second marriage of Julian L. Teves and his
four minor children, namely, Milagros Donio
Teves, his two acknowledged natural
children Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro
Reyes Teves and his two legitimated
children Maria Evelyn Donio Teves and Jose
Catalino Donio Teves. (Emphasis supplied)
On 16 November 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and
Josefa executed a Deed of Assignment of Assets
with Assumption of Liabilities8 in favor of J.L.T. Agro,
Inc. (petitioner). Less than a year later, Don Julian,
Josefa and Emilio also executed an instrument
entitled Supplemental to the Deed of Assignment of
Assets with the Assumption of Liabilities
(Supplemental Deed)9  dated 31 July 1973. This
instrument which constitutes a supplement to the
earlier deed of assignment transferred ownership
over Lot No. 63, among other properties, in favor of
petitioner.10 On 14 April 1974, Don Julian died
intestate.
On the strength of the Supplemental Deed  in its
favor, petitioner sought the registration of the subject
lot in its name. A court, so it appeared, issued an
order11 cancelling OCT No. 5203 in the name of
spouses Don Julian and Antonia on 12 November
1979, and on the same date TCT No. T-375 was
issued in the name of petitioner.12 Since then,
petitioner has been paying taxes assessed on the
subject lot.13
Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had
immediately taken possession over the subject lot
after the execution of the Compromise Agreement.
In 1974, they entered into a yearly lease agreement
with spouses Antonio Balansag and Hilaria
Cadayday, respondents herein.14 On Lot No. 63,
respondents temporarily established their home and
constructed a lumber yard. Subsequently, Milagros
Donio and her children executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate15  dated 18
March 1980. In the deed of partition, Lot No. 63 was
allotted to Milagros Donio and her two (2) children,
Maria Evelyn and Jose Catalino. Unaware that the
subject lot was already registered in the name of
petitioner in 1979, respondents bought Lot No. 63
from Milagros Donio as evidenced by the Deed of
Absolute Sale of Real Estate16 dated 9 November
1983.
At the Register of Deeds while trying to register the
deed of absolute sale, respondents discovered that
the lot was already titled in the name of petitioner.
Thus, they failed to register the deed.17
Respondents, as vendees of Lot No. 63, filed a
complaint before the RTC Branch 45 of Bais City,
seeking the declaration of nullity and cancellation of
TCT No. T-375 in the name of petitioner and the
transfer of the title to Lot No. 63 in their names, plus
damages.18
After hearing, the trial court dismissed the complaint
filed by respondents. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, by
preponderance of evidence, this Court finds
judgment in favor of the defendant and
against the plaintiff, and thus hereby orders:
(1) That complaint be dismissed;
(2) That plaintiffs vacate the subject
land, particularly identified as Lot
No. 63 registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-375;
(3) That plaintiffs pay costs.
Finding no basis on the counterclaim by
defendant, the same is hereby ordered
dismissed.19
The trial court ruled that the resolution of the case
specifically hinged on the interpretation of paragraph
13 of the Compromise Agreement.20 It added that
the direct adjudication of the properties listed in
the Compromise Agreement was only in favor of
Don Julian and his two children by the first marriage,
Josefa and Emilio.21 Paragraph 13 served only as an
amplification of the terms of the adjudication in favor
of Don Julian and his two children by the first
marriage.
According to the trial court, the properties
adjudicated in favor of Josefa and Emilio comprised
their shares in the estate of their deceased mother
Antonia, as well as their potential share in the estate
of Don Julian upon the latter’s death. Thus, upon
Don Julian’s death, Josefa and Emilio could not
claim any share in his estate, except their proper
share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa which was
adjudicated in favor of Don Julian in
the Compromise Agreement. As such, the properties
adjudicated in favor of Don Julian, except Hacienda
Medalla Milagrosa, were free from the forced
legitimary rights of Josefa and Emilio, and Don
Julian was under no impediment to allocate the
subject lot, among his other properties, to Milagros
Donio and her four (4) children.22
The trial court further stressed that with the use of
the words "shall be," the adjudication in favor of
Milagros Donio and her four (4) children was not
final and operative, as the lot was still subject to
future disposition by Don Julian during his
lifetime.23 It cited paragraph 1424 of the Compromise
Agreement in support of his conclusion.25 With Lot
No. 63 being the conjugal property of Don Julian and
Antonia, the trial court also declared that Milagros
Donio and her children had no hereditary rights
thereto except as to the conjugal share of Don
Julian, which they could claim only upon the death of
the latter.26
The trial court ruled that at the time of Don Julian’s
death on 14 April 1974, Lot No. 63 was no longer a
part of his estate since he had earlier assigned it to
petitioner on 31 July 1973. Consequently, the lot
could not be a proper subject of extrajudicial partition
by Milagros Donio and her children, and not being
the owners they could not have sold it. Had
respondents exercised prudence before buying the
subject lot by investigating the registration of the
same with the Registry of Deeds, they would have
discovered that five (5) years earlier, OCT No. 5203
had already been cancelled and replaced by TCT
No. T-375 in the name of petitioner, the trial court
added.27
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial
court’s decision. The decretal part of the appellate
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
is entered declaring the Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-375 registered in the name of
J.L.T. Agro, Inc. as null and void.
With costs against defendant J.L.T. Agro,
Inc. represented by its Manager, Julian L.
Teves.
SO ORDERED.28
Per the appellate court, the Compromise
Agreement  incorporated in CFI decision dated 31
January 1964, particularly paragraph 13 thereof,
determined, adjudicated and reserved to Don
Julian’s two sets of heirs their future legitimes in his
estate except as regards his (Don Julian’s) share in
Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa.29 The two sets of heirs
acquired full ownership and possession of the
properties respectively adjudicated to them in the
CFI decision and Don Julian himself could no longer
dispose of the same, including Lot No. 63. The
disposition in the CFI decision constitutes res
judicata.30 Don Julian could have disposed of only
his conjugal share in the Hacienda Medalla
Milagrosa.31
The appellate court likewise emphasized that
nobody in his right judgment would preterit his legal
heirs by simply executing a document like
the Supplemental Deed which practically covers all
properties which Don Julian had reserved in favor of
his heirs from the second marriage. It also found out
that the blanks reserved for the Book No. and Page
No. at the upper right corner of TCT No. T-375, "to
identify the exact location where the said title was
registered or transferred," were not filled up, thereby
indicating that the TCT is "spurious and of dubious
origin."32
Aggrieved by the appellate court’s decision,
petitioner elevated it to this Court via a petition for
review on certiorari, raising pure questions of law.
Before this Court, petitioner assigns as errors the
following rulings of the appellate court, to wit: (a) that
future legitime can be determined, adjudicated and
reserved prior to the death of Don Julian; (b) that
Don Julian had no right to dispose of or assign Lot
No. 63 to petitioner because he reserved the same
for his heirs from the second marriage pursuant to
the Compromise Agreement; (c) that
the Supplemental Deed  was tantamount to a
preterition of his heirs from the second marriage;
and (d) that TCT No. T-375 in the name of petitioner
is spurious for not containing entries on the Book
No. and Page No.33
While most of petitioner’s legal arguments have
merit, the application of the appropriate provisions of
law to the facts borne out by the evidence on record
nonetheless warrants the affirmance of the result
reached by the Court of Appeals in favor of
respondents.
Being the key adjudicative provision, paragraph 13
of the Compromise Agreement has to be quoted
again:
13. That in the event of death of Julian L.
Teves, the properties herein adjudicated to
Josefa Teves Escaño and Emilio B. Teves,
(excluding the properties comprised as
Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa together with
all its accessories and accessions) shall be
understood as including not only their one-
half share which they inherited from their
mother but also the legitimes and other
successional rights which would correspond
to them of the other half belonging to their
father, Julian L.Teves. In other words, the
properties now selected and adjudicated
to Julian L. Teves (not including his
share in the Hacienda Medalla
Milagrosa) shall exclusively be
adjudicated to the wife in second
marriage of Julian L. Teves and his four
minor children, namely, Milagros Donio
Teves, his two acknowledged natural
 children Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro
Reyes Teves and his two legitimated
children Maria Evelyn Donio Teves and
Jose Catalino Donio Teves." (Emphasis
supplied)
With the quoted paragraph as basis, the Court of
Appeals ruled that the adjudication in favor of the
heirs of Don Julian from the second marriage
became automatically operative upon the approval
of the Compromise Agreement, thereby vesting on
them the right to validly dispose of Lot No. 63 in
favor of respondents.
Petitioner argues that the appellate court erred in
holding that future legitime can be determined,
adjudicated and reserved prior to the death of Don
Julian. The Court agrees. Our declaration in Blas v.
Santos34 is relevant, where we defined future
inheritance as any property or right not in existence
or capable of determination at the time of the
contract, that a person may in the future acquire by
succession. Article 1347 of the New Civil Code
explicitly provides:
ART. 1347. All things which are not outside
the commerce of men, including future
things, may be the object of a contract. All
rights which are not intransmissible may
also be the object of contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon
future inheritance except in cases
expressly authorized by law.
All services which are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy may
likewise be the object of a contract.
Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even
future ones, which are not outside the commerce of
man may be the object of a contract. The exception
is that no contract may be entered into with respect
to future inheritance, and the exception to the
exception is the partition inter vivos referred to in
Article 1080.35
For the inheritance to be considered "future," the
succession must not have been opened at the time
of the contract.36 A contract may be classified as a
contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under
the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the
following requisites concur:
(1) That the succession has not yet been
opened;
(2) That the object of the contract forms part
of the inheritance; and
(3) That the promissor has, with respect to
the object, an expectancy of a right which is
purely hereditary in nature.37
The first paragraph of Article 1080, which provides
the exception to the exception and therefore aligns
with the general rule on future things, reads:
ART. 1080. Should a person make a
partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or
by will, such partition shall be respected,
insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime
of the compulsory heirs.
....
In interpreting this provision, Justice Edgardo Paras
advanced the opinion that if the partition is made by
an act inter vivos, no formalities are prescribed by
the Article.38 The partition will of course be
effective only after death. It does not necessarily
require the formalities of a will for after all it is not the
partition that is the mode of acquiring ownership.
Neither will the formalities of a donation be required
since donation will not be the mode of acquiring the
ownership here after death; since no will has been
made it follows that the mode will be succession
(intestate succession). Besides, the partition here is
merely the physical determination of the part to be
given to each heir.39
The historical antecedent of Article 1080 of the New
Civil Code is Article 105640 of the old Civil Code. The
only change in the provision is that Article 1080 now
permits any person  (not a testator, as under the old
law) to partition his estate by act inter vivos. This
was intended to abrogate the then prevailing
doctrine that for a testator to partition his estate by
an act inter vivos, he must first make a will with all
the formalities provided by law.41
Article 1056 of the old Civil Code (now Article 1080)
authorizes a testator to partition inter vivos his
property, and distribute them among his heirs, and
this partition is neither a donation nor a testament,
but an instrument of a special character, sui
generis, which is revocable at any time by
the  causante  during his lifetime, and does not
operate as a conveyance of title until his death. It
derives its binding force on the heirs from the
respect due to the will of the owner of the property,
limited only by his creditors and the intangibility of
the legitime of the forced heirs.42
The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don
Julian is undoubtedly valid pursuant to Article 1347.
However, considering that it would become legally
operative only upon the death of Don Julian, the
right of his heirs from the second marriage to the
properties adjudicated to him under the compromise
agreement was but a mere expectancy. It was a
bare hope of succession to the property of their
father. Being the prospect of a future acquisition, the
interest by its nature was inchoate. It had no
attribute of property, and the interest to which it
related was at the time nonexistent and might never
exist.43
Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of
assignment covering Lot No. 63 in favor of petitioner,
Don Julian remained the owner of the property since
ownership over the subject lot would only pass to his
heirs from the second marriage at the time of his
death. Thus, as the owner of the subject lot, Don
Julian retained the absolute right to dispose of it
during his lifetime. His right cannot be challenged by
Milagros Donio and her children on the ground that it
had already been adjudicated to them by virtue of
the compromise agreement.
Emerging as the crucial question in this case is
whether Don Julian had validly transferred
ownership of the subject lot during his lifetime. The
lower court ruled that he had done so through
the Supplemental Deed. The appellate court
disagreed, holding that the Supplemental Deed  is
not valid, containing as it does a prohibited
preterition of Don Julian’s heirs from the second
marriage. Petitioner contends that the ruling of the
Court of Appeals is erroneous. The contention is
well-founded.
Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission
of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the time of the execution
of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall
annul the institution of heir; but the devises and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious. Manresa defines preterition as the
omission of the heir in the will, either by not naming
him at all or, while mentioning him as father, son,
etc., by not instituting him as heir without
disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him
some part of the properties.44 It is the total omission
of a compulsory heir in the direct line from
inheritance.45 It consists in the silence of the testator
with regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him in
the testament, either by not mentioning him at all, or
by not giving him anything in the hereditary property
but without expressly disinheriting him, even if he is
mentioned in the will in the latter case.46 But there is
no preterition where the testator allotted to a
descendant a share less than the legitime, since
there was no total omission of a forced heir.47
In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will
since what he resorted to was a partition inter
vivos of his properties, as evidenced by the court
approved Compromise Agreement. Thus, it is
premature if not irrelevant to speak of preterition
prior to the death of Don Julian in the absence of a
will depriving a legal heir of his legitime. Besides,
there are other properties which the heirs from the
second marriage could inherit from Don Julian upon
his death. A couple of provisions in the Compromise
Agreement  are indicative of Don Julian’s desire
along this line.48 Hence, the total omission from
inheritance of Don Julian’s heirs from the second
marriage, a requirement for preterition to exist, is
hardly imaginable as it is unfounded.
Despite the debunking of respondents’ argument on
preterition, still the petition would ultimately rise or
fall on whether there was a valid transfer effected by
Don Julian to petitioner. Notably, Don Julian was
also the president and director of petitioner, and his
daughter from the first marriage, Josefa, was the
treasurer thereof. There is of course no legal
prohibition against such a transfer to a family
corporation. Yet close scrutiny is in order, especially
considering that such transfer would remove Lot No.
63 from the estate from which Milagros and her
children could inherit. Both the alleged transfer deed
and the title which necessarily must have emanated
from it have to be subjected to incisive and detailed
examination.
Well-settled, of course, is the rule that a certificate of
title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the
property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein.49 A certificate of title accumulates in one
document a precise and correct statement of the
exact status of the fee held by its owner. The
certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of
title and shows exactly the real interest of its
owner.50
To successfully assail the juristic value of what a
Torrens title establishes, a sufficient and convincing
quantum of evidence on the defect of the title must
be adduced to overcome the predisposition in law in
favor of a holder of a Torrens title. Thus, contrary to
the appellate court’s ruling, the appearance of a
mere thumbmark of Don Julian instead of his
signature in the Supplemental Deed would not affect
the validity of petitioner’s title for this Court has ruled
that a thumbmark is a recognized mode of
signature.51
The truth, however, is that the replacement of OCT
No. 5203 in the name of Julian by T.C.T. No. T-375
is marred by a grave irregularity which is also an
illegality, as it contravenes the orthodox,
conventional and normal process established by law.
And, worse still, the illegality is reflected on the face
of both titles. Where, as in this case, the transferee
relies on a voluntary instrument to secure the
issuance of a new title in his name such instrument
has to be presented to the Registry of Deeds. This is
evident from Sections 53 and 57 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 or the Property Registration
Decree. The sections read, thus:
deed of conveyance shall be filed and
endorsed with the number and the place
of registration of the certificate of title of
the land conveyed. (Emphasis supplied)
As petitioner bases its right to the subject lot on
the Supplemental Deed,  it should have presented it
to the Register of Deeds to secure the transfer of the
title in its name. Apparently, it had not done so.
There is nothing on OCT No. 5203 or on the
succeeding TCT No. T-375 either which shows that
it had presented the Supplemental Deed. In fact,
there is absolutely no mention of a reference to said
document in the original and transfer certificates of
title. It is in this regard that the finding of the Court of
Appeals concerning the absence of entries on the
blanks intended for the Book No. and Page No.
gains significant relevance. Indeed, this aspect
fortifies the conclusion that the cancellation of OCT
No. 5203 and the consequent issuance of TCT No.
T-375 in its place are not predicated on a valid
transaction.
What appears instead on OCT No. 5203 is the
following pertinent entry:

SEC. 53. Presentation of owner’s duplicate
upon entry of new certificate.
No voluntary instrument shall
registered by the Register of Deeds unless
the owner’s duplicate certificate
is presented with such instrument, except
in cases expressly provided for in this
Decree or upon order of the court, for cause
shown. (Emphasis supplied)
....
SEC. 57. Procedure in registration of
conveyances. – An owner desiring to convey
his registered land in fee simple shall
execute and register a deed of conveyance
in a form sufficient in law. The Register of
Deeds shall thereafter make out in the
registration book a new certificate of title to
the grantee and shall prepare and deliver to
him an owner’s duplicate certificate. The
Register of Deeds shall note upon the
original and duplicate certificate the date of
transfer, the volume and page of the
registration book in which the new certificate
is registered and a reference by number to
the last preceding certificate. The original
and the owner’s duplicate of the grantor’s
certificate shall be stamped "cancelled." The
Entry No. 1374: Kind: Order: Executed in
– favor of J.L.T. AGRO, INC.
be
CONDITIONS: Lost owner’s duplicate is
hereby cancelled, and null and void and a
new Certificate of Title No. 375 is issued
per Order of the Court of First
Instance on file in this office.
Date of Instrument: November 12, 1979
Date of Inscription: Nov. 12, 1979 4:00 P.M.
(SGD) MANUEL C. MONTESA
Acting Deputy Register of Deeds II
(Emphasis supplied)52
What the entry indicates is that the owner’s duplicate
of OCT No. 5203 was lost, a petition for the
reconstitution of the said owner’s duplicate was filed
in court, and the court issued an order for the
reconstitution of the owner’s duplicate and its
replacement with a new one. But if the entry is to be
believed, the court concerned (CFI, according to the
entry) issued an order for the issuance of a new title
which is TCT No. T-375 although the original of OCT
No. 5203 on file with the Registry of Deeds had not
been lost.
Going by the legal, accepted and normal process,
the reconstitution court may order the reconstitution
and replacement of the lost title only, nothing else.
Since what was lost is the owner’s copy of OCT No.
5203, only that owner’s copy could be ordered
replaced. Thus, the Register of Deeds exceeded his
authority in issuing not just a reconstituted owner’s
copy of the original certificate of title but a new
transfer certificate of title in place of the original
certificate of title. But if the court order, as the entry
intimates, directed the issuance of a new transfer
certificate of title—even designating the very number
of the new transfer certificate of title itself—the order
would be patently unlawful. A court cannot legally
order the cancellation and replacement of the
original of the O.C.T. which has not been lost, 53 as
the petition for reconstitution is premised on the loss
merely of the owner’s duplicate of the OCT
Apparently, petitioner had resorted to the court order
as a convenient contrivance to effect the transfer of
title to the subject lot in its name, instead of
the Supplemental Deed which should be its proper
course of action. It was so constrained to do
because the Supplemental Deed does not constitute
a deed of conveyance of the "registered land in fee
simple" "in a form sufficient in law," as required by
Section 57 of P.D. No. 1529.
A plain reading of the pertinent provisions of
the Supplemental Deed discloses that the
assignment is not supported by any consideration.
The provision reads:
....
WHEREAS, in the Deed of Assignment of
Assets with the Assumption of Liabilities
executed by Julian L. Teves, Emilio B.
Teves and Josefa T. Escaño at Dumaguete
City on 16th day of November 1972 and
ratified in the City of Dumaguete before
Notary Public Lenin Victoriano, and entered
in the latter’s notarial register as Doc. No.
367; Page No. 17; Book No. V; series of
1972, Julian L. Teves, Emilio B. Teves and
Josefa T. Escaño, transferred, conveyed
and assigned unto J.L.T. AGRO, INC., all its
assets and liabilities as reflected in the
Balance Sheet of the former as of December
31, 1971.
WHEREAS, on the compromise agreement,
as mentioned in the Decision made in the
Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental,
12th Judicial District Branch II, on Dec. 31,
1964 pertaining to Civil Case No. 3443 the
following properties were adjudicated to Don
Julian L. Teves. We quote.
From the properties at Bais
Adjudicated to Don Julian L.Teves
....
Lot No. 63, Tax Dec. No. 33, Certificate of
Title No. 5203, together with all
improvements. Assessed value - P2,720.00
....
WHEREAS, this Deed of Assignment is
executed by the parties herein in order to
effect the registration of the transfer of the
above corporation.
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in
consideration of the above premises the
ASSIGNOR hereby transfers, conveys, and
assigns unto J.L.T. AGRO, INC., the above
described parcel of land[s] with a fair
market value of EIGHTY-FOUR
THOUSAND PESOS
(P84,000.00), Philippine Currency, and
which transfer, conveyance and assignment
shall become absolute upon
signing.54 (Emphasis supplied)
The amount of P84,000.00 adverted to in the
dispositive portion of the instrument does not
represent the consideration for the assignment made
by Don Julian. Rather, it is a mere statement of the
fair market value of all the nineteen (19) properties
enumerated in the instrument, of which Lot No. 63 is
just one, that were transferred by Don Julian in favor
of petitioner. Consequently, the testimony55 of
petitioner’s accountant that the assignment is
supported by consideration cannot prevail over the
clear provision to the contrary in the Supplemental
Deed.
The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, apparently
considered the 1948 mortgage which is annotated
on the back of the TCT No. T-375 as the
consideration for the assignment.56 However, the
said annotation57 shows that the mortgage was
actually executed in favor of Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation, not of petitioner.58 Clearly, said
mortgage, executed as it was in favor of the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation and there being
no showing that petitioner itself paid off the mortgate
obligation, could not have been the consideration for
the assignment to petitioner.
Article 1318 of the New Civil Code enumerates the
requisites of a valid contract, namely: (1) consent of
the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the
subject matter of the contract; and (3) Cause  of the
obligation which is established.
Thus, Article 1352 declares that contracts without
cause, or with unlawful cause produce no effect
whatsoever. Those contracts lack an essential
element and they are not only voidable but void or
inexistent pursuant to Article 1409, paragraph
(2).59 The absence of the usual recital of
consideration in a transaction which normally should
be supported by a consideration such as the
assignment made by Don Julian of all nineteen (19)
lots he still had at the time, coupled with the fact that
the assignee is a corporation of which Don Julian
himself was also the President and Director,
forecloses the application of the presumption of
existence of consideration established by law.60
Neither could the Supplemental Deed  validly
operate as a donation. Article 749 of the New Civil
Code is clear on the point, thus:
Art. 749. In order that the donation of the
immovable may be valid, it must be made in
a public document, specifying therein the
property donated and the value of the
charges which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same
deed of donation or in a separate public
document, but it shall not take effect unless
it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate
instrument, the donor shall be notified
thereof in an authentic form, and this step
shall be noted in both instruments.
61
In Sumipat, et al v. Banga, et al.,  this Court
declared that title to immovable property does not
pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of a deed
of donation until and unless it has been accepted in
a public instrument and the donor duly notified
thereof. The acceptance may be made in the very
same instrument of donation. If the acceptance does
not appear in the same document, it must be made
in another. Where the deed of donation fails to show
the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the
acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is either
not given to the donor or else not noted in the deed
of donation and in the separate acceptance, the
donation is null and void.
In the case at bar, although
the Supplemental Deed appears in a public
document,62 the absence of acceptance by the
donee in the same deed or even in a separate
document is a glaring violation of the requirement.
One final note. From the substantive and procedural
standpoints, the cardinal objectives to write finis to a
protracted litigation and avoid multiplicity of suits are
worth pursuing at all times.63 Thus, this Court has
ruled that appellate courts have ample authority to
rule on specific matters not assigned as errors or
otherwise not raised in an appeal, if these are
indispensable or necessary to the just resolution of
the pleaded issues.64 Specifically, matters not
assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of
which are necessary in arriving at a just decision and
complete resolution of the case, or to serve the
interest of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal
justice.65
In the instant case, the correct characterization of
the Supplemental Deed, i.e., whether it is valid or
void,  is unmistakably determinative of the underlying
controversy. In other words, the issue of validity or
nullity of the instrument which is at the core of the
controversy is interwoven with the issues adopted by
the parties and the rulings of the trial court and the
appellate court.66 Thus, this Court is also resolute in
striking down the alleged deed in this case,
especially as it appears on its face to be a blatant
nullity.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered,
the Decision dated 30 September 1999 of the Court
of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner J.L.T. Agro, Inc.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 208197, January 10, 2018
ARACELI MAYUGA, SUBSTITUTED BY MARILYN
MAYUGA SANTILLAN FOR AND ON BEHALF OF
ALL THE HEIRS, Petitioner, v. ANTONIO
ATIENZA, REPRESENTING THE HEIRS OF
ARMANDO* ATIENZA; BENJAMIN ATIENZA, JR.,
REPRESENTING THE HEIRS OF BENJAMIN A.
ATIENZA, SR., Respondents.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 (Petition)
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision2 dated July 8, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals3 (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 95599 which
granted the appeal by the respondents Antonio
Atienza4 and Benjamin Atienza, Jr.5 and reversed
and set aside the Decision6 dated April 27, 2010 of
the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region,
Branch 82, Odiongan, Romblon (RTC) in Civil Case
No. OD-489.
Facts and Antecedent Proceedings
As culled from the CA Decision, the antecedents are
as follows:
On May 4, 2000, Araceli Mayuga (Araceli, for short),
as plaintiff, instituted a petition for Cancellation and
Recall of Free Patent Application (FPA) No. 11636
and FPA No. 11637 [and Reconveyance] against
Antonio Atienza, representing the heirs of Armando
Atienza, Benjamin Atienza, Jr., representing the
heirs of Benjamin Atienza, Sr., Community
Environment and Natural Resource Officer and
Register of Deeds of Romblon, as defendants. The
petition, docketed as Civil Case No. OD-489, was
raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Odiongan, Romblon, Branch 82[.]
In her Petition, Araceli, alleged, that [she, Benjamin
A. Atienza, Sr. and Armando A. Atienza are the
surviving legitimate, legal and forced heirs of the late
Perfecto Atienza who died intestate on June 1,
19787, and:]
xxxx
3. That the said deceased Perfecto Atienza left
estates, to wit:
(a) Lot 9819 Csd 341-D (known as Lot 61-A) with an
area of 294 square meters, and
(b) Lot 9820 Csd 341-D (known as Lot 61-B) with an
area of 280 square meters,
or a total area of 574 square meters, both lots are
located at Budiong, Odiongan, Romblon to which the
three (3) compulsory/forced heirs are entitled to an
equal share of 1/3 [each].
4. That through manipulation and misrepresentation
with intent to defraud a co-heir, respondent Antonio
L. Atienza[, son of deceased Armando Atienza,8]
was able to secure Free [P]atent (NRDN-21) 11636
while respondent Benjamin A. Atienza was able to
secure Free Patent (NRDN- 21) 11637, both patents
dated February 28, 1992.
5. That Petitioner was not notified of the application
filed with public respondent Community Environment
& Natural Resource Officer nor any notice of
hearings of proceedings as required by law, being a
co-heir and party- in-interest.
xxxx
Thus, she prayed [for],
xxxx
1. The recall and cancellation of FPA (NRD-IV-21)
11636 dated February 28, 1992 issued to Antonio L.
Atienza.
2. The recall and cancellation of FPA (NRD-IV-21)
11637 dated February 28, 1992 issued to Benjamin
A. Atienza.
3. [The division of] the two lots into three (3) equal
parts among the three (3) forced heirs, namely: the
Petitioner, Benjamin A. Atienza and Armando A.
Atienza.
xxxx
On June 19, 2000, defendants filed a motion for bill
of particulars because the allegations of
manipulation and misrepresentation were general,
vague and ambiguous on which they could not make
an intelligent answer. In the Order dated June 22,
2000, plaintiff was directed to submit a bill of
particulars.
Plaintiff submitted a Reply to Motion for Bill of
Particulars, stating that the allegations on paragraph
4 in her petition are based on the following
considerations:
xxxx
1. That petition/application for title filed by
Respondents before the Bureau of Lands dated
June 22, 1973 was based on a "Confirmation
Affidavit of Distribution of Real Estate," allegedly
executed by Perfecto Atienza, allegedly confirming
[an] alleged partition of 1960, was misrepresented to
Perfecto Atienza as mere compliance of Presidential
Decree No. 76 of December 6, 1972 for Real Estate
Tax purposes;
2. That the Bureau of Lands [had] never notified the
Petitioner, being one of the Compulsory/Forced heirs
about the petition/application for issuance of title and
the hearing thereon;
3. That Respondents took advantage of the absence
of Petitioner in the Philippines, who was in the
United States then when they filed the
Petition/Application for issuance of title in the year
1989.
xxxx
On August 18, 2000, the RTC issued an Order
admitting the Reply to Bill of Particulars.
In their Answer, defendants denied the material
allegations of the complaint, and by way of
affirmative defenses, averred that, the petition is
moot and academic; the Free Patent Titles have
become indefeasible after the lapse of one year from
its issuance in 1992; fraud as a ground for review of
title under Section 38 of Act 496 is not applicable to
a case where a certificate of title was issued in
pursuance of a patent application; that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public,
continuous possession of the subject property for
over 30 years; the basis for their Application for Free
Patent with the CENRO is a Confirmation Affidavit of
Distribution of Real Estate executed by their father,
Perfecto Atienza, confirming partition in 1960.
Defendant Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer (CENRO, for short) also filed an
Answer, alleging that, Free Patent No. 045909-92-
141P was issued by then Provincial Environment
and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO), Dionico F.
Gabay on February 28, 1992 by virtue of the Free
Patent Application No. (NRD-IV-21)-11636 filed by
Antonio L. Atienza at the CENRO Office in
Odiongan, Romblon covering Lot No. 9819, Cad.
341-D, Odiongan Cadastre which is identical to Lot
61-A, Csd-04-008722-D; while Free Patent
Application No. (NRD-IV-21)11637 filed by Benjamin
A. Atienza with the CENRO Office covering Lot
9820, Cad. 341-D, Odiongan Cadastre which is
identical to Lot 61-B, Csd-04-008722-D; it has no
participation whatsoever in the processing and
issuance of free patents and/or titles in the names of
Antonio L. Atienza and Benjamin A. Atienza. It also
prayed that it be excluded as a defendant in the
case.
On July 9, 2001, plaintiff filed an Amended
Complaint to implead the Heirs of Armando A.
Atienza, namely, Antonio L. Atienza, Mae Atienza-
Apostol, Susan Atienza-Sumbeling and Heirs of
Benjamin M. (sic) Atienza, Sr., namely, Benjamin M.
Atienza, Jr., Antonio M. Atienza, Pewrpetuo (sic) M.
Atienza, Maribel M. Atienza and Cristina Atienza, as
defendants.
Defendants moved to dismiss the original petition for
failure of the plaintiff’s counsels to state their IBP No.
and P.T.R. No. and the amended complaint for
failure to attach a verification and certification
against forum-shopping but on September 13, 2001,
the RTC issued an Order denying the motion to
dismiss for lack of merit.
The parties thereafter submitted their respective pre-
trial briefs. A pre-trial conference was conducted and
later, trial ensued.
On April 27, 2010, the RTC ruled in favor of Plaintiff
Araceli. It ruled that the application by the
defendants for a Free Patent with the CENRO is
tainted with fraud because said application was
processed without the plaintiff’s knowledge nor a
notice of hearing of any proceeding was sent to her.
In fact, the defendants took advantage while the
latter was in the United States. Moreover, the titling
of the fraudulently registered real property will not
bar the action for reconveyance.
Thus, the RTC decreed, that:
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Register of
Deeds [of] Romblon, Romblon is hereby directed to
Cancel the Certificates issued pursuant [to] Free
Patent No. 11636 in the name of Antonio L. Atienza
and Free Patent No. 11637 in the name of Benjamin
A. Atienza. The defendants are hereby ordered to
reconvey the 1/3 share of Araceli A. Mayuga as the
compulsory heir of the late Perfecto Atienza on Lot
9819 which is identical to Lot 61-A and 9820 which
is identical to Lot 61-B all located at Budiong,
Odiongan, Romblon.
SO ORDERED.
xxxxx
Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration but the
same was denied in the Order dated July 29, 2010.
Aggrieved, defendants interposed an appeal [before
the Court of Appeals] assailing the decision of the
RTC.9
The CA granted the appeal. It reversed and set
aside the RTC Decision dated April 27, 2010, and
dismissed the Amended Complaint for Recall and
Cancellation of Free Patent Application (FPA) No.
11636 and FPA No. 11637 and Action for
Reconveyance.10
On the procedural aspect of the appeal, the CA ruled
that the RTC erred in not dismissing the Amended
Complaint for failure to append a certification against
non-forum shopping.11 On the substantive aspects of
the appeal, the CA ruled that the free patents issued
in favor of the respondents can no longer be
assailed under the rule of indefeasibility and
incontrovertibility of the certificate of title upon the
expiration of one year from and after the date of the
entry of the decree of registration pursuant to
Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.12 The
CA further ruled that the RTC erred in its finding that
fraud and misrepresentation attended the
respondents' applications for free patents.13 It noted
that the basis for the respondents' application was
the Confirmatory Affidavit of Distribution of Real
Estate dated June 22, 1973 executed by their father,
the late Perfecto Atienza during his lifetime and was
at liberty to dispose of his property to anyone he
desired.14 The said document was duly notarized
and the petitioner could not impugn its validity by
mere self-serving allegations.15 Besides, the records
negate the claim of the petitioner that she was not
notified of the free patent applications because a
Notice of Application for Free Patent was "posted in
conspicuous place on the land applied for, on the
bulletin board of the barrio where the land is located,
and at the door of [the] municipal building on the
2nd day of January, 1987 and remained posted until
the 18th of December."16 The respondents presented
Romulo Fetalvero, Management Officer III of the
PENRO-DENR, Odiongan, Romblon who testified
that they complied with the requirements for the
issuance of a free patent.17 Thus, the petitioner's
allegations of fraud, manipulation and
misrepresentation were unsubstantiated.18
Furthermore, the CA held that the RTC erred in
ordering the reconveyance of 1/3 of the subject
properties to the petitioner since she failed to
establish her title and ownership over such
