Tesis Política 5 PDF

A POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN
BRILL’S
INNER ASIAN LIBRARY
edited by
NICOLA DI COSMO
DEVIN DEWEESE
CAROLINE HUMPHREY
VOLUME 17
A POLITICAL AND
DIPLOMATIC HISTORY
OF AFGHANISTAN
1863-1901
BY
M. HASSAN KAKAR
BRILL
LEIDEN • BOSTON
2006
On the cover: Amir "Abd al-Rahman Khan
This book is printed on acid-free paper.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Kakar, M. Hassan.
A political and diplomatic history of Afghanistan, 1863-1901 / Mohammad Hassan
Kakar.
p. cm. - (Brill’s Inner Asian library ; v. 17)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN-13: 978-90-04-15185-7
ISBN-10: 90-04-15185-0 (hardback : alk. paper)
1. Afghanistan—Politics and government—19th century. 2. Afghanistan—Foreign
relations. I. Title. II. Series.
DS364.K35 2006
958.1’03—dc22
2006043934
ISSN 1566-7162
ISBN-13: 978-90-04-15185-7
ISBN-10: 90-04-15185-0
© Copyright 2006 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands

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To my teachers and professors especially the late Najm al-Din Tarakay
of the high school in Laghman and Malcolm Edward Yapp of the
University of London.
CONTENTS
Preface ........................................................................................ ix
Other books and translation of books by M. H. Kakar ...... x
Abbreviations .............................................................................. xi
Introduction ................................................................................ 1
PART ONE
POLITICAL HISTORY
Chapter One: The Reign of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan ........ 9

Chapter Two: The British Afghan War and the
Accession of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman
Khan .......................................................... 25
Chapter Three: The Afghan Victory at Maiwand
and the Reunification of Afghanistan ...... 45
Chapter Four: The Pacification of Eastern
Afghanistan ................................................ 63
Chapter Five: The Great Ghilzay Uprising and its
Suppression ................................................ 87
Chapter Six: The Revolt of Sardar Mohammad Ishaq
and its Suppression .................................... 96
Chapter Seven: The Pacification of Border Principalities
in Northern Afghanistan .......................... 106
Chapter Eight: The Pacification of the Hazaras .............. 120
Chapter Nine: The Conquest of Former Kafiristan ........ 139
PART TWO
EXTERNAL RELATIONS
Chapter Ten: Relations with the British Government

of India and the Durand Agreement ...... 159
Chapter Eleven: Relations with Russia and the Russian
Occupation of Panjdeh ............................ 193
Chapter Twelve: Relations with Persia and the Ottoman
Turkey ........................................................ 210
viii contents
Conclusion .................................................................................. 217

Appendices ................................................................................ 231
Select Bibliography .................................................................... 241
Glossary ...................................................................................... 247
Index .......................................................................................... 251
PREFACE
My first work in English entitled, Afghanistan, A Study in Internal

Political Developments, was published in 1971. It covered only six-
teen years of the 21-year reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan (pro-
nounced Abdur Rahman) and was based only on the unpublished
and published documents of the British Government of India, which
I had collected from the India Office Library and Records in London
(now a part of the British Library Asia, Pacific and Africa Collections),
for my M.Phil. thesis.
In the following years of the 1970s, I overhauled the entire 1971
publication on the basis of new source material that I had obtained
from the archival centers in Kabul and New Delhi. The Afghan
official chronicle, Siraj al-Tawarikh, became another valuable source
which was not available to me in London. I completed the revision
of the 1971 work at Princeton and Harvard universities where I
served as a visiting Fellow. These new sources enabled me to cover
the entire reign of the amir, not only politically but diplomatically
also, and to add some new topics as described in the Introduction
of the present study. Subsequently, I revised the previously over-
hauled 1971 text on the basis of two important books: Sirdar Abdul
Qadir Effendi’s Royals and Royal Mendicant (1948?) and Major
General Sir Charles M. MacGregor’s War in Afghanistan, 1879–80
(1985).
I have performed the revision of my original study over an extended
period of time, in line with the advice of Socrates, who had advised
that “. . . the lover of inquiry must follow his beloved wherever it
may lead him.”1 As a result of the thoroughness of this revision, the
excellence of the historical sources, and my specialist knowledge of
the subject, it is now possible to state that the national as well as
the local history, of Afghanistan during this period (1863–1901) has
become clearer than its history, during any other comparable period.
I would like to express my thanks to Stanley Barton for reading
the entire manuscript and offering valuable editorial suggestions.
1
Plato, The Trial and Death of Socrates, Translated by Grube, C. M. A.,
Hacket Publishing Co. Indianapolis, Cambridge, 1975, 18.
OTHER BOOKS AND TRANSLATION OF BOOKS
BY M. H. KAKAR
In English
Afghanistan, A Study in Internal Political Developments, 1880–1896 (1971)
Government and Society in Afghanistan, The Reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman
Khan (1979)
Afghanistan, The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979–1982 (1995)
In Pashto
The Geneva Compromise on Afghanistan (1988)
Afghans in the Spring of 1987 at War with the Russians (1990)
Light and Defense or Essays on the Population, History and Current Affairs of
Afghanistan, Editor (1999)
Journey to the Homeland; The Taliban and Islamic Fundamentalism, (2004)
The Reign of King Aman Allah Reconsidered (2005)
In Dari
Afghan, Afghanistan and Afghans and the Organization of the State in India,
Persia and Afghanistan (1978)
The Second Anglo-Afghan War (1989)
Translation
(Pashto or Dari)
Gorky on Literature (1961)
What is History? E. H. Carr, author (1968)
The Real World of Democracy, C. B. McPherson, author (1971)
An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, 2 vols., M. Elphinstone, author (1982)
Introduction to the Philosophy of Education, George Knelle, author (2002)
Manuscript in Pashto
Journal of Political Developments, 1979–1982
ABBREVIATIONS*
ARAMFA The Archives of the Royal Afghan Ministry

of Foreign Affairs, Kabul
BACA Biographical Accounts of Chiefs, Sardars and others
of Afghanistan, Calcutta, 1888
BSOAS Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies
CD Chitral Agency Diary
DSCD Dir, Swat, Chitral Agency Diary
GAK (1895) Gazetteer of Afghanistan, Kabul, pt. 4, 1895
GD Gilgit Agency Diary
IGA Imperial Gazetteer of India, Afghanistan and Nepal,
(Calcutta, 1908)
IOL India Office Library, Commonwealth Relations Office,
London
HD Herat Diary
Kand. D. Kandahar Diary
KD Kabul Diary
Kh.D. Khyber Agency Diary
Mala. D. Malakand Agency Diary
MM Monthly Memorandum
MRA Military Report on Afghanistan, (Calcutta, 1906)
MRA (1925) Military Report on Afghanistan, (Delhi, 1925)
NAI National Archives of India, Delhi
PD Peshawar Agency Diary
PNEA Papers relating to Afghanistan, Narrative of Events
in Afghanistan, 1878–1880
PSLI Political and Secret Letters and Enclosures Received
[in London] from India
* References to the records without ARAMFA or NAI indicate records of the

India Office Library, and Commonwealth Relations Office, now a part of the British
Library, London.
Archival sources are cited without special marks while their volumes and pages
are cited only by their numbers. The pattern of the archival sources varies toward
the end of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman’s reign. Siraj al-Tawarikh without the mention
of volume refers to its third volume which is devoted entirely to the sixteen years
of the amir’s reign.
xii abbreviations
SJD Sawal wa Jawab-e-Dawlati (Amir 'Abd al-Rahman’s interviews

with the viceroy of India), Mohammad Nabi, (author), Kabul
1915
(T) Telegram
Amir Sher 'Ali Khan (1823–1879). Amir Dost Mohammad Khan (1791–1863).
Source: Stephen Wheeler, The Ameer Abdur Rahman, 1895. Source: Stephen Wheeler, The Ameer Abdur Rahman, 1895.
Sketch Map of Afghanistan and Adjoining Countries.
Source: Stephen Wheeler, The Ameer Abdur Rahman Khan, 1895.
INTRODUCTION
This work begins with the death of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan
in 1863 and ends with the death of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan
in 1901. It is an in depth study of the political history and external
relations of Afghanistan during the second reign of Amir Sher 'Ali
Khan and the entire reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan (pro-
nounced Abdur Rahman), who ruled from July 20, 1880 to October
2, 1901. The reigns of these two amirs were characterized by their
efforts in centralizing and consolidating state order as never before.
It was also during their reigns that the boundaries of Afghanistan
were internationally agreed for the first time in its long history albeit
to its disadvantage. The centralization efforts also became significant
because they became a model for their successors.
The introductory remarks of this study begin with the reign of
Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, who founded the Mohammadzay
dynasty following a long period of civil war, which broke out after
the Sadozay dynasty fell from power, in 1818. He was the father of
Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, and the grandfather of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman
Khan, and these three figures were the giant players of nineteenth-
century Afghanistan. The Sadozays and Mohammadzays, who played
a pivotal role in the history of modern Afghanistan for almost two
and a half centuries (1747–1978) were respectively sections of the
Popalzay and Barakzay divisions of the Pashtun Durranay tribal con-
federation, while the Pashtuns have dominated the political scene of
the country in modern times.1
1
The Pashtuns (or Pakhtuns) also called the Afghans, and the Pathans are among
the ancient inhabitants of Afghanistan, constituting linguistically fifty five percent,
and genealogically sixty two percent of the present population of the country. The
Tajiks, the Hazaras, the Uzbeks, the Turkmen, the Char Aimaq and others are
the other ethnic groups of the country. (Wak Foundation of Afghanistan, The Ethnic
Composition of Afghanistan, Sapay Center for Pashto Research and Development,
Peshawar, 1998, 62, 73).
The name ‘Pashtun’ is probably the ‘Pakthas’ of the Vedic period, which Herodotus
in the fifth century B.C.E. recorded as ‘Pactyes’, in describing the inhabitants of
“the Pactyic country, north of the rest of India,” who, he states, “live much like
the Bactrians.” The word Afghan appears in ancient Indian, Persian and Chinese
2 introduction
Dost Mohammad Khan assumed power first as the governor of

Kabul in 1826 and later as the amir of Afghanistan, in 1834, but
the British deported him to India in 1840 after they had invaded
Afghanistan in 1838. The invasion resulted in a full-scale war
sources as ‘Asvaka’, ‘Asva-Ghana’, ‘Abgan’, ‘Apakan’, ‘Avagana’, ‘Ap-o-kien’ and,

finally, ‘Afghan’. The Persian-speaking people still pronounce ‘Afghan’ as ‘Aoghan’.
In modern times the word ‘Afghan’ has come to signify all of the inhabitants of
Afghanistan.
According to many authors, the name ‘Pathan’ is derived from ‘Pakhtana’, the
plural of ‘Pakhtun’. However, this does not seem to be true as the name has come
into use since the twelfth century in India when some Pashtuns settled in the Patna
district in the Bahar province. The Indians then called them, according to the his-
torian Firishta, as ‘Pathan’ after Patna.
Although the Pashtuns are genealogy-conscious they have no written records of
their ancestors. Herodotus mentions Gandaharii, Aparytae, and Sittagydae, names
that may refer to the inhabitants of Gandahara, Apriday (or Afriday), and the
Khattak. But according to one legend, the present-day Pashtuns are the descen-
dants of a person known as Qays, who may have lived in and around the Kisay
Ghar, or in Ghor, in western Afghanistan in the seventh century. This Qays, accord-
ing to the legend, visited the Prophet Muhammad in Medina, who named him
Qays 'Abd al-Rashid.
The name ‘Qays’ is probably the Arabicized form of ‘Kisay’, a name that signifies
a series of ranges that came to be known in the Islamic period the ‘Sulaiman
Mountains’, described by Morgenstierne “as the earliest known home of the Afghans.”
‘Kisay’ was probably also the given name of the person in question, and that he
changed it to Qays 'Abd al-Rashid under the Islamic impulse, as was common
practice in Islamic Afghanistan. The change of Isapzai or Asapzai to Yusufzay is
another example of this type.
Groups of people have also related themselves to the Arabs. The Shinwaray
Pashtuns, for example, formerly called themselves sayyeds—that is, the descendants
of the Prophet, Muhammad, through his daughter, Fatima. Even Pashto has been
considered by some to be a Semitic language. The Kam tribe of the former Kafiristan
too believed that they were related to the Quraysh tribe to which the Prophet,
Muhammad, belonged. These associations were made because in Islamic Afghanistan
the sayyeds were (and still are) respected, and the government paid them as well as
the mullas and religious leaders ( pirs) allowances. Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, however,
compelled the sayyeds to present the firmans on the basis of which they received
allowances. Since only a few could, he discontinued the allowances, saying, “I am
tired of these Soyids (sic). How is it that the soyids are found in such large numbers
everywhere? I can not accept the genealogical table of any of them”. In general,
it is probably impossible for Afghan sayyeds to prove that they are Arabs by descent.
Qays 'Abd al-Rashid had four sons: Beett (or Beettnai), Ghorghasht, Sarbun, and
Korla. The contradiction is obvious between these names and the name ‘Qays 'Abd
al Rashid’. If ‘Qays’ had converted to Islam, as the legend says he had, he cer-
tainly would have given his sons Muslim names, not purely Pashto names such as
these. Also, how can the descendants of one person multiply in the course of four-
teen centuries to about forty million known souls of the present day Pashtuns, who
now live on both sides of the Durand Line? Recently (1976), Afghan historian,
Ahmad 'Ali Kohzad, has advanced the view according to which Beett, Ghorghasht,
and Sarbun were the illustrious ancestors and heroes of the Pashtuns in the Avestan
introduction 3
(1838–1841) that came to be known in the Afghan sources as the

First Anglo-Afghan war and in the English annals as the Afghan
war. After the British had lost more than 16, 500 soldiers and their
Indian camp followers, and that the war had ended, they allowed
Dost Mohammad Khan to return to Afghanistan. Upon his return
home in 1843 he assumed power once again as an independent amir
and ruled the country until his death in June 1863. By the time of
his death he had reunited the fragmented country more by states-
manship than by force, and reorganized the shattered economy and
the government along traditional lines. The Afghanistan that he ruled
stretched from the Oxus River (Amu Darya) to the territories up to
Peshawar. Dost Mohammad Khan was assisted by his numerous sons
and grandsons some of whom served as provincial governors, known
as sardars (‘persons in command; general’), and governed almost
autonomously, subject only to Amir dost Mohammad Khan.
After the heir-apparent, Sardar Sher 'Ali Khan (b. 1822), became
amir some of the provincial governors rebelled. The rebellion lasted
intermittently for four years (1864–1868) during which time Afghanistan
period who were then known respectively by the names of Atratt, Gharshasib, and
Sarand.
According to the aforementioned legend, the present-day divisions of Pashtuns
have descended from the first three sons: for example, the Durranays (formerly
called Awdaul or Abdaul), the Barezh, the Tarin, the Ghoryakhel, and the Yusufzays
are said to be descended from Sarbun; the Kakars, the Daways, the Babis and oth-
ers from Ghorghast; and the Ghilzays, the Lodays, the Suris, the Niazays and oth-
ers are descended from Beett. Korla is said to have had no issues. (For details see,
Neamet Ullah, History of the Afghans, Trans. from Persian into English with annota-
tions by Dorn, Bernard, Vanguard Books (PVT), Lahore, 1999 (Reprint), 26–42.
Herodotus, The History, Translated by Grene, D., The University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, London, 1987, 3–91, 3.102, 7.67, 7.85. Khattak, Tarikh-e-Murrasa" (in Pashto),
A. General History of the Pashtuns, ed. Kamil Momand, D. M., University Book Agency,
Peshawar, 606–624. Afzal Khan Khattak was a grandson of the great poet and
warrior Khushhal Khattak. Morgenstierne, G., “The People; The Pashto Language;
Pashto Literature”, The Encyclopedia of Islam, vol. 1, 1960, 216–221. Durranay,
Sultan Mohammad, The History of Sultani, (in Dari) Bombay, 1298 H. Q., 14–23.
Kakar, M. H. Afghan, Afghanistan and the Afghans and the Organization of the State in India,
Persia and Afghanistan, (in Dari), Kabul University Press, 1978, 1–37. Kakar, Government
and Society in Afghanistan, The Reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, 1880–1901, Texas
University Press at Austin, 1979, 157–158. Kohzad, Ahmad 'Ali, Gharghasht ya
Gharshasib, (in Persian), [Gharghasht or Gharshasib], Kabul, first published in 1976,
reprint by the Daunish Book Store, Peshawar, 1999. Siyal, Mira Jan., Da Zeeno
Pashtano Qaba"ilo Shajaray aw da Hugho Mainay aw Lund Tarikh, (in Pashto) [ The Genealogy
of Some Pashtun Tribes and Their lands and Short History], University Book Agency,
Peshawar, 1986. I am grateful to Dr. Zamin Mohmand for lending me this impor-
tant book.
4 introduction
was plunged into a war in which many sons and grandsons of the
late amir participated. In the course of the war Sardar 'Abd al-
Rahman Khan, the only son of the eldest son of the late amir, dis-
tinguished himself by helping his father and his full-uncle to the
throne one after the other. Amir Sher 'Ali Khan became a fugitive
within his own country, but did not give up the fight. Finally in
September 1868, he regained the throne with the help of his eldest
son, Sardar Mohammad Ya'qub Khan, and Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman
Khan fled to Samarqand in Central Asia after his father and his
full-uncle had died one after the other. In Samarqand Sardar 'Abd
al-Rahman Khan remained on a Russian pension for eleven years.
During his second reign, described in Chapter One, Amir Sher
'Ali Khan organized his administration, and introduced some reforms,
which put Afghanistan on the road to becoming a nation-state.
However, the British, in the pursuit of their Forward Policy of the
1870s, occupied the country once again in 1878. This occupation
resulted in the Second Anglo-Afghan war, and it destroyed all that
Amir Sher 'Ali Khan had accomplished. The viceroy of India, Lord
Lytton, even decided to break up the country, and help the fugitive
Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman ascend the throne of what he called “Northern
Afghanistan.”
Lytton opposed the rise to power of any member of the house of
Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, after the Afghans had massacred the person-
nel of the British embassy in Kabul in an uprising. However, sub-
sequent events obliged him as well as his immediate successor to
abandon the scheme of fragmentation. His successor even assisted
the new ruler, Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, in reuniting the whole
country. This occurred after Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, a son
of the late Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, had inflicted a stunning defeat on
the British army at Maiwand, threatening the position of the British
as well as that of the new amir. To overcome the common foe, the
British assisted the amir, not only with money and weapons, but
also by handing him over the province of Kandahar, which they
had officially declared independent in the name of a local ruler as
part of their scheme of fragmenting the country. To the relief of the
British the amir expelled his rival cousin to Persia, and succeeded
in reuniting the country. But the reunification was incomplete since
the British retained the Khyber and the Michni Passes, along with
the districts of Kurram (Kurma), Pishin and Sibi that they had
acquired by the treaty of Gandumak, of 1879. Additionally, the
introduction 5
British were to conduct the external relations of the country, and

later by the Durand Agreement or the Kabul Convention of 1893,
they even deprived the amir of ruling over a vast region in the east-
ern hinterland.
As amir, 'Abd al-Rahman Khan began the work which his pre-
decessor, Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, had begun, but focused more on
state building than nation building. Consequently, he concentrated
on order and security, and drastically curtailed the traditional lib-
erty that the Afghans especially their rural magnates enjoyed. He
had reasons for doing so. Externally, by then Afghanistan had been
encircled almost entirely by the British and Russian empires. They
also curbed the amir’s drive for regaining the territories that Afghanistan
had lost previously, and also seized additional territory. Later in his
reign they even reached an understanding between themselves and
made Afghanistan a buffer state. The amir suspected both powers,
and made their understanding a further justification for consolidat-
ing the government and his dynastic power, thereby demanding
sacrifices from his subjects. Internally, the amir also had problems
not less demanding. He was to establish his rule in the face of oppo-
sition of dynastic rivals. The more popular son of the late amir,
Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, proved a formidable rival, as noted
above. While Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan succeeded in expelling
him to Persia in 1881, his struggle with him, as well as his close ties
with the British, alienated from the amir the Durranays and most
of those who had fought the British during their occupation of
Afghanistan. In 1888 the amir’s full-cousin, Sardar Mohammad Ishaq
Khan, the virtual autonomous governor of Afghan Turkestan, rebelled,
but failed to unseat the amir. The defeated sardar took refuge in
Samarqand a second time and the expansionist empires of Britain
and Russia became homes to his dynastic rival cousins, including
the former amir, Mohammad Ya'qub Khan.
The external threats coupled with those from dynastic rivals as
well as potential threats from provincial magnates convinced the amir
that for Afghanistan to survive as a country it must have a strong
central government with a strong military force. But this scheme
required the allocation of a large proportion of financial resources
and the curtailment of traditional autonomy of tribal communities
and elders. Considering the country’s meager resources and the
unwillingness of its people to live under a police state this was a
most stupendous task that the amir set for himself. This scheme
6 introduction
resulted in over 40 rebellions of which I have studied only the major

ones. The pacification of Hazarajat and the conquest of Kafiristan
for the first time were different in nature. All of these events as well
as the encirclement of the country by the British and Russian empires,
and the demarcation of its boundaries make the reign of Amir 'Abd
al-Rahman Khan as the most formative period in the history of
modern Afghanistan.
In view of their importance to the history of Afghanistan, Afghan
relations with the British Government of India and with Russia con-
stitute the major part of this study. Britain and Russia which had
started the so-called Great Game to dominate the Central Asian
lands much earlier in the century had finally besieged Afghanistan
in the period under discussion. To them Afghanistan was a land
without borders, an alibi for their forward movements. On the other
hand, it was the policy of Afghan rulers in particular Amir 'Abd al-
Rahman Khan to restore to Afghanistan the outlying territories she
had previously lost. Afghanistan became, thus, a theatre for these
powers to carry on their forward policies in opposite directions. All
this made the period not only rich in events internally but also inter-
nationally. I have studied the external developments in particular the
Durand Agreement and the Russian occupation of Panjdeh in detail
mainly in reference to the internal politics of Afghanistan, the kind
of study no other scholar has previously attempted.
The foundation of the present study is my M.Phil thesis entitled
Afghanistan, A Study in Internal Political Developments, 1880–1896, pub-
lished privately in Lahore in 1971. This work was narrower in scope
and covered only the sixteen years of the twenty-one-year reign of
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan. After its publication I located a great
number of new sources particularly while performing research for
my Ph.D. thesis, entitled, Government and Society in Afghanistan: The Reign
of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan. Published in 1979, this work, as its title
indicates, is a study of the government structure and some aspects
of society to the exclusion of political and diplomatic history.
The source materials drawn upon in the present study, as well as
my previous works, are varied and extensive, and have been evalu-
ated in detail in my 1979 publication. Among the new unpublished
sources that I have consulted for the present work are those that I
collected from the National Archives of India, in New Delhi. I have
also collected source materials from the India Office Library and
Records, in London, (now part of the British Library Asia Pacific
introduction 7
and Africa Collections), and in the Royal Ministry of External

Relations, in Kabul, where I was the only scholar to be given access
to the files relating to the reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan.
Among a number of official and un-official printed sources in Persian,
mention should be made of volume three of Siraj al-Tawarikh, (The
Lamp of Histories) and the works of Mohammad Yusuf Riyazi. As an
official chronicle, the first covers in minute detail the first sixteen
years of the reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan while the second
addresses the events of the period in a general way. These works I
was unable to consult before.
An especially important and rare work not consulted previously is
Royals and Royal Mendicant by Sirdar Abdul Qadir Effendi (b. 1888),
the eldest son of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan. Based on fam-
ily archives it is a biographical account of Amir Dost Mohammad
Khan and Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, as well as that of the hero of
Maiwand, Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan. It is the first major
book of its kind in which an educated prince describes events sur-
rounding his fallen dynasty, and is noteworthy for the author’s objec-
tivity, and critical attitude. In his own words, “With these exposures
I feel proud that I have got nothing hidden from the reader. I would
never sacrifice truth for any consideration.”2 I remain permanently
grateful to Sardar Mohammad Yahya Effendi, a relation of Sardar
Mohammad Ayyub Khan and now a retired army officer in
Rawalpindi in Pakistan, for granting me a copy of it. Mention should
also be made of an unpublished pamphlet, Reminiscences: A Short
History of an Era, 1869–1881 by Mahmud Tarzi (1865–1933) who
was a grandson of a brother of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan. As
a patriotic poet, a prolific author, and a distinguished journalist and
diplomat, Tarzi influenced his contemporary politicians and intel-
lectuals, and as the minister of external affairs in the reign of King
Aman Allah Khan he played a leading role in state affairs. His
account, although brief and sometimes unreliable contains some use-
ful information and insights. I am grateful to Dr M. Ibrahim Majid
Seraj, a grandson of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, for providing me
with a copy of its English translation.
2
Effendi, Sirdar M. A. K., Royals and Royal Mendicant, A Tragedy of the Afghan
History, 1791–1947, Lion Press, Lahore, year of print unknown (1948?), 284. Effendi
was the eldest son of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub and a grandson of Amir Sher 'Ali.
8 introduction
One important work in English is War in Afghanistan, 1878–80, the

Personal Diary of Major General Sir Charles Metcalf MacGregor,
published only recently (1985) with an introduction by Dr. William
Trousdale. As the compiler of the Gazetteer of Central Asia (a large
part of which is devoted to Afghanistan), MacGregor, who served
as the Chief of Staff of the British forces in Kabul was well informed.
His diary is in sharp contrast to the official statements and published
reports of the British government officers of the era which were com-
posed within strict limitations. Although “. . . clumsy in matters of
diplomacy and hopeless in strategy and realpolitik, in all of which
he mistakenly believed he excelled . . . but he had, nonetheless, telling
insights into personalities and issues.”3 The diary complements the
official reports as well as Royals and Royal Mendicants. While the lat-
ter is a valuable source about the Mohammadzay rulers and princes
and elders, MacGregor’s diary is a valuable source with regard to
their British counterparts in Kabul. I remain grateful to Dr. Trousdale
for giving me a copy of this important work.
It is due to the excellence of source materials, both Afghan and
non-Afghan, that this work meets the requirement of historiography.
These materials are not only abundant but also highly reliable, given
the complexity of human affairs and the limitations and fallibility of
those who record them. The sources, as well as my specialist knowl-
edge of the subject, have enabled me to give a balanced and pro-
portionate account of the whole story. Now and then during the
past thirty years or so I have revised and developed as well as com-
pressed the entire text of the original work, especially the chapter
on the former Kafiristan. The Introduction is entirely new as is
Chapter I as well as the following subsections: Waziristan, Bar
Duarranays and Afghanistan, Maymana, Roshan and Shighnan,
Wakhan, and International Significance of the Conquest of Kafiristan.
Part Two, which deals exclusively with external relations, is likewise
an entirely new addition as is the Conclusion.
3
Trousdale, W. Introduction, in MacGregor, War in Afghanistan, 1879–80, The
Personal Diary of Major General Sir Charles, Metcalfe MacGregor, with an Introduction by
Trousdale, W., Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 1985, 68.
CHAPTER ONE
THE REIGN OF AMIR SHER 'ALI KHAN
The Accession
After Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, the founder of the Mohammadzay

dynasty, died of asthma on June 9, 1863 at the age of seventy-two,
his ambitious sons from among his twenty-seven sons and twenty—
five daughters born of sixteen wives fought among themselves in a
conflict that lasted intermittently for four years. During the 21 years
of his second reign, which had begun in 1843, the amir had suc-
ceeded in reunifying the fragmented country which stretched from
the Oxus River to the plains of Peshawar mainly through states-
manship and strategy. From an early age, during the Sadozay rule
(or the Durranay Empire), he held high official posts along with his
many brothers, most of whom also served the dynasty.
The Sadozay dynasty had been founded by Ahmad Shah Durranay,
who ruled from 1747 to 1773. Following the dynasty’s fall, in 1818,
Dost Mohammad Khan distinguished himself greatly in the ensuing
struggle for power even though he was one of the youngest of his
brothers, and born of a Sipahmansur Qizilbash mother, from a
minority Turkoman ethnic group. Of the twenty-one sons of Sardar
Payanda Khan, called the Barakzay or Mohammadzay sardars, it
was the eldest, Wazir Fatih Khan, and one of the youngest, Sardar
Dost Mohammad Khan, who played the most important roles in
the downfall of the ruling Sadozay dynasty. While the former acted
as a state minister (wazir) and promoted his brothers to high posts
the latter finally grabbed the throne when the former had died. In
1826 Sardar Dost Mohammad became the governor of Kabul, and
in 1834 he became amir. During this long period of civil war he,
along with his brothers, first overcame members of the former dynasty
and afterward sidelined his own rival brothers. Some of his rival
brothers had already died of natural causes. However, Amir Dost
Mohammad Khan’s first reign did not last long as the British deported
him to India in 1840, after they had invaded Afghanistan in 1838.
During his second reign, which began in 1843, his many sons and
10 chapter one
grandsons helped him extend his authority throughout the country.

Known as the great amir (amir-e-kabir), he died in Herat shortly after
he incorporated that province into his kingdom. Herat had been
autonomous since 1818.1
At the time of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan’s death his third son,
Sardar Sher 'Ali Khan held the position of heir—apparent (wali'ahd ).
The amir had designated him as such after the two heirs-designate—
Sardar Mohammad Akbar Khan and Sardar Ghulam Haydar Khan
had died one after the other in 1847 and 1859 respectively. Just
before his own death the amir “. . . pulled himself together to don
the turban [of rulership] on the head of our hero, the “Lion of 'Ali”2
after which he was called Amir Sher 'Ali Khan. On the subject of
state power, however, Pashtun princes have seldom heeded the words
of their dead fathers. It is alleged that even before the late amir was
buried the new amir’s “. . . youthful brother [Sardar Mohammad]
Aslam intended to dispatch him [to the grave] with a pistol bullet,
when the enlightened elder brother Sardar [Mohammad] A'zam pre-
vented regicide.”3 However, the “enlightened elder brother” was
among the first to raise the standard of rebellion.
The Civil War
Amir Sher 'Ali Khan ruled in relative peace for two years with the
exception of minor expeditions such as the one undertaken against
Sardar Mohammad A'zam Khan, the governor of Zurmula (Zurmut)
who was exiled to India. In 1864, the amir undertook the first major
expedition against his eldest half- brother, Sardar Mohammad Afzal
Khan, the governor of Turkestan, who had refused to pay revenue
and read the Friday sermon (khutba) in the amir’s name. This was
an open act of rebellion as reading khutba in the name of the reign-
ing amir as well as paying revenue was the obligation of a gover-
nor. The amir feared that he might claim the throne, since he was
the eldest of their father’s sons, and further, possessed an army of
1
Effendi, Royals and Royal Mendicant, 72. According to Fayz Mohammad, Amir
Dost Mohammad Khan had 27 sons and 25 daughters born of 16 wives. Siraj al-
Tawarikh, vols. 1 and 2 in one cover, Kabul, 1331 H.Q., 250.
2
Effendi, Royals and Royal Mendicant, 81.
3
Ibid.
the reign of amir sher 'ali khan 11
twenty-five thousand troops, and had ruled the important frontier

region for almost ten years after it had been pacified in 1855. A
former British officer, William Campbell, re-christened Sher Moham-
mad, who had been taken prisoner in a battle that Dost Mohammad
Khan had waged against Shah Shuja" east of Kandahar, in 1834,
had helped Sardar Mohammad Afzal Khan in organizing his army.
All of these events influenced Amir Sher 'Ali Khan to reconcile him-
self with his rebellious brother after their armies had fought incon-
clusively in Bajgah, in June 1864.
However, Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, the only son of Afzal
Khan, worked against this arrangement because “. . . he could not
bring himself to see his father’s legitimate right of succession as the
eldest son of Dost [Mohammad Khan] trampled.”4
While [Sardar Mohammad] Afzal and the amir were walking hand in
hand in the shrine [of 'Ali in Mazar] to endorse [the] peace, 'Abd al-
Rahman exposed his mala fide to arrest the king and shoot the crown
prince [Sardar Mohammad 'Ali Khan]. Sher 'Ali was convinced that
the father and the son had resolved to end the ruling house.5
The amir then seized his brother and took him to Kabul in custody,
while the latter’s son, Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman, fearful for his life,
had already escaped to Bukhara. In 1865 Amir Sher 'Ali Khan set
out for Kandahar at the head of his army. At the time his younger
full-brother, Sardar Mohammad Amin Khan, the governor of
Kandahar, had rebelled, and, further, had occupied Kalat-e-Ghilzay.
In the fighting that took place at Kajbaz in June 1865 the rebel
governor, the crown prince, Sardar Mohammad 'Ali Khan, as well
as many others were killed. The deaths were too much for the amir
to bear, and losing all interest in world affairs he took refuge in the
khirqa (the location of the reputed robe of the Prophet, Muhammad)
in Kandahar just as Shah Mahmud Hotak had become a recluse
after his conquest of Persia, in 1722. Repeated pleas from officials
failed to move Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, and his opponents, led by
Sardar Mohammad A'zam Khan and Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan,
who had earlier fled to India and Bukhara respectively, proceeded
toward Kabul and occupied it. They then helped the imprisoned
4
Ibid., 84.
5
Ibid., 87.
12 chapter one
Sardar Mohammad Afzal Khan become amir in Kabul, in May

1866. Only then did Amir Sher 'Ali Khan leave the khirqa and ded-
icate himself to organizing an army. In a short time he succeeded
in doing so, but his army suffered defeats in Sayyedabad in May
1866, in Muqur in January 1867, and in Panjsher in September
1867 by the armies of his opponents. In the battle of Sayyedabad
alone “the belligerents sustained casualties to the tune of eight thou-
sand warriors.”6 If true, this was indeed an enormous toll. Amir Sher
'Ali Khan retreated to Herat, and Amir Mohammad Afzal Khan
died in October 1867. The latter was succeeded by his full-brother,
Amir Mohammad A'zam Khan. Sher 'Ali Khan, still did not resign,
but instead he doubled his efforts in regaining the lost throne. His
son, Sardar Mohammad Ya'qub Khan (b. 1849), and several of his
full-nephews helped him in his endeavor. However, his efforts to
march on Kabul via Balkh failed, and he returned to Herat and
planned to recover Kabul by way of Kandahar.
The first successful step in this recovery was taken by Sardar
Mohammad Ya'qub Khan, who expelled from Kandahar the sons
of Amir Mohammad A'zam Khan who ruled over it despotically.
Sher 'Ali followed his triumphant son and proceeded from Kandahar
toward Kabul, engaging Amir Mohammad A'zam Khan in a bat-
tle near Ghazni. It was at this time that a few sardars in Kabul,
tired of Amir Mohammad A'zam Khan’s tyranny, occupied the cap-
ital city for Amir Sher 'Ali Khan. Having lost the capital city and
failed in overcoming their opponent in military engagements Amir
Mohammad A'zam Khan and Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan left
Afghanistan once again. A'zam Khan died on the way to Tehran,
and Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan took asylum in Samarqand where
he lived as a Russian pensioner for eleven years. Sher 'Ali Khan
entered Kabul on September 8, 1868 and began to rule as amir for
the second time.7
There were particular reasons why the sons and grandsons of Amir
Dost Mohammad Khan fought among themselves. The amir had
divided his kingdom among his sons, just as Timur Shah Durranay
6
Ibid., 92.
7
For the best account of the civil war, see Mawlawi Nur Ahmad Nuri, Gulshan-
e-Amarat, [The Garden of the Amirate], History Association, Kabul, 1334/1956. Nuri
was a contemporary of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan.
had done earlier, and they, therefore, regarded themselves as auto-

nomous rulers, subject only to their father. Each of these governors
had his own military force, and the authority to collect taxes and
send the surplus to Kabul after deducting his own expenses; and
each ruled his province as he pleased, and consequently, each looked
upon it as his own domain. Another serious problem was the lack
of unity among Amir Dost Mohammad Khan’s numerous sons, who
were the progeny of many mothers of different ethnic background.
Princes born of the same mother joined forces against their rival
half-brothers, but sometimes even they fought against each other in
disputes over inheritance and power.
The rivalries between those born of different mothers may be
explained by the fact that full-brothers and half-brothers were brought
up in different milieus under different tutors (lalas). Also, in the com-
petitive atmosphere of dynastic circles mothers in general, and co-
wives in particular, raised their sons with a view to making them
manly, competitive, partisan, and contentious. Only with these qual-
ities, as well as skill in horsemanship, was a prince able to compete
effectively in the hard and unpredictable profession of politics. Rivalry
was always present in the families of the sardars, among whom it
“. . . would start with the governors and pages and end up with their
ladies.” The rivalry and all that was connected with it “. . . would
then spread among the sardars and the sons of lesser nobles, result-
ing in ever growing feuds over power and inheritance.” 8 However,
competitiveness and rivalry were not confined to the families of the
governing sardars; they were characteristics of the Pashtuns among
whom it was said that in the tribe you may not be without cousins,
among cousins not without brothers, and among brothers not with-
out sons. All this is due to the custom of turburi or rivalry among
paternal cousins that exists among them with force even to the pre-
sent day.
The immediate causes of the civil war were personal. Sardar
Mohammad Afzal and Sardar Mohammad A'zam felt that their
father had wronged them by passing over them in the succession.
As the eldest sons of their father, they believed that it was their
8
Tarzi, M. Reminiscences, “A Short History of an Era, 1869–1881,” Trans.
from Persian into English by Wahid Tarzi, Unpublished manuscript, 4.
14 chapter one
“natural and legal rights”9 to succeed him, one after the other. They
felt especially wronged since as governors, they had proved them-
selves to be able administrators and soldiers, though not as able as
Amir Sher 'Ali had been. They were, however, the sons of a provin-
cial Pashtun mother, whereas Amir Sher 'Ali Khan was the son of
a Sadozay mother, connected to the inner dynastic circle. This is
not to suggest that the mother of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan had directly
influenced the great amir in his decision. It is said that “Amir Dost
Mohammad Khan was too strong a character to be swayed by the
gust of love for woman.”10 Besides, “Sher 'Ali’s mother was too ugly
to appeal to a man with aesthetic taste.”11 But the great amir had
“. . . stupendous regards for her” as she had been the mother of
Wazir Mohammad Akbar Khan, the ‘Liberator of Afghanistan.’12 By
all accounts “. . . it was the astounding qualities of Sher 'Ali, which
led his father away from the path of justice”.13 The unjust path,
however, “. . . not only knocked the bottom out of his house, but
opened a wide chasm in the fidelity and the faith of the people,
which unfortunately still [as of 1948] endure[s] and emit[s] a nasty
smell of a festering sore.”14 Thus, the death of the great amir followed
by a civil war as the death of Timur Shah Durranay (who had also
shown a preference for his third son as his successor) had been.
During the civil war many other sardars also played roles, since,
by custom, each commanded contingents of private soldiers, enjoyed
rent-free lands, and received allowances in return for military ser-
vices in times of emergency. Some of these sardars, who had been
deprived by the amir of many of their privileges, entered the war,
as did tribal and community elders. However, during the entire
period of this struggle, the triumphant Mohammadzay sardars did
not treat their fallen rivals brutally as some of the triumphant Sadozay
princes had done earlier. Nor did they treat harshly the sardars who
had changed sides and by doing so had contributed to the prolon-
gation of the war. With the one exception of the execution of a
9
10
Ibid., 85.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid., 84.
non-Mohammadzay general, Mohammad Rafi' Ludin, they only

imprisoned or expelled their fallen opponents. Among a people whose
high politics were associated with violence this was indeed an achieve-
ment. This was perhaps because the Mohammadzay sardars viewed
the war as a dynastic struggle, and they considered the punishment
they inflicted on their fallen opponents to be fitting for disloyalty to
a member of their own dynasty, rather than to a ruler representing
heaven, the fatherland, the people, or the state.
The Reforms
The civil war in Afghanistan coincided with the gigantic stride of

Russia in Central Asia, as a result of which it became coterminous
with Afghanistan for the first time. (See Chapter Eleven). Under-
standably, Amir Sher 'Ali Khan feared that Afghanistan would be
probably Russia’s next target. To forestall this danger, he tried to
consolidate his government at home and gain the support of the
British Government of India.
First, on November 12, 1868, he ordered the expulsion under
guard of Sayyed Jamal al-Din Afghani (1830s–1897) via Kandahar
and Quetta to India, in opposition to his own desire to proceed to
the Russian-dominated Bukhara. As an instigator of the Muslim world
determined to oppose the European domination of the Muslim coun-
tries and working for the revival of Islam, Afghani advocated the
Pan-Islamic movement as well as the overthrow of the Muslim abso-
lutist rulers. However, Amir Sher 'Ali Khan charged that “. . . this
person has an object of his own in view,” and consequently con-
sidered his continued residence in Afghanistan “to be full of hazard
to the country.”
Afghani had entered Herat in 1866, and since October 1867 had
lodged at the Bala Hissar in Kabul. There, as a leading member of
Amir Mohammad A'zam Khan’s Privy Council he advised him “to
follow an anti-British course.” Apparently, he also intended to advise
the new amir to follow a similar line. In the words of his biogra-
pher, “It is plausible that Jamal al-Din, who had already evinced a
strong hostility to the British, was simply trying to marshal all the
persuasive power he could to turn the amir to an anti-British pol-
icy.” However, this much was known that in addition to being an
Anglophobe he was also a Russophile, and in response to his desire
16 chapter one
for the conclusion of an alliance between “the Russian and Afghan

Governments” Amir Sher 'Ali Khan had bluntly told him that “I
perfectly know my neighbors, and am well acquainted with the cir-
cumstances of the Russian Government; your further residence in
this country is contrary to my pleasure.”15
Second and more importantly, early in 1869 the amir visited India
officially, and held meetings in Ambala with the governor-general
and viceroy, Lord Mayo, who received him well, but did not share
his fear of Russia. However, he granted him weapons, and the lat-
ter, in addition, brought back with him “. . . many Indian [Muslim]
artisans and retired non-commissioned officers of the Indian Army”
as well as “scores of workers to train his forces and trim his sub-
jects.”16 Thus, it is clear that the reforms the amir introduced began
during his visit to India, which
. . . convinced him that a primitive Afghanistan will scarcely expect to
be treated on terms of equality by the two powerful neighbors, Russia
and England, nor will she remotely command recognition and respect
abroad.17
The amir would openly say that “. . . all people are advancing in
the arts of peace and civilization. It is we Afghans who remain the
ignorant asses we have always been.”18
The amir’s reforms had many dimensions, and the military attracted
most of his attention. According to Effendi the amir “. . . dedicated
15
Keddie, N., Sayyid Jamal ad-Din “al-Afghani”, A Political Biography, University of
California Press, Berkeley, London, 1972, 37, 58. Roy Mottahedeh has character-
ized the great instigator of the Muslim world in the following words: “He had a
madrasah education both in Iran and Iraq. He also acquired training in ‘erfan from
an Iranian teacher and himself wrote a treatise on Islamic mysticism. From then
on he shifted from country to country and role to role in an attempt to revive
Islam as a political force. At the court of the Ottoman emperor, the Egyptian khe-
dive, in exile in Paris or British India or czarist Russia he proved a tireless and
fearless adopter of roles and philosophies, to many of which he proved inconstant:
he was at various times a Scottish freemason, a defender of Islam against European
materialism, an advocate of parliamentary government within Islam, and an admirer
of the messianic politics of the mahdi of the Sudan.” The Mantle of the Prophet, Religion
and Politics in Iran, Pantheon Books, New York, 1985, 183.
16
Effendi, Royals and Royal Mendicant, 130. Ghobar, Mir Ghulam Mohammad,
Afghanistan Dar Masir-e-Tarikh [Afghanistan along the Highway of History, or A General
History of Afghanistan], Kabul, 1967, 596. For a description of the workshops in Kabul
where weapons were made in the reign of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan see Kakar,
Government and Society in Afghanistan, 193–194.
17
18
Ibid., 129.
his life and soul” to the military and viewed it as a “private reli-
gion”.19 Toward the end of his decade-long reign the amir had orga-
nized a large regular army. Thus, he became the first Afghan ruler
to do so, while his predecessors had relied mainly on irregular army
and the notables of the land. Based on the British model, the regular
army of 56,173 troops was grouped into 42 regiments of cavalry, 73
of infantry, and 48 batteries.20 The British Supreme Commander,
General Frederick Roberts, reporting from Kabul in 1879, stated the
following:
Before the outbreak of hostilities last year [1878] the amir had raised
and equipped with arms of precision, 68 regiments of infantry and 16
of cavalry. The Afghan artillery amounted to nearly 300 guns. Numbers
of skilled artisans were constantly employed in the manufacture of
rifled cannon and breach-loading small guns. More than a million
pound of powder and, I believe, several million rounds of homemade
snider ammunition, were in the Bala Hissar. Swords, helmets, uniforms
and other articles of military equipment were stored in proportionate
quantities.”21
The amir had turned Kabul into a military city where “. . . shouts,
marches and trumpets were heard everywhere.”22
Amir Sher 'Ali also attempted to popularize the army by induc-
ing royal princes to serve it. He “. . . enlisted Crown Prince 'Abd
Allah to don the apron of a shoe-maker, while his favorite grand-
son Ahmad 'Ali would discharge his duty with a pair of scissors to
be a good cutter of the soldiers uniforms.”23 The amir “. . . would
admonish the royal clan of the Mohammadzays to take to martial
19
Ibid., 135.
20
Figures on the army of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan are many and at variance with
each other. Those noted by J. Lambert are probably accurate, because he had com-
piled them from the official pay rolls in Kabul when the British had occupied it
in 1879. These I have cited in the text. Lambert, J. “Statement of the Revenue and
Expenditure of Afghanistan, 1877–78,” Pros. Sept. 1886, Nos. 161–166, 1886, Foreign
Department, Secret-F, The National Archives of India, New Delhi (Henceforth, NAI).
Mahmud Tarzi’s figures also tally with them when he states that “. . . the army was
organized into about 80 battalions of 800 soldiers.” Reminiscences, 7.
21
Roberts F., (from Kabul), to Alfred C. Lyall, Secretary to the Government of
India, 22 Nov. 1879, Political and Secret Letters and Enclosures Received (in
London) from India, (Henceforth PSLI), vol. 23, p. 1579. India Office Library,
London. Effendi, Royals and Royal Mendicant, 139.
22
Tarzi, Reminiscences, 7.
23
18 chapter one
life and hard work, while to the aristocracy to cut off from ease and
see his hearth and home well protected”.23a However, the Mohammad-
zays and the aristocracy showed little interest in the military service.
In order to train officers in the science of war, the amir set up a
military academy where mathematics, geography, map- reading and
strategy were taught. The manuals of instruction were translated into
Pashto in which words of command and military titles, as well as
decrees were also issued. These words of command are still in use.
Lingual reform became necessary as the Pashto—speaking Ghilzays
and Wardaks, and their notables dominated the army, and held high
civil and military posts. The amir regarded Persian as “borrowed
feathers”, and therefore felt that it was necessary to replace it with
Pashto, the language of the overwhelming majority.
During this period, the large tract of Pashtun land up to Peshawar
was still a part of Afghanistan. According to Effendi, “Soon the grate-
ful monarch found himself in a position to claim Pashto, to be the
national language of his countrymen.”24 The reform was well received,
since the Pashtuns constituted the great majority of the population,
members of the dynasty still spoke Pashto, and the Persian-domi-
nated bureaucracy was only limited. Qazi 'Abd al-Qadir (Yusufzay),
known as Qazi Qadiro, whom the amir had brought with him from
Peshawar assisted him in his reforms. A competent tradesman, well-
versed in Pashto, English, Urdu and Persian and privy to the inner-
most circle of the Afghan court, Qazi Qadiro “would always point
out the path of progress to his powerful master.” Through his devo-
tion and skill he “had so won his master’s mind that he sat safe
against attackers.”25 In 1876 The Qazi had even supervised the enu-
meration of the residents of the city of Kabul, which then had a
population of 140,700 men and women. To author Abdul Qadir
Effendi, Qazi Qadiro was “a genius.” Contrary to the assertion of
some scholars it was not Jamal al-Din Afghani, but Qazi Qadiro,
who had advised the amir to introduce the reforms.
Military service was for life on a voluntary basis26 and soldiers
were paid in cash instead of by drafts (barat ) which had been the
23a
Ibid.
24
Ibid., 135.
25
Ibid., 130.
26
Ghobar, Afghanistan Dar Masir-e-Tarikh, 612.
practice previously.27 The military expenditure strained the economy,

since out of the yearly income of over thirteen million Kabuli rupees
over five-and-a-half million (or nearly forty-three percent) were spent
on the army28 The military expenses made it necessary for the amir
to revamp the system of taxation.
Information on the overall system of taxation is not available.
However, reports on certain districts indicate that the revenue on
land was assessed either on the basis of se-kot [one-third] or jam’ bast
[assessment on a tribal community]. Under the former system, the gov-
ernment took one-third of the produce, and this was usually farmed
out, while under the latter a fixed lighter amount was assessed. The
rate of revenue on the state land (khalisa) was, of course, higher.29
For revenue purposes, districts were classified on ethnic lines. Various
other types of taxes were also imposed, as was the custom duty of
two-and-a half percent on the original price of merchandises. Further,
occasionally additional taxes were also levied. In 1878, when the
amir believed that Afghanistan was threatened by foreign powers,
he levied four Kabuli rupees on each male to strengthen the army.
This led to general discontent,30 and eroded the good will that the
amir had caused to generate when he had abolished payment of
land revenue by landowners and various other types of taxes collected
three months in advance of the actual produce taken from the land.31
Meanwhile, the amir took some austerity measures, and even
decreased the allowances of the royal household including those of
his wives so that “every penny saved would go to strengthen the
country’s defense, which was that patriotic sovereign’s one and only
desire.”32 Through this and other measures the budget, which was
in deficit in the first years of the amir’s rule33 remained in surplus
towards the closing years of his reign.34 State revenue was then
27
Sykes, Sir Percy, A History of Afghanistan, London, 2, 78. Ghobar, Afghanistan
Dar Masiri-e-Tarikh, 594.
28
Lambert, “Statement of the Revenue,” 7.
29
Hastings, Major, “A Short Account of the Ghazni District,” 4, PSLI, 26, Pt.
3, 358.
30
Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, [The Lamp of Histories], Kabul, vol. 3, 339.
31
Nuri, Gulshan-e-Amarat, 186.
32
33
Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 336.
34
Lambert, “Statement of Revenue,” 7. The total surplus for the year 1877–78
was 1,482,062 Kabuli rupees.
20 chapter one
increased by over five million Kabuli rupees from the annual total
at the end of the reign of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan. In the lat-
ter’s reign state revenue was eight million Kabuli rupees.35
Amir Sher 'Ali Khan also envisaged opening a naval base to
deliver the country from isolation and lay the ground for prosperity:
He made neither a mistake nor a secret of his cherished ambition to
have Gawadir, the forlorn harbor of southern Baluchistan, on the
entrance to the Persian Gulf, for a naval base, where-from his strong,
small but smart navy should proudly emerge, to show his royal stan-
dard of the head of the Bengal tiger, on a crimson background, to all
countries and all climes.36
At the time Baluchistan was a part of Afghanistan.
The amir also introduced administrative reforms by setting up a
twelve-member state council composed of civic leaders and military
officers, whom he himself selected.37 After Ahmad Shah Durranay,
Amir Sher 'Ali was the first Afghan ruler to do so, but his council
was only consultative. Additionally, although the council was devised
to be permanent38 toward the latter years of his reign it was not
heard of. Instead, the amir acted in consultation with a few trusted
advisers from the royal court and the executive branch of government
the latter of which he had enlarged in 1873 on the occasion of the
festivities that were held that year in honor of the official nomina-
tion of his younger son, Sardar 'Abd Allah Jan, as heir apparent.
Also on the occasion of the official nomination, Amir Sher 'Ali
promoted officials to ministerial positions with prestigious titles, in
Pashto: Nur Mohammad Shah Foshanji as loy mukhtar (prime min-
ister), 'Asmat Allah Khan Ghilzay as loy mayan de ghro mulk (minister
of home affairs), Aersala Khan Ghilzay as loy mayan de baunday (min-
ister of foreign affairs), Habib Allah Khan Wardak as loy mulk (min-
ister of finance), Hussayn 'Ali Khan as tol mishr (minister of war),
Ahmad 'Ali Khan Timuri as loy tolawunay (minister of treasury), and
Mohammad Hassan Khan (Qizilbash) as loy kishil (chief secretary to
the amir). The amir adopted the title of Assistant to the Religion
(Mo'in al-Din) for himself.39 No one from the royal dynasty was made
35
Ghobar, Afghanistan Dar Masir-eTtarikh, 575.
36
37
Nuri, Gulshan-e-Amarat, 186.
38
39
Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi ' [Events Observed] in Kulliyat-e-Riyazi (in Persian) [The
a member of the ministerial cabinet, and the amir gave full weight
to the principle of personal qualification. The standing army enabled
him to do so as it freed him from traditional dependence on the
Mohammadzay sardars as well as the magnates. The system worked,
and during the critical days before and after the amir’s death some
of these officials, especially Prime Minister Nur Mohammad Khan
Foshanji and Mustaufi Habib Allah Wardak, distinguished themselves.40
Out of “expediency” the amir did not abolish polygamy, but he would
exercise his full powers, to secure her [widow] the freedom of [re]
marriage and the guardianship of her brood [sic] from her deceased
husband. . . . Polygamy had made life intolerable to the parties concerned,
and would cultivate antagonism from generation to generation.”41
Also, out of “expediency” the amir did nothing to abolish slavery
even though both men and women “would be bought and sold like
so many chattels, to perform [domestic duties] and labor under shock-
ing conditions.” In particular, “The slave-girls would satiate the lust
of their masters, to be mercilessly punished by their jealous mistresses.”42
However, slavery was practiced on a small scale in Afghanistan.
Other measures included the establishment of postal services, the
building of the Sherpur (also Sher Abad) cantonment, and the set-
ting up of a lithographic printing press in which Shams al-Nahar, the
first official periodical in Afghanistan, was published. Coins were
issued bearing the verses: “By the favor of the Eternal Creator, the
money of Sher 'Ali has found circulation”, and “Through the abun-
dant kindness of the Beneficent King of Heaven, Amir Sher 'Ali
coined money like the bright, full moon.”43 Previously, coins bore
the names of rulers with anonymous titles such as sahib-e-zaman (lord
of the age) or Sahib-e-mulk (lord of the land). Also, important was the
use of the word “Afghan” on his coins.44 Additionally, for the first
Collected Works of Riyazi], Mashhad, 1904, 173. Ghobar, Afghanistan Dar Masir-
e-Tarikh, 595. Rishtia, Afghanistan Dar Qarn-e-Nuzdah [Afghanistan in the Nineteenth
Century] 273.
40
Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi', 173. Ghobar, Afghanistan Dar Masiri-e-Tarikh, 595. Fayz
Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 332.
41
42
Ibid.
43
Gulzad, Zalmay A., External Influences and the Development of the Afghan State in the
Nineteenth Century, Peter Lang, New York, San Fransisco, 1994, 70.
44
Ibid.
22 chapter one
time the government opened a school along with a military acad-

emy. The schools were, of course, in addition to the madrasas (tra-
ditional seminaries) which had existed in Afghanistan since the time
of Emperor Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna, in the eleventh century.
Even after it had been reformed the government was still unable
to rule directly over the entire country. It controlled only cities, towns
and their dependencies as well as those areas where contingents of
troops were stationed. Tribal communities, especially those of the
frontier regions, remained self-administered as before, and their affairs
were settled by elders mainly through jirgas in accord with the Shari'a
and Pashtunwali (Pashtun code of behavior). In cases in which dis-
putes between individuals and tribes were unsettled the conflicting
parties often resorted to violence. Thus, in these rural autonomous
communities anarchy and order co-existed, and the government inter-
vened only when general order was disrupted.
In the new state that emerged from these reforms the most impor-
tant force was the amir himself. History, social conventions and Islam
sanctioned allegiance to him, but the ties between him and his sub-
jects were still personal in character rather than institutional. Thus,
allegiance to his successor was not automatically transferred; rather,
the successor had to command it, and the moment the reigning amir
disappeared for whatever reason, powerful forces were ready to assert
themselves. Among these forces, personal ambition was the most
important, while the forces of regionalism and tribalism were still
strong against which centralism and modernism had begun to operate
on a large scale for the first time. As previously noted, the most
important instrument of power in the hands of the government was
the army. However, the army itself was organized along tribal and
regional lines. Even districts were organized in this way. Likewise names
which referred to region and ethnicity such as Kandaharay, Heratay,
Tajik, Wardak and so forth, were widespread and emotionally charged.
Amir Sher 'Ali Khan was the first Afghan ruler to organize (or
reorganize) the state or more specifically the government along rel-
atively modern lines. He started an extremely important movement,
which his successors strengthened. It is then fitting to describe him
an enlightened and a visionary ruler, and also relate him to the
“beginnings of a new Afghanistan”, as some historians have done.45
45
Gregorian, Vartan, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, Stanford University Press,
Stanford, 1968, 93.
The Sons against the Father

Despite his successful reforms’ Amir Sher 'Ali experienced serious
problems with his two eldest sons: Sardar Mohammad Ya"qub Khan
(b. 1849) and Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan (b. 1858). As pre-
viously noted, in 1873, the amir nominated his minor son, Sardar
'Abd Allah Jan (b. 1866) as heir-apparent in a grand ceremony. By
doing so, he provoked his eldest sons, and demonstrated that he was
unable to run his family affairs smoothly.
Amir Sher 'Ali’s troubles have been traced to his unequal treat-
ment of his wives, and the recalcitrance of Sardar Mohammad Ya"qub
Khan. The amir favored the mother of the heir apparent to the
mother of Sardar Mohammad Ya"qub Khan, and he had provided
the former with five hundred Kabuli rupees a month as allowance,
while the same amount was provided for the latter for the whole
year “because of the rebellions of her sons.”46 However, Effendi states
that his grandfather was a “misogynist” and that the reason he
bypassed his eldest son was due to his “vindictiveness.” However,
while the amir may have been a “misogynist” as Effendi claims he
was still open to the influence of the mother of heir-apparent. This
may have been due to the fact that she was a woman of the dynasty,
whereas Qamar Jan, the mother of Sardar Mohsammad Ya"qub and
Sardar Mohammad Ayyub, was the daughter of Sa"adat Khan, the
Khan of the frontier tribe of Mohmand.
Further, Effendi also states that in Herat Ya"qub Khan had accorded
a “rude reception [to] his fugitive father”, and that later in Kabul
he had associated himself with a party, known as “Yakubzais”, which
had, for its purpose, the unseating of his father. He describes the
situation thus:
A party hostile to the amir for their [sic] ends, was secretly forming
under the intriguer Bahadur Khan Kabuli, with the grandiose title of
Yakubzais. Bahadur had earmarked premiership with dictatorial pow-
ers for himself while his lieutenant Shahpisand Khan Barakzai was
appeased to be the commander-in-chief of the Afghan army. Yakub
was to be a mere puppet while Shere Ali had either to end [his] days
as a blind prisoner in jail or be banished from hearth and home.”47
46
Effendi, Royals and Royal Mendicants, 134.
47
Ibid., 107.
24 chapter one
The intrigue surfaced when Sardar Mohammad Ya"qub Khan “set

out for rebellion at the head of six thousand irregular horse”, warn-
ing his father with a bluff that “he would raise piles of skulls of the
dead if he was pursued” while he was on his way to Herat of which
province he took control after some vicissitudes.48
Surprisingly, after his brother, Mohammad Ayyub joined him in
Herat, Mohammad Ya"qub Khan reappeared in Kabul and sought
a pardon, which his father granted him and sent him back to his
post in Herat. The amir, thus, pardoned him, but had lost hope in
him to succeed him. In 1873, the amir bypassed him as well as his
full-brother, and nominated his seven-year-old son, Sardar 'Abd Allah
Jan, as his heir—apparent (wali"ahd ). According to Effendi, “Yakub
again kicked his traces”, but the amir “immediately summoned [him]
to account for his misdeeds, which had become too much to toler-
ate.”49 On the condition that he would not be “molested” which the
amir apparently granted, Mohammad Ya"qub Khan appeared before
his father yet again, but this time he was detained “in solitary
confinement in the royal palace.”50 The amir did so because he also
suspected him of making “Herat an independent principality under
the protection of Persia.”51 Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan fled to
Mashhad in Persia. Thus, the amir got rid of his troublesome sons,
but he also deprived himself as well as the country of the services
of the most able and dynamic members of his house.
48
Ibid., 108.
49
Ibid., 112.
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid., 160.
CHAPTER TWO
THE BRITISH AFGHAN WAR AND THE ACCESSION OF

