THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 119730, September 02, 1999 ]

RODOLFO NOCEDA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND
AURORA ARBIZO DIRECTO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse
the decision dated March 31, 1995 of the respondent Court of Appeals[1] in CA GR CV
No. 38126, affirming with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
71, of Iba, Zambales,[2] in an action by private respondent against petitioner for recovery
of possession and ownership and rescission/annulment of donation.

The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent Court are as follows:[3]
“On June 1, 1981, plaintiff Aurora Directo, defendant Rodolfo Noceda, and Maria
Arbizo, the daughter, grandson, and widow, respectively, of the late Celestino Arbizo,
who died in 1956, extrajudicially settled a parcel of land, Lot 1121, located at Bitaog, San
Isidro, Cabangan, Zambales, which was said to have an area of 66,530 square meters.
Plaintiff Directo’s share was 11,426 square meters, defendant Noceda got 13,294 square
meters, and the remaining 41,810 square meters went to Maria Arbizo (Exhibit G). On
the same date, plaintiff Directo donated 625 square meters of her share to defendant
Noceda, who is her nephew being the son of her deceased sister, Carolina (Exhibit D).
However, on August 17, 1981, another extrajudicial settlement-partition of Lot 1121 was
executed by plaintiff Directo, defendant Noceda, and Maria Arbizo. Three fifths of the
said land went to Maria Arbizo while plaintiff Directo and defendant Noceda got only
one-fifth each. In said extrajudicial settlement-partition as well as in the Tax Declaration
16-0032 over Lot 1121 in the name of the late Celestino Arbizo, the said parcel of land
was said to have an area of only 29,845 square meters (Exhibit C). Sometime in 1981,
defendant Noceda constructed his house on the land donated to him by plaintiff Directo.
Plaintiff Directo fenced the portion allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement,
excluding the donated portion, and constructed thereon three huts. But in 1985, defendant
Noceda removed the fence earlier constructed by plaintiff Directo, occupied the three
huts (3) and fenced the entire land of plaintiff Directo without her consent. Plaintiff
Directo demanded from defendant Noceda to vacate her land, but the latter refused.
Hence, plaintiff Directo filed the present suit, a complaint for the recovery of possession
and ownership and rescission/annulment of donation, against defendant Noceda before
the lower court. During the trial, the lower court ordered that a relocation survey of Lot
1121 be conducted by Engr. Edilberto Quejada of the Bureau of Lands. After the survey
of Lot 1121 in the presence of both parties, Engr. Edilberto Quejada reported that the area
of Lot 1121 stated in the extrajudicial settlement-partition of August 17, 1981 was
smaller than the actual area of Lot 1121 which is 127,298 square meters. Engr. Quejada
subdivided Lot 1121, excluding the portions occupied by third persons, known as Lot 8,
the salvage zone and the road lot, on the basis of the actual occupancy of Lot 1121 by the
heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo and the extrajudicial settlement-partition of August 17,
1981. The portion denominated as Lot A, with an area of 12,957 square meters was the
share of defendant Noceda; Lot C, with the same area as that of Lot A, was the share of
plaintiff Directo, a portion of which was donated to defendant Noceda; and Lot B, with
an area of 38,872 square meters, went to Maria Arbizo (Exhibit E).”
On November 6, 1991, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71, of Iba, Zambales rendered a
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: [4]

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby renders

judgment:
(a) Declaring the Extra-Judicial Settlement-Partition dated August 19, 1981, valid;

(b) Declaring the Deed of Donation dated June 1, 1981, revoked;

(c) Ordering the defendant to vacate and reconvey that donated portion of Lot 2, Lot 1121
subject of the Deed of Donation dated June 1, 1981 to the plaintiff or her heirs or assigns;

(d) Ordering the defendant to remove the house built inside the donated portion at the
defendant’s expense or pay a monthly rental of P300.00 Philippine Currency;

(e) Ordering the defendant to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00; and

(f) To pay the cost.”

Rodolfo Nocedo appealed to the respondent Court which affirmed the trial court as
follows:[5]
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ORDERING defendant Rodolfo Noceda
to VACATE the portion known as Lot “C” of Lot 1121 per Exhibit E, which was allotted
to plaintiff Aurora Arbizo Directo. Except for this modification, the Decision, dated
November 6, 1991, of the RTC-Iba, Zambales, Branch 71, in Civil Case No. RTC-354-I,
is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects. Costs against defendant Rodolfo Noceda.”
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review with the following assignment
of errors:[6]
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY IDENTIFIED AS LOT 1121 CONTAINS AN AREA IN EXCESS OF
THAT STATED IN ITS TAX DECLARATION.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT LOT 1121 SHOULD BE

PARTITIONED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT
DATED 17 AUGUST 1981.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADJUDICATING AND ALLOTING LOT “C”

AS APPEARING IN THE SURVEY PLAN PREPARED BY GEODETIC ENGINEER
EDILBERTO QUEJADA TO THE RESPONDENT.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER

USURPED AN AREA ADJUDICATED TO THE RESPONDENT.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVOKING THE DEED OF DONATION

DATED 1 JUNE 1981.
The first issue raised refers to the actual area of the subject lot known as Lot 1121, which
was registered under Tax Declaration No. 16-0032 under the name of the late Celestino
Arbizo. Petitioner claims that Tax Declaration No. 16-0032 contains only an area of
29,845 sq. meter; thus the respondent Court exceeded its judicial authority when it
sustained the lower court’s findings that the subject property actually contains an area of
127,289 square meters.

We find the argument unmeritorious. The records disclose that the trial court in an Order
dated June 8, 1987 gave both parties to this case the chance to have the subject property
re-surveyed by a licensed surveyor to determine the actual area of Lot 1121. [7] Plaintiff
Aurora Directo filed a motion/compliance where she suggested that Geodetic Engineer
Edilberto V. Quejada of the Bureau of Lands, Iba, Zambales be commissioned to
undertake the survey[8] said motion was also sent to defendant’s counsel, Atty. Eufracio
Pagunuran for Comment,[9] but Atty. Pagunuran however failed to file his Comment
within the given period. Thus the trial court designated Engineer Quejada to undertake
the survey of Lot 1121.[10] Petitioner Noceda through counsel belatedly filed his
Comment without any opposition to the appointment of Engineer Quejada but proposed
that the latter be tasked to solely (a) re-survey, determine and identify the metes and
bounds of the lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 16-0032; (b) to identify the areas
occupied by the parties therein; and (c) to conduct the re-survey with notice and in the
presence of the parties therein and their respective counsels.[11] The Comment was not,
however, acted upon by the trial court in view of its earlier Order directing Engineer
Quejada to undertake the survey of the land.[12] Engr. Quejada conducted the survey with
the conformity and in the presence of both parties, taking into consideration the
extrajudicial partition dated August 17, 1981, deed of donation dated June 1, 1981
executed by plaintiff Aurora Directo in favor of defendant Rodolfo Noceda and the actual
area occupied by the parties,[13] as well as the sketch plan[14] and the technical description
of Lot 1121 taken from the Records Section of the Bureau of Lands, Manila.[15] The
report and the survey plan submitted by Engr. Quejada were approved by the Trial Court
in an Order dated December 7, 1987.[16] These circumstances show that the lower court
ordered the re-survey of the lot to determine the actual area of Lot 1121 and such survey
was done with the conformity and in the presence of both parties. The actual land area
based on the survey plan which was conducted in the presence of both parties, showed a
much bigger area than the area declared in the tax declaration but such differences are not
uncommon as early tax declarations are, more often than not, based on approximation or
estimation rather than on computation.[17] We hold that the respondent court did not err in
sustaining the trial court’s findings that the actual area of Lot 1121 is 127,289 square
meters.

Petitioner also contends that said judicial determination improperly encroaches on the
rights and claims of third persons who were never impleaded below; that the subject lot
was also declared in the name of one Cecilia Obispo and a Free Patent over the said lot
was also issued in her name and that there are several residential houses constructed and
existing on Lot 8 of lot 1121, thus these possessors/occupants of Lot 8 should be joined
as defendants for their non-inclusion would be fatal to respondent’s cause of action.

We find no merit in this argument. The respondent Court correctly ratiocinated on this
issue as follows:[18]
“The fact that Cecilia Obispo has tax declarations in her name over Lot 1121 and several
persons occupied a portion thereof did not make them indispensable parties in the present
case. Defendant Noceda merely presented the tax declarations in the name of Cecilia
Obispo without the alleged free patent in her name. Moreover, no evidence was presented
showing that Cecilia Obispo possessed or claimed possession of Lot 1121. Tax receipts
and declarations of ownership for tax purposes are not conclusive evidence of ownership
of property (Republic vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 224 SCRA 285).

It was not necessary that the occupants of a portion of Lot 1121, designated as Lot 8, be
impleaded in the present case. Lot 8, though part of Lot 1121, was excluded by Engr.
Quejada in determining the respective portions of Lot 1121 occupied by plaintiff Directo,
defendant Noceda and Maria Arbizo pursuant to the extrajudicial settlement which they
executed on August 17, 1981. The result of the present suit shall not in any way affect the
occupants of Lot 8, since the issues involved in the present case are the usurpation by
defendant Noceda of the land adjudicated to plaintiff Directo and the propriety of the
cancellation of the deed of donation in favor of defendant Noceda due to his ingratitude
to plaintiff Directo.”
Notably, defendant’s counsel requested for the appearance of Cecilia Obispo and despite
notice to her to appear in court and bring with her the alleged free patent in her name,
[19]
 she failed to appear and even failed to intervene to protect whatever interest and right
she has over the subject lot. As to the other possessors of residential houses in Lot 8 of
Lot 1121, they are not considered as indispensable parties to this case. A party is not
indispensable to the suit if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is distinct and
divisible from the interest of the other parties and will not necessarily be prejudiced by a
judgment which does complete justice to the parties in court.[20] Private respondent is not
claiming the entire area of Lot 1121 but only a portion thereof which was adjudicated to
her based on the August 17, 1981 extrajudicial settlement and which was denominated in
the survey plan as Lot C of Lot 1121; thus there was no need to implead the occupants of
Lot 8.

Petitioner further claims that the subject property could not be partitioned based on the
extrajudicial settlement-partition dated August 17, 1981, since the distributive share of
the heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo and the area of Lot 1121 stated therein were
different from the extrajudicial settlement executed on June 1, 1981; that the
discrepancies between the two deeds of partition with respect to the area of Lot 1121 and
the respective share of the parties therein indicated that they never intended that any of
the deeds to be the final determination of the portions of Lot 1121 allotted to them; that
the extrajudicial settlement-partition of August 17, 1981 could not effectively subdivide
Lot 1121 because it partitioned only 29,845 square meters, and not its actual area of
127,298 square meters.

We see no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the respondent Court as follows: [21]
The discrepancies between the extrajudicial settlements executed by plaintiff Directo,
defendant Noceda and Maria Arbizo on June 1, 1981 and August 17, 1981 only meant
that the latter was intended to supersede the former. The signature of defendant Noceda
in the extrajudicial settlement of August 17, 1981 would show his conformity to the new
apportionment of Lot 1121 among the heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo. The fact that
defendant Noceda occupied the portion allotted to him in the extrajudicial settlement, as
well as the donated portion of the share of plaintiff Directo, presupposes his knowledge
of the extent of boundaries of the portion of Lot 1121 allotted to him. Moreover, the
statement in the extrajudicial settlement of August 17, 1981 with respect to the area of
Lot 1121, which was 29,845 square meters, is not conclusive because it was found out,
after the relocation survey was conducted on Lot 1121, that the parties therein occupied
an area larger than what they were supposed to possess per the extrajudicial settlement-
partition of August 17, 1981.
Although in the extrajudicial settlement dated August 17, 1981 the heirs of Celestino
Arbizo partitioned only a 29,845 square meter lot to conform with the area declared
under tax declaration 16-0032 yet the heirs were each actually occupying a bigger portion
the total area of which exceeded 29,845 square meters. This was confirmed by Geodetic
Engineer Quejada in his report submitted to the trial court where he stated among other
things:[22]
7. that upon computation of actual survey, it is informed (sic) that the area dated (sic) as
per extrajudicial settlement-partition in the name of Celestino Arbizo was smaller than
the computed lots of their actual occupancy as per survey on the ground;

8. The Lot A, Lot B, and Lot C as appearing on prepared plan for ready reference was
subdivided, base (sic) on stated sharing as per EXTRA JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT-
PARTITION base (sic) on actual occupancy.
The survey conducted on Lot 1121 was only a confirmation of the actual areas being
occupied by the heirs taking into account the percentage proportion adjudicated to each
heir on the basis of their August 17, 1981 extrajudicial settlement.

Petitioner further alleges that the said partition tries to vest in favor of a third person,
Maria Arbizo, a right over the said property notwithstanding the absence of evidence
establishing that she is an heir of the late Celestino Arbizo since Maria Arbizo was never
impleaded as a party in this case and her interest over Lot 1121 was not established.

Such contention deserves scant consideration. We find no compelling basis to disturb the
finding of the trial court on this factual issue, as follows:[23]
In effect, the defendant denies the allegation of the plaintiff that Maria Arbizo was the
third wife of Celestino Arbizo and Agripina is her half sister with a common father. On
this point, the Court believes the version of the plaintiff. The Court observes that in the
“Extra-Judicial Settlement-Partition”(Exhibit “C”), Maria Arbizo is named one of the co-
heirs of the defendant, being the widow of his grandfather, Celestino Arbizo. The names
of Anacleto and Agripina do not also appear in the Extra-judicial Settlement and Partition
because according to the plaintiff, they had sold their shares to Maria Arbizo. And the
defendant is one of the signatories to the said Deed of Extra-judicial Settlement-Partition
acknowledged before Notary Public Artemio Maranon. Under the circumstances, the
Court is convinced that the defendant knew that Maria Arbizo was the widow of
Celestino Arbizo and he knew of the sale of the share of Anacleto Arbizo his share, as
well as that of Agripina. When the defendant signed the Extra-Judicial Settlement, he was
already an adult since when he testified in 1989, he gave his age as 50 years old. So that
in 1981, he was already 41 years old. If he did not know all of these, the defendant would
have not agreed to the sharing and signed this document and acknowledged it before the
Notary Public. And who could have a better knowledge of the relationship of Agripina
and Maria Arbizo to Celestino Arbizo than the latter’s daughter? Besides, at the time of
the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement-Partition by the plaintiff and defendant,
they were still in good terms. There was no reason for the plaintiff to favor Maria Arbizo
and Agripina Arbizo over the defendant. Furthermore, the defendant had failed to support
his allegation that when his grandfather died he had no wife and child.
We likewise find unmeritorious petitioner’s claim that there exist no factual and legal
basis for the adjudication of Lot C of Lot 1121 to private respondent Aurora Directo. It
bears stress that the relocation survey plan prepared by Geodetic Engineer Quejada was
based on the extrajudicial settlement dated August 17, 1981, and the actual possession by
the parties and the technical description of Lot 1121. It was established by the survey
plan that based on the actual possession of the parties, and the extrajudicial settlement
among the heirs the portion denominated as Lot C of Lot 1121 of the survey plan was
being occupied by private respondent Aurora Directo and it was also shown that it is in
Lot C where the 625 square meter area donated by private respondent Directo to
petitioner is located. There is no obstacle to adjudicate Lot C to private respondent as her
rightful share allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement.
Petitioner argues that he did not usurp the property of respondent Directo since, to date,
the metes and bounds of the parcel of land left by their predecessor in interest, Celestino
Arbizo, are still undetermined since no final determination as to the exact areas properly
pertaining to the parties herein; hence they are still considered as co-owners thereof.

We do not agree.

In this case the source of co-ownership among the heirs was intestate succession. Where
there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition,
owned in common by such heirs subject to the payment of debts of the deceased.
[24]
 Partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in
common among those to whom it may belong.[25] The purpose of partition is to put an end
to co-ownership. It seeks a severance of the individual interest of each co-owner, vesting
in each a sole estate in specific property and giving to each one a right to enjoy his estate
without supervision or interference from the other.[26] And one way of effecting a partition
of the decedent’s estate is by the heirs themselves extrajudicially. The heirs of the late
Celestino Arbizo namely Maria Arbizo, Aurora A. Directo (private respondent) and
Rodolfo Noceda (petitioner) entered into an extrajudicial settlement of the estate on
August 17, 1981 and agreed to adjudicate among themselves the property left by their
predecessor-in-interest in the following manner:

To Rodolfo Noceda goes the northern one-fifth (1/5) portion containing an area of 5,989
sq. meters;

To Maria Arbizo goes the middle three-fifths (3/5) portion;

and To Aurora Arbizo goes the southern one-fifth (1/5) portion.[27]

In the survey plan submitted by Engineer Quejada, the portions indicated by red lines and
numbered alphabetically were based on the percentage proportion in the extrajudicial
settlement and the actual occupancy of each heir which resulted to these divisions as
follows:[28]
Lot A; the area is 2,957 sq.m.- goes to Rodolfo A. Noceda (1/5)

Lot B;     38,872 sq.m     Maria Arbizo (3/5)                      

Lot C    12,957 sq.m.     Aurora Arbizo (1/5)

Thus, the areas allotted to each heir are now specifically delineated in the survey plan.
There is no co-ownership where portion owned is concretely determined and identifiable,
though not technically described, or that said portions are still embraced in one and the
same certificate of title does not make said portions less determinable or identifiable, or
distinguishable, one from the other, nor that dominion over each portion less exclusive, in
their respective owners.[29] A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive
ownership of the property adjudicated to him.[30]

We also find unmeritorious petitioner’s argument that since there was no effective and
real partition of the subject lot there exists no basis for the charge of usurpation and hence
there is also no basis for finding ingratitude against him. It was established that petitioner
Noceda occupied not only the portion donated to him by private respondent Aurora
Arbizo-Directo but he also fenced the whole area of Lot C which belongs to private
respondent Directo, thus petitioner’s act of occupying the portion pertaining to private
respondent Directo without the latter’s knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation
which is an offense against the property of the donor and considered as an act of
ingratitude of a donee against the donor.[31] The law does not require conviction of the
donee; it is enough that the offense be proved in the action for revocation.[32]

Finally, petitioner contends that granting revocation is proper, the right to enforce the
same had already prescribed since as admitted by private respondent, petitioner usurped
her property in the first week of September 1985 while the complaint for revocation was
filed on September 16, 1986, thus more than one (1) year had passed from the alleged
usurpation by petitioner of private respondent’s share in Lot 1121. We are not persuaded.
The respondent Court rejected such argument in this wise:
“Article 769 of the New Civil Code states that: “The action granted to the donor by
reason of ingratitude cannot be renounced in advance. This action prescribes within one
year to be counted from the time the donor had knowledge of the fact and it was possible
for him to bring the action.” As expressly stated, the donor must file the action to revoke
his donation within one year from the time he had knowledge of the ingratitude of the
donee. Also, it must be shown that it was possible for the donor to institute the said action
within the same period. The concurrence of these two requisites must be shown by
defendant Noceda in order to bar the present action. Defendant Noceda failed to do so.
He reckoned the one year prescriptive period from the occurrence of the usurpation of the
property of plaintiff Directo in the first week of September, 1985, and not from the time
the latter had the knowledge of the usurpation. Moreover, defendant Noceda failed to
prove that at the time plaintiff Directo acquired knowledge of his usurpation, it was
possible for plaintiff Directo to institute an action for revocation of her donation.”
The action to revoke by reason of ingratitude prescribes within one (1) year to be counted
from the time (a) the donor had knowledge of the fact; (b) provided that it was possible
for him to bring the action. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show proof of the
concurrence of these two conditions in order that the one (1) year period for bringing the
action be considered to have already prescribed. No competent proof was adduced by
petitioner to prove his allegation. In Civil Cases, the party having the burden of proof
must establish his case by preponderance of evidence.[33] He who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.[34]

Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, supported by substantial evidence on record are
final and conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when the Court of
Appeals affirms the factual findings of the trial court;[35] for it is not the function of this
Court to re-examine all over again the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the
parties unless the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are not supported by the
evidence on record or the judgment is based on the misapprehension of facts. [36] The
jurisdiction of this court is thus limited to reviewing errors of law unless there is a
showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record or that
they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion. [37] We find no
such showing in this case.