portion.19 The CA gave due recognition to the tax
declarations dated as early as 1974 presented by
the respondents and the Report of Investigation by
Emilio Firmalo, Deputy Land Investigator/Inspector,
which disclosed that Antonio Atienza and his
predecessors-in-interest had possessed and
occupied the subject land since 1962, while
Benjamin Atienza and his predecessors-in-interest
fully possessed the same since 1962.20
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal
is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated April 27,
2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Odiongan,
Romblon, Branch 82 in Civil Case No. OD-489, and
the subsequent Order dated July 29, 2010
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Amended
Complaint for Recall and Cancellation of Free Patent
Application (FPA) No. 11636 and FPA No. 11637
and Action for Reconveyance is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.21
Proceedings Before the Court
Hence, the present Petition was filed after the Court
granted the petitioner's Motion for Extension of Time
to File Petition for Review22 in its Resolution23 dated
September 16, 2013.
The respondents filed their Comments (To the
Petition for Review)24 dated December 16, 2013
(Comment). The Comment pointed as procedural
flaw the defective verification and certification of the
Petition on account of the lack of authority of Marilyn
Mayuga Santillan, who verified the Petition instead
of petitioner Araceli Mayuga. The respondents also
argued that the petitioner has not explained the lack
of verification and certification against non-forum
shopping in the original complaint which was one of
the reasons for the reversal of the RTC Decision by
the CA.25 As substantive flaws, the respondents
argued that their titles have become indefeasible
one year after the date of entry of the decree of
registration and the petitioner's complaint for recall
and cancellation of free patent application and
reconveyance, having been initiated eight years from
the date of the entry in the registration book of the
Register of Deeds and beyond four years from the
discovery of the alleged fraud, was filed out of
time.26 The respondents further argued that the
petitioner failed to prove that there was fraud or
misrepresentation in the acquisition of their titles.27
The petitioner filed a Reply28 dated April 11, 2014.
The petitioner raised therein that title emanating
from free patent fraudulently obtained does not
become indefeasible,29 and the action for
reconveyance was seasonably filed based on
implied or constructive trust.30
In a Manifestation31 dated October 30, 2015, the
Court was informed of the death of petitioner Araceli
Mayuga in September 2015. The Court in its
Resolution32 dated January 18, 2016, required the
petitioner's counsel to file a motion for substitution of
party together with the death certificate of the
petitioner.
The petitioner's counsel filed a Motion for
Substitution of Party and Compliance33 dated March
11, 2016, praying that Marilyn Mayuga Santillan be
substituted as petitioner on behalf of all the heirs of
the original petitioner Araceli Mayuga. In the Court's
Resolution34 dated April 20, 2016, the motion for
substitution was granted.
Issue
Based on the Petition and the pleadings filed by the
parties, the core issue is:
Whether the CA erred in reversing the RTC Decision
and dismissing the amended complaint of the
petitioner for cancellation of free patent and
reconveyance.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition lacks merit.
To recall, the amended complaint filed by the
petitioner was for "Recall and Cancellation of FPA
No. 11636 and FPA No. 11637 and
Reconveyance."35
The RTC considered the said complaint mainly as
an action for declaration of nullity of the free patents
and the corresponding certificates of title issued to
the respondents. The RTC Decision directed the
Register of Deeds of Romblon to cancel the
certificates of title issued pursuant to Free Patent
No. 11636 in the name of respondent Antonio L.
Atienza and Free Patent No. 11637 in the name of
Benjamin A. Atienza, Sr. and ordered the
respondents to reconvey the alleged 1/3 share of
petitioner Araceli A. Mayuga. On the other hand, the
CA considered the separate merits of the amended
complaint's causes of action for declaration of nullity
of the free patents and reconveyance. The Court will
follow the CA's path.
The Court in Spouses Galang v. Spouses
Reyes,36 citing Heirs of Kionisala v. Heirs of
Dacut,37 observed the essential differences among
an action for declaration of nullity of free patents and
the corresponding certificates of titles issued
pursuant thereto, an action for reversion and an
action for reconveyance, viz.:
An ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of
free patents and certificates of title is not the same
as an action for reversion. The difference between
them lies in the allegations as to the character of
ownership of the realty whose title is sought to be
nullified. In an action for reversion, the pertinent
allegations in the complaint would admit State
ownership of the disputed land. x x x
On the other hand, a cause of action for declaration
of nullity of free patent and certificate of title would
require allegations of the plaintiffs ownership of the
contested lot prior to the issuance of such free
patent and certificate of title as well as the
defendant's fraud or mistake; as the case may be, in
successfully obtaining these documents of title over
the parcel of land claimed by plaintiff. In such a
case, the nullity arises strictly not from the fraud or
deceit but from the fact that the land is beyond the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to bestow and
whatever patent or certificate of title obtained
therefor is consequently void ab initio. The real party
in interest is x x x the plaintiff who alleges a pre-
existing right of ownership over the parcel of land in
question even before the grant of title to the Regarding the petitioner's allegation of fraud, the CA
defendant. x x x correctly dismissed the same, pointing out that her
"averment that [she] was not notified of [the]
xxxx applications for the free patent as well as of the
proceedings which transpired leading to the granting
and registration of the land in the [respondents']
With respect to the purported cause of action
name is bare and self-serving,"40 and "the records
for reconveyance, it is settled that in this kind of
negate this claim because a Notice of Application for
action the free patent and the certificate of title are
Free Patent was 'posted in [a] conspicuous place on
respected as incontrovertible. What is sought
the land applied for, on the bulletin board of the
instead is the transfer of the property, in this case
barrio where the land is located, and at the door of
the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or
[the] municipal building on the 2nd day of January,
erroneously registered in the defendant's name. All
1987 and remained posted until the 18th of
that must be alleged in the complaint are two (2)
December.'"41 The CA was likewise not convinced
facts which admitting them to be true would entitle
with the petitioner's allegation of fraud and
the plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land,
misrepresentation in the execution of the
namely, (1) that the plaintiff was the owner of the
Confirmation Affidavit of Distribution of Real Estate
land and, (2) that the defendant had illegally
dated June 22, 1973 (Confirmation Affidavit) by the
dispossessed him of the same.38 (Emphasis omitted,
petitioner's father, the late Perfecto Atienza
underscoring in the original)
(Perfecto). Being a notarized document, the CA
imbued it with the legal presumption of validity, its
Given the foregoing differences, an action for due execution and authenticity not having been
reconveyance and an action for declaration of nullity impugned by the mere self-serving allegations of the
of the free patent cannot be pursued simultaneously. petitioner.42
The former recognizes the certificate of title issued
pursuant to the free patent as indefeasible while the
The petitioner having failed to persuade the Court by
latter does not. They may, however, be pursued
clear and convincing evidence that the respondents
alternatively pursuant to Section 2, Rule 8 of the
perpetuated fraud against her, the Court's
Rules of Court on alternative causes of action or
conclusion in Spouses Galang finds application in
defenses.
the present case, viz.:
The action for declaration of nullity of the free
x x x As between these two claims, this Court is
patents issued in favor of the respondents must fail,
inclined to decide in favor of the Galangs who hold a
as the CA correctly ruled.
valid and subsisting title to the property which, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, the Court
As noted by the CA, the respondents satisfactorily presumes to have been issued by the PENRO in the
complied with the requirements for the issuance of a regular performance of its official duty.
free patent. After quoting the pertinent portion of the
direct examination of Romulo Fetalvero,
The bottom line here is that, fraud and
Management Officer III of the PENRO-DENR,
misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of
Odiongan, Romblon, on the respondents'
patent and annulment of title, should never be
compliance with the requirements, the CA stated:
presumed, but must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence, with mere preponderance of
From the foregoing, the grant of free patents to evidence not being adequate. Fraud is a question of
defendants-appellants, having been performed in the fact which must be proved.
course of the official functions of the DENR officers,
enjoys the presumption of regularity. This
In this case, the allegations of fraud were never
presumption of regularity was not successfully
proven. There was no evidence at all specifically
rebutted by plaintiff-appellee. All told, there is no
showing actual fraud or misrepresentation. x x x.43
clear and convincing evidence of fraud and plaintiff-
appellee's failure to prove it is fatal to [her] own
cause. And there being none, We will have to Also, Lopez v. Court of Appeals44 supports the
sustain the issuance of [the] free patents to the recognition of the respondents as the absolute and
defendants-appellants.39 exclusive owner of the disputed lots, being grantees
of free patents over them.
In Lopez, the homestead application of one Fermin
Lopez had unfortunately remained unacted upon up
to the time of his death, being neither approved nor
denied by the Director of the (then) Bureau of Lands
as the Bureau failed to process it; the Court ruled
that he could not have acquired any vested rights as
a homestead applicant over the property,45 and his
heirs did not inherit any property right from
him.46 The other heirs of Fermin had no right to be
declared co-owners with Hermogenes Lopez, the
eldest child of Fermin, who filed a new application
after Fermin's death and was granted a homestead
patent over the land which was subject of Fermin's
application because the land exclusively pertained to
Hermogenes. The Court reasoned out:
The failure of the Bureau of Lands to act on the
application of Fermin up to the time of his death,
however, prevented his heirs to be subrogated in all
his rights and obligations with respect to the land
applied for.
Perforce, at the time Hermogenes applied for a
homestead grant over the disputed property, it was
still part of alienable public land. As he applied for it
in his own name, his application inures to his sole
benefit. After complying with the cultivation and
residency requirements, he became a grantee of a
homestead patent over it, thereby making him its
absolute and exclusive owner.47
Thus, the CA did not commit any reversible error in
dismissing the complaint for the recall and
cancellation of the free patent applications of the
respondents.
Proceeding now to the determination of whether the
petitioner has succeeded in proving her cause of
action for reconveyance, the petitioner likewise failed
in this respect. As correctly pointed out by the CA
and stated earlier, an action for reconveyance
involving land that is titled pursuant to a free patent
is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully
registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner
or to one with a better title.48 As such, two facts must
be alleged in the complaint and proved during the
trial, namely: (1) the plaintiff was the owner of the
land or possessed it in the concept of owner, and (2)
the defendant illegally divested him of ownership
and dispossessed him of the land.49
Such facts, as the CA observed, were not only not
alleged in the amended complaint, the petitioner
Araceli Mayuga (Araceli50) also failed to prove that
she was entitled to 1/3 of the two lots in dispute by
succession.
Apparently, Araceli had taken the position that being
one of the surviving compulsory heirs of their late
father, Perfecto, she was entitled to 1/3 of the
disputed lots on the assumption that the decedent
left only three legal heirs (his children Araceli,
Benjamin, Sr. and Armando)51 and that the disputed
lots were part of the inheritance52 left by their father
when he died in 1978. Araceli, however, overlooked
the fact that Perfecto executed the Confirmation
Affidavit dated June 22, 1973 almost five years prior
to his death on June 1, 1978. Araceli did not even
bother to provide the Court a copy thereof so that
the Court could make a determination of its legal
import. And the CA correctly accorded the
Confirmation Affidavit the legal presumption of
validity, being a duly notarized document, where its
validity could not be impugned by mere self-serving
allegations.53
Assuming that Perfecto owned the disputed lots and
the Confirmation Affidavit was a deed of partition,
Perfecto could have legally partitioned his estate
during his lifetime. Under Article 1080 of the Civil
Code, "[s]hould a person make a partition of his
estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition
shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice
the legitime of the compulsory heirs."
Unlike in the old Civil Code, partition  inter vivos is
expressly allowed in the present Civil Code. The
rationale for the change is exhaustively explained by
recognized Civil Law Commentator, former CA
Justice Eduardo P. Caguioa,54 thus:
xxx This article allows the deceased to make a
partition of his estate before his death which partition
shall be respected insofar as it does not prejudice
the legitime of the co-heirs. This partition may be
made either by an act inter vivos or by will. Whether
one or the other, however, is followed, the
requirements of law as to form must be complied
with.55 If the testator should make it by will, then
there is no doubt that the same is valid and binding
on the heirs. It the testator makes a partition inter
vivos, should such partition be after the making of a
will and in accordance therewith or can the testator
make a partition inter vivos without any supporting
will? Under the old Civil Code the article employed
the term "testator"56 in lieu of the term now used
which is "person." Interpreting this provision of law
our Supreme Court in line with the opinion of the
Spanish Supreme Court and Manresa, ruled that the
word "testator" in the article can have no other
meaning than that there must have been a previous
will executed by the decedent wherein the property
was disposed of to the heirs. Subsequently, the
testator makes a partition by an act inter vivos in
accordance with the disposition made in such will.
Hence, our Supreme Court ruled that where the
testator made a partition inter vivos but the will was
declared null and void, the partition was also null
and void.57 The word "testator" in the Old Civil Code
was changed by the New Civil Code into the term
"person," precisely to do away with the interpretation
given to the article by our Supreme Court, the
Supreme Court of Spain and Manresa. Where the
old code uses the specific term "testator," the New
Civil Code uses the broader term "person." What is
the effect of this change? There is no doubt that the
intention behind the change is to do away with the
interpretation requiring a valid will in order that there
be a valid partition inter vivos. Consequently, we
may say that a partition inter vivos may be valid
even though there is no supporting will. However, in
accordance with what disposition shall said partition
be made if made inter vivos? May the deceased
freely, in said partition inter vivos, designate the
shares of the heirs granting that the same does not
prejudice the legitime of the co-heirs? If this is so, is
not this a will without the formalities of a will? Was
that the intention of the legislature in amending the
article from the term "testator" to "person"? If that is
the intention, then property may pass through the
will of the testator without the formalities of a will.
Hence, this will in effect destroy the intention of the
legislature in carefully providing for the formalities of
the will so as to safeguard the testamentary right of
a person. Any act inter vivos which will designate
under this theory a partition of the property will be
valid disposition even though it is not a will.
It is submitted that this is not the intention of the
legislature. A distinction must be made between a
disposition of property and its partition. The
disposition of property must be made in the manner
allowed by law, namely, by will. After the designation
in the will, then comes the second part, the division
in conformity with that disposition and the testator
may make this division in the same will or another
will or by an act inter vivos.58Hence, in reality,
partition is simply making concrete and particular the
apportionment already previously made by the
testator in his will. Since our law now does not
require a valid will in order that the partition inter
vivos may be valid and as we submit that the
partition cannot make the designation of heirs or the
designation of shares but merely makes concrete,
specific a designation previously made, according to
what designation will this partition inter vivos be
made if there is no will of the testator? It is submitted
that this designation shall be in accordance with the
laws of intestacy. Inasmuch as the deceased did not
make a will, it is presumed that he wanted the
disposition in accordance with law, and this
apportionment by the law must be interpreted to be
the presumed will of the deceased; hence, the
partition inter vivos must be in accordance with the
designation laid down by law in case of intestacy.
Said partition shall be valid so long as it does not
impair the legitime of the co-heirs. That there can be
a prejudice to the legitime of the co-heirs in intestate
succession has been previously explained inasmuch
as whether the succession is testamentary or legal,
compulsory succession must always take place.
From what has been explained, it is clear that should
the testator institute a stranger as heir, he cannot
make a partition inter vivos without making a
designation by a valid will because the stranger
cannot inherit by the laws of intestacy.
Since the Civil Code allows partition inter vivos, it is
incumbent upon the compulsory heir questioning its
validity to show that his legitime is impaired.
Unfortunately, Araceli has not shown to what extent
the Confirmation Affidavit prejudiced her legitime.
Araceli could not also claim preterition by virtue of
the Confirmation Affidavit on the assumption that the
disputed two lots pertained to Perfecto's inheritance,
he had only three legal heirs and he left Araceli with
no share in the two lots. Article 854 of the Civil Code
partly provides: "[t]he preterition or omission of one,
some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will
or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall
be valid insofar as they are not inofficious."
As explained by Justice Eduardo P. Caguioa:
x x x Preterition consists in the omission in the
testator's will of a compulsory heir in the direct line or
anyone of them either because they are not
mentioned therein or although mentioned they are
neither instituted as heir nor expressly disinherited.
The act of totally depriving a compulsory heir of his
legitime can take place either expressly or tacitly.
The express deprivation of the legitime constitutes
disinheritance. The tacit deprivation of the same is
called preterition. x x x59
x x x In order that there be preterition, it is essential
that the heir must be totally omitted. This is clear
from the wording of this article in conjunction with July 8, 2013 in CA-G.R. CV No. 95599 is
Article 90660. x x x61 hereby AFFIRMED.