AMIR 'ABD AL-RAHMAN KHAN
Prelude to War
After Lord Edward Robert L. B. Lytton assumed power as gover-

nor-general and viceroy in India, in 1876, Indo-Afghan relations
worsened. Lord Lytton came to India with explicit instructions to
deal with Afghanistan in line with the aims of the ‘Forward Policy’
that will soon be described. In India “Lytton won the grudging sup-
port of his Council and set in motion a diplomatic policy toward
the Amir Sher 'Ali [which] he knew could only culminate in the
Indian army’s advance into Afghan territory.”1 This subject has been
described in Chapter Ten. In order to obviate the assumed Russian
advance on India via Afghanistan, Lord Lytton formulated a policy
the purpose of which was to establish actual control over Afghanistan.
This required a military advance on Afghanistan similar to the one
that his remote predecessor, Lord Auckland, had undertaken forty
years earlier. As a result of that invasion the British had lost almost
an entire army, but Lord Lytton was not deterred by that defeat.
Instead, he made a strenuous effort to implement the new Forward
Policy the advocates of which
. . . believed not only that England had no choice but to meet this
Russian challenge, but that there was an implicit obligation in the
Administration of the Indian subcontinent to extend that form of gov-
ernment to the numerous fragmented tribal groups who would be the
ultimate beneficiaries of European values and civilization.2
In reality, the notion of the importation of “European values and
civilization” was a screen for expansion and domination. Afghanistan
had a history that extended back thousands of years, and the country
1
Trousdale, W., Introduction, in War in Afghanistan, 49. This topic is discussed in
Chapter Ten.
2
Ibid., 48.
26 chapter two
already possessed a rich culture, including the attributes of Islamic

civilization. Further, under Amir Sher 'Ali Khan a central govern-
ment had been instituted on modern lines. (See Chapter One). As
William Trousdale states:
For most of the Forward Policy believers, the Scientific Frontier was
a temporary screen for their real aim. If the [British] government
would support annexation of the southern half of Afghanistan [Kandahar
and Herat] it would in time tolerate annexation of the whole.3
To reach this goal, Lytton took certain steps, among them, the occu-
pation of the city of Quetta, as part of a treaty, which India con-
cluded with the Khan of Qalat in Baluchistan, a feudatory of
Afghanistan, in 1876. The viceroy was willing to conclude an offensive
and defensive treaty with Amir Sher Ali Khan, provided he placed
his external relations under him, and accepted British officers stationed
around the frontiers of his country. In return, Lytton was willing to
officially recognize the young heir-designate, 'Abd Allah Jan, and
thus ensure the amir’s dynastic rule. Since Lytton’s proposal was
meant to turn the independent country of Afghanistan into the
protectorate of the British, whom the Afghans considered “infidels”,
the amir did not accept the proposal, and a stalemate prevailed over
Indo-Afghan relations.
At this juncture General Constantine P. von Kauffmann, Russia’s
governor-general in Tashkand, forced a mission of his own, under
the command of General Stolietoff on the amir. After its arrival in
Kabul in the summer of 1878, the mission was said to have concluded
a defensive and offensive treaty with him. However, the real purpose
of the mission was for Russia to embroil the British in Afghanistan,
so hoping that the latter would recall the Indian troops that they
had sent to Malta in support of the Ottomans, with whom Russia
was then at war.
The Second Anglo-Afghan War
The Kaufmann scheme succeeded, and this provided an excuse for

Lytton to force his own mission under Neville Chamberlain. However,
when the Afghans blocked the mission’s entry at the Khyber Pass,
3
Ibid., 49.
the british afghan war 27
he declared war on Afghanistan, on November 21, 1878. The Second

British War with Afghanistan began as simple as that. Three columns
of the British army overran some frontier cities and districts on their
way to Kabul, Kandahar, and Jalalabad in the first phase of the
Second British Afghan War or the Second Afghan War, as the British
sources describe it.4
Amir Sher 'Ali Khan did not opt to fight the invaders with his
own army, telling his people “I am leaving in order to unite with
the Russians and acquire financial and military assistance so that I
may return to avenge myself.” He also said that “The British have
not accepted our right to freedom and independence, and want us
in captivity.”5 After touring the city, and while he had already sent
“the families, luggage and the multitudes of soldiers” he left for
Mazar in the north of the country to seek the help of Russia.
Surprisingly, Kauffmann refused to extend Russia’s assistance, instead
advising the amir to come to terms with the British, and even refused
him entry into his domain. Russia had duped Amir Sher 'Ali Khan.
He remained in Mazar where because of “. . . his chronic ailments
of gout and tuberculosis, which for years had obliged him to move
around in his special litter, suddenly recurred with such severity that”
he died on February 21, 1879.6
Before his departure for Mazar Amir Sher 'Ali Khan had, as
requested by the courtiers, released Sardar Mohammad Ya"qub Khan
from prison and introduced him to a specially convened darbar (court)
“in regal uniform as regent.” The young heir-designate, 'Abd Allah
Jan, had already died. Following Amir Sher 'Ali Khan’s death,
Mohammad Ya"qub Khan became amir, in Kabul. However, he was
no longer the enterprising man that he had been. His imprisonment
(1874–1878) had taken its toll and he had become “all pale with
poor eyesight and no strength to walk straight.”7 Additionally, he
had dynastic rivals, each of whom had a faction of his own. Weakened
4
Among the many books dealing with the Second Anglo-Afghan War those that
describe it in detail are Kakar, M. H., Jang-e-Dowom Afghan-Englis, (Persian) [The
Second Anglo-Afghan War], The National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, Peshawar, 1989.
Forbes, A., The Afghan Wars, London, 1892. Hanna, H. B. The Second Afghan War,
1878–79, 3 Vols. London, 1899–1910. Hensman, H., The Afghan War of 1879–80,
London, 1881.
5
6
Ibid.
7
Kakar, Jang-e-Dowom-e-Afghan-Englis, 41.
28 chapter two
by imprisonment, and also fearing that his rivals would outbid him
in dealing with the British, he accepted the advice of his “pro-British”
companions who “would say to him that it is all over; you must sur-
render to the British so that at least, as the amir, you may continue
in luxury and success.”8 He then accepted Lytton’s demands by con-
cluding a treaty with Major Pierre Louis N. Cavagnari, an envoy of
the British government of India, on May 26, 1879.
The treaty was concluded in a British military camp in the Safed
Sang village in Gandumak, in eastern Afghanistan, where the last
troops of the British army retreating from Kabul had perished, in
1842. Its main points were the control of Afghanistan’s external rela-
tions by the British, and the stationing of British officers in Afghanistan.
The British were also to control the Khyber Pass and Michni Pass,
and, for only administrative purposes, British India, was assigned the
populous districts of Kurma (Kurram), Pishin and Sibi. All of these
concessions were made in return for British support against foreign
aggression on Afghanistan, plus a small subsidy and a promise of
non-interference in the internal affairs of the country.
Since the treaty had made the ‘infidels’ preponderant in Afghanistan
and transformed the country’s ruler into their vassal, it was bound
to turn most Afghans against it even though there were some who
“[i]n their sectarianism, preferred non-Muslims to Sunnis.” They
were mostly the Shi'i Qizilbzshes, who lived in Chindawal, a dis-
tinct quarter in the city, protected by strong walls and a moat.9 This
explains why the amir did not make the treaty public, and why he
disclosed its contents to only a few of his courtiers. The author D. P.
Singhal, in his book, India and Afghanistan, 1876–1907, states that the
aim of the treaty was to reduce Afghanistan into principalities.10 This
does not seem to be the case, since the treaty had no provision by
which to split Afghanistan. Actually, Lytton intended to rule Afghanistan
through the amir as he hoped that his power “. . . would gradually
be transferred to the British envoy.”11 In this way, the country was
8
9
Ibid., 11.
10
Singhal, D. P. India and Afghanistan, 1876–1907, A Study in Diplomatic Relationns,
The University of Queensland Press, Australia, 1971, 46. Based mainly on official
records of the British Government of India, this is a specialized and highly com-
mendable book. It covers the external relations of Afghanistan during the reigns of
Amir Sher 'Ali Khan and Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan.
11
Ibid., 49.
to eventually become a part of the British Empire as Baluchistan

had become in 1876, and as Chitral became later in 1895. If the
Afghans revoked the treaty the British would then feel justified in
taking military actions against them. William Trousdale even goes
as far as to state that “The British were determined that the Afghans
should abrogate this agreement in order to gain the fullest support
for their military aims.” He also states that “There is every reason
to believe that everything happened as planned, though the ultimate
goal was postponed by the signing of the treaty of Gandumak.”12
The Destruction of the British Embassy in Kabul
The amir claimed that by concluding the Gandumak treaty he had

saved Afghanistan from destruction. In fact, the British had already
started withdrawing their army, but the withdrawal had not been
completed by the time the British embassy in Kabul was destroyed.
This occurred after Cavagnari along with a few officials and a large
number of retinue had taken up residence inside a thick high walled
compound, the Bala Hissar, near the amir’s palace, on July 24, 1879.
There, contrary to the terms of the treaty and in line with its real
purpose, he began to act like a ruler. This made the residence a
target of popular attack, and, on September 3, 1979, three regiments
followed by thousands of people set it on fire and massacred its occu-
pants; a total of four British and seventy five Indian retainers.13 The
British were quick to inflict revenge.
The British Occupation of Kabul
Following the massacre the British armies occupied the cities of

Kabul, Kandahar and Jalalabad, entering the second phase of the
12
Trousdale, Introduction in War in Afghanistan, 49.
13
Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi', 183. Ghobar maintains that to account for the upris-
ing the British authors have fabricated the payment issue to Afghan soldiers. He,
further, states that the Afghan people and the soldiers who were opposed to for-
eign domination and the Anglophile government of Amir Mohammad Ya'qub Khan
had actually resolved in a meeting to destroy the enemy’s military residence.
Afghanistan Dar Masir-e-Tarikh, 620.
30 chapter two
war. They occupied the city of Kabul in early October after Afghan
warriors unsuccessfully resisted them in Char Asia. Fearing humili-
ation in front of his rivals for his failure to save his British allies,
the amir was said to have offered his resignation to General Frederick
Roberts, Supreme Commander of the occupying forces in Kabul.14
Later in India, Ya"qub Khan claimed that he had been unjustly
forced to resign, and that Britain had no right to force him to do
so.15 While it is true that the British did not have the right to force
the amir to resign, they had the might to do so. At first they kept
the amir in custody pending a decision on his fate, but it was soon
clear that he had become a prisoner. As Sir Charles M. MacGregor,
Chief of Staff of the British forces in Kabul, notes in his War in
Afghanistan, 1879–80 “Had meant to examine the amir tomorrow,
but Bobs [Roberts] said we had better not awhile, as he might look
as if he was a prisoner, which he is,”16 Further, the amir himself
“. . . complained of having been made a prisoner and being badly
treated.”17 The British also detained some senior officials except for
General Dawud Shah, the Commander-in-Chief, who tried to save
the lives of the British.
On October 12th, Roberts held a public darbar in Kabul. There,
in the presence of some pro-British Mohammadzay sardars, he pro-
claimed that, as the chief civil and military administrator, he had
appointed Major General Sir James Hill-Jones as the military gov-
ernor of Kabul, and a few sardars as governors of provinces. Among
them were Sardar Wali Mohammad Khan and Sardar Mohammad
Hassan Khan, who were proclaimed as the governors of Turkestan
and Maidan respectively. Both were brothers of the late Amir Sher
'Ali Khan.
The takeover of the government and the brutal punishment of
those who had been implicated or assumed to be involved in the
destruction of the embassy created the impression that the British
intended to stay in Afghanistan, and rule the country. While there
14
According to Riyazi, Roberts imprisoned Amir Mohammad Ya'qub Khan, and
compelled him to resign. 'Ayn al-Waqayi ', 188.
15
16
MacGregor, War in Afghanistan, 108.
17
Roberts, F., Siah Sang, Kabul, 9 Oct. 1879, 9 (909), Dispatches from the
Government of India Containing a Statement of the Cases Tried before the Military
Commission, London, 1880.
is no official policy pronouncement to confirm this, the British officials

in Kabul behaved as if it was actually the case. MacGregor for one
is explicit about it in the following passage,
. . . under the present juncture of affairs, the thing to do is to say to
the Afghans. You shall give in, you have killed Cavi[gnari], and his
100 men, but we are sending another representative with 10,000 men,
and he shall stay there whether you like it or not. We wish one thing
from you, and that is friendship, but whether we get this or not, we
will have your obedience, you may chafe as much as you please, but
we will be your masters, and you will find that the only escape from
our heavy hand will be your entire submission.18
Next, Roberts arranged for the execution of those had been impli-
cated or assumed implicated in the destruction of the embassy. In
his own words: “Every soldier and civilian who took part in the mas-
sacre of the British Embassy on the 3rd of September last will be
executed.”19 It was, of course, impossible for him to execute all of
those who had participated in the massacre, but about those who
were apprehended “. . . he gave an order that the prisoners were to
be tried and hung.”20 The word “hung” indicates that Roberts had
already decided to hang all those who were caught whether tried or
not. This and other similar actions led MacGregor to conclude that
“. . . Bob is the most bloodthirsty beast I know.”21 Roberts’ order
made the political commission that had been set up to determine
who had taken part in the massacre almost meaningless. However,
some officials, including MacGregor, saved the lives of a few Afghans
who would otherwise have been.
As an alien non-Muslim military despot, Roberts had a logic of
his own which was to employ force in order to intimidate the Afghans
into submission and also to inflict revenge. Even as early as September
14th, which was about a month before his arrival in Kabul, he had
decided to do so. At that time, writing from Ali Khel to General
Baker, he stated the following:
Until we have proof that any soldiers actively befriended the Embassy,
we must consider all as belonging to the one lot, and, get rid of them,
18
19
Roberts, Siah Sang, Kabul, 9 Oct. 1879, 9 (909), Dispatches from the Government
of India containing a Statement of the Cases Tried before the Military Commission,
London, 1880.
20
21
Ibid.
32 chapter two
whether their regiments were in Kabul or not—for soldiers caught

with arms in the field trial is unnecessary. A bullet will do if you are
pressed for time otherwise hanging, which does not waste ammunition.22
This was why, according to Trousdale the “. . . vengeful hangings at
Kabul were far more indiscriminate than Roberts cared to admit.”
Also, MacGregor “. . . knew that innocent and guilty alike were
hanged in that autumn of retribution, that the military tribunal was
a sham.”23 He also states that he “[f]ound that men were being simply
murdered under name of justice,”24 and that Roberts “. . . has shot some 6
men already in cold blood.” Further, MacGregor states that “I have saved
three from his clutches already.”25 According to an official report, eighty-
nine suspected persons, including Mohammad Aslam Khan, chief of
the security forces (Kabul Kotwal), and those who had shot some
Qizilbashes for their cooperation with the British were hanged.26 But
Hayat Khan, an Indian Muslim member of the commission, has
been quoted as saying that “. . . 170 men were hung and that 70 of
them were for fighting against us.”27
It appears that Roberts resorted to brutal punishment because,
according to MacGregor, as a “favorite of fortune” he “. . . was like
an active flea, and jumped whichever way the Viceroy ordered.”28 Lytton had
instructed him that
[f ]or such a crime the whole Afghan nation should be held responsi-
ble, and that the punishment for such an act should be inflicted not
only on the Afghan nation, but also on every individual who had taken
part in the event.29
While it appears that Roberts was simply carrying out the instruc-
tions of his superior, in reality he himself held a similar view even
before he received Lytton’s instructions: Lytton’s instructions were
dated September 29th, while Roberts had already—made up his
mind about the punishment by September 14th, as previously noted.
22
Roberts quoted in MacGregor, War in Afghanistan, n. 167.
23
24
25
Ibid., 101.
26
Roberts, Siah Sang, Kabul, 9 Oct. 1879. 5 (905), Dispatches from the Government
of India Containing a statement of the Cases Tried before the Military Commission,
London, 1880.
27
28
Ibid., 171.
29
The instructions strengthened him still further in his resolve, since

he then committed excesses in affecting the killing of so many Afghans
that news of this outraged the liberal press in India, as well as
England. Fredrick Harrison argued that the punishments were ille-
gal and unlawful for the simple reason that people can not be con-
sidered guilty for defending their country.30 The public in Britain
was also outraged and this in part contributed to the defeat of the
government in the general election that was held later, in April 1880.
The executions were followed by the deportation to India of the
amir, and his principal advisers, among them Sardar Yahya Khan
(the amir’s father-in-law), Shah Mohammad Khan, Minister of External
Affairs; and Sardar Zakria Khan. Only Mustaufi Habib Allah Wardak
(b. 1828), the minister of financial affairs was not deported, but was
left in Kabul because the authority needed his skills in administra-
tive and financial affairs. In addition, in Kabul, the family of the
deported amir was placed under house arrest. Also, MacGregor “[g]ot
orders out for the occupation of the Sherpur Cantonment and the
destruction of the Bala Hisar.”31
The Bala Hissar citadel, which was the seat of Afghan rulers after
1776, had been the scene of an explosion in which some Gorkha
soldiers were killed on October 16th. Afterward, the British destroyed
it because Cavagnari and others had been massacred there, and
because MacGregor believed that it would be difficult to guard after
the army moved to the Sherpur Cantonment. The well-cultivated
Cantonment had water ducts running through it, large halls, broad
verandas, and substantial gateways, and it could accommodate over
twenty thousand men.32 The destruction of the Bala Hissar, which
was associated with the glory of the kingdom, contributed even more
to the anger of the people.
The Afghan Response
The takeover of the administration, the brutal punishments, the

deportation and the house arrest of the amir’s family aroused the
Sunni population of the regions around Kabul to action. They believed
30
Ibid., 81.
31
32
Ibid., 103.
34 chapter two
that because the invaders were ‘infidel’ and tyrant, they must leave
their homeland. The feelings of ordinary Afghans are summed up
well by Mulla Mushk-e-'Alam to a large gathering of people in
Ghazni:
Oh people! Our land has been seized by the infidels. It is our duty
to God and his Prophet to fight against the enemy of our faith and
country. If we kill them, we will be heroes, and if we die, we will be
martyrs. Either way, paradise will be our reward.33
Observing the response of the Afghans to the revengeful measures,
especially the hangings, MacGregor notes, “All these rows prove to
me that we are thoroughly hated, and not nearly enough feared.”34
He also states that
. . . there is no doubt a very strong feeling of hostility against us, which
all this indiscriminate hanging and burning villages intensifies, in fact
we have not got a single friend in the country.35
After several major battles in and around the city, known locally as
the Battle of Three Days and Nights, or the Battle of Mount Asamai
and Sherdarwaza, finally approximately fifty thousand Pashtuns and
Tajiks overwhelmed the occupying forces and restored the city. On
December 13th, they besieged them as well as the pro-British sar-
dars in the Sherpur cantonment. Columns of these warriors, called
ghazis, fought under commanders such as General Mohammad Jan
Wardak, General Ghulam Haydar Charkhay of Logar, Mohammad
'Osman Khan of Tagab, and Mir Bacha of Kohistan. The man who
personified the resistance spiritually was Mulla Din Mohammad,
known as Mulla Mushk-e-'Alam Akhundzada, from the Andar tribe
of the Shilgar area near Ghazni. He was the most influential reli-
gious leader ( pir) south of the Hindu Kush. However, the insurgents
failed to force the besiegers to surrender. Afghan historians, Sayyed
Qasim Rishtia and Mir Ghulam Mohammad Ghobar, maintain that
the British bribed Zar Pacha Surkhabay and Mohammad Shah
Surkhabay, Afghan elders from Logar, whose retreat at a critical
moment, reputedly due to their acceptance of bribes led to the
33
34
35
Ibid., 142.
general retreat.36 This is a scapegoat view of history. A more likely

explanation for this is that after they restored Kabul the Afghans
preferred to loot the quarters of the pro-British Qizilbashes, the
Hindus37 and the houses of the rich pro-British Mohammadzay sardars
to defeating the invaders.38
For ten days the insurgents left the besieged army almost unmo-
lested, even though it was vulnerable at the time. Only General
Mohammad Jan Wardak proposed to the besieged General Frederick
Roberts that the British evacuate Afghanistan, and surrender their
weapons,39 presumably in return for a safe passage. The proposal
was similar to the one that Sardar Mohammad Akbar Khan had
made to the besieged British army in Kabul forty years earlier.
However, while Mohammad Akbar Khan had succeeded in his plan,
Mohammad Jan Wardak did not. His proposal as well as the delay
gave Roberts and his officers time to fortify their position. On
December 23, 1879, the Afghan warriors, who were either unarmed
or lightly armed,40 assaulted the besieged army but failed to over-
come it. The British soldiers, whose officers were informed of the
planned attack in advance, drove them away by their counter-shelling
fired from superior artillery and rifles.41 Ultimately, the cold, the
shortage of provisions, and the lack of a unified command con-
tributed to the retreat. More importantly, as MacGregor has noted
the Afghan “. . . power is a good deal broken and we have got most
of their arms and ammunition and nearly all their guns.”42 It was,
36
Ghobar, Afghanistan Dar Masir-e-Tarikh, 630. Rishtia, S. Q. Afghanistan Dar
Qarn-e-Nuzdah, 253.
37
Forbes, The Afghan Wars, 255.
38
Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi', 190.
39
Hensman, The Afghan War of 1879–80, 245.
40
Ibid., 248.
41
Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi', 190. Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, [The Lamp
of Histories] vol. 1, Kabul, 1915, 358.
42
MacGregor, War in Afghanistan, 111. For details and different versions of the
campaigns see Ghobar, Afghanistan Dar Masir-e-Tarikh, 623–633. Riyazi, 'Ayn al-
Waqayi ' 186–193; Hensman, The Afghan War of 1879 –80, 218–259; Hanna, The
Second Afghan War, 111, 168–25; Forbes, The Afghan Wars, 202–265; and Kakar, Jang-
e-Dowom-e-Afghan-Englis, 90–105.
Fayz Mohammad alleges (Siraj al-Tawarikh, 1, 358) that during the anti-British
campaigns, General Mohammad Jan Wardak accepted a bribe from the British.
This is not true. In the first place, I have found no such a reference either in the
unpublished or published British official records. In the second place, such an accu-
sation can not be true because Wardak was the most dynamic leader of the cam-
paigns and for this the people revered him as a saint and a hero. He is the first
36 chapter two
however, only a retreat, not a defeat. Thereafter, the insurgents con-

tinued their resistance, though intermittently, until the invading army
left Afghanistan (short of Kandahar) in August 1880.
The insurgents, who have been described in the British official
papers as constituting “the bulk of the Afghan people,”43 chose Ghazni
as their temporary center after they drove away from there the
Hazaras who had occupied it at the instigation of General Roberts,
when he and his army were besieged in Sherpur. Represented by
the Ghazni Party or the National Party, as it was referred to in the
British official reports, they chose Sardar Musa Jan, a young son of
the exiled amir, as the new amir. The National Party did not have
a single leader, but several leaders of equal status, and wanted to
restore the former amir and observe the “old engagements,”44 a ref-
erence to the treaties of 1855 and 1857 concluded between Amir
Dost Mohammad Khan and the British Government of India. In
these treaties, the amir had agreed to be “the friend of the friends
and the enemy of the enemies of the British.”
The “New Order” for Afghanistan
As a result of the December uprising the Kabul administration headed

by Major-General J. Hill-Jones collapsed. General Roberts decided
to set up a new one and give it an indigenous appearance, with a
Mohammadzay sardar, assisted by office holders to head it. However,
the Mohammadzays were in their twilight years, and even less
influential than the mullas had been.45 Away from their power base—
that is, Kandahar, they could not count on the active support of
others in times of war, when the government and the army had
military officer in Afghanistan whom the rank and file of the army elected to the
rank of general ( ghatmushr) to lead them in the campaigns against the British invaders.
For these reasons as well as for his support of the house of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan,
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan feared him and arranged to have him killed in 1881.
Since Siraj al-Tawarikh is an official chronicle the accusation that Wardak accepted
a bribe is probably a fabrication created by the chronicle’s author in order to
defame him.
43
Papers relating to Afghanistan, Narrative of Events in Afghanistan, 1878–1880,
(Henceforth PANEA), Official publication, India Office Library, London, 103.
44
Afghan elders to Roberts, one dated 25 Dec. 79, PANEA, 103.
45
collapsed. During such times, even the people of Kabul were at the
mercy of the people from the countryside, or whoever controlled the
city.
Despite their state of decline, the Mohammdzays were still viewed
as the ruling dynasty. Among them, specifically among the descen-
dants of Sardar Payanda Khan (father of Amir Dost Mohammad
Khan), most were hedonists, interested in good food, women, music
and the watching of female dancers. Even Amir Mohammad Ya"qub
Khan was “. . . enjoying the dance and song of a dancing girl, called
Sobi” sometimes from evening to dawn.46 Among the Mohammadzays,
who were politicians, two groups had emerged: the “English Party”
known locally as the “Cavagnarizays”, or the party of Cavagnari,
and the “Ya"qubzays”, or the party of Ya"qub Khan. The former
was led by Sardar Wali Mohammad Khan (an uncle of Mohammad
Ya"qub Khan) and the latter by Sardar Yahya Khan, (father-in-law
of Mohammad Ya"qub Khan).47
General Roberts tried to reduce the anti-British Mohammadzays
into insignificance by elevating their opponents to official positions.
He appointed Sardar Wali Mohammad Khan in place of Major-
General J. Hill-Jones as governor (wali ) with Mustaufi Habib Allah
Wardak to assist him in financial affairs. However, although he had
numerous sons, cousins and relatives, the wali had no control out-
side the city, and within the city too his power had to be main-
tained by force. By associating himself with the British he had become
so much unpopular with the people that they referred to him as
lawti (from lord). Likewise, they disparagingly called Roberts “Rawpit-
e-Kal ” (Roberts the Bald). Despite all of this, Roberts was optimistic,
maintaining that with the wali’s help and the assistance of the
Qizilbashes “. . . it would be possible in time to bring over and attach
to our interest a considerable part of the population.”48
After the massacre, Lord Lytton had changed his mind about
Afghanistan. While before the massacre he intended to rule over it
through Amir Mohammad Ya'qub Khan, afterward he wanted to
split it into sections. In this way he wished to punish the “Afghan
nation” which he regarded “responsible” for the massacre, and he
46
47
Kakar, Jang-e-Dowom-e-Afghan-Englis, 51–54.
48
PANEA, 103.
38 chapter two
resolved to punish those Afghans who had taken part in it. The
British government supported him in his scheme. Lytton then resolved
to severe Kandahar from Afghanistan, and offer Herat to Persia on
certain conditions, even though it was beyond his control. He was
undecided about the provinces north of the Hindu Kush and “. . . phi-
losophical about the eventual loss of Badakhshan and Wakhan to
Russia;”49 and did not mind if the Kabul ruler extended his rule
over them. The frontier districts of Pishin, Sibi and Kurma (Kurram),
as well as the Khyber and Michni passes were to be annexed to
India. The scheme or the “new order of affairs in Afghanistan” as
Lytton referred to it meant the division of Afghanistan among Russia,
Persia and Britain with the latter holding the territories south of the
Hindu Kush.
Had Lytton’s plan succeeded, it would have obliterated Afghanistan as a coun-
try, just as the Russians had eliminated Khoqand as a country. It would have
given Lytton the appearance of a Mughal emperor, whose Indian empire at its
zenith had reached the Hindu Kush range. Indeed, Prime Minister Benjamin
Disraeli had referred to him as such after he had imposed the Gandumak treaty
on Amir Mohammad Ya"qub Khan. However, the ‘new order’ collapsed after
the Afghans rejected it in defense of their country and religion. They also pun-
ished its enforcers, and in a way also Lytton as their patriotic determination
finally brought about the collapse of his Afghan policy as well as his own recall
from his position as the viceroy of India. More importantly, the collapse of the
‘new order’ resulted in the reemergence of Afghanistan as a united country under
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan.
Homecoming of Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan
In January 1880, when the ex-Amir, Mohammad Ya"qub Khan, had

been deported to India, Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan arrived at a
location near Rustaq, on the border of Badakhshan, with the con-
nivance of the Russian authorities. The sardar chose to travel through
Badakhshan because he had relatives there, through his former wife,
a daughter of Jahandar Shah, the late mir of Badakhshan. The then
49
Alder, G. J., British India’s Northern Frontier, 1865–95, A Study in Imperial Policy,
Longmans, London, 1963, 172.
mir of Badakhshan, Shahzadah Mohammad Hasan, opposed the entry

of Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman. Eventually, however, the mir was driven
out of his domain to Gilgit by his rivals, Mir Baba and Mohammad
"Omar, who brought Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman to Fayzabad, the cap-
ital city of Badakhshan.50
In the middle of March Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan left for
Qataghan where by a stroke of luck he was joined by a detachment
of the Afghan army, which had been sent there by General Ghulam
Haydar Wardak from Mazar to chastise Sultan Murad, the mir of
Qataghan. This was a turning point for the sardar. Among the pre-
dominantly non-Pashtun inhabitants he became the acknowledged
leader of a regular army. His power increased still further when the
whole army of Mazar joined Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan, who
supported the cause of 'Abd al-Rahman Khan. Ishaq Khan was a
full-cousin of Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, and like the latter, had
been in exile in Samarqand. Afterward, Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman
Khan doubled his efforts in extending his influence throughout the
country.
In Kabul, opposition to the occupation lasted longer than the
British had anticipated. The British government, in London, was get-
ting restless, and was unwilling to continue to sanction the war.51
Further, the executions in Kabul had aroused fury, even in England,
as previously noted. Under pressure, Lord Lytton decided to evac-
uate ‘Northern Afghanistan’ by the following autumn, and this made
it necessary for him to make new arrangements. As part of his plan,
he replaced General Roberts with General Donald M. Stewart as
the supreme commander of ‘the Northern Afghanistan Field Force.’
No reason was given for the replacement, but MacGregor main-
tained that “. . . our misfortune was in having a man like Bobs, when
we wanted a strong, honest and able man.”52 This implies that
General Stewart whom MacGregor viewed as “. . . a masterful man,
a real commander”53 would have succeeded where Roberts had failed.
This was highly unlikely because, as the massacre and the resistance
50
Kushkaki, B., Rahnomay-e-Qataghan wa Badakhshan, [A Guide to Qataghan and
Badakhshan], Kabul, 1302/1924, 171.
51
Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 59.
52
53
Ibid., 184.
40 chapter two
demonstrated, the Afghans opposed the occupation of their home-

land whether it was by Cavagnaris, Roberts, Stewarts or any other
representative of a foreign power.
Lytton placed under Stewart a skillful diplomat, Sir Lepel H. Griffin,
to undertake negotiations with a prospective claimant to the king-
dom of ‘Northern Afghanistan.’ In line with the guidelines that he
had issued to Griffin, Kandahar was to be separated from ‘Northern
Afghanistan’ and a suitable individual, other than the deported amir,
was to be approached.54 In truth, Lytton was against the coming to
power of any member of the family of the late Amir Sher 'Ali Khan,
as he believed that no member of the family would go along with
his scheme. Further, he held a grudge against the entire family
because of the massacre, even though the Investigation Commission
had declared Mohammad Ya"qub Khan only “inculpably negligent.”
The difficulty of Griffin can be appreciated in the context of this
melodrama, in which the views of the Afghans and of Lytton were
poles apart.
In Kabul, the search for a ruler aroused various factions to action.
The strongest party was probably that of Sardar Mohammad Hashim
Khan, a cousin and brother-in-law of the deported amir, but the
National Party did not trust him, and the British withdrew their sup-
port when they began negotiating with Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman
Khan. The wali of Kabul also aspired to the throne, although it was
known that without the British military support he could not succeed.
With regard to the choice of a ruler the National Party was the most
influential voice, and it would support only a member of the family
of the late Amir Sher 'Ali Khan. Although it opposed the occupa-
tion vehemently, it still preferred a closer relationship with British
India to one with Russia.
Roberts had already sent Mustaufi Habib Allah Wardak to Ghazni
to impress upon elders of the National Party the necessity of nam-
ing someone to rule over “Northern Afghanistan.”55 They named
the deported amir, guaranteeing his friendship with the British,56 but
Griffin declined to accept him.57 During this time, Sardar 'Abd
54
Balfour, B., The History of Lord Lytton’s Administration, 1876–1880, London, 408.
55
PANEA, 178.
56
Afghan elders to Lepel Griffin, Political and Secret Letters and Enclosures
Received from India, (Henceforth PSLI), India Office Library, London, Undated,
vol. 25, p. 509.
57
Kabul Diary (KD), 1880, PSLI, 25, 325.
al-Rahman Khan had been communicating regularly with both sides,

giving the British officials the impression that he stood for a nego-
tiated settlement, while simultaneously giving the Afghans the impres-
sion that he had come home to deliver them from the invaders.
The Accession of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan
Even before 'Abd al-Rahman Khan had stirred the Afghan people,
Lytton had regarded him as a suitable ruler for ‘Northern Afghanistan.’
Lytton knew that he opposed the family of the late amir as much as
he himself did. When it became known that the sardar had established
himself in Qataghan, Griffin sent him three separate messengers.
In his first written message, Griffin only asked the sardar the pur-
pose of his return to Afghanistan.58 His verbal message was more
specific. In it he informed the sardar that the British government
was not hostile to him on account of his residence in the Russian
empire, and that it was able to help him more than Russia could.59
In reply the sardar informed Griffin that he had not entered into
an agreement with Russia, that he was bound to it simply by hav-
ing “eaten its salt, and that under him, Afghanistan would be friendly
to Britain as well as Russia.60
Despite the sardar’s reference to Russia as a co-guarantor of a
neutral and, by implication, undivided Afghanistan, Lytton was still
willing to negotiate with him.61 However, the sardar delayed accept-
ing ‘Northern Afghanistan’ as his domain, and asked the deputation
which Griffin had sent to him the following searching questions:
When the British Government tells me what are to be the boundaries
of Afghanistan; will Kandahar as of old, be left in my kingdom or
not? Will a European Envoy and a [British] Government remain within
the boundaries of Afghanistan, after friendship is made between us two
or not? What enemy of the British Government shall I be expected
to repel, and what manner of assistance will the Government wish me
to give? And what benefits will the Government undertake to confer
on me and on my countrymen?62
58
Griffin to Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, PSLI, 25, 225.
59
60
Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman to Mohammad Sarwar, . . . 1880, PSLI, 25, 603.
61
Lytton to Cranbrook, . . . , PSLI, 25, 43. Balfour, Lytton’s Indian Administration, 415.
62
Sardar Mohammad Afzal and his companions to Griffin, 18 May 80, PSLI,
25, 1272.
42 chapter two
After it became known that the British had started negotiations

with Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, the other sardars lost hope.
Only the Mustaufi tried to thwart the negotiations63 and, as a result,
he was soon deported to India. His removal made the situation in
Kabul stable, but elsewhere in the country, excitement was building
up. Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan’s communications with leaders of
the National Party and others had made the jihad livelier, and encour-
aged General Mohammad Jan Wardak and the people of Kohistan
to advance on Kabul.64
By this time, the sardar’s delaying tactics had exasperated Griffin,
who concluded that the sardar was “. . . a Russian nominee.”65 For
the second time Griffin as well as General Stewart, suggested that the
“. . . negotiations with him should be broken off ”, and that either
the ex-amir or his son, or Mohammad Ayyub be brought to power.66
At first, the new viceroy, the Marquis of Ripon, did not go along
with the suggestion, stating that “. . . the grounds upon which it is
proposed at once to break off correspondence with Abdur Rahman
are as yet inadequate.”67 Later, he instructed Griffin to ask the rep-
resentatives of the late Amir Sher 'Ali Khan to organize the gov-
ernment.68 However, before they were able to do so, Sardar 'Abd
al-Rahman Khan had set out for Charikar, north of Kabul, to accept
the kingdom on British terms.
Upon his arrival in Charikar, on 20 July 1880, Sardar 'Abd al-
Rahman Khan was publicly hailed as amir,69 by a large assembly
of men representing the National Party. In Kabul, on the following
Friday, the Khan-e-mulla (the chief judge), Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman
Khan Barakzay, read the Friday sermon (khutba) in his name as amir,
in a grand mosque. Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, thus, became the
legitimate ruler of Afghanistan. Lepel Griffin recognized him as such
on behalf of the British government. The Second Anglo-Afghan war
in northern Afghanistan ended, and the British forces left shortly
afterward.
63
Griffin to Stewart, 21 May 80, PSLI, 25, 1069.
64
Griffin to Stewart, 5 June 80, PSLI, 25, 1146.
65
Griffin to India, (T), 3 June 80, PSLI, 25, 1077.
66
Griffin to India, 11 June 80, PSLI, 25, 1146.
67
Ripon to Hartington, 15 June 80, PSLI, 25, 1136.
68
Ripon to Hartington, 6 July 80, PSLI, 26, pt. 2, 11.
69
Mahomed, Sultan, The Life of Abdur Rahman, London, 1900, 1, 159.
The accession of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan was the result of

general opposition to the invaders, Lord Lytton’s choice of him; and
his own realistic approach. The great majority of the people, espe-
cially the Pashtuns and Tajiks, whom the government officials includ-
ing Lord Ripon referred to as the Ghazni Party, or the National
Party, opposed the invaders almost continually; only a few groups-
that is, the ‘Cavagnarizays’, some Qizilbashes and Hazaras—and
some elders such as the pacha of Konarr and the Khan of Lalpura,
collaborated with them. Throughout the period of occupation, the
British controlled only the cities where they had stationed troops,
and failed in their efforts to dominate the countryside. Moved by
patriotic and religious feelings, most Afghans fought the invaders to
live under a Muslim ruler of their own in an independent land.
The choice by Lytton of 'Abd al-Rahman Khan as an alternative
to the former amir meant that the negotiations with him would be
continued, while Lepel Griffin and General Stewart suggested other-
wise. This was due to the statesmanship of Lord Ripon, the suc-
cessor of Lord Lytton. The deportation to India of the former amir
also influenced events in 'Abd al-Rahman Khan’s favor. Griffin’s
last-minute efforts in winning the support of Mulla Mushk-e-'Alam
and others of the National Party for the cause of Sardar 'Abd al-
Rahman Khan also helped. 'Abd al-Rahman Khan still might have
failed had he persisted in his original claim to the Afghanistan ruled
by his grandfather. In Kabul, Griffin and his colleagues had come
out against him, and in favor of either Sardar Mohammad Ayyub
Khan or the former Amir Mohammad Ya'qub Khan. MacGregor
even suggested that “. . . the thing to do is to assemble the Chiefs
and tell them frankly that we are going, and they must settle amongst
themselves, who to put up or whether to put up any one at all.”70
In mid-June, Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan gave up his demand,
and expressed his willingness to accept ‘Northern Afghanistan’ in
accord with the Lytton’s scheme of fragmentation. This change of
heart can be explained when the movement of his rival cousin,
Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, in southwest Afghanistan is taken
into account.
Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan was popular with the National
Party as well as the Durranays. 'Abd al-Rahman Khan was popular
70
44 chapter two
with neither, and consequently, he was unwilling to ally himself with

Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan against the British, instead opting
to come to terms with them. On June 9, 1880, about three weeks
before 'Abd al-Rahman Khan set out for Kabul, Sardar Mohammad
Ayyub Khan left Herat for Kandahar. Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan
thought that if his rival cousin came to Kandahar, the Durranays
and Ghilzays would rally behind him. He also feared that his rival
might negotiate with the British before he did. 'Abd al-Rahman was
eager to become a ruler, while Mohammad Ayyub Khan was first
and foremost concerned with ousting the invaders. This explains why
the former speedily appeared near Kabul and accepted the British
terms. The Ghilzays supported the family of the late Amir Sher 'Ali
Khan, but their opposition to the invaders was stronger than their
loyalty to the family. Consequently, in the absence of Sardar
Mohammad Ayyub Khan, they accepted Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman
Khan at the last minute.
Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman did not have a substantial support among
the Mohammadzay sardars in Kabul. Amir Sher 'Ali Khan had sup-
pressed those sardars who had supported the family of Sardar 'Abd
al-Rahman in the civil war. The other sardars were either ‘Cava-
gnarizays’, or Ya'qubzays, or had ambitions of their own. Sardar
'Abd al-Rahman Khan bypassed them all, and appealed directly to
the people. It is a tribute to his insight and skill that he gained the
support of those who had opposed the British along with the sup-
port of those who had been committed to the family of the late
amir, while at the same time successfully negotiating with the British.
However, by accepting only ‘Northern Afghanistan’ he went along
with the British scheme to divide Afghanistan. Further, he surren-
dered the external independence of the country for which his com-
patriots had fought.
CHAPTER THREE
THE AFGHAN VICTORY AT MAIWAND AND THE

REUNIFICATION OF AFGHANISTAN
The negotiations conducted between the British officials and Sar-

dar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan in 1880 resulted in the establishment of
the latter’s rule in northern and eastern Afghanistan. In western Afghan-
istan, Kandahar and Herat remained outside his domain. The British,
who had stationed a contingent of troops in Kandahar, had formally
placed it under Wali Sher 'Ali Khan, while Sardar Mohammad
Ayyub Khan ruled Herat independently. This chapter describes how
after the British had evacuated Kandahar as a result of the defeat
of their army at Maiwand, Ayyub Khan occupied it and soon after-
ward lost it in a military encounter with the new amir, 'Abd al-
Rahman Khan. The victory made it possible for the amir to occupy
Herat, and to reunify the whole country.
Kandahar a Separate Principality
Of all the provinces of Afghanistan, Kandahar was the most impor-

tant, since it was large, fertile, and the home mainly of the Durranay
tribal confederation with its main divisions of Popalzay, Barakzay,
Alkozay, Achakzay, Nurzay, Alizay, Ishaqzay, Khugianay and Maku.
The Durranays were formerly called Audaul (or Abdaul). Ghilzays,
Qizilbashes (or Parsiwans) and other groups also lived there, and it
was the Ghilzay elder, Mir Wais Hotak who liberated Kandahar
from the Safavi occupation in 1709. After his death, first his brother
and afterward his son ruled over it until 1738. However, in 1747
the Durranays, under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Durranay, fol-
lowing the death of Nadir Shah Afshar, founded a more permanent
rule that lasted for about two and a half centuries, until 1978. Thus,
Kandahar was associated with the ruling dynasties of the two most
important divisions of the Pashtuns.
Kandahar was the site of human settlement from prehistoric times.
Alexander the Great founded a city there too, as did Nadir Shah
46 chapter three
Afshar in the eighteenth century. The modern city of Kandahar was

founded in 1761 by Ahmad Shah Durranay, and it remained the
capital city of imperial Afghanistan until Timur Shah Durranay trans-
ferred the capital seat to Kabul, in 1776. Having produced emper-
ors and kings, the Durranays looked upon themselves as a proud
people, calling other inhabitants of the city opras (strangers).
In 1880, Viceroy Lord Lytton in line with the “divide-and-rule
policy” which the British reputedly applied in their colonies intended
to separate Kandahar from Afghanistan and subject it to the British
rule. He considered Kandahar to be necessary for India strategically
and commercially. To secretary of state for India, Lord Cranbrook,
he wrote,
Although our primary reason for holding and improving this route
[Quetta-Kandahar-Herat-Central Asia] is, no doubt, the undisputed
command of southern Afghanistan and the means for forestalling Russian
influence at Herat, we cannot lose sight of the fact that this route has
been at all times one of the main tracts of Central Asian traffics.1
To maintain a hold over the province of Kandahar, Lytton arranged
to link it to India by a railway, the construction of which had already
begun, and was scheduled to be completed by the end of 1880.2
Sardar Sher 'Ali Khan, a son of Sardar Mehrdil Khan, was a
cousin of the late Amir Sher 'Ali Khan. Following his accession,
Amir Mohammad Ya'qub Khan appointed him the governor of the
province. He was still the governor when a British army under
General Donald Stewart occupied it in 1879. The governor threw
in his lot with the British in return for their recognition of him as
wali (governor) of the province. Lytton even went so far as to hold
that the wali was “. . . well able to hold his own entirely subject to
our control.”3 On May 11, 1880 Sardar Sher 'Ali Khan was rec-
ognized officially in a public durbar as the “Wali of Kandahar and
its dependencies.” In a letter that was read on the occasion the
viceroy addressed had him thus: “I have the pleasure in announc-
ing to you that Her Majesty the Queen-Empress has been pleased
to recognize Your Highness as an independent ruler of Kandahar.”4
1
Lytton to Cranbrook, 20 Nov. 80, PANEA, 110.
2
Ibid.
3
Balfour, Lytton’s Indian Administration, 382.
4
PANEA, 109.
the afghan victory at maiwand 47
Colonel St. John, the Political Representative was more eloquent

in a statement that he read in Persian, stating the following:
Under the just rule of the Wali Sher 'Ali Khan, and under the pro-
tection of England, Kandahar will, if it pleases God, remain free from
foreign aggression, and will rise to such a height of wealth and pros-
perity that it will be the envy of the whole of Islam.5
The wali’s rule was declared hereditary, but his foreign relations were
to be conducted by a British political representative quartered in
Kandahar. The wali was allowed to have the Friday sermon (khutba)
read and coins issued in his name, and he was also granted weapons
and money. He was, thus, allowed to enjoy the appearance of an
independent ruler.
However, the wali’s dependence on the British soon turned his
countrymen against him. Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan and the
mullas (religious functionaries) denounced him as a ‘kafir’ or ‘infidel’.6
The latter also declared their support for Mohammad Ayyub Khan,
and their opposition to the wali.7 Except for a few Barakzay rela-
tives of the wali the bulk of the Durranays of Kandahar boycotted
him, and even his mother and family advised him to oppose the
British.8 Only the Ghilzays of Qalat paid him revenue, but most of
the inhabitants of Kandahar refused to do so, and, also, defied his
authority. The wali, nevertheless, remained loyal to the British, and
organized an army.
In June 1880 the wali moved with his army to Girishk west of
Kandahar to fortify his frontier and, further, incite people in Taimani
and Farah against Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, who was rumored
to be advancing on Kandahar. However, the wali made it clear to
the British that he needed their military support if he was to move
beyond Girishk. When, in late June, Ayyub Khan’s advance became
certain, a British force 2,400 strong under Major General G. R. S.
Burrows, was dispatched to Helmand, near Girishk.
5
Wheeler, S., The Ameer Abdur Rahman, New York, 1895, 94.
6
PANEA, 118.
7
Kandahar Diary (Kand D), 1–8 June 80, PSLI, 25, 1025.
8
Stewart to Lyall, 12 May 80, PSLI, 25, 1025.
48 chapter three
Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan at Herat
After having spent four years and four months in Mashhad, in Persia,
where he “cultivated a great taste for politics, history and poetry”
Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan (b. 1858) returned to Herat with
the permission of the shah of Persia, and in possession of seventy-
five-thousand Persian qirans (roughly half of rupees). He had gone
to Mashhad after his father, Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, had imprisoned
his full-brother, Sardar Mohammad Ya'qub Khan (See Chapter One).
In Herat, Ayyub Khan had already received “. . . military training
from one Colonel Mehdi Khan, a Russian convert to Islam, who
was finally banished for espionage.”9 Toward the end of his life when
he had traveled from Lahore to Kashmir and Japan Ayyub Khan
composed diaries in Persian that were “. . . simple, lucid and full of
useful information and observations, though replete with grammati-
cal errors and idiomatic slips.” He was, however, so much conser-
vative that he had become, according to his son, “the creature of the
clergy”10 and his “narrow-mindedness” shut him off from “. . . things
which are at once the master keys to human advancement and
progress.” However, this Ayyub Khan came to impress the image
of a real hero in the minds of Afghans by inflicting a most stunning
defeat on the British invaders. As his son correctly states, the “secret
of his prominence [lay] in his patriotism, for which he sacrificed
everything and spared nothing.”11
Early in 1879 Ayyub Khan assumed the administration of Herat
after his full-brother, Sardar Mohammad Ya'qub Khan, had become
amir in Kabul. As the result of having had little contact with his
father, when he was young, and because he had overseen his own
entourage from an early age, the sardar had developed an inde-
pendent personality. He was so sensitive about his independence that
even the command of his brother, the amir, irritated him much,
despite the fact that all along he had been his “true brother and
henchman.”12 In response to his brother’s “bossing” him “which was
too much for the pride and the prestige of Ayyub”13 he deliberately
stirred a rebellion in the army in which the Herati regiments battered
9
10
Ibid., 173, 235.
11
Ibid., 151.
12
Ibid., 178.
13
Ibid.
the Kabuli regiments. Soon afterward he skillfully suppressed the

rebellion, but then requested that the amir relieve him of the post,
because as he explained, “In consequence of the injury [rebellion],
my reputation has suffered. I can no longer live in Afghanistan, in
company of my peers.”14
Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan had purposefully orchestrated
the rebellion to demonstrate that he was indispensable to the ruling
of Afghanistan. However, the British reinvasion of the country and
the deportation to India of his brother forced him to shoulder his
responsibility as the most important member of the family of the
late Amir Sher 'Ali Khan. Specifically, he believed that it was his
duty to restore his family’s rule, and to oppose the British and their
Afghan quislings, even though Na"ib Fath Allah, elder of the Firozkohi
tribe, advised him to make peace with the British and consolidate
his position in Herat.15
Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan decided “. . . to commence a
religious war and drive the infidels out of the country.”16 The Kabuli
troops and his Kandahari advisers who wished to return to their
homes influenced him in his decision17 as did the unpopularity of
the wali and the fact that even individual Kandaharis attacked the
British personnel here and there, hoping to become ghazis (anti-infidel
fighters), or martyrs.18 In truth, many of these attacks were the result
of what he and his followers had instigated. Col. St. John, the British
Political Representative, wrote from Kandahar that “for months
Ayyub Khan and his partisans have used every effort to inflame the
religious and patriotic feelings of the chiefs and people against us
and our protégé, Sher 'Ali Khan.”19 The wali, too, was “. . . fearful
of Ghaza [a raid against ‘infidels’] and jihad against him.”20 However,
because of the discord between his Herati and Kabuli troops21 Ayyub
Khan postponed his advance on Kandahar until June 1880.
14
Ibid., 179.
15
Ibid., 182.
16
Sardar Mohammad Ayyub to Yaru Khan, Kand D, 1–28 July 80, PSLI, 26,
pt 6, 1618.
17
Ripon to Hartington, 17 Aug 80, PSLI, 26, pt. 4, 718.
18
Riyazi, 'Ayn Waqayi', 200.
19
Kand D, 17 July 80, PSLI, 26, pt. 3, 495.
20
St. John to Lyall, 17 July 80, PSLI, 25, 1373.
21
PANEA, 111. According to Ghobar the people of Herat and the Herati army
in his service pressured the reluctant Ayyub Khan to march against the British.
Afghanistan Dar Masir-e-Tarikh, 631.
50 chapter three
The Battle of Maiwand
On June 15, 1880 at the head of a regular and irregular army,

Ayyub Khan set out for Kandahar with “plans of attack on the
British forces at Kandahar, to be followed in good time by an advance
on Kabul.”22 According to Effendi, “To encourage him in his task
the public influenced by the clergies offered him the title of the amir,
which he . . . rejected with the excuse that it was premature.”23 Before
his departure Ayyub Khan appointed Sardar 'Abd al-Wahhab Khan
Mohammadzay with the power of governor, General Mohammad
Jan Barakzay, as the commander of the garrison. He likewise set up
a state council to administer the province in his absence, composed
of the ‘four pillars of Herat’: Na"ib Fath Allah Khan Firozkohi,
Mahmud Khan Hazara, Akram Khan Jamshedi and 'Abd Allah
Khan Taimani.24
When Ayyub Khan arrived at Girishk, most troops of the wali
deserted and joined him.25 From there he moved upward along the
Helmand River toward Zamindawar, with a view to avoiding the
British troops and reaching the city of Kandahar.26 However, Col.
St. John made the battle of Maiwand unavoidable. At his sugges-
tion, Major General G. R. S. Barrows withdrew his forces to the
Kishk-e-Nakhud area apparently to meet the forces of the sardar on
the plain.27 The viceroy, Lord Ripon, supported the plan, later argu-
ing that if the sardar were left unchecked he would have advanced
on Qalat and Ghazni in which case “. . . the effect upon our [the
British] military reputations, and upon the political situation gener-
ally in Afghanistan would have been exceedingly damaging.”28
On July 27, 1880 the two armies met on a plain chosen by the
British near the village of Maiwand. At 9.00 a.m. General Barrows
ordered his army to attack. Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan responded
with the cry of “ya char yar” [“oh the four companions” of the
Prophet], the war slogan of Afghans. Effendi provides the following
account of the battle:
22
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
St. John to Lyall, 17 July 80, PSLI, 26, pt. 3, 495.
26
Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi ', 195.
27
St. John to Lyall, 17 July 80, PSLI, 26, pt. 3, 495.
28
Ripon to Hartington, 17 Aug 80, PSLI, 26, pt. 4, 718.
The first British shell caught the scarlet umbrella held over the prince,
and the Afghans responded with a general frontal assault. They dou-
bled [sic], while the adversary was searching every corner of the
battlefield with perfect impunity. The passive resistance of the Afghans
was due to their muzzle loading fire-arms, which were no match to
the Martini Henry and the Snider rifles of the adversary. One battery
of the Armstrong alone kept the kettle boiling, while the rest of the
Afghan guns [said to be 30 or 35] kept mum. This state of affairs
placed the endurance of the warriors of the crescent to a most severe
test. Their condition was worsened with Loynab’s retreat at the head
of 4,000 Herati irregular cavalry. For a while victory awaited the
English with open arms, when the Afghan officers in utter despera-
tion rushed their men with drawn swords against the enemy squares.
Though their death rate cost them appalling casualties, yet it, nonethe-
less, sealed the fate of the enemy. The attackers [Afghans] tightened
the cordon and their smooth bore guns, confident of their range,
belched out with the perceptible result of British lines swinging to and
fro. In spite of the tenacity of their officers, an orderly retreat seemed
impossible to perform.29
Toward the end of the battle
a handful of the British infantrymen, . . ., literally fought to the last
man and the last shot, to uphold the honor of the British flag, which
won them the ever-lasting appreciations of their adversaries . . . They
kept the Afghans at bay, and held their standard high, till the last
man fell.30
Many of those “. . . who were hiding in streams, wells, and gardens
perished at the hands of women, who, from the roofs hurled heavy
objects such as millstones, rocks, well-pulleys and stone mortars at
them.”31 Effendi states: “Thus the entire British forces were annihi-
lated [in four hours] with the exception of three scores, who were
destined to reach Kandahar, to relate the tale of woe.”32
According to St. John the Afghans killed and wounded numbered
2,150, and the English about 1,100. Ayyub’s army was made up of
4,555 infantry, about 3,200 cavalry, and 4,000 ghazis [fighters against
the ‘infidels’] many of whom were talibs (students of Islamic studies),
while that of General Burrows made up of 2,800 regular with 2,000
29
Effendi, Royals and Royal Mendicant, 187–188.
30
Ibid., 188–189.
31
32
52 chapter three
followers. The Afghans captured, according to their account, 20

enemy guns and, according to the British account, only two, but the
former stuck to their number. In Maiwand both sides fought tooth
and nail, and in this pitched battle only one British officer had been
made as a prisoner, an indication of the ferocity of the killing. Women
also helped the ghazis in their fight by “. . . carrying water skins over
their shoulders, and singing odes in praise of heroism.”33
The triumphant Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan stayed in Mai-
wand for ten days to supervise the burial affairs of his fallen war-
riors in line with Islam and tradition. In doing so, he probably lost
the chance to overcome the remaining vulnerable British troops
in the city or to compel them to surrender. The delay, which by
coincidence lasted the same length of time as the one in Kabul six
months earlier, when the Afghans had besieged the British army,
gave time to the demoralized British army to entrench itself in the
citadel of the city and devise defensive measures. The result was the
same as the outcome in Kabul. By the time of Ayyub Khan’s arrival
in Kandahar, about thirty thousand men had joined him34 includ-
ing people as far as Qalat, in Baluchistan.
Shortly after his arrival, Ayyub Khan repulsed a sortie of the
besieged British army, but despite his advantageous position did not
try to force it into submission. On the contrary, to the annoyance
of his officials35 he commenced negotiations. Afghan chronicler Ya'qub
'Ali Khafi maintains that the leader of the British army obtained a
forty-day grace period, through the good office of Bibi Hawa, a
widow of Sardar Rahimdil Khan, who had adopted the British officer
as her “son.”36 In a letter to Bibi Hawa, Ayyub Khan wrote, “From
the beginning we had no intention of fighting with the British
Government, but [had] only wishes of friendship and peace.”37 In
one of his letters to St, John, he also expressed similar sentiments,
stating that “. . . the kindness [?] which was extended by the British
Government to the late Amir should be granted to me.”38 Ayyub
33
34
Akbar to St. John, Jan 81, PSLI, 27, 595.
35
Khafi, M. Ya'qub, Shahan-e-Muta"khir-e-Afghanistan, [The Recent Kings of Afghan-
istan], Kabul, 1336/1957, 2, 192.
36
Ibid.
37
Kand D, 29 July–1 Sept. 80, PSLI, 26, pt 7, 1923.
38
Ibid.
Khan probably felt that he either could not force the British army,
or because of the presence of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, he saw
it advisable to come to terms with the British from a position of
strength. Whatever the truth, despite the fact that the negotiation
bore no fruit, the Maiwand battle dealt a deadly blow to the British
scheme of dividing Afghanistan.
Battles are organized by generals and fought by warriors. When
the battles are won the generals are viewed as heroes, and the war-
riors are forgotten perhaps because people want to have heroes and
forget about those who have actually made them. That is why Sardar
Mohammad Ayyub Khan is known to this day as the hero or vic-
tor of Maiwand, and the actual fighters are forgotten, although it
was they who fought the battle with a fierce determination, at an
enormous cost, to the point of final victory. Of course, they did so
when a dynastic prince led them to the battlefield to defend the
fatherland, Islam, and independence. The Maiwand victory com-
pares with the victory that was won over forty years earlier in Kabul
against a strong British army and camp followers from among whom
only about three hundred survived, and only one, Surgeon William
Brydon, escaped. Both damaged the reputation of the British, a
superpower of the time. But at Maiwand according to Sir Charles
M. MacGregor it was not “. . . so bad in the way of the losses . . .
but worse for our honor as they [the British soldiers] ought all to
have been killed.”39 On the other hand, both victories established
the reputation of Afghans as Spartans and rescued them from being
conquered by a European colonial superpower. That is why they
left a deep mark not only on Afghans of the time, but on Afghans
of the future generations as well.
The victory in Kabul was the outcome largely of the statesman-
ship and generalship of Ghazi Mohammad Akbar Khan, and that
in Maiwand largely of the efforts of his nephew, Ghazi Mohammad
Ayyub Khan. These individuals as well as the memory of Maiwand
have come to symbolize Afghan gallantry and patriotism. Both have
contributed much toward consolidating the Afghans as a nation, a
notion actually inherited from Mir Wais Hotak and Ahmad Shah
Durranay. Emotionally evocative, all these names have become the
ingredients of Afghan culture. However, in the long run, the victories
39
54 chapter three
at Kabul and Maiwand kept the Afghans isolated from the currents
of science and technology, and other progressive aspects of modern
life, and they also contributed to a legacy of xenophobia.
The Zimma Meeting
The British officials in Kabul feared that the Afghan victory at