We find that both the trial court and the respondent Court had carefully considered the
questions of fact raised below and the respondent Court‘s conclusions are based on the
evidence on record. No cogent reason exists for disturbing such findings. [38] We also note
that petitioner in this petition merely rehashed the same issues and arguments raised in
the respondent Court in whose decision we find no reversible error. Clearly, petitioner
failed to present any substantial argument to justify a reversal of the assailed decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 135602, April 28, 2000 ]
HEIRS OF QUIRICO SERASPI AND PURIFICACION R. SERASPI,
PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND SIMEON RECASA,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This case is here for review of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated May 15,
1998, reversing the decision of Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Kalibo, Aklan and
dismissing, on the ground of prescription, the complaint filed by petitioners for the
recovery of possession and ownership of two parcels of land in Banga, Aklan.

The facts are as follows:

Marcelino Recasa was the owner of two parcels of land described as follows:
PARCEL I: A parcel of cocal land located at Barangay Lapnag, Banga, Aklan, with an
area of 770 square meters, more or less; bounded North by Lazaro Navarra, now
Flocerfina Ibit; South by Celsa Retis; East by Banga-Libacao Provincial Road; and West
by Aklan River, which parcel of land declared in the name of Marcelino Recasa under
Tax Declaration No. 3721, Series of 1984, with an assessed value of P2,440.00;

PARCEL II: A parcel of cocal land with an area of 3,648 square meters, more or less,
located in Barangay Lapnag, Banga, Aklan; bounded North by Concepcion Navarra;
South by Diosdado Navarra; East by Gabriel Reloj; and West by National Road; covered
by Tax Declaration No. 11079 in the name of Purificacion Seraspi, Series of 1984, and
having an assessed value of P1,650.00.
During his lifetime, Marcelino contracted three (3) marriages. At the time of his death in
1943, he had fifteen (15) children from his three marriages. In 1948, his intestate estate
was partitioned into three parts by his heirs, each part corresponding to the share of the
heirs in each marriage.

In the same year, Patronicio Recasa, representing the heirs of the first marriage, sold the
share of the heirs in the estate to Dominador Recasa, an heir of the second marriage. On
June 15, 1950, Dominador, representing the heirs of the second marriage, in turn sold the
share of the heirs to Quirico and Purificacion Seraspi whose heirs are the present
petitioners. Included in this sale was the property sold by Patronicio to Dominador.

In 1958, the Seraspis obtained a loan from the Kalibo Rural Bank, Inc. (KRBI) on the
security of the lands in question to finance improvements on the lands. However, they
failed to pay the loan for which reason the mortgage was foreclosed and the lands were
sold to KRBI as the highest bidder. Subsequently, the lands were sold by KRBI to
Manuel Rata, brother-in-law of Quirico Seraspi. It appears that Rata, as owner of the
property, allowed Quirico Seraspi to administer the property.

In 1974, private respondent Simeon Recasa, Marcelino’s child by his third wife, taking
advantage of the illness of Quirico Seraspi, who had been paralyzed due to a stroke,
forcibly entered the lands in question and took possession thereof.

In 1983, the Seraspis purchased the lands from Manuel Rata and afterwards filed a
complaint against Simeon Recasa for recovery of possession of the lands.

The trial court ruled in favor of the Seraspis, stating that they had acquired the property
through a sale and acquisitive prescription. However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed on the ground that the action of the Seraspis was barred by the statute of
limitations. Hence, this petition filed by Quirico Seraspi who, in the meantime, had
passed away and was thus substituted by his heirs.

Two issues are presented: (1) whether petitioners’ action is barred by extinctive
prescription; and (2) whether private respondent Simeon Recasa acquired ownership of
the properties in question through acquisitive prescription.

We rule for petitioners.

The Court of Appeals, while ruling that petitioners were able to establish the identity of
the property as well as the credibility of their title ¾ the elements required to prove one’s
claim for recovery of property[2] ¾ nonetheless held that the action was barred by
prescription. Citing Arradaza v. Court of Appeals,[3] it held that an action for recovery of
title or possession of real property or an interest therein can only be brought within ten
(10) years after the cause of action has accrued. Since the action for recovery of
possession and ownership was filed by petitioners only on April 12, 1987, i.e., thirteen
(13) years after their predecessor-in-interest had been allegedly deprived of the
possession of the property by private respondent, it was held that the action had
prescribed.

Arradaza involves acquisitive, not extinctive, prescription. What is more, the facts in that
case arose before the effectivity of the Civil Code. Accordingly, what was applied was
§41 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides that title by prescription is acquired
after ten (10) years, in whatever manner possession may have been commenced or
continued, and regardless of good faith or with just title. On the other hand, what is
involved here is extinctive prescription, and the applicable law is Art. 1141 of the Civil
Code which provides:
Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.

This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership
and other real rights by prescription.
The question, therefore, is whether private respondent has acquired the ownership of the
two lands by prescription. On this point, the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or
extraordinary.

Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just
title for the time fixed by law.

Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by
ordinary prescription through possession of ten years.

Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through
uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good
faith.
Thus, acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or
extraordinary, depending on whether the property is possessed in good faith and with just
title for the time fixed by law.[4] Private respondent contends that he acquired the
ownership of the questioned property by ordinary prescription through adverse
possession for ten (10) years.

The contention has no merit, because he has neither just title nor good faith. As Art. 1129
provides:
For the purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into
possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the
acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could
not transmit any right.
In the case at bar, private respondent did not acquire possession of the property through
any of the modes recognized by the Civil Code, to wit: (1) occupation, (2) intellectual
creation, (3) law, (4) donation, (5) succession, (6) tradition in consequence of certain
contracts, and (7) prescription.[5]

Private respondent could not have acquired ownership over the property through
occupation since, under Art. 714 of the Civil Code, the ownership of a piece of land
cannot be acquired by occupation. Nor can he base his ownership on succession for the
property was not part of those distributed to the heirs of the third marriage, to which
private respondent belongs. It must be remembered that in the partition of the intestate
estate of Marcelino Recasa, the properties were divided into three parts, each part being
reserved for each group of heirs belonging to one of the three marriages Marcelino
entered into. Since the contested parcels of land were adjudicated to the heirs of the first
and second marriages, it follows that private respondent, as heir of the third marriage, has
no right over the parcels of land. While, as heir to the intestate estate of his father, private
respondent was co-owner of all of his father’s properties, such co-ownership rights were
effectively dissolved by the partition agreed upon by the heirs of Marcelino Recasa.

Neither can private respondent claim good faith in his favor. Good faith consists in the
reasonable belief that the person from whom the possessor received the thing was its
owner but could not transmit the ownership thereof.[6] Private respondent entered the
property without the consent of the previous owner. For all intents and purposes, he is a
mere usurper.

Like private respondent, petitioners have not acquired the property through any of the
modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership. The basis of petitioners’ claim
of ownership is the contract of sale they had with Rata, but this by itself is insufficient to
make them owners of the property. For while a contract of sale is perfected by the
meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price,
[7]
 the ownership of the thing sold is not transferred to the vendee until actual or
constructive delivery of the property.[8] Hence, the maxim non nudis pactis, sed traditione
dominia dominica rerum transferuntur (not mere agreements but tradition transfers the
ownership of things).    
Consequently, petitioners are not the owners of the property since it has not been
delivered to them. At the time they bought the property from Rata in 1983, the property
was in the possession of private respondent.

However, this does not give private respondent a right to remain in possession of the
property. Petitioners’ title to the property prevails over private respondents’ possession in
fact but without basis in law. As held in Waite v. Peterson,[9] when the property belonging
to a person is unlawfully taken by another, the former has the right of action against the
latter for the recovery of the property. Such right may be transferred by the sale or
assignment of the property, and the transferee can maintain such action against the
wrongdoer.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED,

and private respondent Simeon Recasa is ordered to return the possession of the contested
parcels of land to petitioners as heirs of Quirico and Purificacion Seraspi.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 109963, October 13, 1999 ]
HEIRS OF JOAQUIN TEVES:  RICARDO TEVES, ARCADIA TEVES, TOM
AS ZAMORA, FELICIA TEVES, HELEN TEVES, ALFREDO OSMEÑA,
ROBERTO TEVES, JOAQUIN TEVES, III, PETER TEVES, MILDRED
TEVES, WILSON MABILOG, LEONILO PATIGAYON, EDUARDO
PATIGAYON, ALEXANDER PATIGAYON, ALDRIN PATIGAYON, NOEL
PATIGAYON, VICTOR PATIGAYON, MA. TEVES PATERNO
OCHOTORENA, EXEQUILA TEVES, EMILIO JO, EMILIANA TEVES,
MILAGROS TEVES, EDSEL PINILI, VICENTE TEVES, EMILIANA ISO,
ALBERTO TEVES, ERLINDA TEVES, DIOSDADO TEVES, VICTORIA
TEVES AND VIVENCIO NARCISO, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, HEIRS OF ASUNCION IT-IT NAMELY:  ELISA IT-IT, SUSANA
IT-IT, NORBERTO IT-IT, ISA-AC IT-IT, JR., JAIME IT-IT, FELICITAS IT-
IT, TERESITA IT-IT, ANTONIO NODADO, CORAZON IT-IT, JIMMY
LERO, DANILO IT-IT, EDITA GAMORA, PACITA VAILOCES, CRIS
VAILOCES, CECILIA CIMAFRANCA AND CECILIA FLOR
CIMAFRANCA, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision[1] of the Court of

Appeals which was promulgated on August 18, 1992 affirming the July 11, 1991
decision[2] of Branch 38 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental in favor of
defendants-appellees.

The facts, as culled from the pleadings of the parties herein and the decision of the lower
courts, are as follows:

Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves had nine children, namely Teotimo, Felicia,
Pedro, Andres, Asuncion, Gorgonio, Cresenciano, Arcadia and Maria. Andres, however,
predeceased both his parents and died without issue. After Marcelina Cimafranca and
Joaquin Teves died, intestate and without debts, in 1943 and 1953, respectively, their
children executed extrajudicial settlements purporting to adjudicate unto themselves the
ownership over two parcels of land belonging to their deceased parents and to alienate
their shares thereto in favor of their sister Asuncion Teves. The validity of these
settlements executed pursuant to section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the primary
issue in the present case.

On May 9, 1984, plaintiffs-appellants Ricardo and Arcadia Teves filed a complaint with
the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental for the partition and reconveyance of two
parcels of land located in Dumaguete, designated as Lots 769-A and 6409, against the
heirs of Asuncion Teves. The complaint was subsequently amended to include Maria
Teves and the heirs of Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, and Gorgonio Teves as plaintiffs and the
spouses Lucresio Baylosis and Pacita Nocete, and Cecilia Cimafranca-Gamos and Cecilia
Flor Cimafranca as defendants.[3] Plaintiffs-appellants alleged that defendants-appellees,
without any justifiable reason, refused to partition the said parcels of land and to convey
to plaintiffs their rightful shares.[4]

Lot 769, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 4682-A,[5] is registered in the
names of Urbana Cimafranca, one-fourth (1/4) share, Marcelina Cimafranca, the wife of
Joaquin Teves, one-fourth (1/4) share, Domingo Villahermosa, one-eighth (1/8) share,
Antero Villahermosa, one-eighth (1/8) share, Cecilia Cimafranca, one-eighth (1/8) share
and Julio Cimafranca, one-eighth (1/8) share. The present controversy involves only
Marcelina Cimafranca’s one-fourth (1/4) share in the land, designated as Lot 769-A.

On June 13, 1956, Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, Asuncion, Gorgonio and Arcadia Teves
executed a document entitled "Settlement of Estate and Sale,"[6] adjudicating unto
themselves, in equal shares, Lot 769-A and conveying their shares, interests and
participations over the same in favor of Asuncion Teves for the consideration of P425.00.
A similar deed denominated "Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale"[7] was signed by Maria
Teves on April 21, 1959. Under such deed, Maria conveys her own share over Lot 769-A
in favor of Asuncion Teves for the consideration of P80.00. The two settlements were
denounced by the plaintiffs as spurious. The trial court summarized the claims of the
plaintiffs, viz –

…Maria Teves Ochotorena herself, denied having executed this Extrajudicial Settlement
and Sale over her share or interest in Lot 769 claiming that her signature in said
document is a forgery. She disowns her signature declaring that as a married woman she
always signs a document in her husband’s family name. Further, she declared that on the
date she purportedly signed said document in Dumaguete City before the notary public,
she was in her home in Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte.

On Exhibit "G" which is likewise offered as Exhibit "3" for the defendants, plaintiffs hold
that said document is spurious claiming that the signatures of Pedro Teves, Felicia Teves
and Gorgonio Teves are all forgeries. To support this allegation, Helen T. Osmena,
daughter of Felicia Teves and Erlinda Teves, daughter of Gorgonio Teves were presented
as witnesses. Being allegedly familiar with the style and character of the handwriting of
their parents these witnesses declared unequivocally that the signatures of their parents
appearing on the document are forgeries.

In sum, plaintiffs argue that these fraudulent documents which defendants rely in
claiming ownership to the disputed properties are all nullities and have no force in law
and could not be used as basis for any legal title. Consequently, in their view, they are
entitled to the reliefs demanded particularly, to their respective shares of the disputed
properties.[8]

The other property in dispute is Lot 6409 which was originally covered by OCT No.
9091[9] and was registered in the name of Joaquin Teves and his two sisters, Matea and
Candida Teves. However, Matea and Candida died without issue, causing the entire
property to pass to Joaquin Teves. On December 14, 1971, Lot 6409 was adjudicated and
divided in equal shares in a "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement & Sale"[10] executed by
Joaquin Teves’ children - Asuncion, Teotimo, Felisia, Gorgonio, Arcadia and Maria
Teves. In the same deed, the shares of these same heirs in Lot 6409 were sold to
Asuncion Teves for P100.00. Asuncion Teves took possession of the land and acquired
title[11] over the same on March 22, 1972. After her death in 1981, her children,
defendants-appellees It-it herein, extrajudicially settled Asuncion Teves’ property,
adjudicating unto themselves Lot 6409.[12] On July 20, 1983 a new transfer certificate of
title[13] was issued in the names of Asuncion Teves’ children, namely Elisa, Susana,
Norberto, Isaac, Jaime, Felicitas, Teresita, Corazon, and Danilo, all surnamed It-it. On
July 2, 1984, the It-its sold Lot 6409 to defendants-appellees Lucrecio Baylosis, Sr. and
Pacita Nocete-Baylosis for P20,000.00[14] and a transfer certificate of title[15] was issued in
the name of the Baylosis couple.
Plaintiffs-appellants claim that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement & Sale covering Lot
6409 is also spurious. Their arguments were discussed in the trial court’s decision as
follows -

Presented as Exhibit "D" and "1" for both the plaintiffs and defendants respectively, is a
document denominated as "Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale" executed on December 4,
1971 by and among the heirs of Joaquin Teves and Marcelina Cimafranca. This
document which gave birth to TCT No. 5761 over Lot 6409 registered in the name of
Asuncion Teves It-it is questioned by the plaintiffs as spurious for the following reasons:

1. Erasure of the word "quitclaim" is superimposed with the word "sale" in handwriting.

2. The consideration of "One peso" stated in the document is intercalated with the word
"hundred" in handwriting.

3. The signature of Maria Teves Ochotorena, Pedro Teves and Felicia Teves are
forgeries.

4. The thumbmark imposed on the name of Gorgonio Teves does not actually belong to
Gorgonio Teves who was an educated man and skilled in writing according to his
daughter.

Aside from these defects which would make said document null and void, Arcadia Teves
who is one of the living sisters of the mother of the principal defendants although
confirming the authenticity of her signature averred that in reality no consideration was
ever given to her and that her impression of the said document was that she was only
giving her consent to sell her share of the land.

Plaintiffs likewise contend that as regards the share of Ricardo Teves, son of
Crescenciano Teves who predeceased Joaquin and Marcelina, it was not at all affected in
that extrajudicial settlement and sale since neither Crescenciano Teves nor his son
Ricardo Teves participated in its execution.

xxx                                     xxx                                    xxx

Likewise, plaintiffs offered TCT No. 5761 for Lot 6409 registered in the name of
Asuncion Teves It-it as Exhibit "B" as proof that said property was later titled in trust for
all the heirs of Joaquin Teves and which was used later as basis in effecting a deed of sale
in favor of co-defendant Lucresio Baylosis. In this light, the plaintiffs argue that the sale
of said property is a nullity for it was not only attended with bad faith on the part of both
the vendor and the vendee but primarily the vendor had no right at all to part with said
property which is legally owned by others.[16]
In answer to plaintiffs-appellants’ charges of fraud, defendants-appellees maintained that
the assailed documents were executed with all the formalities required by law and are
therefore binding and legally effective as bases for acquiring ownership or legal title over
the lots in question. Furthermore, it is contended that plaintiffs-appellants have slept on
their rights and should now be deemed to have abandoned such rights.[17]

The trial court ruled in favor of defendants-appellees and rendered judgment dismissing
the complaint with costs against plaintiffs-appellants. As regards Lot 6409, the court
declared that the Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale executed by the heirs of Joaquin
Teves and Marcelina Cimafranca was duly executed with all the formalities required by
law, thus, validly conveying Lot 6409 in favor of Asuncion Teves. Moreover, it stated
that, even granting the truth of the imputed infirmities in the deed, the right of plaintiffs-
appellants to bring an action for partition and reconveyance was already barred by
prescription. An action for the annulment of a partition must be brought within four years
from the discovery of the fraud, while an action for the reconveyance of land based upon
an implied or constructive trust prescribes after ten years from the registration of the deed
or from the issuance of the title. The complaint in this case was filed on May 9, 1984,
exactly 12 years, 1 month and 17 days after the issuance of the transfer certificate of title
in the name of Asuncion Teves on March 22, 1972. Thus, ownership over Lot 6409
rightfully belonged to defendants-appellees It-it.

Moreover, the trial court held that the extrajudicial settlements over both Lots 6409 and
769, having been prepared and acknowledged before a notary public, are public
documents, vested with public interest, the sanctity of which deserves to be upheld unless
overwhelmed by clear and convincing evidence. The evidence presented by the plaintiffs
to support their charges of forgery was considered by the court insufficient to rebut the
legal presumption of validity accorded to such documents.[18]

The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision affirming the validity of the
extrajudicial statements, with a slight modification. It disposed of the case, thus -

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the
modification in that herein defendant-appellees are hereby ORDERED to partition Lot
769-A and deliver to plaintiff-appellant Ricardo Teves one-eight (sic) (1/8) portion
thereof corresponding to the share of his deceased father Cresenciano Teves. No costs.

The appellate court said that plaintiffs-appellants’ biased and interested testimonial
evidence consisting of mere denials of their signatures in the disputed instruments is
insufficient to prove the alleged forgery and to overcome the evidentiary force of the
notarial documents. It also ruled that the plaintiffs-appellants’ claim over Lot 6409 was
barred by prescription after the lapse of ten years from the issuance of title in favor of
Asuncion Teves, while their claim over Lot 769-A is barred by laches since more than 25
years has intervened between the sale to Asuncion Teves and the filing of the present
case in 1984.