xxxx SO ORDERED.

Summarizing, therefore, total omission means that

the omitted compulsory heir receives nothing under
the will, whether as heir, legatee or devisee, has
received nothing by way of donation inter vivos or
propter [nuptias], and will receive nothing by way of
intestate succession.62

Although Araceli was a compulsory heir in the direct

descending line, she could not have been preterited.
Firstly, Perfecto left no will. As contemplated in
Article 854, the presence of a will is necessary.
Secondly, before his death, Perfecto had properties
in Limon, Rizal which was almost 50 hectares, part
of which was developed for residential and
agricultural purposes, and in Odiongan.63 Araceli
could not have been totally excluded in the
inheritance of Perfecto even if she was not allegedly
given any share in the disputed two lots.

If Araceli's share in the inheritance of Perfecto as

claimed by her was indeed impaired, she could have
instituted an action for partition or a settlement of
estate proceedings instead of her complaint for
cancellation of free patent and reconveyance.

Furthermore, as the persons who applied for and

were awarded free patents, the respondents are the
rightful, legal owners of the disputed lots. The free
patents having been issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources on February
28, 1992 and recorded in the Book of Entries at the
Office of the Registry of Deeds in June 1992, 64 the
respondents' certificates of title have already
become indefeasible pursuant to Section 32 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 (the Property
Registration Decree), which pertinently provides:
"Upon the expiration of said period of one year [from
and after the date of entry of the decree of
registration], the decree of registration and the
certificate of title issued shall become
incontrovertible."