Maiwand would upset the arrangement that they had made with
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan. Griffin wired the foreign secretary,
Alfred Lyall the following message:
The Kandahar news alters the position here and unless Ayyub can be
beaten decisively and quickly, may cause all arrangements to collapse.
Amir will not be able to stand against Ayyub, victorious. Many of his
adherents will abandon him and his troops here and in Turkestan may
mutiny. If he marches to Ghazni, the country will join him.40
The amir himself shared this fear, and he and Griffin agreed to
cooperate. During a two-day meting in Zimma41 just north of Kabul,
on July 31–August 1, 1880, the amir pressed Griffin to conclude a
treaty with him. However, Griffin was not authorized to do so,
because at the time, the British Government of India viewed the
amir’s position as precarious. Alternatively, in order to help the amir
consolidate his position, the Government granted him a few light
guns and nearly two million rupees which actually belonged to the
Afghan treasury. More importantly, Griffin promised him that the
British troops would leave soon, a promise that enabled the amir to
tell his people that he was sending the invading army away.
In return for the British assistance, the amir promised to persuade
the Ghilzay elders to allow a British force to pass through their land
on the way to Kandahar. A select army of ten thousand strong, with
artillery guns and nine thousand camels appeared to be for the pur-
pose of evacuating Kabul, but in reality had been sent to relieve the
besieged army in Kandahar, as the British found it difficult to send
troops there from their nearest base, in the city of Quetta. Starting
40
Griffin to Lyall (T), 28 July 80, PSLI, 26, pt. 3, 47.
41
For the text of the Zimma meeting, see Kakar, Afghanistan, A Study in Internal
Political Developments, 1880–1896, Punjab Educational Press, Lahore, 1971, 256–281.
on August 7, the army, under General Roberts, covered 324 miles

in twenty-three days, which was a remarkable feat, although the
army was traveled unhindered, and MacGregor who had accompa-
nied it, states, “People, civil, they say apologetically by order.”42 As
previously noted, the amir had asked their elders not to molest the
British army.
The army arrived at Kandahar on August 31 and found that the
besieged British officers there had been under tremendous pressure.
According to MacGregor, as they had lost over 200 men, with eight
officers, in an unsuccessful sortie, they were “looking very cheap.”43
On September 1, 1880, the British army, commanded by General
Roberts, defeated the army of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan in
an engagement in the Baba Wali Pass, near the city, with a loss of
about 200 to the British and about the same number to the Afghans.44
Ayyub Khan returned to Herat on September 22, 1880, and Roberts
and his army left Kandahar for India for good. As William Trousdale
states,
Roberts’ . . . defeat of [Sardar Mohammad] Ayub near Kandahar was
vengeance for the British, but the true victory belonged to Abdur
Rahman who was thus spared the necessity of defeating Ayub Khan
in a military challenge for the crown.45
The Collapse of the Scheme of Partition
The Afghan victory at Maiwand dealt a deadly blow to the ‘inde-

pendence’ of Kandahar, and Lord Lytton’s ‘new order’ for Afghanistan.
Foreign Secretary Alfred Lyall, who visited Kandahar shortly after
Maiwand to assess the situation, concluded that, “. . . the Durranis
of Kandahar are much opposed to the occupation, either directly
through [Wali] Sher Ali or any other nominee, or directly through
our officers.”46 The British government then decided to hand over
42
43
Ibid., 239.
44
Ibid. Officially, the British casualties were 35 killed and 229 wounded. The
Afghan losses are difficult to ascertain, and estimates vary from 700 to 1,200. It is
to be noted that since the Baba Wali battle was not a major one these figures
appear to be high.
45
46
Lyall on Kandahar, Nov. 90, PSLI, 27, 547.
56 chapter three
Kandahar to the amir despite the strong opposition of the viceroy’s

council,47 but since Ayyub Khan was “. . . the most popular candi-
date for rule in southern Afghanistan”48 the amir did not want to
occupy it immediately.49 However, the British were anxious to with-
draw their troops before the summer heat hit the region, and on
April 16, 1881 they handed over Kandahar to the amir’s officials
along with weapons and money, but let themselves meet the feared
challenge of the victor of Maiwand. Shortly afterward, they left the
city for good. Wali Sher 'Ali Khan, who had been guaranteed ‘dynas-
tic hereditary rule’ was granted an allowance for life, settled in
Karachi, and faded into obscurity. Thus, the Second British War on
Afghanistan came to an end. It was fought with the utmost feroc-
ity, had an enormous death toll, weakened economies and disrupted
the normal ways of Afghan life. The war also stained Britain’s rep-
utation and doomed its Forward Policy. What the British gained
from this and their first Afghan war was the everlasting bad will of
Afghans.
Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan and the Heratis
Upon his return to Herat Mohammad Ayyub faced a major rebel-

lion which forced him to postpone his early march on Kandahar.50
The Heratis, that is, the Pashtuns, Tajiks, Parsiwans, the nomadic
and semi-nomadic Char Aimaq ( Jamshedis, Firozkohis, Taimanis
and the Sunni Hazaras of Qal'a-e-Nao) and others—were sick and
tired of Kabuli rule. When the position of Ayyub Khan had been
weakened, ‘Northern Afghanistan’ had formed the amir’s kingdom,
and Kandahar was still controlled by the British, the Heratis felt
that the time had come for them to rule Herat themselves. Animosity
had first appeared in Mazar between the Herati and Kabuli troops
47
For details see Memoranda on Kandahar, PSLI, 27: 541, 547, 566, 1354, 1143,
1137, 1141.
48
Lyall on Kandahar, Nov. 80, PSLI, 27, 547.
49
Mahomed, The Life of Abdur Rahman, 1, 208.
50
My description of the relations of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan with the
people of Herat, featured in my book (1971), is basically the same as that provided
by Riyazi in 'Ayn al-Waqayi'. While my 1971 account is based on reports from the
Kandahar Diary, my present account is based mainly on the work of Riyazi, a
native of Herat.
during the anarchy that followed the death of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan.
This and the tyranny exercised over the Heratis by the Kabuli troops
prompted them to initiate an uprising. They declared Fayz Mohammad
Khan as their ruler and Colonel Yar Mohammad Khan Alkozay as
their military leader.
According to Mohammad Yusuf Riyazi, a contemporary native
chronicler, “165,000” ordinary men and artisans from “every class
and tribal sections” took part in the uprising. On the day of the
action a small number of people from the army joined them, but
the leaders were not up to the task. The Kabuli troops of Ayyub
Khan commanded by seasoned Ghilzay officers and armed with
superior weapons and artillery suppressed the rebels.51
Sardar Ayyub Khan had already crushed the Jamshedi and Qibchaq
tribes by disposing of their elders, Khan Agha Jamshedi and Qazi
Jahandar Khan Qibchaq for their pro-British policies, even though
the former was his father-in-law.52 Sardar Ambia Khan, elder of the
Taimani tribe, also refused to pay revenue and, in addition, showed
loyalty to the British.53 Of the Char Aimaq tribes only the Hazaras
of Qal'a-e-Nao, under their elder, Mohammad Khan Nizam al-
Dawla, remained loyal and fought on the side of Ayyub Khan.54
Thus, the sardar asserted his rule over the people of Herat, but they
became alienated, and the alienation later became fatal to his rule.
Ayyub Khan’s next step was to recover Kandahar, and he began
to build up his army for the purpose of doing so. However, he
needed to raise money, and was, therefore, compelled to exact taxes
and customs dues. He was also in need of war materials, since the
British had pressured the shah of Persia to prohibit their export to
Herat.55 Still, the sardar was able to build up an army of 4,400
men,56 made up of the Kabuli, Herati and Uzbek regiments, in
addition to a large number of Herat and Qibchaq feudal cavalry.57
In early July 1881 the sardar, accompanied by his officers, set out
51
Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi', 200–205.
52
Ibid., 195. MacGregor writes of Khan Agha Jamshedi whom he had met while
on the way to Kandahar: “I had a long talk with him, he was very anxious for us
to go to Herat, saying it was ours.” The War in Afghanistan, 228.
53
Sardar Ambia Khan to St. John, Kand D, 28 Mar. 80, PSLI, 28, 767.
54
Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi', 200, 209.
55
St. John to Lyall, 15–21 Jan. 81, PSLI, 27, 1039.
56
St. John to Lyall, 19 July 81, PSLI, 29, 508.
57
58 chapter three
for Kandahar. After his advance force encountered a setback in

Girishk, it defeated in Girishk the amir’s larger force at Karez-e-
'Atta. Subsequently he entered Kandahar without a military encounter.
The War of Reunification
The occupation of Kandahar set Sardar Mohammad Ayyub in direct

opposition to the amir. The sardar, who had the superior claim and
more public support still did not march on Kabul even though the
amir’s position there was said to have been “. . . extremely critical.”58
Instead, he stayed in Kandahar and waited for the amir to confront
him there. He did so because his Durranay supporters did not show
enthusiasm for marching on Kabul. Also, from a vague letter addressed
to him by St. John, then the Political Agent in Baluchistan, Ayyub
Khan suspected59 that if he marched on Kabul the British forces at
Quetta might occupy Kandahar. In contrast, the amir acted boldly
to meet the first challenge to his rule. After holding consultations
with elders of the eastern Ghilzays and the Tajiks of Kohistan he
set out for Kandahar in early August 1881. On the way, he won
over the support of the southern Ghilzays mainly by presenting gifts
and cash to their elders and the promise of a just government to
all. He also provided free cooked food for the public. It was during
this time that he demonstrated the greatest generosity of his life time.
Although he was the legal ruler, the amir was only able through
presents and money to persuade the mullas to denounce Sardar
Mohammad Ayyub Khan as a ‘rebel’. In contrast, Sardar Mohammad
Ayyub, though only a claimant to the throne, declared jihad against
what he called the “farangi amir.” The mullas of Kandahar went
even further, denouncing the amir as a “kafir” and calling on Muslims
“. . . to fight against the nominee and coadjutor of the infidels.”60 The
legal rulings ( fatwas), thus, justified bloodshed between cousins and
Muslims of the same denomination, and showed that the sardar
enjoyed more public support than the amir. Still, Ayyub Khan
expressed willingness to negotiate with the amir, proposing an alliance
58
AB, Kabul Correspondent, 4 Aug. 81, PSLI, 29, 771.
59
St. John to Ayyub Khan, 10 Aug. 81, PSLI, 29, 721.
60
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to Ripon, 22 Shawal 1298, PSLI, 33, 86.
with him against the British. He also proposed that Afghanistan be

ruled in effect as a confederation by the six surviving princes whose
fathers had ruled provinces under their grandfather, Amir Dost
Mohammad Khan.61 However, the amir refused either to forge an
alliance with him or rule the country in association with his peer
cousins in spite of the fact that at the Zimma meeting he had shown
no desire either for Kandahar or Herat.62 The matter was, thus, left
to be settled by the sword.
St. John, who widely reported on the developments in southern
Afghanistan, described the confrontation between the rival cousins
as a war between the two “hereditary foes”—the Ghilzays and
Durranays whose “ancestral animosity” he considered to have been
“. . . by far the strongest political passion in southern Afghanistan.”63
He concluded that the Durranays flocked to Ayyub Khan, “. . . the
representative of the Durranay against the Ghilzays [to defend] their
city against the Ghilzay invader.”64
Although the southern Ghilzays were traditionally on bad terms
with the Durranays, the conflict was not inter-tribal, but shaped more
by religion, fear of foreign domination, and the hope of the acqui-
sition of rewards. The Ghilzays took part on both sides; while the
Tarakay Ghilzays supported Ayyub Khan, and closed the road behind
the amir as a sign of rebellion.65 the Hotak Ghilzays were divided
in their loyalty. As the name indicates, the Qalat regiment, which
went over to Ayyub Khan in Girishk, was, in all probability, com-
posed of the Ghilzays. Further, many of Ayyub Khan’s senior officers
were Ghilzays, although most Ghilzays supported the amir, but he
bought their service with money and the promise of plunder. The
amir’s army also had two thousand Kandahari horseman, most of
whom were Durranays, although the Durranays flocked to Ayyub
Khan in the belief that he was ‘a champion of Islam’ and the amir
‘a creature of the British.’ This was because they opposed the idea
of being ruled by another puppet which they believed the amir to
be. This also accounts for the presence of many mullas and talibs
(students of Islamic studies) in the army of the sardar. Further, as
61
St. John to Foreign, (T), 5 Sept. 81, PSLI, 29, 977.
62
Griffin to Stewart, 4 Aug. 80, PSLI, 26, pt. 5, 869.
63
St. John to Lyall, 22 Sept. 81, PSLI, 30, 117.
64
Ibid., 118.
65
St. John to Lyall, 22 Sept. 81, PSLI, 29, 1063 a.
60 chapter three
already noted, the Maiwand battle had made Ayyub Khan an unques-
tionable hero.
The sardar had a larger army—seventeen thousand versus the
fourteen thousand of the amir’s army—with more experienced
officers—Sipah Salar Hussayn 'Ali Qizilbash, Na"ib Salar Hafiz Allah
Ghilzay, Sardar 'Abd Allah Nasir, and General Taj Mohammad
Ghilzay. However, the sardar had fewer guns than the amir had
because he had lost many guns to the British.66
On the day of the battle (September 22, 1881), the prevailing
impression was a victory for the sardar’s army. Indeed, at the start
of the encounter, his army made advances against its adversary, but
all of a sudden it retreated and dispersed; this occurred when some
of the sardar’s troops from the rear fired on the main body of the
army. This was apparently the result of the discord that existed
between the officers of the sardar about some unreliable troops; some
officers wanted to disarm them, while others were against doing so.67
In the heat of the battle, these troops, which according to one source,
were the three Kabuli regiments that had surrendered in the battle
of Karez-e-'Atta,68 and according to another69 were the Herati and
Kabuli regiments, fired on the Kandahari troops and the mullas and
talibs. The latter constituted the core of the army of the sardar.
The retreat and dispersal of Ayyub Khan’s troops were also due
to the discord of his officers that the sardar’s army had been with-
drawn from inside the city to a suburb near Chilzeena, close to the
old city (Shahr-e-Kohna) where the armies fought. The relocation,
which was intended to save civilians from being killed and property
from being destroyed, created fear among the troops of the sardar
while, conversely, it emboldened the amir’s troops.70 The relocation
was looked upon as a retreat for the army of the sardar and an
advance for that of the amir. Also, unlike the amir who “was every-
where deploying and reinforcing his troops” and was “in full control
66
Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi' 206. According to Mohammad Hashim, a native agent
of the British, the total number of the amir’s army was 14,000 while that of Sardar
Mohammad Ayyub Khan was 17,000. Hashim to St. John, 26 Sept 81, PSLI, 30,
8. But Sultan Mahomed’s figures for the former are 22,000 and for the latter are
20,000. The Life of Abdur Rahman, I, 212. The figures noted by Hashim seem
to be more accurate.
67
68
Ibid., 208.
69
Mohammad Hashim to St. John, 26 Sept. 81, PSLI, 30, 81.
70
of the battle”, the sardar watched it from “a ruined tower (Burj-e-

Dedah) from the crumbling walls of the still sturdy fortress of Shahr-
e-Kohna.”71
In Chilzeena Sardar Mohammad Ayyub failed to realize that the
solidarity that had made his troops unbeatable in Maiwand was not
as solid in the fight for power with his own cousin when victims on
both sides were bound to be his own compatriots. To win the war
for power it was necessary for both to personally command their
armies, maintain discipline, and act decisively. However, the sardar
“who was too much of a gentleman . . . in a world dotted with pit-
falls of cheat, deceit and chicanery”72 proved to be no match for the
cunning amir who maintained discipline in the army and personally
commanded it in the battle. Already, when on his way to Kandahar
he had shown generosity in money and won people by promising
them a fair rule as already noted. Thus, mainly by the default of
his adversary, the amir won the battle that secured for him his rule.
The casualties of the battle were countless as “[t]he widely scattered
bodies of the dead and wounded had turned the battlefield of meadows,
gardens and undulating plains into a field of slaughter.”73
Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan again headed toward Herat, but
on the way he learned that on October 2, 1881, it had fallen to
Sardar 'Abd al-Quddus Khan, the governor of Shiberghan whom
the amir had ordered there to occupy it. He had done so with the
help of those Heratis who had been alienated from Ayyub Khan,
as previously described. Consequently, Ayyub Khan once again fled
to Mashhad with his followers. Meanwhile, in Kandahar, the amir
allowed his victorious army to plunder the city for twenty-four hours.
His own wrath fell on a religious scholar-Mawlawi 'Abd al-Rahim—
who, prior to the fighting, had issued a fatwa to the effect that
“. . . aiding the infidels was blasphemous.” The amir first told him
in rage that “I arrived to liberate the country from the occupation
of foreigners”, and then “With one stroke severed his head from his
frail body and threw it out like a football” with his Caucasian sword.
He did so even though the scholar had taken refuge in the khirqa
where the assumed robe of the Prophet Muhammad had been, and
71
Tarzi, Reminiscence, 23.
72
73
Tarzi, Reminiscences 24.
62 chapter three
on that account had made it a sanctuary.74 With the exception of

the province of Maymana which was pacified in 1884, all of
Afghanistan was, thus, brought under the control of the central gov-
ernment, and reunited.
As the result of his victory at Maiwand, Sardar Mohammad Ayyub
Khan had become so popular that his presence even in Mashhad
was considered a threat to the amir’s rule. The British once again
helped the amir; in order to neutralize the danger, and also to keep
the amir under pressure the British Government of India, in 1887,
persuaded Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan as well as Persia to make
a deal in which Ayyub Khan agreed to live in India. India granted
Persia a handsome sum of money in return for this deal. In 1888,
Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, accompanied by over eight hun-
dred followers, arrived in Karachi via Iraq (where the author Effendi
was born) and settled in Lahore on an allowance. The British never
before or afterward had such an Afghan dignitary with so many fol-
lowers in India.
As a resident of India, Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan was not
the same person that he had been in his native land. According to
his son, “While in Afghanistan and Iran he was virile and active, in
India he became morose and reserved.”75 Content with the life of a
‘Royal Mendicant’ he kept his distance from the British officials,
declining even “. . . to draw the increment in his allowance, which
rendered his financial position deplorable” and also affected his twelve
sons and seven daughters and several wives.76 In 1907, he visited
first Kashmir and later Japan. Living with the dignity of a fallen
hero among his conservative followers, Sardar Mohammad Ayyub
Khan, who was the epitome of Afghan patriotism, “died in his sleep
of heart failure, caused by chronic blood pressure” in 1914, at the
age of fifty-seven.
74
Ibid., 30.
75
76
Ibid., 231.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE PACIFICATION OF EASTERN AFGHANISTAN
The preceding chapters have described the events that led to the
establishment of the rule of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan. This and
the following chapters describe how he extended the government
authority throughout Afghanistan.
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, who was well experienced in the politics
of his people and their intractable elders; knowledgeable about the
willingness of elders of some minority ethnic groups to undergo for-
eign domination; and concerned about the presence of dynastic rivals
in the neighboring lands as well as about the danger to Afghanistan
posed by the Russians and the British, took a wide range of mea-
sures for the institution of a centralized government in order to safe-
guard the country as well as to ensure his dynastic rule. This
two-pronged program made it necessary for him to build up a strong
army and create sources of income by imposing a wide range of
taxes. All of these measures enabled him to rule the country directly
through government officials. He was, thus, the first Afghan ruler to
do so in a country where people resented government control of
their autonomous communities. The people most of whom were small
landowners and landless peasants living within an agrarian economy
opposed the taxes, as well as the amir’s absolutist style of ruling.
The amir, nevertheless, pushed his program, and this resulted in
over forty uprisings of which I have studied only the major ones.1
1
The minor failed rebellions not studied in the present study are, as follows,
and the source of all references to this entry is Siraj al-Tawarikh, vol. 3: a rebel-
lion in Panjsher in 1881 (111, 384); a rebellion in Sedrah in Nijrao in 1881 (385);
a rebellion in Rustaq and Badakhshan until crushed in 1882 (395); a rebellion by
the Nurzays of Dehrawud in Kandahar in 1881 (398); a rebellion by the inhabit-
ants of Khost in 1881 (401); a rebellion by Patanzay Achakzays in1881 (406); a
rebellion in Katawaz and Zurmula (Zurmut) in 1882 (407); a rebellion in Farajghan
in Laghman in 1882 (401); a rebellion in the Ghassak valley in Nijrao in 1882
(413); a rebellion in Chaghanserai in Konarr in 1882 (413); a rebellion by the
Achakzays in 1883 (416, 417); a rebellion in the upper part of the Alishang valley
in Laghman in 1883 (441); a rebellion in Waigal, Kulman and Sao in Laghman
in 1885 (443); a rebellion in Pasha in the district of Jalalabad in 1885 (592); a
rebellion by the Sapays of Konarr in 1886 (490); a rebellion in Baghran in 1886
64 chapter four
The Eastern Province

the pacification of eastern afghanistan 65
This chapter describes how the amir vindicated the authority of

the central government in eastern Afghanistan. An able officer,
Ghulam Haydar Khan Charkhay, whom the amir had commissioned
there as his viceroy with special powers over civil and military affairs
assisted him in the implementation of his program. During the warm
winter months, the amir also ruled from Jalalabad, the capital city
of the province, and at times from his summer resort in Mamakhel,
in Khugiani. In this important frontier province adjacent to India
lived Pashtuns—who were mainly small landholders, peasants, clients
(hamsayas)—along with other ethnic groups, predominantly in river
valleys largely free of government control, but within the fold of
Islam and the Pashtun codes of behavior (Pashtunwali ). On the other
hand, the British government of India in the pursuit of its Forward
Policy of the 1890s advanced its own program of expansion and
curbed the amir’s advance eastward.
The Mohmands
The Mohmands (or Momands), who are divided, according to their

location, into the Upper Mohmand (Bar Mohmand or the Sori
Mohmand) and the Lower Mohmand (Kuz Mohmand or the Petawi
Mohmand) were one of the most important tribes in eastern Afghan-
istan. The inhabitants of the Upper Mohmand generally occupy the
agriculturally poor valleys and hills between the Kabul and Swat
(490, 510); a rebellion by the Alkozays of Arghistan in 1887 (530); the robbery of
caravans by Sa'd al-Din (alias Sadu) Karokhel Ghilzay in conjunction with Sardar
Nur Mohammad Khan, son of Sardar Wali Mohammad Khan (former wali of
Kabul), and their instigation of the Mangals, Zazays and Shinwars until Sadu died
in Tirah in 1888 (385); a rebellion by the Firozkohis until they were crushed in
1888 (399, 423, 563, 667, 687); a rebellion by the Tatars of Doab in 1888 (615);
a rebellion by the Habash who lived in the neighborhood of Tatars in 1888 (615);
a rebellion by the Shaykh Ali Hazaras in 1888 (619); a rebellion in Ragh, Pas-e-
Koh, and Shahr-e-Bozorg in 1888 (620, 623); a rebellion in Durnama in Panjsher
in 1888 (623, 645); a rebellion by the mirs of Badakhshan in 1888 (753, 804); a
rebellion by the Zadrans in 1892 and again in 1893 (753, 804); a rebellion by the
Baluches of Chakhansur in 1892 (757); a revolt by the Baluches of Chaghai (782);
a rebellion by the Sunni Hazaras of Qal'a-e-Nao of Herat in 1893 (790); a rebel-
lion in Maymana in 1892 and again in 1893. (800, 802); a rebellion by the Muqbils
in 1894 (922); an ongoing rebellion by the Mangals until it was suppressed in 1894
(878); a revolt by the Tanays in 1896 (912); and a rebellion by the Kayan bor-
dering the Wazirs in 1896 (922, 937).
66 chapter four
rivers, while those of the Lower Mohmand reside in the northwest-

ern corner of the relatively fertile Peshawar plain.
The city of Peshawar is in the Mohmand country, and members
of the Khalil and Khwaezay divisions are conspicuous among its
inhabitants. Both parts of Mohmand are divided into the main divi-
sions of the Tarakzays, Baezays, Halimzays and Khwaezays. These
divisions are the descendants of the Masayzay, who, along with
Uthmanzay and Dawaizay are the descendants of Mohmand, known
as Mohmand Baba. The Mohmands like the Durranays and Yusufzays
are the descendants of Sarbun. The first known dwelling place of
the Mohmands was Murgha, east of Kandahar from which they,
like many other divisions of eastern Pashtuns, migrated first to Ghazni
and then to their present land, in the sixteenth century. It was after
their settlement here that they were divided into the two parts.
In both parts the very strict Masayzay code known as dode grando
(Code of Grando?) is applied in criminal cases such as theft, homi-
cide, adultery, rape, etc. In these matters this code rather than the
Shari'a is applied even though the latter is the law of the land, and
the clergy enjoy considerable influence among the Mohmands. In
controversial cases, the Masayzay code specifies that certain house-
holds in both parts of the Mohmand are authorized to act as courts
of appeal. Their verdict is final with no right of appeal.2
The inhabitants of the two parts of Mohmand did not have much
dealing with each other. Strangely, the inhabitants of the Lower
Mohmand were mild by comparison to those of the Upper Mohmand
who were warlike. Also, the power of the khans of the Upper
Mohmands had developed greatly, and, among them the khan of
Lalpura was the most important, and the other khans of significance
were those of Pandiali and Goshta. Carpenters, blacksmiths, weavers,
barbers, and potters lived in almost all of the villages of the Mohmands,
as in those of other tribes; a special group of people, the Parachas,
carried on trade among them.
The only khan (head of a tribe with feudal privileges) who retained
his position throughout the reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan
was the khan of Lalpura, Mohammad Akbar Khan. Lalpura was
2
For details see, Siyal, Mira Jan, Mohmand Baba, (in Pashto), University Book
Agency, Peshawar, 1950. I am grateful to Dr. Zamin Mohmand for lending me
this book.
the main seat of the Upper Mohmand, and Akbar Khan was a
descendant of Morcha Khan, the founder of the Morcha Khel sec-
tion of the Shahmansur clan of the Tarakzay Mohmands. Morcha
Khan had established the khanate of Lalpura in the second half of
the sixteenth century apparently with the blessing of a local saint,
Murzad Wali Baba for an act of chivalry. Additionally, for his ser-
vice with the Mughal Emperor, Jalal al-Din Akbar (1556–1605),
Morcha Khan was placed in charge of the Dakka Fort, the com-
mand of which had apparently become hereditary in his family.
From this time onward, the position of the Morcha Khel as the khan
khel (ruling section) was recognized by all of the Mohmands.3 The
most famous of Morcha Khan’s successors was Sa'adat Khan, who
served as khan for about forty years and who had arranged the mar-
riage of his daughter, Qamar Jan, to Sardar Sher 'Ali Khan before
he became amir. Amir Mohammad Ya'qub Khan and Sardar
Mohammad Ayyub Khan were the sons of Qamar Jan. In his mono-
graphic study, H. Merk states that
Of all the Khans, Saadat Khan appears to have made the deepest
impression on the Mohmands; simple in his habits, generous and acces-
sible to the people, sagacious in council and the champion of the
national cause, he is held up as the model of what a Khan should be.4
Because of Sa"adat Khan’s commitment to the “national cause” his
opposition to the British was so strong that during his khanate the
Mohmands committed eighty-five raids on British territory between
January 1855 and March 1860. The raids finally led to his impris-
onment, as the British remonstrated to Amir Sher 'Ali Khan who,
for wider considerations, listened to them. According to the author
Christine Noelle
After a major military confrontation between the Mohamnds and the
British at Shabkadir on 2 January 1864, Sher 'Ali Khan seized Sa'adat
Khan and Nauroz Khan and took them to Kabul. A few months later,
Sa'adat Khan died in captivity from the effects of the inclement cli-
mate of Kabul.5
3
Noelle, Christine, State and Tribe in Nineteenth-Century Afghanistan, The Reign of Amir
Dost Muhammad Khan (1826–1863), Curzon Press, 1997, 182, 183.
4
Merk, W. R. H., The Mohmands, Introduction by Akbar S. Ahmed, first pub-
lished in 1898. Reproduced by Vanguard Books, Lahore, 1984, 46, 50.
5
Noelle, State and Tribe in Nineteenth Century Afghanistan, 186.
68 chapter four
Even though the Upper Mohmands were a poor people owing to

the shortage of arable land except for that along the Kabul River
the office of their khanate was more developed than those of “. . . the
little republics of Safed Koh and Tirah” as well as that of the Lower
Mohmands. This was due more to the strategic location of their
country than to its tribal structure. As guardians of the Khyber, the
khans of Lalpura collected tolls on the Jalalabad–Peshawar road at
Dakka, and levied dues on the rafts on the Kabul River. The
significance of the Mohmands in the area can be understood from
the fact that, as Moutstuart Elphinstone had noted in the early part
of the century that “A single Mumand will pass a whole caravan”
through the Khyber. For the same reason Kabul paid the khans of
Lalpura allowances for keeping the Kabul road safe as well as for
providing militia in times of emergency. All of this may account for
the existence, especially among the khans, of a destructive sense of
competition and the custom of badal (revenge). This destructive cus-
tom was so prevalent among the Mohmands that important indi-
viduals perished at the hands of rivals than due to natural causes.
In December 1879 the people of the Upper Mohmand rose in
protest after the British in Kabul deported Amir Mohammad Ya'qub
Khan to India. Soon a split occurred among elders of the uprising
and Mohammad Akbar Khan accepted the position of ruling the
Upper Mohmand from the British “. . . on condition of his loyalty
and good services to the British Government.”6 In return, Akbar
Khan supplied the British forces with provisions and opposed the
jihad movement against them,7 so keeping the intractable Mohmands
in as well ordered as could be expected.8
After the withdrawal of the British forces from Afghanistan, the
amir gradually stripped Akbar Khan of his privileges by taking over
the management of the road,9 and in 1883, confiscating the Lalpura
tolls.10 Before that Akbar Khan’s annual income amounted to about
one hundred thousand rupees. Afterward the amir paid him allowances
in return for his agreement to serve the state with militias in times
6
Biographical Accounts of Chiefs, Sirdars and Others of Afghanistan, Official
publication, Calcutta, 1888. Henceforth BACA, 31.
7
Ibid.
8
Griffin to Stewart, 8 May 80, PSLI, 33, 512.
9
Peshawar Diary (PD), 18 Sept. 80, PSLI, 34, 9.
10
Mohammad Akbar Khan to Peshawar Commissioner, 30 Nov. 83, PSLI, 38,
999.
of emergency.11 Akbar Khan had no alternative but to comply: first,

his request “. . . for the intervention of the British Government”12
met with the reply that he comply with “. . . the orders received
from . . . the amir;”13 second, among his many peers, Akbar Khan
was only the first among equals, and had brothers and cousins, who
were formidable rivals.
The Pacha of Konarr
For centuries the long and narrow valley of Konarr (Kunar) with
Pashat as its main town had been ruled by a Pashtunized reputedly
sayyed family of 'Arab descent. Sayyed 'Ali Termizi, known as the
Pir Baba, who had accompanied Mohammad Zahir al-Din Babur
from Termiz, was the founder of the family. His shrine in the vil-
lage of Paucha in Bonair is venerated to the present day. Emperor
Humayun, who was the son and successor of Babur, had granted
him Konarr free of revenue. His descendants known locally as de
Konarr pachayaun (rulers of Konarr) as well as de Konarr sayyedaun (sayyeds
of Konarr) gradually became secular. They took the revenue at the
rate of one-third of the production of the land14 and in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries their annual income fluctuated
between sixty thousand and eighty thousand rupees.15 According to
Malcolm Yapp, they
. . . had successfully maintained a substantial degree of independence
of the Kabul Government but under the Barakzays there began a
series of attempts to bring the area under control. . . . In 1834 Sayyid
Faqir was deposed by Dost Mohammad and Sayyid Baha al-Din made
ruler on his undertaking to pay an annual tribute of 19,000 rupees.
In 1839 Baha al-Din was deposed and replaced by his brother, Sayyid
Hashim, who agreed to pay 28,000 rupees per annum.16
11
PD, 31 May 83, PSLI, 44, 860. Noelle, State and Tribe in Nineteenth Century
Afghanistan, 183.
12
BACA, 32.
13
Ibid.
14
Statement by Sayyed Mahmud, 1893, PSLI, 67, 1078. Siyal, De Zeeno Pashtano
Qaba’lo Shajaray, 86.
15
16
Yapp, M. E., “Disturbances in Eastern Afghanistan, 1839–42”, BSOAS, xx,
pt. 3, 1962, 504.
70 chapter four
The dissension that prevailed among members of the sayyed family

helped Amir Dost Mohammad Khan to annex a portion of Konarr
to Kabul.17 During his second reign the Amir divided Konarr between
Sayyed Baha al-Din and one of his brothers, Mohammad Hashim,
while annexing a large portion of it to his kingdom. While the amir’s
son and successor, Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, kept the arrangement, his
other son, Amir Mohammad Afzal Khan, arrested Sayyed Baha
al-Din.18
During the second British occupation of Afghanistan, Sayyed
Mahmud Pacha, who had succeeded his father, Baha al-Din Pacha
probably in 1868, took possession of the whole of Konarr. He sided
immediately with the British even though his father had held Konarr
under Amir Sher 'Ali, and himself was married to the daughter of
Wazir Mohammad Akbar (brother of Amir Sher 'Ali) and had served
the late amir as a member of his advisory council in Kabul. Believing
that by assisting the British he would retain Konarr “. . . indepen-
dent of any ruler in Kabul and only subordinate to the British”19
he opposed the jihad movement against them. In 1880 in Jalalabad
in a meeting with the British Political Agent, Sir Lepel Griffin, when
he was on his way to Kabul, Sayyed Mahmud even suggested to
him that Afghanistan should be divided up into minor principalities,
independent of each other, but subordinate to the British. Griffin
was so impressed by him that on behalf of the government he guar-
anteed his “hereditary possession”, promising him that,
he might rest assured Government would fulfill literally and fully all
promises made to him, and would take care, happen what might, he
would not suffer for having placed himself upon the side of the British.20
However, despite this guarantee the pacha did suffer.
After the withdrawal of the British forces, Amir 'Abd al-Rahman
Khan confirmed Mahmud Pacha’s land possessions on both sides of
the Konarr river, but subjected them to revenue demands. Soon,
however, the pacha’s relations with the amir deteriorated, as his son,
Sayyed Ahmad Pacha, deserted the amir when he was on his way
17
Statement by Sayyed Mahmud, 1078.
18
Ibid.
19
Griffin to Roberts, 29 Mar. 80, PSLI, 33, 546.
20
Griffin to Roberts, 29 Mar. 80, PSLI, 33, 548.
to Kandahar to oust Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan.21 Fearful of

his son’s defection as well as of his own partisanship of the house of
Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, Mahmud Pacha refused a summons to Kabul
unless he obtained an assurance of his safety from the British Govern-
ment. The pacha also reminded Griffin, who was then the Viceroy’s
Agent in the Central Province of India, of the services that he had
rendered the British Government. The pacha wrote to him that
Up to date as far as lay in my power, I had served the Government,
and incurred a bad name among my clansmen. The service was not
rendered with the object that it should bear good fruit in the next
world.22
The British Government of India and the amir exchanged several
letters on the subject. In one letter, Foreign Secretary Alfred Lyall
even addressed the amir in an unusually complimentary language,
stating that the viceroy “is assured that the feelings of justice for
which Your Highness is so distinguished will make you hesitate of
visiting upon Syud Ahmad [Sayyed Mahmud] the sins of his son.”23
This failed to impress the amir as in reply he wrote that if the pacha
. . . comes with the purity of heart to pay his respect to me . . . I will
not punish him for the sins of his son. Should his actions prove contrary
to his professions, I shall have no other course but to drive him away.24
When it had occupied Afghanistan, the British Government of India
considered Konarr as well as Kandahar, strategically important.
Consequently, it gave explicit guarantees to the rulers of both. Like
Kandahar, Konarr was situated on a road leading ultimately to
Central Asia and western China. Also, from the upper part of Konarr,
one road led to Chitral and another to the territories of the tribes
along the northwestern parts of India, territories that were part of
Afghanistan but at that time were not under centralized adminis-
trative control. From the lower part of Konarr was a road leading
to Jalalabad. Despite the strategic importance of Konarr the
Government of India reneged on its promise to the ruler of Konarr,
21
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to Ghilzay elders, AB (in Ghazni), 16 Aug. 81, PSLI,
29, 1014.
22
Sayyed Mahmud to Griffin, PSLI, 33, 514.
23
Lyall to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, 12 Jan. 82, PSLI, 33, 514.
24
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to Lyall, 1 Feb. 82, PSLI, 33, 414.
72 chapter four
just as it had to the ruler of Kandahar. It did so because, due to

much wider considerations, it had pledged to assist the amir in the
consolidation of his rule, and to refrain from interfering in the inter-
nal affairs of his kingdom. Nevertheless in the same manner that the
government of India had backed away from Kandahar it likewise
backed away from Konarr. It did so because, due to much wider
considerations, it had pledged to assist the amir in the consolidation
of his rule, and to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of
his kingdom. The viceroy then left the fate of the pacha to the amir’s
mercy, arguing that because of its geographical location
. . . the possessions of the Badshah are so situated as to render it impos-
sible to give him any active assistance without the violation of the
amir’s territory in a manner amounting practically to an act of war.25
In November 1882, after an advance was made against him by a
contingent of the government army, the pacha, who had been aban-
doned by his British ally, and was opposed by his own people for
his pro-British activities, fled first to Mittai and later in 1886 to
Hassan Abdal, in India. Soon afterward, Kabul established direct
control over Konarr. During his residence in India, the pacha lived
on a British allowance, and returned to Konarr after the amir had
died in 1901.
The Shinwarays
Kabul treated the Shinwarays more leniently than it treated other

tribes because they kept the road to the Khyber pass open. Kabul
also allowed them to levy tolls on the road to Peshawar and, in
addition, paid allowances to them.26 It even exempted two of their
divisions—Sangu Khel (or Sun Khel) and Sipai—from paying revenue.
The Shinwarays have four main divisions, the others are Ali Sher
Khel and Mandozays. The Shinwarays, though a very important
tribe, had no one khan or elder as influential as that of the Mohmands.
Kabul changed its policy in 1882, when Amir 'Abd al-Rahman
garrisoned Dakka27 Prior to the rebellion, the Shinwarays sent a jirga
25
Ripon to Hartington, 23 Dec. 82, PSLI, 34, 221.
26
Jenkyns, W., A Report on the District of Jalalabad, Chiefly in regard to
Revenue, Calcutta, Official publication, 1879, 12–15.
27
PD, 18 Dec. 82, PSLI, 34, 9.
(a council or deputation of elders) to the amir to discuss the restora-

tion of what they called their ‘rights’. The amir imprisoned the jirga
and executed some of its members. During this time he declared the
introduction for the first time in the whole of the eastern province,
including the Shinwar (land of the Shinwarays) the three-portion sys-
tem of taxation on land (se-kot) whereby landowners were demanded
to pay one third of their revenue to the government.28 The Shinwarays
opposed the new measures, but in 1883 they were defeated in a bat-
tle with the government army, led by General Ghulam Hayder Khan
Orakzay.
The battle hardened the attitude of the Shinwarays, especially
when more radical younger members assumed leadership after some
of their elders were killed in the battle.29 The new leaders rejected
the concessions which required them to pay a tithe ('ushr), or one-
tenth of their revenue, to the government, instead of one-third, pro-
vided they agreed to be disarmed and hostages taken from them.30
Several battles were fought in many of which the Shinwarays were
routed. They then fled to the upper part of the Spin Ghar Mountain,
but still persisted in their demand that the amir should completely
annul the revenue. The victorious army burned their houses and
destroyed their crops. The Shinwarays resorted to robbery, announc-
ing, “We have no mind to return to our country, and we do not
care for the amir. We will support ourselves by plunder and robbery.”31
In 1885, Ghulam Haydar Khan Charkhay, the Sipah Salar,
(commander-in-chief ) took over the administration of the eastern
province in both civil and military affairs. His arrival signaled hope
for a settlement as he sent many jirgas to the Shinwarays. Although
the jirgas failed to bring about a settlement, they caused dissension
among the Shinwarays.32 Some of the Shinwarays stood for a settle-
ment, while others opposed it. During the uprisings of the Ghilzay
in 1886 (See Chapter Five) and of Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan
in 1888 (See Chapter Six), the amir adopted a conciliatory attitude
28
Gazetteer of Afghanistan, pt. 4, Kabul, Official publication, Calcutta, 1910, 495.
Henceforth GAK.
29
GAK, 488.
30
PD, 1 June 83, PSLI, 36, 1549.
31
Shinwaray elders to General Ghulam Haydar Orakzay, 11 May 85, PSLI, 44,
1079.
32
Monthly Memorandum (Henceforth MM), Sept. 86, PSLI, 48, 511.
74 chapter four
toward the Shinwarays. During these periods, many jirgas attempted

a settlement, but failed to produce a substantial result.
Although the Shinwaray elders agreed to pay revenue in propor-
tion to the quality of the land,33 and although the Sangu Khel section
accepted the payment of a tithe and the stationing of a govern-
ment—appointed judge (qazi ) in their region,34 the bulk of the tribes-
men rejected the agreement, because they had lost faith in the amir.
Compelled by the tribesmen the elders wrote to the amir, stating,
We are ready to submit to Your Highness’s authority . . . but two things
prevent us from carrying these wishes into effect: first, that we are in
poverty and are compelled to commit depredations; allowances should
be fixed upon us; secondly, Your Highness’s subjects are in great straits;
both days and nights arrests are made. Most of the Khugianis and
Mohmands have fled on account of oppression. How can we be con-
soled and assured that we will be treated well?35
However, the Shinwaray elders made this plea too late, for by then
the tribesmen had lost their unity.
After the other, more serious uprisings elsewhere had been put
down, the amir began to pressure the Shinwarays to submit to his
authority. Toward the end of 1888 he dispatched tribal militias from
other parts of Ningrahar36 and the district of Tagao37 which, together
with government troops and some Afridays and Shinwarays of the
occupied areas, defeated the Sangu Khel, the most determined of
the Shinwarays.38 Although they were still far from being defeated,
their position had actually become untenable, since by then they had
been driven to the upper parts of the Spin Ghar Mountain, and the
Sangu Khel were living under extremely harsh conditions. Exhausted,
they finally agreed to pay half a rupee per half acre of land ( jarib)
as revenue.39 However, the Sangu Khel still held out until 1892,
when the tribe as a whole settled down.40
The extension of the government authority in Shinwar illustrates
how the government tried to extend its authority elsewhere, especially
33
Col. 'Atta Allah, British agent in Kabul, 17 Feb. 88, PSLI, 52, 1073.
34
PD, 22 Feb. 88, PSLI, 52, 768.
35
Shinwaray elders to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, 16 Mar. 88, PSLI, 53, 511.
36
PD, 28 Nov. 88, PSLI, 55, 1243.
37
PD, 22 Dec. 88, PSLI, 55, 1368.
38
MM, Mar. 89, PSLI, 56, 1072.
39
Col. 'Atta Allah (in Mazar), 5 Nov. 89, PSLI, 58, 849.
40
GAK, 500.
in the outlying parts of the country. The takeover of the Jalalabad–

Dakka road by the government led to the struggle that was intensified
with the introduction of the three-portion system of taxation of land
revenue (se-kot) and the seizure of the jirga elders, the latter of which
was contrary to the Pashtun code of behavior (Pashtunwali ). It was
to take a decade before the Shinwarays accepted government authority.
Immediately afterward, the amir tried to extend government con-
trol over the vast regions of Bajaur, Dir and other territories as will
be described in the following sections. However, by that time the
British Government of India had devised a new strategy for the
defense of India, which required it to bring these territories under
its influence, and block the advances of Kabul within them. Had
the amir attempted to pacify these vast territories of the Afghan hin-
terland before embarking on pacifying the Shinwarays he may not
have been obliged to forgo his traditional right to rule over them—
for it was toward the end of the 1880s that the British formulated
the Forward Policy that ultimately led to the Durand Agreement, in
1893 (See Chapter Ten). Thus, the victory over the Shinwarays was
achieved at too great a price.
Asmar
After the pacification of the Shinwarays government troops under

Sipah Salar Ghulam Haydar Khan moved to the Konarr valley with
the apparent objective of pacifying the regions further east. Beforehand,
all of the side valleys on the right bank of the Konarr valley inhab-
ited by the Sapays (Safis) and other ethnic groups were pacified and
a fixed amount of tax was imposed on their land and cattle.41 In
early 1892, Asmar, a small khanate on the left bank of the river, in
the upper part of the Konarr valley, was also occupied. This was
the first step in the extension of official authority over the much
vaster and more populous territories of Dir, Swat, and Bajaur.
Although the amir claimed that Asmar was a part of Konarr,42 it
was, in fact, geographically and demographically a part of Bajaur43
41
42
PD, 23 Nov. 91, PSLI, 64, 1452.
43
Khan of Asmar, MM, Sept. 89, PSLI, 58, 376 a.
76 chapter four
while Bajaur itself was a dependency of Jalalabad.44 Importantly,

Asmar held a key position in the territories further east and because
of this significance it can be compared to the Khyber Pass, as a gate
to India.
Over two thousand three hundred years ago, Alexander the Great
of Macedonia chose Konarr, not Khyber, for his advance on India.
The people he encountered there, as well as in Bajaur and Swat,
during his military campaign, from November 327 BCE to February
326 BCE, were called Aspasians and Acvaka [the Asva–Ghana of
Sanskrit and Abgan of the middle Persian] from which the names
Yusufzay and Afghan have evolved. In the words of the historian
Peter Green,
. . . most of the tribesmen he came against proved themselves first class
fighters. During one engagement he got an arrow through his shoulder;
and by the end of the campaign his condition can perhaps best be
described as jittery.45
In 1892, the easy pacification of Konarr and the stationing of gov-
ernment troops in Asmar under Sipah Salar Ghulam Haydar Charkhay
became a signal for the pacification of Bajaur and the regions further
east. Because of the conflicting policies of the khans of Bajaur, there
was even a strong impression among its inhabitants that their khans
might accept the amir’s rule.46
Bajaur, Dir and Swat
The vast territories of Bajaur, Dir and Swat were autonomous prin-
cipalities or khanates commonly known as yaghistan (the land of rebels),
to the east of the Konarr valley from which they were separated by
a rocky mountain. Numerous divisions of the Pashtun Yusufzay and
Mandir tribal confederation, their clients (hamsayas), and others pop-
ulated the three khanates. The relatively fertile region of Bajaur is
44
45
Kakar, Afghan, Afghanistan and the Afghans and the Organization of State in India,
Persia and Afghanistan, (in Persian), Kabul University Press, 1979, 17. Kohzad, Ahmad
Ali, Afghanistan Dar Shahnama, (in Persian) [Afghanistan in the Shahnama], Baihaqi Book
Publishing House, Kabul, 1976, 288. Green, Peter, Alexander of Macedon 356–323 BC,
A Historical Biography, University of California Press, 1992, 382.
46
PD, 23 Feb. 93, PSLI, 65, 722.
comprised of the five valleys of Charmang, Babuqara, Sur Kamar,

Rud and Mamund (or Watalai). Nawagai, the seat of the khanate,
lies in the Sur Kamar valley. Bajaur is peopled principally by
theYusufzay Tarkanays, but Mohmands, Sapays, Uthman Khel and
others also live there. Although outnumbered by other groups of
people, the Yusufzays and Mandirs were supreme in the region as
a whole on account of owning the land and were as important there
as the Durranays were in Kandahar. (The Durranays and Yusufzays
are descendants of a common ancestor, the Sarbun.)
A khan ruled over a khanate, maintained some troops, and col-
lected revenue on the basis of a tithe ('ushr). However, his power was
limited by a jirga (council) of the heads of clans among whom the
khan was the first among equals. No khan’s position was secure or
permanent, though some were khans because their fathers had been
khans. On the whole, a khan was powerful when he had a strong
character and many relatives with a substantial following among the
minor khans under his jurisdiction. Only with the approval of the
elders did he have the right to levy a tithe as tax and recruit men
for military service in times of war.47
During the period under discussion, 'Omara Khan (Umra Khan)
of Jandol emerged as the most powerful khan. Situated between the
Bajaur and Panjkora rivers, Jandol had many khans known as Mast
Khel. Among them 'Omara Khan, son of Aman Khan Tarkanay,
finally emerged victorious, and by 1890 he made himself the khan
of Jandol as a result of a decade-long struggle.48 He scored the vic-
tory that made him powerful in 1890 when he occupied Dir, and
expelled Mohammad Sharif Khan. The defeated khan who was a
member of the ruling house founded by Mulla Ilyas, known as the
Akhund Baba, took refuge in Swat. By expelling the khan of Dir,
'Omara Khan threatened the mehtar (ruler) of the principality of
Chitral. By the middle of 1891, he likewise threatened Nawagai and,
to a lesser extent, Swat.49
47
Momand, M. J. Siyal, Da Zeeno Pashtano Qaba’ilo Shajaray, 97. Yapp, M. E.,
“Disturbances in eastern Afghanistan, 1839–42”, reprinted from the Bulletin of the
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Vol. xxv, part 3,
1962, 500. Noelle, State and Tribe in Nineteenth Century Afghanistan, 178.
48
Imperial Gazetteer of India, Provincial Series, North West Frontier Province, Calcutta,
1908, 129. Henceforth GNWFP.
49
MM, Apr. 91, PSLI, 63, 120. Siyal, Da Zeeno Pashtano Qaba’ilo Shajaray, 92.
78 chapter four
'Omara Khan’s rapid rise to power turned many khans against

him. Safdar Khan, the khan of Bajaur, made an alliance with
Mohammad Sharif Khan, the exiled khan of Dir.50 Additionally,
Mian Gul 'Abd al-Wadud of Swat incited the people in his domain
against 'Omara Khan;51 his support was important because he was
the son of 'Abd al-Ghafur Khan, who was known as the Akhund
of Swat, as well as the Ghous (Saint) of Saido or the Babajee of
Swat, and was the most celebrated former ruler of Swat. Among his
many disciples some were as influential as he himself was such as
Mulla Mushk-e-'Alam, and Mulla Najm al-Din. The Mohmands of
Mittai likewise supported the khans who were against 'Omara Khan
in their endeavors.52
The amir supported Safdar Khan with larger allowances, and even
expressed willingness to support him with troops if necessary.53 The
concentration of troops at Asmar under the command of Ghulam
Haydar Khan Charkhay, himself a Yusufzay Pashtun, had changed
the balance of power in favor of the latter, in particular after his
troops scored a victory in Shurtan, in Bajaur.54 The defeat of 'Omara
Khan and the extension of the amir’s rule in Bajaur seemed immi-
nent. However, at this juncture the Government of India warned
the sipah salar as well as 'Omara Khan not to move against each
other. Specifically, it warned the former that his advance into Bajaur
would be “. . . regarded as an act of hostility to the Government of
India.”55 The strong tone of the warning indicated the resolve of the
British to implement its Forward Policy, which culminated in con-
cluding the Durand Agreement in 1893 (See Chapter Ten).
Although the amir maintained his claim to Bajaur, he instructed
the sipah salar not to advance on it. As for 'Omara Khan, the British
finally forced him to flee to Afghanistan after he, in conjunction with
Sher Afzal, the pro-Kabul exiled brother of the mehtar of Chitral,
occupied that principality in 1895. Thus, a remarkable khan, the so-
called ‘Napoleon of Bajaur’ was forced out of the region. He had,
50
MM, May 91, PSLI, 63, 497.
51
PD, 21 July 91, PSLI, 63, 1068.
52
PD, 13 June 91, PSLI, 63, 624. In 1917, Mian Gul was acclaimed as the
ruler of Swat, and later in 1926 recognized by the British as the wali of Swat.
Siyal, De Zeeno Pashtanao Qaba’ilo Shajaray, 89.
53
PD, 8 Aug. 91, PSLI, 63, 1183.
54
PD, 28 June 92, PSLI, 67, 308.
55
PD, 28 June 92, PSLI, 67, 308.
through statesmanship and military action, carved out a kingdom

that comprised Dir, Jandol, and Chitral and, like the amir; he had
been determined to overrun Bajaur and Kafiristan. The exiled
Mohammad Sharif Khan became the khan of Dir once again, this
time with the additional title of nawab (ruler). This occurred in 1897
through an agreement with the British in which they undertook to
pay him a regular allowance and grant him weapons in return for
his keeping the road to Chitral open. He ruled the khanate until he
died in 1904.56
Kurma
From late 1891 onward, Kurma (Kurram), inhabited by Shi'i "Ali

Khel Pashtuns, commonly known as the Turis (the Blackened), was
frequently raided by the neighboring Sunni tribal elders and mullas,
who had been encouraged to do so by Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan.57
Finally a widely known adventurer, Sarwar Khan of Chinarak, nick-
named Chikkai, who had given much trouble to the British at Kohat,
occupied Lower Kurma (Kuz Kurma) and the Turis paid him rev-
enue.58 This occurred after Chikkai and his armed men returned
from Kabul where the amir had received him “. . . with unusual
honor.”59 Having given up hope of recovering the territory60 the
Turis concluded a truce with Chikkai, according to which they agreed
to let him retain Lower Kurma, while he agreed to make no fur-
ther advances.61
The amir tried to make the Turis his subjects, but he wanted to
do this through a proxy to avoid antagonizing the Government of
India, which had already told him that Kurma would not be restored
to Afghanistan.62 By the treaty of Gandumak Kurma had first been
conditionally assigned to the Government of India, and later annexed
56
Siyal, De Zeeno Pashtano Qaba’ilo Shajaray, 92.
57
Derajat Confidential Diary, 15 Dec. 91, PSLI, 65, 513. Fayz Mohammad, Siraj
al-Tawaikh, 826.
58
KD, 4–8 Dec. 91, PSLI, 69, 1706.
59
MM, Oct. 91, PSLI, 66, 1324.
60
MM, June 91, PSLI, 66, 1323.
61
MM, May 92, PSLI, 66, 884.
62
80 chapter four
by it. After the Government of India exchanged some correspondence

with the Amir on the subject, British troops forced Chikkai and
others out of Kurma, in October 1892, and affected a settlement
there.63 The amir remained silent.
The Afridays
Settled in high walled forts and villages in the Khyber, Akhor,

Kowwatt and Tirah from ancient times the Afridays or Apridays are
the most important Pashtun tribe of the historic twenty-three—mile-
long Khyber Pass extending from Jamrud to Dakka. The Afridays
are probably the people known as Aparaytae, described by Herodotus.
Due to their mountainous territory, and their hard style of living
they have lived beyond the pale of government authority even to
the present day. Parts of the Khyber valley are also inhabited by
the Mohmands and Shinwarays, but the Afridays are the predomi-
nant tribe. As the guardian of the Khyber, these tribes were collec-
tively referred to as the Khyberays. They were, thus, singularly
important because as a gateway of Central Asia to South Asia, the
Khyber Pass served as the shortest thoroughfare for the passage of
caravans, conquerors, merchants and people. Additionally, the Khyber
Pass directly connected the cities of Peshawar and Jalalabad.
The Khyberays became famous in the latter stage of the Roshaniyya
movement when they rose several times in rebellion under the lead-
ership of Aimal Khan Mohmand and Darya Khan Afriday against the
Mughal rulers of India. Aimal Khan “who was a born general,
declared himself king, struck coins in his name and invited all the
Pathan tribes to take part in the national struggle.” For four years
he kept alive the independence struggle of the Afghans from Kabul
to Peshawar. In the Khyber area in 1672, the Pashtuns under his
leadership killed “. . . a large number of soldiers and officers of the
[Mughal] empire. . . and enslaved thousands of them.” According to
the Imperial Gazetteer of India, the entire Mughal army number-
ing 40,000 soldiers perished in this encounter. The Afridays are
divided into the eight distinct divisions of Malik Din Khel, Qambar
63
Harris, L., British Policy on the North West Frontier of India, 1889–1901,
Unpublished Ph.D. thesis at London University, 1960, 88.
Khel, Koki Khel, Zakha Khel, Akaw Khel, Se Pai, Kamar Khel,
and Adam Khel.64
After the Second Anglo-Afghan War an agreement had been
reached between the Government of India and the Afridays in which
the latter allowed the Khyber Pass to remain open, in return for
allowances and a guarantee of non-interference in their domestic
affairs.65 The Afridays did not consider this to be a surrender of
their rights, and, as before, regarded themselves as fully independent
of the British66 and continually offered allegiance to the amir. However,
the amir temporized, encouraging them to look to Kabul for sup-
port without actually supporting them with troops. To the repeated
offer of allegiance by the various jirgas of the Afidays the amir kept
replying that the “Afridis must be unanimous in accepting his rule
before he could address the British Government as such.”67 The amir
actually did not intend to run afoul of the British Government over
the Afridays, as the British had extended control over the Khyber
as a result of the Gandumak treaty which they had imposed on Amir
Mohammad Ya"qub Khan, in 1879. Hence, Amir 'Abd al-Rahman’s
excuse that the Afridays were interested in getting allowances, but
unwilling to inform the British Commissioner of their intention to
submit to him.68
Waziristan
Waziristan comprised Northern Waziristan and Southern Waziristan

where the Massyd or Masawud (not Massoud or Mahsud of the
English sources) and Darwesh Khel Wazirs constitute the bulk of its
inhabitants and the Ghilzays, the Ormurr, the Dawars, the Hindus
and the sayyeds constitute its smaller groups of people. In Southern
Waziristan the Gomal is the oldest of all the trade routes in this
quarter along which proceeded every year a succession of caravans
of thousands of well-armed traders, called powindas, from Afghanistan
64
Herodotus, The History, 3.91. Kakar, Afghans and Afghanistan, 50. Siyal, De Zeeno
Pashtano Qaba’ilo Shajaray, 254. GNWFP, 7.
65
Harris, British Policy, 33.
66
Afriday elders to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, 4 Nov. 97, PSLI, 99, No. 205, Encl.,
231.
67
MM, Dec. 91, PSLI, 65, 108.
68
Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 777, 786.
82 chapter four
to India. The Wazirs “. . . are by instinct intensely democratic, and

any man may rise by courage and wisdom to the position of malik
or leader; but these maliks have often little influence and no real
authority.” In 1881, the Punjab Government of India characterized
the Massyds thus: “Notorious as the boldest of robbers, they are
more worthily admired for the courage which they show in attack
and in hand-to-hand fighting with the sword.”69
Just as other tribes in eastern Afghanistan, the Wazirs of Waziristan
also looked on the ruler of Afghanistan as a Muslim sovereign of
their own ethnic stock. In 1883, they invited the amir’s officials to
their land, but when the officials arrived there the Kabul Khel sec-
tion of the tribe drove them away70 even though a militia of Kabul
had been stationed in Wana, a town in Southern Waziristan.
Subsequently, however, the Wazirs and Dawars agreed to pay a
tithe, but the Biland Khel section incited the speen gund, as opposed
to the tore gund against the amir.71
Among the Wazirs, as among some other Pashtun tribes, the speen
gund (white bloc) and tore gund (black bloc) were two leagues of tribes
traditionally at odds with each other. Although the existence of the
leagues should have made it relatively easy for the government to
penetrate the Wazirs, it actually made this more difficult. The schism
between the two leagues was so pronounced that even the amir’s
marriages with the daughter of Malik Rahmat Khan and the sister
of Malik Tirin Khan did not help him extend his authority in
Waziristan. These maliks were probably associated with the tore gund,
as one Shahzada, a leader of the speen gund, went so far as to invite
Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan to return, promising him the sup-
port of “sixty-thousand” families of the Wazirs and Tanays to unseat
the amir.72 Actually, Shahzada resented the allowances, which the
amir paid to his relations, fearing that the allowances would strengthen
his opponents.
69
GNWFP, 243–255. Siyal, De Zeeno Pashtano Qaba’ilo Shajaray, 275–281. The
word Wazir is derived from Wadair, denoting a subdivision of the Sapay (Sapi or
Safi) tribe, the other being the Gurbuz, and the Massyd. Sections of the Sapays
also lived in Konarr, Laghman, Tagao, Paktia, Ghorband and other localities inside
Afghanistan. Dr. Nasir Ahmad Sapay, personal communication, California, 2004.
70
71
Ibid., 552.
72
Ibid., 882.
Notwithstanding the setback, the amir could have pacified Waziristan

by force or other means, but he refrained from doing so. The rea-
son for this was the warning he received from the viceroy in July
1892, stating that
. . . the British Government will not tolerate any further advance on
the part of your officers or permit Your Highness to establish new
posts or to increase any garrison you may now have in Waziristan or
the country to the south of it.73
This was after foreign secretary, Mortimer Durand, had stated in
June 1991 that
We are getting very bad news all along the border from the Black
Mountain to the Waziri country. The Amir is threatening Kurram;
the Afridis are in a very shaky condition, with his emissaries among
them giving them ammunition.74
Afterward, the amir made no advances further east, and made excuses
to those Wazirs who persisted in submitting to him, arguing that they
were interested only in getting allowances whether they received them
from the British or the Afghan government.75 The British presence
in the area was due to the British India’s so-called “Scientific Frontier”
which led to their advances toward Afghanistan. For this purpose
they had already tunneled the Khojak range and built the railway at
Chaman, pointing unmistakably toward Kandahar. The amir resented
the construction of this railway greatly describing it, as quoted by
Durand, as “running an awl into his navel.”76 The final outcome of
these events was the Durand Agreement (See Chapter Ten).
The Bar Durranays and Afghanistan
The amir’s advance into the lands of the eastern Pashtuns or the
Bar Durranays of Ahmad Shah Durranay can be understood in the
context of their relationship with Afghanistan. Following the expulsion
73
Lansdowne to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, 16 July 92, Past Records and Files,
Archives of the Royal Afghan Ministry of External Affairs, Kabul, 5, Henceforth
ARAMFA.
74
Durand, M., quoted in Sykes, Sir Percy, The Right Honourable Sir Mortimer Durand,
A Biography, Cassell and Co. Ltd., London, 1926, 201.
75
76
Sykes, Mortimer Durand, 201.
84 chapter four
of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, the amir concentrated on con-

solidating his rule in the interior of the country and on extending
it into the outlying regions, especially those inhabited by his kins-
men, the Pashtuns. Difficult as the latter program was, the amir had
the resources and the determination to implement it. In the back-
ground was, of course, the ethnic affinity, as well as family and per-
sonal marriage relationships that he had with some of the tribes. He
was also personally well acquainted with the region and the people.
However, while the amir was certain to succeed in his policy of
pacification, he had other concerns. Since the reign of Amir Sher
'Ali Khan the British and Russian empires were steadily approach-
ing Afghanistan and their officials did not hesitate to curb the advances
toward them of the amir’s forces. Consequently, the amir could not
become a second Ahmad Shah, although in military skill and the
ability to organize he was his equal if not superior to him.
Of all the outlying regions of Afghanistan, the regions to the south
east of the country were especially significant because Afghanistan
as a country had originated from this region. From time immemo-
rial this was the land that was inhabited predominantly by the
Pashtuns, who in the eighteenth century helped Ahmad Shah Durranay
establish the kingdom of Afghanistan. These Pashtuns have professed
allegiance to Afghan rulers ever since. It was because of this kind
of relationship that the Pashtun tribes moved unhindered within this
vast region. For example, in the post-Mongol era, some tribes, includ-
ing the Durranays, have spread from these lands toward the west
as far as Kandahar and Herat. In the opposite direction, “. . . between
the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries, numerous Pathan tribes from
Afghanistan spread over and conquered the country roughly corre-
sponding to the modern North-West Frontier Province.”77
Migration of the Pashtun tribes in both directions was not uncom-
mon. Every time the Pashtuns were pressured by outsiders, or when
they themselves found it profitable to migrate in search of new lands
and pastures, they did so in both directions. They have actually
engaged in this type of migration from the Vedic period as the orig-
inal inhabitants of “the Paropamisade of the Ancients”, Ghor, and
the Sulaiman mountains [the Kisay Ghar]. However, the southeastern
region was not exclusively inhabited by them, and other ethnic groups
77
Davies, C. C., The Problem of the North-West Frontier of India, Cambridge, 1932,
38.
had a share in it.78 In medieval times, the Pashtuns did so within

the then contemporary confines of Afghanistan, which stretched
roughly from the Indus to Helmand and populated predominantly
by the Pashtuns, called Paktues and Pakthas in the Vedas79 and
Pactyes by Herodotus as noted in Introduction.80
The name Afghanistan was initially applied to the land lying
between the Indus River and Ghazni on which the Pashtuns had
settled.81 It was probably this country which Herodotus described as
the “the Pactyic country”, placing it “north of the rest of India” and
referring to its people “as the most warlike of the Indians” who lived
“much like the Bactrians.”82 The terms Acvaka and Aspasians of the
ancient Greek historians also refer to these people.
Modern Afghanistan emerged, as already noted, mainly through
the efforts of the Pashtuns, notably eastern Pashtuns. They had played
a major part in assisting Ahmad Shah establish Afghanistan not only
as a political entity up to the Indus but also as an empire. From
Ahmad Shah down, all Afghan rulers looked on these Pashtuns as
their subjects, not only because they were Pashtuns—that is, people
of their own stock related to them by ethnicity, language, religion,
history and culture, but also because they had accompanied them
during their campaigns in northern India, as far as Delhi. The
Sadozay rulers had even adopted Peshawar as their winter capital.
To Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, the land up to the Indus River
formed the eastern limit of Afghanistan,83 speaking of its inhabitants
as “. . . people of my nationality and religion.”84 An outward sign of
this affinity was the fact that beginning with the Sadozays, Afghan
rulers as well as members of the royal families had established mar-
riage ties with the Pashtuns. The amir’s grandmother, mother, two
of his wives and some wives of his sons were Pashtuns from these
areas. As already noted, a wife of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan was a daugh-
ter of Sa"adat Khan Mohmand. However, the main weakness of
Afghan rulers was their inability to rule directly over the Pashtuns.
78
Dorn, B., Annotations on Part the First in Ullah, Neamet, History of the Afghans,
65, 72.
79
Tate, R., The Kingdom of Afghanistan, originally published in 1911, reproduced
by Indus publications, 1973, 15.
80
Herodotus, The History, 7.67.
81
For details see, Kakar, Afghan, and Afghanistan.
82
Herodotus, The History, 3. 101.
83
84
Sultan Mahomed, The Life of Abdur Rahman, 2, 158, 159.
86 chapter four
This was due to the type of government which allowed, or had to

allow, autonomy for the outlying provinces, especially the lands of
the eastern Pashtuns, who resented the interference of the central
government in their affairs.
Additionally, with regard to some districts of eastern Afghanistan
the amir was in a less advantageous position than his predecessors
had been. In critical moments of the negotiations for the amirate,
the representative of the British Government of India told the then
Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan that the frontier districts and some
passes mentioned in the Gandumak treaty would not be restored.
At the time he remained silent, presumably allowing himself space
for future political maneuver. After the expulsion of Sardar Mohammad
Ayyub Khan, the amir embarked on establishing control over the
lands of the eastern Pashtuns. However, it took him ten years to
pacify the Shinwarays, and also to put down major rebellions else-
where before he was able to pacify the eastern Pashtuns. Throughout
this period, and later, until his death even in spite of the Durand
Agreement he concentrated on peaceful penetration. He did so mainly
by granting allowances to the Pashtun elders and mullas, employing
many mullas and emissaries for this purpose. Also, from nowhere
else to the same extent as from these areas did so many jirgas of
elders visit Kabul where the amir treated them as his subjects.
The amir’s many booklets on the jihad were addressed mainly to
the people of the regions as noted. The progress of his pacification
of these areas was slow but steady. After the pacification of the
Shinwarays he finally dispatched a military force under his most able
general to Asmar with the specific aim of pacifying Bajaur and
beyond. It was just at this juncture that the British Government of
India intervened. Had it not done so the amir would probably have
pacified all of the regions in eastern Afghanistan over which his
grandfather, Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, had exercised control.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE GREAT GHILZAY UPRISING AND ITS SUPPRESSION
In 1886 the amir’s alliance with the Ghilzays was shaken to its foun-
dation when the latter rose against him. This was an extremely seri-
ous event because the Ghilzays, after the Durranays, were the second
major Pashtun tribal confederation with their major divisions of
Hotak, Tokhay, Andar, Tarakay, Sulaiman Khel, Nasir, and Kharotay.
The view held by some non-Afghan writers concerning the origin
of the Ghilzays is as strange as the view of others about the Pashto
language and the Pahtuns. The view held by the Ghilzays them-
selves concerning their origin is basically different from that held by
non-Afghan writers. According to the Ghilzays their ancestors whose
original name was Gharzay lived in the Gharj district of Ghor from
where they migrated to the Kisay Ghar [the Sulaiman Mountains].
Slowly, over the years due to their increasing population, they spread
as pastoralists in various districts in Ningrahar, Logar, Paktya, Kalat
and Kandahar.1 However, unlike the Durranays, the Ghilzays nei-
ther settled in one particular region, nor owned as much land. Those
Ghilzays, who settled on the land between Kabul and Kandahar
were referred to in English-language sources as the ‘Western Ghilzays’,
while those who settled on the land between Kabul and Laghman
were referred to as the ‘Eastern Ghilzays’. A portion of almost every
major division of the Ghilzays lived as transhumant nomads in the
summer on pastures near Ghazni and in the winter in northern
India. The Ghilzays considered themselves to be peers to the Durranays
particularly because in 1709 their celebrated elder, Mir Wais Hotak,
was the first to liberate Kandahar from the Safavi domination, while
his son, Shah Mahmud Hotak, overran Persia in 1722, ushering the
era of the rise of Pashtuns. Due to these feats the Hotak section of
the Ghilzays was considered to be the badshah khel (ruling section),
1
Hotak, A. Aman Allah, De Khpilwakee Lmar Srak, ya de Hotako de Afghani Dawlat
'Urooj aw Nizool, (Pashto), [The Beacon of Independence, The Rise and Decline of the Afghan
Hotak State]. Daunish Book Store, Peshawar, 1989, 6.
88
chapter five
The Ghilzay Land

the great ghilzay uprising and its suppression 89
as the Sadozay section was subsequently referred to in the same way.