The appellate court noted that the conveyance of Lot 769-A in favor of Asuncion Teves
did not affect the share of Cresenciano Teves as he was not a signatory to the settlements.
It also found that Ricardo Teves, Cresenciano’s heir, is in possession of a portion of Lot
769-A and that defendants-appellees do no not claim ownership over such portion. Thus,
the defendants-appellees It-it were ordered to partition and convey to Ricardo Teves his
one-eighth share over Lot 769-A.

As regards the extrajudicial settlement involving Lot 6409, although it was found by the
appellate court that Cresenciano Teves was also not a signatory thereto, it held that it
could not order the reconveyance of the latter’s share in such land in favor of his heir
Ricardo Teves because Cresenciano had predeceased Joaqin Teves. Moreover, Ricardo
Teves, by a deed simply denominated as “Agreement” executed on September 13, 1955
wherein he was represented by his mother, authorized the heirs of Joaquin Teves to sell
his share in Lot 6409.[19]

Plaintiffs-appellants assailed the appellate court’s decision upon the following grounds -

I. IN CONSIDERING RICARDO TEVES AS BOUND BY THE SIGNATURE OF HIS

MOTHER, INSPITE OF DEATH OF CRESENCIANO TEVES IN 1944; AND UNDER
THE OLD CIVIL CODE THE SPOUSE CANNOT INHERIT EXCEPT THE
USUFRUCT;

II. IN UPHOLDING SWEEPINGLY THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY OF

NOTARIZED DEED, DESPITE CLEAR, CONVINCING, SUBSTANTIAL AND
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT MARIA OCHOTORENA WAS IN MINDANAO;
THE NOTARY PULIC DID NOT KNOW MARIA OCHOTORENA AND THE
SIGNATURES OF THE OTHER HEIRS IN THE QUESTIONED DOCUMENT ARE
BELIED BY COMPARISON WITH THE GENUINE SIGNATURE IN EXH. “E”;

III. IN VALIDATING THE ONE PESO CONSIDERATION, INSPITE OF NO OTHER

VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, THE SUPERIMPOSED P100 WAS
UNILATERALLY INSERTED, SHOWING FICTITIOUS AND SIMULATED
CONSIDERATION; AND

IV. PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT START FROM A VOID CONTRACT. [20]

We affirm that the extrajudicial settlements executed by the heirs of Joaquin Teves and
Marcelina Cimafranca are legally valid and binding.
The extrajudicial settlement of a decedent’s estate is authorized by section 1 of Rule 74
of the Rules of Court, which provides in pertinent part that -

If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are
represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the
parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among
themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the
register of deeds, ...

xxx                                     xxx                                     xxx

Thus, for a partition pursuant to section 1 of Rule 74 to be valid, the following conditions
must concur: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) the decedent left no debts, or if there were
debts left, all had been paid; (3) the heirs are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are
represented by their judicial guardian or legal representatives; (4) the partition was made
by means of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds. [21]

We uphold, finding no cogent reason to reverse, the trial and appellate courts’ factual
finding that the evidence presented by plaintiffs-appellants is insufficient to overcome the
evidentiary value of the extrajudicial settlements. The deeds are public documents and it
has been held by this Court that a public document executed with all the legal formalities
is entitled to a presumption of truth as to the recitals contained therein.[22] In order to
overthrow a certificate of a notary public to the effect that the grantor executed a certain
document and acknowledged the fact of its execution before him, mere preponderance of
evidence will not suffice. Rather, the evidence must be so clear, strong and convincing as
to exclude all reasonable dispute as to the falsity of the certificate. When the evidence is
conflicting, the certificate will be upheld.[23] The appellate court’s ruling that the evidence
presented by plaintiffs-appellants does not constitute the clear, strong, and convincing
evidence necessary to overcome the positive value of the extrajudicial settlements
executed by the parties, all of which are public documents, being essentially a finding of
fact, is entitled to great respect by the appellate court and should not be disturbed on
appeal.[24]

It is noted that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement & Sale covering Lot 6409 purports to
divide Joaquin Teves’ estate among only six of his heirs, namely Asuncion, Teotimo,
Felisia, Gorgonio, Arcadia and Maria Teves.[25] It does not mention nor bear the
signatures of either Pedro or Cresenciano Teves although they are both intestate heirs of
Joaquin Teves and as such, are entitled to a proportionate share of the decedent’s estate.
Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, the fact that Cresenciano predeceased
Joaquin Teves does not mean that he or, more accurately, his heirs, lose the right to share
in the partition of the property for this is a proper case for representation, wherein the
representative is raised to the place and degree of the person represented and acquires the
rights which the latter would have if he were living.[26]
However, notwithstanding their non-inclusion in the settlement, the action which Pedro
and Cresenciano might have brought for the reconveyance of their shares in the property
has already prescribed. An action for reconveyance based upon an implied trust pursuant
to article 1456 of the Civil Code prescribes in ten years from the registration of the deed
or from the issuance of the title.[27] Asuncion Teves acquired title over Lot 6409 in 1972,
but the present case was only filed by plaintiffs-appellants in 1984, which is more than 10
years from the issuance of title.[28]

The division of Lot 769-A, on the other hand, was embodied in two deeds. The first
extrajudicial settlement was entered into by Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, Gorgonio, Arcadia
and Asuncion Teves in 1956[29] , while the second deed was executed in 1959 by Maria
Teves.[30] Cresenciano was not a signatory to either settlement. However, in contrast to
the extrajudicial settlement covering Lot 6409, the two extrajudicial settlements
involving Lot 769-A do not purport to exclude Cresenciano from his participation in Lot
769-A or to cede his share therein in favor of Asuncion. The settlement clearly
adjudicated the property in equal shares in favor of the eight heirs of Marcelina
Cimafranca. Moreover, the deeds were intended to convey to Asuncion Teves only the
shares of those heirs who affixed their signatures in the two documents. The pertinent
portions of the extrajudicial settlement executed in 1956, of which substantively identical
provisions are included in the 1959 deed, provide -

xxx                                    xxx                                     xxx

5. That by virtue of the right of succession the eight heirs above mentioned inherit and
adjudicate unto themselves in equal shares Lot No. 769-A and our title thereto is
evidenced by the O.C. of Title No. 4682-A of the Land Records of Negros Oriental.

THAT FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the sum of FOUR HUNDRED TWENTY-

FIVE (P425.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency which we have received from ASUNCION
TEVES; WE, Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, Gorgonio and Arcadia, all surnamed Teves, do
hereby sell, transfer and convey unto Asuncion Teves, married to Isaac Itit, Filipino, of
legal age and resident of and with postal address in the City of Dumaguete, all our shares,
interests and participations over Lot 769-A of the subdivision plan, Psd, being a portion
of Lot No. 769 of the Cadastral Survey of Dumaguete, her heirs, successors and assigns,
together with all the improvements thereon.

xxx                                    xxx                                     xxx

It has even been admitted by both parties that Ricardo Teves is in possession of an
undetermined portion of Lot 769-A and defendants-appellees It-it do not claim ownership
over his share in the land.[31] Thus, contrary to the appellate court’s ruling, there is no
basis for an action for reconveyance of Ricardo Teves’ share since, in the first place,
there has been no conveyance. Ricardo Teves is entitled to the ownership and possession
of one-eighth of Lot 769-A.

Neither does Ricardo Teves have a right to demand partition of Lot 769-A because the
two extrajudicial settlements have already effectively partitioned such property. Every act
which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is
deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise, or any other transaction.[32] The extrajudicial settlements executed in 1956
and 1959 adjudicated Lot 769-A in equal shares unto the eight heirs of Marcelina
Cimafranca. Such a partition, which was legally made, confers upon each heir the
exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him.[33] Although Cresenciano,
Ricardo’s predecessor-in-interest, was not a signatory to the extrajudicial settlements, the
partition of Lot 769-A among the heirs was made in accordance with their intestate shares
under the law.[34]

With regards to the requisite of registration of extrajudicial settlements, it is noted that

the extrajudicial settlements covering Lot 769-A were never registered. However, in the
case of Vda. de Reyes vs. CA,[35] the Court, interpreting section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules
of Court, upheld the validity of an oral partition of the decedent’s estate and declared that
the non-registration of an extrajudicial settlement does not affect its intrinsic validity. It
was held in this case that –

[t]he requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has for its
purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs
themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive
notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with
the prescribed formalities does not come into play when there are no creditors or the
rights of creditors are not affected. Where no such rights are involved, it is competent for
the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a
plan different from those provided by law.

Thus, despite its non-registration, the extrajudicial settlements involving Lot 769-A are
legally effective and binding among the heirs of Marcelina Cimafranca since their mother
had no creditors at the time of her death.

Except for the portion of Lot 769-A occupied by Ricardo Teves, both parcels of land
have been and continue to be in the possession of Asuncion Teves and her successors-in-
interest.[36] Despite this, no explanation was offered by plaintiffs-appellants as to why
they instituted the present action questioning the extrajudicial settlements only in 1984,
which is more than 25 years after the assailed conveyance of Lot 769-A and more than 10
years after the issuance of a transfer certificate of title over Lot 6409, both in favor of
Asuncion Teves. Such tardiness indubitably constitutes laches, which is the negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.[37] Thus, even
assuming that plaintiffs-appellants had a defensible cause of action, they are barred from
pursuing the same by reason of their long and inexcusable inaction.

An extrajudicial settlement is a contract and it is a well-entrenched doctrine that the law

does not relieve a party from the effects of a contract, entered into with all the required
formalities and with full awareness of what he was doing, simply because the contract
turned out to be a foolish or unwise investment.[38] Therefore, although plaintiffs-
appellants may regret having alienated their hereditary shares in favor of their sister
Asuncion, they must now be considered bound by their own contractual acts.

WHEREFORE, the August 18, 1992 decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED. No pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 141882, March 11, 2005 ]
J.L.T. AGRO, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGER, JULIAN L. TEVES,
PETITIONER, VS. ANTONIO BALANSAG AND HILARIA CADAYDAY,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Once again, the Court is faced with the perennial conflict of property claims between two
sets of heirs, a conflict ironically made grievous by the fact that the decedent in this case
had resorted to great lengths to allocate which properties should go to which set of heirs.

This is a Rule 45 petition assailing the Decision[1] dated 30 September 1999 of the Court

of Appeals which reversed the Decision[2] dated 7 May 1993 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 45, of Bais City, Negros Oriental.

The factual antecedents follow.

Don Julian L. Teves (Don Julian) contracted two marriages, first with Antonia Baena
(Antonia), and after her death, with Milagros Donio Teves (Milagros Donio). Don Julian
had two children with Antonia, namely: Josefa Teves Escaño (Josefa) and Emilio Teves
(Emilio). He had also four (4) children with Milagros Donio, namely: Maria Evelyn
Donio Teves (Maria Evelyn), Jose Catalino Donio Teves (Jose Catalino), Milagros Reyes
Teves (Milagros Reyes) and Pedro Reyes Teves (Pedro). [3]

The present controversy involves a parcel of land covering nine hundred and fifty-four
(954) square meters, known as Lot No. 63 of the Bais Cadastre, which was originally
registered in the name of the conjugal partnership of Don Julian and Antonia under
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 5203 of the Registry of Deeds of Bais City. 
When Antonia died, the land was among the properties involved in an action for partition
and damages docketed as Civil Case No. 3443 entitled “Josefa Teves Escaño v. Julian
Teves, Emilio B. Teves, et al.”[4] Milagros Donio, the second wife of Don Julian,
participated as an intervenor.  Thereafter, the parties to the case entered into
a Compromise Agreement[5] which embodied the partition of all the properties of Don
Julian.

On the basis of the compromise agreement and approving the same, the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Negros Oriental, 12th Judicial District, rendered a Decision [6] dated 31
January 1964.  The CFI decision declared a tract of land known as Hacienda Medalla
Milagrosa as property owned in common by Don Julian and his two (2) children of the
first marriage. The property was to remain undivided during the lifetime of Don Julian.
[7]
 Josefa and Emilio likewise were given other properties at Bais, including the electric
plant, the “movie property,” the commercial areas, and the house where Don Julian was
living.  The remainder of the properties was retained by Don Julian, including Lot No.
63.

Paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement, at the heart of the present dispute, lays

down the effect of the eventual death of Don Julian vis-à-vis his heirs:
13. That in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties hereinafter adjudicated to
Josefa Teves EscaHo and Emilio B. Teves, (excluding the properties comprised as
Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa together with all its accessories and accessions) shall be
understood as including not only their one-half share which they inherited from their
mother but also the legitimes and other successional rights which would correspond to
them of the other half belonging to their father, Julian L. Teves.  In other words, the
properties now selected and adjudicated to Julian L. Teves (not including his share in
the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa) shall exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in second
marriage of Julian L. Teves and his four minor children, namely, Milagros Donio Teves,
his two acknowledged natural children Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro Reyes Teves and
his two legitimated children Maria Evelyn    Donio Teves and Jose Catalino Donio Teves.
(Emphasis supplied)
On 16 November 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of Assignment of
Assets with Assumption of Liabilities[8] in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. (petitioner).  Less
than a year later, Don Julian, Josefa and Emilio also executed an instrument
entitled Supplemental to the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the Assumption of
Liabilities (Supplemental Deed)[9] dated 31 July 1973. This instrument which constitutes a
supplement to the earlier deed of assignment transferred ownership over Lot No. 63,
among other properties, in favor of petitioner.[10] On 14 April 1974, Don Julian died
intestate.

On the strength of the Supplemental Deed in its favor, petitioner sought the registration of
the subject lot in its name.  A court, so it appeared, issued an order[11] cancelling OCT No.
5203 in the name of spouses Don Julian and Antonia on 12 November 1979, and on the
same date TCT No. T-375 was issued in the name of petitioner. [12] Since then, petitioner
has been paying taxes assessed on the subject lot.[13]

Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had immediately taken possession over the
subject lot after the execution of the Compromise Agreement. In 1974, they entered into a
yearly lease agreement with spouses Antonio Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday,
respondents herein.[14] On Lot No. 63, respondents temporarily established their home and
constructed a lumber yard. Subsequently, Milagros Donio and her children executed
a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate[15] dated 18 March 1980.  In the deed of
partition, Lot No. 63 was allotted to Milagros Donio and her two (2) children, Maria
Evelyn and Jose Catalino. Unaware that the subject lot was already registered in the name
of petitioner in 1979, respondents bought Lot No. 63 from Milagros Donio as evidenced
by the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Estate[16] dated 9 November 1983.

At the Register of Deeds while trying to register the deed of absolute sale, respondents
discovered that the lot was already titled in the name of petitioner.  Thus, they failed to
register the deed.[17]

Respondents, as vendees of Lot No. 63, filed a complaint before the RTC Branch 45 of
Bais City, seeking the declaration of nullity and cancellation of TCT No. T-375 in the
name of petitioner and the transfer of the title to Lot No. 63 in their names, plus damages.
[18]

After hearing, the trial court dismissed the complaint filed by respondents. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, by preponderance of evidence, this Court finds
judgment in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, and thus hereby orders:

(1) That complaint be dismissed;

(2) That plaintiffs vacate the subject land, particularly identified as Lot No. 63 registered
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-375;

(3) That plaintiffs pay costs.

Finding no basis on the counterclaim by defendant, the same is hereby ordered dismissed.
[19]

The trial court ruled that the resolution of the case specifically hinged on the
interpretation of paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement.[20] It added that the direct
adjudication of the properties listed in the Compromise Agreement was only in favor of
Don Julian and his two children by the first marriage, Josefa and Emilio. [21] Paragraph 13
served only as an amplification of the terms of the adjudication in favor of Don Julian
and his two children by the first marriage.

According to the trial court, the properties adjudicated in favor of Josefa and Emilio
comprised their shares in the estate of their deceased mother Antonia, as well as their
potential share in the estate of Don Julian upon the latter’s death.  Thus, upon Don
Julian’s death, Josefa and Emilio could not claim any share in his estate, except their
proper share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa which was adjudicated in favor of Don
Julian in the Compromise Agreement.  As such, the properties adjudicated in favor of
Don Julian, except Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa, were free from the forced legitimary
rights of Josefa and Emilio, and Don Julian was under no impediment to allocate the  
subject lot, among his other properties, to Milagros Donio and her four (4) children.[22]

The trial court further stressed that with the use of the words “shall be,” the adjudication
in favor of Milagros Donio and her four (4) children was not final and operative, as the
lot was still subject to future disposition by Don Julian during his lifetime.[23] It cited
paragraph 14[24] of the Compromise Agreement in support of his conclusion.[25] With Lot
No. 63 being the conjugal property of Don Julian and Antonia, the trial court also
declared that Milagros Donio and her children had no hereditary rights thereto except as
to the conjugal share of Don Julian, which they could claim only upon the death of the
latter.[26]

The trial court ruled that at the time of Don Julian’s death on 14 April 1974, Lot No. 63
was no longer a part of his estate since he had earlier assigned it to petitioner on 31 July
1973.  Consequently, the lot could not be a proper subject of extrajudicial partition by
Milagros Donio and her children, and not being the owners they could not have sold it. 
Had respondents exercised prudence before buying the subject lot by investigating the
registration of the same with the Registry of Deeds, they would have discovered that five
(5) years earlier, OCT No. 5203 had already been cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-
375 in the name of petitioner, the trial court added.[27]

The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial court’s decision. The decretal part of
the appellate decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered declaring the Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-375 registered in the name of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. as null and void.
With costs against defendant J.L.T. Agro, Inc. represented by its Manager, Julian L.
Teves.

SO ORDERED.[28]
Per the appellate court, the Compromise Agreement incorporated in CFI decision dated
31 January 1964, particularly paragraph 13 thereof, determined, adjudicated and reserved
to Don Julian’s two sets of heirs their future legitimes in his estate except as regards his
(Don Julian’s) share in Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa.[29] The two sets of heirs acquired
full ownership and possession of the properties respectively adjudicated to them in the
CFI decision and Don Julian himself could no  longer dispose of the same, including Lot
No. 63.  The disposition in the CFI decision constitutes res judicata.[30] Don Julian could
have disposed of only his conjugal share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa. [31]

The appellate court likewise emphasized that nobody in his right judgment would preterit
his legal heirs by simply executing a document like the Supplemental Deed which
practically covers all properties which Don Julian had reserved in favor of his heirs from
the second marriage. It also found out that the blanks reserved for the Book No. and Page
No. at the upper right corner of TCT No. T-375, “to identify the exact location where the
said title was registered or transferred,” were not filled up, thereby indicating that the
TCT is “spurious and of dubious origin.”[32]

Aggrieved by the appellate court’s decision, petitioner elevated it to this Court via a
petition for review on certiorari, raising pure questions of law.

Before this Court, petitioner assigns as errors the following rulings of the appellate court,
to wit: (a) that future legitime can be determined, adjudicated and reserved prior to the
death of Don Julian; (b) that Don Julian had no right to dispose of or assign Lot No. 63 to
petitioner because he reserved the same for his heirs from the second marriage pursuant
to the Compromise Agreement; (c) that the Supplemental Deed was tantamount to a
preterition of his heirs from the second marriage; and (d) that TCT No. T-375 in the name
of petitioner is spurious for not containing entries on the Book No. and Page No.[33]

While most of petitioner’s legal arguments have merit, the application of the appropriate
provisions of law to the facts borne out by the evidence on record nonetheless warrants
the affirmance of the result reached by the Court of Appeals in favor of respondents.