Given the foregoing, the resolution of the procedural

issues pertinent to the Petition has become
superfluous.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED for

lack of merit. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 193374, June 08, 2016
HEIRS OF THE LATE GERRY* ECARMA,
NAMELY: AVELINA SUIZA-ECARMA, DENNIS
ECARMA, JERRY LYN ECARMA PENA,
ANTONIO ECARMA AND NATALIA ECARMA
SANGALANG, Petitioners, v. COURT OF
APPEALS AND RENATO A.
ECARMA, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
We here have another case of heirs quarrelling over
inherited properties, some of them refusing their
partition.
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court assailing the twin
Resolutions2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 92375 for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in
excess of jurisdiction. The appellate court dismissed
outright the appeal of petitioners, heirs of Gerry
Ecarma for a number of procedural defects,
including failure to comply with Section 13, Rule 44
of the Rules of Court on the contents of their
appellants' brief. Petitioners sought to appeal the two
(2) Orders3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 220, Quezon City in SP PROC. No. Q-90-
6332 which approved the Project of Partition
proposed by respondent Renato Ecarma,
administrator in the intestate proceedings to settle
the estate of decedent Arminda vda. de Ecarma
covering four (4) properties.
Because of the outright dismissal of their appeal
before the CA, we have a dearth of facts we had to
glean from the bare pleadings of petitioners.
The decedent Arminda was married to Natalio
Ecarma who predeceased her on 9 May 1970.
During their marriage, they acquired several
properties and begat seven (7) children: (1) Angelita;
(2) Rodolfo; (3) respondent Renato; (4) Maria
Arminda; (5) Gerry Anthony Ecarma, husband and
father respectively of herein petitioners Avelina
Suiza Ecarma, Dennis Ecarma, Gerry Lyn Ecarma
Pena, Antonio Ecarma and Natalia Ecarma
Sangalang (collectively petitioners and/or heirs of
Gerry Ecarma); (6) Fe Shirley; and (7) Rolando.
After Natalio's death, his heirs executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate4 covering four (4)
properties designated as Kitanlad, Cuyapo and Lala
(consisting of two separate lots), half of which was
specifically noted as pertaining to herein decedent
Arminda's share in their property regime of conjugal
partnership of gains. In the same Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate signed by all the heirs, the four
(4) properties were partitioned among them:
Arminda was assigned an undivided two-ninth's
(2/9's) proportion and all their children in equal
proportion of one-ninth (1/9) each. Significantly,
despite the partition agreement, no physical division
of the properties was effected, Natalio's heirs
remaining in co-ownership (pro indiviso) even at the
time of their mother's, decedent Arminda's, death on
17 April 1983.
On 18 May 1990, after his petition for the probate of
Arminda's will was dismissed by the RTC, Branch
86, Quezon City, respondent Renato filed the
subject intestate proceedings before the RTC,
Branch 220.
On 30 January 1991, Renato was appointed Special
Administrator by the RTC, Branch 220.
After what appears to be continuing conflict between
Gerry Ecarma and the other heirs of Natalio and
Arminda over actual division of their inherited
properties, by 9 March 2005, Renato unequivocally
moved to terminate their co-ownership: he filed a
Project of Partition of the Kitanlad Property, alleging
that:
1. This probate case has been left unresolved for 16
years now because of the incessant opposition by
Oppositor and legal heir, Jerry Ecarma, the only
legal heir who stays in Kitanlad, for reasons they had
ventilated already in this Court in their previous
pleadings, xxx
2. This, Court has ordered the sale of the assets of
the estate in an earlier order, but efforts to sell the
Kitanlad property, the most contentious issue, by the
Regular Administrator, [Renato Ecarma |, has been
thwarted by Jerry for reasons already known by this
Court, xxx
3. The law frowns on the indivision of property held
in common indefinitely. Furthermore, the legal heirs,
except Jerry and perhaps the Oppositor, have
expressed their desire to have the Kitanlad property
partitioned. The fairest legal way to partition the
property without any legal heir getting a share bigger
than the others is to sell the property and divide the
net proceeds, but Jerry's objection to its sale at a
price which will attract interested buyers has
rendered nugatory this option. The next best option,
with no legal heir getting an undue advantage over
the others, is to divide the property longitudinally
from the frontage down to the other end in seven
equal parts. Although this option will render the
improvements unusable, it must be realised that
these improvements are now fully depreciated. The.
duplex house is 57 years old, while the apartments
are now 40 years old. All seven parts will be equal to
each other in all their aspects: the measurements,
length and width, will be the same, each part will
have a frontage to the street. Each legal heir will
have complete control over his/her portion. Me/she
may keep it if he/she wishes, or sell it if he/she
desires. Allocation of these seven parts will be by
lot.5
On 7 April 2005, Renato filed another motion,
Omnibus Motion: Project of Partition of the Lala and
Cuyapo Properties.
Finding the motions impressed with merit, the RTC,
Branch 220, on 28 July 2005,6 issued a lengthy
Order approving the proposed partition of the
properties:
1. That the property be divided
longitudinally from the frontage
down to the other end in seven (7)
equal parts. The shares of Jerry
Ecarma and Rodolfo Ecarma shall
be contiguous to each other on one
side of the property nearest the
main entrance, while the shares of
the other five (5) legal heirs shall
comprise the balance thereof.
Following this general guideline,
Jerry Ecarma and Rodolfo Ecarma
shall determine among themselves
their respective share. Similarly, the
five (5) remaining legal heirs shall
determine among themselves by
draw of lot their respective shares.
They shall submit to the
Petitioner/Regular Administrator
their choice of their specific shares
not later [than] fifteen (15) days
upon receipt of this Order. Should
they fail to comply, the Regular
Administrator is hereby directed to
assign the respective share of each
legal heir.
xxxx
II. Cuyapo Property
1. The Cuyapo farm lot shall be
partitioned into seven (7) equal parts
substantially in accordance with
Annex "A" of the "Partial Project of
Partition of Estate" dated 22 June
1992. Lots 1 and 2 will be allocated
to Jerry Ecarma and Rodolfo
Ecarma, so that the remaining
balance will remain contiguous to
one another. The remaining
balance, as prayed for, can now be
donated by the five (5) other legal
heirs to the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP). This manner of
partition will effectuate the desire of
the five (5) remaining legal heirs to
donate their share to the AFP.
2. The Regular Administrator is hereby
directed to cause the partition and
titling of the property.
3. Expenses for the partition and titling
of the property shall be for the
personal account of each legal heir,
which shall be deducted from their
share of the estate.
III. Lala Property
1. The Lala Property consisting of two
(2) farm lots contiguous to each
other, one consisting of more than
six (6) hectares and the other more
than 13 hectares shall each be
partitioned into seven (7) equal parts
substantially in accordance with
Annex "B" of the aforecited "Partial
Project of Partition of Estate" dated
22 June 1992, as submitted by the
Regular Administrator. Lots 6 and 7
of the six-hectare lot will while Lots 1
and 2 of the 13-hectare lot will be
likewise allocated to Jerry Ecarma
and each other. The remaining
balance can now be donated by the
five (5) other legal heirs to the AFP.
This manner of partition will
effectuate the desire of the five (5)
 remaining legal heirs to donate their
shares to the AFP.7
Gerry Ecarma filed a motion for reconsideration on
the following grounds: (1) the project of partition of
the Kitanlad properties is not feasible, impractical
and detrimental to the interests of the heirs of the
Spouses Natalio and Arminda Ecarma; (2) the
planned partition is not in accordance with the
wishes of the decedents, the spouses Natalio and
Arminda; and (3) the RTC, Branch 220, as the court
settling the intestate estate of Arminda, has no
jurisdiction over part of.the subject properties which
do not form part of Arminda's estate, such undivided
share already pertaining to the other heirs as part of
their inheritance from their deceased father, Natalio.
The other oppositor to the partition, Rodolfo Ecarma,
likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 28
July 2005 Order of Partition on the main ground,
akin to the 3rd ground raised by Gerry in his motion,
that the RTC, Branch 220 acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction by ordering the partition of the subject
properties, portions of which do not belong to the
intestate estate of Arminda.
After Renato filed his Comment/Opposition to the
two motions for reconsideration, the RTC, Branch
220, finding no cogent reason to reverse or modify
its prior order of partition, issued an Order denying
Gerry's and Renato's motions.
Thereafter, Gerry filed both a Notice of Appeal and a
Record on Appeal before the RTC, Branch 220 to
bring up on appeal to the CA the trial court's partition
order.
It appears that sometime before 4 May 2009,
counsel of Gerry Ecarma filed a Notice of Death of
Gerry Ecarma before the appellate court and was
subsequently required by the latter to submit a
certified true copy of Gerry Ecarma's death
certificate within a prescribed period.8
Meanwhile, herein petitioners, presumably in
substitution of the deceased Gerry Ecarma, filed
their Appellants' Brief pursuant to the order of the
appellate court. From this incident of herein
petitioners' Appellants' Brief before the CA, and its
contents, the controversy has reached us.
Renato forthwith filed a Motion to Dismiss
Appellants' Brief, to which the CA required a
comment from petitioner.9
The Resolutions of the CA finding insufficient herein
petitioners' Appellants' Brief are now before us. The
CA ruled that:
The Court xxx finds [petitioners'] submission [that
their brief substantially complied with the
requirements under Section 13, Rule 44 of the Rules
of Court] to be utterly devoid of merit. Indeed,
[petitioners'] brief does not contain a subject index,
table of cases and authorities, statement of case,
statement of facts and page references to the record
in violation of Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure xxx.
xxxx
Non-compliance with these requirements warrants
the dismissal of appeal under Section 1(1), Rule 50.
xxxx
[Petitioners] could have easily cured these multiple
defects in the same manner their counsel did with
his MCLE compliance and SPA. But, they opted not
to. Instead, they stubbornly insist, albeit erroneously,
that their appellants' brief substantially complied with
the requirements. They failed, however, to point out
with specificity what part or parts of their brief
contain their so-called substantial compliance.
Surely, the Court cannot countenance [petitioners']
careless attitude, if not irreverent disregard, of the
procedural rules intended precisely to ensure orderly
administration of justice.
xxxx
Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED.10
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the
dismissal of their appeal, attaching a Supplemental
Appellants' Brief11 to their motion. However, the
appellate court again deemed the Supplemental
Appellants' Brief to be unsatisfactory and non-
compliant with the rules and denied petitioners'
motion for reconsideration:
Notably, the new appeal brief, just like the original
one, does not contain reference to the relevant
portions of the record pertaining to its statement of
facts. Further, the subject index does not contain a
summary of arguments and reference to the specific
pages of the brief, and the supporting laws and
authorities.12
From that denial, petitioners filed this petition
for certiorari  under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
almost sixty (60) days from the time they received
the appellate court's denial of their motion for
reconsideration.
At the outset, we see through petitioners' obvious
ploy to avoid the necessary consequence of their
failure to file, within the required fifteen-day period,
the correct remedy of appeal by certiorari under Rule
4513 of the Rules of Court, from the assailed ruling of
the CA. On this score alone, the present petition
should have been dismissed outright.
Petitioners simple allegation of grave abuse of
discretion in the CA's dismissal of their appeal
cannot substitute for the correct remedy of a lost
appeal.14
Notably, as they have stubbornly done so in the
appellate court, petitioners urge us to reverse these
adverse rulings of the appellate court without abiding
by the rules therefor.
First. An appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is different from a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 thereof. A special civil
action for certiorari may be availed of only if the
lower tribunal has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and if
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 5
Simply imputing in a petition that the ruling sought to
be reviewed is tainted with grave abuse of discretion
does not magically transform a petition into a special
civil action for certiorari.
The appellate court's outright dismissal of therein
appellants' appeal was a final order which left it with
nothing more to do to resolve the case.16 That
disposition is a final and executory order, appealable
to, and may be questioned before, this Court by
persons aggrieved thereby, such as herein
petitioners,  via Rule 45.
Moreover, the dismissal of therein appellants', herein
petitioners', appeal before the CA is expressly
allowed by Section 1(f),17 Rule 50 of the Rules of
Court. The appellate court, therefore, cannot be
charged with grave abuse of discretion as there is no
showing that, in the exercise of its judgment, it acted
in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic
manner tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Absent
grave abuse of discretion, petitioners should have
filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
instead of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The
soundness of the ruling dismissing petitioners'
appeal before the appellate court is a matter of
judgment with respect to which the remedy of the
party aggrieved is a Rule 45 petition. An error of
judgment committed by a court in the exercise of its
legitimate jurisdiction is not the same as grave
abuse of discretion. Errors of judgment are
correctible by appeal, while those of jurisdiction are
reviewable by certiorari.18
Even if we were to take a liberal stance and consider
this present petition as that filed under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court raising grave error in the appellate
courts' ruling, such cannot cure the unavoidable
consequence of dismissal for failure to file an appeal
within the reglementary fifteen-day period provided
under Section 219 of Rule 45.
Second. The CA correctly dismissed herein
petitioners' Appellants' Brief for failure to comply with
the content requirement specified under Section
1320 of Rule 44.
Petitioners are adamant, however, that they
complied with the required content specified in the
rules even attaching a sample copy of an Appellant's
Brief found in Guevarra's Legal Forms which was
purportedly their guideline in revising and submitting
their Supplemental Appellants' Brief to the appellate
court.21
We assiduously went through the Supplemental
Appellants' Brief of herein petitioners and as the CA
have, we likewise find it wanting, a lame attempt at
compliance through superficial changes, devoid of
substance.22
In fact, the Supplemental Appellants' Brief could only
cite Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court as its
sole legal authority in questioning the RTC, Branch
220's Order of Partition.23 Petitioners, even in their
present petition before us, are unable to grasp the
necessity of supporting and anchoring their
arguments with legal basis. They cannot simply cite
one section of one rule without expounding thereon.
In the recent case of Lui Enterprises, Inc., v. Zuellig
Pharma Corporation, et al. ,24 we reiterated the
faithful adherence to the rules on the specific
contents of an Appellant's Brief as provided in
Section 14, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court:
Lui Enterprises did not comply with the
rules on the contents of the appellant's brief
Under Rule 50, Section 1, paragraph (f) of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court of Appeals may,
on its own motion or that of the appellee, dismiss an
appeal should the appellant's brief lack specific
requirements under Rule 44, Section 13, paragraphs
(a), (c), (d), and (f):
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. - An
appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals,
on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the
following grounds:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
(f) Absence of specific assignment of errors in the
appellant's brief, or of page references to the record
as required in Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d),
and (f) of Rule 44[.]
These requirements are the subject index of the
matter in brief, page references to the record, and a
table of cases alphabetically arranged and with
textbooks and statutes cited:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 13. Contents of the appellant's brief. - The
appellant's brief shall contain, in the order herein
indicated, the following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) A subject index of the matter in brief with a digest
of the arguments and page references, and a table
of cases alphabetically arranged, textbooks and
statutes cited with references to the pages where
they are cited;
xxxx
(c) Under the heading "Statement of the Case," a
clear and concise statement of the nature of the
action, a summary of the proceedings, the appealed
rulings and orders of the court, the nature of the
controversy, with page references to the record;
(d) Under the heading "Statement of Facts," a clear
and concise statement in a narrative form of the
facts admitted by both parties and of those in
controversy, together with the substance of the proof
relating thereto in sufficient detail to make it clearly
intelligible, with page references to the record;
xxxx
(f) Under the heading "Argument," the appellant's
arguments on each assignment of error with page
references' to the record. The authorities relied upon
shall be cited by the page of the report at which the
case begins and the page of the report on which the
citation is found;
xxxx
Lui Enterprises' appellant's brief lacked a subject
index, page references to the record, and table of
cases, textbooks and statutes cited. Under Rule 50,
Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Court of Appeals correctly dismissed Lui Enterprises'
appeal.
Except for cases provided in the Constitution, appeal
is a "purely statutory right."The right to appeal "must
be exercised in. the manner prescribed by law" and
requires strict compliance with the Rules of Court on
appeals. Otherwise, the appeal shall be dismissed,
and its dismissal shall not be a deprivation of due
process of law.
In Mendoza v. United Coconut Planters Bank, Inc.,
this court sustained the Court of Appeals' dismissal
of Mendoza's appeal. Mendoza's appellant's brief
lacked a subject index, assignment of errors, and
page references to the record. In De Liano v. Court
of Appeal, this court also sustained the dismissal of
De Liano's appeal. De Liano's appellant's brief
lacked a subject index, a table of cases and
authorities, and page references to the record.
There are exceptions to this rule. In Philippine
Coconut Authority v. Corona International, Inc., the
Philippine Coconut Authority's appellant's brief
lacked a clear and "concise statement of the nature
of the action, a summary of the proceedings, the
nature of the judgment, and page references to the
record. However, this court found that the Philippine
Coconut Authority substantially complied with the
Rules. Its appellant's brief apprise[d] [the Court of
Appeals] of the essential facts and nature of the
case as well as the issues raised and the laws
necessary [to dispose of the case]." This court
"[deviated] from a rigid enforcement of the rules" and
ordered the Court of Appeals to resolve the
Philippine Coconut Authority's appeal.
In Go v. Chaves, Go's 17-page appellant's brief
lacked a subject index. However, Go subsequently
filed a subject index. This court excused Go's
procedural lapse since the appellant's brief
"[consisted] only of 17 pages which [the Court of
Appeals] may easily peruse to apprise it of [the case]
and of the relief sought." This court ordered the
Court of Appeals to resolve Go's appeal "in the
interest of justice."
In Philippine Coconut Authority and Go, the
appellants substantially complied with the rules on
the contents of the appellant's brief. Thus, this court
excused the appellants' procedural lapses.
In this case, Lui Enterprises did not substantially
comply with the rules on the contents of the
appellant's brief. It admitted that its appellant's brief
lacked the required subject index, page references
to the record, and table of cases, textbooks, and
statutes cited. However, it did not even correct its
admitted "technical omissions" by filing an amended
appellant's brief with the required contents. Thus,
this case does not allow a relaxation of the rules.
The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Lui
Enterprises' appeal.
Rules on appeal "are designed for the proper and
prompt disposition.of cases before the Court of
Appeals." With respect to the appellant's brief, its
required contents are designed "to minimize the
[Court of Appeals'] labor in [examining] the record
upon which the appeal is heard and determined."
The subject index serves as the briefs table of
contents. Instead of "[thumbing] through the
[appellant's brief]" every time the Court of Appeals
Justice encounters an argument or citation, the
Justice deciding the case only has to refer to the
subject index for the argument or citation he or she
needs. This saves the Court of Appeals time in
reviewing the appealed case. Efficiency allows the
justices of the appellate court to substantially attend
to this case as well as other cases.
Page references to the record guarantee that the
facts stated in the appellant's brief are supported by
the record. A statement of fact without a page
reference to the record creates the presumption that
it is unsupported by the record and, thus, "may be
stricken or disregarded altogether."
As for the table of cases, textbooks, and statutes
cited, this is required so that the Court of Appeals
can easily verify the authorities cited "for accuracy
and aptness."
Lui Enterprises' appellant's brief lacked a subject
index, page references to the record, and a table of
cases, textbooks, and statutes cited. These
requirements "were designed to assist the appellate
court in the accomplishment of its tasks, and,
overall, to enhance the orderly administration of
justice." This court will not disregard rules on appeal
"in the guise of liberal construction." For this court to
liberally construe the Rules, the party must
substantially comply with the Rules and correct its
procedural lapses. Lui Enterprises failed to remedy
these errors.
All told, the Court of Appeals did not err in
dismissing Lui Enterprises' appeal. It failed to comply
with Rule 44, Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d),
and (f) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the
required contents of the appellant's brief.
Third. While we sustain the appellate court's
dismissal of herein petitioners' appeal, we find it
imperative to rule on the merits of the RTC, Branch
220's Order of Partition to forestall any further delay
in the settlement of decedent Arminda's estate which
has been pending since 1990 where Order of
Partition of the subject properties was issued on 28
July 2005. We note also that petitioners themselves
pray for a ruling thereon.
There is no quarrel from any of the parties that the
subject properties were originally part of the conjugal
partnership of gains property regime of the
deceased spouses Natalio and Arminda.25 The
nature of these properties as part of the spouses'
conjugal properties was confirmed in the
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Natalio
signed by all his heirs, his spouse Arminda and their
children, including predecessor of herein petitioners,
Gerry Ecarma.26
Essentially, pursuant to this Extrajudicial Settlement,
Arminda was apportioned two-ninth's (2/9's) share,
while her children were equally ascribed one-ninth
(1/9) portion, of the subject properties. Upon
Arminda's death, her heirs' rights to the succession
(covering Arminda's share in the subject properties)
vested and their co-ownership over the subject
properties has consolidated by operation of
law.27 Effectively, without a valid will of Arminda, and
as Arminda's compulsory heirs,28 herein parties
(specifically Gerry Ecarma prior to his death and
substitution by herein petitioners) all ipso facto co-
owned the subject properties in equal proportion
being compulsory heirs of the deceased spouses
Natalio and Arminda.29
There appears to be no clear objection, therefore, to
the RTC, Branch 220's Order of Partition approving
the proposal of the administrator, herein respondent
Renato, for the equal division of the properties:
1. The Kitanlad property: longitudinally from the
frontage down to the other end with the shares of the
[oppositors to the partition] Jerry Ecarnia and
Rodolfo Ecarma contiguous to each other on one
side of the property nearest to the main entrance;
and
xxxx
2. The Cuyapo and Lala properties: partitioned into
seven (7) equal parts with Jerry's and Rodolfo's property." However, it is apparent that Gerry Ecarma
respective shares contiguous to each other, and the and his heirs (herein petitioners) completely object to
remainder to be donated by the other legal heirs, as any kind of partition of the subject properties,
manifested by them, to the Armed Forces of the contravening even the proposed sale thereof.
Philippines (AFP).
We note that petitioners have been careful not to
Their objection to the actual partition proffer that the subject properties are indivisible or
notwithstanding, herein petitioners and even Rodolfo that physical division of thereof would render such
Ecarma cannot compel the other co-heirs to remain unserviceable since Article 49530 of the Civil Code
in perpetual co-ownership over the subject provides the remedy of termination of co-ownership
properties. Article 494, in relation to Article 1083, of in accordance with Article 49831 of the same
the Civil Code provides: Code, i.e. sale of the property and distribution of the
proceeds. Ineluctably, therefore, herein petitioners'
Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in absolute opposition to the partition of the subject
the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at properties which are co-owned has no basis in law.
any time the partition of the thing owned in common, As mere co-owners, herein petitioners, representing
insofar as his share is concerned. the share of the deceased Gerry Ecarma, cannot
preclude the other owners likewise compulsory heirs
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing of the deceased spouses Natalio and Arminda, from
undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding exercising all incidences of their full ownership.32
ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended
by a new agreement. Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED. The Court of
Appeal's dismissal of the Appeal in CA-G.R. CV No.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period 92375 is FINAL. Costs against petitioners.
which shall not exceed twenty years.
SO ORDERED.
Neither shall there be any partition when it is
prohibited by law.