Consequently, relations between the Durranays and Ghilzays were
marked more by competition and enmity and less by cooperation
and amity.
The Seeds of Enmity
As previously described, the amir made an alliance with the Ghilzays

when he confronted his rival cousin, Sardar Mohammad Ayyub
Khan. However, following his expulsion in late 1881 the amir’s rela-
tions with the Ghilzays became increasingly strained. First the gov-
ernment detained elders of the Andar for refusing to pay revenue
arrears. Afterward it suppressed the Tarakays for the support they
had given to Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, and demanded that
they should also pay their revenue arrears. Additionally, the gov-
ernment imprisoned Mir Afzal Khan Hotak, a descendant of Mir
Wais Khan Hotak, charging that he had aspired to the throne dur-
ing the reign of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan.2 The arrest was probably due
to the support he had given to the family of the late Amir Sher 'Ali
Khan. Whatever the truth, the arrest provoked the whole tribe, since
it considered the Hotak section to be its ruling section, as previously
noted.
The amir, further, angered the tribe by alienating Mulla Mushk-
e-'Alam when he refused, as the mullah had requested, to release
Ghazi Mohammad Jan Khan Wardak and 'Asmat Allah Jabar Khel.
The amir had imprisoned and later had them executed on charges
that the former had plotted to assassinate him3 and the latter had
corresponded with Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan. As described
in Chapter Two, General Wardak had campaigned heroically against
the British occupation of Afghanistan for which he had gained the
title of ghazi, and the mulla was extremely influential with the peo-
ple south of the Hindu Kush in general and the Ghilzays in par-
ticular. He had played a major part in the patriotic war, and, in
addition, was related to the tribe by being an Andar from Shilgar.
2
Col. Mohammad Afzal (Mamakhel), 13 July 83, PSLI, 37, 543.
3
AB, Kabul Correspondent, 7 Dec. 81, PSLI, 31, 305. Ghobar maintains that
the leaders of the jihad movement turned away from the amir when they found
out that he was an Anglophile. Afghanistan Dar Masir-e-Tarikh, 658.
90 chapter five
Although the amir had reasons for the arrests and executions, the
Ghilzay elders were not convinced by his argument. The actual prob-
lem was the lack of trust between the amir and the elders. This was
because during the resistance period the Ghilzay elders had become
so powerful that the amir came to fear them. He also feared
Mohammad Jan Wardak, whom the common people revered as a
saint and a hero for the exceptional dynamic leadership that he had
provided during the patriotic war, and who, afterward, had demon-
strated signs of independence.
In addition to those previously mentioned, the amir also impris-
oned many others and the arrests frightened the people. The mulla
declared:
Three thousand men who took defense during the British occupation
and endured hardship in protecting the honor and the country of Islam
are today in prison in Kabul. Therefore all the people including me
consider us in danger.4
The amir did not deny the charge, but reasoned that he had not
arrested any innocent man and that many of those arrested had
been held in accord with the Shari'a.5 While he still attempted to
gain the mulla’s trust by referring to him as his friend and religious
leader6 the latter could not be persuaded, replying that the amir had
killed many people through similar treachery.7 Thereafter, he intensified
his anti-amir rhetoric, inciting the Sulaiman Khel Ghilzay8 and the
people who lived between Ghazni and Kabul. He died in 1886 at
the age of 96, leaving a discontented tribe behind.
New Taxes
The next phase of the worsening of relations between the govern-

ment and the Ghilzay landowners began when the amir imposed
new taxes on them. These taxes were wider in range and at a higher
rate9 than the fixed quotas ( jam" bast) that the tribe as a whole had
4
5
Ibid.
6
KD, 21 Sept. 83, PSLI, 3, 153.
7
KD, 21 Dec. 83, PSLI, 39, 338.
8
MM, Nov. 86, PSLI, 49, 76.
9
KD, Jan. 86, PSLI, 46, 193. Kand D, 12 Mar. 86, PSLI, 46, 1533.
formerly paid through its elders.10 Even more serious was a new sys-
tem of taxation which the amir introduced to increase land revenue.
Accordingly, landowners were to pay a tax of one-third (se-kot) of
the produce of land irrigated by streams (nahri ), a tax of one-fifth
(khums) on land irrigated by springs (chishmai ), and a tithe ('ushr) on
land irrigated by underground canals (karezi ).11 These were the heaviest
rates of taxes the tribe had ever been asked to pay, whereas the
Durranay landowners enjoyed the fruits of rent-free lands. The amir
also stopped the customary allowances that the government paid to
the late Mulla Mushk-e-'Alam, and his son and successor, Mulla
'Abd al-Karim, and, in addition, made their rent-free land subject
to the payment of revenue.12
The Uprising
The discontented Ghilzay elders rose in rebellion in October 1886,

in support of the exiled sardar, Mohammad Ayyub Khan,13 after
General Taj Mohammad Khan Ghilzay who had accompanied him
to Persia, had conspired with them.14 To make their uprising legit-
imate, the rebel leaders granted the title of caliph (khalifa) to Mulla
'Abd al-Karim,15 and they allowed Mohammad Shah Hotak, a son
of Mir Afzal Hotak (freed from prison), to lead them in military
campaigns. There is some confusion about the title which Mulla
'Abd al-Karim assumed to make the uprising legitimate. According
to some reports, the latter was given the title of amir,16 while the
former had declared himself king,17 and had read the religious ser-
mon (khutba),18 and issued coins in his own name.19 The latter reports
seem doubtful, since the rebel leaders had invited Sardar Mohammad
Ayyub Khan to lead them in their campaigns against the amir.
10
GAK, 141.
11
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to Col. Afzal, 9 Aug. 87, PSLI, 51, 310.
12
Qazi 'Abd al-Qadir to Peshawar Commissioner, 7 Dec. 86, PSLI, 49, 111.
13
PD, 8 Jan. 87, PSLI, 49, 283.
14
15
PD, 7 Apr. 87, PSLI, 50, 243.
16
BACA, 178.
17
PD, 29 Mar. 87, PSLI, 49, 1320.
18
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman in darbar, KD, 29 Oct. 86s, PSLI, 48, 1173.
19
PD, 20 May 87, PSLI, 50, 725.
92 chapter five
Probably, as Fayz Mohammad, the official chronicler states, Mulla

'Abd al-Karim was declared something similar to badshah (ruler).20
Whatever the truth, by inviting Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan
the rebels planned to oppose the amir more effectively.
The Sulaiman Khel and the Andar took the first step toward
rebellion by looting a Durranay army contingent in the Muqur area,21
and afterward marching on the city of Ghazni. However, in late
October 1886, at Talkhakzar [ Talkha Guzar?] the army led by
General Ghulam Haydar Orakzay defeated them, and the general
sent the heads of about two thousand fallen rebels to Kabul where,
after the fashion of Timur Lane, a tower of skulls (kala munar) was
displayed as a warning to others.22 The leading rebels escaped to
the country of the Kakars in the British territory.
Confrontation and Suppression
After the victory, the amir instructed General Ghulam Haydar

Orakzay to disarm the Andar and their allies. He also instructed
him to stop the allowances that the government paid to religious
scholars, to sell the lands and underground irrigation canals of those
who had escaped, and to confiscate the lands of the Qarabagh region.
In addition, he instructed the general to build a fort in Ataghar in
the heart of the Hotak land.23 With the exception of the latter the
instructions were carried out, the Ghilzays were harshly treated, and
their women insulted. The uprising appeared to have been sup-
pressed, although it was the winter that created that impression.
Meanwhile, the amir tried to isolate the Ghilzays as a whole while
he appealed directly to their elders to submit. He also tried to win
the support of his own tribesmen, the Durranays, who, until then,
were on bad terms with him, warning them that the Ghilzays were
after their ruling position.24 The Ghilzays had, after their looting of
the Durranay contingent, made it known that they had risen against
20
21
MM, Nov. 86, PSLI, 49, 75.
22
The Amir to Colonel 'Ata Allah, British Agent, KD, 2 Nov. 86, PSLI, 48,
117.
23
24
KD, 29 Oct. 86, PSLI, 48, 1173.
the amir only, and that they had no quarrel with the Durranays.
However, the amir still continued to incite them against the Ghilzays,
just as he had done the opposite when he was engaged in the fight
against Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan. Further, the amir let them
enjoy their lands free of revenue as before, whereas prior to the
Ghilzay uprising he had ordered them to pay it.25
Ultimately, the amir failed to win over other people against the
Ghilzays. He succeeded only in weaning the Hazaras from the Ghilzays
with the help of the Qizilbashes,26 but failed to win the support of
the Tajiks of Ghazni and Kohistan. The amir’s notable failure was
with the 'ulema (Sunni religious scholars), as only a small number
of them condemned the Ghilzays as rebels, while most sat on the
fence by declaring that he was justified in fighting those who were
dangerous to Islam.27 This reference could not apply to the Ghilzays
because a distinguished scholar, Mulla 'Abd al-Karim-led them in
the campaigns against the amir. More importantly, the amir failed
in his efforts to calm the rebel leaders, even though he promised
them that he would lower their rate of revenue if they desisted from
rebelling.28 The rebel leaders rejected his overtures, and Mulla 'Abd
al-Karim declared that the amir’s tyranny “had exceeded all bounds,”29
and that he was “. . . an infidel, the extirpator of Islam, worshipper
of himself, and the friend of an alien Government.”30 The non-
Durranay Pashtuns of the neighboring lands, including the Kakars,
supported the Ghilzays, but among the latter the Tokhays did not
participate in the rebellion.31
The uprising took formidable proportions during the following
spring. The total number of the rebels was reported to have increased
from twenty thousand in March 188732 to one hundred thousand in
April.33 However, after their initial successes in Qalat and Ataghar,34
the rebels were defeated at Ataghar,35 Qal'a-e-Katal, and still later
25
Kand D, 25 Jan. 87, PSLI, 48, 487.
26
Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 539, 527, 541.
27
KD, 29 Oct. 86, PSLI, 48, 1137.
28
PD, 7 Apr. 87, PSLI, 50, 244.
29
PD, 8 Jan. 87, PSLI, 49, 283.
30
PD, 29 Mar. 87, PSLI, 49, 1320.
31
32
MM, Mar. 87, PSLI, 49, 1281.
33
PD, 7 Apr. 87, PSLI, 50, 243.
34
BACA, 178.
35
KD, 20 May 87, PSLI, 50, 879.
94 chapter five
in other unspecified places,36 by the government army under the com-

mand of General Ghulam Haydar Khan Orakzay. In its final phase
the uprising found support in an unexpected quarter. The Ghilzays
in the army at Herat, who had earlier risen in support of Sardar
Mohammad Ayyub Khan,37 arrived and joined their recalcitrant kins-
men, and inflicted the final defeat on the army and recovered Nawa
in July 1887.38 However, thereafter with the onset of winter and
against the well-organized army which was continually reinforced
they could no longer fight, and the uprising petered out. About
twenty-four thousand Ghilzays were killed in all the clashes.
The Ghilzay uprising provided an opportunity for Sardar Mohammad
Ayyub Khan to try his luck once again. However, he traveled in
the wrong direction, and failed to arrive at the Afghan border until
late September when the uprising was over. Thus, the sardar lost
his final opportunity to enter Afghanistan, as by then the amir had
fortified the frontiers, and the Persian Government, under pressure
from the British Government, had ordered his seizure.39
The Ghilzay uprising was essentially a war between the govern-
ment and the Ghilzay landowners, whose power the amir had resolved
to break. Among the provocative measures that the amir took, he
imposed heavy taxes on the landowners, resulting in the uprising led
by the Ghilzay elders. The elders were actively supported in their
stand by almost all of their own tribesmen, while others responded
with good will. The amir had neither, as he failed to send tribal
militias against them, or to obtain a legal ruling ( fatwa) from the
‘ulema to denounce them as rebels as he had done in response to
other rebellious tribes. However, since the Ghilzay elders had poor
weapons and no other means of fighting, they had no chance of
success against the well-disciplined and well-equipped army. The
uprising illustrated the ineffectiveness of a popular uprising against
a well-organized military power.
After their defeat, the amir intentionally disabled the Ghilzay by
impoverishing them economically and weakening them politically,
doing so with a view to preventing future uprisings. What the amir
36
MM, June 87, PSLI, 50, 1239.
37
Riyazi, 'Ayn Waqayi', 262.
38
KD, 5 July 87, PSLI, 50, 283.
39
For detail see, Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi', 226–232. Riyazi had met Sardar Mohammad
Ayyub when the latter was on his way to Afghanistan.
had once believed about the Andar he now believed about the entire
tribe, stating that “when they [Andar] have no money left with them,
[they] will not again raise disturbances.”40 He proved correct in his
prediction, and the Ghilzays never rose en masse again. The upris-
ing also had another important consequence; after its suppression
the amir drew closer to his own Durranay tribe—in particular, to
the Mohammadzay section to which he belonged. He provided annual
allowances to its members residing in Kabul whether female or male
and treated the whole section as a partner of the state (sharik-e-dawlat).
40
The Amir to Na"ib Kotwal of Kabul, KD, 7 Dec. 86, PSLI, 49, 149.
CHAPTER SIX
THE REVOLT OF SARDAR MOHAMMAD ISHAQ KHAN

AND ITS SUPPRESSION
The extension of the power of Kabul over the province of Afghan

Turkestan marks an important increase in the power of Amir 'Abd
al-Rahman Khan. In 1880, at the same time that he established
himself in Badakhshan, his full-cousin, Sardar Mohammad Ishaq
Khan, took possession of Turkestan of which province he remained
governor. Ishaq Khan ruled the province as governor in virtual inde-
pendence until in 1888 he revolted, was defeated and fled to
Samarqand in Bukhara.
Historical Background
Since the Vedic time, Turkestan—formerly known as Bakhdi, Balkh

and Bakhtar (the East), as well as Bactria (or Bactriana) by the Greek
historians, had been an important region. Its importance lay in its
history as the first center of civilization in former Afghanistan. The
region was, basically, important for its agriculture and pastures as
well as its geographic location that directly connects Central Asia to
the regions south of the Hindu Kush and South Asia. The ruins of
the old capital city of Balkh (ancient Zariaspa, or Bactra) which still
exist there, attest its former grandeur. King Gushtasp of the Aspa
ruling dynasty, in the Avestan period, is said to have founded the
city of Balkh or Bakhtar.1 It was there during the reign of King
Vishtaspa of the Aspa dynasty that the reformer Zoroaster began to
preach his Zoroastrianism, a religion based on the dual concept of
the god of virtue (Ahura Mazda) and the god of evil (Ahriman),
sometime between 1000 and 600 BCE.2
1
The Greek name ‘Bactriana’ is derived from the river ‘Bactrius’, the Balkhab
of the locals. Leitner, G. W., “Dardistan”, Woking 1895, 10.
2
Kakar, M. H., “The Avesta and Zoroaster of Mr. Babi and the Trace of Pashto
in the Avestan Period” in Light and Defense or Essays on the Population, History and the
Current Affairs of Afghanistan, (Pashto), Sapay Center for Pashto Research and Develop-
ment, Peshawar 1999, 105–122.
the revolt of sardar mohammad ishaq khan 97
Afghan Turkestan
98 chapter six
With its excellent cotton and wheat, Balkh was still a kingdom,
though a dependency of the Achaemenian Persia, when Alexander
the Great invaded it in 330 BCE. Its ruler, Bessus, and his succes-
sor, Spitamenes, waged “a nationalist war, with strong religious over-
tones”, and “between them they gave Alexander more continuous
trouble than all the embattled hosts of Darius.”3 Afterward, in the
Hellenistic Greco-Bactrian period, “Bactria occupied much of mod-
ern Afghanistan”, a country then known as “the land of a thousand
cities.” The Greek colonists of the post-Alexander period had con-
tributed to this development by fraternizing with the native popula-
tion so much that, according to Frank Holt, nineteenth century
European scholars “. . . saw in Bactria the best of all ancient worlds.”4
It was for its grandeur that in the Islamic times Bactria was called
umm al-bilad (the mother of cities), as well as janat al-arz (the paradise
of the earth), and khair al-turab (the best of soil).5 However, the city
of Balkh was totally destroyed in the Chingizid onslaught of the thir-
teenth century as were all other cities of Afghanistan. During the
second reign of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, the governor of
Turkestan, Sardar Mohammad Afzal Khan, transported the debris
of Balkh to Takhtapul. During the second reign of Amir Sher 'Ali
Khan, the Shi'i governor of the region, Na"ib Mohammad 'Alam
Khan, enlarged Mazar-e-Sharif (the noble mausoleum) at the expense
of Balkh. Mazar was (and still is) assumed to be the site of the shrine
of 'Ali, the fourth caliph of Islam, and the cousin and son-in-law of
the Prophet Muhammad. 6 There also lie the graves of Ghazi
Mohammad Akbar Khan and Amir Sher 'Ali Khan.
3
Green, P., Alexander of Macedon, 338. Arrian, The Campaigns of Alexander, transl.
by A. de Selincort, Penguin Books, 1958, 229–232. That the inhabitants of Bactria
were patriotic is evident from a statement by Zoroaster as, according to him,
instructed by Ahura Mazda: “I have made every land dear to its people, even
though it had no charms whatever in it: had I not made every land dear to its
people, even though it had no charms whatever in it, then the whole living world
would have invaded the Airyana Vaego. The first of the good lands and countries
which I, Ahura Mazda, created was the Airyana Vaego.” “Selections from the Zend-
Avesta”, Transl. by Darmestetter, James in The Sacred Books of the East, the Colonial
Press, New York, MDCCCXCIX, 67.
4
Holt, Frank L., The Thundering Zeus, The Making of Hellenistic Bactria, University
of California Press, 1999, 9–20.
5
Leitner, Dardistan, 10.
6
McChesney, R. D., Waqf in Central Asia, Four Hundred Years in the History of a
Muslim Shrine, 148–1889. Kakar, Government and Society of Afghanistan, 141.
By the 1830s, Balkh still functioned as a city, but afterward was

completely replaced by Mazar as the political and commercial cen-
ter of the region, and Turkestan comprised all of the territories lying
between the Oxus, the Hindu Kush, the Pamir steppe and Herat.7
However, under Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan (b. 1851) Turkestan-
inhabited by Uzbeks, Arabs, Hazaras, Tajiks, Pashtuns and others
with its capital at Mazar, comprised only the plains south of the
Oxus between Andkhoy and Badakhshan.
Estrangement of Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan
As early as 1881, Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan asked the amir

to recognize him as “. . . the exclusive owner of Turkestan.” Unwilling
to provoke the sardar, the amir promised him that he would do so
“When all our anxieties and troubles [are over];”8 the “anxieties”
he spoke of were caused by the presence of Sardar Mohammad
Ayyub Khan in Herat. However, the demand strained relations
between the amir and the sardar. When Kandahar and Herat fell
in late 1881, and Ayyub Khan was expelled, Ishaq Khan asked the
amir to appoint his younger brothers as governors there. The amir
refused to do so and instead trusted the sardar with vast power and
the authority to keep the revenue of the province to himself. Further,
the amir even sent him money from Kabul to consolidate his posi-
tion in this important frontier province.
Consequently, Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan had de facto inde-
pendence in Turkestan, although, like all governors, he also sent
valuable presents, especially horses, to the amir from time to time.
The presentation of gifts by provincial governors to the Kabul ruler
was a custom of the land, as was the reading of Friday sermon
(khutba) in his name. In Kabul, the amir kept the sardar’s three
younger brothers apparently as his ‘guests’, but they were actually
hostages.
In 1884, the fall of Maymana proved crucial in the relationship
between the amir and Ishaq Khan. Because the latter had under-
taken an expedition against Maymana, and because the district had
7
Wheeler, J. T., Memorandum on Afghan-Turkistan, Calcutta, 1869, Gazetteer of
Afghanistan, Part 2, Afghan Turkistan, Calcutta, 1912, i–xii.
8
BACA, 107.
100 chapter six
often been a part of Turkestan, the sardar expected that the amir
would give him jurisdiction over it after it was pacified. However,
the amir did not do so.
Following his disappointment over Maymana, Ishaq Khan tried
to consolidate his position still further and gain more popular support.
Reports are unanimous concerning the popularity of the sardar with
the people under his jurisdiction. In fact, even in 1880, the people
themselves had chosen the sardar as their governor after he crossed
the border from Samarqand where he, like the amir, had been in
exile. More importantly, the sardar’s administration was mild in sharp
contrast to that of the amir which was rigid. The contrast between
the two men was apparent even more in their characters; the sardar
was gentle and pious whereas the amir was stern and rigid.
Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan’s adherence to the Naqshbandiyya
mystic order of Islam had drawn him closer to the Uzbeks who
observed Islam in its “minute detail”,9 and to the Turkmen in par-
ticular, among whom the order was widespread;10 he had first adhered
to the order while he was living in exile in Samarqand. He was also
popular with his army which he paid regularly.11 Because Turkestan
was a frontier province, and because it was under the apparent threat
of Russia the amir had allowed the sardar to raise a large army,
and, in addition, from to time sent him money from Kabul to meet
the expenditure.12 Thus, the sardar had not been obliged to exact
money from the people and make himself unpopular with them.
For the reasons cited, relations between the amir and Ishaq Khan
were far from cordial. The amir’s efforts at affecting conciliation with
the sardar through some influential dynastic members failed to bear
fruit. While the amir maintained the facade of good relationship, he
tried to remove the sardar from Turkestan. Several times he invited
him to come to Kabul. The summons was not unusual, and in line
with the amir’s policy of removing governors in disgrace before they
became wealthy and influential, and then giving their posts to non-
Mohammadzay sardars, or head servants of the royal court. Governors
from influential families, including those from among the Moham-
madzay sardars, were especially subject to this policy.
9
Elphinstone, An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, 2, 188.
10
Sultan Mahomed, The Life of Abdur Rahman, 1, 265.
11
Khafi, The Recent Kings of Afghanistan, 2, 160.
12
BACA, 106.
Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan was the only Mohammadzay sar-

dar with a claim to the throne who still governed a province, as he
was the eldest surviving son of the late Amir Mohammad A'zam
Khan, the full-uncle of the amir. Under the circumstances, it was
unlikely that the sardar would visit the amir in Kabul, and his refusals
to obey the summons alarmed the amir. Since he was subject to
attacks of gout,13 the amir feared that in the event of his own col-
lapse the sardar would secure the throne for himself. He was espe-
cially fearful because at the time his own sons were minors, had no
brothers and the sardar was his nearest relative with a claim to the
throne.14 When the Ghilzay uprising was over, the amir decided to
remove this probable danger. He first tried to undermine Ishaq Khan’s
position by sending officials from Kabul to take senior posts in
Turkestan.15 The amir then again summoned him to Kabul, ostensibly
to consult with him on state affairs, but in reality to remove him.16
The Rebellion
The elders of Turkestan viewed the repeated summons as a sign that

the amir intended to rule the province himself and tyrannize its peo-
ple. They undertook to uphold the cause of Sardar Mohammad
Ishaq Khan, and occupy Afghanistan for him. Leaders of the
Naqshbandiyya order assured the sardar that they had been inspired
by championing his cause, and that the Khwaja Baha al-Din
Naqshband, the founder of the order, had bestowed the throne on
him.17 Soldiers and officers also took the oath of allegiance to him.
On August 10, 1888 they all declared him to be their amir and
read the religious sermon (khutba) in his name as a proof of their
fidelity and determination.18
In the mean time the sardar revealed that the people of Kabul,
too, had sent him their words of support, and that he was the avenger
of the oppressed people of Afghanistan against the tyrant amir.19
13
Owen, Surgeon, C. W., Member of the Afghan Boundary Commission who
visited the amir in Kabul, 12 Oct. 86, PSLI, 49, 51.
14
A female servant of the amir, MM, July 86s, PSLI, 47, 1128.
15
16
17
18
Khafi, The Recent Kings of Afghanistan, 2, 168–170.
19
Ibid., 171.
102 chapter six
For tactical reasons, Ishaq Khan also spread rumors that the amir
had died. However, at this juncture, events in Maymana and Andkhoy
turned against the sardar. In Maymana, although General Sharbat
Khan, commander of the troops, declared his allegiance to Ishaq
Khan, the army and civilians remained loyal to the amir and seized
the general.20 The elders of the Andkhoy and Dawlatabad districts
also reiterated their loyalty to the amir.21 Thus, the sardar’s north-
west flank became insecure.
Despite the aforementioned event, Ishaq Khan still marched on
Kabul at the head of his army, leaving his minor son, Sardar
Mohammad Isma'il Khan in charge of Turkestan. Upon his arrival
in Qunduz, its mir, Sultan Murad, joined him, as did the army sta-
tioned in Khanabad and Badakhshan. Subsequently, the whole of
Badakhshan also fell to him, an occurrence made easier by the
absence of its governor, Sardar 'Abd Allah Khan Tokhay, who was
on his way to Kabul at the time.22 Thus, northern Afghanistan minus
Maymana, fell to Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan, and he stayed in
Khanabad for three weeks. During this time the amir decided to
take action against him.
The revolt of Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan presented the amir
with problems similar to those that the rebellion of Sardar Mohammad
Ayyub Khan had caused, in 1881. Both sardars claimed the throne,
and both were sons of former amirs, though the claim of Ishaq Khan
was of lesser weight. However, under the latter a large army with
many guns23 advanced on Kabul at a time when the amir was so
ill that “. . . he could not walk for more than . . . two or three steps.”24
Further, because of the prevailing discontent in the country in the
wake of the Ghilzay uprising, public opinion was in favor of Sardar
Mohammad Ishaq Khan.25 However, as usual the amir, despite his
illness, acted swiftly and with determination.
20
21
MM, Aug. 88, PSLI, 55, 133.
22
Khafi, The Recent Kings of Afghanistan, 2, 173–176. According to Fayz Mohammad,
the military and civilian population of Qataghan and Badakhshan joined Sardar
'Abd Allah Khan, the governor of Badakhshan in Andarab against the rebel Sardar
Mohammad Ishaq Khan, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 587.
23
The forces of the rebel sardar included 18,700 soldiers, 86 guns minus the
number of troops stationed in Maymana, Andkhoy, and Dawlatyar. Military Resources
of Afghanistan, November 1886, No. 78, 1.
24
KD, 21 Aug. 88, PSLI, 72, 64.
25
Ibid.
The Battle of Ghaznigak and the Flight of Ishaq Khan
As was usual on such occasions, the amir tried to mobilize public

opinion against his rival even though he was in a less morally defen-
sible position. The amir obtained a legal ruling ( fatwa) from the
'ulema, in which they declared the sardar a rebel.26 On the basis of
the ruling, the amir called on all tribes to act against the rebel sar-
dar,27 and, further, gave out that the rebellion of the sardar was due
to Russia.28 By implicating Russia in the rebellion, the amir intended
to turn the rebellion into a “religious war”,29 even though there was
no indication that Russia had either incited or supported the sardar.
The amir’s description of the rebel sardar as “the bastard Armenian
servant of Russia,” (the sardar’s mother was an Armenian) and the
sardar‘s accusation that the amir was “a British protégé”30 was no
more than propaganda directed at inciting Muslims against each
other in the game of power politics, just as when the amir was con-
fronting Sardar Mohammad Ayyub in Kandahar in 1881.
The amir speedily dispatched a strong force under Ghulam Haydar
Khan Orakzay, now deputy commander-in-chief (na"ib sipah salar) to
quell the rebellion. At the same time, according to the foreign sec-
retary of the British Government of India, Mortimer Durand, “in
his straits” the amir “wished us to occupy Kandahar and Jalalabad.”31
The army was reinforced by tribal levies of the Hazaras of Dai Zangi
and Dai Kundi, after it had defeated the advance force of the rebel
sardar under the command of General Najm al-Din at Kahmard,32
as well as some regulars. By the time the amir’s main force under
the Na"ib Salar Orakzay arrived at Ghaznigak, where the rebel force
had already taken position, it numbered more than the rebel force
that was commanded by Mohammad Hussayn Khan, the comman-
der-in-chief (sipah salar)33 At Ghaznigak the two forces fought the
decisive battle.
26
PD, 9 Sept. 93, PSLI, 72, 64.
27
The amir’s firman, KD, 28 Aug. 88, PSLI, 55, 21.
28
The amir’s firman, KD, 28 Aug. 88, PSLI, 55, 24.
29
KD, 4 Sept. 88, PSLI, 55, 190.
30
MM, Sept. 88, PSLI, 55, 600.
31
Quoted in Sykes, Sir Mortimer Durand, 200.
32
33
The amir’s forces were comprised of 13 regiments of infantry, four of cavalry
with twenty-six guns and an unknown number of irregulars.
104 chapter six
On September 27, 1888, on the eve of the battle, Sardar

Mohammad Ishaq Khan who had taken position on a hill, received
a sealed Qur"an from a section of the amir’s army, in which it had
promised desertion during the coming engagement.34 On the day of
the actual fighting, that part of the amir’s army which was led by
Sardar 'Abd Allah Tokhay opened fire, but was defeated.35 Afterward
an additional seven regiments submitted.36 The apparently victorious
army began looting the apparently defeated army. At this point,
Na"ib Salar Ghulam Haydar Khan Orakzay made a surprisingly
forceful attack and compelled the sardar’s troops to retreat, but the
retreat was indecisive and the outcome uncertain.
What finally and surprisingly decided the outcome of the battle
in favor of the amir was the sudden flight of the sardar himself as
the result of a misunderstanding. He fled after his adjutant informed
him that the “orderlies” (orderly regiments) had submitted. This adju-
tant meant the orderly regiments of the amir, but the sardar thought
that his own orderly regiments had submitted. The news of the word
“submission” had frightened the sardar so much that upon hearing
it he took to flight without verifying the news.37 Leaving his army
behind, the sardar continued fleeing across the Oxus River to
Samarqand in total haste once again, but this time his exile was
permanent.
The rebellion of the sardar had stirred the people throughout the
country, and criminals had engaged in robbery in an open man-
ner.38 The early collapse of the rebellion checked disturbances else-
where in the country that otherwise might have become widespread.
The flight of the sardar was fortunate for the amir, since after that
no other ambitious member of the dynasty remained in the coun-
try to claim the throne.
The revolt of Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan resulted from the
clash of his views on ruling Afghanistan with those of the amir. The
sardar held the traditional view of ruling by dynastic sardars, which
had also been held earlier by Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan.
Specifically, Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan requested that the amir
34
Khafi, The Recent Kings of Afghanistan, 2, 178–186.
35
MM, Oct. 88, PSLI, 55, 927.
36
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to British agent (in Mazar), 5 July 89, PSLI, 57, 1068.
37
Griesbach, C. L., Notes on the Battle of Ghaznigak, Mazar, No. 224, 28 Mar
89, Foreign Dept., Secret-F, Pros., May 89, Nos. 216–225, 4.
38
allow him and his brothers, to rule over Turkestan, Herat, and
Kandahar under the amir’s overall hegemony. However, the latter
did not respond favorably, because he wished to rule over the entire
country himself autocratically with a centralized political structure.
By 1884, when Ishaq Khan was disappointed in his scheme, he
drew still closer to the people, and became popular, whereas the
amir was not. The latter’s oppressive rule, which was evident from
the desertion of the army and the acceptance of the rebel sardar’s
claim by the people of Turkestan and Badakhshan helped him in
his bid for the amirate of the whole land. Had he shown courage
and resoluteness in the critical hour of military confrontation he
might have unseated the amir, and changed the course of Afghan
history. However, during the fateful hour of the battle, he revealed
cowardice and a lack of sound judgment. He fled precipitously, and
his flight left the people of Turkestan and Badakhshan at the mercy
of the amir who went to Mazar the next year.
For about one year of his stay in Mazar, the amir took very stern
measures against all those who had supported the rebel sardar.
Meanwhile, he stepped up anti-Russian rhetoric and arranged for
the fortification of military posts along the border, especially in
Dehdadi. More important in the long run, the amir encouraged
Pashtun and other ethnic groups from the densely populated regions
south of the Hindu Kush to settle in the sparsely populated regions
north of the Hindu Kush, and to cultivate the plots of state land
which the government granted them on favorable terms.39 This land
grant continued to be issued until recently as part of the population
relocation policy. In particular in the 1930s, Sher Khan Kharotay
and Mohammad Gul Khan Mohmand became, as the nationally—
known governors of Kunduz and Mazar respectively, overzealous in
implementing the policy. As a consequence, from demographic per-
spective, northern Afghanistan became largely mixed and transformed
from a dependency into an integral part of the country.
39
For details see Kakar, Government and Society in Afghanistan, 132–135.
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE PACIFICATION OF THE BORDER PRINCIPALITIES

IN NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN
Maymana
Maymana, a large district in northwestern Afghanistan was inhab-

ited mainly by Uzbeks and Turkmen, and had a small population
of Tajiks, and Pashtuns.1 Ahmad Shah Durranay recognized Haji
Khan Uzbek as the wali [governor] of Maymana and Balkh on the
condition that he would provide the state with a military force in
times of war.2 However, his son and successor, Timur Shah Durranay,
restricted the wali’s son and successor to the district of Maymana.
When the Sadozay and Barakzay princes fought against each other,
Maymana was left to its own destiny. Subsequently, when the
Mohammadzay sardars fought against each other over succession
Maymana experienced the same ordeal, until 1830, when Mizrab
Khan prevailed over his rivals. Under his rule Maymana prospered,
but his death, in 1845,3 triggered another civil war that lasted until
1848, when Yar Mohammad Khan Alkozay, the governor of Herat,
annexed Maymana to his domain.4
The rule of Yar Mohammad Khan did not last long. Opposition
mounted and finally resulted in the independence of Maymana under
Wali Hekmat Khan. This event coincided with the efforts of Amir
Dost Mohammad Khan in extending his rule over Turkestan. Wali
Hekmat Khan submitted to the amir in 1855; five years later the
wali’s brother, Mir Mohammad Hussayn Khan, succeeded him after
having him killed.5 During the civil war of the 1860s that followed
the death of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan the wali acted as an
independent ruler. In 1866 he submitted to Amir Sher 'Ali Khan,
agreeing to pay one hundred thousand tangas as an annual tribute.
1
Hamilton, A. Afghanistan, London, 1906, 259.
2
BACA, 98.
3
Yate, C. E., North Afghanistan, London, 1888, 338.
4
BACA, 99.
5
Yate, North Afghanistan, 338.
the pacification of the border principalities 107
The wali reasserted his independence after the amir lost the throne
to his rival brothers.
In 1868, Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan besieged Maymana with
sixteen thousand men. The month-long siege was, however, lifted
after the sardar returned to Kabul to help his full uncle, Amir Moham-
mad A'zam Khan, against the fugitive Amir Sher 'Ali Khan. In late
1868, when Amir Sher 'Ali Khan regained Kabul, the wali refused
to submit, and held correspondence with the king of Bukhara as well
as Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, who was then in Samarqand. In
1869–70, Maymana was struck by a famine which swept away almost
all the sheep, the staple wealth of the region. Finally, during the sec-
ond reign of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan his well-known governor, Na"ib
Mohammad 'Alam, laid siege to the city of Maymana with twenty
four thousand men and occupied it in March 1869. Mir Hussayn
Khan was taken to Kabul, and from then on until the Second Anglo-
Afghan war, in 1879, Maymana was administered by government
officials.6
On the accession of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan Maymana was
ruled by Mir Delawar Khan, who had seized the reign of power
after the government garrison had evacuated the district. Since he
had supported Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, Wali Delawar Khan
feared the amir, and opposed his attempts to bring Maymana under
control. However, the wali was willing to become a tributary vassal,7
although he was unwilling to accept government troops stationed in
Maymana.8 Later, he reversed his position by refusing to pay even
the revenue that he had already agreed to pay.9
Meanwhile, the wali tried in vain to place himself under the pro-
tection either of Britain or Russia. To the British he wrote, “It is
known even to the Russians that I am a dependent of the British
Government. I desire instructions regarding the management of my
affairs.”10 In reply he was informed that “The British Government
regards Maymana as a part of the amir’s domain.”11 The British
Government also informed the amir of the wali’s proposal. Afterward,
6
Ibid.
7
KD, 15 May 82, PSLI, 34, 64.
8
Mir Delawar to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, Kand D., 215 May 82, PSLI, 32, 119.
9
Herat Diary (HD), 9 Apr. 83, PSLI, 36, 1137.
10
Mir Delawar to Col. Waterfield, 8 May 82, PSLI, 32, 1131.
11
Waterfield to Delawar, 31 May 82, PSLI, 32, 1132.
108 chapter seven
the wali asked the Russian officials in Merv to occupy Maymana,12

but they were unable to do so because of the intervening of the
Salor and Sarik Turkmen of Panjdeh, who were still independent.
However, the Russians were reported to have given the wali arms,
and in return, the wali hoisted their flag in Maymana.13
Meanwhile, the wali tried to fortify his position. He was reported
to have bought five hundred breach-loading rifles from the Turkmen.14
He also asked the Sarik Turkmen of Panjdeh to join him against
the Afghans, and as a token of his good will toward them, he reduced
tolls on their merchandise destined for Maymana.15 Next, the wali
also asked Fath Allah Khan, head of the Firozkohi tribe of Herat,
to come and settle with his tribesmen in Maymana, since the latter
was also on bad terms with the amir; however this request was
futile.16 At the same time, the wali engaged in correspondence with
Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, and then announced that the sar-
dar was coming to Maymana.17
The wali’s exaction of money from his subjects for the fortification
of his defenses caused unrest.18 About three hundred families from
Khairabad emigrated to Andkhoy19 and the Turkmen cultivators of
Qal'a-e-Wali, a dependency of Maymana near Murghab, informed
the government’s official in Herat that they were ready to submit.20
The wali had become so unpopular that it was generally believed
that if the amir encouraged the inhabitants of Maymana they would
abandon him.21
The early pacification of Maymana was not a compelling neces-
sity for the amir. He only instructed Mir Hussayn Khan, the for-
mer wali of Maymana, to replace the incumbent wali, but he failed
to do so.22 Meanwhile, the amir instructed Sardar Mohammad Ishaq
Khan, the governor of Turkestan, in Mazar, to keep the wali under
12
Shahzadah of Khoqand to Commissioner of Peshawar, PD, 23 Sept. 84, PSLI,
42, 123.
13
HD, 12 Apr. 84, PSLI, 40, 1315.
14
Col. Waterfield, 22 Apr. 82, PSLI, 32, 525.
15
HD, 14 Sept. 82, PSLI, 34, 385.
16
HD, 12 Dec. 82, PSLI, 35, 386.
17
HD, 6 May 82, PSLI, 32, 867.
18
HD, 25 Jan. 83, PSLI, 35, 832.
19
HD, 6 June 83, PSLI, 37, 299.
20
HD, 21 June 83, PSLI, 37, 1066.
21
Kand D., 3 Oct. 93, PSLI, 38, 413.
22
BACA, 100.
pressure, but his attempts at coercing him without undertaking mil-

itary expeditions against him also failed.
In 1884, when the Russians reached Merv, the matter became
serious, as Maymana was considered to be their likely target.23 Only
then did the amir order the simultaneous dispatch of troops from
Herat and Mazar against Maymana, leading to its fall. In the words
of Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan,
When the people of the city [of Maymana] saw Your Highness’s troops
. . . they were surprised and struck with terror, and came out until their
number reached 2,000. Mir Delawar . . . finding himself unable to effect
his escape, came over to my camp.24
Mir Hussayn Khan, the former wali of Maymana was appointed as
its wali independent of Herat and Mazar, but his power was restricted
by a contingent of government troops that were stationed in the dis-
trict. With the incorporation of Maymana in 1884, the reunification
of Afghanistan became complete. However, in 1892, when the Hazara
war was in progress, the wali of Maymana, who was a son of the
former Wali Mir Hussayn Khan, revolted. The revolt was speedily
put down, and thereafter government officials administered Maymana.
Shighnan and Roshan
The mountainous districts of Shighnan and Roshan in northeast-

ern Afghanistan formed one principality as part of the province of
Badakhshan with Fayzabad as its capital city. Badakhshan was the
first province over which the amir had extended his authority in
January 1880, as previously noted. Shighnan and Roshan as well as
the districts of Darwaz and Wakhan lie on both sides of Panja,
referred to erroneously the Upper Oxus in English-language sources.
The greater part of Shighnan lies on the right side of the river as
far as the Ak-su or the Murghab River. This means that the province
of Badakhshan extends as far as Murghab. The Panja River is nar-
row and does not constitute a significant barrier for the people of
either part. There, as well as in all the Upper Oxus where valleys
23
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to General Amir Ahmad, KD, 3 June 84, PSLI, 41,
1674.
24
Sardar Mohammad Ishaq to the amir, KD, 24 May 84, PSLI, 40, 1523.
110 chapter seven
are often separated from one another by impassable peaks, the rivers
become the main thoroughfares and the same people dwell on both
banks. Often the rulers of Balkh have extended their sway over
Badakhshan.
The inhabitants of Roshan and Shighnan are mistakenly thought
to be Tajiks or Mountain Tajiks. According to Aerghawan, those
who live on the skirts of the Pamir and the highlands of Badakhshan
speak languages such as Munji, Wakhi, Roshani, Sanglechi and other
Pamiri dialects; they are neither Tajiks, nor Pashtuns, nor Hazaras, but
separate ethnic groups. Their languages [especially Sarghulami] are
closer to Pashto than to any other language. So other than the speak-
ers of the Pamiri dialects most inhabitants of Badakhshan are Tajiks.25
The Pamiri languages are collectively called Galcha, and the land
on which its speakers live is mountainous and unfavorable to culti-
vation to such an extent that most of its inhabitants subsisted until
the early part of the twentieth century on dried mulberry and a few
boiled herbs (chakari ), especially in late winter and early spring.
The common folk of Roshan and Shighnan, as distinct from mem-
bers of the ruling house, were peaceful and fatalistic. Rarely, if ever,
did they possess weapons, and they did not steal. Neither did they
feud among themselves nor with their neighbors, even though the
more zealous Sunni Uzbek marauders frequently overran their ter-
ritory in raids called alaman, and sold their children and women into
slavery. The Shignis and Roshanis, thus, behaved differently from
the inhabitants of some of the other similar mountainous districts
who lived within similar subsistence economies, but took to plun-
dering and fighting.
The communities of the Shighnis and Roshanis were hierarchical,
divided into the ruling elite (khawass) and commoners ('awam). Indeed,
the history of Roshan and Shighnan, and all of Badakhshan is more
the history of the khawass (mirs, shahs, and begs) than of the 'awam,
and among the former civil wars and feuds were common. Apparently,
approximately, seventy percent of the inhabitants of Shighnan smoked
opium and drank opium-potion (ghamza), and lived in a state of per-
manent inebriety and resignation.26
25
Aerghawan, “Is the Federal System Practicable for Afghanistan?” Khpilwaki
( Journal), Peshawar, No. 3, 1992, 62.
26
Kushkaki, Burhan al-Din, Rahnuma-e-Qataghan wa Badakhshan, (in Persian)
[A Guide to Qataghan and Badakhshan], Kabul, 1302 / 1924, 317–336.
The Shighnis practiced the Isma'ili Shi'i brand of Islam and focused
much on religion, although they neither prayed nor observed fast.
Also, in their worldview religious leaders ( peers), rather than the reli-
gion itself, personified the faith, and the Shignis showed them
unbounded devotion. The religious leaders also acted as temporal
rulers (mirs) and the Agha Khan of Bombay was their supreme peer.
Thus, wielding spiritual as well as secular powers, the mirs had become
so powerful that they styled themselves as shahs (kings). The term
shah, a derivation of khshatra, an Avestan word, which symbolizes
power and domain, is probably a part of Shah-e-Khamosh, the
founder of the dynasty. Seemingly Shah-e-Khamosh (the Reticent
King) had been the title that he had assumed after he, whatever his
given name, had founded the dynasty. The mirs or shahs ruled their
subjects in an absolute fashion, even selling their children or offering
them as gifts to others.27
Through their representatives (khalifas) the mirs exacted a tithe
('ushr) as revenue,28 and enforced their authority through their ret-
inue. They had no consultative assemblies, and had rivals among
members of their own house. Since succession among them did not
follow the principle of primogeniture they fought for power, when-
ever an opportunity arose, and the result was often civil war.
The Shighni mirs improved their status by establishing marriage
ties with the princes of surrounding regions. In the 1870s, for instance,
they had such bonds with Ya"qub Beg of Kashghar, Khudayar Khan
of Yarkand, Prince Afzal al-Mulk of Chitral, the Uzbek mir of
Qunduz, and some Afghan princes and officials. A wife of Sardar
'Abd al-Rahman Khan whom he married before he became amir
was a daughter of Jahandar Shah, the once powerful mir of
Badakhshan. After her death the sardar married her maiden, Gulrez,
with whom he had two sons, one son, Sardar Habib Allah Khan,
succeeded him as amir.
However, since Shighni females were singularly attractive they
were married primarily for their beauty, and the marriages were
politically insignificant.
As guardians of the route leading to Kashghar, Yarkand, Bukhara,
Chitral and Peshawar, the mirs of Shighnan levied tolls on mer-
chandise. Cotton, china, tea, shoes and other goods were brought
27
Ibid., 338.
28
Ibid., 318.
112 chapter seven
there by merchants to exchange for slaves, woolen items, and furs.

When the Chinese occupied Kashghar in 1759, they paid the Shighni
mirs “a kind of subsidy” to keep the route safe and open.29 The mirs
paid a portion of their incomes to the then Agha Khan of Bombay
who was the supreme peer of the Isma'ili sect.
Although the district of Shighnan was a dependency of the province
of Badakhshan its mirs acted as equal partners in a kind of confed-
eration. The mir of Badakhshan allowed the mir of Shighnan to be
autonomous just as he had allowed the mirs of other districts to be
autonomous. He occasionally received horses and iron as tributes
from some, and also military aid in times of emergency.30
From the seventh century, Shighnan and Roshan were ruled as
previously noted, by the descendants of Shah-e-Khamosh, who came
from Persia and converted the majority of the inhabitants from
Zoroastrianism to the Shi'i faith of Islam. He wrested Shighnan from
Kahakah (the Qahqah of the locals) the governor of the Zoroaster,
whose capital seat was Balkh.31 To this day the shrine of the shah
at Bar Panja is visited by the faithful. Afterward the shah’s descen-
dants expanded their rule, which at one point reached the frontiers
of Badakhshan and Chitral;32 at another point “Wakhan and Darwaz
and all the surrounding States were under the rule of the King of
Shighnan.”33 From 1749 Roshan and, indeed the whole of Badakhshan
became part of the Durranay Empire, although it retained its auto-
nomy because of its inaccessible location. During the civil war that
followed the break-up of the empire, in 1818, Mir Murad Beg “the
most powerful Uzbek prince south of the Amu [Oxus] up to Bamian”34
overran Badakhshan, and “made himself master of the whole coun-
try from Wakhan to Balkh inclusive, and from the Hindu Kush to
the borders of Karatigin.”35 He sold a large number of the inhabitants
29
BACA, 233. The actual annual amount was ten yambus or about 1,730 Indian
rupees.
30
Yule, Col. H., “An Essay on the Geography and History of the Regions of
the Upper Waters of the Oxus”, LXXIX, in Wood, J., A Journey to the Sources of the
River Oxus, London, 1872.
31
BACA, 233.
32
Kushkaki, Qataghan and Badakhshan, 336.
33
BACA, 233.
34
Masson, C., Narrative of Various Journeys in Baloochistan, Afghanistan and the Panjab,
1826–1838, London, 1842, 2, 306.
35
Yule, “An Essay on the Geography and History of the Regions of the Upper
Waters of the Oxus”, xxxvii, in Wood, J., A Journey to the Sources of the River Oxus,
London, 1872.
of Badakhshan into slavery, or let them perish from fever in the

swampy plains of Qunduz. The mir of Shighnan paid him fifteen
slave-girls as annual tribute.36 This state of affairs ended in the reign
of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, when Governor Na"ib Mohammad 'Alam
Khan pacified the whole of Turkestan, including Badakhshan after
it had asserted independence in the Civil War.
In 1874, Shah Yusuf 'Ali Shah, the mir of Roshan, also accepted
the suzerainty of Kabul,37 but maintained a free hand in running
his domain. During the first three years of the reign of Amir 'Abd
al-Rahman Khan, the mir ruled as before, sending slave-boys, slave-
girls, and other goods as tribute.38 In 1883, his relations with Kabul
worsened. At the time, Shighnan had become internationally significant,
and the mir showed an inclination toward the Russian-dominated
Bukhara. The mir of Shighnan had become perturbed over the fate
of his domain since 1873, when he heard of the understanding that
had been reached between Russia and Britain concerning the Oxus
River, which had been agreed upon as the boundary between
Afghanistan and Bukhara. This was to split the domain of the mir
with its larger and more populous part (the area lying between the
Panja and Aksu-Murghab which included the valleys of Shakh, Ghund,
and Bartang) becoming a part of Bukhara.
To retain his entire domain the mir intended to maintain good
relations with both the Russian-dominated Bukhara and Kabul. As
a precaution he handed over Roshan to one of his minor sons.
Roshan was also significant for having abundant supplies of iron
which was included as part of the mir’s tribute to Kabul.39 In 1882,
the mir received a Russian explorer in Shighnan.40 The next year a
Russian mission visited him and reportedly assured him that “he
need not fear the Ruler of Badakhshan” as “The Russians are look-
ing upon Shighnan on the right bank of the Oxus as within the
sphere of their influence.”41
This was during the time when the mir had refused a summons
from the Afghan Governor 'Abd Allah Tokhay of Badakhshan and
had removed his family to Sarojan, (adjoining Darwaz), which had
36
Wheeler, The Ameer Abdur Rahman, 102.
37
38
Ibid., 339.
39
BACA, 234.
40
41
PD, I Aug. 83, PSLI, 37, 1007.
114 chapter seven
been held by the amir of Bukhara since 1877. The mir feared that
if he presented himself to the governor he would be removed as the
governor had replaced many mirs from other districts with government
officials42 even though this was contrary to the promise that Amir
'Abd al-Rahman Khan had given them in 1880. Early that year,
when Amir 'Abd al-Rahman came to Badakhshan from Samarqand
he had promised them that “so long as he held power, the mirs of
Badakhshan would be exempt from paying revenue; [and] all that
would be required of them was to acknowledge his supremacy.”43
In addition to his refusal to meet the governor, the mir, had
engaged in correspondence with officials of Russia, Bukhara and
China in Yarkand. Although he informed the governor that he had
only told the foreign officials that he was a subject of Afghanistan,44
and on that account was unwilling to receive their emissaries, the
governor, nevertheless, suspected him. Meanwhile, a rival faction had
risen in Shighnan under one Darab Shah, which had weakened the
mir’s position.45 The amir suspected the mir of Shighnan of intrigu-
ing with Russia “for allowing Russians to visit Shighnan”46 and
ordered his removal.47 This was accomplished with some difficulty,
and the mir accompanied by one hundred and thirty followers arrived
in Kabul in September 1883.48 Subsequently, a subgovernor was
appointed, and troops were stationed there. Shighnan and Roshan
were, thus, brought under the direct rule of Kabul.
It was widely rumored that a new order had been established in
Shighnan. The Shighnis who had lived in bondage elsewhere for
years escaped from their masters and returned homes to live in free-
dom.49 However, their troubles were far from over. Though freed
from the clutches of their masters, they now found themselves sub-
ject to the excesses of government officials. Barely a year had passed,
when from Badakhshan “. . . nearly half the population . . . deserted
for Hissar, Kulab, and Karatigin.”50 Afterward, the amir started
42
PD, 4 Feb. 82, PSLI, 31, 449.
43
Chitral Diary (CD), 8 May 80, PSLI, 26, pt. 111, 315.
44
Yusuf Ali Shah to governor of Badakhshan, . . . , 1882, PSLI, 34, 453.
45
46
BACA, 234.
47
Col. Afzal (in Mama Khel), 21 Aug. 83, PSLI, 37, 1093.
48
Col. Afzal (in Mama Khel), 11 Sept. 83, PSLI, 37, 1427.
49
50
PD, 5 Sept. 84, PSLI, 41, 1586.
fortifying the government’s position, by setting up posts across the

river, including one as far away as Surmatash (Somatash) on the
extreme eastern point of Yahsikol, near the Pamir. Shortly after
taking office, the new subgovernor, prevented the Russian scholar
M. M. Ivanoff from entering Shighnan.51
All of these developments brought Shighnan into the limelight of in-
ternational diplomacy. Russia protested to Britain over the amir’s pro-
ceedings in Shighnan. While claiming that the principality was always
independent, Russia, moreover, claimed that it was not “. . . among
the number of those provinces which were recognized by the agree-
ment arrived at in 1873 between Russia and England, as forming
part of the possessions of the amir of Afghanistan.” Russia consid-
ered the amir’s proceedings in Shighnan “in flagrant violation of the
terms of the agreement in question,” and asked Britain to induce
him “to renounce forever all interferences in its affairs.”52
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan claimed that the principality was a
part of Afghanistan because it had always been a dependency of
Badakhshan,” a province which had been even formally decided to
belong to Afghanistan.”53 In support of the claim it was argued that
the Aksu-Murghab River, not the Panja River, flowing from Sarikol,
was the river that had been agreed upon as the international bound-
ary. Indeed, the last official dispatch of the British Government that
Russia accepted on the subject, and which constituted an under-
standing between the two powers speaks of “the Oxus, from the
junction of the Kokcha River to the post of the Khojeh Saleh inclu-
sive” toward the west,54 indicating that Panja had been left outside
the understanding. Several letters on the subject were exchanged
51
52
Ibid., 105.
53
Ibid., 106.
54
Ibid., 182. The so-called ‘agreement’ consisted of two dispatches, the first of
which was written by Lord Granville. In this dispatch, the British government
claimed for Afghanistan the following: “Badakhshan with the dependent district of
Wakhan; Afghan Turkestan comprising the districts of Kunduz, Khulm and Balkh,
the northern boundary of which would be the line of the Oxus, from the junction
of the Kokcha River to the post of Khoja Saleh inclusive, on the high road from
Bokhara to Balkh. The internal districts of Akcha, Sari Pul, Maimana, and Shibergan
and Andkhui, the latter of which would be the extreme Afghan frontier possession
to the north-west, the desert beyond belonging to the independent tribes of
Turkomans.” In response, Prince Gortchakov of Russia sent a dispatch to his ambas-
sador in London, in January 1873, agreeing to these terms. Sykes, Sir Mortimer
Durand, 82.
116 chapter seven
between the British and the Russian governments, but the amir main-
tained a firm stand, keeping the principality under his rule. However,
in the early 1890s Russia backed its diplomacy with brute force.
In 1892, a Russian contingent under Colonel Yanoff massacred
Afghan frontier guards at Surmatash (Somatash).55 The following
year, another Russian contingent of two hundred troops under the
command of Colonel Yannovsky entered Shighnan, but the Afghans
repulsed them as they had already repulsed a Chinese contingent in
Alichur, north of Somatash. Meanwhile, the Russian government in
its negotiations with Britain stressed that Kabul should evacuate trans-
Shighnan and Roshan. Finally, in the same manner that it had acqui-
esced to Russia’s demand on the Panjdeh in 1885, the British
Government complied, and urged the amir to do the same. In return,
the amir was to occupy the extreme eastern corridor, Wakhan, and
a small part of Darwaz to the south of the Panja, which Bukhara
was to surrender. The amir consented because, in July 1892, the
viceroy had warned him not to cause any trouble with an active pol-
icy on the Pamirs, a warning that reached him, ironically, at the
same time as news of the Afghan casualties in the collision at Somatash.56
For eight years prior to the British request, the amir had been
under pressure from the British Government of India about the delim-
itation of his eastern frontiers (See Chapter 10). In an agreement con-
cluded between the amir and Foreign Secretary Mortimer Durand,
in Kabul, on 12 November, 1893 it was decided that the amir
. . . hereby agrees that he will evacuate all the districts held by him to
the north of this portion of the Oxus [from Lake Victoria or Sarikol on
the east to the conjunction of the Kokcha with the Oxus] on the clear
understanding that all the districts lying to the south of this position of
the Oxus, and now not in his possession, be handed over to him.57
The Panja stream remained the boundary between the Russian-
controlled Bukhara and Afghanistan58 even though it “. . . is almost
unknown as a boundary, and is as artificial as a wire fence or a
degree of latitude.”59
55
56
Alder, British India’s Northern Frontier, 252.
57
For details see Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 144–148. Alder, British India’s
Northern Frontier, 248–298.
58
Alder, British India’s Northern Frontier, 187
59
Kushkaki, Qataghan and Badakhshan, 274, 288.
Wakhan
Wakhan, a long sparsely populated corridor northeast of Badakhshan

up to the Greater Pamir in the Lake Victoria (Sarikol) area, was
inhabited predominantly by Isma'ili Shi'as known as the Wakhi, and
a small number of pastoral Sunni Kirghiz Turkmen.60 A land of
high altitude and extremely low temperatures, Wakhan’s land pro-
duction was limited. While at times the Pamirs had been under the
suzerainty either of Ferghana or China, Wakhan had been ruled by
local mirs who often were, like the mirs of Shighnan, Darwaz, and
Zebak, vassals to the mirs of Badakhshan or of Qataghan. They col-
lected animals, rare birds, ghee, and slaves from their subjects as
revenue.
In the period under discussion, Wakhan became internationally
significant for its location between the empires of Russia and Britain.
However, in the early 1890s, the retention of Wakhan became a
problem. Although in the Anglo-Russian understanding of 1873 Russia
had recognized “Badakhshan with its dependent district Wakhan”61
as a part of Afghanistan, Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan was unwill-
ing to occupy it with force for a number of reasons. Russian pledges
of the same kind had applied to Shighnan62 but the Russians had
later reversed their position and, acting under British pressure, the
amir, agreed to the demands of Russia. Further, the British Government
had not fulfilled its obligation to Afghanistan with regard to Russia’s
unprovoked aggression by occupying Panjdeh, in 1885 (See Chapter
Eleven). More importantly, Wakhan would have been difficult to
defend if Russia had chosen to invade it. This was evident, as in
1892, when Colonel Yanoff of Russia annihilated the Afghan mili-
tary post at Surmatash near Yashil Kul, as previously noted.
Despite all of this, Foreign Secretary Mortimer Durand raised the
question of Wakhan with the amir in Kabul in October 1893, with
the intention of turning it into a buffer zone between the empires
of Russia and Britain. He wanted the amir to occupy it because
Russia was against its retention by any other power. Alternatively,
Durand intended to persuade the amir to at least acknowledge his
suzerainty over it. In such a situation Wakhan was to be nominally
60
Ibid., 314.
61
62
Ibid., 187.
118 chapter seven
held by an Afghan wakil (representative), but actually managed from