Being the key adjudicative provision, paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement has to

be quoted again:
13. That in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties herein adjudicated to
Josefa Teves Escaño and Emilio B. Teves, (excluding the properties comprised as
Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa together with all its accessories and accessions) shall be
understood as including not only their one-half share which they inherited from their
mother but also the legitimes and other successional rights which would correspond to
them of the other half belonging to their father, Julian L.Teves.  In other words, the
properties now selected and adjudicated to Julian L. Teves (not including his share
in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa) shall exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in
second marriage of Julian L. Teves and his four minor children, namely, Milagros
Donio Teves, his two acknowledged natural children Milagros Reyes Teves and
Pedro Reyes Teves and his two legitimated children Maria Evelyn Donio Teves and
Jose Catalino Donio Teves.” (Emphasis supplied)
With the quoted paragraph as basis, the Court of Appeals ruled that the adjudication in
favor of the heirs of Don Julian from the second marriage became automatically
operative upon the approval of the Compromise Agreement, thereby vesting on them the
right to validly dispose of Lot No. 63 in favor of respondents.

Petitioner argues that the appellate court erred in holding that future legitime can be
determined, adjudicated and reserved prior to the death of Don Julian. The Court agrees.
Our declaration in Blas v. Santos[34] is relevant, where we defined future inheritance as
any property or right not in existence or capable of determination at the time of the
contract, that a person may in the future acquire by succession. Article 1347 of the New
Civil Code explicitly provides:
ART. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men, including future
things, may be the object of a contract. All rights which are not intransmissible may also
be the object of contracts.

No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly
authorized by law.

All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy may likewise be the object of a contract.
Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future ones, which are not outside the
commerce of man may be the object of a contract. The exception is that no contract may
be entered into with respect to future inheritance, and the exception to the exception is the
partition inter vivos referred to in Article 1080.[35]

For the inheritance to be considered “future,” the succession must not have been opened
at the time of the contract.[36] A contract may be classified as a contract upon future
inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following
requisites concur:
(1) That the succession has not yet been opened;

(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and

(3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is
purely hereditary in nature.[37]
The first paragraph of Article 1080, which provides the exception to the exception and
therefore aligns with the general rule on future things, reads:
ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by
will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the
compulsory heirs.

....
In interpreting this provision, Justice Edgardo Paras advanced the opinion that if the
partition is made by an act inter vivos, no formalities are prescribed by the Article.[38] The
partition will of course be effective only after death. It does not necessarily require the
formalities of a will for after all it is not the partition that is the mode of acquiring
ownership.  Neither will the formalities of a donation be required since donation will not
be the mode of acquiring the ownership here after death; since no will has been made it
follows that the mode will be succession (intestate succession). Besides, the partition here
is merely the physical determination of the part to be given to each heir. [39]

The historical antecedent of Article 1080 of the New Civil Code is Article 1056 [40] of the
old Civil Code. The only change in the provision is that Article 1080 now permits
any person (not a testator, as under the old law) to partition his estate by act inter vivos.
This was intended to abrogate the then prevailing doctrine that for a testator to partition
his estate by an act inter vivos, he must first make a will with all the formalities provided
by law.[41]

Article 1056 of the old Civil Code (now Article 1080) authorizes a testator to
partition inter vivos his property, and distribute them among his heirs, and this partition is
neither a donation nor a testament, but an instrument of a special character, sui
generis, which is revocable at any time by the causante during his lifetime, and does
not operate as a conveyance of title until his death.  It derives its binding force on the
heirs from the respect due to the will of the owner of the property, limited only by his
creditors and the intangibility of the legitime of the forced heirs.[42]

The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly valid pursuant to
Article 1347. However, considering that it would become legally operative only upon the
death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs from the second marriage to the properties
adjudicated to him under the compromise agreement was but a mere expectancy. It was a
bare hope of succession to the property of their father. Being the prospect of a future
acquisition, the interest by its nature was inchoate. It had no attribute of property, and the
interest to which it related was at the time nonexistent and might never exist. [43]

Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment covering Lot No. 63 in
favor of petitioner, Don Julian remained the owner of the property since ownership over
the subject lot would only pass to his heirs from the second marriage at the time of his
death. Thus, as the owner of the subject lot, Don Julian retained the absolute right to
dispose of it during his lifetime. His right cannot be challenged by Milagros Donio and
her children on the ground that it had already been adjudicated to them by virtue of the
compromise agreement.

Emerging as the crucial question in this case is whether Don Julian had validly
transferred ownership of the subject lot during his lifetime. The lower court ruled that he
had done so through the Supplemental Deed.  The appellate court disagreed, holding that
the Supplemental Deed is not valid, containing as it does a prohibited preterition of Don
Julian’s heirs from the second marriage.  Petitioner contends that the ruling of the Court
of Appeals is erroneous.  The contention is well-founded.

Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will
or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises
and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.  Manresa defines preterition
as the omission of the heir in the will, either by not naming him at all or, while
mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting
him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the properties.[44] It is the total omission
of a compulsory heir in the direct line from inheritance.[45] It consists in the silence of the
testator with regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him in the testament, either by not
mentioning him at all, or by not giving him anything in the hereditary property but
without expressly disinheriting him, even if he is mentioned in the will in the latter case.
[46]
 But there is no preterition where the testator allotted to a descendant a share less than
the legitime, since there was no total omission of a forced heir. [47]

In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to was a
partition inter vivos of his properties, as evidenced by the court approved Compromise
Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not irrelevant to speak of preterition prior to the death
of Don Julian in the absence of a will depriving a legal heir of his legitime.  Besides,
there are other properties which the heirs from the second marriage could inherit from
Don Julian upon his death.  A couple of provisions in the Compromise Agreement are
indicative of Don Julian’s desire along this line.[48] Hence, the total omission from
inheritance of Don Julian’s heirs from the second marriage, a requirement for preterition
to exist, is hardly imaginable as it is unfounded.

Despite the debunking of respondents’ argument on preterition, still the petition would
ultimately rise or fall on whether there was a valid transfer effected by Don Julian to
petitioner.  Notably, Don Julian was also the president and director of petitioner, and his
daughter from the first marriage, Josefa, was the treasurer thereof.  There is of course no
legal prohibition against such a transfer to a family corporation.  Yet close scrutiny is in
order, especially considering that such transfer would remove Lot No. 63 from the estate
from which Milagros and her children could inherit. Both the alleged transfer deed and
the title which necessarily must have emanated from it have to be subjected to incisive
and detailed examination.

Well-settled, of course, is the rule that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an

indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. [49] A
certificate of title accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of the
exact status of the fee held by its owner.  The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the
evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. [50]

To successfully assail the juristic value of what a Torrens title establishes, a sufficient
and convincing quantum of evidence on the defect of the title must be adduced to
overcome the predisposition in law in favor of a holder of a Torrens title.  Thus, contrary
to the appellate court’s ruling, the appearance of a mere thumbmark of Don Julian instead
of his signature in the Supplemental Deed would not affect the validity of petitioner’s
title for this Court has ruled that a thumbmark is a recognized mode of signature. [51]

The truth, however, is that the replacement of OCT No. 5203 in the name of Julian by
T.C.T. No. T-375 is marred by a grave irregularity which is also an illegality, as it
contravenes the orthodox, conventional and normal process established by law.  And,
worse still, the illegality is reflected on the face of both titles.  Where, as in this case, the
transferee relies on a voluntary instrument to secure the issuance of a new title in his
name such instrument has to be presented to the Registry of Deeds.  This is evident from
Sections 53 and 57 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 or the Property Registration
Decree.  The sections read, thus:
SEC. 53. Presentation of owner’s duplicate upon entry of new certificate. – No voluntary
instrument shall be registered by the Register of Deeds unless the owner’s duplicate
certificate is presented with such instrument, except in cases expressly provided for in
this Decree or upon order of the court, for cause shown. (Emphasis supplied)

....

SEC. 57. Procedure in registration of conveyances. – An owner desiring to convey his

registered land in fee simple shall execute and register a deed of conveyance in a form
sufficient in law. The Register of Deeds shall thereafter make out in the registration book
a new certificate of title to the grantee and shall prepare and deliver to him an owner’s
duplicate certificate. The Register of Deeds shall note upon the original and duplicate
certificate the date of transfer, the volume and page of the registration book in which the
new certificate is registered and a reference by number to the last preceding certificate.
The original and the owner’s duplicate of the grantor’s certificate shall be stamped
“cancelled.” The deed of conveyance shall be filed and endorsed with the number
and the place of registration of the certificate of title of the land conveyed. (Emphasis
supplied)
As petitioner bases its right to the subject lot on the Supplemental Deed, it should have
presented it to the Register of Deeds to secure the transfer of the title in its name. 
Apparently, it had not done so.  There is nothing on OCT No. 5203 or on the succeeding
TCT No. T-375 either which shows that it had presented the Supplemental Deed.  In fact,
there is absolutely no mention of a reference to said document in the original and transfer
certificates of title.  It is in this regard that the finding of the Court of Appeals concerning
the absence of entries on the blanks intended for the Book No. and Page No. gains
significant relevance.  Indeed, this aspect fortifies the conclusion that the cancellation of
OCT No. 5203 and the consequent issuance of TCT No.  T-375 in its place are not
predicated on a valid transaction.

What appears instead on OCT No.  5203 is the following pertinent entry:
Entry No. 1374: Kind:  Order:  Executed in favor of J.L.T. AGRO, INC.

CONDITIONS:  Lost owner’s duplicate is hereby cancelled, and null and void and a

new Certificate of Title No. 375 is issued per Order of the Court of First Instance on
file in this office.

Date of Instrument:  November 12, 1979

Date of Inscription:  Nov. 12, 1979               4:00 P.M.

(SGD) MANUEL C. MONTESA

Acting Deputy Register of Deeds II
(Emphasis supplied)[52]
What the entry indicates is that the owner’s duplicate of OCT No.  5203 was lost, a
petition for the reconstitution of the said owner’s duplicate was filed in court, and the
court issued an order for the reconstitution of the owner’s duplicate and its replacement
with a new one.  But if the entry is to be believed, the court concerned (CFI, according to
the entry) issued an order for the issuance of a new title which is TCT No. T-375
although the original of OCT No. 5203 on file with the Registry of Deeds had not been
lost.

Going by the legal, accepted and normal process, the reconstitution court may order the
reconstitution and replacement of the lost title only, nothing else.  Since what was lost is
the owner’s copy of OCT No. 5203, only that owner’s copy could be ordered replaced. 
Thus, the Register of Deeds exceeded his authority in issuing not just a reconstituted
owner’s copy of the original certificate of title but a new transfer certificate of title in
place of the original certificate of title. But if the court order, as the entry intimates,
directed the issuance of a new transfer certificate of title—even designating the very
number of the new transfer certificate of title itself—the order would be patently
unlawful.  A court cannot legally order the cancellation and replacement of the original of
the O.C.T. which has not been lost,[53] as the petition for reconstitution is premised on the
loss merely of the owner’s duplicate of the OCT
Apparently, petitioner had resorted to the court order as a convenient contrivance to
effect the transfer of title to the subject lot in its name, instead of the Supplemental
Deed which should be its proper course of action. It was so constrained to do because
the Supplemental Deed does not constitute a deed of conveyance of the “registered land
in fee simple” “in a form sufficient in law,” as required by Section 57 of P.D. No. 1529.

A plain reading of the pertinent provisions of the Supplemental Deed discloses that the

assignment is not supported by any consideration.  The provision reads:
....

WHEREAS, in the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the Assumption of Liabilities

executed by Julian L. Teves, Emilio B. Teves and Josefa T. Escaño at Dumaguete City on
16th day of November 1972 and ratified in the City of Dumaguete before Notary Public
Lenin Victoriano, and entered in the latter’s notarial register as Doc. No. 367; Page No.
17; Book No. V; series of 1972, Julian L. Teves, Emilio B. Teves and Josefa T. Escaño,
transferred, conveyed and assigned unto J.L.T. AGRO, INC., all its assets and liabilities
as reflected in the Balance Sheet of the former as of December 31, 1971.

WHEREAS, on the compromise agreement, as mentioned in the Decision made in the

Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, 12th Judicial District Branch II, on Dec. 31,
1964 pertaining to Civil Case No. 3443 the following properties were adjudicated to Don
Julian L. Teves. We quote.

From the properties at Bais

Adjudicated to Don Julian L.Teves

....

Lot No. 63, Tax Dec. No. 33, Certificate of Title No. 5203, together with all
improvements. Assessed value - P2,720.00

....

WHEREAS, this Deed of Assignment is executed by the parties herein in order to effect
the registration of the transfer of the above corporation.

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the above premises the ASSIGNOR
hereby transfers, conveys, and assigns unto J.L.T. AGRO, INC., the above described
parcel of land[s] with a fair market value of EIGHTY-FOUR THOUSAND PESOS
(P84,000.00), Philippine Currency, and which transfer, conveyance and assignment shall
become absolute upon signing.[54] (Emphasis supplied)
The amount of P84,000.00 adverted to in the dispositive portion of the instrument does
not represent the consideration for the assignment made by Don Julian.  Rather, it is a
mere statement of the fair market value of all the nineteen (19) properties enumerated in
the instrument, of which Lot No. 63 is just one, that were transferred by Don Julian in
favor of petitioner. Consequently, the testimony[55] of petitioner’s accountant that the
assignment is supported by consideration cannot prevail over the clear provision to the
contrary in the Supplemental Deed.

The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, apparently considered the 1948 mortgage which
is annotated on the back of the TCT No. T-375 as the consideration for the assignment.
[56]
 However, the said annotation[57] shows that the mortgage was actually executed in
favor of Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, not of petitioner.[58] Clearly, said mortgage,
executed as it was in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation and there being no
showing that petitioner itself paid off the mortgate obligation, could not have been the
consideration for the assignment to petitioner.

Article 1318 of the New Civil Code enumerates the requisites of a valid contract,
namely:  (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the subject
matter of the contract; and (3) Cause of the obligation which is established.

Thus, Article 1352 declares that contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause produce
no effect whatsoever. Those contracts lack an essential element and they are not only
voidable but void or inexistent pursuant to Article 1409, paragraph (2).[59] The absence of
the usual recital of consideration in a transaction which normally should be supported by
a consideration such as the assignment made by Don Julian of all nineteen (19) lots he
still had at the time, coupled with the fact that the assignee is a corporation of which Don
Julian himself was also the President and Director, forecloses the application of the
presumption of existence of consideration established by law.[60]

Neither could the Supplemental Deed validly operate as a donation. Article 749 of the

New Civil Code is clear on the point, thus:
Art. 749. In order that the donation of the immovable may be valid, it must be made in a
public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges
which the donee must satisfy.

The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public
document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.

If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in
an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.
In Sumipat, et al v. Banga, et al.,[61] this Court declared that title to immovable property
does not pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of a deed of donation until and unless
it has been accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly notified thereof. The
acceptance may be made in the very same instrument of donation. If the acceptance does
not appear in the same document, it must be made in another. Where the deed of donation
fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a
separate instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not noted in the deed of
donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.

In the case at bar, although the Supplemental Deed appears in a public document,[62] the

absence of acceptance by the donee in the same deed or even in a separate document is a
glaring violation of the requirement.

One final note. From the substantive and procedural standpoints, the cardinal objectives
to write finis to a protracted litigation and avoid multiplicity of suits are worth pursuing
at all times.[63] Thus, this Court has ruled that appellate courts have ample authority to
rule on specific matters not assigned as errors or otherwise not raised in an appeal, if
these are indispensable or necessary to the just resolution of the pleaded issues.
[64]
 Specifically, matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which are
necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case, or to serve the
interest of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice.[65]

In the instant case, the correct characterization of the Supplemental Deed, i.e., whether it

is valid or void, is unmistakably determinative of the underlying controversy.  In other
words, the issue of validity or nullity of the instrument which is at the core of the
controversy is interwoven with the issues adopted by the parties and the rulings of the
trial court and the appellate court.[66] Thus, this Court is also resolute in striking down the
alleged deed in this case, especially as it appears on its face to be a blatant nullity.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated 30 September 1999 of

the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner J.L.T. Agro, Inc.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 208197, January 10, 2018 ]
ARACELI MAYUGA, SUBSTITUTED BY MARILYN MAYUGA
SANTILLAN FOR AND ON BEHALF OF ALL THE HEIRS, PETITIONER, V.
ANTONIO ATIENZA, REPRESENTING THE HEIRS OF
ARMANDO[*] ATIENZA; BENJAMIN ATIENZA, JR., REPRESENTING THE
HEIRS OF BENJAMIN A. ATIENZA, SR., RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
CAGUIOA, J:

This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] (Petition) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision[2] dated July 8, 2013 of the Court of Appeals[3] (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 95599 which granted the appeal by the respondents Antonio Atienza [4] and
Benjamin Atienza, Jr.[5] and reversed and set aside the Decision[6] dated April 27, 2010 of
the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 82, Odiongan, Romblon (RTC)
in Civil Case No. OD-489.

Facts and Antecedent Proceedings

As culled from the CA Decision, the antecedents are as follows:

On May 4, 2000, Araceli Mayuga (Araceli, for short), as plaintiff, instituted a petition for
Cancellation and Recall of Free Patent Application (FPA) No. 11636 and FPA No. 11637
[and Reconveyance] against Antonio Atienza, representing the heirs of Armando Atienza,
Benjamin Atienza, Jr., representing the heirs of Benjamin Atienza, Sr., Community
Environment and Natural Resource Officer and Register of Deeds of Romblon, as
defendants. The petition, docketed as Civil Case No. OD-489, was raffled to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Odiongan, Romblon, Branch 82[.]

In her Petition, Araceli, alleged, that [she, Benjamin A. Atienza, Sr. and Armando A.
Atienza are the surviving legitimate, legal and forced heirs of the late Perfecto Atienza
who died intestate on June 1, 1978[7], and:]

xxxx

3. That the said deceased Perfecto Atienza left estates, to wit:

(a) Lot 9819 Csd 341-D (known as Lot 61-A) with an area of 294 square meters, and

(b) Lot 9820 Csd 341-D (known as Lot 61-B) with an area of 280 square meters,

or a total area of 574 square meters, both lots are located at Budiong, Odiongan, Romblon
to which the three (3) compulsory/forced heirs are entitled to an equal share of 1/3 [each].

4. That through manipulation and misrepresentation with intent to defraud a co-heir,

respondent Antonio L. Atienza[, son of deceased Armando Atienza, [8]] was able to secure
Free [P]atent (NRDN-21) 11636 while respondent Benjamin A. Atienza was able to
secure Free Patent (NRDN- 21) 11637, both patents dated February 28, 1992.
5. That Petitioner was not notified of the application filed with public respondent
Community Environment & Natural Resource Officer nor any notice of hearings of
proceedings as required by law, being a co-heir and party- in-interest.

xxxx

Thus, she prayed [for],

xxxx

1. The recall and cancellation of FPA (NRD-IV-21) 11636 dated February 28, 1992
issued to Antonio L. Atienza.

2. The recall and cancellation of FPA (NRD-IV-21) 11637 dated February 28, 1992
issued to Benjamin A. Atienza.

3. [The division of] the two lots into three (3) equal parts among the three (3) forced
heirs, namely: the Petitioner, Benjamin A. Atienza and Armando A. Atienza.

xxxx

On June 19, 2000, defendants filed a motion for bill of particulars because the allegations
of manipulation and misrepresentation were general, vague and ambiguous on which they
could not make an intelligent answer. In the Order dated June 22, 2000, plaintiff was
directed to submit a bill of particulars.