No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or

co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as
he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership.

Art. 1083. Every co-heir has a right to demand the

division of the estate unless the testator should have
expressly forbidden its partition, in which case the
period of indivision shall not exceed twenty years as
provided in Article 494. This power of the testator to
prohibit division applies to the legitime.

Even though forbidden by the testator, the co-

ownership terminates when any of the causes for
which partnership is dissolved takes place, or when
the court finds for compelling reasons that division
should be ordered, upon petition of one of the co-
heirs.

The impasse between the parties is due to herein

petitioners' persistent objection to proposals for the
partition of the subject properties. The deceased
Gerry Ecarma, Rodolfo Ecarma and herein
petitioners consistently opposed the proposed
partition of the administrator, respondent Renato,
since such is ostensibly "not feasible, impractical
and renders detrimental use of the Kitanlad
THIRD DIVISION
GR No. 179859 August 9, 2010
IN RE: PETITION FOR PROBATE OF LAST WILL
AND TESTAMENT OF BASILIO SANTIAGO,
MA. PILAR SANTIAGO and CLEMENTE
SANTIAGO, Petitioners,
vs.
ZOILO S. SANTIAGO, FELICIDAD SANTIAGO-
RIVERA, HEIRS OF RICARDO SANTIAGO, HEIRS
OF CIPRIANO SANTIAGO, HEIRS OF TOMAS
SANTIAGO, Respondents.
FILEMON SOCO, LEONILA SOCO, ANANIAS
SOCO, URBANO SOCO, GERTRUDES SOCO
AND HEIRS OF CONSOLACION
SOCO, Oppositors.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J .:
Basilio Santiago (Basilio) contracted three marriages
— the first to Bibiana Lopez, the second to Irene
Santiago, and the third to Cecilia Lomotan. Basilio
and his first wife bore two offsprings, Irene and
Marta, the mother of herein oppositors Felimon,
Leonila, Consolacion, Ananias, Urbano, and
Gertrudes, all surnamed Soco.
Basilio and his second wife had six offsprings,
Tomas, Cipriano, Ricardo, respondents Zoilo and
Felicidad, and petitioner Ma. Pilar, all surnamed
Santiago.
Basilio and his third wife bore three children,
Eugenia herein petitioner Clemente, and Cleotilde,
all surnamed Santiago. 1
After Basilio died testate on September 16, 1973, his
daughter by the second marriage petitioner Ma. Pilar
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bulacan 2 a petition for the probate of Basilio's will,
docketed as SP No. 1549-M . The will was admitted
to probate by Branch 10 of the RTC and Ma. Pilar
was appointed executrix.
The will contained the following provisions, among
others:
4. My property described above is LEFT, GIVEN,
GIVEN, and INHERITED to my said heirs under the
following conditions:
xxxx
c) my daughter Ma. Pilar will run and
manage the balutan located in Santiago,
Malolos, Bulacan, as described above 2 (y);
d) In the management of rice, animal feed
and land and house in Manila, all solar in the
Malolos-Paombong road in Malolos,
Bulacan, including and along the fishery
behind it, will be transferred to their name is
Ma. Pilar and Clemente; but the income of
the fishery will be used by them for all and
any expenses incurred, be it majora or
roperacion [sic], on land and houses in the
City of Manila described above 2 (c);
e) The land and house in the City of Manila
described above 2 (c) shall be transferred
and placed in their name Ma. Pilar and
Clemente not as my legacy to them but only
to manage and take care of them and when
any of my ten children and grandchildren
and grandchildren will forever have a place if
they want to study in Manila or nearby cities
xx x.
f) The rice, machines and animal feed
factory I bequeathed to my wife, Cecilia
Lomotan, and children Zoilo, Ma. Pilar,
Ricardo, Cipriano, Felicidad, Eugenia,
Clemente, and Cleotilde equally. But, for
twenty (20) years from the day of my death,
they will not share it and Clemente will
manage it and the person who will handle
the money will be Ma. He is ready to
share. The only thing to share is their
income after the expenses that will be
needed, as reparacion, replacement or
enlargement will be deducted. I wish this to
be my love for them and may I live them all,
besides that is also their benefit and
goodness.
g) All lands, other than land and houses in
the City of Manila, I bequeathed to my said
wife, Cecilia Lomotan, and children Tomas,
Zoilo, Ma. Pilar, Ricardo, Cipriano, Felicidad,
Eugenia, Clemente and Cleotilde
equally. However, just like rice, machines
and animal feed mills, it will not be shared
 for twenty (20) years from my passing, and
they will also manage Ma. Pilar and
Clemente . All that will be shared is the
income or yield of such assets after paying
taxes and / or irrigation and other expenses
required. Si Ma. Pilar will also handle the
harvest or money coming from it. (emphasis
and underscoring supplied) 3
The oppositors-children of Marta, a daughter of
Basilio and his first wife, were, on their motion,
allowed to intervene. 4
After the executrix-petitioner Ma. Pilar filed a "Final
Accounting, Partition and Distribution in Accordance
with the Will," 5 the probate court approved the will
by Order of August 14, 1978 and directed the
registers of deeds of Bulacan and Manila to register
the certificates of title indicated
therein. 6 Accordingly, the titles to Lot Nos. 786, 837,
7922, 836 and 838 in Malolos, Bulacan and Lot
No. 8-C in Manila were transferred in the name of
petitioners Ma. Pilar and Clemente. 7
The oppositors thereafter filed a Complaint-in-
Intervention 8 with the probate court, alleging that
Basilio's second wife was not Irene but a certain
Maria Arellano with whom he had no child; and that
Basilio's will violates Articles 979-981 of the Civil
Code. 9
The probate court dismissed the Complaint-in-
Intervention, citing its previous approval of the "Final
Accounting, Partition, and Distribution in Accordance
with the Will." 10
The oppositors-heirs of the first marriage thereupon
filed a complaint for completion of legitime before the
Bulacan RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 562-M-
90, 11 against the heirs of the second and third
marriages.
In their complaint, oppositors-heirs of the first
marriage essentially maintained that they were
partially preterited by Basilio's will because their
legitime was reduced. 12 They thus prayed, inter alia,
that an inventory and appraisal of all the properties
of Basilio be conducted and that Ma. Pilar and
Clemente be required to submit a fresh accounting
of all the incomes of the properties from the time of
Basilio's death up to the time of the filing of Civil
Case No. 562-M-90. 13
RTC-Branch 17 decided Civil Case No. 562-M-90
(for completion of legitime) in favor of the oppositors-
heirs of the first marriage.
On appeal (docketed as CA GR No. 45801), the
Court of Appeals, by Decision of January 25,
2002, 14 annulled the decision of RTC-Branch 17,
holding that the RTC Branch 17 dismissal of the
Complaint-in-Intervention in SP No. 1549-M and its
August 14, 1978 Order approving the probate of the
will constitute res judicata with respect to Civil Case
No. 562-M-90. 15 Thus the appellate court disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is
hereby GRANTED. The Decision in Civil Case
No. 562-M-90 is hereby ANNULLED on the ground
of res judicata. Let the Decree of Distribution of the
Estate of Basilio Santiago remain UNDISTURBED .
SO ORDERED. 16 (emphasis in the original;
underscoring supplied)
Oppositors-heirs of the first marriage challenged the
appellate court's decision in CA GR No. 45801 by
petition for review, docketed as GR No. 155606,
which this Court denied. 17 The denial became final
and executory on April 9, 2003. 18
In the interregnum, or on October 17, 2000,
respondent-heirs of the second marriage filed before
the probate court (RTC-Branch 10) a Motion for
Termination of Administration, for Accounting, and
for Transfer of Titles in the Names of the
Legatees . 19 Citing the earlier quoted portions of
Basilio's will, they alleged that:
xxxx the twenty (20) year period within which subject
properties should be under administration of [Ma.]
Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago expired on
September 16, 1993 .
Consequently, [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente
Santiago should have ceased as such administrator
[s] way back on September 16, 1993 and they
should have transferred the above said titles to the
named legatees in the Last Will and Testament of
the testator by then. Said named legatees in the Last
Will and Testament are no [ne] other than the
following:
xxxx
Said [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago
should have also rendered an accounting of their
administration from such death of the testator up to
the present or until transfer of said properties and its
administration to the said legatees.
xxxx 20
Respondents prayed that petitioners be ordered:
1) To surrender the above-enumerated titles
presently in their names to [the] Honorable
Court and to transfer the same in the names
of the designated legatees in the Last Will
and Testament, to wit:
1) wife, Cecilia Lomotan,
children
2) Thomas
3) Zoilo
Opposing the motion, petitioners argued that with
the approval of the Final Accounting, Partition and
Distribution in Accordance with the Will, and with the
subsequent issuance of certificates of title covering
the properties involved, the case had long since
been closed and terminated. 22
The probate court, finding that the properties in
question would be transferred to petitioners Ma. Pilar
and Clemente for purposes of administration only,
granted the motion, by Order of September 5,
2003, 23 disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for
Termination of Administration, for Accounting, and
and
for Transfer of Titles in the Names of the Legatees
dated October 3, 2000 filed by some heirs of the
testator Basilio Santiago xxx is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the administratrix [sic]
Ma. Pilar Santiago and Mr. Clemente Santiago are
hereby DIRECTED, as follows:

4) Ma. Pilar a.) To surrender the above-enumerated

titles presently in their names to this
5) Ricardo Honorable Court and to transfer the same in
the names of the designated legatees in the
6) Cipriano Last Will and Testament, to wit: 1.) asawa,
Cecilia Lomotan at mga anak and 2.)
Thomas 3). Zoilo 4.) Ma. Pilar 5.) Ricardo 6.)
7) Happiness
Cipriano 7.) Felicidad 8.) Eugenia 9.)
Clemente and 10.) Cleotilde all named
8) Eugenia SANTIAGO.

9) Clemente at b.) To peacefully surrender possession and

administration of subject properties including
10) Cleotilde any and all improvements thereon, to said
legatees; and
(all surnamed SANTIAGO)
c.) To render an accounting of their
2) To peacefully surrender possession and administration of subject properties,
administration of subject properties, including any and all improvements thereon,
including any and all improvements thereon, to said legatees; and
to said legatees.
d.) To submit an accounting of their
3) To render an accounting of their administration of the above-mentioned
administration of said properties and other estate of the testator or all the above said
properties of the testator under their lots including the rice mill, animal feeds
administration, from death of testator Basilio factory, and all improvements thereon from
Santiago on September 16, 1973 up to the August 14, 1978 up to the present.
present and until possession and
administration thereof is transferred to said e.) To submit a proposed Project of
legatees. 21 Partition, indicating how the parties may
actually partition or adjudicate all the above
said properties including the properties
 already in the name of all the said legatees will of the testator. The Order dated August 14, 1978
xxx. refers only to the accounting, partition, and
distribution of the estate of the deceased for the
xxx x. period covering from the date of the filing of the
petition for probate on December 27, 1973 up to
August 14, 1978. And in the said August 14, 1978
Further, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan are
order it does not terminate the appointment of
hereby DIRECTED to cancel and consider as no
petitioner [s] Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente
force and effects Transfer Certificates of Title
Santiago as executrix and administrator,
Nos. T-249177 (RT-46294) [Lot No. 786], T-249175
respectively, of the estate of the deceased
(RT-46295) [Lot No. 837], T-249174 (RT-46296) [Lot
particularly of those properties which were prohibited
No. 7922], T-249173 (RT-46297) [Lot No. 836], and
by the testator to be partitioned within 20 years from
T-249176 (RT-46293) [Lot No. 838] in the names of
his death. Since then up to the present, Ma. Pilar
Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago and to
Santiago and Clemente Santiago remain the
issue new ones in the lieu thereof in the names of
executor and administrator of the estate of the
Cecilia Lomotan-Santiago, Tomas Santiago, Zoilo
deceased and as such, they are required by law to
Santiago, Ma. Pilar Santiago, Ricardo Santiago,
render an accounting thereof from August 14, 1978
Cipriano Santiago, Felicidad Santiago, Eugenia
up to the present; there is also now a need to
Santiago, Clemente Santiago, and Cleotilde
partition and distribute the aforesaid properties as
Santiago.
the prohibition period to do so has
elapsed. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)25
Moreover, the Register of Deeds of Manila is hereby
DIRECTED to cancel and consider as no force and
Petitioners, together with the oppositors, filed a
effect Transfer Certificate of Title No. 131044 [Lot
motion for reconsideration, 26 which the probate
No. 8-C] in the names of Ma. Pilar Santiago and
court denied, drawing them to appeal to the Court of
Clemente Santiago and to issue new ones in lieu
Appeals which docketed it as CA GR No. 83094.
thereof in the names of the Heirs of Bibiana Lopez,
the Heirs of Irene Santiago, and the Heirs of Cecilia
Lomotan. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
probate court, 27 hence, the petition 28 which raises
the following grounds:
The Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by
Filemon, Leonila, Ma. Concepcion, Ananias, Urbano
and Gertrudes, all surnamed Soco, dated December I.
3, 2002, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. 24
"CAN THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
Respecting petitioners' argument that the case had REVERSE ITSELF"
long been closed and terminated, the trial court held:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS
xxxx [I] t is clear from the Last Will and Testament ERRED IN NOT BINDING ITSELF
that subject properties cannot actually be partitioned WITH ITS PREVIOUS DECISION
until after 20 years from the death of the testator INVOLVING THE SAME PARTIES
Basilio Santiago xxx x. It is, therefore, clear that AND SAME PROPERTIES;
something more has to be done after the approval of
said Final Accounting, Partition, and B. THE COURT OF APPEALS
Distribution. The testator Basilio Santiago died on ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RTC
September 16, 1973, hence, the present action can AS IT AGREED WITH THE RTC
only be filed after September 16, 1993. Movant's THAT THIS CASE IS NOT BARRED
cause of action accrues only from the said date and BY RES JUDICATA;
for which no prescription of action has set in.
C. IN CA-GR NO. 45801, THE
The principle of res judicata does not apply in the HONORABLE COURT OF
present probate proceeding which is continuing in APPEALS HELD THAT THERE
character, and terminates only after and until the WAS RES JUDICATA; IN CA-GR
final distribution or settlement of the whole estate of CV NO. 83094, THERE WAS NO
the deceased in accordance with the provision of the RES JUDICATA.
II.
"GRANTING THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS
HAS ALL THE COMPETENCE AND JURISDICTION
TO REVERSE ITSELF, STILL THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RTC'S
ORDER TO TRANSFER THE MANILA PROPERTY
COVERED BY TCT NO. 131004 TO THE NAMES
OF CECILIA, MA. PILAR, RICARDO, CIPRIANO
FELICIDAD, EUGENIA, CLEMENTE AND
CLEOTILDE, ALL SURNAMED SANTIAGO.
" 29 (emphasis in the original)
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioners' argument that the decision of the
appellate court in the earlier CA-GR NO. 45801
(upheld by this Court in GR No. 155606) constitutes
res judicata to the subsequent CA GR No. 83094
(the subject of the present petition for review) fails.
Res judicata has two aspects, which are embodied
in Sections 47 (b) and 47 (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure. 30 The first, known as "bar by
prior judgment," proscribes the prosecution of a
second action upon the same claim, demand or
cause of action already settled in a prior
action. 31 The second, known as "conclusiveness of
judgment," ordains that issues actually and directly
resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in
any future case between the same parties involving
a different cause of action. 32
Both aspects of res judicata, however, do not find
application in the present case. The final judgment
regarding oppositors' complaint on the reduction of
their legitime in CA-GR NO. 45801 does not dent the
present petition, which solely tackles the propriety of
the termination of administration, accounting and
transfer of titles in the names of the legatees-heirs of
the second and third marriages. There is clearly no
similarity of claim, demand or cause of action
between the present petition and GR No. 155606.
While as between the two cases there is identity of
parties, "conclusiveness of judgment" cannot
likewise be invoked. Again, the judgment in GR
No. 155606 would only serve as an estoppel as
regards the issue on oppositors' supposed
preterition and reduction of legitime, which issue is
not even a subject, or at the very least even invoked,
in the present petition.
What is clear is that petitioners can invoke res
judicata insofar as the judgment in GR No. 155606 is
concerned against the oppositors only . The records
reveal, however, that the oppositors did not appeal
the decision of the appellate court in this case and
were only impleaded pro forma parties.
Apparently, petitioners emphasize on the directive of
the appellate court in CA GR No. 45801 that the
decree of distribution of the estate of Basilio should
remain undisturbed. But this directive goes only so
far as to prohibit the interference of the oppositors in
the distribution of Basilio's estate and does not
pertain to respondents' supervening right to demand
the termination of administration, accounting and
transfer of titles in their names.
Thus, the Order of September 5, 2003 by the
probate court granting respondents' Motion for
Termination of Administration, for Accounting, and
for Transfer of Titles in the Names of the Legatees is
a proper and necessary continuation of the August
14, 1978 Order that approved the accounting,
partition and distribution of Basilio's estate. As did
the appellate court, the Court notes that the August
14, 1978 Order was yet to become final pending the
whole settlement of the estate. And final settlement
of the estate, in this case, would culminate after 20
years or on September 16, 1993, when the
prohibition to partition the properties of the decedent
would be lifted.
Finally, petitioners object to the inclusion of the
house and lot in Manila, covered by TCT
No. 131044, among those to be transferred to the
legatees-heirs as it would contravene the testator's
intent that no one is to own the same. 1avvphi1
The Court is not persuaded. It is clear from Basilio's
will that he intended the house and lot in Manila to
be transferred in petitioners' names for
administration purposes only, and that the property
be owned by the heirs in common, thus:
e) The land and house in the City of Manila
described above 2 (c) shall be transferred
and placed in their name Ma. Pilar and
Clemente not as my legacy to them but only
to manage and take care of them and when
any of my ten children and grandchildren
and grandchildren will forever have a place if
they want to study in Manila or nearby cities
in In other words, this house and land will
not be owned by anyone but will be used for
as long as anyone wants my descendants to
 discover wisdom at school in Manila and
neighboring cities xxxx 33 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

But the condition set by the decedent on the

property's indivisibility is subject to a statutory
limitation. On this point, the Court agrees with the
ruling of the appellate court, viz:

For this Court to sustain without qualification,

[petitioners] 's contention, is to go against the
provisions of law, particularly Articles 494, 870, and
1083 of the Civil Code, which provide that the
prohibition to divide a property in a co- ownership
can only last for twenty (20) years xxxx

xxxx

xxxx Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect

of the indivision of a property for more than twenty
years, it would be contrary to public policy to
sanction co-ownership beyond the period expressly
mandated by the Civil Code xxxx 34