Gilgit by the British.63
The amir, anxious for the support of the British against Russia’s
threat to northeastern Afghanistan, finally agreed to establish his
authority over Wakhan, but without occupying it with troops.64 In
the agreement that was concluded between them on November 12,
1893 on the matter it was decided that “. . . the River Oxus should
form the northern boundary of Afghanistan from Lake Victoria
(Wood’s Lake) or Sarikul on the east to the junction of the Kokcha
with the Oxus.” The Wakhan Corridor lies to the south of this line.
Pleased with the arrangement Durand observed, “The amir’s fear of
Russia did more for us than any diplomacy of mine.”65
In 1895, the Anglo-Russian official commissions and the unofficial
representatives of the Afghan government demarcated the bound-
aries between Russia, Afghanistan, China and the British Indian
Empire. Although China did not take part in the negotiations it did
not raise any objections. Thus, the Wakhan Corridor and the Afghan
Pamirs were established as “neutral ground” or a buffer zone between
three of the world’s strongest powers of the time in an area popu-
larly known as the “roof of the world.”66
Why did the viceroy pressure the amir to forgo trans-Oxus Roshan
and at the same time required him to hold Wakhan as noted? The
answer lies in the concern of the British Government for the safety
of its most precious colonial possession, India. This is evident from
the fact that, in delimiting the boundaries of Afghanistan, the British
Government of India had always primarily tried to meet its own
strategic requirements, even at the expense of Afghanistan. The cres-
cent-shaped northern frontier of the British Indian Empire had three
main lines of approach from the north—on the east, from Kashghar
towards Ladakh; in the center, from the Pamirs towards Hunza and
Yasin; and on the west, from the western Pamirs or the Upper Oxus
provinces towards Chitral.67 This explains why Russia’s military
advances in the territories north of the Pamirs and the Upper Oxus
63
Durand to Lansdowne (from Kabul), 27 Oct. 93, Mss. Eur. 727, No. 5.
64
65
Durand to Lansdowne, (from Kabul), 25 Oct. 93, Mss. Eur., D., 727, No. 5.
66
Shahrani, N., The Kirgiz and Wakhis of Afghanistan: Adaptation to Closed Frontiers,
Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1979, 37.
67
Alder, British India’s Northern Frontier, 300.
in the early 1890s prompted both London and Simla to fix a limit

for Russia’s southward march by agreement with the Russian gov-
ernment, even though it was common knowledge that it was next
to impossible for Russia to embark on a large scale military advance
toward India on any of the line of approache, as previously noted.
It also explains why Viceroy Lansdowne believed that “it would be
better to risk offending the Amir than to allow the presence of Russians
on the northern slopes of the Hindu Kush.”68 He was not alone in
his concern about Russia. According to the author G. J. Alder,
Most British statesmen disliked the idea of coterminity [with Russia]
anywhere, and, hence, of course, the traditional policy of maintaining
on India’s frontier the buffer-state of Afghanistan.69
68
Ibid., 267.
69
Ibid., 304.
CHAPTER EIGHT
THE PACIFICATION OF THE HAZARAS
In 1891, the semi-independent Hazaras of the central highland, the

Hazarajat, agreed to the stationing of government officials in their
territory. Shortly afterward, government officials and troops were sta-
tioned in parts of it, but they oppressed the local population so much
that they rose in rebellion that lasted for three years (1891–93). Since
the Hazara elders had supported the British in the Second Anglo-
Afghan war, and since, as Shi'i Muslims, they had been on bad
terms with their Sunni neighbors, they were vulnerable, despite their
highland terrain. This enabled the amir to dispatch a large number
of troops and militias against them. Ultimately, the Hazaras were
overcome; some Durranays and Ghilzays were settled in parts of
their land, while their pastures were given to nomads.
The Hazaras live in most parts of the central highland, called the
Hazarajat,1 and at times also Hazaristan,2 or Barbaristan.3 It has lit-
tle arable land, six-month long winters and vast pastures. The Hazarajat
was divided into 15 regions or districts (olgas or nawas),4 each of which
was ruled by one family, notably the Beg family of Dai Zangi (also
called the toll sardar, which owned the whole of Dai Zangi) and the
Ibrahim Beg family of Dai Kundi.5 The Hazara ruling elders, or
mirs were so powerful that they ruled their respective communities
as they pleased, without recourse to councils. They even sold the
children of the Hazara commoners into slavery. Hazara women per-
formed domestic chores and bore children as if they existed only to
1
Smaller groups of Hazaras settled in the provinces of Herat, Turkestan and
Badakhshan would not be discussed as they were already under government con-
trol.
2
GAK (1895), 272.
3
Riyazi, M. Y. Zia al-Mu'arafa (The Light of Knowledge), Mashhad, 1907, 44.
4
These olcas [olus?] were Dai Zangi, Dai Kundi, Behsud, Dai Mirdad, Say-
pawy, Gizao, Ajaristan and Malistan, Chora and Baburi, Dai Folad, Uruzgan, Zawli
and Bobash, Dai Chopan, Tirin and Dehrawud, Jaghuri, and Shaykh Ali.
5
Riyazi, Zia al-Mu'rafa, 44.
the pacification of the hazaras 121
The Hazarajat
122 chapter eight
serve the needs of their male relations; sometimes they were even
exchanged for donkeys. Although all Hazaras spoke a variant of the
Persian language, known as Hazaragi, and although their over-
whelming majority practiced the Shi'i faith of the brand of the
Twelvers and only some were Sunnis among them, they were far
from a cohesive people. Their mirs often fought among themselves
even though their relations with their Sunni neighbors were always
strained.6 Reports about the number of the Hazaras vary greatly. In
the second half of the nineteenth century, all the Hazaras were said
to number over half a million7 and the Hazaras of the Hazarajat
proper were said to number 340,000 families.8
The Origin of the Hazaras
The Hazaras began to live in Afghanistan in the first half of the

thirteenth century. Until recently, it was believed that they were the
descendants of the army left by Chinggis Khan,9 as the people of
former Kafiristan were said to be the descendants of the army left
by Alexander the Great. However, neither of these statements is true.
Chinggis Khan (? 1167–1227) withdrew his forces as soon as the
objective of his campaigns was accomplished.10 It was sometime after
his death, after his empire had been divided among his sons, that
the Mongol forces encamped in the pastures of Afghanistan notably
Lal and Kirman in the Hazarajat, Badghis in Herat and Ishkamish
and Rustaq in Tukharistan. They chose the pastures as encamp-
ments ( yurts) so that they could continue their nomadic way of life.
As skilful horse riders they ruled from there in an absolute fashion,
6
Molly, Major, “Reports on the Hazarajat, Tokhi Ghilzais, and Kabul Districts”,
For. Dept. A-Political-E., Sept 83, Nos. 312–319, No. 316, NAI.
7
Riyazi, Zia al Mu'arafa, 47.
8
GAK (1895), The Hazaras have been noted to number 66,900 families in 1838
(Burnes, A., Cabool, 1973, 230) and 120,000 families in 1886. The latter figures
have been provided by Subadar Mohammad Hussayn son of Rajab Ali, (elder of
the Jaghatu Hazara). Kakar, Afghanistan, (1971), 160. Population figures for the
Hazaras recorded in the second half of the nineteenth century vary.
9
Bellew, W., The Races of Afghanistan, London, 1880, 115. Burnes states that
3,000 families of the Hazaras are said to have been left by Chinggis Khan, and
1,000 families by Timure Lane. Cabool, 231.
10
Bacon, E., “An Inquiry into the History of the Hazara Mongols of Afghanistan,”
South Western Journal of Anthropology, University of Mexico, vol. 7, 1951, 241.
and exacted heavy taxes from what was left of the rural population
some time several times a year.
The Mongols had destroyed the centers of population and massacred
their inhabitants. In this period, when the Tajiks in the cities had
been wiped out, the Pashtuns of the rural areas began to move on
in large number to northern India. Conversely, Mongols and Turco-
mongols entered Afghanistan in large number. Each of the military
units encamped there consisted of one thousand soldiers, and these
were known by the term hazara in Persian.11 Gradually, the word
was applied to these new settlers, who became known as Hazaras,
and the land upon which they settled was called the Hazarajat.
The Hazarajat seems to have been populated chiefly by Chaghatay
Mongols from Transoxania. Other Mongols and some Turks or
Turcomongols might have joined the Chaghatays, and it is possible
that the rebellious troops of the Ilkhanids in Khurasan also sought
refuge in the Hazarajat. Later under Timur Lane and his son, Shah
Rukh Mirza, troops and administrative officials were sent into the
area and probably some of them remained there when the Timurids
returned to Samarqand. Thus, it appears that the Hazara Mongols
are descended from Mongol troops, many of them Chaghatays, who
entered Afghanistan at various times from 1229 to c. 1447.12 An
anthropological study has confirmed this nexus; according to Debets
the features of the present Hazaras indicate that the Mongoloids of
Central Asia—whose contemporary representatives are the Mongols,
Buryats, South Altains and others, and, to a lesser degree, the Kirghiz
and Kazaks, have entered into the composition of the Hazaras.13
11
For details see, Ghobar, Afghanistan Dar Masir-e-Tarikh, 206–237.
12
Bacon, E., The Hazara Mongols of Afghanistan, A Study in Social Organization,
Ph.D. thesis, Berkeley, 1951, 5. Abul Fazl quoted in Schurmann (The Mongols of
Afghanistan, 117) writes, “The Hazaras are of the army of Chaghatai.” However, the
anthropologist Schurmann doubts whether the main Hazara groups are related to
each other. They are, according to him, differentiated on the basis of certain cultural
features even though they all call themselves Hazaras. (111) Likewise, G. K., Dulling,
a specialist on Hazaragi (Hazara Persian) notes of the presence of “esoteric” Mongol
words in the Hazarajat, and indicates that it is possible to conclude that the Hazaras
were originally an Iranian people who came under Mongol/Turkish domination and
adopted many of the conquerors’ words and forms because they had no equivalents
of their own. (Quoted in Schurmann, The Mongols of Afghanistan, 110).
13
Debets, G. F., Physical Anthropology of Afghanistan, transl. by E. Proston, edited
by H. Field, Russian translation Series of the Peabody Museum of Archeology and
Ethnology, Harvard University Press, Vol. V, No. 1, p. 3.
124 chapter eight
By the sixteenth century the Hazaras were a distinct people, living

in an area in or near their present highland.14 The original Mongols
or Tatars15 who settled in the Hazarajat were male warriors probably
without women. They were said to have obtained wives from the
Tajiks with whom they mingled. Their association with these and
other neighboring Tajiks may account for the gradual change of
speech from Turkic and Mongolian to [Hazaragi] Persian.16 The
Hazaras gradually borrowed the culture of the Iranian aborigines.
Today the Hazaras have recognizable Tajik, Pashtun, and gener-
ally Caucasian features.17 This is due partly to the custom of krubast
among the Jaghuri Hazaras, according to which they lent their wives
to their guests18 with the consequence that among them some were
the offspring of non-Hazara fathers. Additionally, the Hazaras of
Ghazni, Badakhshan, Qataghan and Kandahar had always lived side
by side with people of other ethnicities. Conversely, the Tajiks have
lived even in the interior of the Hazarajat proper. In Chora and
Gizao there was a colony of the Shi'i Tajiks,19 but it is not known
whether they were really Tajiks. This is because a subsection (ta"ifa)
of the Hazaras was also known by the name of Tajik.20 More impor-
tantly, in Bamiyan the Tajiks are predominant21 over the Hazaras,
while in Dai Kundi subordinate groups, as distinct from the ruling
Dawlat Begi Hazara groups, reveal a social structure, which is sim-
ilar to that of the Tajiks.22 The ‘real’ Hazara tribes seem to be the
14
Bacon, The Hazara Mongols of Afghanistan, 5.
15
Originally the Tatars were of the easterly tribes in Mongolia, but now in
Persian literature the word is synonymous with the appellation Mongol (from
Mangkhol), the name of the leading tribes of the Union which conferred the title
of Chinggis Khan on Timujin in 1206.) Spuler, B., The Mongols in History, Praeger
Publishers, 1971, 2, 6.
16
17
Schurmann, The Mongols of Afghanistan, ’s-Gravenhage, 1962, 111.
18
Wood, J., A Journey to the Sources of the River Oxus, London, 1872, 128–129. To
Alexander Burnes the custom of lending wives [krubast] to guests among the Jaghuri
Hazaras is an established fact. He, further, states that “Throughout this tribe a stranger
may marry for a night or a week, and either leave his wife or take her along with
him, but this [custom of sigha] is only according to Shi'a usage.” Cabool, 232.
19
Isfahani, A. M., Aman al-Tawarikh, [The History of Amani, or the General
History of Afghanistan], manuscript in Persian, Vol. 5, 102).
20
21
Molly, “Reports on the Hazarajat”, 7.
22
Schurmann, The Mongols of Afghanistan, 145.
Dai groups, which inhabit the Hazarajat proper, stretching from the
southern slopes of the Kohi-Baba to the confines of Kandahar.23
Relations with Neighbors
Situated in central highland the Hazarajat was surrounded by regions

inhabited by Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Aimaq with all of whom
the Hazaras were on unfriendly terms for various reasons, even
though their relations were basically symbiotic. While the Hazaras
depended on their neighbors for wheat, rice, salt and other neces-
sities of life their neighbors purchased ghee and woolen fabrics from
them. As a people surrounded by more numerous neighbors the
Hazaras were at a disadvantage. Distinct from most of their neigh-
bors in physical appearance, their religious sect, and also, to an
extent, speech, the Hazaras by and large kept to themselves. These
distinctions may account for the clashes between them and their
neighbors. However, during the winter months some lived in cities,
23
Ibid. This view of the origin of the Hazaras can be elaborated as follows: The
word dai or dia is probably a form of the Persian word daha (decade), the latter the
basic unit of ten soldiers of Mongol military formations, the others being sada (cen-
tury), hazara (a unit of one thousand), and tuman (a unit of ten thousand), (Ghobar,
Afghanistan Dar Masir-e-Tarikh, 189, Spuler, The Mongols in History, B., 8). As noted
in the text, a unit of one thousand soldiers, (a hazara), was encamped in the pastures
around Hazarajat following the death of Chinggis Khan, in 1227. Up to the Timurid
times, the terms sada and hazara were in use for the Hindu Kush region. (Schurmann,
The Mongols of Afghanistan, 123, 124) Both Bacon (quoted in Schurmann, The Mongols
of Afghanistan, 124) and Fayz Mohammad (quoted in Isfahani, Aman al-Tawarikh,
5, 108) note with slight variations, sada-e-sueka and sada-e-qabr as the survivals of
tribal terms. Schurmann maintains that these medieval sadas broke down, because
of the incessant wars among the Hazaras, ultimately leaving the various dais. As
late as Elphinstone’s time (the early nineteenth century) these dais, as well as other
Hazara groups were still considered to be tribes, each having their own sultan
(ruler), while others doubt this usage. Elphinstone is the only author who has used
the term ‘sultan’ for a Hazara tribal ruler. In time, the various dais or dias have
became territorial designations. Originally, there were nine or ten dais or dias, who,
according to Fayz Mohammad, were the tribes of Dai Zangi, Dai Kundi, Dai
Mirdad, Dai Mir Kashta, Dai Mirak, Dai Chopan, Dai Khitai, Dai Luri, Dai Miri,
and the Dai. (Quoted in Aman al-Tawarikh, 5, 108). To these can be added Dai
Zinyat for the Hazaras of Qala-e-Nao in Herat and Dai Kalan for the Hazaras of
Shaykh Ali. The Hazaras are predominantly Shi'as of the Twelve Order but the
Seveners or Isma'ili Shi'as and Sunnis are also found among them. For detail see
Timur Khanov, L. A National History of the Hazaras, transl. into Persian by Tughyan,
A., The Press Institute of Isma"iliyan, Tehran, 1993, PP 42–53, 65–72.
126 chapter eight
particularly Kabul. In 1838, Alexander Burnes noted that “All the

drudgery and work in Kabul is done by some Hazaras, some of
whom are slaves and some free; in winter there are not less than
ten thousand who reside in the city, and gain a livelihood by clear-
ing the roofs of snow and acting as porters.”24
What the Hazara shared with their neighbors was Islam, although
even with regard to this they were distinct from them. As previously
noted, most Hazaras were Shi'as, and only some were Sunnis, whereas
their neighbors were all Sunnis. Consequently, the Hazaras were
“. . . oppressed by all their neighboring nations, whom they served
as hewers of wood and drawers of water.”25 The oppression began
with the decline of the Mongol power, a situation that enabled their
neighbors to expel them from their pasture encampments and besiege
them in their present highland, just as they had besieged the Kafirs
in Kafiristan. Their neighbors even viewed them as ‘infidels’ (kafirs)
and thereby justified their sale,26 although the sale of Muslims was
forbidden in Islam.
Down to the reign of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, the Uzbeks and Turkmens
enslaved and sold the Hazaras in Turkestan as well as Central Asia.
Although the Hazaras of Dai Kundi and Dai Zangi and the Shaykh
'Ali Hazaras, sent slaves as tributes to Mir Murad 'Ali, ruler of Qunduz,
when they were subject to his rule27 the Uzbeks and Turkmens still
sent raiding parties into the Hazarajat until they were checked by the
government during the reign of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, and by the
development of local fortifications in northern Hazarajat.28 Of the Char
Aimaq who were “at hereditary enmity with the Hazaras”29 the
Firozkohis enslaved them, and sold them in Bukhara.30 The Jamshedis
enslaved the Hazaras even though on a smaller scale up to the last
year of the nineteenth century, after which time they were unable to
do so because of the pressure applied by the government. The Russian
authorities also checked the sale of the Hazaras in Panjdeh.
24
Burnes, Cabool, 231.
25
Ibid.
26
27
Wood, The Sources of the Oxus, 128–129.
28
Canfield, R., Faction and Conversion in a Plural Society, Religious Alignments in the
Hindu Kush, Ann Arbor, 1973, 93.
29
Harlan, J., Central Asia, Personal Narrative of General Josaiah Harlan, 1823–1841,
edited by Ross, F. E., London, 1939, 152.
30
HD, 1 Feb. 94, PSLI. 73, 1228.
The Hazaras were on friendly terms with the Ghilzay Pashtuns

in the beginning of the eighteenth century, and a contingent of them
had accompanied Shah Mahmud Hotak in his Persian campaigns.
Subsequently, however, relations between them and the other Pashtuns
soured,31 principally over pastures and arable lands. The Pashtuns
did not enslave the Hazaras, but took over their land. Charles Masson
notes that Wardak territory
. . . was anciently possessed by the Hazaras, who, about one hundred
years since, were expelled by the Afghans. The Hazaras would also
seem to have held the country from Qarabagh to Ghazni, but have
been in like manner partially expelled.32
Similarly, advancing in wealth, number and power the Durranays
of Kandahar started to take over Hazara lands. As early as in the
reign of Timur Shah Durranay the Popalzays and Nurzays of Kandahar
took over Tirin and Dehrawud from the Hazaras.33 Hazara relations
with the Tajiks were not as strained mainly because they spoke the
same language and lived in some places side by side.34
In general relations between the Hazaras and other groups were
poor because the Hazaras, especially the Shaykh 'Ali Hazaras, robbed
caravans and travelers. At all times, especially when the government
in Kabul was weak, few dared to go to the Hazarajat: the nomads
kept to the Pashtun areas, and trade caravans preferred the longer
routes of the Unai and Iraq passes to Bamiyan. The route in the
Ghorband valley that stretched through the areas of the Shaykh 'Ali
Hazara was kept open by force or subsidies.35 This was the situation
until 1888, when Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan ordered the removal
en masse of the Shaykh 'Ali Hazaras to other parts of Afghanistan.
This was done because they were committing robbery, and had sup-
ported Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan in his fight against the amir.
31
32
Masson, Narrative of Various Journeys, 2, 224. Canfield, Faction and Conversion, 97.
33
Rawlinson, H., “Report on the Dooranee Tribes dated 19th April 1841”. The
Report has been quoted in full in MacGregor, C. M., Central Asia, Part II, A
Contribution towards the better knowledge of the topography, ethnology, resources and the history
of Afghanistan, Calcutta, 1971, 829.
34
In Bamian the Tajiks predominated over the Hazaras. Molly, “Reports on the
Hazarajat”, 7. This topic has been described in detail in Bamyani, B., Nigah-e-ba
kultur wa Tarikh-e-Bashindagan-e-Bamyan, (in Persian) [A Glance at the History and Culture
of the Inhabitants of Bamyan], privately published, Peshawar, 1380/2001, 47–180.
35
Ferdinand, K., quoted in Canfield, Faction and Conversion, 96.
128 chapter eight
Another serious offense committed by the Hazara was their sack-

ing of Ghazni at the instigation of the British officials during the
Second Anglo-Afghan war, when the Sunni inhabitants were fighting
the British army in Kabul.36 In particular, the Hazaras of Jaghuri
and of other areas cooperated with General Donald Stewart against
the Ghilzays when he was on his way from Kandahar to Kabul in
April 1880. At Ahmad Khel, south of Ghazni, over fourteen thou-
sand Ghilzays and others attacked and nearly routed the British army
of over four thousand men, but at the end of the conflict they lost
over one thousand men to the superior weapons and the good dis-
cipline of the British.37 After the Ghilzays had fled, the Hazaras
looted their houses and insulted their women.
The Historical Background
In the early sixteenth century, when he ruled Kabul, Mohammad

Zahir al-Din Babur did not invade the Hazarajat even though he
passed Bamiyan in the late fifteenth century. Thereafter, Bamiyan,
though not considered a part of the Hazarajat,38 but an important
center linking the Oxus River, the Indus River and the Hazarajat,
remained more or less open to expeditions, which were undertaken
by his successors, notably Emperor Shah Jahan (1628–1658). While
the Emperor Shah Jahan’s attempts at invading the Hazarajat did
not succeed,39 the Safavi emperor, Shah 'Abbas I (1587–1629)
influenced the Hazaras by appointing an elder over them.40 It was
probably during this period that the Shi‘i faith of Islam began to
replace the shamanism of the Hazaras, although exactly who per-
suaded the Hazaras to accept the new faith, and also when they
36
37
At Ahmed Khel, on April 19, 1880, the Ghilzays were comprised of 1,000
horse and 13,000 foot soldiers against a division of the British troops numbering
3,000 rifles, 350 lances, 700 sabers, and 22 guns. Trousdale in MacGregor, War
in Afghanistan, 178n. The Ghilzays had no guns and were also poorly armed. See
also Robson, B. The Road to Kabul, The Second Afghan War, Arms and Armour Press,
London, New York, 1986, 194, 195.
38
39
40
GAK, (1895), 277.
used takya khanas as centers for the performance of religious rituals

is unknown.41 In the first part of the eighteenth century, Nadir Shah
Afshar was said to have received the submission of the Hazaras and
to have removed a number of the Dai Zangi and Dai Kundi Hazaras
to Badghis, in Herat, as a counterpoise to the Jamshedi tribe.42
Afghan rulers before Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan had brought
some areas of the Hazarajat under control. As early as the reign of
Ahmad Shah Durranay, the Mohammad Khwaja and Jaghatu Hazaras
of Ghazni paid revenues to the government.43 Ahmad Shah Durranay
had appointed Darwesh 'Ali Khan Hazara, as governor of Herat.
He was probably an elder of the Hazaras of Qal'a-e-Nao of Herat,
who are Sunnis. Under Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, the Behsud
Hazaras to the southwest of Kabul also recognized government
suzerainty. The amir’s best-known governor was Haji Khan Kakar,
who received from Bamiyan according to him 120,000 Rupees and
according to Charles Masson 150,000 Rupees, in 1832, whereas the
actual jagir “. . . was originally fixed at 72,000 rupees per annum”
for the province as well as the transit-duties of Charikar.44
Notable progress was made during the reign of Amir Sher 'Ali
Khan, when the Hazaras of Balkhab, Shaykh 'Ali, Dai Zangi, Dai
Kundi, and Jaghuri were pacified. However, they were ruled as
before by their own mirs, who were made responsible for the pay-
ment of taxes to the government. For their services, the amir con-
ferred the title of ilkhan (head of the tribe) on Mir Mohammad Amir
of Dai Zangi, of sardar (military general) on Sher 'Ali Khan of
Jaghuri, and of nizam al-dawla (order of the state) on Mohammad
Khan of Qal'a-e-Nao of Herat.
On the eve of pacification of the entire Hazarajat under Amir
'Abd al-Rahman Khan, only the 44,500 Hazaras of Uruzgan, had
remained independent while the rest had been brought still more
closely under government control. Their old taxes were increased,
41
For a discussion of this subject see also Timur Khanov, L. The National History
of the Hazaras. The Isma'iliyan Press Institute, Iran, 1993, 42–53.
42
GAK (1895), 278. Other reports indicate that Shah Rukh, the son and successor
of Timur, had removed the ancestors of the Hazaras from Qunduz to Qal'a-e-Nao
in Herat. Whatever the case may be, by 1880 they had lost all their Hazara features
and were Uzbek in all but name. (Yate, North Afghanistan, 136.)
43
Report by Subadar Mohammad Hussayn, son of Rajab Ali (elder of Jaghatu
Hazara) member of the Afghan Boundary Commission, 1886, PSLI, 49, 418.
44
Masson, Narrative of Various Journeys, 2, 316.
130 chapter eight
various other kinds of new taxes were imposed, and subgovernors

(hakims) appointed to rule over them. Only the mirs of the Dai Zangi
and Dai Kundi Hazaras were allowed to administer their commu-
nities in return for the support they had given the amir against
Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan and Sardar Mohammad Ishaq
Khan. For the same reason, the amir had promoted Mohammad
'Azim Khan, of the Se-Pai section of the Dai Kundi Hazaras, to
the rank of sardar and appointed him his head servant ( peshkhidmat).45
The Submission of the Hazaras
In 1890, the amir appointed Sardar 'Abd al-Quddus Khan, the

governor of Shiberghan, as governor of Bamiyan with the authority
to pacify the still-independent Hazaras in the Hazarajat proper.
Meanwhile, the amir invited the mirs of 45 clans (tawa"if ) of Uruzgan,
Ajaristan, Malistan, Dahla, Zawli, Dai Chopan, and other areas to
submit to the government.46 In the proclamations ( firmans) which he
sent them the amir did not offer them terms for submission. He only
asked them to submit, because he believed that their further insistence
on rebellion, in view of the closeness of the Christian powers, would
be injurious to Afghanistan.47 However, the Hazaras claimed that
they were invited to submit on terms that included autonomy, and
exemption from paying taxes for several years to come.48 Whatever
the truth may have been, the Hazaras agreed to submit. In the
spring of 1891, Sardar 'Abd al-Quddus Khan, accompanied by an
army and tribal levies of ten thousand men, including the Hazaras
of Dai Zangi, Dai Kundi and Behsud entered the independent Haza-
rajat. Sardar Mohammad 'Azim Khan Hazara and Mir Mohammad
Ilkhan had led the Hazara levies, and the entry of the army was smooth
except for sporadic light resistance.
45
GAK (1895), 279. Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi', 247. Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-
Tawarikh, 606. Subadar Hussayn Khan, 1886, PSLI, 49, 415–547.
46
For names of tribal sections and elders see, Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh,
727–728. Riyazi, Zia al-Mu'arafa, 44–45.
47
48
Statement by Mir Mohammad Hussyan Beg, elder of Sultan Mohammad clan,
11 Apr. 94, PSLI, 74, 547.
The Hazara Uprising
In the winter of 1891, the Hazaras rebelled for a number of reasons,

the first of which involved the confiscation of their weapons. Due to
the lack of a single quarter the government army was stationed in
different places, and this made it vulnerable to attacks. To forestall
such attacks the amir ordered that the Hazaras be disarmed;49 some
Hazaras surrendered their weapons, and others refused. The weapons
that were collected were sent to Kabul,50 and the Hazaras consid-
ered this a breach of the government’s promise that their weapons
would be returned when the situation warranted it. The second
provocation occurred when officers and soldiers of the army in the
course of collecting revenue also raped married and unmarried women
alike,51 and tortured and killed men who refused to surrender arms.52
Sardar 'Abd al-Quddus Khan could not restrain these soldiers and
officers who were acting independently.53 Actually, he was among
the first to enjoy the company of Hazara women.
In an effort to break Hazara power, the amir ordered that their
mirs and religious leaders (sayyeds and zawwars) be separated from the
Hazara commoners and sent on to Kabul where lands would be given
to them.54 Although the order was not fully carried out, it created fear
among all of the Hazaras as the mirs and sayyeds, constituting two-thirds
of the population, were very influential.55 Even though the mirs acted
as tyrants to the point of selling the children of the Hazara commoners
into slavery56 and in some places usurping their land the Hazara
commoners still viewed them as their elders. Since class-consciousness
had not developed among the Hazaras even though theirs was a
class society for a mountain people, the policy of separating the reli-
gious and secular groups from the Hazara commoners incited the
latter to action. Initially, it may have been because the Hazara com-
moners were unwilling to fight57 that the entry of the troops was not
49
50
Ibid., 736.
51
Ibid., 891.
52
Ibid., 745.
53
Ibid., 761.
54
Ibid., 761, 891.
55
Ibid., 862.
56
Ibid., 891.
57
Ibid.
132 chapter eight
opposed, but as the troops became oppressive, the Hazara com-

moners stood fast behind their mirs and sayyeds.
In the official chronicle, Siraj al-Tawarikh, there is no mention of
whether the Hazaras were made to pay taxes, but other sources indi-
cate that they undertook to pay one rupee per family annually.58 The
Hazaras were also hard pressed for supplies.59 After having killed a
few soldiers, the Palo subsection of the powerful Sultan Mohammad
clan of the Uruzgan Hazaras, under the leadership of Mir Hussayn
Beg, rebelled. Soon, other Hazaras joined them, killing and expelling
the rest of the army scattered throughout the Hazarajat. Further,
they declared a war and a jihad against the kingdom of Afghanistan.
Sardar 'Abd al-Quddus Khan, who had been stationed with his army
of four thousand soldiers in Gizao fled to Qalat in the Ghilzay coun-
try.60 The Hazaras may have killed the rest, numbering, about six
thousand soldiers and others.
The Mobilization of Public Opinion
The Hazara rebellion crystallized animosity between the Sunni and

Shi'i population still further, and religious leaders on both sides
incited their co-religionists. The 'ulema gave the amir the legal rul-
ing ( fatwa) to the effect that the Hazaras were “infidel”, rebel, and
deserving of death.61 They preached this theme in their sermons and
incited the soldiers, whom they accompanied to the battlefields. At
this time, Amir ‘Abd al-Rahman called himself the “amir of Islam.”62
He tried to turn the war into a sectarian war by stating that the
Hazaras were “infidels” and that the army and tribal levy were free
to act as they pleased with regard to them and their property after
they conquered their land.63
The Hazara land was promised only to the Durranays and the
Ghilzays.64 The amir also declared that his object in conquering
58
Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi', 249. KD, 22 Dec. 91, PSLI, 65, 103.
59
MM, Dec. 91, PSLI, 65, 103.
60
Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi', 250. Mir Hussayn Beg, 11 Apr. 94, PSLI, 74, 548.
61
Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 891. KD, 22–24 June 92, PSLI, 1511.
62
63
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman’s Firman, Kand D, 28 May 92, PSLI, 66, 1259.
64
Uruzgan was to secure “an impregnable natural position” for the

Durranays as the infidels on both sides now exposed them to attacks.65
Despite all of this, hostility to the Hazaras was not universal. About
twenty seven thousand “Afghans” (of unknown tribal identity) living
side by side with the Hazaras were reported to have joined them
against the amir. This population had been refractory for some time.66
Near Kabul, the inhabitants of Kohistan encouraged the rebel lead-
ers in their stand against the amir.67 The mir of Maymana, who had
revolted at the time, promised his support to the Hazaras.68 For their
part the Hazaras also declared a religious war,69 and elected Timus
Shah, a descendant of Imam Musa Raza, as their ruler (khalifa).70
In her, A Tale of the Hazara War, Lady Hamilton who lived in
Kabul at the time notes that the Hazaras detested “the unholy
alliance” that existed between the amir and the English. She quotes
the Hazaras as having declared that “We will fight for one true God,
and his true prophet, and for 'Ali against these Kafirs and the allies
of Kafirs.”71 This statement is true in the sense that the Hazaras
cloaked the war in religion, but untrue with regard to the point that
they wanted to fight the British also.
On the contrary, in view of their cooperation with the British dur-
ing their invasion of Afghanistan, the Hazaras expected that they
would help them against the amir,72 and so they asked them, although
in vain, to assist them in their present struggle in return for their
cooperation in future “in every way.”73 Both sides resorted to reli-
gion for the justification of their bellicose stand. The amir and the
‘ulema on one side, and the mirs, and the mujtahids (Shi'i 'ulema) on
the other, for reasons best known to them, invoked the names of
God, the Prophet, 'Ali and Islam in inciting the Sunni and Shi'i
65
MM, July 92, PSLI, 67, 275.
66
KD, 21–24 May 92, PSLI, 66, 1103.
67
68
69
Ibid., 781.
70
KD, 10 May 92, PSLI, 66, 606.
71
Hamilton, L., A Vizier’s Daughter, a Tale of the Hazara War, London, 1900, 31.
Based on the experience of the author with the Hazara prisoners in Kabul, this is
a historical novel. The author, who was sympathetic toward the prisoners, has dra-
matized her account and so has made it unreliable as a source.
72
Brown, Major J., to secretary to Government of India, 11 Apr. 91, PSLI, 74,
547.
73
MM, Sept 92, PSLI, 68, . . . .
134 chapter eight
Muslims to wage war against each other, a war that resulted not
only in physical destruction but also in enslavement of the Muslim
Hazaras at the hands of their own Muslim compatriots. It also caused
the disruption of the Hazara political and, to a certain extent, the
religious order. Never had the amir been as successful in rallying his
Sunni subjects around him as during that time, when tribal elders
volunteered their service against the Hazaras.
Occasionally, each side made peace overtures, but these were futile.
The original proposal of the Hazaras to retain autonomy in return
for becoming tributary vassals74 was repeated several times, but the
amir was willing only to pardon them, provided they disposed of
their mirs.75 This was, of course, unacceptable to the Hazaras. The
amir had singled out the mirs because earlier they had stated that
they would never trust him, as they knew how he had done away
with many leading men in the country, and how he governed his
own nation with brute force.76 Ultimately, the matter was left unsettled.
The Fighting
The uprising spread throughout the Hazarajat. Although more unified

than ever, the Hazaras were far from united. The smaller tribes of
the periphery—the Char Dasta, the Jaghuri, the Jaghatu, and the
Mohammad Khwaja—supported the government,77 as did a small
segment of the Dai Zangi, and Behsud Hazars,78 and a number of
the mirs from the hitherto independent Gizao and Panjab in Uruzgan.79
However, most of the Hazaras fought, believing that the shrine of
Imam Musa Raza, in Shah Tus, in Uruzgan, would cause defeat to
the amir’s army as it had, so they thought, repulsed similar attempts
in the past. They fought recklessly under the leadership of Qazi
'Askar, elder of the 'Inayat section, Mir Mohammad Hussayn Beg,
elder of the Sultan Mohammad section, and Sardar Mohammad
74
Hazaras of Daya and Folad to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, KD, 25 Apr. 91, PSLI,
63, 528.
75
Herat governor in darbar, HD, 6 Aug. 92, PSLI, 67, 528.
76
Hazara elders to the amir, KD, 8–10 June 92, PSLI, 66, 1296.
77
78
Ibid., 956.
79
Ibid., 890, 995, 1015. According to Riyazi, ('Ayn al-Waqyi', 260) the cattle
owners of Uruzgan left their fortifications for pastures and others accepted bribes.
'Azim Khan, elder of the Se-pai Dai Kundi, who was until then the
amir’s head servant.
The amir poured about one hundred thousand troops and tribal
levies into the Hazarajat from all sides.80 He had never previously
been able to employ so many soldiers and militias against an enemy.
The army was led by Sipah Salar Ghulam Haydar Orakzay, Sardar
'Abd al-Quddus, General Sher Ahmad and others. Many battles pre-
ceded the decisive ones that were fought in Daya, Folad, and Uruzgan.
In Uruzgan the battle continued for five days,81 and fifty skirmishes
took place before it was reoccupied.82 In the winter, the troops evac-
uated the Hazarajat just short of Uruzgan. During the next spring,
the Hazaras of the northern Hazarajat were the first to rise. However,
after their initial successes in April 1893, they were defeated by the
tribal levies, and the army led by Sipah Salar Ghulam Haydar
Orakzay and General Amir Mohammad. It appears that General
Amir Mohammad won the last decisive battle on the bank of the
Helmand River between Dai Kundi and Dai Zangi. The Hazaras
were finally crushed in September 1893.83
The Hazara Settlement
After the defeat of the Hazaras, the amir tried to break their power.
As an ethnic group of the Shi'i sect occupying the central highland,
the Hazaras were a significant force, and the amir regarded them
as a source of potential danger to the country.84 He considered their
mirs and religious elders in particular to be the enemies of both the
Hazara commoners and the Afghans. These “enemies” he ordered
to be separated from the rest of the Hazaras and settled elsewhere,85
and commissioned Na"ib Padshah Gul to round up the elders and
send them on to Kabul. However, since the government officials
80
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to Durranys of Kandahar, Kand D, 2 July 92, PSLI,
66, 1721. According to Riyazi, ('Ayn al-Waqayi', 258) the number of regular troops
was 20,000, of tribal levies 60,000; and of guns 40. His figures of 10,000 for the
Hazara fighting men are incredibly low.
81
Mir Hussayn Beg, 11 Apr. 94, PSLI, 74, 548.
82
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman in darbar, KD, 21–23 Sept. 92, PSLI, 68, 105.
83
MM, Sept. 93, PSLI, 72, 257. Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 898.
84
85
136 chapter eight
were corrupt most of the real mirs escaped the ordeal, and Hazara
commoners were sent to Kabul instead.86 They were settled in Bagram
and Nahr-e-Shahi in Jalalabad, and were allowed to return to their
land after the amir had died.87
As the amir had already promised, everyone involved in the war
actually enslaved the Hazaras and looted their property.88 Since a
large number of the Hazaras had been made prisoners, they became
subject to the slave trade. Traders from all over the country bought
them from soldiers and sold them at a profit.89 The famine that
spread following the war also compelled many Hazaras to take their
children to the market to be sold.90 The government prohibited
Hindus and Sikhs from participating in the slave trade, and in
Kandahar, a few Hindus who sold some Hazaras, and reportedly
tried to convert others to their religion were fined.91 The state reaped
the largest share of the sale of the Hazaras and the seizure of their
property, as it levied a tax of one-tenth ('ushr) on the sale92 of each
Hazara and one-fifth (khums) on his or her seizure as war booty.93
In Kandahar alone, such sales tax amounted to seventy thousand
rupees.94 As a result, slavery which the amir had previously banned
was, in effect, reintroduced. Finally, the judge (qazi) and the expounder
of the Islamic law (mufti ) of Jaghuri raised their voices in dissension,
arguing that the sale of Muslims was prohibited by Islam.95 Afterward,
the sale was banned, although the Hazaras still remained, in effect,
in bondage until the 1920s, when King Aman Allah, the amir’s
grandson, emancipated them.96
Due to the destruction of the Hazaras’ shelters and crops97 dur-
ing the war, the Hazarajat could no longer support even the dimin-
ished population, as was evident from the fact that they were eating
86
Ibid., 987.
87
Ibid., 934.
88
Ibid., 853.
89
Ibid., 830, 937.
90
Ibid., 863.
91
Ibid., 989.
92
Ibid., 863.
93
Ibid., 830.
94
Ibid., 969.
95
Ibid., 1115.
96
97
The fertile valley of Ajaristan was laid waste. Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh,
819.
grass and selling their children for wheat.98 With the additional sup-
pression exercised over them and the fine imposed on them for their
rebellion, it was reported perhaps with some exaggeration, that the
“majority”99 of the Hazaras had left for Central Asia, Khurasan,
Quetta, Baluchistan, and Sind.100 The amir then asked the Durranays
and Ghilzays to settle in Uruzgan.101 He also announced that everyone
wishing to settle in the rest of the Hazarajat would be exempt from
paying revenue for the first year and allowed to pay it at a lower
rate in the future.102 At the same time, he also announced that money
and seeds would be advanced on easy terms to Hazara cultivators.
The government converted the pastures of the Hazarajat into state
property and then sold them to the nomads (kuchays) who had helped
it to transport supplies during the war.103 Until then the nomads had
been unable to graze their cattle beyond Behsud, Nahur, and the
Saydasta of the Jaghuri area;104 with the blessing of government
officials, they forced their way onto the pastures of Dai Zangi, Dai
Kundi, Malistan, and other interior localities.105 The lands of those
who had fallen in the war and had left no inheritors were confiscated,
as were the lands of the mirs of Dai Zangi and Dai Kundi. Since
in the past, these mirs had taken over lands from the Hazara
commoners, the latter now claimed their lands. The amir ruled that
such lands were to be handed over to their original owners, and the
mirs were to be left only with those lands, which they themselves
cultivated.106
The Qizilbashes, who were followers of the same Shi'i faith as
the Hazaras, sympathized with them, incited them by saying that
“. . . the British were going to bring an end to the Emirate, and that
now was the time to assert Hazara independence against the Amir’s
fledgling government.”107 The government then accused the Qizilbashes
98
Of the 20,000 families of Behsud only 6,400 families in total and only 60
families of the Sultan Mohammad clan survived the war. Fayz Mohammad, Siraj
al-Tawarikh, 854, 1031.
99
Ibid., 989.
100
Ibid., 855, 914.
101
MM, Nov. 94, PSLI, 80, 21. Kand D., 6 Jan. 94, PSLI, 69, 627.
102
KD, 2 June 95, PSLI, 80, 21. Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 829, 855.
103
104
Ibid., 714, 715.
105
Ibid., 1100.
106
Ibid., 1011.
107
Gulzad, External Influences and the Development of the Afghan State, 150.
138 chapter eight
of having cooperated with the British in the past,108 and compelled

them, as well as the Hazaras, to observe only Sunni Islam.109 For
that purpose, the government instructed the judges (qazis) and the
expounders of Islamic law (muftis) of the districts of Uruzgan, 'Askarabad,
Malistan, Ajaristan, Jaghuri, Behsud, Gizao, Yakawlang, Bamiyan,
Kahmard and Saighan110 to settle the legal affairs of the Hazaras in
accord with the Hanafi system of jurisprudence.
By forcing the Shi'as—that is, the followers of the Ja'fari system
of law—to embrace the Sunni system the amir intended to unite his
subjects religiously, as the Safavi rulers had converted the Sunnis of
Persia into the Shi'i faith in the sixteenth century. Nadir Shah Afshar
had unsuccessfully tried to do the opposite in the eighteenth century.
At the same time the amir also tried to weaken the hold of the muj-
tahids (Shi'i 'ulema) of Persia over the Shi'as of Afghanistan, and this
had given the mujtahids a chance to interfere in the affairs of
Afghanistan. However, the professed conversion of the Shi'as was
just a pretense in line with the doctrine of concealment (taqiyya) that
allowed them to temporarily change faith in a time of danger.111
The Hazara war revealed how the religious, social and cultural
institutions in Afghanistan released forces for destruction. The amir,
the 'ulema, the tribal elders and senior government officials, on one
side, and the mirs and mujtahids, on the other, as well as common men
on both sides involved themselves in a war to physically destroy the
adversary and his property. In the absence of restraining influences on
both sides this war was fought as if in a non-Muslim land (dar al-harb).
The Hazaras were crushed for the first time in their history, but
the war also ended their centuries-old isolation forever. Afterward,
they mingled with their neighbors and settled in cities particularly
Kabul. In Kabul, while most Hazara males did menial jobs, the women
secured places with wealthy families as wives, concubines, and domestic
helpers. Enterprising Hazara businessmen flourished, and their children
studied in government-run educational institutes, and later entered
state employment. Today the Hazaras constitute a considerable portion
of the permanent residents of the city of Kabul.
108
109
110
Ibid., 986.
111
Kakar, Government and Society in Afghanistan, 158–161.
CHAPTER NINE
THE CONQUEST OF FORMER KAFIRISTAN
Kafiristan,1 a highland in northeastern Afghanistan, with patches of

pastures, some arable land, and tall woods in its numerous narrow
valleys, had remained independent for centuries because of its inac-
cessible location and the determination of its inhabitants in defend-
ing it. Until the reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, only minor
incursions had been undertaken against it, but these had, neverthe-
less, reduced its size. The amir did not overrun Kafiristan earlier in
his reign because he was preoccupied elsewhere. Instead, he adopted
a paternal attitude toward its elders on the occasions when they vis-
ited him in Kabul, whenever their overzealous neighbors pressured
them. Only in the mid-1890s when Russia and Britain had reached
almost to the border of Kafiristan through their occupation of the
Pamirs and Chitral, respectively, did he order its conquest.
1
‘Kafiristan’ (‘the land of the infidel’) is the name reputedly given by the Muslims
to the land where the ‘Kafirs’ lived. The name has been in use since the sixteenth
century. According to Ghobar (Afghanistan, 671) before that Kafiristan was called
Bilor or Bular. As noted in the present study Bilor is derived from the word Bakhtar.
Seemingly this name had been in use by the Kafirs who after their migration from
Bakhtar (Bactria) lived in the south and west of former Kafiristan. According to
Wheeler M. Thackston “The origin of the name Kafiristan probably has nothing
at all to do with the Arabic Kafir but rather with Gabarik, the tribal name Babur
gives. Overtime and also because of the paganism of the region, ‘Gabar’ could have
been transformed into ‘Kafir.’” (The Baburnama, Memoirs of Babur, Prince and Emperor),
Transl., edited and annotated by Thackston, Modern Library Paperback edition,
2002, New York, 484). According to Sir H. M., Elliot, (“Notes on the Hindu Kings
of Kabul”, Appendix, B., GAK, 1895, cxxxiii) the Kafirs lived in Katorman, a state-
ment based on the writing of Abu Raihan al-Bairuni’s Tarikh al-Hind. Elliot also
states that a prince as well as a tribe of the same name lived in Katorman bor-
dering Kabul. Charles Masson also notes that “. . . the general name of the north-
ern part of the region of Kafiristan was Ketuer, or Katawar.” He likewise states
that “the princes of Chitral, who in the time of Timur were no doubt infidels . . .,
being still [1832] stiled [Sic] Shah Katawar.” (Narrative of Various Journeys in Balochistan,
Afghanistan and the Panjab, 1,198) In the late nineteenth century Riyazi ('Ayn al-
Waqayi', 269) states much the same and notes that before Timur (1336?–1405)
invaded Kafiristan it was called ‘Kator’.
The names Kator, Katorman, and Katawar are seemingly variations of Katir
who constituted the great majority of the population of Kafiristan. Among the
“Kafir” tribes, they have appeared most prominently in history.
140 chapter nine
Kafiristan
the conquest of former kafiristan 141
The People and Society of Former Kafiristan
The inhabitants of Kafiristan, an Indo-Aryan people, had preserved

their ancient beliefs and customs in their largely inaccessible and iso-
lated highland. Generally, they were tall, lean, fair, and quarrelsome.
Some had green eyes and blond hair. Due to these and various other
features, they were said to be the descendants of the troops of
Alexander the Great, but there is no evidence to suggest that they
were of Greek origin.
The Kafirs did not have a single name for their land or for them-
selves as a whole, and used regional names instead. The eastern
region was called Prigrom, the central region Kalshom, and the west-
ern region Ramgul. Each consisted of a number of very narrow river
valleys.2 The Kafirs also employed more than one name for the same
village and the same clan.
It is generally believed that because their ancient religion was a
form of polytheism of an Indian type, with pantheons varying from
tribe to tribe, these people were called ‘Kafirs’ (infidels) and their
land as ‘Kafiristan’ (the land of infidels) by their Muslim neighbors.
The Afghan historian Ghobar, however, states that the name ‘Kafir’
is probably derived from the word kapira originally by the Siyah-
posh Kafirs of western Biloristan. The name ‘Kafiristan’ is also derived
from the word Kapria,3 with the addition of stan, signifying place in
Sanskrit, as well as in Kafiri languages.4
The Kafirs and their society stood in sharp contrast to those of
their Muslim neighbors, essentially because of different religious beliefs
and mutually hostile relationship in general, a situation that has
affected the Kafir character and society in more than one way. To
begin with, the former Kafirs had numerous deities to whom they
offered sacrifices and presents in their shrines made of wood or stone,
for the protection of themselves, and their crops, cattle and villages.
These deities were worshiped through sacrifices; with dances, and
with the singing of hymns (lalu Kunda), and by uttering invocations
(namcha kunda). The deities common to all tribes, in order of significance,
2
Tauza, Sami' Allah, The Historical and Cultural Roots of Nuristan, Ministry of
Information and Culture, Kabul, 1988, 7 (Dari). Mr. Tauza is a native author.
3
Ghobar, Mir G. Mohammad, Goghrafiyya-e-Tarikhi-e-Afghanistan (Persian) [The
Geographical History of Afghanistan], Reprint, Maiwand Publication House, Peshawar,
1999, 36.
4
Tauza, 319.
142 chapter nine
were Imra, or Yamra (the creator), Moni, or Mani, (his prophet),

Gish, or Gesh, (the war god); Bagisht (the god of wealth), Diazane,
Krumati and Nirmali, (three goddesses).5 There were also many other
deities, but they were of inferior status and peculiar to individual
localities.
A belief in spirits (dogan), heroic ancestors, demons and fairies like-
wise formed the Kafir religious outlook. For example, the god Bagisht,
like all other gods, was “. . . believed to have lived in this world as
a man, and to have become deified after his death.”6 Not only did
the Kafirs invoke their assistance; they also believed that the spirits
managed their worldly affairs. As a whole the Kafir religion was, as
Robertson believed, a somewhat low form of idolatry, with an admix-
ture of ancestor worship and some traces of fire-worship.7
The religious beliefs and rituals of the Kafirs were simple, and
they knew little about their theology. Humbly standing in front of
their shrines, they would invoke their assistance in protecting their
crops and themselves from the forces of nature and their Muslim
enemies; Utah, the high priest, presided over all of their religious
ceremonies, including sacrifices at shrines. However, it was their reli-
gious beliefs and the danger posed by their Muslim enemies that
held the Kafirs together as a people. Otherwise they had no com-
mon bonds. The Kafir religious beliefs and practices were, thus, an
example of the powerlessness of a small, superstitious and traditional
society against the indomitable forces of nature and of the Muslim
enemies, who had reduced their once larger habitat, and then kept
continually for centuries in a state of permanent siege and pressure.
The people of Kafiristan who lived in large and compact villages
situated at the foot of hills with attached storied-houses made mainly
of wood, were tribal and non-tribal, a division which corresponded
roughly to the division of society into freemen (atrogen) and slaves
5
Robertson, Sir George S., The Kafirs of the Hindu-Kush, Reprint, Johnson
Corporation, London, 1970, 381. It was first published in 1895. Robertson (1852–1916)
twice had traveled into Kafiristan on the eve of its conquest, and had lived among
the Kafirs for over a year. His book based on his own observations and findings
gives the most comprehensive account of the Kafirs, their society and politics that
exists in any language. Because of its significance the book was in the same year
rearranged and reissued entitled Kafiristan and Its People. I am indebted to Mr.
M. Hassan Sahak for sending me a photostat copy of this book. Tauza, 227.
6
Robertson, 406.
7
Robertson, 376.
(borjan).8 Tribal Kafirs were in the majority, and only they owned
land and cattle, and, therefore, had wealth and power. Their Muslim
neighbors distinguished them by the names ‘Siyah-posh’, (Black-robed)
and ‘Safed-posh’ (White-robed). This division was more apparent
than real as the Kafirs were known to each other by the name of
the tribe and social group to which they belonged.
The Kata tribe (Katir, or Kator) which was larger than all of the
others combined, lived in the Kantiva and Ramgul and Bashgul
(Bashgol) valleys. In the past, the eastern Kata was known as ‘Bilor’
and the western Kata as ‘Kator’. The Kam tribe also lived in the
Bashgul valley. These Siyah-posh tribes, with their large town of
Kamdesh, adjacent to Chitral, carried on trade and made other kinds
of contact with the outside world to a greater extent than the other
tribes. Hence the significance they had over others.
Among the other tribes were the Safed-posh tribes of Kalsha (or
Wai in Waigul), Prasun (in central Kafiristan), Ashkun and Gowar
(Sutra Gor). The Prasun are perhaps the oldest inhabitants of Kafiris-
tan.9 The Kata, including the Muman and Kam, spoke one lan-
guage, which was called Kati, with local variations; others spoke the
languages of Waiguli, Presun and Ashkun. The Presun language was
so difficult that it was impossible for a non-native speaker to learn
it. The last- mentioned three languages were mutually unintelligible,
and all languages spoken in Kafiristan belonged to the Dardic group
of the Indo-European family.
Each tribe consisted of a number of clans whose headmen, known
as Jast (or Jashtt) and others constituted councils. Tauza, a native
author, states that in former Kafiristan each village had two coun-
cils: the common council (urey), which was composed of free tribes-
men and headed by a Jast, settled village affairs, while the council
of elders, composed of the influential individuals such as Jast,
Shoramuach, Batur and others made laws and executed them.10 Since
the latter held meetings in a special house it may not have been
known to the English author George Robertson, who traveled twice
in the eastern parts of Kafiristan and stayed there for over a year.
Or, he may be referring to this council when he states that “The
affairs of a tribe such as the Kam are managed by the Jast nominally,
8
Tauza, 166.
9
Tauza, 149–158.
10
Tauza, 182–183.
144 chapter nine
but actually by a small group of greybeards, who at ordinary times

rule in a more or less absolute way.”11 At any rate, Robertson focuses
only on the common council (urey) which he calls “parliament” and
which he attended. He states:
A Kafir parliament is a strange sight. . . . A dozen men, perhaps, try
to speak at once; each has his own little group of listeners, whose
attention . . . he seeks to recall by loud ejaculations of ‘ai ai’ or by lit-
tle pokes in the ribs with his walking club. If some very exciting topic
is being discussed, perhaps all are talkers and none are listeners; but,
as a rule, when one of the tribal orators begins to speak, he gets the
attention of the greater part of the assembly.12
Since the illiterate Kafirs could not record their decisions they often
did not stick to them. Robertson notes:
. . . the discussion [decision] arrived at on one day is quite likely to be
rescinded on the next, and reverted to on the third. But such occur-
rences are exceptional and only happen when people are laboring
under strong excitement on some subject.
Further, Robertson states that “Generally the Jast, or its inner coun-
cil, manage every thing.” He then refers to the political order of the
Kafirs as “oligarchy, or, in some tribes, an autocracy.”13 While it is
true that the Kafir political order was an oligarchy, it is also true
to say that it was not an autocracy, since membership in the coun-
cil was only for one year, and the position of Jast as head of the
clan was not hereditary. More importantly, in the absence of landed
aristocracy as well as a cash economy to enable some one to retain
militias even the powerful Jast were unable to rule autocratically,
and had to rely on the good will of the tribesmen in conducting
public affairs. Robertson even speaks of “. . . a public opinion which
avenges any outrage on itself by promptly burning down the cul-
prit’s house and destroying his property.” In his view public opin-
ion is “a power not to be disregarded.”14
Also, by the time a tribesman attained the status of Jast he had
become financially worse off. This may explain why no one has evi-
dently attempted to set up a monarchy. The reason for this is sim-
ple; the process of choosing the Jast was elaborate and very expensive.
11
Robertson, 234.
12
Robertson, 435.
13
Robertson, 434, 435.
14
Robertson, 436.
A candidate was required to have shown special valor in fighting

the Muslim enemy and to have hosted feasts for elders and the tribe.
The Kam, for example, required a candidate to wait for three years
and give twenty-one feasts to become a Jast. Still as Robertson states
“. . . many men utterly ruin themselves in becoming Jast, spending
their substance to the last goat, the last cheese, the last pound of
ghee.”15 However, although it was an ordeal for a candidate to
undergo this process, he did so to become not necessarily rich but
socially important. According to Robertson “While going through
the ordeal the man himself or his immediate relations are all con-
scious of the dignified position the family is attaining.”16 He endures
the expenses because, as Robertson notes,
An individual cannot become of great importance in the tribe until
he is a headman or Jast, one of those individuals who are permitted
to wear the women’s coroneted earrings, and to wear whatever gor-
geous dress he can procure for religious ceremonies and dances.17
In addition, only the Jast had the privilege of sitting on a special
chair before the public.
The main privilege of the Jast, as noted, was membership and
chairmanship in the tribal council (urey),18 but the function and author-
ity of councils differed somewhat from tribe to tribe. What was com-
mon to all councils was this. Even though in theory every tribal
Kafir was entitled to become a Jast in actual practice only the val-
orous wealthy could do so. Thus, among tribal Kafirs, only the
wealthy and the valorous with strong religious beliefs could raise
themselves to the pinnacle of power. However, they could rise only
within the traditional framework, as the Kafir political culture was
only conventional and routine. Within this order, the position of the
Jast was of paramount importance because he headed the commu-
nity of the tribal Kafirs, who alone were economically and politi-
cally the most important among a people who were divided into
various clans, and had feuds among themselves, some of which had
lasted for generations.
The non-tribal or client Kafirs, who were fewer in number were
either freemen or slaves. The freemen were de-tribalized, but owned
15
Robertson, 450.
16
Robertson, 450.
17
Robertson, 449.
18
Tauza, 171.
146 chapter nine
neither land nor cattle, maintaining themselves by laboring mainly

as shepherds. The slaves (borjan) were divided into the Bari and the
Showala, and were either artisans or domestics. They were the prop-
erty of families whose heads enjoyed wide power. The slaves were
originally prisoners of war, whom the Kafirs had acquired in conflicts
with their neighbors in past centuries.19 The position of the artisan
slaves was much better because they owned property and the com-
munity needed their services as carpenters, tanners, weavers, gold-
smiths, ironsmiths and the like. Slaves of both types were forbidden
to visit shrines, and domestic slaves were even banned from going
beyond certain limits in the house. Like the shudras or dasas of ancient
India slaves were considered unclean. Of all the Kafir tribes the
Kam and the Calsha had the highest number of slaves, and they
were sold and bought in the town of Kamdesh.20
The Kafirs had some other customs as well that distinguished them
markedly from their neighbors. Their women, being unveiled and
therefore able to move freely, tilled the land. However, since Kafiristan
was a mountainous country it had narrow valleys and only limited
stretches of cultivable land. Tauza claims that women tilled the land
so that men have ample time to defend the country against the
ever—present danger to which they were exposed from their Muslim
neighbors.21 Consequently, it was not uncommon for Kafir women
to engage in sexual affairs both out of wedlock and extra-maritally.
If discovered, the women were not severely punished and any result-
ing problems were settled by a council of elders, who ordered the
male ‘seducer’ to give a few goats to the wronged husbands. Young
unmarried women were especially indulgent, and their fathers accepted
and raised their out of the wedlock children without grudges. It is
even said that the Siyah-posh Kafirs were inclined to “. . . resign
their wives to those who reside under their roofs” out of hospitality
to their guests.22
The Kafirs were polygamous to the extent that some of them mar-
ried more than four wives. It was even considered a reproach to
have only one wife—a sign of poverty and insignificance.23 However,
19
Ghobar, The Geographical History of Afghanistan, 140. Tauza, 178.
20
Tauza, 177–181.
21
Tauza, 185.
22
Masson, Charles, Narrative of Various Journeys in Balochistan, Afghanistan, and the
Panjab, First published in 1842. Reprint by Oxford University Press, 1874, 1, 227.
23
Robertson, 435.
unlike Pashtuns, among whom parallel cousin marriage was com-

mon, the Kafirs did not marry wives even from their own clans, a
custom which had contributed to the solidarity of society. “[A]s no
man may take a wife from his own clan, or from his mother’s or
from his father’s clan, it can easily be imagined how closely the peo-
ple are connected with one another.”24 Their marriage as well as
divorce ceremonies were simple. Marriage was performed by the
tying together of two twigs or rods of the height of the groom and
bride, and divorce was performed by their being broken. Even though
the Kafir women overworked, and were undervalued the Kafir fam-
ily life was full of affection.
The Kafirs were extremely social within their own community.
They held parties at home in which men, women, and even young
boys drank wine. Alexander Burnes notes that the Kafirs “. . . are
very fond of honey, wine, and vinegar all of which they have in
abundance.”25 The Kafirs were likewise fond of music and dancing,
although men and women danced separately and differently. With
regard to work, every Kafir, who was physically capable, did so.
Even elders and aristocrats with lofty titles labored as shepherds,
warriors, and even cultivators.26 The Kafirs could not understand
suicide, and the very idea of man killing himself struck them as inex-
plicable. “They are never melancholy”27 and “[s]ingly, they are often
reasonable.”28 Also, they slept as they pleased, and, in contrast to
their Muslim neighbors, the Kafirs did not have blood feud, and
made murderers outcasts forever or until payment of a ransom, which
was so heavy that it was rarely paid. The infliction of severe pun-
ishment upon the murderer was meant to prevent blood feud, which
if not checked, would have meant “the extinction of a tribe” and
the loss of warriors, who were badly needed in feud with their Muslim
neighbors.29
Further, the killing of a Kafir who had accepted Islam (shaykh)
was treated as if an ordinary Kafir had been murdered.30 Unlike
24
Robertson, 86. Tauza, 185.
25
Burnes, Alexander, Cabool, First published in 1842. Reprint 1973. Graz, Austria,
210.
26
Tauza, 180.
27
Robertson, 381.
28
Robertson, 432.
29
Robertson, 442.
30
Robertson, 73.
148 chapter nine
their Muslim neighbors, who buried their dead, the Kafirs neither
buried nor burned their dead, and placed the body of the dead in
a box that was put on the summit of a nearby hill, a custom sim-
ilar to that which prevailed in the Avestan period. Since the Kafirs
were illiterate they had no written records of their own. Also, because
of their small-scale contact with the outside world they were not
exposed to change, and held steadfast to their cultural values.
Consequently, for centuries their society had been essentially reten-
tive. The biggest change in their long history that affected them as
well as their society in a fundamental way came with their conver-
sion to Islam in 1896. On the eve of their conversion the author
Robertson characterized the Kafirs in the following manner. “Their
present ideas and all the associations of their history and their reli-
gion are simply assassinations and blackmailing; yet they are not sav-
ages. Some of them have the head of philosophers and statesmen.
Their features are Aryan, and their mental capabilities are consid-
erable. Their love of decoration, their carving, their architecture, all
point to a time when they were higher in the human scale than
they are at present.”31
The Kafirs had a hostile as well as symbiotic relationship with
their Muslim neighbors. Although they suffered from disunity they
would unite whenever the latter would threaten them, but would
not conduct a combined operation, preferring instead to retaliate in
small parties. On the other hand, the Muslims would raid their ter-
ritory to exact tribute, grab their land and capture their women, or
to take revenge for their relatives whom the Kafirs had killed. The
Muslim and Kafir communities in return would reward their respec-
tive successful raiders with the title of ghazi (Muslim fighter against
non-Muslims) for the Muslims, and of shoramauch for the Kafirs.
Nevertheless, the Kafirs and their neighbors maintained a symbi-
otic relationship through trade in local commodities. Muslim ped-
dlers carried on such trade in times of peace, even in the interior
of Kafiristan. The Kafirs also maintained relationships with the
Muslims individually as well as collectively. They had ‘brothers’
among some frontier Muslims, and both sides extended hospitality
to each other when called upon. It was this symbiotic relationship
and the introduction of currency that contributed to the spread of
31
Robertson, 165.
Islam in the fringes of Kafiristan. Here, particularly in Bashgul, lived

a large number of converts to Islam, known as shaykhs or neemchas.
Although they had converted, their kinsmen accepted them without
prejudice, because their blood ties were much stronger than religious
ones. Thus, on the eve of the invasion, Islam had made consider-
able inroads among the Kafirs, who were said to number about
52,500 people in 1891.32
The Historical Background of the Kafirs
As previously noted, the Kafirs were an indigenous people. According

to Ghobar they were the descendents of the people of Bakhtar who
left their land (Bakhtar or Bactria) after the overthrow of the Greco-
Bactrian rule by the people of Takhar. They settled in regions south
of the Hindu-kush, which they called Biloristan after their former
land Bakhtar. In their new habitat, where they partly mixed with
the indigenous people, but largely kept to themselves, they main-
tained their former predominantly Zoroastrian ways of life,33 as pre-
viously described.
In the Islamic period, when Islam was being introduced in what
is now eastern Afghanistan, the Kafirs were pressured to accept Islam,
and those who refused proceeded further up the highland, from
Laghman, Konarr, Bajaur and other valleys. Sultan Mahmud of
Ghazna may have been the first Muslim ruler to have pressured
them to embrace Islam, in the beginning of the eleventh century.
Although he invaded India seventeen times, he did not conquer the
highland of the Kafirs. The example he set was followed by Timur
Lane (1335–1405) and by the Muslim princes of Turkestan, in the
fifteenth century. 34 In the early part of the sixteenth century,
Mohammad Zahir al-Din Babur (1483–1530), the founder of the
Mughal dynasty of India, had a small encounter with the Kafirs in
the Konarr valley. During the reigns of his successors, notably Jalal
al-Din Akbar (1556–1605) and Jahangir (1605–1627), the Kafirs of
32
GAK, 250.
33
Ghobar, The Geographical History of Afghanistan, 135–139.
34
McNair, W. W., Exploration in Eastern Afghanistan, Kafiristan, 1883, 38,
PSLI, 44, 1208. Masson, Narrative of Various Journeys, 1, 198–201.
150 chapter nine
Tagao, Nijrao, Pech, Konarr and Laghman were converted to Islam.35