Plaintiff submitted a Reply to Motion for Bill of Particulars, stating that the allegations
on paragraph 4 in her petition are based on the following considerations:

xxxx

1. That petition/application for title filed by Respondents before the Bureau of Lands
dated June 22, 1973 was based on a "Confirmation Affidavit of Distribution of Real
Estate," allegedly executed by Perfecto Atienza, allegedly confirming [an] alleged
partition of 1960, was misrepresented to Perfecto Atienza as mere compliance of
Presidential Decree No. 76 of December 6, 1972 for Real Estate Tax purposes;

2. That the Bureau of Lands [had] never notified the Petitioner, being one of the
Compulsory/Forced heirs about the petition/application for issuance of title and the
hearing thereon;

3. That Respondents took advantage of the absence of Petitioner in the Philippines, who
was in the United States then when they filed the Petition/Application for issuance of title
in the year 1989.
xxxx

On August 18, 2000, the RTC issued an Order admitting the Reply to Bill of Particulars.

In their Answer, defendants denied the material allegations of the complaint, and by way
of affirmative defenses, averred that, the petition is moot and academic; the Free Patent
Titles have become indefeasible after the lapse of one year from its issuance in 1992;
fraud as a ground for review of title under Section 38 of Act 496 is not applicable to a
case where a certificate of title was issued in pursuance of a patent application; that they
and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public, continuous possession of the
subject property for over 30 years; the basis for their Application for Free Patent with the
CENRO is a Confirmation Affidavit of Distribution of Real Estate executed by their
father, Perfecto Atienza, confirming partition in 1960.

Defendant Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO, for short)
also filed an Answer, alleging that, Free Patent No. 045909-92-141P was issued by then
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO), Dionico F. Gabay on
February 28, 1992 by virtue of the Free Patent Application No. (NRD-IV-21)-11636 filed
by Antonio L. Atienza at the CENRO Office in Odiongan, Romblon covering Lot No.
9819, Cad. 341-D, Odiongan Cadastre which is identical to Lot 61-A, Csd-04-008722-D;
while Free Patent Application No. (NRD-IV-21)11637 filed by Benjamin A. Atienza
with the CENRO Office covering Lot 9820, Cad. 341-D, Odiongan Cadastre which is
identical to Lot 61-B, Csd-04-008722-D; it has no participation whatsoever in the
processing and issuance of free patents and/or titles in the names of Antonio L. Atienza
and Benjamin A. Atienza. It also prayed that it be excluded as a defendant in the case.

On July 9, 2001, plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint to implead the Heirs of Armando
A. Atienza, namely, Antonio L. Atienza, Mae Atienza-Apostol, Susan Atienza-
Sumbeling and Heirs of Benjamin M. (sic) Atienza, Sr., namely, Benjamin M. Atienza,
Jr., Antonio M. Atienza, Pewrpetuo (sic) M. Atienza, Maribel M. Atienza and Cristina
Atienza, as defendants.

Defendants moved to dismiss the original petition for failure of the plaintiff’s counsels to
state their IBP No. and P.T.R. No. and the amended complaint for failure to attach a
verification and certification against forum-shopping but on September 13, 2001, the
RTC issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit.

The parties thereafter submitted their respective pre-trial briefs. A pre-trial conference
was conducted and later, trial ensued.

On April 27, 2010, the RTC ruled in favor of Plaintiff Araceli. It ruled that the
application by the defendants for a Free Patent with the CENRO is tainted with fraud
because said application was processed without the plaintiff’s knowledge nor a notice of
hearing of any proceeding was sent to her. In fact, the defendants took advantage while
the latter was in the United States. Moreover, the titling of the fraudulently registered real
property will not bar the action for reconveyance.

Thus, the RTC decreed, that:

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Register of Deeds [of] Romblon, Romblon is

hereby directed to Cancel the Certificates issued pursuant [to] Free Patent No. 11636 in
the name of Antonio L. Atienza and Free Patent No. 11637 in the name of Benjamin A.
Atienza. The defendants are hereby ordered to reconvey the 1/3 share of Araceli A.
Mayuga as the compulsory heir of the late Perfecto Atienza on Lot 9819 which is
identical to Lot 61-A and 9820 which is identical to Lot 61-B all located at Budiong,
Odiongan, Romblon.

SO ORDERED.

xxxxx

Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in the Order dated
July 29, 2010.

Aggrieved, defendants interposed an appeal [before the Court of Appeals] assailing the
decision of the RTC.[9]

The CA granted the appeal. It reversed and set aside the RTC Decision dated April 27,
2010, and dismissed the Amended Complaint for Recall and Cancellation of Free Patent
Application (FPA) No. 11636 and FPA No. 11637 and Action for Reconveyance. [10]

On the procedural aspect of the appeal, the CA ruled that the RTC erred in not dismissing
the Amended Complaint for failure to append a certification against non-forum shopping.
[11]
 On the substantive aspects of the appeal, the CA ruled that the free patents issued in
favor of the respondents can no longer be assailed under the rule of indefeasibility and
incontrovertibility of the certificate of title upon the expiration of one year from and after
the date of the entry of the decree of registration pursuant to Section 32 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529.[12] The CA further ruled that the RTC erred in its finding that fraud and
misrepresentation attended the respondents' applications for free patents. [13] It noted that
the basis for the respondents' application was the Confirmatory Affidavit of Distribution
of Real Estate dated June 22, 1973 executed by their father, the late Perfecto Atienza
during his lifetime and was at liberty to dispose of his property to anyone he desired.
[14]
 The said document was duly notarized and the petitioner could not impugn its validity
by mere self-serving allegations.[15] Besides, the records negate the claim of the petitioner
that she was not notified of the free patent applications because a Notice of Application
for Free Patent was "posted in conspicuous place on the land applied for, on the bulletin
board of the barrio where the land is located, and at the door of [the] municipal building
on the 2nd day of January, 1987 and remained posted until the 18th of December."[16] The
respondents presented Romulo Fetalvero, Management Officer III of the PENRO-DENR,
Odiongan, Romblon who testified that they complied with the requirements for the
issuance of a free patent.[17] Thus, the petitioner's allegations of fraud, manipulation and
misrepresentation were unsubstantiated.[18]

Furthermore, the CA held that the RTC erred in ordering the reconveyance of 1/3 of the
subject properties to the petitioner since she failed to establish her title and ownership
over such portion.[19] The CA gave due recognition to the tax declarations dated as early
as 1974 presented by the respondents and the Report of Investigation by Emilio Firmalo,
Deputy Land Investigator/Inspector, which disclosed that Antonio Atienza and his
predecessors-in-interest had possessed and occupied the subject land since 1962, while
Benjamin Atienza and his predecessors-in-interest fully possessed the same since 1962. [20]

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The assailed Decision

dated April 27, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Odiongan, Romblon, Branch
82 in Civil Case No. OD-489, and the subsequent Order dated July 29, 2010
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Amended Complaint for Recall and
Cancellation of Free Patent Application (FPA) No. 11636 and FPA No. 11637 and
Action for Reconveyance is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[21]

Proceedings Before the Court

Hence, the present Petition was filed after the Court granted the petitioner's Motion for
Extension of Time to File Petition for Review[22] in its Resolution[23] dated September 16,
2013.

The respondents filed their Comments (To the Petition for Review)[24] dated December
16, 2013 (Comment). The Comment pointed as procedural flaw the defective verification
and certification of the Petition on account of the lack of authority of Marilyn Mayuga
Santillan, who verified the Petition instead of petitioner Araceli Mayuga. The
respondents also argued that the petitioner has not explained the lack of verification and
certification against non-forum shopping in the original complaint which was one of the
reasons for the reversal of the RTC Decision by the CA.[25] As substantive flaws, the
respondents argued that their titles have become indefeasible one year after the date of
entry of the decree of registration and the petitioner's complaint for recall and
cancellation of free patent application and reconveyance, having been initiated eight
years from the date of the entry in the registration book of the Register of Deeds and
beyond four years from the discovery of the alleged fraud, was filed out of time. [26] The
respondents further argued that the petitioner failed to prove that there was fraud or
misrepresentation in the acquisition of their titles.[27]

The petitioner filed a Reply[28] dated April 11, 2014. The petitioner raised therein that title
emanating from free patent fraudulently obtained does not become indefeasible,[29] and
the action for reconveyance was seasonably filed based on implied or constructive trust.
[30]

In a Manifestation[31] dated October 30, 2015, the Court was informed of the death of
petitioner Araceli Mayuga in September 2015. The Court in its Resolution[32] dated
January 18, 2016, required the petitioner's counsel to file a motion for substitution of
party together with the death certificate of the petitioner.

The petitioner's counsel filed a Motion for Substitution of Party and Compliance[33] dated
March 11, 2016, praying that Marilyn Mayuga Santillan be substituted as petitioner on
behalf of all the heirs of the original petitioner Araceli Mayuga. In the Court's
Resolution[34] dated April 20, 2016, the motion for substitution was granted.

Issue

Based on the Petition and the pleadings filed by the parties, the core issue is:

Whether the CA erred in reversing the RTC Decision and dismissing the amended
complaint of the petitioner for cancellation of free patent and reconveyance.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition lacks merit.

To recall, the amended complaint filed by the petitioner was for "Recall and Cancellation
of FPA No. 11636 and FPA No. 11637 and Reconveyance."[35]

The RTC considered the said complaint mainly as an action for declaration of nullity of
the free patents and the corresponding certificates of title issued to the respondents. The
RTC Decision directed the Register of Deeds of Romblon to cancel the certificates of title
issued pursuant to Free Patent No. 11636 in the name of respondent Antonio L. Atienza
and Free Patent No. 11637 in the name of Benjamin A. Atienza, Sr. and ordered the
respondents to reconvey the alleged 1/3 share of petitioner Araceli A. Mayuga. On the
other hand, the CA considered the separate merits of the amended complaint's causes of
action for declaration of nullity of the free patents and reconveyance. The Court will
follow the CA's path.

The Court in Spouses Galang v. Spouses Reyes,[36] citing Heirs of Kionisala v. Heirs of

Dacut,[37] observed the essential differences among an action for declaration of nullity of
free patents and the corresponding certificates of titles issued pursuant thereto, an action
for reversion and an action for reconveyance, viz.:

An ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of free patents and certificates of title is
not the same as an action for reversion. The difference between them lies in the
allegations as to the character of ownership of the realty whose title is sought to be
nullified. In an action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint would
admit State ownership of the disputed land. x x x

On the other hand, a cause of action for declaration of nullity of free patent and certificate
of title would require allegations of the plaintiffs ownership of the contested lot prior to
the issuance of such free patent and certificate of title as well as the defendant's fraud or
mistake; as the case may be, in successfully obtaining these documents of title over the
parcel of land claimed by plaintiff. In such a case, the nullity arises strictly not from the
fraud or deceit but from the fact that the land is beyond the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Lands to bestow and whatever patent or certificate of title obtained therefor is
consequently void ab initio. The real party in interest is x x x the plaintiff who alleges a
pre-existing right of ownership over the parcel of land in question even before the grant
of title to the defendant. x x x

xxxx

With respect to the purported cause of action for reconveyance, it is settled that in this
kind of action the free patent and the certificate of title are respected as incontrovertible.
What is sought instead is the transfer of the property, in this case the title thereof, which
has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the defendant's name. All that must be
alleged in the complaint are two (2) facts which admitting them to be true would entitle
the plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land, namely, (1) that the plaintiff was the
owner of the land and, (2) that the defendant had illegally dispossessed him of the same.
[38]
 (Emphasis omitted, underscoring in the original)

Given the foregoing differences, an action for reconveyance and an action for declaration
of nullity of the free patent cannot be pursued simultaneously. The former recognizes the
certificate of title issued pursuant to the free patent as indefeasible while the latter does
not. They may, however, be pursued alternatively pursuant to Section 2, Rule 8 of the
Rules of Court on alternative causes of action or defenses.
The action for declaration of nullity of the free patents issued in favor of the respondents
must fail, as the CA correctly ruled.

As noted by the CA, the respondents satisfactorily complied with the requirements for the
issuance of a free patent. After quoting the pertinent portion of the direct examination of
Romulo Fetalvero, Management Officer III of the PENRO-DENR, Odiongan, Romblon,
on the respondents' compliance with the requirements, the CA stated:

From the foregoing, the grant of free patents to defendants-appellants, having been
performed in the course of the official functions of the DENR officers, enjoys the
presumption of regularity. This presumption of regularity was not successfully rebutted
by plaintiff-appellee. All told, there is no clear and convincing evidence of fraud and
plaintiff-appellee's failure to prove it is fatal to [her] own cause. And there being none,
We will have to sustain the issuance of [the] free patents to the defendants-appellants. [39]

Regarding the petitioner's allegation of fraud, the CA correctly dismissed the same,
pointing out that her "averment that [she] was not notified of [the] applications for the
free patent as well as of the proceedings which transpired leading to the granting and
registration of the land in the [respondents'] name is bare and self-serving,"[40] and "the
records negate this claim because a Notice of Application for Free Patent was 'posted in
[a] conspicuous place on the land applied for, on the bulletin board of the barrio where
the land is located, and at the door of [the] municipal building on the 2nd day of January,
1987 and remained posted until the 18th of December.'"[41] The CA was likewise not
convinced with the petitioner's allegation of fraud and misrepresentation in the execution
of the Confirmation Affidavit of Distribution of Real Estate dated June 22, 1973
(Confirmation Affidavit) by the petitioner's father, the late Perfecto Atienza (Perfecto).
Being a notarized document, the CA imbued it with the legal presumption of validity, its
due execution and authenticity not having been impugned by the mere self-serving
allegations of the petitioner.[42]

The petitioner having failed to persuade the Court by clear and convincing evidence that
the respondents perpetuated fraud against her, the Court's conclusion in Spouses
Galang finds application in the present case, viz.:

x x x As between these two claims, this Court is inclined to decide in favor of the
Galangs who hold a valid and subsisting title to the property which, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, the Court presumes to have been issued by the PENRO in the
regular performance of its official duty.

The bottom line here is that, fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of
patent and annulment of title, should never be presumed, but must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence, with mere preponderance of evidence not being adequate. Fraud is
a question of fact which must be proved.
In this case, the allegations of fraud were never proven. There was no evidence at all
specifically showing actual fraud or misrepresentation. x x x.[43]

Also, Lopez v. Court of Appeals[44] supports the recognition of the respondents as the

absolute and exclusive owner of the disputed lots, being grantees of free patents over
them.

In Lopez, the homestead application of one Fermin Lopez had unfortunately remained
unacted upon up to the time of his death, being neither approved nor denied by the
Director of the (then) Bureau of Lands as the Bureau failed to process it; the Court ruled
that he could not have acquired any vested rights as a homestead applicant over the
property,[45] and his heirs did not inherit any property right from him.[46] The other heirs of
Fermin had no right to be declared co-owners with Hermogenes Lopez, the eldest child of
Fermin, who filed a new application after Fermin's death and was granted a homestead
patent over the land which was subject of Fermin's application because the land
exclusively pertained to Hermogenes. The Court reasoned out:

The failure of the Bureau of Lands to act on the application of Fermin up to the time of
his death, however, prevented his heirs to be subrogated in all his rights and obligations
with respect to the land applied for.

Perforce, at the time Hermogenes applied for a homestead grant over the disputed
property, it was still part of alienable public land. As he applied for it in his own name,
his application inures to his sole benefit. After complying with the cultivation and
residency requirements, he became a grantee of a homestead patent over it, thereby
making him its absolute and exclusive owner.[47]

Thus, the CA did not commit any reversible error in dismissing the complaint for the
recall and cancellation of the free patent applications of the respondents.

Proceeding now to the determination of whether the petitioner has succeeded in proving
her cause of action for reconveyance, the petitioner likewise failed in this respect. As
correctly pointed out by the CA and stated earlier, an action for reconveyance involving
land that is titled pursuant to a free patent is one that seeks to transfer property,
wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner or to one with a better
title.[48] As such, two facts must be alleged in the complaint and proved during the trial,
namely: (1) the plaintiff was the owner of the land or possessed it in the concept of
owner, and (2) the defendant illegally divested him of ownership and dispossessed him of
the land.[49]

Such facts, as the CA observed, were not only not alleged in the amended complaint, the
petitioner Araceli Mayuga (Araceli[50]) also failed to prove that she was entitled to 1/3 of
the two lots in dispute by succession.
Apparently, Araceli had taken the position that being one of the surviving compulsory
heirs of their late father, Perfecto, she was entitled to 1/3 of the disputed lots on the
assumption that the decedent left only three legal heirs (his children Araceli, Benjamin,
Sr. and Armando)[51] and that the disputed lots were part of the inheritance[52] left by their
father when he died in 1978. Araceli, however, overlooked the fact that Perfecto executed
the Confirmation Affidavit dated June 22, 1973 almost five years prior to his death on
June 1, 1978. Araceli did not even bother to provide the Court a copy thereof so that the
Court could make a determination of its legal import. And the CA correctly accorded the
Confirmation Affidavit the legal presumption of validity, being a duly notarized
document, where its validity could not be impugned by mere self-serving allegations. [53]

Assuming that Perfecto owned the disputed lots and the Confirmation Affidavit was a
deed of partition, Perfecto could have legally partitioned his estate during his lifetime.
Under Article 1080 of the Civil Code, "[s]hould a person make a partition of his estate by
an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs."

Unlike in the old Civil Code, partition inter vivos is expressly allowed in the present
Civil Code. The rationale for the change is exhaustively explained by recognized Civil
Law Commentator, former CA Justice Eduardo P. Caguioa,[54] thus:

xxx This article allows the deceased to make a partition of his estate before his death
which partition shall be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the co-
heirs. This partition may be made either by an act inter vivos or by will. Whether one or
the other, however, is followed, the requirements of law as to form must be complied
with.[55] If the testator should make it by will, then there is no doubt that the same is valid
and binding on the heirs. It the testator makes a partition inter vivos, should such
partition be after the making of a will and in accordance therewith or can the testator
make a partition inter vivos without any supporting will? Under the old Civil Code the
article employed the term "testator"[56] in lieu of the term now used which is "person."
Interpreting this provision of law our Supreme Court in line with the opinion of the
Spanish Supreme Court and Manresa, ruled that the word "testator" in the article can have
no other meaning than that there must have been a previous will executed by the decedent
wherein the property was disposed of to the heirs. Subsequently, the testator makes a
partition by an act inter vivos in accordance with the disposition made in such will.
Hence, our Supreme Court ruled that where the testator made a partition inter vivos but
the will was declared null and void, the partition was also null and void. [57] The word
"testator" in the Old Civil Code was changed by the New Civil Code into the term
"person," precisely to do away with the interpretation given to the article by our Supreme
Court, the Supreme Court of Spain and Manresa. Where the old code uses the specific
term "testator," the New Civil Code uses the broader term "person." What is the effect of
this change? There is no doubt that the intention behind the change is to do away with the
interpretation requiring a valid will in order that there be a valid partition inter vivos.
Consequently, we may say that a partition inter vivos may be valid even though there is
no supporting will. However, in accordance with what disposition shall said partition be
made if made inter vivos? May the deceased freely, in said partition inter vivos,
designate the shares of the heirs granting that the same does not prejudice the legitime of
the co-heirs? If this is so, is not this a will without the formalities of a will? Was that the
intention of the legislature in amending the article from the term "testator" to "person"? If
that is the intention, then property may pass through the will of the testator without the
formalities of a will. Hence, this will in effect destroy the intention of the legislature in
carefully providing for the formalities of the will so as to safeguard the testamentary right
of a person. Any act inter vivos which will designate under this theory a partition of the
property will be valid disposition even though it is not a will.