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 162421               August 31, 2007
NELSON CABALES and RITO
CABALES, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JESUS FELIANO and
ANUNCIACION FELIANO, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the
reversal of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals
dated October 27, 2003, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68319
entitled "Nelson Cabales and Rito Cabales v. Jesus
Feliano and Anunciacion Feliano," which affirmed
with modification the decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, dated
August 11, 2000, in Civil Case No. R-2878. The
resolution of the Court of Appeals dated February
23, 2004, which denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration, is likewise herein assailed.
The facts as found by the trial court and the
appellate court are well established.
Rufino Cabales died on July 4, 1966 and left a
5,714-square meter parcel of land located in Brgy.
Rizal, Sogod, Southern Leyte, covered by Tax
Declaration No. 17270 to his surviving wife
Saturnina and children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco,
Leonora, Alberto and petitioner Rito.
On July 26, 1971, brothers and co-owners Bonifacio,
Albino and Alberto sold the subject property to Dr.
Cayetano Corrompido for ₱2,000.00, with right to
repurchase within eight (8) years. The three (3)
siblings divided the proceeds of the sale among
themselves, each getting a share of ₱666.66.
The following month or on August 18, 1971, Alberto
secured a note ("vale") from Dr. Corrompido in the
amount of ₱300.00.
In 1972, Alberto died leaving his wife and son,
petitioner Nelson.
On December 18, 1975, within the eight-year
redemption period, Bonifacio and Albino tendered
their payment of ₱666.66 each to Dr. Corrompido.
But Dr. Corrompido only released the document of
sale with pacto de retro after Saturnina paid for the
share of her deceased son, Alberto, including his
"vale" of ₱300.00.
On even date, Saturnina and her four (4) children
Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco and Leonora sold the
subject parcel of land to respondents-spouses Jesus
and Anunciacion Feliano for ₱8,000.00. The Deed of
Sale provided in its last paragraph, thus:
It is hereby declared and understood that the
amount of TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
EIGHTY SIX PESOS (P2,286.00) corresponding and
belonging to the Heirs of Alberto Cabales and to Rito
Cabales who are still minors upon the execution of
this instrument are held
in trust by the VENDEE and to be paid and delivered
only to them upon reaching the age of 21.
On December 17, 1985, the Register of Deeds of
Southern Leyte issued Original Certificate of Title
No. 17035 over the purchased land in the names of
respondents-spouses.
On December 30, 1985, Saturnina and her four (4)
children executed an affidavit to the effect that
petitioner Nelson would only receive the amount of
₱176.34 from respondents-spouses when he
reaches the age of 21 considering that Saturnina
paid Dr. Corrompido ₱966.66 for the obligation of
petitioner Nelson’s late father Alberto, i.e., ₱666.66
for his share in the redemption of the sale with pacto
de retro as well as his "vale" of ₱300.00.
On July 24, 1986, 24-year old petitioner Rito
Cabales acknowledged receipt of the sum of
₱1,143.00 from respondent Jesus Feliano,
representing the former’s share in the proceeds of
the sale of subject property.
In 1988, Saturnina died. Petitioner Nelson, then
residing in Manila, went back to his father’s
hometown in Southern Leyte. That same year, he
learned from his uncle, petitioner Rito, of the sale of
subject property. In 1993, he signified his intention to
redeem the subject land during a barangay
conciliation process that he initiated.
On January 12, 1995, contending that they could not
have sold their respective shares in subject property
when they were minors, petitioners filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, a
complaint for redemption of the subject land plus
damages.
In their answer, respondents-spouses maintained
that petitioners were estopped from claiming any
right over subject property considering that (1)
petitioner Rito had already received the amount
corresponding to his share of the proceeds of the
sale of subject property, and (2) that petitioner
Nelson failed to consign to the court the total amount
of the redemption price necessary for legal
redemption. They prayed for the dismissal of the
case on the grounds of laches and prescription.
No amicable settlement was reached at pre-trial.
Trial ensued and on August 11, 2000, the trial court
ruled against petitioners. It held that (1) Alberto or,
by his death, any of his heirs including petitioner
Nelson lost their right to subject land when not one
of them repurchased it from Dr. Corrompido; (2)
Saturnina was effectively subrogated to the rights
and interests of Alberto when she paid for Alberto’s
share as well as his obligation to Dr. Corrompido;
and (3) petitioner Rito had no more right to redeem
his share to subject property as the sale by
Saturnina, his legal guardian pursuant to Section 7,
Rule 93 of the Rules of Court, was perfectly valid;
and it was shown that he received his share of the
proceeds of the sale on July 24, 1986, when he was
24 years old.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the
decision of the trial court. It held that the sale by
Saturnina of petitioner Rito’s undivided share to the
property was unenforceable for lack of authority or
legal representation but that the contract was
effectively ratified by petitioner Rito’s receipt of the
proceeds on July 24, 1986. The appellate court also
ruled that petitioner Nelson is co-owner to the extent
of one-seventh (1/7) of subject property as Saturnina
was not subrogated to Alberto’s rights when she
repurchased his share to the property. It further
directed petitioner Nelson to pay the estate of the
late Saturnina Cabales the amount of ₱966.66,
representing the amount which the latter paid for the
obligation of petitioner Nelson’s late father Alberto.
Finally, however, it denied petitioner Nelson’s claim
for redemption for his failure to tender or consign in
court the redemption money within the period
prescribed by law.
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners
contend that the Court of Appeals erred in (1)
recognizing petitioner Nelson Cabales as co-owner
of subject land but denied him the right of legal
redemption, and (2) not recognizing petitioner Rito
Cabales as co-owner of subject land with similar
right of legal redemption.
First, we shall delineate the rights of petitioners to
subject land.
When Rufino Cabales died intestate, his wife
Saturnina and his six (6) children, Bonifacio, Albino,
Francisco, Leonora, Alberto and petitioner Rito,
survived and succeeded him. Article 996 of the New
Civil Code provides that "[i]f a widow or widower and
legitimate children or descendants are left, the
surviving spouse has in the succession the same
share as that of each of the children." Verily, the
seven (7) heirs inherited equally on subject property.
Petitioner Rito and Alberto, petitioner Nelson’s
father, inherited in their own rights and with equal
shares as the others.
But before partition of subject land was effected,
Alberto died. By operation of law, his rights and
obligations to one-seventh of subject land were
transferred to his legal heirs – his wife and his son
petitioner Nelson.
We shall now discuss the effects of the two (2) sales
of subject land to the rights of the parties.
The first sale with pacto de retro to Dr. Corrompido
by the brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and
Alberto was valid but only as to their pro-indiviso
shares to the land. When Alberto died prior to
repurchasing his share, his rights and obligations
were transferred to and assumed by his heirs,
namely his wife and his son, petitioner Nelson. But
the records show that it was Saturnina, Alberto’s
mother, and not his heirs, who repurchased for him.
As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Saturnina
was not subrogated to Alberto’s or his heirs’ rights to
the property when she repurchased the share.
In Paulmitan v. Court of Appeals,3 we held that a co-
owner who redeemed the property in its entirety did
not make her the owner of all of it. The property
remained in a condition of co-ownership as the
redemption did not provide for a mode of terminating
a co-ownership.4 But the one who redeemed had the
right to be reimbursed for the redemption price and
until reimbursed, holds a lien upon the subject
property for the amount due.5 Necessarily, when
Saturnina redeemed for Alberto’s heirs who had then
acquired his pro-indiviso share in subject property, it
did not vest in her ownership over the pro-indiviso
share she redeemed. But she had the right to be
reimbursed for the redemption price and held a lien
upon the property for the amount due until
reimbursement. The result is that the heirs of
Alberto, i.e., his wife and his son petitioner Nelson,
retained ownership over their pro-indiviso share.
Upon redemption from Dr. Corrompido, the subject
property was resold to respondents-spouses by the
co-owners. Petitioners Rito and Nelson were then
minors and as indicated in the Deed of Sale, their
shares in the proceeds were held in trust by
respondents-spouses to be paid and delivered to
them upon reaching the age of majority.
As to petitioner Rito, the contract of sale was
unenforceable as correctly held by the Court of
Appeals. Articles 320 and 326 of the New Civil
Code6 state that:
Art. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is
the legal administrator of the property pertaining to
the child under parental authority. If the property is
worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or
mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of
the Court of First Instance.
Art. 326. When the property of the child is worth
more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother
shall be considered a guardian of the child’s
property, subject to the duties and obligations of
guardians under the Rules of Court.
In other words, the father, or, in his absence, the
mother, is considered legal administrator of the
property pertaining to the child under his or her
parental authority without need of giving a bond in
case the amount of the property of the child does not
exceed two thousand pesos.7 Corollary to this, Rule
93, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964,
applicable to this case, automatically designates the
parent as legal guardian of the child without need of
any judicial appointment in case the latter’s property
does not exceed two thousand pesos,8 thus:
Sec. 7. Parents as guardians. – When the property
of the child under parental authority is worth two
thousand pesos or less, the father or the mother,
without the necessity of court appointment, shall be
his legal guardian x x x x9
Saturnina was clearly petitioner Rito’s legal guardian
without necessity of court appointment considering
that the amount of his property or one-seventh of
subject property was ₱1,143.00, which is less than
two thousand pesos. However, Rule 96, Sec.
110 provides that:
Section 1. To what guardianship shall extend. – A
guardian appointed shall have the care and custody
of the person of his ward, and the management of
his estate, or the management of the estate only, as
the case may be. The guardian of the estate of a
nonresident shall have the management of all the
estate of the ward within the Philippines, and no
court other than that in which such guardian was
appointed shall have jurisdiction over the
guardianship.
Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary
power of administration of the minor’s property. It
does not include the power of alienation which
needs judicial authority.11 Thus, when Saturnina, as
legal guardian of petitioner Rito, sold the latter’s pro-
indiviso share in subject land, she did not have the
legal authority to do so.
Article 1403 of the New Civil Code provides, thus:
Art. 1403. The following contracts are
unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another
person by one who has been given no authority or
legal representation, or who has acted beyond his
powers;
xxxx
Accordingly, the contract of sale as to the pro-
indiviso share of petitioner Rito was unenforceable.
However, when he acknowledged receipt of the
proceeds of the sale on July 24, 1986, petitioner Rito
effectively ratified it. This act of ratification rendered
the sale valid and binding as to him.
With respect to petitioner Nelson, on the other hand,
the contract of sale was void. He was a minor at the
time of the sale. Saturnina or any and all the other
co-owners were not his legal guardians with judicial
authority to alienate or encumber his property. It was
his mother who was his legal guardian and, if duly
authorized by the courts, could validly sell his
undivided share to the property. She did not.
Necessarily, when Saturnina and the others sold the
subject property in its entirety to respondents-
spouses, they only sold and transferred title to their
pro-indiviso shares and not that part which pertained
to petitioner Nelson and his mother. Consequently,
petitioner Nelson and his mother retained ownership
over their undivided share of subject property.12
But may petitioners redeem the subject land from
respondents-spouses? Articles 1088 and 1623 of the
New Civil Code are pertinent:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary
rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of
the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the
purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the
sale, provided they do so within the period of one
month from the time they were notified in writing of
the sale by the vendor.
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or
redemption shall not be exercised except within
thirty days from the notice in writing by the
prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case
may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in
the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an
affidavit of the vendor that he has given written
notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that
of adjoining owners.
Clearly, legal redemption may only be exercised by
the co-owner or co-owners who did not part with his
or their pro-indiviso share in the property held in
common. As demonstrated, the sale as to the
undivided share of petitioner Rito became valid and
binding upon his ratification on July 24, 1986. As a
result, he lost his right to redeem subject property.
However, as likewise established, the sale as to the
undivided share of petitioner Nelson and his mother
was not valid such that they were not divested of
their ownership thereto. Necessarily, they may
redeem the subject property from respondents-
spouses. But they must do so within thirty days from
notice in writing of the sale by their co-owners
vendors. In reckoning this period, we held in Alonzo
v. Intermediate Appellate Court,13 thus:
x x x we test a law by its results; and likewise, we
may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in
seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of
the judge should be to discover in its provisions the
intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law
should never be interpreted in such a way as to
cause injustice as this is never within the legislative
intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for
we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to
render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not
independently of but in consonance with justice. Law
and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them
so. x x x x
x x x x While we may not read into the law a purpose
that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to
read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing
so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the
spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the lawmaker’s
will.
In requiring written notice, Article 1088 (and Article
1623 for that matter)14 seeks to ensure that the
redemptioner is properly notified of the sale and to
indicate the date of such notice as the starting time
of the 30-day period of redemption. Considering the
shortness of the period, it is really necessary, as a
general rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is
supposed to begin, to obviate the problem of alleged
delays, sometimes consisting of only a day or
two.1awph!1
In the instant case, the right of redemption was
invoked not days but years after the sale was made
in 1978. We are not unmindful of the fact that
petitioner Nelson was a minor when the sale was
perfected. Nevertheless, the records show that in
1988, petitioner Nelson, then of majority age, was
informed of the sale of subject property. Moreover, it
was noted by the appellate court that petitioner
Nelson was likewise informed thereof in 1993 and he
signified his intention to redeem subject property
during a barangay conciliation process. But he only
filed the complaint for legal redemption and
damages on January 12, 1995, certainly more than
thirty days from learning about the sale.
In the face of the established facts, petitioner Nelson
cannot feign ignorance of the sale of subject
property in 1978. To require strict proof of written
notice of the sale would be to countenance an
obvious false claim of lack of knowledge thereof,
thus commending the letter of the law over its
purpose, i.e., the notification of redemptioners.
The Court is satisfied that there was sufficient notice
of the sale to petitioner Nelson. The thirty-day
redemption period commenced in 1993, after
petitioner Nelson sought the barangay conciliation
process to redeem his property. By January 12,
1995, when petitioner Nelson filed a complaint for
legal redemption and damages, it is clear that the
thirty-day period had already expired.
As in Alonzo, the Court, after due consideration of
the facts of the instant case, hereby interprets the
law in a way that will render justice.15

Petitioner Nelson, as correctly held by the Court of

Appeals, can no longer redeem subject property. But
he and his mother remain co-owners thereof with
respondents-spouses. Accordingly, title to subject
property must include them.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The

assailed decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals of October 27, 2003 and February 23, 2004
are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The
Register of Deeds of Southern Leyte is ORDERED
to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 17035 and
to issue in lieu thereof a new certificate of title in the
name of respondents-spouses Jesus and
Anunciacion Feliano for the 6/7 portion, and
petitioner Nelson Cabales and his mother for the
remaining 1/7 portion, pro indiviso.

SO ORDERED.