In the first half of the eighteenth century, Nadir Shah Afshar
(d. 1747) left the Kafirs unmolested, as did the Sadozay rulers after-
ward. However, later in 1874, Amir Sher 'Ali Khan tried to con-
quer Kafiristan, although the details of his attempt are unknown.
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan did not take a military expedition
against them until 1895, since he was not ready to confront them.
Nor did the Kafirs present a problem. After Russia occupied Panjdeh
in 1885, the amir feared that the Russians viewed the Kafirs as
“. . . their auxiliary force.”36 A year later he also feared that “. . . the
British Government intended to annex Kafiristan.”37 This was after
the British Government requested him that he permit a British party
under Colonel Lockhart to enter Kafiristan for collecting geological
data.38 The amir turned down the request, but was still unable to
bring the Kafirs within the orbit of Kabul, due to more pressing
problems elsewhere. Instead, he lent his blessing to the jihad move-
ment that Mulla Khalil Mohmand and others were waging against
the Kafirs at the same time that he also adopted a paternal attitude
toward those deputations of Kafir elders who were turning to him
in Kabul, for protection. Pressured by overzealous Muslims on the
fringes of their land, groups of Kafir elders frequently visited the
amir and received good treatment, as well as presents of robes and
cash.
'Omara Khan and the Kafirs
In the late 1880s 'Omara Khan (Umra Khan), the famous khan of
Jandol, revived the centuries-old custom of jihad against the Kafirs.
In 1891, he occupied the Kafir village of Nasrat on the left bank
of the Konarr River even though his local rivals and the mehtar (ruler)
of Chitral had made a coalition against him, which prevented him
from undertaking a large-scale invasion. However, his second attempt
35
Rahim, M., Sifat Nama-e-Darwesh Mohammad Khan Ghazi (Persian) [in Praise of
Darwesh Mohammad Khan Khan Ghazi], 1288 H.Q., Islamabad, Laghman, Introduction
and Annotation by Scarcia, G., Rome, 1965, 74.
36
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to Afzal, KD, 17, Mar. 85, PSLI, 44, 740.
37
MM, Apr. 86, PSLI, 63, 496.
38
Durand to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, 22 Jan. 86, PSLI, 47, 1027.
at invading the Kafir’s territory, after he had defeated his rivals, was
anticipated by the Kafirs,39 and they invaded his territory instead.
They did so with the encouragement they received from Sipah Salar
Ghulam Haydar Khan Charkhay, who had arrived at the time at
Asmar with a large number of troops. Further, as a result of the
Durand Agreement of 1893, when Kafiristan was officially recog-
nized by India as a part of Afghanistan, the sipah salar warned
'Omara Khan to leave the Kafirs alone.40 However, 'Omara Khan
was still undeterred, stating that in Kafiristan his claim was “supe-
rior”41 to that of the amir’s and of the Mehtar of Chitral. He gave
up his planned invasion only after the Government of India pre-
vented him from carrying it out.42
The Mehtar of Chitral and the Kafirs
Previously Kafiristan, Chitral and Gilgit formed one land,43 and the
Mehtar of Chitral, entitled Shah Kator,44 was viewed as the suzerain
of the Kafirs, for which they paid him tribute.45 Although, during
the period under discussion, the mehtar was unable to administer their
affairs, the Kafirs, especially those of the nearby Bashgul valley, still
sought his protection when pressured by other Muslims. After they
found out that he could no longer protect them from the threats of
'Omara Khan, they turned to the amir for protection.46 When the
Government of India, the suzerain of the mehtar, accepted the amir’s
claim that the whole of Kafiristan was a part of Afghanistan47 the
centuries-old relationship between the former and Chitral came to
an end.
39
PD, 23 Nov. 92, PSLI, 68, 703.
40
PD, 8 Jan. 94, PSLI, 7, 208.
41
'Omara Khan to Mehter, PD, 8 Jan. 94, PSLI, 73, 208.
42
Secretary to government of India to 'Omara Khan, 30 Mar. 94, PD, 9 May,
PSLI, 74, 711.
43
44
Elliot, “Hindu Kings of Kabul”, GAK, Appendix B., cxxlv.
45
46
Kam elders to Ghulam Haydar Khan, PD, 8 Jan. 94, PSLI, 74, 128.
47
Elgin to Hamilton, 22 Apr. 96, F.L. No. 77 (1896), PSLI, 85, 20.
152 chapter nine
The Negotiations
The concentration of troops at Asmar, as described in Chapter Four,

alarmed the Kafirs. The amir instructed the sipah salar to allay their
fear by negotiating with them. However, the purpose was not a set-
tlement through negotiation, but to dissuade the Kafirs from fleeing
to Chitral, as, reportedly, they would do, if military expeditions were
taken against them before the winter set in. The sipah salar was most
suited for conducting the negotiation. As a Yusufzay Pashtun, well
versed in the art of negotiations and settlements and enjoying wide
authority as the amir’s viceroy in the eastern province, the sipah salar
also preferred negotiation to the employment of force. Since one
political center did not exist among the Kafirs, he began negotiat-
ing with the tribes separately. Extensive negotiations were held with
the Kam Kafirs of the Bashgul valley bordering Chitral. However,
these were no more than a delaying tactic.
The sipah salar and his troops moved to Barikot (Birkot), closer to
the Kam Kafirs of the Bashgul valley, and proposed that they accept
Islam and the amir’s rule.48 While, they were willing to submit to
the amir, they were unwilling to accept Islam. They were also unwill-
ing to accept the construction of a road through their valley to
Badakhshan, which the sipah salar had planned to build. Subsequently,
they agreed to the construction of the road, provided they were left
free to practice their religion. The sipah salar went along with their
request, but when work was begun on the road, the Kafirs changed
their minds, proposing instead to accept Islam, not the road. For
the sipah salar, the construction of the road and their submission were
of greater urgency than the Kafirs’ immediate conversion, because
without the road the invasion would be difficult.
For precisely the same reason, ultimately the Kafirs of the whole
valley made it clear that they wanted to become zimmis (non-Muslim
subjects), but would accept neither Islam nor the road.49 Evidently,
the Kafirs, who had lived in freedom since their arrival in their ter-
ritory, resented losing their freedom, and so wanted to retain it by
becoming zimmis. The sipah salar gave way, knowing that if he refused
to accept their proposal they would resist and then escape to Chitral.50
48
Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 1124, 1125, 1129, 1130.
49
Ibid.
50
Sayyed Shah of Daryu of Luthkoh to British agent, Gilgit Diary, 2 Nov. 95,
F.L., No. 4493 (1896), PSLI, 83.
Elsewhere the negotiations, which were mixed with intimidation,

were more successful: Some even submitted and accepted Islam and
the impression prevailed that Kabul might not undertake the mili-
tary expedition after all. In reality, Kabul accomplished its intended
goal; the negotiations created a false sense of security as the result
of which the Kafirs remained in their areas of habitation. During
the coming winter when it was most difficult, if not impossible, for
them to flee either to Chitral or to the upper parts of their valleys
the last grand invasion of Kafiristan was undertaken.
The Invasion
In the winter of 1895 Kafiristan was invaded from all sides by reg-
ular troops and tribal levies (eljaris). The purpose was to bring about
the “. . . absolute submission and conversion to Islam”51 of the Kafirs.
51
For details of the military operations in the Bashgul valley see, Fayz Mohammad,
Siraj al-Tawarikh, 1163, 1165, 1166 and 1167.
Dr. S. Jones in his book, Men of Influence in Nuristan, (Seminar Press, 1974) has
devoted a chapter to the invasion of Kafiristan. Essentially, a chronology, the chap-
ter is based exclusively on some, not all, of the diaries of the agents of the British
Government of India. However, he has viewed the Kafiristan issue in isolation, not
in the context of the region. Besides, Dr. Jones is selective in the citation of reports,
and has cited unreliable reports on a number of topics. He has, for instance, noted
a report from a dubious source in which it is stated that prior to December 1895
“10,000” Kafirs were killed in the fighting with Afghan troops, and that the casu-
alties among the latter amounted to about “600” men. (p. 13) The report is about
the military operation in the Bashgul valley before it was overrun.
In a population of about 20, 000 with a fighting force of about 7000 men which
the Bashgul valley had the figures cited by Dr. Jones can not possibly be true. Kafir
women and old men neither fought nor were massacred by the Afghan army. Also,
the shaykhs or neemchas (Kafirs converted to Islam) supported the army of Islam
against their own kinsmen, and among the inhabitants of large villages, especially
Kamdesh with 600 houses, some did not oppose the army. Dr. Jones had not cited
a report from a reliable source, namely the Chitral Diary, stating that about 200
tribal levies and 180 Kafirs were lost in the fighting in the upper part of the Bashgul
valley. (Kakar, (1971), 198). Obviously, by the end of the fighting this number must
have risen, but not much since in the whole valley no major battle was fought,
and the casualties inflicted on the Kafirs seems proportional with those inflicted by
them on the Afghan army, which were 29 killed and 30 wounded. (Fayz Mohammad,
Siraj al-Tawarikh, 1178) Dr. Jones has no word in his book about the penetration
of Islam among the Kafirs and the amir’s paternal treatment of the prisoners of
war. The amir’s paternal treatment is evident from his decree which states that
anyone who tried to enslave a Kafir would be fined 3,500 rupees. (Fayz Mohammad,
Siraj al-Tawarikh, 1182) Contrary to this, Dr. Jones (p. 233) claims that the amir
“even sold” handsome slave-girls to the officers ( ghulam bachas) of the court, ignor-
154 chapter nine
The sipah salar overran the Bashgul valley and returned to Asmar in
early January 1986, after having left a garrison there; resistance was
light and a number of Kafirs fled to Chitral.52 Next, along with
troops from Munjan, he pacified the long valley of Pech and all of
its side vales. The Ramgul and Kulum Kafirs, who lived in the inte-
rior of Kafiristan and stood fast by their religion, proved difficult to
overcome. This finally occurred in the winter of 1896, after both
sides incurred heavy casualties. With the fall of Kulum the conquest
was complete.
The Settlement and Conversion
Following the invasion the conversion to Islam of the Kafirs began.

Armed Sunni mullas of the Hanafi system of laws guarded by armed
khassadars (militia) were commissioned to convert the Kafirs. Further,
mosques were built in all of the villages and hamlets, where the
Kafirs were taught in the fundamentals of Islam. Many wooden
effigies and statuettes depicting Kafir deities, and presumably also
their ancestors, were collected and sent on to Jalalabad and Kabul,
where they disappeared. Thus, the Kafir art which was the work of
client artisans, and exemplified the religious beliefs of the Kafirs van-
ished. Except for a few ugly incidents here and there the mass con-
version went on smoothly, and the Kafirs gradually became staunch
Muslims. This was particularly true of young Kafirs, although the
elderly felt sorrow over the loss of their traditional religion.
By the amir’s order, no one was to pillage Kafir property or to
enslave a Kafir. The Kafir slaves were declared to be free as the
amir had already abolished slavery in Afghanistan. If anyone did so,
he was to pay a fine of seven thousand rupees—an exorbitant sum.
Qazis and hakims (subgovernors) were appointed to manage the land
ing the fact that the amir’s betrothal of the Kafir slave-girls was in line with the
custom that allowed dowry and bride-price.
Additionally, according to Dr. Jones (p. 3) following the British invasion of
Afghanistan Amir Sher 'Ali Khan accompanied the Russian mission to Russia where
“Sher 'Ali was something of an embarrassment and he was advised to return.” The
plain fact is that Russia’s governor-general von Kaufmann did not allow the amir
to enter even Central Asia, and that this refusal became partly responsible for the
estrangement in Russo-Afghan relations until 1917 when the Bolsheviks came to
power.
52
CD, 29 Dec 96, F.L., No. 78-F., (1896), PSLI, 90.
of the Kafirs with the support of contingents of troops. Over a quar-

ter of all Kafirs from the interior of Kafiristan, who resisted the inva-
sion, were deported first to various parts of the country and then to
Paghman, a district that resembled Kafiristan. From there, too, like
the Hazara deportees, they were eventually allowed to return to their
own region.
About ten thousand Kafirs were recruited into the army. Kafiristan
was first renamed Nur al-Islam (the light of Islam) and later Nuristan
(the Land of Light), and the Kafirs were called Nuristanays. For the
first time in their long history, the Kafirs came out of isolation. Thus,
in the reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan the last enclave of
‘infidels’ in Afghanistan was Islamized and with its Islamization the
‘infidels’ found a new identity that enabled them to co-exist with
their neighbors for the first time in a spirit of Islamic brotherhood.
The raison d’être for the vendetta with their neighbors as well as
their isolation ceased to exist.
Side by side with the conquest, three roads were built along the
main valleys. Although the best of the roads was like “. . . a sort of
track”53 these were passable with loaded animals. After the Asmar-
Badakhshan road was opened merchants used it freely. It was made
exempt from tolls for three years. Previously, the merchants had sent
their merchandises to India along the much longer route of Chitral.
While, it might appear that the purpose of constructing the new
road was solely to encourage trade, but the construction was prob-
ably linked to the occupation of the Pamirs by the Russians and of
Chitral by the British in 1895. Thereafter, the amir repeatedly warned
his people of the impending danger, stating, “The time is not very
far off that this country of us Afghans will be divided by the Russians
and the English among themselves.”54 The conquest was thought
necessary at the time, because situated as it was, Kafiristan was “. . . a
danger to Afghanistan.”55 The roads were built there in the hope
that the Russians might use them if they choose to invade India,56
thus avoiding Afghanistan proper.
53
Lorimer, J. G., Afghan Troops and the Roads in Ningrahar and Kafiristan,
7 Aug (4). Letters Received from India (1899), 865.
54
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman’s firman to the people of Ningrahar and others. PD,
No. 23, 9 Dec. 95, PSLI, 83.
55
The amir quoted by Pyne, S., to Reuter’s agent. 20 Jan. 96, 66-F., PSLI, 84.
56
PD., No. 1, 8 Jan. 96, F–L., No. 159-F (1896), PSLI, 84.
156 chapter nine
Internal and External Significance
The conquest produced strong repercussions in Afghanistan, as well

as in India, Great Britain, and Russia. While in Afghanistan the
people lauded the amir, in the other three countries, the press and
some Christian societies expressed concern and sought to bring pres-
sure upon their respective governments to prevent the amir from
annexing Kafiristan, and failing that to save the Kafirs from what
was referred to as “extermination.” However, the protestations failed
to arouse their governments to action.
In an age of European domination, devout Christians found it
hard to tolerate the conquest of the ‘Land of the Infidel’ by a Muslim
ruler, and consequently, they demanded counteraction from their
own governments. The intellectual ground for this had already been
laid by Christian missionaries in India to the effect that because the
Kafirs of Kafiristan “. . . are almost without a religion . . . such peo-
ple are open to receive the Gospel.”57 This view had originated with
a Jesuit priest, Benedict Goes. Upon hearing that the Siyah-posh
Kafirs were not Muslims, and that they drank wine, he had “inferred
that they were Christians.” Goes had made this assertion in 1603,
when crossing the Hindu Kush by the Parwan Pass to Andarab.58
Until George Robertson traveled into Kafiristan in 1890–1891 no
European had penetrated it, and Robertson had found no evidence
to suggest that the Kafirs were Christians or were even their sym-
pathizers. Nevertheless, after the conquest, some Christian societies
in Britain raised their voices against it, charging that it was intended
to result in the “enslavement” and “extermination” of the Kafirs.
Sympathizing with the Kafirs on the basis that they had always
“relied on British protection”, and that they were “the brethren of
the Europeans”, these societies asked the British Government to res-
cue them from “the present danger.”59 Others viewed the conquest
as an “irredeemable loss to our [British] prestige”,60 predicting that
“England in India will be the first to suffer by it.”61
57
Downes, E., Kafiristan, London, 1873, 15.
58
Masson, Narrative of Journeys, 1, 205.
59
Aborigines Protection Society to Secretary of state for India, 22 Jan. 96, 5.
The Anti-Slavery Society in London also made similar assertions and requests. For
details see, Memoranda-Parliamentary Questions, Chitral, Afghanistan, etc., 1896.
60
A Missionary, “The Amir’s Paean, the Mittai Valley and the Kafirs”, The
Asiatic Quarterly Review, 2, 1896, 186.
61
Chamberlain, N., “Russia’s Countermeasures to the Kafir Encroachment,” The
Asiatic Quarterly Review, 2, 1896, 186.
Some Russian journals referred to Kafiristan as the “Montenegro

of the Hindu Kush”,62 and to the Kafirs as “the white men” and
“our neighbors”,63 arguing that “The conquest of Kafiristan means
the expansion of the Khalifate,” which in essence is “. . . the old
fight between Christianity and Islam.”64 One Russian journal stated
that “. . . we must curb the propensity for annexations of the great
man Abdurrahman.” An overzealous missionary even suggested that
“. . . if there ever was a time for Crusade, it is now.”65
The utterances echoed some concern. During an era when the
Christian powers of the West had dominated the Muslim world, the
conquest increased the amir’s prestige among Muslims everywhere.
In Afghanistan, he was given the title of the Light of the Nation
and Religion and of Ghazi (Zia al-Millat wa al-Din, and Ghazi ), and
praised as “equal to Alexander in power and to Darius in pomp.”66
On August 17, 1896 pledges of loyalty were given to the amir on
the occasion when he instituted the Festival of Unanimity ( Jashn-e-
Mutafiqqiya) as a symbol of national solidarity. Abroad, the conquest
increased the amir’s prestige among the Muslim subjects of Russia
in Central Asia, and of the British in India so much so that it was
feared that the outcome of the conquest might cause the rise of
“Mahdism in Central Asia”67 and stir “in India some 60 millions of
fanatical Musulman subjects “. . . among whom it was said that “the
time of other Kafirs . . . will come next.”68 As a result of the con-
quest even the transfer of the “Khalifat of Islam from Constantinople
to Kabul” was considered to be “merely a question of time”, which,
if it occurred, would cause,” untold possibilities of harm to peace
and civilization in the future.”69
The alarmist voices, however, failed to incite the British and
Russian governments to action. Apart from other issues, the Kafirs
62
The Petersburg Vidomosti, quoted by Leitner, “Kafiristan and the Khalifa
Question,” The Asiatic Quarterly Review, 1896, 1, 294.
63
The Rega Messenger, The Asiatic Quarterly Review, 1896, 1, 294.
64
Ibid.
65
A Missionary, “The Amir’s Paean”, The Asiatic Quarterly Review, 1896, 2, 283.
66
Jalalabadi, S., A., Fathnama-e-Kafiristan (Dari), [The Ballad of the Conquest of
Kafiristan], The full translation of the text is found in The Asiatic Quarterly Review,
1896, 2, 283–290.
67
Chamberlain, N., “Russia’s Countermeasures” The Asiatic Quarterly Review, 1896,
2, 186.
68
A Missionary, “The Amir’s Paean”, The Asiatic Quarterly Review, 1896, 2, 279.
69
Chamberlain N., “Russia’s Countermeasures”, The Asiatic Quarterly Review,
1896, 2, 186.
158 chapter nine
had not expressed a desire to become Christians, and the claim in

certain missionary circles that during the previous forty years they
had invited them several times “to bring Christianity into their
secluded homes”70 was simply untrue. Contrary to this assertion, in
1886 the Kafirs themselves had blocked the entry into Kafiristan of
a British mission led by Colonel Lockhart. The stated purpose of
the mission was to examine the passes of the Hindu Kush for “a
scientific” survey, but it was, in fact, political. From George Robertson’s
travel accounts of Kafiristan it is clear that the Kafirs had no love
for their so-called European ‘Kafir brethren.’ They even suspected
Robertson of being a spy and his journey, in his own words, “. . . a
mere preliminary to an attempt to annex their country.”71 In the
second place, in comparison to his rebellious subjects, the amir treated
the Kafirs mildly. He realized that since they were fewer in num-
ber they could never become a threat. It was because of all these
considerations that the British Government thought it inadvisable
even to address the amir on the subject, although certain members
of the House of Commons (where the subject was discussed) asked
it to do so.72 In a similar fashion, the official Turkestan Gazette,
wrote, “We, Russians can only, against our wish, remain deeply sad
spectators of the tragedy enacted in Kafiristan which is one of the
darkest blots on European domination in Asia.”73
From all this one good result emerged for the Kafir refugees when
the British Government of India declared that they would be given
asylum with small grants of land in Chitral.74 The Kafir refugees
were then settled in the upper Bumber-et and Gobar. They were
also allowed to retain their beliefs. They gradually became Muslims,
who are now known as Bashgulay shaykhs.75
70
Leitner, W., “Kafiristan and the Khalifa Question”, The Asiatic Quarterly Review,
1896, 1, 288.
71
Robertson to Cunningham, 14 Jan. 90, PSLI, 59, 1006.
72
Memoranda-Parliamentary Questions, 1896, 6.
73
Quoted in The Asiatic Quarterly Review, 1896, 1, 294.
74
Memoranda-Parliamentary Questions, 1896, 4.
75
Shah, Wazir A., “Invasions Preceding the Conquest of Nuristan,” in Cultures
of the Hindu Kush, ed. by Jettmar, K., Wiesbaden, 1974, 25.
CHAPTER TEN
RELATIONS WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

OF INDIA AND THE DURAND AGREEMENT
Great Britain was the first European country with which Afghanistan
came into contact, but relations between them were often hostile.
Britain twice invaded Afghanistan, first in 1838 and then in 1878,
but failed to make it a colony. However, it did succeed in controlling
Afghanistan’s external relations after the second invasion, and it also
helped define and delimit the country’s international boundaries.
Thus, Anglo-Afghan relations are the most important aspect of
Afghanistan’s external relations during the period under consideration.
Before 1880
The first official contact between Afghanistan and Britain was made
in 1809, when a British mission led by Mountstuart Elphinstone, an
envoy of the East India Company, concluded a treaty with the Afghan
ruler, Shah Shuja" Sadozay, in Peshawar, his winter seat. By the
terms of the treaty concluded on June 17, 1809, the Afghans agreed
to prevent the French from entering Afghanistan as the Sindians and
the Persians had agreed to prevent them from entering their coun-
tries. Both parties to the treaty agreed to refrain from meddling in
the internal affairs of each other’s country.1
The treaty had been prompted by the fear of a joint Franco-
Persian invasion of India through Afghanistan. In it the Afghan king
agreed that he would “prevent their passage, and, . . . not permit
them to cross into British India.”2 However, the fear proved unreal,
and Shah Shuja' was soon overthrown. Consequently, the treaty lost
its purpose, even though it had declared friendship between the two
states “to continue for ever”, and Anglo-Afghan relations remained
in limbo for the next twenty years. However, the treaty caused the
1
Norris, J. A., The First Afghan War, 1839–1842, Cambridge, 1967, 14.
2
Kaye, J. W., History of the Afghan War, London, 1851, 1, 150.
160 chapter ten
production of a permanent value. Elphinstone, who was more of a

scholar than a civil servant, managed to collect wide range infor-
mation on Afghanistan on the basis of which he, in cooperation with
his colleagues, composed the most comprehensive book which has
ever been written in any language on the state and society of the
Durranay Empire entitled, An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul.
In the 1830s, Russo-phobia struck British India once again. By
then, as a result of the treaty of 1828 of Torkmanchai, Russian
influence had replaced British influence at the court of Tehran, in
Persia. Afghanistan had been fragmented into the principalities of
Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and Peshawar. This led the British gov-
ernment to conclude that the pro-Russian king of Persia, Fath 'Ali
Shah, intended to dominate Kandahar and Herat, and influence
Afghanistan.3 Britain considered such an eventuality detrimental to
her interests in India, and to forestall the perceived danger, it charged
Governor-general Lord Auckland to counteract the progress of Russian
influence in Afghanistan. For this purpose Lord Auckland sent a mis-
sion under Alexander Burnes to the court of Kabul, but it failed in
its purpose.
Although by then “Russia declared to abstain from entering into
any political relationships with Afghan chiefs and not to take part
in their civil wars or in their family feuds”4 Lord Auckland still
decided to intervene. Apparently, Auckland saw it necessary to fore-
stall a perceived Russian intervention in Afghanistan in order to
make way for the actual British military intervention there. In prepa-
ration for this intervention, he along with Rangit Singh, the Sikh
ruler of the Panjab and the former Afghan king, Shah Shuja", then
a fugitive in India, concluded a treaty.5 For its purpose it had the
placing on the throne of Kabul a ruler who would be subject to the
British. The tool of its accomplishment became Shah Shuja"—a
rejected claimant to the throne who soon became unpopular with
the Afghans during his brief period of British-dominated reign.6
Britain failed in its purpose by losing more than 16,500 soldiers and
Indian servants in its war with Afghanistan, and Dost Mohammad
3
Habberton, W., Anglo-Russian Relations Concerning Afghanistan, 1833–1907, Illinois
Studies in Social Sciences, Vol., XXI, 1933, 10.
4
5
Habberton, Anglo-Russian Relations, 19.
6
Ibid., 20.
relations with the british government of india 161
Khan became its independent ruler once again. The Afghans whose
friendship was advantageous to Britain, turned against it, and in the
process its military fame was undermined, and the defeat of its “splen-
did dignity” echoed throughout its colonies.7 Afghanistan “Once
again . . . had reverted to its original position, and the British inter-
est in Central Asia remained threatened as before.”8 Shah Shuja" no
longer symbolized a “brave king” as his name indicates; on the con-
trary, his name became synonymous with a puppet ruler.
Thereafter, the British pursued a policy of non-interference in
Afghanistan dubbed “masterly inactivity.” In 1854, however, a changed
situation in Europe prompted the British and Amir Dost Mohammad
Khan to an attempt at reconciliation. Governor-general Lord Delhousie
made overtures to the amir with a view to providing in Afghanistan
a barrier against any possible Russian aggression.9 Finally, in 1855,
the amir concluded a treaty with British India, according to which
he declared himself to be the friend of the friends and the enemy
of the enemies of the British Government of India. But the British
did not make a similar pledge, and only agreed to refrain from inter-
fering in the territories that were then in the possession of the amir.
Thus, by implication, the British had a free hand with regard to
Peshawar, which was a part of Afghanistan, but which they had
occupied in 1849. This one-sided treaty was the first diplomatic vic-
tory for the British in Afghanistan.
The 1855 treaty was followed, in 1857, by the conclusion of a
second treaty that was similar to the first in substance. Both treaties
proved effective, and the amir stood by his pledges, making no
attempt whatsoever to recover Peshawar even at a time when the
British were in trouble during the Indian mutiny in the summer of
the same year. He did so in spite of the pressure brought on him by
the public “. . . to attack the British at Peshawar.”10 Although, accord-
ing to Bellew who was in Kandahar at the time, “A word from Dost
Mohammad would have sent the tribes in a wave of fanatical irre-
dentism to overrun and possess again the rich valley of Peshawar
and the Derajat” he cooled down the public temper, arguing that
because the British “. . . were supporting him against the Persian foe
7
8
9
Ibid., 6.
10
Bellew, H. W., Journal of Political Mission to Afghanistan in 1857, London, 269.
162 chapter ten
with the aid of both arms and money”11 he “. . . declared his friend-
ship with the British Government.”12
To a certain extent, the British compensated the Afghans for the
loss of Peshawar by granting weapons and money to help recover
Herat, which Persia had invaded in 1856 as it had unsuccessfully
invaded it several times before. This was to be Persia’s last invasion
of Herat. At the same time, Calcutta and Kabul were to exchange
diplomatic representatives, known as wakil, although the former
refrained from concluding “a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance”
with Afghans.13 On the whole, the treaties improved relations between
the two countries so long as the amir was alive.
From the death of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, in 1863, and
the accession of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan the British policy toward
Afghanistan falls into three phases: the so-called “neutrality”, from
1864–to 1868; reconciliation without commitment, from 1868 to
1876; and active intervention, once again, afterward.
Amir Sher 'Ali Khan expected Britain to follow the same policy
toward him that it had followed toward his father. However, dur-
ing the Afghan civil war, Britain followed a policy of partiality in
the name of neutrality in the hope that his rival, pro-British brother,
Sardar Mohammad A'zam Khan, would establish” . . . a strong gov-
ernment in Afghanistan friendly to the British power.”14 Nevertheless,
Amir Sher 'Ali Khan still preferred British friendship to that of
Russia’s, as he was concerned about the integrity of his kingdom,
and its independence from the feared Russian encroachment. He
11
Ibid., 256.
12
Ibid., 269. Amir Dost Mohammad Khan’s reluctance to restore Peshawar in
1857 was crucial as in 1848 when the Sikhs rose up against the British and “. . . in
their extremity appealed to Amir Dost Mohammad Khan to help them in return
for the cession of Peshawar.” (Hamid-ud Din, “Dost Mohammad and the Second
Sikh War”, Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society, Vol. 11, pt. 1v, Oct. 1954,
280). But Amir Dost Mohammad Khan helped the Sikhs only with a token force
under his son Sardar Mohammad Akram Khan, even though he regarded Peshawar
as “the burial place of my forefathers, and my hereditary country.” (Ibid., 281) He
did so probably because he stuck to the promise that he had given after he had
concluded the treaty of 1857 with the British government in Peshawar. He had
promised that “I have now made an alliance with the British government, and
come what may I will keep it till death.” (Fraser-Tytler, W. K., Afghanistan, A Study
in Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia, Oxford University Press, London,
1967, 125.
13
14
MacGregor, C. M., Central Asia, Pt. 11, A Contribution towards the Better Knowledge
of the Topography, Ethnology, Resources and History of Afghanistan, Calcutta, 1871, 102.
then endeavored to establish friendly relations with British India and

for that purpose visited India officially in early 1869, after he had
overcome his rivals in September the previous year. At Ambala, he
met with Viceroy Lord Mayo, but the latter did not share his alarm
with regard to Russia. Further, Lord Mayo politely refused to rec-
ognize the amir’s dynasty, and only reaffirmed the policy of friend-
ship, help and non-interference. Additionally, the amir was granted
some weapons and cash.15
The Amir’s visit provided a chance for London to approach St.
Petersburg over the establishment of an intermediate zone between
their empires in Central Asia. After some correspondence initiated
by London, in 1869, and went on for years in long intervals, the
British and Russian governments finally, in 1873, reached an under-
standing—not an agreement as is generally understood—over the
northern boundary of Afghanistan. According to this understanding,
the northern boundary of the country followed the course of the
Oxus from the junction of the Kokcha River to a point known as
Khwaja Saleh, and thence south-west to the Persian border as to
include the provinces of Badakhshan, Turkestan, Herat, Andkhoy,
and Maymana within Afghanistan.16
Actually, the Oxus River had been the northern boundary of
Afghanistan ever since Ahmad Shah Durranay had founded mod-
ern Afghanistan in the mid-eighteenth century, but now the two
imperial powers officially accepted it as an international boundary.
However, as noted in Chapter Seven, whether the river Murghab
(Ak-su) or the Panja constituted the Upper Oxus, or indeed whether
that portion was called Oxus at all, subsequently became a subject
of controversy; but the understanding meant that Russia agreed to
regard Afghanistan as a country beyond its sphere of influence, and
not to interfere behind the line in any way.
The implication was that Afghanistan fell within the British sphere
of influence, especially when all possible steps were taken to prevent
intercourse between Russia and Afghanistan.17 This also meant that
15
Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 9. India offered Amir Sher 'Ali Khan 60,000
Pounds in 1868 and a similar sum in 1869. For the so-called agreement of 1873
see Sykes, Sir Percy, Mortimer Durand, A Biography, Cassell and Co. Ltd., London,
1926, 82.
16
Anglo-Russian Dialogue on Afghanistan, 30 Nov. 81, PSLI, 31, 856. Fraser-
Tytler, Afghanistan, A Study in Political Developments, 135. Alder, British India’s Northern
Frontier, 175.
17
Wheeler, The Life of Abdur Rahman, 121.
164 chapter ten
Afghanistan, lying between the Russian and British empires, would

serve as a buffer state. Ultimately, the situation, which was in a way
the continuation of the policy of “masterly inactivity” adopted ear-
lier when Governor-general Lord Lawrence ruled India, helped Amir
Sher 'Ali Khan to concentrate on the reforms of the state, as described
in Chapter One.
When the Marquis of Salisbury again became secretary of state
for India in early 1874, he considered the arrangement inadequate
for the safety of India. While not Russo-phobic, he demanded far
more accurate information about Russian activities in Central Asia,
and in particular from the buffer state of Afghanistan, than Viceroy
Lord Northbrook was able to give from British spies operating there.
His fear was not so much that Tsar Alexander II of Russia wished
to harm British India, but, as he told Northbrook, “he is not rig-
orous enough to prevent his officers doing it in spite of him.”18 Like
Russia’s Foreign Minister, Prince Gorthchakov, the Marquis of
Salisbury held a deterministic view of history, stating that “the Russian
avalanche is moving on by its own weight.”19 Actually, he feared
that how two hundred and fifty thousand Britons could rule over
two hundred and fifty million Indians if British prestige suffered or
Russia dominated Afghanistan in which case “our subjects” would
be excited “to revolt”20 as they had revolted on a large scale in 1857.
This scenario, he argued, would require a large British permanent
force to guard the North-West Frontier, something Britain could
financially ill afford.
Despite his concern regarding Russia, the Marquis of Salisbury
was not for an alliance with Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, even though the
latter had approached Viceroy Lord Mayo for friendship, and had
an organized government with a strong army and a nation willing
to support him against foreign encroachments. Salisbury distrusted
him, perhaps because he did not want to surrender his own dignity
and the independence of his country. Finally on January 22, 1875,
Salisbury gave the viceroy a direct order to request the amir to
accept British agents in Herat, and if possible also Kandahar, for
the first time since the First Anglo-Afghan war.21 However, the bit-
18
Roberts, Andrew, Salisbury, Victorian Titan, Phoenix Paperback, 2002, London,
144.
19
Ibid., 145.
20
Ibid., 147.
21
Ibid., 145.
ter memory of the war with the “infidel Farangi” was still too fresh
in the minds of Afghans to tolerate a British presence in the coun-
try. Consequently, Viceroy Northbrook did not make the request,
stating that “all those best qualified to form an opinion” believed
that the amir would refuse the request.22 He also stated that the fear
of Russian design upon India was based upon chimera.
Concluding that “Salisbury was bent on war”23 the viceroy left
India in April 1876. However, the first step for the Second Anglo-
Afghan war had been taken in the same year after the British Prime
Minister Benjamin Disraeli (later Earl Beaconsfield) adopted a new
policy, known as the “Forward Policy”, which meant intervention
and occupation. It consisted of securing by Britain key frontier points
close to Afghanistan, and turning Afghanistan into a protectorate
state.
The implementation of the Forward Policy began after Lord Edward
Robert L. B. Lytton replaced Lord Northbrook as viceroy and gov-
ernor-general in the spring of 1876. Lytton “arrived in India armed
with an entirely fresh set of instructions to guide the government of
India’s attitude to the Central Asian problem.” In particular “. . . [h]e
came to India with specific instructions to deal with Afghanistan in
accordance with the aims of the Forward Policy.”24 He not only had
the full support of Salisbury; Beaconsfield too assured him that “[m]y
confidence in you is complete.”
With regard to the administration of the North-west Frontier,
Salisbury even told him that “whatever you decide on, I shall
uphold.”25 This point will be explained soon. Lytton was willing to
conclude a defensive and offensive alliance with Amir Sher 'Ali Khan,
and also to recognize his heir apparent. In return, he demanded
that the amir forgo the external independence of his country, and
accept the stationing of British officers along its frontiers. For obvi-
ous reasons, the amir did not accept the proposal.26 The Peshawar
conference that was held in March 1877 between Lytton and the
amir’s representatives on the subject failed. A mission from the
Ottoman Sultan to the amir in September 1877, which attempted
22
Ibid., 146.
23
Ibid., 147.
24
25
Roberts, Salisbury, Victorian Titan, 215.
26
Singhal, India an Afghanistan, 25–26.
166 chapter ten
to estrange him from the Russians, and to persuade him to come

to an agreement with the British also failed. Lytton accused the amir
of being under the Russian spell, while the latter viewed the Russians
as devils, who were concerned only with their own interests.27
During this time, in August 1878, General Constantine P. von
Kauffmann, Russia’s governor-general in Tashkand forced a mission
under General Stolietoff on the amir in Kabul. Stolietoff concluded
a treaty with the amir, the actual content of which has never been
disclosed, but it was said to be a defensive and offensive alliance
without any restrictions placed on the amir.28 However, the Russians
were insincere in their pledge, and gave it only to frighten the British
so that embroiled in Afghanistan they might withdraw the Indian
troops that they had sent to Malta in support of the Ottomans with
whom the Russians were then at war.29
The Russian plan worked; it provided Lytton with a pretext to
win the support of the cabinet in London for his plan of action with
regard to Afghanistan. At first he tried to force a mission under
Neville Chamberlain on the amir, but when it was refused permis-
sion to cross the border at the Khyber Pass he declared war on
Afghanistan on November 20, 1878. The Second Anglo-Afghan war
started as simple as that. However, as Trousdale describes, “The
Second Afghan War was not a popular war. It was also not a nec-
essary war; at least it was no more necessary than the First Afghan
War had been.”30 The overconfident Lytton viewed the conflict as
a means to impose his will on the amir, disregarding the fact that
war especially with the “infidels” arouses strong passions among the
Afghans to action, resulting in a massive death of themselves and of
their adversaries.
Amir Sher 'Ali Khan died shortly after the invasion. His son and
successor, Amir Mohammad Ya"qub Khan, accepted all of the
demands that Lytton had made on his father, plus some additional
ones. All of these became part of the treaty that he concluded with
a British envoy, Major Louis N. Cavagnari in the village of Safed
Sang in Gandumak in eastern Afghanistan on May 26, 1879, as pre-
viously described. Through this treaty
27
Ibid., 28.
28
Ibid., 34.
29
Ibid., 33.
30
. . . the ultimate goal was temporarily postponed . . . The British were

determined that the Afghans should abrogate this agreement in order
to gain the fullest support for their military aims.31
In line with the treaty, a British embassy, headed by Cavagnari was
quartered inside the Bala Hissar near the amir’s palace, on July 24,
1879. “Part Italian, part French, part Irish and all British” Cavagnari
had actually dictated the treaty to the amir in Gandumak. In Kabul,
Cavaganari behaved as if he had been appointed ruler of Afghanistan.
He was mistaken. On September 3, 1879, the people and the army
of Kabul massacred all the inmates of the embassy which consisted
of Cavagnari, W. Jenkyns, A. H. Kelly, W. R. P. Hamilton, and
seventy five members of the cavalry and infantry.32 Soon afterward,
in response to the massacre, the British invaded Afghanistan once
again. During this second phase of the war, Lytton embarked on a
policy with the purpose of dismembering Afghanistan in accord with
the requirements of the Forward Policy. Ultimately, this policy, as
described in Chapter Two, also failed and Afghanistan emerged
reunited under the leadership of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan.
The Reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan
During the Zimma meeting ( July 31–August 1, 1880) Sir Lepel

Griffin, the British Political Officer at Kabul, secretly handed over
the following letter to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan:
His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council has learnt
with pleasure that your Highness has proceeded toward Cabul, in
accordance with the invitation of the British Government. Therefore
in consideration of the friendly sentiments by which your Highness is
animated, and of the advantage to be derived by the Sirdars and
31
Ibid., 49. That Cavagnari viewed the Gandumak treaty with contempt is clear
from the note of Frederic Villiers, the Graphic’s special artist, who was present on
the occasion: “Cavagnari was kneeling on the floor when I entered, melting the
wax [to seal the treaty] by the aid of a candle. On the tent-stool by his side were
the pens with which the treaty had just been signed. ‘Ah,’ said I, ‘these pens, so
unimportant but yesterday, are now wonderfully historic.’ ‘Do you think so?’ he
replied with just a faint touch of the brogue in his voice, for he was a son of the
Emerald Isle, ‘then take the things, and put them into your museum.” Trousdale,
Introduction, in War in Afghanistan, 50.
32
For a detailed account of the massacre of the British embassy and the Kabul
uprising see, Kakar, Jang-e-Dowom-e-Afghan-Englis, 57–68.
168 chapter ten
people from the establishment of a settled government under your

Highness’s authority, the British recognises your Highness as Ameer
of Cabul. I am further empowered, on the part of the Viceroy and
Governor-General of India, to inform your Highness that the British
Government has no desire to interfere in the internal Government of
the territories in possession of Your Highness, and has no wish that
an English Resident should be stationed anywhere within those terri-
tories. For the convenience of ordinary friendly intercourse, such as is
maintained between two adjoining states, it may be advisable that a
Mahomedan Agent of the British Government should reside, by agree-
ment, at Cabul. Your Highness has requested that the views and inten-
tions of the British Government, with regard to the position of the
ruler of Cabul, in relation to foreign powers, should be placed on
record for your Highness’s information. The Viceroy and Governor-
General in Council authorizes me to declare to you that since the
British Government admits no right of interference by Foreign Powers
within Afghanistan, and since both Russia and Persia are pledged to
abstain from all interference with the affairs of Afghanistan, it is plain
that Your Highness can have no political relations with any Foreign
Power except with the British Government. If any foreign power should
attempt to interfere in Afghanistan, and if such interference should
lead to unprovoked aggression on the domains of Your Highness, in
that event the British Government would be prepared to aid you to
such an extent and in such manner as may appear to the British
Government necessary, in repelling it, provided that Your Highness
follows unreservedly the advice of the British Government in regard
to your external relations.33
It is rather curious that this letter, which is a masterpiece of impe-
rial logic, had the signature only of Sir Alfred Lyall, Foreign Secretary
to the government of India. Apparently, it was, as Griffin states,
“merely a memorandum of an obligation granted by the British Gov-
ernment.”34 Yet it was this memorandum that constituted the basis
of relations between the two governments for a generation to come.
No treaty or agreement to regulate relations between Afghanistan
and Britain during the reign of the amir was signed, even though
at Zimma the amir pressured Lepel Griffin for the conclusion of a
treaty. Mahmud Tarzi’s statement that at Zimma “. . . the amir of
Afghanistan and the British would sign a treaty of friendship”35 is
simply not true. Although the letter was not actually a treaty, as
time passed, it was invested with the significance of a treaty. If at
33
Wheeler, The Ameer Abdur Rahman, 87–88.
34
Quoted in Wheeler, Ibid., 125.
35
Tarzi, Mahmud, Reminiscences, 20.
first, it was no more than a conditional promise to help the amir in

defending the territories then in his possession, it subsequently was
regarded as applicable to the whole of Afghanistan.36
However, according to the letter only the British government was
to judge whether or not an aggression against Afghanistan had
occurred. This showed its unwillingness to enter into treaty obliga-
tions with the amir. At the time, the British government believed
the amir’s position to be insecure. It also claimed that the treaties
that the British governments had concluded with Afghan rulers in
the past had proved impermanent.37 Contrary to this claim, Amir
Dost Mohammad Khan had stood firm by his treaties with the
British, and it appears that the reference is probably to the Gandumak
treaty, which was clearly an imposition on Afghanistan and grossly
unjust and, therefore, abrogated by the Afghans. For his part, Amir
'Abd al-Rahman Khan treated the letter the way it had been handed
over to him: he went along with it when it suited him, and ignored
it when it did not.
As early as December 1880, the amir desired to meet the viceroy,
probably to obtain assistance against his rival, Sardar Mohammad
Ayyub Khan, who held Herat, and who, it was feared, might occupy
Kandahar when the British government evacuated it in the spring
of the following year as the British government of India had declared
that it would. India was actually doubtful about the amir’s ability to
overcome his rival. Having recently withdrawn its forces from
Afghanistan it was unwilling to embroil itself in the imminent Afghan
civil war. In fact, the government of India was cautious to the point
of even not publicly taking the side of the amir. The viceroy, Lord
Ripen, wrote
. . . there is great doubt whether it is judicious to agree to such a meet-
ing, which would be universally construed as a public manifestation
of our resolution to adopt his [amir’s] cause and support his interest.38
However, since India wanted to strengthen Afghanistan under the
amir, it granted him weapons and cash, but made it clear that he
should meet his rival without direct British involvement.
36
37
For the unwillingness of the British to conclude a treaty with the amir see ver-
batim records of the Zimma meeting in Kakar, Afghanistan, 1971, 256–281. The
original source of these records is PSLI, 26 pt. 5, 863–875.
38
Ripon to Hartington, 19 Jan. 81, PSLI, 27, 365.
170 chapter ten
Meanwhile, Lord Ripon saw that the time was ripe for the two
governments to station agents in each other’s capitals in line with
the understanding that had been reached between the amir and
Lepel Griffin, in 1880. The amir was asked to send a delegate, but
instead he sent an agent, with the instruction that he was only to
listen and report what he had been communicated, because “. . . no
other [person] than the amir can settle the difficulties of Afghanistan.”
The British Muslim agents who were stationed in Kabul from 1882
onward also suffered from similar restrictions. Up to that time, (1882)
Qazi 'Abd al-Qadir, under the name of AB, Kabul Correspondent,
reported from Kabul to Calcutta.
After the expulsion of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, what
troubled the amir was Russia’s advance toward northwestern Afghanis-
tan. As early as October 1881, he told the viceroy, Lord Ripon, that
the time had come for Britain to fix the undefined boundaries of
Afghanistan with the Russian protectorate.39 However, Britain did
not share his alarm. The amir still continued to concentrate on his
concern, stating that the danger from Russia would be on the border
of Herat,40 a region that was considered to be the “key to India”
(See Chapter Eleven). The amir intended to “. . . put Afghanistan in
proper order as a barrier to the Russian advance”,41 but his over-
tures for grants produced no favorable response for two years. Coupled
with his earlier disappointment over his attempts to have a treaty,
he expressed his dissatisfaction. To Lord Ripon he wrote, if the
British
. . . do not wish to set the affairs of this country to right, I should like
to know whether it is on account of expenditure that they shrink from
it, or because I do not flatter them; but I can not flatter as the Rajas
of India . . . do.42
Earlier, Colonel Mohammad Afzal, the British Agent in Kabul, had
stated that should the amir became disappointed with the British,
he would come to terms with the Russians.43
39
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to Ripon, 18 Oct. 81, PSLI, 35, 364.
40
The Amir quoted by AB, Kabul Correspondent, 9 Feb. 82, PSLI, 31, 739.
41
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to Zain Khan, AB, Kabul Correspondent, 9 Feb. 82,
PSLI, 31, 735.
42
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to Ripon, I June 83, PSLI, 37, 135.
43
Col. Afzal ( Jalalabad), 24 Jan. 83, PSLI, 35, 66.
In July 1883, the viceroy, Lord Ripon, fixed the amir an annual
grant of 1,200,000 rupees, stating that
The internal disorders of Afghanistan were so largely due to our inva-
sion of that country that we felt it to be our duty to aid him [the
amir] in the establishment of a regular government.44
The British government of India also granted weapons to Kabul in
critical times. By the “establishment of a regular government” Ripon
meant the organization of a strong army, because the internal resources
of Afghanistan for that purpose were insufficient. The grant indi-
cated the significance which the British attached to Afghanistan.
However, it was bound to injure the amir’s public image, as it made
him look like a British vassal. As a countermeasure, the amir announced
that
. . . this grant of theirs is not a favor or an obligation, but the secu-
rity and safety of India is in view. The English do not give a single
cowry to any without motive. In the second place, I am the shield of
their country, and on account of me, they are secure from the Russian
attack. If my government remains stable, I go on in this way, taking
rifles and money from the English; and having made my foundation
firm, I shall be able to fight the Russians and the English.45
In his private darbars [courts] the amir used to say that the grants
he received were a poll tax ( jazya).46 The statement was not entirely
rhetoric. Although the amir could not fight the British or the Russians,
he did not allow them to influence him in running the country. This
was clear, among other things, from his negative responses to the
British requests. But in this he went so far as to block the intro-
duction of modern technology by rejecting the proposal of the viceroy
that the British be allowed to construct a telegraph line connecting
Kabul with Peshawar47 or a railway line linking Kandahar with
Herat.48 He even discontinued the work of a British specialist in a
copper mine in a location near Kabul. He did all of this to deprive
the British of a chance to meddle in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.
This meant that the amir preferred isolationism and medieval auto-
cracy to renewal and modernization.
44
Ripon to secretary of state for India, 13 July 83, PSLI, 37, 121.
45
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman in darbar, KD, 5 Apr. 87, PSLI, 50, 268.
46
KD, 214–16 Feb. 94, PSLI, 73, 1029.
47
The Amir’s Visit to India, 1885, PSLI, 44, Encl. No. 3, 7.
48
Ibid., 15.
172 chapter ten
The amir’s responses were even more definite to the British requests
that affected his rule directly. All along, he opposed the stationing
of British personnel in Afghanistan, or even accepting their ad hoc
commissions, arguing that his people were against them. He also did
not allow the British agents in Kabul to maintain a separate postal
service, stating that he could not permit them to assume a position
of equality with him or to interfere with his internal administration.49
Additionally, the agents had even been restricted in their movements.
In the same vein, the amir refused to accept the recommendation
of the Government of India to leave the Pacha of Konarr undis-
turbed in his domain. Lepel Griffin even noted that the recom-
mendation annoyed the amir.50 The amir likewise rejected Lord
Curzon’s proposal to depute an Indian physician to Herat,51 argu-
ing that his presence might have grave consequences.52 All he asked
for and obtained were weapons and cash with no strings attached
to. To him the restriction, which had been placed on his external
relations, was enough.
In 1885, in India, when the viceroy, Lord Dufferin, jokingly asked
the amir to accept his advice, the latter responded by saying that,
I do not act in regard to foreign affairs without your advice, but in
the internal affairs of my country, I have nothing to do with your
advice. My people will not approve of your advice.53
As the viceroy pointed out, it was probably a unique case in history
that a small state applied for assistance to a neighboring power with-
out at the same time allowing the active aid and supervision of its
officials.54
After 1883, as a result of the establishment of the grant; the hon-
orable reception in India in 1885 of the amir as a state guest; and
the Russian occupation of Panjdeh in the same year, Anglo-Afghan
relations improved. The improvement was reflected in a speech, that
the amir gave at a banquet in Rawalpindi in which he said that he
was,
49
The Amir’s Visit to India, 1885, PSLI, No. 12.
50
Griffin to government of India, 4 Mar. 82, PSLI, 33, 514.
51
Curzon to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, 23 Feb. 1901, PSLI, 134, No. 831.
52
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to Curzon, 7 Mar. 1901, PSLI, 134, No. 831. Mohammad
Nabi, Sawal wa Jawab-e-Dawlati (The Amir’s Interview with the Viceroy), Kabul,
1302 A.Q., 1885, PSLI, 47, 611 (5).
53
Ibid.
54
The amir’s Visit to India, 1885, PSLI, 44, Encl. No. 13.
. . . ready with my army and my people to render any service, which

may be required of me or of the Afghan nation. As the British
Government have declared that it will assist me in repelling any for-
eign enemy, so it is right and proper that Afghanistan should unite in
the firmest manner and stand side by side with the British Government.55
To reciprocate the British commitment to Afghanistan, the amir
added “. . . should disturbances arise in your empire of India . . . the
people of Afghanistan can . . . give you friendly help by protecting
the frontiers of India.”56 However, this honeymoon period did not
last long.
In the late 1880s, certain events stained Anglo-Afghan relations.
The Government of India did not invite Kabul to participate in the
Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission which was set up to delimit
Afghanistan’s north-western boundary, even though the issue was
bound to affect the country’s integrity. This angered the amir, and
in retaliation he did not allow the British commission to travel to
the areas through Afghanistan. The commission, under Colonel
Ridgeway, then had to travel through a barren and inhospitable
route along the Persian-Afghan border, mainly in Seistan. For this
and his diatribes the viceroy accused the amir of using “unfriendly
language and unfriendly acts.”57
Later, in 1889, the amir resented what he considered interference
in his administration by the viceroy, Lord Lansdowne, who had sent
a letter asserting that his punishment of the people of Turkestan,
following the suppression of the revolt of Sardar Mohammad Ishaq
Khan, was “abhorrent to civilization.”58 As the viceroy, Lord Elgin,
later stated the amir had resented Lansdowne’s interference in his
internal affairs very much, and he had never forgiven him for send-
ing him that letter. Consequently, this personal resentment had
affected political relations disadvantageously.59 The amir also resented
the presence of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, with over eight
hundred of his followers in India, believing that that through him
the Government of India intended to pressure him.60 However, what
actually restrained Anglo-Afghan relations was the British “Forward
55
Ibid., 9.
56
Mohammad Nabi, Sawal wa Jawab, 11.
57
58
Lansdowne to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, 27 Feb. 89, PSLI, 56, 721.
59
60
PD, 8 Jan. 92, PSLI, 65, 171.
174 chapter ten
Policy of the nineties”, the beginning of which had already been

manifested in the opening of the Gomal Pass, and in the extension
of the railway to Chaman. This policy will be described shortly.
The amir responded to these developments. Believing that the
viceroy was not a sovereign ruler like himself, and that he could not
get satisfaction in India, the amir tried to establish diplomatic rela-
tions with Britain, independent of India.61 With a view to being
invited to England,62 he addressed a letter to the secretary of state
for India, Lord Salisbury, which contained expressions of friendship
with the British and complaints about the Government of India, and
proposed to submit his grievances to parliament.63
Since it was not the policy of the British government to establish
relations with Burma and Afghanistan64 the Government of India
refused the amir permission in polite language, before the disputed
points between India and Afghanistan had been settled. Instead they
asked him to accept their invitation to come to India. In 1895, after
the disputed points had been settled the British government invited
the amir to visit England. However, then the amir only exploited the
invitation to his advantage at home.
In an effort to demonstrate his popularity with the people, and
to make the propaganda of the Afghan refugees in India ineffective
against him65 the amir made public his intended visit to England,
hoping “. . . to introduce new schemes and reforms in the State, and
to lay down satisfactorily the boundaries of Afghanistan.”66 However,
he said that he would do so only when the Afghans, including the
military, gave him guarantees that in his absence they would main-
tain peace in the country.67 Although various groups of Afghans gave
him such guarantees in writing, soon he announced that tribal “elders”
had advised him against making the trip.68 In 1895, the amir sent
his second son, Sardar Nasr Allah Khan, after providing him with
a detailed guideline as to how he should behave with European dig-
61
MM, Nov. 91, PSLI, 64, 1404.
62
Ibid.
63
64
Ibid., 136.
65
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman in private darbar, KD, 19–22 Sept. 91, PSLI, 64, 237.
66
Parwana Khan, Kabul kotwal and nai"b salar addressing the army, KD, 9–11
Sept. 91, PSLI, 64, 186.
67
Khan-e-mulla (in a public mosque), PD, 8 Oct. 91, PSLI, 64, 755, 756.
68
nitaries. Meanwhile, the Government of India thwarted the amir’s

efforts to station his representative in London.69
The amir’s failure to establish relations with the British govern-
ment was followed by his efforts to make Afghanistan independent
by other means. To dishonor his pledge with the British, who had
helped him to the throne and had afterward strengthened him with
money and weapons, was out of the question. This was particularly
so, when the viceroy, Lord Dufferin, had assured him that the British
government wanted
. . . to maintain a powerful, independent and united Afghanistan under
a ruler capable of enforcing peace and order within his own territo-
ries, of conciliating the good-will and confidence of his people, and of
showing a formidable front to an invading foe.70
Nevertheless, mutual trust was often lacking, and the type of rela-
tionship that developed between the amir and the British govern-
ment was only the result of mutual necessity.
The amir fully realized that the British could make trouble for
him, and even unseat him, as they had unseated Amir Sher 'Ali
Khan and Amir Mohammad Ya"qub Khan.71 Even without under-
taking military action, themselves, the British could do so through
the former Amir Mohammad Ya"qub Khan, Sardar Mohammad
Ayyub Khan, and hundreds of other Mohammadzay sardars and
Ghilzay elders most of whom lived on British pensions in India and
had followers in Afghanistan. Additionally, just around the corner
was the standing menace of a Russian invasion. All of these points
restrained the amir from forcing any issue at any time with the
British government, and they even prompted him to cooperate. As
the viceroy, Lord Curzon, noted on the broader issues of foreign
relations the amir always acted within the framework of the British
imperial policy.
Nevertheless, toward the end of his reign, when he had consolidated
his position, the amir acted as an independent ruler. For the sake
of appeasing the Afghans72 and “[f ]irmly impressed with belief in
the divine right of Kings and with determination to make Afghanis-
tan a powerful and independent State unhampered by interference
69
70
Marquis of Dufferin to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, 20 July 87, PSLI, 50, 1420.
71
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to Col. Afzal, KD, 20 Jan. 82, PSLI, 23, 720.
72
Curzon, Tale of Travels, London, 1923, 54.
176 chapter ten
of either England or Russia”73 the amir strove for an independent

international position by dealing with other powers directly. He was
reported to have said that he could not consent to be bound up
with the British government alone, and that he would treat Russia
and Germany and all other powers with the same respects as he
showed to Britain.74 Assuring the Afghans that he had not adopted
a servile attitude toward foreign powers,75 the amir maintained cor-
respondence with the Czar of Russia,76 and the Ottoman Sultan.77
Even in a letter to the viceroy, he styled himself as “Independent
King of the domains of Afghanistan.”78
Further, the amir intensified the movement of jihad by which he
incited the public against the “infidels”, who were understood to be
the Russians and the British. In one of the many booklets that was
issued on the subject, it was stated that it was incumbent on the
people of Afghanistan to be ready for sacrifice, because the “infidels”
wanted to invade their country for the third time,79 a reference to
the British, who had invaded Afghanistan twice in the past. In par-
ticular, he warned his subjects that now their wives, their faith, and
their land were in danger because of the closeness of the “infidels.”
In the middle of the 1890s, when the Russians reached the Pamirs
and the British occupied Chitral with troops, which the latter dis-
patched there through the hitherto unpenetrated lands of Dir and
Swat, the amir was alarmed.
Thereafter, the amir became more vocal in his anti-infidel pro-
paganda. Believing that the Anglo-Russian enmity was only a screen
for these powers to cover up their design on Afghanistan80 he declared
that they were allies to each other and the enemies of Afghanistan.81
In his view, their design was to divide Afghanistan between them-
73
Griffin, L., “The Late Amir and His Successor”, Fortnightly Review, 1901, 752.
74
MM, Aug. 99, PSLI, 115, No. 888, 4.
75
Kand D., 8 Sept. 93, PSLI, 72, 1025.
76
KD, 12 Jan. 95, PSLI, 80, No. 22.
77
MM, Jan. 99, PSLI, 111, Regst. No. 237.
78
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to viceroy, 25 Aug. 96, PSLI, 88, F.L.. No. 178, 96.
79
Anonymous, Kalimat-e-Amir al-Bilad fee Targhib illal Jehad (The Words of the Amir
of the Land for the Encouragement of the Jihad), (a pamphlet in Dari), Kabul, 1304 A.Q.,
8–9.
80
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to elders in darbar, Malakand Agency Diary (MD), 23
Apr. 1901, PSLI, 133, No. 619.
81
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman’s firman to the people of Ningrahar etc., PD, 9 Dec.
95, PSLI, 83, No. 23.
selves at an opportune moment,82 with the Russians taking Herat

and Balkh, and the British occupying Kabul, Kandahar and Jalalabad.83
Meanwhile, he repeatedly stressed that any power that may try to
set foot on the Afghan soil was to be regarded as the enemy of the
King of Islam. However, in the amir’s view, friendship with the
British was advantageous.84 While, the alarmist pronouncements were
not meant to disturb Anglo-Afghan relations drastically, they made
the public more inward- looking and xenophobic.
The Government of India watched the developments, but showed
no concern. It only thwarted the amir’s efforts to deal with Persia
directly by pressing that power to refrain from dealing with the
Afghan agent at Mashhad on matters other than commercial ones.85
After the amir died it showed concern, and made overtures to his
successor over the nature of its relationship with Afghanistan.86
The Durand Agreement
The amir’s advance in eastern Afghanistan, as described in Chapter