It is submitted that this is not the intention of the legislature. A distinction must be made
between a disposition of property and its partition. The disposition of property must be
made in the manner allowed by law, namely, by will. After the designation in the will,
then comes the second part, the division in conformity with that disposition and the
testator may make this division in the same will or another will or by an act inter vivos.
[58] 
Hence, in reality, partition is simply making concrete and particular the apportionment
already previously made by the testator in his will. Since our law now does not require a
valid will in order that the partition inter vivos may be valid and as we submit that the
partition cannot make the designation of heirs or the designation of shares but merely
makes concrete, specific a designation previously made, according to what designation
will this partition inter vivos be made if there is no will of the testator? It is submitted
that this designation shall be in accordance with the laws of intestacy. Inasmuch as the
deceased did not make a will, it is presumed that he wanted the disposition in accordance
with law, and this apportionment by the law must be interpreted to be the presumed will
of the deceased; hence, the partition inter vivos must be in accordance with the
designation laid down by law in case of intestacy. Said partition shall be valid so long as
it does not impair the legitime of the co-heirs. That there can be a prejudice to the
legitime of the co-heirs in intestate succession has been previously explained inasmuch as
whether the succession is testamentary or legal, compulsory succession must always take
place. From what has been explained, it is clear that should the testator institute a stranger
as heir, he cannot make a partition inter vivos without making a designation by a valid
will because the stranger cannot inherit by the laws of intestacy.

Since the Civil Code allows partition inter vivos, it is incumbent upon the compulsory
heir questioning its validity to show that his legitime is impaired. Unfortunately, Araceli
has not shown to what extent the Confirmation Affidavit prejudiced her legitime.

Araceli could not also claim preterition by virtue of the Confirmation Affidavit on the
assumption that the disputed two lots pertained to Perfecto's inheritance, he had only
three legal heirs and he left Araceli with no share in the two lots. Article 854 of the Civil
Code partly provides: "[t]he preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will
or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises
and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious."

As explained by Justice Eduardo P. Caguioa:

x x x Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of a compulsory heir in the
direct line or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein or although
mentioned they are neither instituted as heir nor expressly disinherited. The act of totally
depriving a compulsory heir of his legitime can take place either expressly or tacitly. The
express deprivation of the legitime constitutes disinheritance. The tacit deprivation of the
same is called preterition. x x x[59]

x x x In order that there be preterition, it is essential that the heir must be totally omitted.
This is clear from the wording of this article in conjunction with Article 906[60]. x x x[61]

xxxx

Summarizing, therefore, total omission means that the omitted compulsory heir receives
nothing under the will, whether as heir, legatee or devisee, has received nothing by way
of donation inter vivos or propter [nuptias], and will receive nothing by way of intestate
succession.[62]

Although Araceli was a compulsory heir in the direct descending line, she could not have
been preterited. Firstly, Perfecto left no will. As contemplated in Article 854, the
presence of a will is necessary. Secondly, before his death, Perfecto had properties in
Limon, Rizal which was almost 50 hectares, part of which was developed for residential
and agricultural purposes, and in Odiongan.[63] Araceli could not have been totally
excluded in the inheritance of Perfecto even if she was not allegedly given any share in
the disputed two lots.

If Araceli's share in the inheritance of Perfecto as claimed by her was indeed impaired,
she could have instituted an action for partition or a settlement of estate proceedings
instead of her complaint for cancellation of free patent and reconveyance.

Furthermore, as the persons who applied for and were awarded free patents, the
respondents are the rightful, legal owners of the disputed lots. The free patents having
been issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources on February 28,
1992 and recorded in the Book of Entries at the Office of the Registry of Deeds in June
1992,[64] the respondents' certificates of title have already become indefeasible pursuant to
Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (the Property Registration Decree), which
pertinently provides: "Upon the expiration of said period of one year [from and after the
date of entry of the decree of registration], the decree of registration and the certificate of
title issued shall become incontrovertible."

Given the foregoing, the resolution of the procedural issues pertinent to the Petition has
become superfluous.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals

Decision dated July 8, 2013 in CA-G.R. CV No. 95599 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 193374, June 08, 2016 ]
HEIRS OF THE LATE GERRY* ECARMA, NAMELY: AVELINA SUIZA-
ECARMA, DENNIS ECARMA, JERRY LYN ECARMA PENA, ANTONIO
ECARMA AND NATALIA ECARMA SANGALANG, PETITIONERS, VS.
COURT OF APPEALS AND RENATO A. ECARMA, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

We here have another case of heirs quarrelling over inherited properties, some
of them refusing their partition.

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the

twin Resolutions[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 92375 for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction.
The appellate court dismissed outright the appeal of petitioners, heirs of Gerry Ecarma
for a number of procedural defects, including failure to comply with Section 13, Rule 44
of the Rules of Court on the contents of their appellants' brief. Petitioners sought to
appeal the two (2) Orders[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 220, Quezon City in
SP PROC. No. Q-90-6332 which approved the Project of Partition proposed by
respondent Renato Ecarma, administrator in the intestate proceedings to settle the
estate of decedent Arminda vda. de Ecarma covering four (4) properties.
Because of the outright dismissal of their appeal before the CA, we have a dearth of
facts we had to glean from the bare pleadings of petitioners.

The decedent Arminda was married to Natalio Ecarma who predeceased her on 9 May
1970. During their marriage, they acquired several properties and begat seven (7)
children: (1) Angelita; (2) Rodolfo; (3) respondent Renato; (4) Maria Arminda; (5) Gerry
Anthony Ecarma, husband and father respectively of herein petitioners Avelina Suiza
Ecarma, Dennis Ecarma, Gerry Lyn Ecarma Pena, Antonio Ecarma and Natalia Ecarma
Sangalang (collectively petitioners and/or heirs of Gerry Ecarma); (6) Fe Shirley; and (7)
Rolando.

After Natalio's death, his heirs executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate [4] covering
four (4) properties designated as Kitanlad, Cuyapo and Lala (consisting of two separate
lots), half of which was specifically noted as pertaining to herein decedent Arminda's
share in their property regime of conjugal partnership of gains. In the same Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate signed by all the heirs, the four (4) properties were partitioned
among them: Arminda was assigned an undivided two-ninth's (2/9's) proportion and all
their children in equal proportion of one-ninth (1/9) each. Significantly, despite the
partition agreement, no physical division of the properties was effected, Natalio's heirs
remaining in co-ownership (pro indiviso) even at the time of their mother's, decedent
Arminda's, death on 17 April 1983.

On 18 May 1990, after his petition for the probate of Arminda's will was dismissed by
the RTC, Branch 86, Quezon City, respondent Renato filed the subject intestate
proceedings before the RTC, Branch 220.

On 30 January 1991, Renato was appointed Special Administrator by the RTC, Branch
220.

After what appears to be continuing conflict between Gerry Ecarma and the other heirs
of Natalio and Arminda over actual division of their inherited properties, by 9 March
2005, Renato unequivocally moved to terminate their co-ownership: he filed a Project of
Partition of the Kitanlad Property, alleging that:

1. This probate case has been left unresolved for 16 years now because of the
incessant opposition by Oppositor and legal heir, Jerry Ecarma, the only legal heir who
stays in Kitanlad, for reasons they had ventilated already in this Court in their previous
pleadings, xxx
2. This, Court has ordered the sale of the assets of the estate in an earlier order, but
efforts to sell the Kitanlad property, the most contentious issue, by the Regular
Administrator, [Renato Ecarma |, has been thwarted by Jerry for reasons already known
by this Court, xxx

3. The law frowns on the indivision of property held in common indefinitely.

Furthermore, the legal heirs, except Jerry and perhaps the Oppositor, have expressed
their desire to have the Kitanlad property partitioned. The fairest legal way to partition
the property without any legal heir getting a share bigger than the others is to sell the
property and divide the net proceeds, but Jerry's objection to its sale at a price which
will attract interested buyers has rendered nugatory this option. The next best option,
with no legal heir getting an undue advantage over the others, is to divide the property
longitudinally from the frontage down to the other end in seven equal parts. Although
this option will render the improvements unusable, it must be realised that these
improvements are now fully depreciated. The. duplex house is 57 years old, while the
apartments are now 40 years old. All seven parts will be equal to each other in all their
aspects: the measurements, length and width, will be the same, each part will have a
frontage to the street. Each legal heir will have complete control over his/her portion.
Me/she may keep it if he/she wishes, or sell it if he/she desires. Allocation of these
seven parts will be by lot.[5]

On 7 April 2005, Renato filed another motion, Omnibus Motion: Project of Partition of
the Lala and Cuyapo Properties.

Finding the motions impressed with merit, the RTC, Branch 220, on 28 July 2005,
[6]
 issued a lengthy Order approving the proposed partition of the properties:

1. That the property be divided longitudinally from the frontage down to the other
end in seven (7) equal parts. The shares of Jerry Ecarma and Rodolfo Ecarma shall
be contiguous to each other on one side of the property nearest the main
entrance, while the shares of the other five (5) legal heirs shall comprise the
balance thereof. Following this general guideline, Jerry Ecarma and Rodolfo
Ecarma shall determine among themselves their respective share. Similarly, the
five (5) remaining legal heirs shall determine among themselves by draw of lot
their respective shares. They shall submit to the Petitioner/Regular Administrator
their choice of their specific shares not later [than] fifteen (15) days upon receipt
of this Order. Should they fail to comply, the Regular Administrator is hereby
 directed to assign the respective share of each legal heir.

xxxx

II. Cuyapo Property

1. The Cuyapo farm lot shall be partitioned into seven (7) equal parts substantially
in accordance with Annex "A" of the "Partial Project of Partition of Estate" dated
22 June 1992. Lots 1 and 2 will be allocated to Jerry Ecarma and Rodolfo Ecarma,
so that the remaining balance will remain contiguous to one another. The
remaining balance, as prayed for, can now be donated by the five (5) other legal
heirs to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). This manner of partition will
effectuate the desire of the five (5) remaining legal heirs to donate their share to
the AFP.

2. The Regular Administrator is hereby directed to cause the partition and titling of
the property.

3. Expenses for the partition and titling of the property shall be for the personal
account of each legal heir, which shall be deducted from their share of the estate.

III. Lala Property

1. The Lala Property consisting of two (2) farm lots contiguous to each other, one
consisting of more than six (6) hectares and the other more than 13 hectares
shall each be partitioned into seven (7) equal parts substantially in accordance
with Annex "B" of the aforecited "Partial Project of Partition of Estate" dated 22
June 1992, as submitted by the Regular Administrator. Lots 6 and 7 of the six-
hectare lot will while Lots 1 and 2 of the 13-hectare lot will be likewise allocated
to Jerry Ecarma and each other. The remaining balance can now be donated by
the five (5) other legal heirs to the AFP. This manner of partition will effectuate
the desire of the five (5) remaining legal heirs to donate their shares to the AFP. [7]

Gerry Ecarma filed a motion for reconsideration on the following grounds: (1) the
project of partition of the Kitanlad properties is not feasible, impractical and detrimental
to the interests of the heirs of the Spouses Natalio and Arminda Ecarma; (2) the planned
partition is not in accordance with the wishes of the decedents, the spouses Natalio and
Arminda; and (3) the RTC, Branch 220, as the court settling the intestate estate of
Arminda, has no jurisdiction over part of.the subject properties which do not form part
of Arminda's estate, such undivided share already pertaining to the other heirs as part
of their inheritance from their deceased father, Natalio.

The other oppositor to the partition, Rodolfo Ecarma, likewise filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the 28 July 2005 Order of Partition on the main ground, akin to the
3rd ground raised by Gerry in his motion, that the RTC, Branch 220 acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction by ordering the partition of the subject properties, portions of
which do not belong to the intestate estate of Arminda.

After Renato filed his Comment/Opposition to the two motions for reconsideration, the
RTC, Branch 220, finding no cogent reason to reverse or modify its prior order of
partition, issued an Order denying Gerry's and Renato's motions.

Thereafter, Gerry filed both a Notice of Appeal and a Record on Appeal before the RTC,
Branch 220 to bring up on appeal to the CA the trial court's partition order.

It appears that sometime before 4 May 2009, counsel of Gerry Ecarma filed a Notice of
Death of Gerry Ecarma before the appellate court and was subsequently required by the
latter to submit a certified true copy of Gerry Ecarma's death certificate within a
prescribed period.[8]

Meanwhile, herein petitioners, presumably in substitution of the deceased Gerry

Ecarma, filed their Appellants' Brief pursuant to the order of the appellate court. From
this incident of herein petitioners' Appellants' Brief before the CA, and its contents, the
controversy has reached us.

Renato forthwith filed a Motion to Dismiss Appellants' Brief, to which the CA required a
comment from petitioner.[9]

The Resolutions of the CA finding insufficient herein petitioners' Appellants' Brief

are now before us. The CA ruled that:

The Court xxx finds [petitioners'] submission [that their brief substantially complied with
the requirements under Section 13, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court] to be utterly devoid of
merit. Indeed, [petitioners'] brief does not contain a subject index, table of cases and
authorities, statement of case, statement of facts and page references to the record in
violation of Section 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure xxx.

xxxx

Non-compliance with these requirements warrants the dismissal of appeal under

Section 1(1), Rule 50.

xxxx

[Petitioners] could have easily cured these multiple defects in the same manner their
counsel did with his MCLE compliance and SPA. But, they opted not to. Instead, they
stubbornly insist, albeit erroneously, that their appellants' brief substantially complied
with the requirements. They failed, however, to point out with specificity what part or
parts of their brief contain their so-called substantial compliance. Surely, the Court
cannot countenance [petitioners'] careless attitude, if not irreverent disregard, of the
procedural rules intended precisely to ensure orderly administration of justice.

xxxx

Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED.[10]

Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the dismissal of their appeal, attaching a

Supplemental Appellants' Brief[11] to their motion. However, the appellate court again
deemed the Supplemental Appellants' Brief to be unsatisfactory and non-compliant with
the rules and denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration:

Notably, the new appeal brief, just like the original one, does not contain
reference to the relevant portions of the record pertaining to its statement of facts.
Further, the subject index does not contain a summary of arguments and reference to
the specific pages of the brief, and the supporting laws and authorities. [12]

From that denial, petitioners filed this petition for  certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court almost sixty (60) days from the time they received the appellate court's denial
of their motion for reconsideration.

At the outset, we see through petitioners' obvious ploy to avoid the necessary
consequence of their failure to file, within the required fifteen-day period, the correct
remedy of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45[13] of the Rules of Court, from the assailed
ruling of the CA. On this score alone, the present petition should have been dismissed
outright.

Petitioners simple allegation of grave abuse of discretion in the CA's dismissal of their
appeal cannot substitute for the correct remedy of a lost appeal. [14]

Notably, as they have stubbornly done so in the appellate court, petitioners urge us to
reverse these adverse rulings of the appellate court without abiding by the rules
therefor.

First. An appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is different from a

petition for certiorari under Rule 65 thereof. A special civil action for certiorari may be
availed of only if the lower tribunal has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and if there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 5
Simply imputing in a petition that the ruling sought to be reviewed is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion does not magically transform a petition into a special civil action
for certiorari.

The appellate court's outright dismissal of therein appellants' appeal was a final order
which left it with nothing more to do to resolve the case. [16] That disposition is a final
and executory order, appealable to, and may be questioned before, this Court by
persons aggrieved thereby, such as herein petitioners, via Rule 45.

Moreover, the dismissal of therein appellants', herein petitioners', appeal before the CA
is expressly allowed by Section 1(f),[17] Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. The appellate court,
therefore, cannot be charged with grave abuse of discretion as there is no showing that,
in the exercise of its judgment, it acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic
manner tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Absent grave abuse of discretion, petitioners
should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 instead of a petition
for certiorari  under Rule 65. The soundness of the ruling dismissing petitioners' appeal
before the appellate court is a matter of judgment with respect to which the remedy of
the party aggrieved is a Rule 45 petition. An error of judgment committed by a court in
the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is not the same as grave abuse of discretion.
Errors of judgment are correctible by appeal, while those of jurisdiction are reviewable
by certiorari.[18]
Even if we were to take a liberal stance and consider this present petition as that filed
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising grave error in the appellate courts' ruling,
such cannot cure the unavoidable consequence of dismissal for failure to file an appeal
within the reglementary fifteen-day period provided under Section 2 [19] of Rule 45.

Second. The CA correctly dismissed herein petitioners' Appellants' Brief for failure to
comply with the content requirement specified under Section 13 [20] of Rule 44.

Petitioners are adamant, however, that they complied with the required content
specified in the rules even attaching a sample copy of an Appellant's Brief found in
Guevarra's Legal Forms which was purportedly their guideline in revising and submitting
their Supplemental Appellants' Brief to the appellate court. [21]

We assiduously went through the Supplemental Appellants' Brief of herein petitioners

and as the CA have, we likewise find it wanting, a lame attempt at compliance through
superficial changes, devoid of substance.[22]

In fact, the Supplemental Appellants' Brief could only cite Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules
of Court as its sole legal authority in questioning the RTC, Branch 220's Order of
Partition.[23] Petitioners, even in their present petition before us, are unable to grasp the
necessity of supporting and anchoring their arguments with legal basis. They cannot
simply cite one section of one rule without expounding thereon.

In the recent case of Lui Enterprises, Inc., v. Zuellig Pharma Corporation, et al. ,[24] we
reiterated the faithful adherence to the rules on the specific contents of an Appellant's
Brief as provided in Section 14, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court:

Lui Enterprises did not comply with the

rules on the contents of the appellant's brief

Under Rule 50, Section 1, paragraph (f) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court of
Appeals may, on its own motion or that of the appellee, dismiss an appeal should the
appellant's brief lack specific requirements under Rule 44, Section 13, paragraphs (a),
(c), (d), and (f):
Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. - An appeal may be dismissed by the
Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following
grounds:
 xxxx

(f) Absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellant's brief, or of page

references to the record as required in Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d), and (f) of Rule
44[.]
These requirements are the subject index of the matter in brief, page references
to the record, and a table of cases alphabetically arranged and with textbooks and
statutes cited:
Section 13. Contents of the appellant's brief. - The appellant's brief shall contain,
in the order herein indicated, the following:
(a) A subject index of the matter in brief with a digest of the arguments and page
references, and a table of cases alphabetically arranged, textbooks and statutes cited
with references to the pages where they are cited;

xxxx

(c) Under the heading "Statement of the Case," a clear and concise statement of the
nature of the action, a summary of the proceedings, the appealed rulings and orders of
the court, the nature of the controversy, with page references to the record;

(d) Under the heading "Statement of Facts," a clear and concise statement in a narrative
form of the facts admitted by both parties and of those in controversy, together with
the substance of the proof relating thereto in sufficient detail to make it clearly
intelligible, with page references to the record;

xxxx

(f) Under the heading "Argument," the appellant's arguments on each assignment of
error with page references' to the record. The authorities relied upon shall be cited by
the page of the report at which the case begins and the page of the report on which the
citation is found;
xxxx

Lui Enterprises' appellant's brief lacked a subject index, page references to the record,
and table of cases, textbooks and statutes cited. Under Rule 50, Section 1 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed Lui Enterprises'
appeal.
Except for cases provided in the Constitution, appeal is a "purely statutory right."The
right to appeal "must be exercised in. the manner prescribed by law" and requires strict
compliance with the Rules of Court on appeals. Otherwise, the appeal shall be
dismissed, and its dismissal shall not be a deprivation of due process of law.

In Mendoza v. United Coconut Planters Bank, Inc., this court sustained the Court of
Appeals' dismissal of Mendoza's appeal. Mendoza's appellant's brief lacked a subject
index, assignment of errors, and page references to the record. In De Liano v. Court of
Appeal, this court also sustained the dismissal of De Liano's appeal. De Liano's
appellant's brief lacked a subject index, a table of cases and authorities, and page
references to the record.

There are exceptions to this rule. In Philippine Coconut Authority v. Corona

International, Inc., the Philippine Coconut Authority's appellant's brief lacked a clear and
"concise statement of the nature of the action, a summary of the proceedings, the
nature of the judgment, and page references to the record. However, this court found
that the Philippine Coconut Authority substantially complied with the Rules. Its
appellant's brief apprise[d] [the Court of Appeals] of the essential facts and nature of
the case as well as the issues raised and the laws necessary [to dispose of the case]."
This court "[deviated] from a rigid enforcement of the rules" and ordered the Court of
Appeals to resolve the Philippine Coconut Authority's appeal.

In Go v. Chaves, Go's 17-page appellant's brief lacked a subject index. However, Go
subsequently filed a subject index. This court excused Go's procedural lapse since the
appellant's brief "[consisted] only of 17 pages which [the Court of Appeals] may easily
peruse to apprise it of [the case] and of the relief sought." This court ordered the Court
of Appeals to resolve Go's appeal "in the interest of justice."
In Philippine Coconut Authority and Go, the appellants substantially complied
with the rules on the contents of the appellant's brief. Thus, this court excused the
appellants' procedural lapses.

In this case, Lui Enterprises did not substantially comply with the rules on the contents
of the appellant's brief. It admitted that its appellant's brief lacked the required subject
index, page references to the record, and table of cases, textbooks, and statutes cited.
However, it did not even correct its admitted "technical omissions" by filing an amended
appellant's brief with the required contents. Thus, this case does not allow a relaxation
of the rules. The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Lui Enterprises' appeal.

Rules on appeal "are designed for the proper and prompt disposition.of cases before the
Court of Appeals." With respect to the appellant's brief, its required contents are
designed "to minimize the [Court of Appeals'] labor in [examining] the record upon
which the appeal is heard and determined."

The subject index serves as the briefs table of contents. Instead of "[thumbing] through
the [appellant's brief]" every time the Court of Appeals Justice encounters an argument
or citation, the Justice deciding the case only has to refer to the subject index for the
argument or citation he or she needs. This saves the Court of Appeals time in reviewing
the appealed case. Efficiency allows the justices of the appellate court to substantially
attend to this case as well as other cases.

Page references to the record guarantee that the facts stated in the appellant's brief are
supported by the record. A statement of fact without a page reference to the record
creates the presumption that it is unsupported by the record and, thus, "may be
stricken or disregarded altogether."

As for the table of cases, textbooks, and statutes cited, this is required so that the Court
of Appeals can easily verify the authorities cited "for accuracy and aptness."

Lui Enterprises' appellant's brief lacked a subject index, page references to the record,
and a table of cases, textbooks, and statutes cited. These requirements "were designed
to assist the appellate court in the accomplishment of its tasks, and, overall, to enhance
the orderly administration of justice." This court will not disregard rules on appeal "in
the guise of liberal construction." For this court to liberally construe the Rules, the party
must substantially comply with the Rules and correct its procedural lapses. Lui
Enterprises failed to remedy these errors.

All told, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Lui Enterprises' appeal. It failed to
comply with Rule 44, Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d), and (f) of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure on the required contents of the appellant's brief.

Third. While we sustain the appellate court's dismissal of herein petitioners' appeal, we
find it imperative to rule on the merits of the RTC, Branch 220's Order of Partition to
forestall any further delay in the settlement of decedent Arminda's estate which has
been pending since 1990 where Order of Partition of the subject properties was issued
on 28 July 2005. We note also that petitioners themselves pray for a ruling thereon.

There is no quarrel from any of the parties that the subject properties were originally
part of the conjugal partnership of gains property regime of the deceased spouses
Natalio and Arminda.[25] The nature of these properties as part of the spouses' conjugal
properties was confirmed in the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Natalio signed
by all his heirs, his spouse Arminda and their children, including predecessor of herein
petitioners, Gerry Ecarma.[26]

Essentially, pursuant to this Extrajudicial Settlement, Arminda was apportioned two-

ninth's (2/9's) share, while her children were equally ascribed one-ninth (1/9) portion, of
the subject properties. Upon Arminda's death, her heirs' rights to the succession
(covering Arminda's share in the subject properties) vested and their co-ownership over
the subject properties has consolidated by operation of law. [27] Effectively, without a
valid will of Arminda, and as Arminda's compulsory heirs,[28] herein parties (specifically
Gerry Ecarma prior to his death and substitution by herein petitioners) all ipso facto  co-
owned the subject properties in equal proportion being compulsory heirs of the
deceased spouses Natalio and Arminda.[29]

There appears to be no clear objection, therefore, to the RTC, Branch 220's Order of
Partition approving the proposal of the administrator, herein respondent Renato, for
the equal division of the properties:

1. The Kitanlad property: longitudinally from the frontage down to the other end
with the shares of the [oppositors to the partition] Jerry Ecarnia and Rodolfo Ecarma
contiguous to each other on one side of the property nearest to the main entrance; and

xxxx

2. The Cuyapo and Lala properties: partitioned into seven (7) equal parts with Jerry's and
Rodolfo's respective shares contiguous to each other, and the remainder to be donated
by the other legal heirs, as manifested by them, to the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP).

Their objection to the actual partition notwithstanding, herein petitioners and even
Rodolfo Ecarma cannot compel the other co-heirs to remain in perpetual co-ownership
over the subject properties. Article 494, in relation to Article 1083, of the Civil Code
provides:

Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-
owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as
his share is concerned.

Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not
exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.

A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty
years.

Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.

No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-
heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

Art. 1083. Every co-heir has a right to demand the division of the estate unless the
testator should have expressly forbidden its partition, in which case the period of
indivision shall not exceed twenty years as provided in Article 494. This power of the
testator to prohibit division applies to the legitime.

Even though forbidden by the testator, the co-ownership terminates when any of the
causes for which partnership is dissolved takes place, or when the court finds for
compelling reasons that division should be ordered, upon petition of one of the co-heirs.

The impasse between the parties is due to herein petitioners' persistent objection to
proposals for the partition of the subject properties. The deceased Gerry Ecarma,
Rodolfo Ecarma and herein petitioners consistently opposed the proposed partition of
the administrator, respondent Renato, since such is ostensibly "not feasible, impractical
and renders detrimental use of the Kitanlad property." However, it is apparent that
Gerry Ecarma and his heirs (herein petitioners) completely object to any kind of
partition of the subject properties, contravening even the proposed sale thereof.

We note that petitioners have been careful not to proffer that the subject properties are
indivisible or that physical division of thereof would render such unserviceable since
Article 495[30] of the Civil Code provides the remedy of termination of co-ownership in
accordance with Article 498[31] of the same Code, i.e. sale of the property and
distribution of the proceeds. Ineluctably, therefore, herein petitioners' absolute
opposition to the partition of the subject properties which are co-owned has no basis in
law. As mere co-owners, herein petitioners, representing the share of the deceased
Gerry Ecarma, cannot preclude the other owners likewise compulsory heirs of the
deceased spouses Natalio and Arminda, from exercising all incidences of their full
ownership.[32]

Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED. The Court of Appeal's dismissal of the Appeal in
CA-G.R. CV No. 92375 is FINAL. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 179859, August 09, 2010 ]
IN RE: PETITION FOR PROBATE OF LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF
BASILIO SANTIAGO, MA. PILAR SANTIAGO AND CLEMENTE
SANTIAGO, PETITIONERS, VS. ZOILO S. SANTIAGO, FELICIDAD
SANTIAGO-RIVERA, HEIRS OF RICARDO SANTIAGO, HEIRS OF
CIPRIANO SANTIAGO, HEIRS OF TOMAS SANTIAGO, RESPONDENTS.
FILEMON SOCO, LEONILA SOCO, ANANIAS SOCO, URBANO SOCO,
GERTRUDES SOCO AND HEIRS OF CONSOLACION SOCO,
OPPOSITORS.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Basilio Santiago (Basilio) contracted three marriages--the first to Bibiana Lopez,

the second to Irene Santiago, and the third to Cecilia Lomotan.  Basilio and his first wife
bore two offsprings, Irene and Marta, the mother of herein oppositors Felimon, Leonila,
Consolacion, Ananias, Urbano, and Gertrudes, all surnamed Soco.

Basilio and his second  wife had six offsprings, Tomas, Cipriano, Ricardo, respondents
Zoilo and Felicidad, and petitioner Ma. Pilar, all surnamed Santiago.
Basilio and his third wife bore three children, Eugenia herein petitioner Clemente, and
Cleotilde, all surnamed Santiago.[1]

After Basilio died testate on September 16, 1973, his daughter by the second marriage
petitioner Ma. Pilar filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan [2] a petition for
the probate of Basilio's will, docketed as SP No. 1549-M.  The will was admitted to
probate by Branch 10 of the RTC and Ma. Pilar was appointed executrix.

The will contained the following provisions, among others:

4.  Ang mga ari-arian ko na nasasaysay sa itaas ay INIWAN, IPINAGKAKALOOB,

IBINIBIGAY, at IPINAMAMANA ko sa aking mga nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng gaya
ng sumusunod:

xxxx

c) ang aking anak na si Ma. Pilar ang magpapalakad at mamamahala ng balutan na nasa
Santiago, Malolos, Bulacan, na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(y);

d) Sa pamamahala ng bigasan, pagawaan ng pagkain ng hayop at lupa't bahay sa

Maynila, ang lahat ng solar sa danay ng daang Malolos-Paombong na nasa Malolos,
Bulacan, kasali at kasama ang palaisdaan na nasa likuran niyon, ay ililipat sa pangalan
nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente; nguni't ang kita ng palaisdaan ay siyang gagamitin nila sa
lahat at anomang kailangang gugol, maging majora o roperacion [sic], sa lupa't bahay sa
Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c);

e)  Ang lupa't bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c) ay ililipat at

ilalagay sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente hindi bilang pamana ko sa kanila kundi
upang pamahalaan at pangalagaan lamang nila at nang ang sinoman sa aking mga
anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko sa habang panahon ay may tutuluyan kung
magnanais na mag-aral sa Maynila o kalapit na mga lunsod x x x.

f)   Ang bigasan, mga makina at pagawaan ng pagkain ng hayop ay ipinamamana ko sa

aking asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga anak na Zoilo, Ma. Pilar, Ricardo, Cipriano,
Felicidad, Eugenia, Clemente, at Cleotilde nang pare-pareho.  Ngunit, sa loob ng
dalawampong (20) taon mula sa araw ng aking kamatayan, hindi nila papartihin ito at
pamamahalaan ito ni Clemente at ang maghahawak ng salaping kikitain ay si Ma. Pilar
na siyang magpaparte.  Ang papartihin lamang ay ang kita ng mga iyon matapos na ang
gugol na kakailanganin niyon, bilang reparacion, pagpapalit o pagpapalaki ay maawas
na.  Ninais ko ang ganito sa aking pagmamahal sa kanila at pagaaring ibinubuhay ko sa
kanila lahat, bukod sa yaon ay sa kanila ding kapakinabangan at kabutihan.

g)  Ang lahat ng lupa, liban sa lupa't bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila, ay ipinapamana ko

sa aking nasabing asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga anak na Tomas, Zoilo, Ma. Pilar,
Ricardo, Cipriano, Felicidad, Eugenia, Clemente at Cleotilde nang pare-
pareho.  Datapwa't, gaya din ng mga bigasan, makina at gawaan ng pagkain ng hayop,
ito ay hindi papartihin sa loob ng dalawampong (20) taon mula sa aking pagpanaw, at
pamamahalaan din nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente.  Ang mapaparte lamang ay ang kita o ani
ng nasabing mga pag-aari matapos bayaran ang buwis at/o patubig at iba pang mga
gugol na kailangan.  Si Ma. Pilar din ang hahawak ng ani o salaping manggagaling dito. 
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)[3]

The oppositors-children of Marta, a daughter of Basilio and his first  wife, were, on their
motion, allowed to intervene.[4]

After the executrix-petitioner Ma. Pilar filed a "Final Accounting, Partition and
Distribution in Accordance with the Will," [5] the probate court approved the will
by Order of August 14, 1978 and directed the registers of deeds of Bulacan and Manila
to register the certificates of title indicated therein. [6]  Accordingly, the titles to Lot Nos.
786, 837, 7922, 836 and 838 in Malolos, Bulacan and Lot No. 8-C in Manila were
transferred in the name of petitioners Ma. Pilar and Clemente. [7]

The oppositors thereafter filed a Complaint-in-Intervention [8] with the probate court,

alleging that Basilio's second wife was not Irene but a certain Maria Arellano with whom
he had no child; and that Basilio's will violates Articles 979-981 of the Civil Code. [9]

The probate court dismissed the Complaint-in-Intervention, citing its previous approval
of the "Final Accounting, Partition, and Distribution in Accordance with the Will." [10]

The oppositors-heirs of the first marriage thereupon filed a complaint for completion of
legitime before the Bulacan RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 562-M-90,[11] against the
heirs of the second and third marriages.

In their complaint, oppositors-heirs of the first marriage essentially maintained that they
were partially preterited by Basilio's will because their legitime was reduced. [12] They
thus prayed, inter alia, that an inventory and appraisal of all the properties of Basilio be
conducted and that Ma. Pilar and Clemente be required to submit a fresh accounting of
all the incomes of the properties from the time of Basilio's death up to the time of the
filing of Civil Case No. 562-M-90.[13]

RTC-Branch 17 decided Civil Case No. 562-M-90 (for completion of legitime) in favor of
the oppositors-heirs of the first marriage.

On appeal (docketed as CA G.R. No. 45801), the Court of Appeals, by Decision of
January 25, 2002,[14] annulled the decision of RTC-Branch 17, holding that the RTC
Branch 17 dismissal of the Complaint-in-Intervention in SP No. 1549-M and its August
14, 1978 Order approving the probate of the will constitute res judicata with respect to
Civil Case No. 562-M-90.[15]   Thus the appellate court disposed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision

in Civil Case No. 562-M-90 is hereby ANNULLED on the ground of res judicata.   Let the
Decree of Distribution of the Estate of Basilio Santiago remain UNDISTURBED.

SO ORDERED.[16] (emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

Oppositors-heirs of the first  marriage challenged the appellate court's decision in CA

G.R. No. 45801 by petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 155606, which this Court
denied.[17]  The denial became final and executory on April 9, 2003.[18]

In the interregnum, or on October 17, 2000, respondent-heirs of the second marriage

filed before the probate court (RTC-Branch 10) a Motion for Termination of
Administration, for Accounting, and for Transfer of Titles in the Names of the
Legatees.[19]  Citing the earlier quoted portions of Basilio's will, they alleged that:

x x x x the twenty (20) year period within which subject properties should be

under administration of [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago expired on
September 16, 1993.

Consequently, [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago should have ceased as such
administrator[s] way back on September 16, 1993 and they should have transferred the
above said titles to the named legatees in the Last Will and Testament of the testator by
then.  Said named legatees in the Last Will and Testament are no[ne] other than the
following:
xxxx

Said [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago should have also rendered an
accounting of their administration from such death of the testator up to the present or
until transfer of said properties and its administration to the said legatees.

x x x x[20]

Respondents prayed that petitioners be ordered:

1) To surrender the above-enumerated titles presently in their names to [the]

Honorable Court and to transfer the same in the names of the designated legatees in
the Last Will and Testament, to wit:

1) asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga anak na

2) Tomas
3) Zoilo
4) Ma. Pilar
5) Ricardo
6) Cipriano
7) Felicidad
8) Eugenia
9) Clemente at
10) Cleotilde

(all surnamed SANTIAGO)

2) To peacefully surrender possession and administration of subject properties,

including any and all improvements thereon, to said legatees.

3) To render an accounting of their administration of said properties and other

properties of the testator under their administration, from death of testator Basilio
Santiago on September 16, 1973 up to the present and until possession and
administration thereof is transferred to said legatees. [21]

Opposing the motion, petitioners argued that with the approval of the Final Accounting,
Partition and Distribution in Accordance with the Will, and with the subsequent issuance
of certificates of title covering the properties involved, the case had long since been
closed and terminated.[22]

The probate court, finding that the properties in question would be transferred to
petitioners Ma. Pilar and Clemente for purposes of administration only, granted the
motion, by Order of September 5, 2003,[23]  disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Termination of

Administration, for Accounting, and for Transfer of Titles in the Names of the Legatees
dated October 3, 2000 filed by some heirs of the testator Basilio Santiago xxx is
hereby GRANTED.  Accordingly, the administratrix [sic] Ma. Pilar Santiago and Mr.
Clemente Santiago are hereby DIRECTED, as follows:

a.) To surrender the above-enumerated titles presently in their names to this Honorable
Court and to transfer the same in the names of the designated legatees in the Last Will
and Testament, to wit: 1.) asawa, Cecilia Lomotan at  mga anak na 2.) Tomas 3). Zoilo 4.)
Ma. Pilar 5.) Ricardo 6.) Cipriano 7.) Felicidad 8.) Eugenia 9.) Clemente and 10.) Cleotilde
all named SANTIAGO.

b.) To peacefully surrender possession and administration of subject properties

including any and all improvements thereon, to said legatees; and

c.) To render an accounting of their administration of subject properties, including any

and all improvements thereon, to said legatees; and

d.) To submit an accounting of their administration of the above-mentioned estate of

the testator or all the above said lots including the rice mill, animal feeds factory, and all
improvements thereon from August 14, 1978 up to the present.

e.) To submit a proposed Project of Partition, indicating how the parties may actually
partition or adjudicate all the above said properties including the properties already in
the name of all the said legatees xxx.

x x x x.

Further, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan are hereby DIRECTED to cancel and consider
as no force and effects Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.  T-249177 (RT-46294) [Lot No.
786], T-249175 (RT-46295) [Lot No. 837], T-249174 (RT-46296) [Lot No. 7922], T-249173
(RT-46297) [Lot No. 836], and T-249176 (RT-46293) [Lot No. 838] in the names of Ma.
Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago and to issue new ones in the lieu thereof in the
names of Cecilia Lomotan-Santiago, Tomas Santiago, Zoilo Santiago, Ma. Pilar Santiago,
Ricardo Santiago, Cipriano Santiago, Felicidad Santiago, Eugenia Santiago, Clemente
Santiago, and Cleotilde Santiago.

Moreover, the Register of Deeds of Manila is hereby DIRECTED to cancel and consider as

no force and effect Transfer Certificate of Title No. 131044 [Lot No. 8-C] in the names of
Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago and to issue new ones in lieu thereof in the
names of the Heirs of Bibiana Lopez, the Heirs of Irene Santiago, and the Heirs of Cecilia
Lomotan.

The Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by Filemon, Leonila, Ma. Concepcion, Ananias,
Urbano and Gertrudes, all surnamed Soco, dated December 3, 2002, is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.[24]

Respecting petitioners' argument that the case had long been closed and terminated,
the trial court held:

x x x x [I]t is clear from the Last Will and Testament that subject properties cannot
actually be partitioned until after 20 years from the death of the testator Basilio
Santiago x x x x.  It is, therefore, clear that something more has to be done after the
approval of said Final Accounting, Partition, and Distribution.  The testator Basilio
Santiago died on September 16, 1973, hence, the present action can only be filed after
September 16, 1993.  Movant's cause of action accrues only from the said date and for
which no prescription of action has set in.