Four, coincided with the British Forward Policy of the 1890s. The
main point of this policy was the so-called ‘Scientific Frontier’, which
called for the speedy occupation of the Kabul-Ghazni-Kandahar line
in the event of Russia’s advance toward India, or in the case of
domestic troubles inside Afghanistan following the amir’s death.87
The implementation of the Forward Policy required the extension
of control over the main passes leading to the ‘Scientific Frontier’,
and the devising of a means of political control over the tribes in
whose territories these passes lay.88 All of this made it necessary for
India to fix its frontier with Afghanistan. For this purpose, the British
82
Dir, Swat, Chitral Agency Diary (DSCD), 21 Aug. 1900, PSLI, 126, No. 1026.
83
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman’s firman to the people of Ningrahar etc., PD, 9 Dec.
95, PSLI, 83, No. 23.
84
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman’s firman to the people of Kabul, PD, 8 May 1900,
PSLI, 123, No. 604. In Sultan Mahomed’s, The Life of Abdur Rahman (2,260), there
is undue stress on the amir’s hostile attitude toward Russia and friendly attitude
toward Britain.
85
MM, Oct. 98, PSLI, 109, Regist. No. 1088, 1.
86
For details see Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 166–173.
87
Harris, L., British Policy on the North-West Frontier of India, 1889–1901,
Ph.D., Thesis, London, 1960, 2, 46.
88
Ibid., 2, 41.
178 chapter ten
Government of India exchanged many letters with the amir at the

same time that it pressured him heavily by various other means.
Among the measures taken were the ban of the transport of iron
which Afghanistan needed for making guns for the war in the
Hazarajat, and the detention of “a large consignment of munitions,
ordered from Europe by the Amir.”89 Viceroy Lansdowne even pro-
posed to the amir to receive Lord Roberts on a mission in Kabul
with a powerful military escort, a proposal to which the amir reacted
thus: “I considered the position very critical, to receive 10,000 sol-
diers, whom I was expected to receive as my guests. I had, there-
fore, to prepare 100,000 to receive them.”90 Finally, the viceroy
directly warned the amir “. . . that it will be necessary to decide what
territory does and what does not form part of the kingdom of
Afghanistan.”91 The Government of India had already proposed that,
a certain line be determined and announced, beyond which the author-
ity of the amir did not extend, and that any Afghan troops found
beyond this line be forcibly pushed back. The line was to be marked
so as to exclude Asmar, Chageh and Wana from Afghanistan.92
The amir still could not be moved, and continued the delaying tac-
tics skillfully that he had adopted since 1888, when he had been
asked for the first time to receive a British mission in Kabul. He
accepted only after Russia embarked on its own forward march of
the 1890s, toward the Pamirs and northeastern Afghanistan. At the
same time Russia urged Britain to fulfil the so-called agreement of
1873, with regard to some territories across the Oxus held by the
amir’s troops, as described in Chapter Seven. Apprehensive about
Russia’s pressure the amir, at the request of the viceroy,93 received
a small civil British mission in Kabul, led by Sir Henry Mortimer
Durand, foreign secretary to the Government of India. On November
12, 1893 the amir and Durand signed two agreements, one con-
cerning northeastern Afghanistan, and the other concerning the south-
eastern region. The latter agreement, concerning the southeast, came
89
Sykes, Sir Percy, A History of Afghanistan, 1940, 2, 173. Singhal, India and
Afghanistan, 142.
90
Sykes, A History of Afghanistan, 2, 172.
91
Lansdowne to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, 23 July 92, ARAMFA, 5.
92
93
to be known as the Durand Agreement or the Kabul Convention

of 1893.
The Forward Policy was, of course, not ‘scientific’, but ‘forward’,
a term that implies expansion and domination. The new ‘Scientific
Frontier’ policy was, in fact, a modification of the one which had
led to the war with Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, about which Trousdale
had stated,
For most of the Forward Policy believers, the Scientific Frontier was
but a temporary screen for their real aim. If the government would
support annexation of the southern half of Afghanistan, it would in
time tolerate annexation of the whole.94
This was why the reasons for devising the new Forward Policy-
Russia’s southward advance or the amir’s death—were unconvincing.
As will be seen later in this chapter and in Chapter Eleven, Russia
had, in 1873, declared Afghanistan to be beyond its sphere of influ-
ence. After Russia’s occupation of Panjdeh in 1885, particularly fol-
lowing the demarcation of Afghanistan’s entire boundary with its
colonies, and the boundary adjustment between Afghanistan and
Russian-controlled Bukhara in 1892, the issues of the ‘Great Game’,
the rivalry between Britain and Russia for the domination of Central
Asia—had been settled, and an atmosphere of rapprochement between
the two powers had been created. While it is true that, despite this,
trust was lacking, in reality a Russian military invasion of India
through Afghanistan—an organized state with a strong army and
a xenophobic people—would have been extremely difficult, if not
impossible.
As its text states, the Durand agreement was for the purpose of
“. . . fixing the limit of their [Afghanistan and the British Government
of India’s] respective spheres of influence”, marked by a line drawn
from Wakhan to the Persian border, covering about 1,500 miles
drawn on a map produced by the British. As Zalmay Gulzad states,
Nowhere in the Agreement is the word boundary used to define the
Durand Line. Rather, it was a line that functioned to illustrate where
the Amir’s influence ceased and limitations of the British sphere.95
Sir Olaf Caroe is even more explicit, stating that “. . . the agreement
did not describe the line as the boundary of India, but as the frontier
94
95
Gulzad, Afghan State, 182.
180 chapter ten
of the amir’s domain and the line beyond which neither side would
exercise interference.”96
The concept is even plainer in the text of the agreement itself,
which states that “The Government of India will at no time exer-
cise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side
of Afghanistan”, while the amir agreed that “. . . he will at no time
exercise interference in Swat, Bajaur, or Chitral including the Arnawai
or Bashgal valley.” However, the amir relinquished his claim to the
main part of the Wazir country, and the small pieces of lands of
Dawar and Chagheh, whereas the Government of India agreed to
leave the Birmal tract of the Wazir country to Afghanistan. In addi-
tion, both sides made adjustments on a number of smaller points.
The British Government of India added a sum of 600,000 rupees a
year to the amir’s grant.
Despite the importance of the issue, Afghan records on the agree-
ment, which has ever since constituted the basis for Afghan irre-
dentism and friction with the country’s eastern neighbors, have been
lost. Although it is known that a secretary, who was concealed, had
been assigned to note the negotiations, this information is not avail-
able. Even the pamphlet, which contained the transcript of the talks
held between the amir and Durand that was made public at the
time, cannot be traced.97 The official Afghan chronicle, Siraj al-
Tawarikh, has noted only the proceedings of the council of some
elders and courtiers stationed in Kabul which was convened after
the agreement was concluded.
Addressing the council about the outcome of the agreement and
about external pressure, the amir said that at the time every nation
sought alliance with friends against enemies and that under his lead-
ership the Afghans were lucky to find a worthy friend. He also argued
that there was no alternative but to rely on the British government,
which, he said, had no motive but to strengthen Afghanistan with
weapons and money. About the actual agreement he said little, and
that little too was vague. Only about the Wazirs [actually the main
part of the Wazirs] he was specific, saying that he gave them up
because they did not listen to him. The elders and courtiers raised
no objections, and only said that they would accept whatever agree-
ment their rightful king would conclude with foreign powers. They
96
Quoted in Gulzad, The Afghan State, 182.
97
Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 950. Sykes, Sir Mortimer Durand, 211.
likewise assured the amir that as they had inherited service and obe-
dience during the past eighty [sic] years of the Mohammadzay rule,
they were willing to sacrifice their lives for him.98
The Durand Agreement was the work of the amir alone. In con-
cluding it, he did not consult the elders or even his own courtiers
or advisers. Durand is specific about this. In a talk to the Central
Asian society in London, on 6 November 1907, he said: “He con-
ducted the negotiations entirely himself, his ministers being mere
ciphers, without the smallest power or responsibility. He knew his
mind, and wanted no help from anyone.” Remarkably, this occurred
at a time when the amir was suffering much from gout, as attested
by Durand, who states, “. . . he walked with difficulty, leaning on a
stick.” As the above statement indicates, the amir only told his
courtiers about the circumstances and the external pressure that led
to its conclusion.
It is important to note that the agreement was between a ruler
and an official of a foreign state, and was not a treaty. If it had
been a treaty the state bodies of both parties on behalf of their peo-
ples should have endorsed it. A matter of such supreme importance
required the consensus of at least the elders of Afghanistan. While
it is true that the amir summoned Afghan elders and courtiers, they
were relatively few and of his own choosing, and lived in Kabul.
He did so only to tell them what had happened, but did not seek
their consensus about it. That was why what they uttered on the
occasion was irrelevant and even the irrelevance was unreal. For fear
of the amir known as the ‘iron amir’, they could not oppose the
agreement without risking their lives. More importantly, the Afghan
elders and courtiers acted as those who had “inherited service and
obedience during the . . . Mohammadzay rule” not as representatives
of the people. Consequently, instead of evaluating the agreement and
its relationship to the country and the people, they only expressed
their willingness to sacrifice their lives for the amir.
In reality, not only did the elders and courtiers fear, the ‘iron
amir’ himself feared. He feared the Russians, the British Government
and, in a way, also his own people. Russia and the British Government
of India had both pressured him. As previously noted, the British
viceroy had kept him under pressure from 1888 onward for the con-
clusion of an agreement, while Russia, in its expansionist drive in
98
Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 946–950.
182 chapter ten
the Greater Pamir area in the 1890s, had annihilated Afghan posts
there, and posed a danger to Afghanistan itself. Even while Durand
was in Kabul a “small Russian force under the son of the War
Minister, Vannovsky, entered Roshan and was refused permission to
advance. Shots were exchanged.”99
It was because of this danger that the amir succumbed to the
British demand and concluded the Durand Agreement. Thus, the
conditions under which the agreement was concluded were more
fearsome than those under which capitulatory treaties were concluded
in the nineteenth century between the stronger European and weaker
Asian powers. Additionally, even though he was known as the ‘iron
amir’ Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan feared his own people because
he had relinquished sovereignty over a vast region that had been
part of their homeland; he had no right to do so even though he
was their ruler. It was because of this fear that he kept them in the
dark about the purpose of the mission as attested by Durand, who
states that “. . . the true objects of the mission which until then [the
convening of the council] had been kept secret” was finally disclosed
by the amir. Evidently, the amir’s fear was the real factor that made
the agreement possible in the first place.
The Afghan historian, Mir Ghulam Mohammad Ghobar, has cor-
rectly concluded that the amir “. . . signed the treaty blindfolded
solely under the shadow of British threat and deception, and accepted
a great historical responsibility forever.”100 This “great historical
responsibility” becomes clear when it is born in mind that the amir
made no attempt to either limit its duration or let the British to fix
the frontier themselves without he himself becoming a party to it.
Further, Durand deceived the amir; his pledge of “no interference”
inserted in the text of the agreement, was contrary to the require-
ment of the so-called Scientific Frontier. More seriously, Durand mis-
led the amir by presenting him with an inaccurately drawn map, or
else the amir misunderstood it. Consequently, the amir did not sign
the map, because he “. . . did not really understand all the implica-
tions of the line drawn on the map”, and “. . . refused to agree to
some of the details shown on the map.”101
99
Alder, British India’s Northern Frontier, 276. Sykes, Sir Mortimer Durand, 212.
100
101
Rastogi, R. S., Indo-Afghan Relations, 1880–1900, Lucknow, 1965, 180.
More importantly, the amir did not sign the Persian text of the
agreement, even though Durand had done so.102 This point raises a
question of fundamental significance. When the amir refused to sign
the Persian text it is safe to assume that he had not signed the
English text for the obvious reason that he did not understand English.
Consequently, it can be assumed that Durand had read the amir
the Persian translation of the English-language text, which he was
able to understand well. If the amir did not sign either version of
the text then the validity of the agreement becomes doubtful.
The validity of the agreement is also in question due to the fact
that the amir did not agree to a number of major points later at
the time of the demarcation of the line, known as the Durand Line.
One point concerned the Bashgul valley. The amir only wrote on
the map (without signing it) that the Bashgul valley was a part of
Afghanistan, whereas in the English text it was stated to be within
the British sphere of influence. When the line was demarcated, in
1896, the amir insisted on the point so firmly that the viceroy, Lord
Elgin, gave way, admitting that “. . . it was an unfortunate error.”103
Another point refers to the Mohmand country which the amir, at
the time of the demarcation, insisted that the whole of the Mohmand
belonged to Afghanistan. This very important point will be discussed
shortly.
Now, the pertinent question is to ask where is the text, which the
amir had signed, whereas he had the habit of putting his signature
on all kinds of documents after he had approved of them? In the
archival centers in Kabul, New Delhi and London where I have car-
ried on research I have not come across the text of the agreement
signed by him. In all probability there had been no text of the agree-
ment signed jointly by the Amir and Durand. Azmat Hayat Khan’s
assertion in his study, The Durand Line (2000), that the amir had
put his signature “on the [t]reaty” is simply not true.104 Additionally,
it was not a treaty’ but an agreement, as previously noted. It was
due to all of these points that the demarcation of the line by three
Anglo-Afghan commissions took much longer than anticipated, and
that the entire Mohmand country and the Khyber area were left
undemarcated.
102
The Incoming State Documents, vol. 7, 109, ARAMFA.
103
Elgin to Hamilton, 22 Apr. 96, PSLI, F.L., No. 77, (1896), 85.
104
Khan, Azmat Hayat, The Durand Line, Its Geo-Strategic Importance, University of
Peshawar, 2000, 150.
184 chapter ten
The amir, as noted, insisted that the entire Mohmand country

was a part of Afghanistan,105 whereas on the map it was not. However,
the Lower Mohmand, as described in Chapter Four, stretched as far
as and included Peshawar. Peshawar was, since 1849, under the
British control, which they had taken from the Sikhs, who had pre-
viously usurped it from the Mohammadzay rulers, in 1833. Even
the Lower Mohmands still recognized the Khan of Lalpura of the
Upper Mohmands, as their khan, receiving the customary allowances
from him as well as from the Kabul government.
Perhaps no other tribe ever caused as much trouble for the British
as the Mohmands did, after the British occupation of Peshawar. After
the Durand Agreement was signed, the British authorities proposed
the partition of the Mohmand country between Afghanistan and
India, and asked the amir to withdraw his levies from Mittai. However,
the amir refused to cooperate either in dividing the tribe or in erect-
ing the pillars. As a result of pressure from the British he ordered
the withdrawal of the levies but without officially declaring it. The
problem persisted, and finally the viceroy, in face of opposition even
from his own council, backed away from giving the green light for
the erection of the pillars unilaterally as a line of division of the
Mohmands.106 Thus, as the author Sir Percy Sykes states “the bound-
ary through the Mohmand country to the Khyber Pass was never
demarcated, and remains to this day [1926] a cause of trouble on
a small scale.”107
However, the British extended their influence over the Mohmands
of the plains by delivering the traditional allowances to their clans
and elders that were paid to them by Kabul and the khan of Lalpura.
They also granted allowances to some clans, who had not been paid
before. All of these clans known subsequently as the ‘assured clans’
received the allowances in return for their acceptance of the British
“political control”;108 but “political control” did not mean adminis-
trative control. This distinction applied not only to the Mohmands,
but to all tribes of the region, as Durand “did not propose to move
forward the administrative border of India, and merely wished for
105
106
107
Sykes, Sir Mortimer Durand, 220.
108
Merk, The Mohmands, 33–42.
political control”109 to meet the requirements of the so-called Scientific

Frontier.
Almost all of the Mohmand clans, both with and without allowances,
including the “assured clans” (except for their Tarakzay clan), took
park in the great uprising of 1897, to be described soon. Apparently
to assert his rule over all of the Mohmands, the amir ordered the
construction of a road in their country to extend up to Peshawer.
He also intended to make the new road a counterpoise to the Khyber
Pass, which was under the control of the British as a result of the
Gandumak treaty of 1879. The construction of the road had started
in earnest, but was abandoned after the amir died, in 1901.
As noted earlier, the amir agreed not “to exercise interference”
in the territories within the British sphere of influence. However, this
does not mean that he had renounced his claim, on behalf of
Afghanistan, over the territories as Durand110 and Sultan Mahomed111
have claimed. These assertions which have universally been accepted
as reliable original sources are indeed invalid. Sultan Mahomed’s
book, The Life of Abdur Rahman Khan, is unreliable on external issues,
as Lord Kitchener, in a memorandum to Viceroy Lord Curzon, had
stated that “. . . all the latter part [of it] is made up in England.” I
have established this invalidity in detail in my book published in
1979.112 Strangely, this spurious part, unlike the genuine part, has
been widely quoted as the real words of the amir. As for Durand,
his private letters, which have been made public in the 1970s, and
which reflect the more actual state of affairs, contradict his official
stand on this point. In one of his letters, he has quoted the amir as
saying that if the British withdrew their objections to his staying at
Asmar he would refrain from interfering in Chitral and Bajaur.113
Durand is even more specific on the tribes that came within the
British sphere of influence. In an interview in 1897, he has stated
that
. . . the tribes on the Indian side are not to be considered as within
British territory. They are simply under our influence in the technical
109
Sykes, Sir Mortimer Durand, 219.
110
Durand to Cunningham, 3 Dec. 93, PSLI, 73, 14. For Durand’s complete
official report see, For Dept., Sec-F, Pros., Jan. 94, Nos. 193–217.
111
112
Kakar, (1979), 248. In this study, I have fully established the unreliability of
the second part of Sultan Mahomed’s The Life of Abdur Rahman.
113
Durand to Lansdowne, Kabul, 24 Oct. 93, Mss. Eur. D., 727, No. 5.
186 chapter ten
sense of the term, that is to say, so far as the amir is concerned and
so far as they submit to our influence, or we exert it.114
The viceroy, Lord Elgin, also stated that the Durand Line made the
amir accept only the status quo. In his own words,
The Durand Agreement was an agreement to define the respective
spheres of influence of the British government and of the amir. Its
object was to preserve and to obtain the amir’s acceptance of the sta-
tus quo.115
The author, Louis Dupree, has grasped the essence of the agreement
in stating that the object of the Durand Line was “. . . the extension
of the British authority and not of the Indian frontier.” Further, he
states “The Line was not described as the boundary of India, but
as the eastern and southern frontier of the amir’s domains, and the
limits of the respective spheres of the two governments.”116
By the word “interference” the amir as well as his successors meant
armed interference, and they did not consider influencing the tribes117
to be a breach of the contract.118 That was why they continually
influenced the tribesmen through many and varied non-military means
in spite of the agreement. Further, like his predecessors, Amir Abd
al-Rahman also looked on the tribesmen as the people of Afghanistan,
and the Indus as the natural and demographic boundary of the coun-
try.119 As described in Chapter Four, the people of the region were
overwhelmingly Pashtuns, and Afghanistan itself had originated from
this region.
By the amir’s compelled adherence to the status quo, the Durand
Line checked the extension of his actual control over his own kins-
men, depriving him “. . . of his natural sovereignty over the kindred
Pathans of Bajaur and Swat.”120 Hastily drawn on the map with a
lack of local knowledge, the Line was “. . . not based on any natural,
114
Durand quoted by Leitner, G. W., “The Amir, the Frontier Tribes and the
Sultan”, The Asiatic Quarterly Review, Series 3, 1897, 4, 237.
115
Elgin to Hamilton, 22 Apr 96, F.L., No. 77, (1896), PSLI, 85.
116
Dupree, L., Afghanistan, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1980, 767.
117
Rastogi, Indo-Afghan Relations, 180.
118
119
Mahomed, The Life of Abdur Rahman, 2, 158, 159.
120
Leitner, “Kafiristan and the Khalifa Question”, The Asiatic Quarterly Review,
1896, 1, 285.
topographical, ethnographical or political principle of delimitation.”121

In fact, it was impossible to draw a line taking into account all of
these delimitations, but to bifurcate major tribes, and even smaller
ethnic groups at villages and other places, with strong kinship ties.
Among these ethnic groups were the Tarkalanays, the Wazirs, (later
the Mohmands), the Shinwarays, the Nurzays, the Achakzays, the
Bareches, the Baluches and others. More seriously, the Durand Line
marked for eventual separation a significant portion of the Pashtuns
who constituted the backbone of Afghanistan, and who had defended
it against foreign invaders. No wonder that they, more than any
other non-European people whom the British had encountered, defied
and frustrated them. Clearly, the separation and the bifurcation of
its people weakened Afghanistan as a whole, and that by creating
the Durand Line the British Government of India actually “. . . trans-
formed Afghanistan into a landlocked country, making it politically
and economically more dependent on India.”122
The bifurcation of major tribes and individual ethnic groups also
opened a Pandora’s Box that continues to be a source of trouble in
Afghanistan and the region to the present day. There was no rea-
son other than the logic of imperialism to dissect a people of the
same stock, the same speech, the same system of beliefs, the same
mode of life and weltanschauung, who lived under the same geo-
graphical and economic conditions.
The presumed occasion—the Russian invasion of India through
Afghanistan—did not arise for which the Durand Line had to be
used for which it was apparently intended. Instead, it caused untold
hardship to the people of the area, and problems of all kinds for
governments on both sides, the most serious of which was deterio-
ration in the security situation. Despite the many military expeditions
that were undertaken the Line did not alter the situation substan-
tially on the ground from what it had been before it was drawn. In
1877, the viceroy, Lord Lytton had stated that
I believe that our North-Western Frontiers present at this moment a
spectacle unique in the world; at least I know of no other spot where,
121
Leitner, “The Amir, The Frontier Tribes and the Sultan”, The Asiatic Quarterly
Review, Series, 3, Vol. 4, 237.
122
Gulzad, The Afghan State, 182.
188 chapter ten
after twenty five years of peaceful occupation, a great civilized power

has obtained so little influence over its semi savage [!] neighbors . . . that
the country within a day’s ride of its most important garrison (Peshawar)
is absolutely terra incognita and that there is absolutely no security for
British life a mile or two beyond our border.123
Professor Akbar Ahmad, a native political anthropologist, familiar
with the affairs of these Pashtuns, has recently stated that “[t]he
pious hope of international harmony contained in the Durand
Agreement was rarely respected and the treaty constantly revoked
on both sides of the Durand Line.”124 The fact of the matter is that
for tribesmen, the Durand Line has never existed in reality, but only
on the map. It is impossible for governments on either side of the
Line to prevent the tribesmen from crossing its passes, of which there
are 141.
The agreement, however, left a profound mark on the people of
the region. The blocking of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan from extend-
ing control over these people, and the British inability to adminis-
ter them created a no-man’s land. By introducing the Durand Line,
the British caused the region to remain “. . . isolated, with its inhab-
itants more divided and economically undeveloped”,125 resulting in
the retention of a medieval way of life. Further, due to the Durand
Line tribal peoples perpetuated the destructive custom of revenge
(badal ), mainly because the Afghan authorities invoked it when cul-
prits fled to the British side.126
Since the Durand Line was a by-product of the Forward Policy,
Viceroy Lord Elgin disrupted it by adopting measures aimed at
extending control over the region in question, even though earlier
he had stated that the aim was to maintain the status quo. The
measures, in particular the demarcation of the Line which started
following the conclusion of the agreement and was completed (except
in the Mohmand country and the Khyber area) in 1896, resulted in
a great uprising in June 1897. Except for the Shi'i Turis all of the
tribes of this vast region, led by their elders as well as religious per-
123
124
Ahmad, Akbar, S., “Pakhtun Tribes in the Great Game, Waziristan Case”,
Afghanistan and The Frontier, eds. Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat, Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah
Kakakhel, Peshawar, [1993?], 200.
125
126
sonalities—(Mulla Najm al-Din, Mulla Faqir, the Mulla of Manakai,

the Palam Mulla and others) rose against the British.127 However, the
latter with an army of about seventy thousand men, including the
future Sir Winston Churchill, suppressed them in their biggest oper-
ation west of the Indus up to that date.128
The greatest impetus that prompted the tribes to action came from
the Durand Line. Its demarcation suggested visibly and forcefully to
them that they were no longer inhabitants of an independent coun-
try, but had been brought within the circumference of British influence
and control.129 That was why they rose against it en masse. Of course,
the amir encouraged them to rise. As their ruler, he could not remain
a spectator, but was obliged to support them in their uprising.
However, because of his fear of the British he did not support them
openly with regular troops; rather, he supported them with some
soldiers in plain clothes, tribal levies, and money. Mulla Najm al-
Din even announced that the amir had promised him that he would
proclaim jihad.130
The amir as well as the Sipah Salar Ghulam Haydar Khan were
said to be behind the uprising because they had instigated the khans
of Bajaur and Swat.131 However, the amir soon backed away from
his token support, even going so far as to assure the British that, as
was requested of him, he would disarm any tribes that might flee
to Afghanistan, and would expel Mulla Najm al-Din to Arabia.132
This assurance followed the determined suppression of the uprising
and the spread of a rumor to the effect that the British intended to
invade Afghanistan proper also. It is probable that the amir’s full
backing of the uprising would have made a huge difference as the
commander-in-chief of the government of India stated: “Had he but
raised his little finger, he could have set the whole country ablaze
127
Kakar, (1971), 113. Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 159–162. For the leading
and interpretive role of the Hadda Mulla and Mulla Faqir in the uprising see
Edwards, David B., Heroes of the Age, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1996,
176–219. I am grateful to the author for giving me a copy of this excellent work.
128
129
Ibid., 278.
130
Mulla Najm al-Din to Main Gul of Swat, 2 Sept. 97, ARAMFA, 7.
131
Nawab Mohammad Khan to viceroy, 19 Feb. 1901, Sec F., 5–10, NAI. Riyazi,
'Ayn al-Waqayi ', 296.
132
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman’s autograph on a letter to him from Cunningham,
6 Sept. 97, ARAMFA, 7.
190 chapter ten
beyond the borderland already affected, but he held to his engage-

ments with a high sense of honor and remained faithful to the pledges
given to the British Raj.”133
The amir believed that he had saved Afghanistan, and his dynasty
from imminent danger, but actually consented to the fragmentation
of the country in the long run, and had alienated such a great por-
tion of the population, including those who had taken a leading part
in founding the country in the eighteenth century and who had
defended it against external aggressors ever since. Consequently, it
was natural for them to complain as they actually did when the
British overran their country. They complained that the amir did
not care, because, as they put it, he had sold them “. . . to the British
Government for money.” As an excuse in a carefully written procla-
mation that was intended for the British, the amir declared that
“. . . as you did not consult me when you raised this revolt, you are
not justified in throwing blame on me.” After reviewing Amir Sher
'Ali Khan’s policy toward the British, which ultimately led to the
downfall of his dynasty, Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan continued,”
Don’t be led to think that, like Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, I am such a
fool as to annoy and offend others for your sake.” However, he was
careful not to alienate them forever, stating, “If you now choose to
leave yourselves at my disposal and authority I shall try, please God,
to settle your affairs with the British government satisfactorily.”134
The uprising, the military operations and the consequent expen-
ditures made the British also cautious not to antagonize further either
the tribesmen or the amir. A senior British official made the fol-
lowing recommendation:
[I]nstruct our officials on the frontier not to push forward, and not
to give the amir any cause for suspicion. I would wait until the amir
dies before making any further endeavor to bring the tribes under our
control. I believe we lose nothing by the delay.135
133
Quoted in Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 162.
134
For details see, Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, Izah al-Bayan fee Nasihat al-Afghan
[A Word of Explanation for the Benefit of Afghans], (Dari), 13 Aug 97, Sir R.,
Udny to secretary to government of Panjab, 24 Sept. 97, PSLI, 96, No. 1043, No.
376.
135
In conclusion, to obviate an assumed threat to their Indian empire

the British deprived Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan and his successors
from their right to govern their kinsmen in the hope that they them-
selves could do so to ensure the requirements of the Forward Policy.
However, with the demarcation of the Durand Line they set in
motion a movement that ultimately led to the division of Afghanistan
and the bifurcation of the Pashtuns who had been the backbone of
the country, founding and safeguarding it. This provoked the tribes
to the extent that because of it they (the British) failed in their efforts
to ensure the requirement of the Forward policy, despite their inge-
nuity in colonial affairs, their skill in dealing with overseas nations,
and their military prowess as a superpower of the time.
Although the British still persisted in the implementation of the
Forward Policy, the people of the region persisted in their efforts to
retain their independence. To keep these ever-defiant people com-
pliant, the British frequently undertook military expeditions against
them, especially after the amir died, in 1901. In response, the local
people continually resisted, and even carried on raids on India itself.
For instance, from 1920 to 1938—that is, in the course of 18 years—
they carried on eighteen such raids from the Tribal Areas.136
An incidental corollary of these military expeditions and raids, as
well as that of the Anglo-Afghan wars, was the strengthening of reli-
gious and xenophobic feelings of the people and the incremental
increase in the influence of religious personalities. The raids were
called ghazas in emulation of the raids carried on in Arabia at time
of the Prophet Muhammad.137 Individual tribesmen likewise distin-
guished themselves in showing their opposition to the Durand Line
sometimes with such daring enterprises that they soon turned into
legends. A conspicuous example of such a legend is the story of
'Ajab Khan Afriday, who abducted Miss Elis, a British woman, from
her family, which was securely quartered in Peshawar, and treated
her as an honorable guest, even providing her with European food
that he stealthily procured from Peshawar. The story of these people’s
struggle is an odyssey of a fight for independence. All of this activ-
ity kept alive anti-British feeling and a state of permanent anarchy
136
Akbar, “Pakhtun Tribes in the Great Game”, 195.
137
Mohmand, Siyal, de Mohmando Ghazaganay, (Pashto), [ The Raids of the
Mohmands], University Book Agency, Peshawar, 1354/1975.
192 chapter ten
pregnant with local and international tensions, not only during a

time when the British ruled India until 1947, and also to the pre-
sent day. This colonial legacy is still a source of local and interna-
tional conflict, and will probably remain so until it is settled to the
satisfaction of all those affected by it.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA AND THE RUSSIAN

OCCUPATION OF PANJDEH
Relations with Russia
The first official contact between Russia and Afghanistan was made
in 1837, when the government of Russia sent Captain Paul Vitkevich
to Kabul to obtain its support for Persia’s design on Herat. Since
the province of Herat was a part of Afghanistan, but then besieged
by Persia, it was impossible for Vitkevich to succeed in his mission.
What he actually did in Kabul is unknown, but whatever overtures
he might have made to Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, were rejected.1
Ironically, the Vitkevich’s mission along with Persia’s siege of Herat
provided an alibi for the British Government of India to invade
Afghanistan, in 1838. The British Government feared that since after
the conclusion of the Tukomanchay treaty in 1828, Persia had been
under the influence of Russia, its occupation of Herat might endan-
ger its Indian colony.
Earlier in the century, especially in the 1830s, some British and
Indian Muslim travelers, among them Eldred Pottinger, Alexander
Burnes, James Abbott, John Wood, Percival Lord, 'Izzat Allah and
Mehdi 'Ali Khan, had established that the routes through which
Russia could reach India led through Afghanistan.2 Thereafter, Herat
was looked upon as the key or the gate to India. At that time, the
Indian official circles believed that “[o]f all the external influences
beyond Indian frontiers, the Russian advance in Central Asia threat-
ening British supremacy in Afghanistan constituted the greatest dan-
ger.”3 The “danger” also had something to do with the nature of
1
Yapp, M. E., Strategies of British India, Britain, Iran and Afghanistan, 1798–1850.
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980, 234, 235. I am grateful to Professor Yapp, my for-
mer supervisor at the University of London for giving me a copy of this excellent
book. Waller, J. H., Beyond the Khyber Pass, The Road to British Disaster in the First
Afghan War, University of Austin Press, 1993, 97.
2
3
Singhal, India and Afghanistan, xl.
194 chapter eleven
the Russian empire that was compact, centralized, expanding and

run autocratically by unpredictable masters. Also, as Plehve, Russia’s
minister of the interior stated at the time, “Russia has been made
by bayonets not diplomacy.” Actually, as B. H. Sumner states, “. . . the
root of the trouble lay in St. Petersburg itself where the different
ministries were usually at loggerheads with one another, as well as
often divided within themselves.”4 The British Empire, in compari-
son, was diffused, open, and ruled democratically. Since it had already
reached its broadest limits its masters concerned themselves mainly
with safeguarding it. However, after the Vitkevich’s mission Russia,
did not pose a danger for Afghanistan for a quarter of a century.
After its defeat in the Crimean war (1854–56) and the perceived
failure of its policies in Europe, Russia embarked on expansion south-
ward in the vast region of Central Asia. Early in the century, it had
already subdued the Kazakh steppes and established a strong mili-
tary fort in Orenburg from which it dispatched troops in every direc-
tion. In 1864, Russia extended its authority to the borders of the
organized khanates, or states, of Khoqand, Bukhara and Khiva
(Khwarazm or Khorezm). In the following year (1865), it occupied
Tashkand; in 1867, it created the new province of Russian Turkestan
and compelled Muzafar al-Din, the amir of Bukhara, to sign a treaty
in which he placed his state under Russia’s protection; and in 1868,
Russia annexed Samarqand.5 Russia then became, for the first time,
co-terminous with Afghanistan and the Russian-dominated Central
Asia a rival to the British-dominated South Asia.
Russia’s advances sharpened the so-called ‘Great Game.’ Played
by different actors in various forms to the present day, the phrase
was first coined in the 1840s by a British traveler, Captain Arthur
Conolly, and immortalized years later by the British poet, Rudyar
Kipling, in his novel, Kim. The ‘Great Game’ referred to the rivalry
that existed between Russia and Britain over the domination of
Central Asia. The chessboard on which it was played was, however,
much wider in extent and “. . . stretched from the snow-capped
Caucasus in the west, across the great deserts and mountain ranges
4
Sumner, B. H., Tsardom and Imperialism in the Far East and Middle East, 1880–1914,
Archon Books, 1986, 6, 14.
5
Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 9. Audrey, C. Sh., Long Years of Exile, Central
Asian Refugees in Afghanistan and Pakistan, University Press of America, Lanham, New
York, 1994, 17.
afghanistan’s relations with russia 195
of Central Asia, to Chinese Turkestan and Tibet in the east.”

According to Peter Hopkirk, “The ultimate prize, or so it was feared
in London and Calcutta, and fervently hoped by ambitious Russians
serving in Asia, was British India.”6
The ‘Great Game’ escalated after Russia made Khiva a protec-
torate in 1873 and occupied Khoqand three years later, in 1876.
This state, which included the fertile Ferghana valley, was subsequently
abolished by Russia. The ‘Great Game’ became likewise a challenge
to the rulers of Afghanistan with regard to how to safeguard their
country at a time when the viceroys and military generals of the
expanding Asian empires of Russia and Britain were trying to occupy
new territories. All of this was in an age when no international com-
munity existed to curb the expansionist drive of the colonial powers.
As noted in Chapter Ten, Russia regarded Afghanistan as a coun-
try beyond its sphere of influence as the result of an understanding
that had been reached between it and Britain, in 1873. Nevertheless,
in 1878, Russia’s governor-general at Tashkand, General Constantine
P.von Kauffmann, forced a mission under General Stolietoff on Amir
Sher 'Ali Khan in Kabul. Stolietoff is said to have concluded a
defensive and offensive treaty with the amir.7 Two Afghan senior
officials, Mohammad Nabi and Mohammad Hassan Khan, later told
General Roberts in Kabul, after he had occupied it that a “treaty”
had been concluded. However, from the correspondence exchanged
between the amir and Kauffmann the author D. P. Singhal has con-
cluded that “. . . there was no ‘treaty’ at all.” He has based his con-
clusion on the amir’s letters, in which he had asked for military
assistance from Russia without invoking the treaty. He had only
requested of Mohammad Hassan Khan, who was then in Tashkand,
that Russia not “. . . withhold the aid of troops at this time of need
and in accordance with the requirements of the friendship between
the two Governments, and not to defer the aid till some other time,
but to send to Afghan Turkestan the 32,000 troops of Tashkand which General
Stolietoff told in your presence were ready and would be dispatched whenever I
required them.”8
6
Hopkirk, P. The Great Game, The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia, Kandansha
International, New York, London, 1992, 2.
7
8
Singhal, D. P., “Russian Correspondence with Kabul, 1870–1879”, The Journal
of Indian History, April 1963, No. 121, vol. XLI, Part 1, 122, 125.
196 chapter eleven
It was the presence in Kabul of the Stolietoff mission that Britain

made an excuse for its second invasion of Afghanistan, in 1878. It
should be noted that its first invasion of Afghanistan forty years ear-
lier had also been prompted, in part, by the presence in Kabul of
a Russian mission, as noted in Chapter Two. While on his way to
Afghan Turkestan, the amir, in a letter, addressed to Kauffmann
expressed his desire to proceed to the Russian capital to “. . . have
a congress held there to inquire into and settle my cause with the
English after asking them what right they had to advance on
Afghanistan.” Kauffmann hastened to advise the amir “. . . not to
leave your kingdom”, adding that the “Emperor has caused the
British Government to agree to the continuance of Afghan inde-
pendence, and that the “British Government have promised this.”
However, subsequently he wrote that the Czar had directed him to
ask the amir to come to Tashkand. With regard to the military aid
requested by the amir, he had earlier replied that “. . . it is impos-
sible to assist you now. I hope you will be fortunate. It all depends
on the decree of God.”9 Ill, betrayed, and helpless, the amir died
in Mazar on February 21, 1879. Singhal writes,
Thus ended the life of a prince who refused to surrender an iota of
dignity before the threat of war and betrayal of friendship alike, to
accept diminution of his authority as a prelude to certain foreign dom-
ination, as had happened to many Indian and Asian princes.10
When the British invaded Afghanistan, Russia ignored the treaty if
it had been concluded. Russia not only did not provide arms and
assistance to the amir, as it had agreed to if Afghanistan was attacked;
Kauffmann even refused permission to the amir to cross the border,
in January 1879.11
When Amir Sher 'Ali Khan had died and his son and successor,
Amir Mohammad Ya"qub Khan, had been deported to India, and
the roads south of the Hindu Kush had been occupied by the British,
Russian officials in Tashkand seemed to have devised a plan with
regard to northern Afghanistan. This was during the period when
Russia had embarked on expansion in the Turkmen country north-
west of Afghanistan, to be described shortly. Although the lack of
9
Ibid., 126.
10
Ibid., 127.
11
official documents makes it difficult to be certain about the design,

but from the available evidence it is clear that, like Britain, Russia
also intended to partition Afghanistan, and help establish an Afghan
kingdom12 north of the Hindu Kush favorable to its interests. The
linchpin of its design was intended to be Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman
Khan, who had gone as early as 1869 to Russian Turkestan in the
hope of occupying Afghan Turkestan with Russia’s help.13 Although
at the time Russia did not help him, after the deportation of Amir
Mohammad Ya"qub Khan to India the Russian officials at Tashkand
entertained the idea.
According to Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan Kauffmann’s secre-
tary encouraged him to expel the governor from Afghan Turkestan
and establish himself there.14 Upon his arrival in Badakhshan, in
January 1880, Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan was reported to have
said that Russia had sent him to occupy Turkestan on its account,
as it had come to an understanding with Britain on dividing
Afghanistan, making the Hindu Kush their boundary.15 In actual
fact, the sardar did not share Russia’s design, and instead came to
terms with the British, as previously described. The Russian plan
had failed.
The Reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan
During his negotiations with the British in 1880, Sardar 'Abd al-
Rahman Khan was apparently in contact with the Russians, but the
nature of their communication is unknown. Sardar Mohammad Afzal
Khan, head of the British delegation sent by Lepel Griffin to Sardar
'Abd al-Rahman Khan, who was then in Khanabad in northeast-
ern Afghanistan, had concluded that Russia had assisted him with
money and arms.16 Griffin even believed that the sardar was “. . . a
Russian nominee”;17 this was at the time when the sardar had refused
12
Griffin, L., “The Late Amir and his Successor”, Fortnightly Review, 1901, 758.
13
BACA, 16.
14
Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman (in Kunduz) to Mohammad Sarwar, 1880, PSLI, 25,
603.
15
CD [?], 14 May 80, PSLI, 26, pt. 3, 320.
16
Col. Mohammad Afzal and his companions to Griffin from Khanabad, 18
May 80, PSLI, 25, 1972.
17
Griffin to government of India, (T), 3 June 80, PSLI, 25, 1077.
198 chapter eleven
to come to terms with the British. In one of his letters, the sardar
had even referred to Russia as a co-guarantor of a neutral Afghanis-
tan,18 and he had also shown reluctance to visit the British officials
in Kabul. However, he finally changed his mind and accepted the
throne of a reduced Afghanistan with a limitation on his external
relations, as described in Chapter Ten.
It is unknown whether 'Abd al-Rahman maintained official cor-
respondence with Russia after he became amir, but it is known that
many news writers, notably Mulla Ya"qub, worked for Russia in
Herat, Kabul and Turkestan.19 Mulla Ya"qub, who was a Russian
renegade, was believed to have been a colonel in the Russian army,
and was in charge of the Russian subjects arriving in Kabul.20
Attending the Kabul court frequently in the guise of a Muslim,21 he
acted as an interpreter when the amir interviewed new Russian vis-
itors. In December 1882, Mulla Ya"qub left for Mecca through
India.22 Another Russian envoy, Sayyed Khan, who accompanied
the amir to Jalalabad in early 1883, succeeded him. The Russian
counselor at Mashhad also had employed certain native merchants
of Herat to provide him with information about Afghanistan.
Reportedly, the amir had permitted them to work as Russian agents.23
One of them, Mirza Mohammad Sadiq, in anticipation of being
harassed volunteered information about his profession with Russian
permission to the amir.24
Although the presence of the Russian agents was a source of con-
cern to the amir, he took no action against them. One exception
was his refusal to permit some Russians who had entered Shighnan,
in northeastern Afghanistan to proceed to Kabul.25 About Mohammad
Sadiq the amir asked the viceroy as to what to do with him.26 This
was during the period when Russia was advancing toward Merv,
and northwestern Afghanistan was considered to be under the even-
18
Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman to Mohammad Sarwar, 15 Apr. 80, PSLI, 25, 603.
19
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to viceroy, 24 Feb. 82, PSLI, 32, 324.
20
BACA, 219.
21
AB, Kabul Correspondent, 8 Feb. 82, PSLI, 32, 366.
22
BACA, 219.
23
Mirza 'Abbas, British agent at Mashhad to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, 12 Jan.
82, PSLI, 32, 322.
24
Mohammad Sadiq to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, 21 Sept. 82, PSLI, 34, 783.
25
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to Col. Mohammad Afzal, British agent in Kabul, KD,
22 Dec. 82, PSLI, 35, 341.
26
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to viceroy, 11 Oct. 82, PSLI, 34, 785.
tual threat of its occupation. At the time the amir’s position and the
affairs of the country were far from being satisfactory, and the British
were unwilling to conclude a treaty with Afghanistan. Under the cir-
cumstances, the amir considered it inadvisable to alienate the Russians.
He dwelt on the British fears arising from the Russian advance by
stating,
Nothing but full understanding respecting Afghanistan will satisfy me
and that necessitates large expenditure of money. Now the Russians
have come close and day by day they approach.27
During this period, as previously noted, the British had no reliable
information about Russia’s activities in Afghanistan. Following their
evacuation of Afghanistan, they commissioned Qazi 'Abd al-Qadir
in Kabul, to inform them of the possible Russian activities and the
amir’s handling of the Russians, but 'Abd al-Qadir had also entered
into the amir’s service.28 In this confusing situation the viceroy, Lord
Ripon, asserted that any display of fear of the presence of the Russian
agent, Mohammad Sadiq, in Kabul at the time, would be “unwise.”29
He disagreed with Lord Hartington, the secretary of state for India,
in London, that the amir should be told that the presence of the
Russian agent in Afghanistan was objectionable. However, at a later
date Ripon informed the amir that the expulsion of Mohammad
Sadiq “. . . would be proper.”30
By that time the viceroy had formulated an approach to the sit-
uation. In his view, the proper course with regard to the agent would
be for London to remonstrate to Russia.31 It was also to arrange a
treaty with Russia in which Afghanistan was to be considered by it
beyond the sphere of Russia’s influence. In return, Britain should
do the same with regard to the Turkmen tribes beyond northwest-
ern Afghanistan. Such a treaty, Ripon believed
. . . would show a clear understanding between the two countries in
regard to Afghan affairs, and should prove to the Ruler of Afghanistan
that it would be useless to play off one of them against the other.32
27
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to Sardar Mohammad 'Alam Khan, AB, Kabul
Correspondent, 22 Mar. 82, PSLI, 32, 469.
28
BACA, 5.
29
Ripon to Hartington, 1 Apr. 82, PSLI, 32, 326.
30
Ripon to Ami 'Abd al-Rahman, 11 Oct. 82, PSLI, 34, 785.
31
Ripon to Hartington, 1 Apr. 82, PSL1, 32, 326.
32
Ripon to Hartington, 16 Jan. 82, PSLI, 31, 84.
200 chapter eleven
Not interested in the subject, Russia prolonged the current state of

affairs with evasive responses.33 Finally, after the British fixed a grant
for the amir, in July 1883, and, in particular, after Russia occupied
Panjdeh in 1885 (to be described shortly) there were no reports con-
cerning the activities of the Russian agents in Afghanistan. Thereafter,
Anglo-Afghan relations improved while, conversely, Russo-Afghan
relations deteriorated.34
The Russian Occupation of Panjdeh
The wide valley of Panjdeh to the northwest of Herat was the habi-
tation of nomadic tribes of Turkmen with no permanent residences,35
but with vast pastures and small portions of cultivable land here and
there. Panjdeh depended on Herat and Maymana for supplies of
grain. Around 1850, Panjdeh, up to Maruchak and Qal'a-e-Wali,
was occupied by about eight thousand families of Sarik Turkmen,36
divided into the five sections; the Soktis, the Harzagis, the Khurasanli,
the Bairach and the 'Ali Shah.37 This wealthy tribe, possessed large
flocks of sheep—each of which consisted of from 1,200 to 1,500
head38 and lived in a series of hamlets or kibitkas.39 Their nomadic
pastoral lifestyle dictated that they always be ready to pack up and
move at a moment’s notice.40 In 1882, the Sariks voluntarily sub-
mitted to the amir,41 and agreed to pay a tithe ('ushr) as revenue.42
A sub-governor (hakim) was placed in charge of Panjdeh, and a mil-
itary contingent was stationed there. The Sariks did so, after 1881,
when the Tekke Turkmen of the Akhal oasis had submitted to Russia.
After the fall of Khiva, in 1873, a Trans-Caspian military zone
had been formed. At that time the only area in Central Asia that
remained undisturbed was the country of the Turkmen, which stretched
from Khiva, in the north, to the border of Afghanistan, in the south,
33
34
Mohammad Nabi, Sawal wa Jawab-e-Dawlati, 8.
35
36
Ibid., 189.
37
Ibid., 186.
38
Ibid., 191.
39
Ibid., 184.
40
Ibid., 189.
41
. . ., 17 July 82, PSLI, 33, 1173.
42
and from Bukhara, in the east, to the Caspian Sea, in the west.
Persia exercised some suzerainty over the Turkmen until 1861, when
the Tekke Turkmen of Merv defeated its forces.43
In June 1879, a Russian force under General Lomakin, reached
Geok Tepe in the Akhal oasis and assaulted the camp of the Tekke
Turkmen, but was repulsed with losses. In January 1881, another
Russia force under General Skobelev attacked the same position and
secured a decisive victory. This victory resounded like a thunder
blast throughout Central Asia, and in February 1884 the Tekke
Turkmen of Merv were, in consequence, subdued and annexed later
in the same year.44 More than six hundred Turkmen were massa-
cred with a view to intimidating the recalcitrant Turkmen in the
countryside. This gigantic stride of hundreds of miles made the fron-
tiers of Afghanistan coterminous with Russia. Thus, Herat, consid-
ered to be the key to India, came within the reach of Russia for
the first time.
After the fall of Merv, the British government concluded that the
time had come to settle the northwestern frontiers of Afghanistan,
which were then indefinite. This was the area where, if a settlement
was not reached, the Russian and British forces were likely to col-
lide. Letters were exchanged on the subject, and it was finally agreed
that an Anglo-Russian commission was to be sent to the frontiers to
demarcate them in the spirit of the understanding of 1873.
In the mean time both Russia and Afghanistan became active in
the area. Russia’s advance forces reached Pul-e-Khatun, north of
Panjdeh, and Russia disputed the Afghan rule of it arguing that
. . . even if the Sarik Turkmen established at Panjdeh formerly paid
tribute to Afghanistan, this fact would not of itself confirm the claim
of the present amir to the place, looking to the fact that it had never
been accompanied by the Afghan troops, and that its population had
enjoyed complete independence.45
Although, at the time, the greater part of the Turkmen had passed
into its hands, Russia still did not lay claim to Panjdeh, probably
because its inhabitants, the Sariks, were distinct from the Tekke
43
Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 109. Sykes, Sir P. M., A History of Afghanistan, 2,
1975, 88. Allworth, E., Central Asia, Columbia University Press, New York, 1967,
148.
44
45
Ibid., 117.
202 chapter eleven
Turkmen of Merv whom it had subjugated.46 The fact that the Sarik
Turkmen had rejected the overture of the khan of Organj, a vassal
of Russia, to accept his rule on the grounds that they were the sub-
jects of Afghanistan might have also influenced Russia in its stand.47
However, afterward Russia changed its stand, insisting on ethnic
consideration for the demarcation of its frontiers with Afghanistan.48
The Russians contended that the tranquility of the Turkmen coun-
try was impossible to accomplish unless all of the Turkmen were
brought under control. Specifically, they believed that should the
Sarik Turkmen in the east remain either independent, or under
Afghan rule, their nomadic and plundering habits would complicate
matters between Afghanistan and Russia, and render it impossible
to establish settled rule among those who had already submitted to
Russia.49 This was, in fact, an echo of the apologetic, deterministic,
expansionistic, and colonialist view of Prince Aleksandr M. Gortchakov,
Russia’s foreign minister.
Gortchakov had expressed this view on 21 November 1864, in a
well-known memorandum in which he had stated that, in their drive
for expansion, all of the colonial powers, including the United States,
“. . . have been drawn into a course wherein ambition plays a smaller
part than imperious necessity, and where the greatest difficulty is in
knowing where to stop.”50 This manifesto in which the peoples of
Central Asia have been called “half-savage tribes” and Russia has
been commissioned with “a mission to civilize” them is strange
because relative to most people of Central Asia Russia was a late
comer to the fold of civilization. Nevertheless, the manifesto has ever
since impressed like-minded pundits.
It is true that at times “. . . military actions taken in Central Asia
were often in violation of orders from above”, but “. . . once con-
quest had been completed, the Czar accepted as fait accompli.”51
Sumner’s statement that, in dealing with imperial problems Alex-
ander II (r. 1855–1881) and Nicholas II (r. 1894–1917) suffered from
46
Shahzada of Khoqand to Peshawar Commissioner, PD, 23 Sept. 84, PSLI,
42, 123.
47
48
Habberton, Anglo-Russian Relations, 51.
49
Ibid., 52.
50
For the full text of the Gortchakov Memorandum see, Fraser-Taytler, Afghanistan,
A Study in Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia, 333–337.
51
Gulzad, The Afghan State, 127, 128.
“. . . a certain blunt autocratic naivete”52 applies to all of the Czars

in various degrees. As a colonial power, Russia, like Britain, had
deliberately set out on the road to grab land. In this situation its
high priests, like Gortchakov, formulated views that justified not only
the occupation of land, but also the slaughter of indigenous people,
the plundering of their collective wealth, and the resulting disrup-
tion of their social order.
Afghanistan’s claim to the region inhabited by the Turkmen was
historical as well as demographic. The Turkmen were linked to
Afghanistan through Herat. Ghobar, maintains that Merv was a
province of Afghanistan for centuries.53 According to Qazi Sa'd al-
Din, the governor of Herat, formerly the elders of Merv and of
Sarakhs accompanied Afghan rulers as their vassals, and, because
they were subject to Herat, the elders of Akhal and the Tekke
Turkmen were with Amir Sher 'Ali Khan in Kabul.54 The Sarik
Turkmen of Panjdeh were still more closely linked to Herat. Formerly,
the Jamshedis, who were subject to Herat, inhabited Panjdeh, but
were driven out of it by the Arsari Turkmen who, nevertheless,
agreed to pay tribute to them. The Arsari Turkmen were, in turn,
expelled by the Sarik Turkmen in about the middle of the nine-
teenth century.55 The new settlers also agreed to pay tribute to the
Jamshedi tribe, which had always been subject to Herat.56 In addi-
tion to the fact that the northern frontier of Panjdeh beyond Sari
Yazi was the natural and traditional frontier of Herat,57 and that
Merv itself was a dependency of Herat, by the time the Russians
approached Panjdeh, the Afghans had established their rule there.58
All of this demonstrates that Panjdeh was ethnically, geographically
as well as historically a part of Herat, and through it a part of
Afghanistan.
This explains why Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, who knew the
area well, favored a forward policy there.59 As a Muslim ruler, he
enjoyed the support of the Muslim rulers of Central Asia and northern
52
Sumner, Tsardom and Imperialism, 6.
53
54
55
56
57
58
Peter Lumsden, Chief member of the British delegation to the Joint Afghan
Boundary Commission quoted in Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 117.
59
Ibid., 113.
204 chapter eleven
Muslim India, in particular the tribal area (later officially called the
North-West Frontier of India) and, after the fall of Panjdeh, these
elders asked him to declare a jihad against Russia.60 A number of
elders from Central Asia had either taken asylum with the amir, or
engaged in correspondence with him.61 Others, from Central Asia,
had promised him that they would rise against Russia from within,
when he rose against it from without.62 Consequently, because of
these assurances the amir believed that in the event of war with
Russia the Turkmen would rise en masse against it.63 As late as
1889, he even cherished the idea of raising a rebellion against Russia
and becoming a second Timur Lane.64
In spite of all this, when the Russian forces arrived near Panjdeh,
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan instructed his army under the com-
mand of General Ghous al-Din Khan to desist from opposing them
when they chose to attack it, and to retreat to Bala Murghab.65 He
did so for the following reasons. First, he had been discouraged in
his forward policy in the area by the British. In 1881, they had
advised him not to accept the allegiance66 of the Tekke Turkmen of
Merv, offered by their ruler, Makhdum Quli Khan.67 Perhaps for
the same reason, the amir had earlier turned down the offer of sub-
mission by the khan of khwarazm.68 Second, the British government
had ignored the amir’s warnings for the delimitation of the undefined
boundaries of Afghanistan with Russia,68 in spite of his repeated com-
plaints to the effect that the British had abandoned their responsi-
bilities with regard to Afghanistan, and about impending advances
by Russia.70 At first, neither Britain nor India took the amir’s warn-
ings seriously. The viceroy, Lord Ripon, only reminded him that
Afghan boundaries with Russia were so fixed in 1873, and that it
would be unwise to reopen the question.71
60
61
Ibid., 546.
62
Ibid., 483.
63
64
Griechbach, C. L., to Ellias, N., 5 Mar 89 (Mazar), For Dept., Secret-F., Pros.,
May 1889, Nos. 216–225, NAI.
65
66
Ripon to Hartington, 22 May 81, PSLI, 28, 887.
67
68
Ibid., 383.
69
The Amir’s Visit to India, 1885. PSLI, 44, Enclo., No. 3, 2.
70
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman in darbar, PD, 9 Dec. 82, PSLI, 35, 5.
71
As previously noted, only after Russia occupied Merv in 1884 did

the Government of India and Britain consider the situation a threat
to Afghanistan as well as India. After an agreement with Russia had
been reached, the Government of India sent a mission, led by Sir
General Peter Lumsden, to the area in the autumn of 1884, to define
the undemarcated boundary in collaboration with Lumsden’s Russian
counterpart. Kabul was not invited to take part in the commission,
even though the issue in question was the delimitation of its bound-
ary. By then, because Russia had forcefully entered the area between
Merv and Panjdeh, the situation had turned favorable to it; that was
why Russia delayed the work of the commission, and in the mean-
time reinforced its army.72 The Russians did not heed the British,
who wanted the subject to be settled quickly. Hoping that this would
occur, Lumsden discouraged the Afghans from reinforcing the gar-
rison, arguing that reinforcement was likely to jeopardize the settle-
ment. His discouragement led the amir to believe that,
In reality the General intended to witness an engagement between the
Russians and the Afghans, since he had the foolish idea that if blood-
shed did not take place between the Afghans and the Russians, the
Afghans might become their friends, and this will be altogether inju-
rious to the British interest.73
Third, among the amir’s reasons for instructing his army to desist
from opposing the Russians was that he believed that the Sariks were
unreliable even though they were the subjects of Afghanistan. It was
feared that, in the event of war, they would side with the Russians
because the Afghan officials had oppressed them, and because they
were a wealthy people concerned with safeguarding their wealth.74
Fourth, the most important consideration for the amir in not fighting
with Russia over Panjdeh was the disorganized state of affairs. The
army which was stationed in various parts of the country, acted more
as a police force than as an element of fighting strength suitable to
72
For details see Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 107–129.
73
For details see, Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, Nasayih Namcha [A Book of Advice], Kabul,
1303/1866, 4–6. Riyazi ('Ayn al-Waqayi', 222, 223) also maintains that the British
officials of the Boundary Commission duped the Afghans by assuring them that the
Russians did not pose a threat to Panjdeh. He adds that the British officials intended
to create enmity between the Afghans and the Russians. Wheeler (Abdur Rahman,
175), however, rejects the allegation, stating that “We may be quite sure that Sir
Peter Lumsden never for a moment entertained ‘the foolish idea’ imputed to him.”
74
Mohammad Nabi, Sawal wa Jawab-e-Dawlati, 7. The Amir’s Visit to India, 5.
206 chapter eleven
defend the country against invaders.75 In the amir’s view “. . . his ene-
mies were powerful, his nation weak, and his friends procrastinating.”76
Faced with the threat posed by Russia, the amir took a long-range
view of Afghanistan itself. In his view, if the Afghan army retreated
the fall of Panjdeh was unlikely to endanger the integrity of the
country. He believed that if the Afghans opposed the Russians, and
Herat and Maymana fell to them, the country would disintegrate.77
In his view, “. . . war between Russia and England on Afghan soil
would ultimately destroy his country, and his supreme interest was
to avoid such a catastrophe.”78 Actually, the amir was opposed to
any power, whether Christian or Muslim, who may try to pass
through Afghanistan to fight against another country.”79 That was
why, at the height of the crisis, he showed unwillingness to allow
even a small number of British engineering officers to fortify the
defenses of Herat.80 Only in the event of Russia advancing on Heart
would he have been willing to accept British troops,81 and then
together with them would fight with his army to the end.82
On March 30, 1885 Panjdeh fell to the Russians. The Afghan
troops opposed them, even though they were overwhelmed by them,
and even though they had been handicapped by the amir’s instruc-
tion not to fight.83 At the time Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan was on
a state visit to India. When informed of the fall he advised his host
“not to distress yourself ( gham ma khurid ).”84 Not only did he not
make any attempt to invoke the British commitment to Afghanistan
which had been subjected to “unprovoked aggression”, but he also
75
The Amir’s Visit to India, 5.
76
Ibid., 10.
77
78
79
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, Nasayih Namcha (A book of Advice), PD, 22 Dec. 88, PSLI,
55, 1372. The amir has developed this theme in the above booklet. In his view
“Any government which desires to pass through Afghanistan . . . is its enemy. If
Persia desires to pass through Afghanistan to fight with the Chinese, she will be
the enemy of Afghanistan. The same may be said of China if she wishes to pro-
ceed through Afghanistan against Persia. If the British ask Afghanistan to let them
through it for war with Russia or Central Asia they will make Afghanistan their
enemies. It is hardly possible that friendship can be established between Afghanistan
and Russia, because the latter has a firm intention to advance and take possession
of India. Afghanistan is to make no distinction between such enemies as regard
religion; they may be Christians or Mohammedans such as Turkey or China.”
80
81
Ibid., 14.
82
Ibid., 9.
83
Ibid., 11.
84
Ibid., 9.
made the British position easier by volunteering to “give up a part