The principle of res judicata does not apply in the present probate proceeding which is
continuing in character, and terminates only after and until the final distribution or
settlement of the whole estate of the deceased in accordance with the provision of
the will of the testator.  The Order dated August 14, 1978 refers only to the accounting,
partition, and distribution of the estate of the deceased for the period covering from the
date of the filing of the petition for probate on December 27, 1973 up to August 14,
1978.  And in the said August 14, 1978 order it does not terminate the appointment of
petitioner[s] Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago as executrix and administrator,
respectively, of the estate of the deceased particularly of those properties which were
prohibited by the testator to be partitioned within 20 years from his death.  Since then
up to the present, Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago remain the executor and
administrator of the estate of the deceased and as such, they are required by law to
render an accounting thereof from August 14, 1978 up to the present; there is also now
a need to partition and distribute the aforesaid properties as the prohibition period to
do so has elapsed. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) [25]

Petitioners, together with the oppositors, filed a motion for reconsideration, [26] which
the probate court denied, drawing them to appeal to the Court of Appeals which
docketed it as CA G.R. No. 83094.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the probate court,[27] hence, the

petition[28] which raises the following grounds:

I.

"CAN THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS REVERSE ITSELF"

A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT BINDING ITSELF WITH ITS PREVIOUS
DECISION INVOLVING THE SAME PARTIES AND SAME PROPERTIES;

B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RTC AS IT AGREED WITH THE
RTC THAT THIS CASE IS NOT BARRED BY RES JUDICATA;

C.  IN C.A.-G.R. NO. 45801, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HELD THAT THERE
WAS RES JUDICATA; IN C.A.-G.R. CV NO. 83094, THERE WAS NO RES JUDICATA.

II.

"GRANTING THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ALL THE COMPETENCE AND
JURISDICTION TO REVERSE ITSELF, STILL THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE RTC'S ORDER TO TRANSFER THE MANILA PROPERTY COVERED BY TCT NO. 131004
TO THE NAMES OF CECILIA LOMOTAN, TOMAS, ZOILO, MA. PILAR, RICARDO,
CIPRIANO FELICIDAD, EUGENIA, CLEMENTE AND CLEOTILDE, ALL SURNAMED
SANTIAGO."[29]  (emphasis in the original)

The petition lacks merit.

Petitioners' argument that the decision of the appellate court in the earlier CA-G.R. NO.
45801 (upheld by this Court in G.R. No. 155606) constitutes res judicata to the
subsequent CA G.R. No. 83094 (the subject of the present petition for review) fails.

Res judicata has two aspects, which are embodied in Sections 47 (b) and 47 (c) of Rule
39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.[30]  The first, known as "bar by prior judgment,"
proscribes the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of
action already settled in a prior action.[31] The second, known as "conclusiveness of
judgment," ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot
again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause
of action.[32]

Both aspects of res judicata, however, do not find application in the present case. The
final judgment regarding oppositors' complaint on the reduction of their legitime in CA-
G.R. NO. 45801 does not dent the present petition, which solely tackles the propriety of
the termination of administration, accounting and transfer of titles in the names of the
legatees-heirs of the second and third  marriages.  There is clearly no similarity of claim,
demand or cause of action between the present petition and G.R. No. 155606.

While as between the two cases there is identity of parties, "conclusiveness of

judgment" cannot likewise be invoked.  Again, the judgment in G.R. No. 155606 would
only serve as an estoppel as regards the issue on oppositors' supposed preterition and
reduction of legitime, which issue is not even a subject, or at the very least even
invoked, in the present petition.

What is clear is that petitioners can invoke res judicata  insofar as the judgment in G.R.
No. 155606 is concerned against the oppositors only.  The records reveal, however, that
the oppositors did not appeal the decision of the appellate court in this case and were
only impleaded pro forma parties.

Apparently, petitioners emphasize on the directive of the appellate court in CA G.R. No.
45801 that the decree of distribution of the estate of Basilio should remain
undisturbed.  But this directive goes only so far as to prohibit the interference of the
oppositors in the distribution of Basilio's estate and does not pertain to
respondents' supervening right to demand the termination of administration,
accounting and transfer of titles in their names.

Thus, the Order of September 5, 2003 by the probate court granting respondents'
Motion for Termination of Administration, for Accounting, and for Transfer of Titles in
the Names of the Legatees is a proper and necessary continuation of the August 14,
1978 Order that approved the accounting, partition and distribution of Basilio's estate. 
As did the appellate court, the Court notes that the August 14, 1978 Order was yet to
become final pending the whole settlement of the estate.  And final settlement of the
estate, in this case, would culminate after 20 years or on September 16, 1993, when the
prohibition to partition the properties of the decedent would be lifted.

Finally, petitioners object to the inclusion of the house and lot in Manila, covered by TCT
No. 131044, among those to be transferred to the legatees-heirs as it would contravene
the testator's intent that no one is to own the same.

The Court is not persuaded.  It is clear from Basilio's will that he intended the house and
lot in Manila to be transferred in petitioners' names for administration purposes only,
and that the property be owned by the heirs in common, thus:

e)  Ang lupa't bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c) ay ililipat
at ilalagay sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente hindi bilang pamana ko sa kanila
kundi upang pamahalaan at pangalagaan lamang nila at nang ang sinoman sa aking
mga anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko sa habang panahon ay may tutuluyan kung
magnanais na mag-aral sa Maynila o kalapit na mga lunsod sa medaling salita, ang
bahay at lupang ito'y walang magmamay-ari bagkus ay gagamitin habang panahon ng
sinomang magnanais sa aking kaapuapuhan na tumuklas ng karunungan sa paaralan sa
Maynila at katabing mga lunsod x x x x[33] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

But the condition set by the decedent on the property's indivisibility is subject to a
statutory limitation.  On this point, the Court agrees with the ruling of the appellate
court, viz:

For this Court to sustain without qualification, [petitioners]'s contention, is to go

against the provisions of law, particularly Articles 494, 870, and 1083 of the Civil Code,
which provide that the prohibition to divide a property in a co-ownership can only last
for twenty (20) years x x x x

xxxx

x x x x Although  the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the indivision of a property for
more than twenty years, it would be contrary to public policy to sanction co-ownership
beyond the period expressly mandated by the Civil Code x x x x[34]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 162421, August 31, 2007 ]
NELSON CABALES AND RITO CABALES, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, JESUS FELIANO AND ANUNCIACION FELIANO,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision [1] of
the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 2003, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68319 entitled "Nelson
Cabales and Rito Cabales v. Jesus Feliano and Anunciacion Feliano," which affirmed with
modification the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte,
Branch 25, dated August 11, 2000, in Civil Case No. R-2878. The resolution of the Court
of Appeals dated February 23, 2004, which denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration, is likewise herein assailed.

The facts as found by the trial court and the appellate court are well established.

Rufino Cabales died on July 4, 1966 and left a 5,714-square meter parcel of land located
in Brgy. Rizal, Sogod, Southern Leyte, covered by Tax Declaration No. 17270 to his
surviving wife Saturnina and children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco, Leonora, Alberto and
petitioner Rito.

On July 26, 1971, brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto sold the subject
property to Dr. Cayetano Corrompido for P2,000.00, with right to repurchase within
eight (8) years. The three (3) siblings divided the proceeds of the sale among
themselves, each getting a share of P666.66.

The following month or on August 18, 1971, Alberto secured a note ("vale") from Dr.
Corrompido in the amount of P300.00.

In 1972, Alberto died leaving his wife and son, petitioner Nelson.

On December 18, 1975, within the eight-year redemption period, Bonifacio and Albino
tendered their payment of P666.66 each to Dr. Corrompido. But Dr. Corrompido only
released the document of sale with pacto de retro after Saturnina paid for the share of
her deceased son, Alberto, including his "vale" of P300.00.

On even date, Saturnina and her four (4) children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco and
Leonora sold the subject parcel of land to respondents-spouses Jesus and Anunciacion
Feliano for P8,000.00. The Deed of Sale provided in its last paragraph, thus:
It is hereby declared and understood that the amount of TWO THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX PESOS (P2,286.00) corresponding and belonging to the Heirs of
Alberto Cabales and to Rito Cabales who are still minors upon the execution of this
instrument are held in trust by the VENDEE and to be paid and delivered only to them
upon reaching the age of 21.
On December 17, 1985, the Register of Deeds of Southern Leyte issued Original
Certificate of Title No. 17035 over the purchased land in the names of respondents-
spouses.

On December 30, 1985, Saturnina and her four (4) children executed an affidavit to the
effect that petitioner Nelson would only receive the amount of P176.34 from
respondents-spouses when he reaches the age of 21 considering that Saturnina paid Dr.
Corrompido P966.66 for the obligation of petitioner Nelson's late father Alberto, i.e.,
P666.66 for his share in the redemption of the sale with pacto de retro as well as his
"vale" of P300.00.

On July 24, 1986, 24-year old petitioner Rito Cabales acknowledged receipt of the sum
of P1,143.00 from respondent Jesus Feliano, representing the former's share in the
proceeds of the sale of subject property.
In 1988, Saturnina died. Petitioner Nelson, then residing in Manila, went back to his
father's hometown in Southern Leyte. That same year, he learned from his uncle,
petitioner Rito, of the sale of subject property. In 1993, he signified his intention to
redeem the subject land during a barangay conciliation process that he initiated.

On January 12, 1995, contending that they could not have sold their respective shares in
subject property when they were minors, petitioners filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, a complaint for redemption of the subject land plus
damages.

In their answer, respondents-spouses maintained that petitioners were estopped from

claiming any right over subject property considering that (1) petitioner Rito had already
received the amount corresponding to his share of the proceeds of the sale of subject
property, and (2) that petitioner Nelson failed to consign to the court the total amount
of the redemption price necessary for legal redemption. They prayed for the dismissal of
the case on the grounds of laches and prescription.

No amicable settlement was reached at pre-trial. Trial ensued and on August 11, 2000,
the trial court ruled against petitioners. It held that (1) Alberto or, by his death, any of
his heirs including petitioner Nelson lost their right to subject land when not one of
them repurchased it from Dr. Corrompido; (2) Saturnina was effectively subrogated to
the rights and interests of Alberto when she paid for Alberto's share as well as his
obligation to Dr. Corrompido; and (3) petitioner Rito had no more right to redeem his
share to subject property as the sale by Saturnina, his legal guardian pursuant to Section
7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court, was perfectly valid; and it was shown that he received
his share of the proceeds of the sale on July 24, 1986, when he was 24 years old.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court. It held that the
sale by Saturnina of petitioner Rito's undivided share to the property was unenforceable
for lack of authority or legal representation but that the contract was effectively ratified
by petitioner Rito's receipt of the proceeds on July 24, 1986. The appellate court also
ruled that petitioner Nelson is co-owner to the extent of one-seventh (1/7) of subject
property as Saturnina was not subrogated to Alberto's rights when she repurchased his
share to the property. It further directed petitioner Nelson to pay the estate of the late
Saturnina Cabales the amount of P966.66, representing the amount which the latter
paid for the obligation of petitioner Nelson's late father Alberto. Finally, however, it
denied petitioner Nelson's claim for redemption for his failure to tender or consign in
court the redemption money within the period prescribed by law.

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals
erred in (1) recognizing petitioner Nelson Cabales as co-owner of subject land but
denied him the right of legal redemption, and (2) not recognizing petitioner Rito Cabales
as co-owner of subject land with similar right of legal redemption.

First, we shall delineate the rights of petitioners to subject land.

When Rufino Cabales died intestate, his wife Saturnina and his six (6) children,
Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco, Leonora, Alberto and petitioner Rito, survived and
succeeded him. Article 996 of the New Civil Code provides that "[i]f a widow or widower
and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the
succession the same share as that of each of the children." Verily, the seven (7) heirs
inherited equally on subject property. Petitioner Rito and Alberto, petitioner Nelson's
father, inherited in their own rights and with equal shares as the others.

But before partition of subject land was effected, Alberto died. By operation of law, his
rights and obligations to one-seventh of subject land were transferred to his legal heirs -
his wife and his son petitioner Nelson.

We shall now discuss the effects of the two (2) sales of subject land to the rights of the
parties.

The first sale with pacto de retro to Dr. Corrompido by the brothers and co-owners
Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto was valid but only as to their pro-indiviso shares to the
land. When Alberto died prior to repurchasing his share, his rights and obligations were
transferred to and assumed by his heirs, namely his wife and his son, petitioner Nelson.
But the records show that it was Saturnina, Alberto's mother, and not his heirs, who
repurchased for him. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Saturnina was not
subrogated to Alberto's or his heirs' rights to the property when she repurchased the
share.

In Paulmitan v. Court of Appeals,[3] we held that a co-owner who redeemed the

property in its entirety did not make her the owner of all of it. The property remained in
a condition of co-ownership as the redemption did not provide for a mode of
terminating a co-ownership.[4] But the one who redeemed had the right to be
reimbursed for the redemption price and until reimbursed, holds a lien upon the subject
property for the amount due.[5] Necessarily, when Saturnina redeemed for Alberto's
heirs who had then acquired his pro-indiviso share in subject property, it did not vest in
her ownership over the pro-indiviso share she redeemed. But she had the right to be
reimbursed for the redemption price and held a lien upon the property for the amount
due until reimbursement. The result is that the heirs of Alberto, i.e., his wife and his son
petitioner Nelson, retained ownership over their pro-indiviso share.

Upon redemption from Dr. Corrompido, the subject property was resold to
respondents-spouses by the co-owners. Petitioners Rito and Nelson were then minors
and as indicated in the Deed of Sale, their shares in the proceeds were held in trust by
respondents-spouses to be paid and delivered to them upon reaching the age of
majority.

As to petitioner Rito, the contract of sale was unenforceable as correctly held by the
Court of Appeals. Articles 320 and 326 of the New Civil Code [6] state that:
Art. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of
the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth
more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the
approval of the Court of First Instance.

Art. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the
father or mother shall be considered a guardian of the child's property, subject to the
duties and obligations of guardians under the Rules of Court.
In other words, the father, or, in his absence, the mother, is considered legal
administrator of the property pertaining to the child under his or her parental authority
without need of giving a bond in case the amount of the property of the child does not
exceed two thousand pesos.[7] Corollary to this, Rule 93, Section 7 of the Revised Rules
of Court of 1964, applicable to this case, automatically designates the parent as legal
guardian of the child without need of any judicial appointment in case the latter's
property does not exceed two thousand pesos, [8] thus:
Sec. 7. Parents as guardians. - When the property of the child under parental
authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the mother, without the
necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal guardian x x x x [9]
Saturnina was clearly petitioner Rito's legal guardian without necessity of court
appointment considering that the amount of his property or one-seventh of subject
property was P1,143.00, which is less than two thousand pesos. However, Rule 96, Sec.
1[10] provides that:
Section 1. To what guardianship shall extend. - A guardian appointed shall have
the care and custody of the person of his ward, and the management of his estate, or
the management of the estate only, as the case may be. The guardian of the estate of a
nonresident shall have the management of all the estate of the ward within the
Philippines, and no court other than that in which such guardian was appointed shall
have jurisdiction over the guardianship.
Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary power of administration of the
minor's property. It does not include the power of alienation which needs judicial
authority.[11] Thus, when Saturnina, as legal guardian of petitioner Rito, sold the
latter's pro-indiviso share in subject land, she did not have the legal authority to do so.

Article 1403 of the New Civil Code provides, thus:

Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:

(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no
authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;

xxxx
Accordingly, the contract of sale as to the pro-indiviso share of petitioner Rito
was unenforceable. However, when he acknowledged receipt of the proceeds of the
sale on July 24, 1986, petitioner Rito effectively ratified it. This act of ratification
rendered the sale valid and binding as to him.

With respect to petitioner Nelson, on the other hand, the contract of sale was void. He
was a minor at the time of the sale. Saturnina or any and all the other co-owners were
not his legal guardians with judicial authority to alienate or encumber his property. It
was his mother who was his legal guardian and, if duly authorized by the courts, could
validly sell his undivided share to the property. She did not. Necessarily, when Saturnina
and the others sold the subject property in its entirety to respondents-spouses, they
only sold and transferred title to their pro-indiviso shares and not that part which
pertained to petitioner Nelson and his mother. Consequently, petitioner Nelson and his
mother retained ownership over their undivided share of subject property. [12]

But may petitioners redeem the subject land from respondents-spouses? Articles 1088
and 1623 of the New Civil Code are pertinent:
 Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before
the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser
by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of
one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.

Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except
within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the
vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of
Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written
notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.

The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners.

Clearly, legal redemption may only be exercised by the co-owner or co-owners
who did not part with his or their pro-indiviso share in the property held in common. As
demonstrated, the sale as to the undivided share of petitioner Rito became valid and
binding upon his ratification on July 24, 1986. As a result, he lost his right to redeem
subject property.

However, as likewise established, the sale as to the undivided share of petitioner Nelson
and his mother was not valid such that they were not divested of their ownership
thereto. Necessarily, they may redeem the subject property from respondents-spouses.
But they must do so within thirty days from notice in writing of the sale by their co-
owners vendors. In reckoning this period, we held in Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,[13] thus:
x x x we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a
cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge
should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the
law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never
within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume
the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. x x x x

x x x x While we may not read into  the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless
have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to
"the letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the lawmaker's
will.

In requiring written notice, Article 1088 (and Article 1623 for that matter) [14] seeks to
ensure that the redemptioner is properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date of
such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of redemption. Considering the
shortness of the period, it is really necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise
date it is supposed to begin, to obviate the problem of alleged delays, sometimes
consisting of only a day or two.
In the instant case, the right of redemption was invoked not days but years after
the sale was made in 1978. We are not unmindful of the fact that petitioner Nelson was
a minor when the sale was perfected. Nevertheless, the records show that in 1988,
petitioner Nelson, then of majority age, was informed of the sale of subject property.
Moreover, it was noted by the appellate court that petitioner Nelson was likewise
informed thereof in 1993 and he signified his intention to redeem subject property
during a barangay conciliation process. But he only filed the complaint for legal
redemption and damages on January 12, 1995, certainly more than thirty days from
learning about the sale.

In the face of the established facts, petitioner Nelson cannot feign ignorance of the sale
of subject property in 1978. To require strict proof of written notice of the sale would be
to countenance an obvious false claim of lack of knowledge thereof, thus commending
the letter of the law over its purpose, i.e., the notification of redemptioners.

The Court is satisfied that there was sufficient notice of the sale to petitioner Nelson.
The thirty-day redemption period commenced in 1993, after petitioner Nelson sought
the barangay conciliation process to redeem his property. By January 12, 1995, when
petitioner Nelson filed a complaint for legal redemption and damages, it is clear that the
thirty-day period had already expired.

As in Alonzo, the Court, after due consideration of the facts of the instant case, hereby
interprets the law in a way that will render justice. [15]

Petitioner Nelson, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, can no longer redeem
subject property. But he and his mother remain co-owners thereof with respondents-
spouses. Accordingly, title to subject property must include them.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals of October 27, 2003 and February 23, 2004 are AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. The Register of Deeds of Southern Leyte is ORDERED to cancel Original
Certificate of Title No. 17035 and to issue in lieu thereof a new certificate of title in the
name of respondents-spouses Jesus and Anunciacion Feliano for the 6/7 portion, and
petitioner Nelson Cabales and his mother for the remaining 1/7 portion, pro indiviso.

SO ORDERED.