of the disputed frontier [Panjdeh and its dependency to the south]
for the honor of the Russian Government and the Great Emperor”,85
provided Afghanistan was left in possession of Maruchak, Gulran
and Zulfiqar.86 In excuse for the loss of Panjdeh, the amir stated
that his occupation of it was in anticipation of such a day, when it
could become a basis for bargaining to make a settlement.87 In his
view by making the sacrifice of Panjdeh, Afghanistan would be safe
from total disaster.88
Nevertheless, the Panjdeh crisis brought Russia and Britain to the
brink of war.89 However, after exchanging letters and telegrams, they
agreed to settle it through arbitration. The concession, which the
amir had already made, and which was, in fact, recognition of the
fait accompli, was accepted by Russia as a basis for a settlement.
Accordingly, Panjdeh was exchanged for Zulfiqar,90 and afterward a
new Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission delimited the undefined
boundary of Afghanistan from Zulfiqar to Khamiab, on the Oxus.91
The demarcation alleviated the crisis, but the boundary here as else-
where was “only an arbitrary line based on the circumstances of the
moment rather than on any permanent and natural basis.”92 Sir West
Ridgeway was then in charge of the British Boundary Commission;
Colonel C. E. Yate, a member of the commission stated that “. . . there
can be little doubt that the Russian foot now advanced will at some
future time be either advanced still further or withdrawn altogether,
and a frontier thus arbitrarily defined . . . cannot be expected to be
permanent.”93 Finally, as already noted in Chapter Seven, with the
demarcation of the northeastern boundary, in the region of the Pamirs,
with Russia and China, and with the exchange of the Bukhara-held
85
86
87
Mohammad Nabi, Sawal wa Jawab, 7.
88
89
For the international repercussions of the Panjdeh crisis see Singhal, India
and Afghanistan, 119–122. Sumner also holds that “. . . the Panjdeh crisis . . . had
nealy brought Great Britain and Russia to war with each other.” Tsardom and
Imperialism, 6.
90
91
Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 476. For details of the demarcation of the
northwest and northeast boundaries of Afghanistan with Russia’s protectorates see
Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 124–129, 146–148. Habberton, Anglo-Russian
Relations, 54–57, 58–67.
92
93
Ibid., 179.
208 chapter eleven
territory of Darwaz south of the Oxus with the Afghan-held terri-

tories of Shighnan and Roshan, north of the Oxus, the entire bound-
ary of Afghanistan and Bukhara and the Russian-held territories
north of the Oxus, were defined and fixed.
The Russian occupation of Panjdeh and Russia’s subsequent intru-
sion into the northeastern parts of Afghanistan, particularly its dis-
lodging of an Afghan outpost in Surmatash (or Somatash) in the
Pamirs, in 1892,94 produced serious consequences, both nationally
and internationally. The leading men of the Char Aimaq of the
Herat province, who were said to have offered their land to Russia,95
were arrested, and the Jamshedis were removed en masse from the
frontiers to the Herat Valley.96 The border with Russia was fortified,
and reliable tribes, especially the Pashtuns, were settled along it. Also,
the traditional free movement of pilgrims from Central Asia to Mecca
through Afghanistan97 was restricted. This and the imposition by
Russia of high tariffs on British and Indian goods reduced the vol-
ume of trade.
The Panjdeh incident drew the amir closer to Britain, and strained
Russo-Afghan relations for a generation until the Bolsheviks came
to power in Russia, in 1917. In particular, after the rebellion of
Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan in 1888, which the amir believed
had been instigated by Russia, he began to direct anti-Russian pro-
paganda toward his subjects to such an extent that finally the viceroy
warned him that it will have the “. . . effect of provoking a collision
between Your Highness’s forces and those of Russia.”98 Despite this
warning, the amir expanded the jihad movement,99 and continually
claimed that the Russian threat to Afghanistan was just around the
corner. Further, the amir made Russian duplicity and the bad faith
Russia had shown in Afghanistan during the reign of Amir Sher 'Ali
Khan a permanent theme of propaganda. By inculcating fear among
his subjects, the amir probably also intended to exact money from
94
For details see Wheeler, Abdur Rahman, 185–187. See also, Shighnan and
Roshan in Chapter 6.
95
PD, 18 Mar 85, PSLI, 44, 572. The Amir 'Abd al-Rahman in his booklet,
Nasayih Namcha, alleged that the sons of Khan Agha Jamshedi sent messengers to
the Russian officers and offered them submission.
96
HD, 15 Jan. 91, PSLI, 62, 768. BACA, 228. Military Report on Afghanistan,
70, Delhi, 1925, Pt. 1, History, 70.
97
Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 738. This restriction was enforced with a
view to checking Russian spies entering Afghanistan in the guise of Muslims.
98
Viceroy to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, 27 Feb. 89, PSLI, 56, 1071.
99
them to strengthen the army and to persuade them to make even

bigger sacrifices to safeguard their faith, their women, their honor
and themselves from what he referred to as ‘Russian bondage.’
The completion of the demarcation of the entire boundary with
Russia made it impossible for its forces to march further south with-
out clashing with Britain and Afghanistan. Marking the beginning
of an era of rapprochement between Russia and Britain, which had
a significant impact on world affairs, it detracted from the empha-
sis put on the ‘Great Game.’
In the mid-1890s, as the result of an improvement in Anglo Russian
relations in Central Asia, a marked shift of emphasis became apparent
in the amir’s policy toward Britain and Russia. Although the amir
regarded Britain as the bigger danger, because of its Forward Policy
of the 1890s, the foundation of his foreign policy remained intact.
Only his hostile attitude toward Russia gave way to his suspicion of
both powers. While he tried to alert the Afghans to the dangers
posed by the “infidels”, the amir also tried to open the channel of
communication with the Russians. Since he believed that every thing
changes rapidly in foreign relations100 he favored maintaining a bal-
ance between both powers, believing that any gesture of friendliness
toward Britain was likely to provoke Russia to pressure Afghanistan.
The amir believed that the movement of the Russians along the
Afghan frontiers in 1895 was due to the departure of Sardar Nasr
Allah Khan for England. The amir then advised his eldest son,
Sardar Habib Allah Khan, that “We should try in every way to be
on friendly terms with him [the Russian Emperor].”101 One year
later, out of the same presents that he had received from Queen
Victoria through Sardar Nasr Allah Khan, the amir sent a few items
to the Russian emperor with an apology for the inability of his son
to have visited him.102 The channels of communication with the
Russians were Afghan agents and the amir’s assumed uncle, Moham-
mad Afzal Khan, who had shops in Samarqand and Bukhara.103
Also, from time to time, contacts were made and correspondence
was exchanged between the governor of Herat, and the Russian
officers at Panjdeh and elsewhere.104
100
PD, 9 Dec. 95, PSLI, 83, No. 23.
101
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to Sardar Habib Allah Khan, KD, 7 Mar. 95, PSLI,
80, No. 17.
102
KD, 2 Mar. 96, PSLI, 85, No. G., 736.
103
GD, 15 Mar. 94, PSLI, 78, 1005.
104
MM, Jan. 95, PSLI, 78, 685.
CHAPTER TWELVE
RELATIONS WITH PERSIA AND THE

OTTOMAN TURKEY
Relations with Persia
Throughout the reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, Persian-

Afghan relations were regulated through the medium of the British
Government of India. Persia was under the influence of foreign pow-
ers, and had little direct contact with Afghanistan, even though the
two countries had a long border and extensive cultural ties.
Following the British evacuation of Kandahar and its restoration
to the amir in April 1881, the Persian government intended to annex
the Afghan part of Seistan. It intended to do so because at the time
the position of the amir was precarious, and his rival cousin, Sardar
Mohammad Ayyub Khan, who held Herat, had challenged his rule.
For that purpose, Persia’s minister in London made overtures to the
British government, which referred the matter to India as to whether
or not Persia should be allowed to proceed with its design. The
viceroy, Lord Ripon, opposed the design, arguing that in 1873, Amir
Sher 'Ali Khan complained that he lost “. . . the better part of Seistan
because we [the British] persuaded him not to resort to arms against
Persia and to trust to our arbitration.” Further, he stated that if
Persia was allowed to go on with its scheme Amir 'Abd al-Rahman
would be discredited among his subjects “. . . who are already too
much displeased to regard him as under the dictation of foreign
powers.”1 Lord Ripon suggested to the British government that it
should negotiate the matter with Persia. However, Persia made no
further move since there was no room for negotiation on the matter.
After the arrival of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan at Mashhad
in October 1881, Persia feared that his presence there, with over
eight hundred followers, would disturb Persian-Afghan relations. The
amir, who wanted to have friendly relations with Persia, expected
that the shah of Persia would intern the sardar somewhere, such as
1
Ripon to Hartington, 8 May 81, PSLI, 28, 771.
relations with persia and ottoman turkey 211
Tehran, away from the border city of Mashhad. As a gesture of

goodwill, the amir instructed the governor of Herat to send an official
to the governor of Khurasan to express his condolences with regard
to the death of his uncle, Hisham al-Sultana.2 The presence of Sardar
Mohammad Ayyub Khan with his followers was rightly considered
to be a disturbing factor in the area, as the Turkmen of the area
had expressed their willingness to occupy Mashhad for him. The
Persian authorities were likewise disturbed after the sardar and his
followers began to buy arms and ammunition.3 As a result of this
situation, Persia dispatched a mission composed of one hundred men
under the leadership of Mirza Ma'sum Khan, to Kabul in September
1883. According to the shah the mission was only to congratulate
the amir on his accession.4 There were, however, indications that
the mission was political, and commissioned to affect reconciliation
between the amir and the principal refugee sardars5—Sardar Moham-
mad Ayyub Khan, his cousin Sardar Mohammad Hashim Khan and
his nephew Sardar Musa Jan, the son of the former Amir Mohammad
Ya"qub Khan, all of whom had taken refuge in Persia.
The content of the letter addressed to the amir by the brother of
the shah was not disclosed, but the two interviews, that the envoy
held with the amir centered on Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan
and Russia. With regard to the sardar, the amir told the envoy that,
“[i]t would not serve either Persian or Afghan interests if the shah
permitted intriguing refugees to remain on his frontiers,” because,
“[t]hey would give fresh encouragement to the advance of the
Russians.” Further, he told the envoy that “. . . his friendship for the
shah was merely the sympathy of one Mohammedan Ruler with
another.” But he “. . . inveighed vehemently against the Russians and
advised the envoy to warn his master against their intrigues.”6
The question of reconciliation had been brushed aside, since at
the end of his meeting the envoy indicated that the shah proposed
to let Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan to go either to Turkey or
Russia. Naturally, the amir was against allowing the sardar going to
the border region of Russia, where he would be a standing menace.
2
MM, June 83, PSLI, 37, 26.
3
Kand, D., 22 Feb. 84, PSLI, 40, 243.
4
The shah of Persia to British minister at Tehran, 19 Oct. 83, PSLI, 38, 465.
5
MM, Sept. 83, PSLI, 38, 46.
6
MM, Oct. 83, PSLI, 38, 465.
212 chapter twelve
In a strong tone he told the envoy, “Very good . . . Let him go to

the boundaries of Russia, so that he may die in their territory in
the manner that his father died in the hope of getting help from
them.”7 The mission failed to accomplish anything significant. It
was even prohibited from proceeding to Herat via the Hazarajat as
the envoy requested, presumably with a view to impressing his co-
religionist Hazaras. In Kabul the mission was watched closely, and
made to stay inconspicuously. Afghans were not allowed to visit it.
The dispatch of the mission to Kabul coincided with the appli-
cation of pressure by the British Government of India to persuade
the shah to remove Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan from Mashhad.
The failure of the mission, the danger to Mashhad due to the pres-
ence of the sardar, and British pressure finally persuaded the Persian
government to remove him to Tehran, in June 1884 in return for
the money it had received from India. Subsequently in Tehran, too,
Persia “considered the presence of [Sardar Mohammad] Ayyub and
his many followers dangerous.”8 Finally, as previously noted, Sardar
Mohammad Ayyub Khan and his followers were persuaded to move
to India, and he arrived in Lahore via Iraq in 1888, and resided
there for the rest of his life.
In 1885, when Russia occupied Panjdeh, Persia occupied Hashtadan,
a small district in Kohsan, west of Herat. The Afghans reversed the
occupation easily,9 but the controversy concerning whether the dis-
trict belonged to Afghanistan or Persia lingered on. Under British
arbitration, both sides were asked to produce evidence to prove their
ownership,10 but neither side was able to do so. However, the amir
gave way, stating “Where we do not have the right and are unable
to prove it we should not insist, and where we possess documents
we should not leave it.”11 Actually, since at the time, the amir was
seriously ill, and, in addition, was confronted with the rebellion of
Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan, he accepted the arbitration of
General Mclean through which Hashtadan was partitioned between
the two countries.12
7
Ibid.
8
BACA, 53.
9
10
11
Ibid., 604.
12
Ibid., 604.
An Afghan agent, with the title of Head of Traders (tajir bashi ),

was stationed at Mashhad. He was commissioned to provide facili-
ties to traders, and, in addition, to report on Persia as well as on
Afghan refugees in the Persian province of Khurasan. In response,
the Persian government demanded the stationing of its own agent
in Herat, but the amir refused to accept the demand, and, further,
threatened to stop trade and close the border with Persia. At the
same time, he made it clear to the Persian government that his agent
was commissioned only to report on the Afghan refugees, and had
not been instructed to interfere in the affairs of that country. Under
the advice of the Government of India, the shah finally acquiesced.13
In the early 1890s, the Persian-Afghan relations reached their low-
est point. During the Hazara war, the Hazaras were persecuted, and
along with the Qizilbashes compelled to practice only Sunni Islam.
Led by Shaykh Mohammad Taqi, the mujtahids (Shi'i 'ulema) of
Mashhad issued a legal ruling ( fatwa) in which they declared war
on the Sunni population of Afghanistan. The ruling was issued after
the shah twice failed to stop the persecution, although in late 1892,
he had sent remonstrance to the British government, in London,
about the persecutions.14 As instructed by the British government,
the viceroy of India wrote to the amir, stating, “It would be a great
advantage if Your Highness were to authorize me to contradict these
reports [the reports of persecution].”15 Not only did the amir not
contradict the reports, but he also adopted an uncompromising atti-
tude, stating
I gave instructions for the punishment of my rebellious Shiah [Shi'i]
subjects, who are ryots [ra'iyats] of Afghanistan and sentenced them to
death, imprisonment and banishment according to their respective
merits.16
Further, he wrote,
. . . should it be known that the shah of Persia and his mullas enter-
tain a thought of interfering with the subjects of Afghanistan, the Sunnis
of Afghanistan will render a good account of the matter without aid
from the Sunnis of Turkey.17
13
Ibid., 530, 1054.
14
Viceroy to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, 19 Oct. 92, PSLI, 68, 335.
15
Ibid.
16
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to viceroy, 27 Oct. 92, PSL1, 68, 1053.
17
Ibid.
214 chapter twelve
At the same time, to appease the Persian public, the amir sent a dec-
orated Quran as a gift to be placed in the shrine of Musa Imam Raza
in Mashhad. Ultimately, the viceroy dropped the subject altogether.
Relations with the Ottoman Turkey
Afghanistan and the Ottoman Turkey had no commercial or other

ties between them. However, as Sunni Muslim states separated by
Shi'i Persia, they were traditionally on friendly terms with each other.
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan had great respect toward the person
of the Caliph Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid, and regarded him as the pro-
tector of the Muslims, calling on every Muslim to be loyal to him.18
The amir’s respect for the caliph sultan, as the guardian of Mecca
and Medina and the spiritual head of the Muslim world was, of
course, religiously significant, but more importantly, his autocracy
and the police state he had created appealed to him. Additionally,
it was prestigious for Afghan rulers to be on good terms with the
Ottoman sultans.
The amir tried to respect and even imitate the caliph sultan. In
The Booklet on Islamic Affairs (Risala-e-Islamiya), he declared that since
the caliph of Islam had decreed that his subjects should pay ten per-
cent of their annual income over and beyond their usual tax, his
subjects should also do the same.19 Hence the exaltation of the sul-
tan and of his innovation whether real or imaginary. In a firman,
the amir called on his subjects, to “[b]e at least as zealous in this
cause as the subjects of the sultan of Turkey . . . who have offered
their lives for the sultan.”20 Further, in his treatises on jihad the amir
expressed that he had been inspired by the example of the sultan,
because, apart from the fact that they were both Muslims, both the
Ottoman Empire and Afghanistan were threatened by the same
power—Russia. Like the Ottoman sultans, the amir was likewise on
good terms with the British government and, conversely, on bad
18
Kabul Series, Pt., 111, 141, Nos. 233–234, Encl. No. 22, Ikdam Turkish Paper,
9 Oct 1901.
19
For details see, Sarrishta-e-Islamiyya-e-Rum (The Islamic Management of Turkey),
Kabul, 1311/1894.
20
PD, 9 Dec. 95, PSLI, 83, No. 23.
terms with the Russian government, as explained in the preceding

chapters. That was why he did not show any interest in the Pan
Islamic movement, which Sayyed Jamal al-Din Afghani had initiated
to incite the Muslims against the British for their domination of the
Muslim world.
While at the same time that the amir tried to obtain international
recognition for his own position, he also established communication
with the sultan. The sultan was said to have offered him the title
of ‘Light of the Religion, Ghazi’ (Zia al-Din, Ghazi ).21 It was due to
his deference to the sultan that the amir did not adopt the title of
the sultan in 1896, despite the advice of his advisers to do so. The
two rulers communicated with each other, and this communication
and the existence of friendly relations between their countries resulted
in the spread of rumors, especially in Mashhad, to the effect that
an alliance had been concluded between them. In response, the amir
declared:
Up to the present [1898], there has been no intention on our part
either to cause the khutba [Friday sermon] to be delivered or the coin
struck in the sultan’s name, but should we wish to consider this with
His Majesty, we are not afraid of anyone to do so. Nothing could be
better for the two governments which belong to the same religion and
sect than to combine with each other.22
The dispatch of the firman to Mashhad must have been significant.
In summary, with regard to external relations, it is clear that when
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan agreed to rule over a reduced Afghan-
istan, he also agreed to deal only with the British Government of
India, not other powers. He did so apparently because at the time
he needed the British support against his rival cousin, Sardar Moham-
mad Ayyub Khan, who held Heart, and also due to the fact that
the country was in a disorganized state. The preceding pages show
that he was temporizing. For at the same time that he reorganized
the state and suppressed internal revolts and rivals, the amir reunited
the country and extended control over the outlying regions to the
east and south, and northeast and northwest of Afghanistan.
As the preceding chapters make also clear the amir intended to
proceed still further in these directions, as well as to make himself
21
MM, July 96, PSLI, 87, F.L., No. 134, 96.
22
MM, Oct. 98, PSLI, 109, Regist. No. 1088, 1.
216 chapter twelve
the ruler of a completely independent country. But Britain and Russia

in their forward movements, in opposite directions, not only curbed
his advances, but also grabbed territory from Afghanistan, and reduced
its size. Had they not done so, Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan would
probably have become a second Ahmad Shah Durranay. The advances
which Russia and Britain made toward Afghanistan created near-
crisis and crisis situations. However, these were ultimately managed
through diplomacy, and, in addition, the two powers cooperated with
each other in completely delimiting the boundaries of Afghanistan.
Although these boundaries were drawn up at Afghanistan’s expense,
their delimitation helped the amir to build a nation-state, and they
became the internationally agreed-upon boundaries that now con-
stitute modern Afghanistan.
Despite the limitations on his external relations that the amir had
accepted, he did not feel bound by them. The objective of his pol-
icy was to do away with these limitations and make the country
strong. However, as long as there was internal opposition to crush,
and the threat of a Russian military advance to counteract, the amir
remained loyal to his obligations to the British government, despite
the disagreements that he had with it a number of times. During
this period, the amir made no attempt to keep a balance of power
between Russia and Britain as Ludwig Adamec maintains.23 On the
contrary, until the mid-1890s he acted in a way that was decidedly
pro-British, and bitterly anti-Russian.
Thereafter, as a result of the military presence of Britain in Chitral,
and of Russia in the Pamirs, and the rapprochement between them,
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan tried to maintain a kind of balance of
power between them, while simultaneously attempting to make
Afghanistan completely independent. But he failed in his latter pro-
gram as well as in his efforts to establish direct relations with the
British government, in London. Also, the extent of his secret communi-
cations with other powers, including Russia, remained limited. However,
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan bequeathed a strong Afghanistan to
his successors, who finally made the country completely independent.
23
Adamec, L., Afghanistan, 1900–1923, University of California Press, 1967, 2,
17, 24.
CONCLUSION
The last four decades of the nineteenth century, which included the
first and second reigns of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan and the reign of
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, constitute an extremely eventful period
in the history of modern Afghanistan. During this period, two trends
dominated the political scene of the country: political centralization
with traditional individual liberty, and political centralization with-
out individual liberty. The first trend appeared in the second reign
of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, and the second in the reign of Amir 'Abd
al-Rahman Khan.
By the end of the reign of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, as a result of
the reforms that he had introduced, Afghanistan was on the road
to becoming a nation-state. The amir’s reforms included the estab-
lishment of a consultative assembly, the creation of a standing army,
the expansion of the official bureaucracy, the opening of schools,
and the establishment of the periodical, Shams al-Nahar. In rural areas,
most elders were assisted by councils, while others managed the
affairs of their communities by themselves in line with traditional
codes of behavior. The communities enjoyed the loyalty of their
members to a degree that ensured stability. Civil suits were settled
throughout the land on the basis of the Islamic law (Shari'a), in cities
by state-appointed judges, and in rural areas by self-appointed reli-
gious scholars.
The overwhelming majority of the people, whether they belonged
to tribal or mixed communities, or whether they were their clients,
or detribalized city residents of known or unknown origin, believed
in Islam. They all enjoyed a degree of individual liberty unparal-
leled elsewhere in the East.1 But wherever the government ruled
directly it ruled harshly. On the administration of Kandahar, Henry
W. Bellew, a British specialist on affairs of Afghanistan writes in his
unusual overcritical way thus:
The oppression of its [government’s] successive governors and the loca-
tion of a strong body of troops . . . has almost completely ruined the
1
Kakar, Afghanistan (1971), 4.
218 conclusion
place and has reduced the citizens to a state of poverty bordering on

despair.2
Still, by the standard of the region and the time this combination
of political centralization and individual liberty was an accomplish-
ment, and that time was needed for the country to become a mod-
ern nation-state. However, in 1878 the British invasion destroyed the
whole arrangement. Thereafter, disturbances bordering on anarchy
shook the society, until Amir 'Abd al-Rahman stabilized it by insti-
tuting such a rigid system of administration which the people of
Afghanistan had never experienced.
During the British occupation, Afghanistan did not have a legiti-
mate government; in fact, it did not even have a functional gov-
ernment, except in the city of Kabul and its immediate environs.
The reigning ruler, Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, had died and the British
had deported his son and successor, Amir Mohammad Ya"qub Khan,
to India. In this situation, the Sunni Muslims of the greater Kabul
region, known in the British official reports sometimes as the Ghazni
Party and at other times as the National Party, strove for a ruler of
their own to lead them in their struggle against the ‘infidel’ invaders.
This was what time-honored tradition and Islam demanded, but since
there were several claimants to the throne they failed in their purpose.
The British occupiers likewise failed in their efforts to elevate a
Mohammadzay sardar of their choice to the throne; it was out of
the question for them to rule the country directly. They failed because
the National Party upheld the cause of the family of the late Amir
Sher 'Ali Khan. For the same reasons, a few middle-of-the-road
Mohammadzay sardars also failed in their efforts to attract a sub-
stantial following, while the non-Mohammadzay elders who had dis-
tinguished themselves in the campaigns against the British invaders
could not aspire to the throne for the simple reason that they were
not Mohammadzays. Only the house of Amir Dost Mohammad
Khan was viewed as the ruling dynasty.
The failure of the British officials dealing with Afghanistan to set
up a functional government was due to the opposition of its people.
Prompted by their loyalty to their country, their religion and their
own Muslim rulers, they opposed the British and their various schemes.
2
Bellew, H. W., From the Indus to the Tigris, London, 1874, 148.
conclusion 219
Further, their determination to live according to their own rules

proved too strong for the invaders to break.
The difficulties of the British officials can be traced to their inabil-
ity to comprehend the Afghan people. Overconfident of the power
of their empire and of their own convictions, they underestimated
Afghan patriotic and religious values. For example, the Viceroy Lord
Lytton believed that “It is as idle to talk of the national sentiments
of the Afghans as it would be to talk of the corporate feeling of the
parish of Marylebone.” In Lytton’s view, Afghanistan was not a coun-
try, and he even went so far as to assert that “If ever there was a
mere geographical entity it was Afghanistan.”3 Consequently, Lytton
tried to wean the Afghan people from the house of Amir Sher 'Ali
Khan with a view to dominating them. In his declaration of war,
he stated in part,
With the Sardars and the people of Afghanistan this government has
still no quarrel, and desires none. Upon the Amir Sher 'Ali Khan
alone rests the responsibility of having exchanged the friendship for
the hostility of the Empress of India.4
However, soon the British officials demonstrated by their actions that
the declaration was only a bunch of words.
After the same people destroyed the small British embassy in an
uprising, Lytton instructed the Supreme Commander General, Frederick
S. Roberts, that for it the “Afghan nation must be held to be col-
lectively responsible.” About the participants in the uprising, he explic-
itly ordered that they should be punished, and that their punishment
“. . . should be swift, stern and impressive.”5 To day we have come
a long way from the time when even a European viceroy could
proclaim the people of another country “collectively responsible.”
Actually, it was the uprising which forced Lytton to change his mind
about Afghans and their land. Whereas before the uprising he viewed
Afghanistan as a mere “geographical entity” afterward he referred
to them as the “Afghan nation.”
The nationhood of the Afghans became further evident from the
fact that, even though
3
Quoted in Robson, B., The Road to Kabul, The Second Afghan War, 1878–1881,
Arms and Armour Press, London and New York, 1886, 203.
4
Lytton quoted in Duff, M. G., The Afghan Policy of the Beaconsfield Administration,
London, 1880 [?], 29.
5
Lytton to Roberts, 29 Sept. 79, in Balfour, Lytton’s Indian Administration, 372.
220 conclusion
Afghanistan was invaded, conquered, occupied and dismembered; her

peoples suffered mass arrests, collective fines and mass executions;
yet she successfully survived all these ordeals and acquired a political
personality.6
It was because of this “political personality” that Lytton was forced
to change his view. It was also the reason that he had previously
failed to rule over Afghanistan first through Amir Mohammad Ya"qub
Khan and afterward directly, even when the country was to have
been divided among Russia and Persia and British India.
After the uprising and the almost continuous unsettled situation,
Lytton decided to evacuate Afghanistan, even if a new ruler had not
been found for it. This was because the resistance was appreciated
even by the people of Great Britain, who replaced the government
of Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli, which had devised the ‘Forward
Policy’ by the liberal government of William Gladstone in the gen-
eral election that was held later, in April 1880. The Afghan war
had become an issue in the election, and Gladstone won in part
because he had promised an “honorable withdrawal” from Afghanistan.
Until the evacuation, set for October 1880, the search for a native
ruler for what Lytton and his lieutenants called “Northern Afghanistan”,
an entity from which the provinces of Kandahar and Herat were to
be excluded, continued.
This was during the period when Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan
had arrived in Badakhshan from Samarqand, where he had lived in
exile for eleven years. Lytton, who had declared war on Afghanistan,
apparently in an effort to forestall the danger to India posed by
Russia, had become so desperate that he tried to negotiate terms
with a claimant to the throne who was a known Russian pensioner.
He did so because, like him, 'Abd al-Rahman Khan was also opposed
to the rule of any member of the family of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan.
Lytton found it necessary to search for an able dynastic rival
because the National Party had already rejected the pro-British can-
didates to the throne. It accepted the sardar mainly in order to get
rid of the ‘infidel’ invaders. Although, it had preferred the house of
Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, its opposition to the ‘infidel’ invaders was
stronger. Further, the war had dragged on for too long and the peo-
ple of Afghanistan as well as Britain desired for someone to bring
6
conclusion 221
peace. An additional influence in the matter was the failure of Sardar

Mohammad Ayyub Khan to reach Kabul from Herat.
For his part, Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, in the critical weeks
of the negotiations, demonstrated realism in keeping a balance between
the opposing sides. At the same time that he impressed upon the
British that he was not a Russian nominee he convinced his coun-
trymen that he had returned home to deliver them from the ‘infidel’
invaders. Further, he reached Kabul before his rival, Sardar Moham-
mad Ayyub Khan, could arrive even in Kandahar, and acceded to
the throne, albeit on British terms. It is untrue to state, as some
have stated that the British installed the sardar in Kabul. They did
not, and if they could have done so they would not have waited for
Sardar 'Abd-al-Rahman Khan. As Singhal states
. . . it was almost impossible to find a puppet ruler who could retain his
head on his shoulders once the back of the British troops was turned,
while the maintenance of a permanent British force to quell frequent
rebellions was financially unendurable and politically unproductive.7
For the same reason the annexation of the country had also been
ruled out. In fact, the British could not raise a ruler to the throne
without the concurrence of the National Party, and this had become
impossible for them to achieve. The opposition of the National Party
and of others to the presence of the invaders was so strong that they
neutralized the various schemes that the invaders had devised for
ruling the country. No wonder that, as instructed by Lytton, the
British officials in Kabul ‘recognized’ 'Abd al-Rahman Khan as amir,
rather than ‘declared’ him as such.
With the accession of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, the British
war in Afghanistan came to an end, but the country lost its exter-
nal independence. Nevertheless, its people rejoiced, because they were
victorious in rescuing themselves from the ‘infidel’ invaders, and had
found a ruler of their own in the person of Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman
Khan. With his accession, a new period in the history of the coun-
try began to unfold, but, as it turned out, it proved more violent
than either the occupation period or the reign of any of his prede-
cessors. But first here is a brief account of the external aspect of the
subject.
7
Ibid., 187.
222 conclusion
Whatever their real aim, the British twice invaded Afghanistan,

apparently in an effort to forestall a Russian danger to India. Toward
that end, in 1878, Lytton devised a strategy to secure a line of
defense along the passes of the Hindu Kush range. This made it
necessary for British India to occupy Afghanistan up to or beyond
the Hindu Kush—a scheme that, whether by chance or design, coin-
cided with the western limit of the Mughal Empire at its zenith. But
the Sunni inhabitants of Afghanistan foiled the scheme, as their
fathers had foiled a similar British scheme some forty years earlier.
The policies that the British Government of India adopted toward
Afghanistan following each war were different. After the first war, it
pursued the policy of ‘containment’, known as ‘masterly inactivity’,
the essence of which was non-interference in the affairs of the land
beyond the Indus, that is, Afghanistan. This policy which had a
strong proponent in the person of John Lawrence, the governor-
general of India, was successful because no major clashes occurred
during the period in which the policy was in place.
After the Second Anglo-Afghan War, two concepts crystallized in
British official circles, regarding Afghanistan, though both had been
conceived of much earlier: the concepts of the ‘buffer zone’, and the
‘scientific frontier.’ These concepts, which were interrelated, appeared
to be a product of Russo-phobia, and were applied for the ultimate
purpose of making India secure from the threat of a Russian inva-
sion. Whether the danger was real is uncertain, but the fear of it
was, and it permeated official circles in India whenever the Conservative
Party was in power in Britain. This fear affected Afghanistan, inter-
nally as well as externally. To make India secure, the British gov-
ernment attempted to make Afghanistan secure from Russian influence;
at the same time it sought an additional alternative. The former
made it necessary for the British government to arrange a buffer
zone, and the latter to occupy strategic points in Afghanistan’s east-
ern hinterland.
The idea of creating a buffer zone between the empires of Russia
and Britain in Central Asia was an old one, which had arisen fol-
lowing the British withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1841. Three years
later, in 1844, Britain and Russia had arrived at an understanding
concerning what was known as the ‘Asiatic Question.’ They agreed
that “. . . the Khanates of Central Asia should be left by Russia to
form a neutral zone between the two empires, so as to preserve them
conclusion 223
from dangerous contact.”8 But Russia violated that agreement fol-

lowing its defeat in the Crimean war of 1854–56, at the hands of
European powers, as a result of which its passageways toward the
West were blocked, and after the Indian uprising of 1857, when the
grip of the British on India had been loosened. To compensate for
its Crimean defeat, Russia, as previously noted, turned to the East
“. . . with a mission to civilize neighboring countries on the continent
of Asia.”9 The ‘mission’, however, was only a pretext for conquest
as was the ‘Forward Policy’ of the British, both of which had been
summed up as ‘The Great Game’, a poetic phrase that is still alive.
As described in Chapter Eleven, by 1868, Russia had reached the
frontiers of Afghanistan. However, in 1873, it arrived at an under-
standing, not an agreement, as is generally claimed, with Britain that
the Oxus River was the boundary between the Russian-dominated
Bukhara and Afghanistan, and that the latter was beyond the sphere
of Russia’s influence.10 This understanding marked the beginning of
a buffer-status for Afghanistan. It also implied that Russia regarded
it to be within the sphere of British influence, and that Britain, in
return, accepted Russia’s conquests beyond the Oxus River.
In 1878, Lytton’s Afghan war upset the arrangement between
Britain and Russia. During the war when Britain realized that it
could not conquer Afghanistan it tried to restore the status quo ante.
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan went along with the scheme, although
at the time the northwestern boundary of Afghanistan had neither
been surveyed nor demarcated. Russia in its southward advance of
the 1880s occupied Panjdeh, in violation of its pledge of 1873, since
it lay inside Afghanistan to the south of the line between Sarakhs
and Khoja Saleh. Afterward, Britain took counter-measures, but these
still fell short of its obligations to repel ‘unprovoked aggression’ against
Afghanistan. Yet in the middle of the 1880s, and again in the early
1890s, when Russia pressured Afghanistan in the Pamir area, Britain
in cooperation with Russia managed to demarcate Afghanistan’s
entire northern boundary line. Afterward, Russia could not encroach
on Afghanistan without violating an international boundary, and
without colliding with Britain and Afghanistan.
8
Krausse, A., Russia in Asia, 1558–1899, London, 1899, 222.
9
Prince Gortchakov quoted in Krausse, Russia in Asia, 225.
10
Krausse, Russia in Asia, 228.
224 conclusion
The demarcation of Afghanistan’s northern boundary, and Russia’s

pledge that Afghanistan lay beyond its sphere of influence made it
a buffer zone as far as Russia was concerned; however, this was not
so with regard to Britain. Britain controlled Afghanistan’s external
relations, and, in addition, British India was coterminous with
Afghanistan’s eastern and southern populous hinterland, where even
the drawing of an international boundary could not alter the status
quo. However, because Russo-phobia was so pronounced in British
official circles, the British Government of India decided to have an
alternative line in Afghanistan’s hinterland. This was after Britain
had realized that it could not establish a forward line along the
Hindu Kush range. British officials referred to this alternative line
a ‘Scientific Frontier.’ In an age of European optimism when sheer
assumptions were called ‘laws’, they called this assumption also
‘scientific’. Probably, the real purpose of this ‘Scientific Frontier’ was
the containment of India itself, lest its people rise up against the
British, at the instigation of Russia.
Henry Rawlinson, the “high priest of the forward school”11 had
expressed this phobia when he stated that
India is a conquered country, where a certain amount of discontent
must be ever smoldering which would be fanned into a chronic con-
flagration by the contiguity of a rival European power.12
However, the demarcation of the Durand Line proved disastrous.
Shortly after its introduction, in 1897, it led to the greatest uprising
against the British west of the Indus, forcing them to employ more
troops than they had in their two wars in Afghanistan. Subsequently,
it also resulted in numerous clashes between the British forces and
the ever-defiant peasants of the frontier regions, until Britain left
India in 1947. The problems emanating from the so-called ‘scientific
Frontier’, as well as the Anglo-Afghan wars, have left a legacy of
anti-British feelings that is still alive to the present day.
The demarcation of the Durand Line made it imperative for the
British to try to make Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan neutral as far
as the frontier tribes were concerned. In this regard the British fol-
lowed a carrot-and-stick policy to compel the amir to keep out of
the affairs of the tribes, at the same time that it increased the amount
11
Duff, The Afghan Policy of the Beaconfield Adminstration, 33.
12
Rawlinson, Sir H., England and Russia in the East, London, 1874, 144.
conclusion 225
of grants for him and delivered weapons to Kabul from time to

time. All this helped the amir to suppress internal revolts and to
consolidate the state and his dynasty. Thus, Britain affected the course
of events inside Afghanistan, although it had nothing to do with its
internal affairs directly.
It is now time to deal with the internal aspect of the subject. An
important feature of this period was a sharp interplay of external
and internal influences in the shaping of Afghan history. The cir-
cumscription of Afghanistan checked the amir’s expansionist drive,
and it also indicated that danger to the country from the imperial
powers was just around the corner, in spite of their pledges of non-
interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. Meanwhile, due to the
British monopoly on Afghanistan’s external relations, the amir had
ample time to devote to domestic issues. He made strenuous efforts
to organize a strong central government to meet external and internal
challenges, and he opposed the federal-style system of administra-
tion, which Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan and Sardar Mohammad
Ishaq Khan had advocated.
When his more popular cousin, Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan,
vied for power, the amir ruled relatively mildly. After he expelled
him, in 1881, the amir leaned toward autocracy. Torn and frag-
mented by the British as well as by the civil wars, and sandwiched
between the Russian and British empires, Afghanistan needed a strong
central government, so the amir thought. He then took such mea-
sures that led to the enlargement of the standing army, the expan-
sion of bureaucracy and the intelligence service, the over-haul of the
system of taxation in order to increase revenue, the development of
state monopoly on foreign trade, and the enforcement of the cen-
tral government authority by a police state.
All of this resulted in the highhandedness of government officials,
and a financial burden on every group of the ra'iyats—or subjects—
that is, landlords, peasants, nomads, artisans, spiritual leaders, secu-
lar elders, the sardars and traders. The ra'iyats were treated as subjects,
not as citizens with equal rights. Further, even though the amir
obtained pecuniary grants from the British he expected the ra'iyats
to meet the ever-increasing expenses of the state. However, since the
ra'iyats were mostly small landowners and crop-sharing peasants who
lived under the conditions of a subsistence agrarian economy it was
difficult for them to meet these demands. They could not do so
unless compelled, and they were compelled mainly during the first
226 conclusion
decade of the amir’s reign, when almost all groups of the ra'iyats
rebelled.
The amir managed to suppress the more than forty rebellions that
occurred, and he also employed other tactics as a matter of policy.
For example, he would send tribal levies (eljaris) to oppose a rebellious
tribe, from among its neighbors. This was, of course, standard prac-
tice, but the amir also would instruct his officials to create dissen-
sion between tribes to weaken them in relation to the government—a
tactic that none of his predecessors had adopted. Consequently, this
divide-and-rule policy deepened old animosities that existed between
tribes, and created new ones among the ra'iyats, a practice that weak-
ened national solidarity. The amir also inculcated a fear of the infidels
among the ra'iyats, and set the jihad movement, or a kind of ideo-
logical war, in motion.
Scores of other new measures were also adopted to keep the ra'i-
yats calm. For example, the amir placed restrictions on the move-
ment of the ra'iyats, sometimes even from one village to another.
Additionally, efforts were even made to keep the rebellions secret,
and anyone who talked about them as well as politics was punished.
Once a man’s lips were sewed closed because he had talked about
politics. The subjects of peace, war and politics even though they
affected the lives of people in a fundamental way, were considered
to be the concern only of the amir and of those who were directly
involved in them.
The suppression of the rebellions took a tremendous toll on the
population. The number of casualties from the uprisings and the
number of those who were killed by the police will never be known;
the amir quotes a figure of over 100,000. In a population of approx-
imately six million, even this number, if true, is proportionately very
high, and many times higher than the combined number of Afghans
and the British killed in the two Anglo-Afghan wars. In addition,
those persons who were in a position to oppose the government were
either killed or expelled, or they went into exile for safety.
Consequently, the country was purged of known elders to such
an extent that it was said that if the British invaded Afghanistan
again, they would encounter no resistance. This was evident from
the reactions to the amir’s rule by the general public who, on many
occasions, especially after prayers in mosques, wished the amir bad
luck. They even prayed for the return of the British to deliver them
conclusion 227
from his tyranny. The loss of property was also immense: villages
and crops were destroyed; cattle were confiscated; and underground
canals (karezes) for cultivation dried up. Agriculture, which was the
foundation of the economy, suffered much.
The hardship was, however, impermanent and replete with rewards.
During the last years of the amir’s reign, he reversed his policy of
divide-and-rule, and embarked on a policy of forging unity among
the ra'iyats. This was after the demarcation of the boundaries of the
country had been completed, rebellions had been put down, the
elders of some ethnic communities crushed for their willingness to
undergo foreign rule, and the Hazarajat and Kafiristan had been
pacified. The countrywide institution of the ‘Festival of Unanimity’
( jashn-e-mutafiqqiyya), in 1896, is an illustration of the amir’s revised
policy.
The amir instituted a program to arm the entire nation, and cen-
ters were set up in many parts of the country where men able to
carry arms were trained in the military arts and armed with rifles,
which the government had accumulated in abundance.
By referring to the country as the ‘God-granted state of Afghanistan’
(dawlat-e-khudadad-e-Afghanistan), the amir stressed the Islamic charac-
ter of the state, even though the state that he had organized was
essentially secular, as will be described shortly. At times he even
called himself ‘the amir of Islam.’ In an effort to forge unity among
his subjects, he tried to blend Islamic values with nationalistic ones,
overlooking their inconsistent aspects and treating them as though
they were complementary. This was perhaps because Islam in
Afghanistan had become a mighty national religion, and, as noted
by Jacob Burckhardt, was “closely interwoven with the memories,
culture and history”13 of the people. This was so in spite of the fact
that, in Afghanistan, Islam and nationalism suffered from limitations.
Among these limitations was discrimination directed against the
religious minorities of Hindus, Sikhs and Jews through the imposi-
tion of a poll tax ( jazya), although some of the Brahman Hindus
were allowed to hold administrative posts. More serious was the fact
that, among the Muslim population, the Shi'as, especially the Hazaras,
were persecuted, and that some of the latter were kept in bondage,
despite the official abolition of slavery.
13
Force and Freedom, ed. Nicolos, Meridian Books, New York, 115.
228 conclusion
Additionally, the amir treated ethnic groups unequally, favoring

the Pashtuns, but without reviving the reform that Amir Sher 'Ali
Khan had begun for making Pashto the official language. The amir
served the Persian language by readopting it as the sole medium of
an extensive and expanding bureaucracy, and Persian also penetrated
the court, although he spoke Pashto more fluently than either Persian
or Uzbeki. He likewise treated the Pashtuns differentially, raising the
Mohammadzays to the top of the new polity. Even they he treated
unequally, raising the descendants of his great grandfather, Sardar
Payanda Khan, to a privileged position by providing them with reg-
ular allowances and making them partners of the state (sharik-e-dawlat).
The Kabul Mohammadzays, who, following the British intervention
were in twilight period, began to emerge as aristocrats among a
people who were more or less egalitarian.
The nationalism the amir envisaged had another, more serious,
limitation. This was the bifurcation of the Pashtuns by the demar-
cation of the Durand Line, which weakened the state, in a funda-
mental way. This occurred because Afghanistan subsequently lost a
vast region inhabited by a people who had played a leading role in
creating and safeguarding the country. However, the amir laid down
the foundation of a nation-state by instituting a uniform political
structure throughout multi-ethnic Afghanistan. The new structure
replaced the system of regional self-administered communities, and,
as a result people throughout the country began to identify them-
selves with the concept of Afghanistan as a nation, while they retained
their own ethnic identity.
In brief, during the reign of Amir 'Abd al Rahman Khan, the
enforcement of unified political, economic, legal and currency sys-
tems heralded the emergence of a single society in which a cen-
tralized dynastic nation-state was instituted. In view of the fact that,
as a result of the triumph over the ‘infidel’ army in the war, reli-
gious beliefs had become stronger and the clergy had become more
popular, the establishment of the secular nation-state was an accom-
plishment, indeed. The clergy, who had played a strong role in the
resistance, had helped Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan in scoring
spectacular victories. Had he unseated the amir, Afghanistan prob-
ably would not have had the secular state that developed under Amir
'Abd al-Rahman Khan. As his own son states, Sardar Mohammad
Ayyub Khan’s “. . . religious side of character was pronouncedly big-
oted, flowing with lush orthodoxy, which made him a tool in the
conclusion 229
hands of the priests.”14 The amir suppressed the clergy as well as

the landlords and tribal elders, and this suppression helped prepare
the ground not only for the institution of a strong secular govern-
ment, but also for modernization and industrialization in the decades
to come.
The amir set up workshops where modern weapons were pro-
duced and modern military technology introduced. Social and edu-
cational reforms were not attempted, not because the amir was
indifferent to them but because against the external forces, which
threatened the integrity of the country, and the internal forces, that
threatened its stability, he devoted most of his attention to the main-
tenance of stability and the centralization of political power. He had
no time to devote to social and educational reforms. Overall he tried
to conserve rather than to change. What he accomplished in con-
serving none of his predecessors even Ahmad Shah Durranay had
accomplished. He did all of this during the period when Afghanistan
was sandwiched between the expanding British and Russian empires.
However, his accomplishments were at the expense of individual
liberty which the people of Afghanistan enjoyed in their hitherto self-
administered tradition-oriented communities. No longer could indi-
viduals act as free agents; rather, they were there to serve the state
and society to which they were attached still more closely. In the
names of Islam, society, homeland and honor, as well as the monarch,
obedience was sought and obtained through organized official bod-
ies. In these names violence was allowed to be used extensively
against individuals.
The amir made no efforts to organize a society based on reason,
free discussion and the rule of law. He neither initiated, nor was he
asked to adopt a constitution in which the fundamental rights and
obligations of individuals as well as those of the state were clearly
stated. Rather, he treated the people as subjects (ra'iyats), not as cit-
izens, with a voice in the management of the government through
their representatives. In this system of centralized power the amir
became, as all absolute rulers are, oblivious to the notion that “[n]o
society can be of value to man’s life if the price is the surrender of
his right to his life.”15 Consequently, the individual on whom the
14
15
Rand, A. The Virtue of Selfishness, A Signet Book, 1964, 32.
230 conclusion
progress or stagnancy of society depends was stifled. The new soci-

ety that was composed of such individuals then could not become
creative, dynamic and productive, especially intellectually.
Not that the amir meant ill. He worked hard, indeed, to make
Afghanistan strong, but he did so by consolidating the society at the
expense of the individual. In this endeavor, too, he acted mainly on
his own views, discarding even the traditional system of consulta-
tion. Through the systems he organized, the amir centralized and
institutionalized state power and raised the monarch—that is—him-
self to the pinnacle of the new polity. Resultantly, he made himself
the source of emulation for most of his successors, but became unpop-
ular with the ra'iyats. However, in his own era the state he orga-
nized was able to stand up to the threats directed at it, and, through
it, the amir also ensured stability and order for the ra'iyats. In the
age of European colonialism and imperialism when Afghanistan was
sandwiched between two imperial powers, the amir perhaps saved
the country as well as the nation from being torn asunder, and, in
addition, laid down the foundation for a nation-state, albeit in a
reduced Afghanistan. In the words of D. P. Singhal, a specialist of
the external currents of the period,
Afghanistan owes a tremendous debt of gratitude to 'Abd al-Rahman
who guided her destiny in an hour of extreme danger with remark-
able political perception, diplomatic shrewdness and perseverance. In
spite of the many cruel deeds and inhuman punishments he inflicted
upon the people in his bid to consolidate his power, he gave the
Afghans a government such as they had never known before.16
This accomplishment as well as the earlier victories of the Afghans
over the British in the two Anglo-Afghan wars in a life time, con-
tributed to the establishment of a proud Islamic warrior nation.
However, in the long run Amir 'Abd al-Rahman’s concern for soci-
ety at the expense of the individual contributed to the weakening of
the country and the nation-state, and to-day’s backward Afghanistan
is the result. This is because “. . . even the best intentions and aspi-
rations must inevitably be smashed against the evils inherited in any
system of centralized power.”17
16
17
Serven, M., quoted in Noam Chomsky, N., Problems of Knowledge and Freedom,
Vintage Books, 1971, 66.
APPENDICES
A. The Peshawar Treaty of 1855
Treaty between the British Government and His Highness Amir Dost
Mohammad Khan, Wali of Kabul and of those countries of
Afghanistan now in his possession, concluded on the part of the
British Government by John Lawrence, Esquire, Chief Commissioner
of the Punjab in virtue of full power vested in him by the most
Noble James Andrew, Marquis of Dalhousie, KT, &C., Governor-
General of India; and on the part of the Amir of Kabul, Dost
Mohammad Khan by Sardar Ghulam Hayder Khan, in virtue of
full authority granted to him by His Highness—1885
Article 1
Between the Honorable East India Company and His Highness Amir
Dost Mohammad Khan, Wali of Kabul and of those countries of
Afghanistan now in his possession, and the heirs of the said Amir,
there shall be perpetual peace and friendship.
Article 2
The Honorable East India Company engages to respect those terri-
tories of Afghanistan now in His Highness’s possession, and never
to interfere therein.
Article 3
His Highness Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, Wali of Kabul and of
those countries of Afghanistan now in his possession, engages on his
own part, and on the part of his heirs, to respect the territories of
the Honorable East India Company and never to interfere therein;
and to be the friend of the friends and the enemy of the enemies
of the East India Company.
232 appendices
B. The Peshawer Treaty of 1857
Articles of Agreement made at Peshawer on the 26th January 1857

(corresponding with Jamade-al-Awwal, 29 A.H. 1273), between Dost
Mohammad Khan, ruler of Kabul and of those countries of Afghanis-
tan now in his possession, on his part, and Sir John Lawrence,
K.C.B., Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, and Lieutenant-Colonel
H. B. Edwardes, C.B., Commissioner of Peshawer, under the author-
ity of the right Honorable Charles John, viscount Canning, Governor-
General of India in the Council.
1. Whereas the Shah of Persia contrary to his engagement with
the British Government, has taken possession of Herat, and has man-
ifested an intention to interfere in the present possession of Amir
Dost Mohammad Khan, there is now war between the British and
the Persian Governments therefore the Honorable East India Company,
to aid Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, to defend and maintain his
present possessions in Balkh, Kabul, and Kandahar against Persia,
hereby agrees out of friendship to give the said Amir one lakh of
Company’s rupees monthly during the war with Persia on the fol-
lowing conditions:
2. The Amir shall keep his present number of cavalry, and shall
maintain not less than 18,000 Infantry, of which 13,000 shall be reg-
ulars divided into 13 Regiments.
3. The Amir is to make his arrangements for receiving the money
at the British treasuries and conveying it through his own country.
4. British Officers, with suitable native establishments and order-
lies, shall be deputed, at the pleasure of the British Government, to
Kabul or Kandahar, or Balkh, or wherever an Afghan army be
assembled to act against the Persians. It will be their duty to see
generally that the subsidy granted to the Amir be devoted to the
military purposes for which it is given, and to keep their Government
informed of all affairs. They will have nothing to do with the pay-
ment of the troops, or advising the Kabul government; and they will
not interfere in any way in the internal administration of the coun-
try. The Amir will be responsible for their safety and honorable
treatment, while in his country, and for keeping them acquainted
with all military and political matters connected with the war.
5. The Amir of Kabul shall appoint and maintain a Vakeel in
Peshawer.
appendices 233
6. The subsidy of one lakh per mensem shall cease from the date
on which peace is made between the British and Persian Governments,
or at any previous time at the will and pleasure of the Governor-
General of India.
7. Whenever the subsidy shall cease the British officers shall be
withdrawn from the Amir’s territory; but at the pleasure of the British
Government, a Vakeel, not a European Officer, shall remain at
Kabul on the part of the British Government, and one at Peshawur
on the part of the Government of Kabul.
8. The Amir shall furnish a sufficient escort for the British officers
and to the British border when returning.
9. The subsidy shall commence from 1st January 1857, and be
payable at the British treasury one month in arrears.
10. The five lakhs of rupees which have been already sent to the
Amir (three lakh to Kandahar and two to Kabul), will not be counted
in this agreement. They are free and separate gift from the Honorable
East India Company. But the sixth lakh now in the hands of the
mahajuns [sic] of Kabul, which were sent for another purpose, will
be one of the installments under this Agreement.
11. This agreement in no way supersedes the Treaty made at
Peshawer on 30th March 1855 (corresponding with the 11th of Rajab
1271), by which the Amir of Kabul engaged to be the friend of
the friends and the enemy of the enemies of the Honorable East
India Company; and the Amir of Kabul, in the spirit of that Treaty,
agrees to communicate to the British Government any overtures he
may receive from Persia, or from the allies of Persia during the war,
or while there is friendship between the Kabul and the British
Governments.
12. In consideration of the friendship existing between the British
Government and Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, the British Govern-
ment engages to overlook the hostilities of all the tribes of Afghanistan,
and on no account to visit them with punishment.
13. Whereas the Amir has expressed a wish to have 4,000 mus-
kets given him in addition to the 4,000 already given, it is agreed
that 4,000 muskets shall be sent by the British Government to Tull,
whence the Amir’s people will convey them with their carriage.
234 appendices
C. The Gandumak Treaty of 1879
Treaty between the British Government and His Highness Mahommad

Ya'qub Khan, Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies, concluded
at Gandumak on the 26th May, by His Highness the Amir Mahommad
Ya'qub Khan on his own part and on the part of the British Gov-
ernment by Major (afterward Sir Louis) P. L. N. Cavagnari, C.S.I.
1. From the day of the exchange of the ratifications of the pre-
sent Treaty there shall be perpetual peace and friendship between
the British Government on the one part and His Highness the Amir
of Afghanistan and its dependencies, and his successors, on the other.
2. His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies
engages, on the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty, to pub-
lish a full and complete amnesty, absolving all his subjects from any
responsibility for intercourse with the British forces during the war,
and to guarantee and protect all persons of whatever degree from
any punishment or molestation on that account.
agrees to conduct his relations with Foreign States in accordance
with the advice and wishes of the British Government. His Highness
the Amir will enter into no engagements with Foreign States, and
will not take up arms against any Foreign State, except with the
concurrence of the British Government. On these conditions the
British Government will support the Amir against any foreign aggres-
sion with money, arms, or troops, to be employed in whatsoever
manner the British Government may judge best for this purpose.
Should British troops at any time enter Afghanistan for the purpose
of repelling foreign aggression, they will return to their stations in
British territory as soon as the object for which they entered has
been accomplished.
4. With a view to the maintenance of the direct and intimate rela-
tions now established between the British Government and His
Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, and for the better protection of
the frontiers of His Highness’s domain, it is greed that a British
Representative shall reside at Kabul, with a suitable escort, in a place
of residence appropriate to his rank and dignity. It is also agreed
that the British Government shall have the right to depute British
Agents with suitable escorts to the Afghan frontiers whensoever this
may be considered necessary by the British Government in the inter-
ests of both States, on the occurrence of any important external fact.
appendices 235
His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan may on his part depute an

Agent to reside at the court of His Excellency the Viceroy and
Governor-General of India and at such other places in British India
as may be similarly agreed upon.
guarantees the personal safety and honorable treatment of British
Agents within his jurisdiction; and the British Government on its
part undertakes that its Agents shall never in any way interfere with
the internal administration of His Highness’s domains.
undertakes, on behalf of himself and his successors, to offer no imped-
iment to British subjects peacefully trading within his domains so
long as they do so with the permission of the British Government,
and in accordance with such arrangements as may be mutually agreed
upon from time to time between the two Governments.
7. In order that the passage of trade between the territories of
the British Government and of His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan
may be open and uninterrupted, His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan
agrees to use his best endeavors to ensure the protection of traders
and to facilitate the transit of good along the well-known customary
roads of Afghanistan. These roads shall be improved and maintained
in such manner as the two Governments may decide to be most
expedient for the general convenience of traffic, and under such
financial arrangements as may be mutually determined upon between
them. The arrangements made for the maintenance and security of
the aforesaid roads, for the settlement of the duties to be levied upon
merchandise carried over these roads, and for the general protec-
tion and development of trade with and through the dominions of
His Highness, will be stated in a separate Commercial Treaty, to
be concluded within one year, due regard being given to the state
of the country.
8. With a view to facilitate communications between the allied
Governments and to aid and develop intercourse and commercial
relations between the two countries, it is hereby agreed that a line
of telegraph from Kurram to Kabul shall be constructed by and at
the cost of the British Government, and the Amir of Afghanistan hereby
undertakes to provide for the protection of this telegraphic line.
9. In consideration of the renewal of a friendly alliance between
the two States which has been attested and secured by the forego-
ing Articles, the British Government restores to his Highness the
236 appendices
Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies the towns of Kandahar

and Jalalabad with all the territory now in possession of the British
armies, excepting the districts of Kurram, Pishin and Sibi. His
Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and is dependencies agrees on his
part that the districts of Kurram and Pishin and Sibi, according to
the limits defined in the schedule annexed, shall remain under the
protection and administrative control of the British Government: that
is to say, the aforesaid districts shall be treated as assigned districts,
and shall not be considered as permanently severed from the limits
of the Afghan kingdom. The revenue of these districts, after deduct-
ing the charges of civil administration, shall be paid to His High-
ness the Amir. The British Government will retain in its own hands
the control of the Khyber and Michni Passes, which lie between the
Peshawar and Jalalabad districts and of all relations with the inde-
pendent tribes of the territory directly connected with these passes.
10. For the further support of His Highness the Amir in the recov-
ery and maintenance of his legitimate authority, and in considera-
tion of the efficient fulfillment in their entirety of the engagements
stipulated by the foregoing Articles, the British Government agrees
to pay to His Highness the Amir and to his successors an annual
subsidy of six lakhs of Rupees.
26 May 1879 – 4 Jamade-Ussani 1296
D. The Durand Agreement or the Kabul Convention of 1893
Whereas certain questions have arisen regarding the frontier of

Afghanistan on the side of India and whereas both His Highness
the Amir and the Government of India are desirous of settling these
questions by friendly understanding, and of fixing the limit of their
respective sphere of influence, so that for the future there may be
no difference of opinion on the subject between the allied Governments,
it is hereby agreed as follows:
1. The eastern and southern frontier of His Highness’s domains,
from Wakhan to the Persian border, shall follow the line shown on
the map attached to this agreement.
2. The Government of India will at no time exercise interference
in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan,
appendices 237
and His Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in

the territories lying beyond this line on the side of India.
3. The British Government thus agrees to His Highness the Amir
retaining Asmar and the valley above it, as far as Chanak. His High-
ness agrees, on the other hand, that he will at no time exercise inter-
ference in Swat, Bajaur, or Chitral, including the Arnawai or Bashgal
valley. The British Government also agrees to leave to His Highness
the Birmal tract as shown in the detailed map already given to His
Highness, who relinquishes his claim to the rest of the Wazir coun-
try and Dawar. His Highness also relinquishes his claim to Chageh.
4. The frontier line will hereafter be laid down in detail and
demarcated, whenever this may be practicable and desirable, by joint
British and Afghan commissioners, whose objet will be to arrive by
mutual understanding at a boundary which shall adhere with the
greatest possible exactness to the line shown in the map attached to
this agreement, having due respect to the existing local rights of vil-
lages adjoining the frontier.
5. With reference to the question of Chaman, the Amir withdraws
his objection to the new British cantonment and concedes to the
British Government the rights purchased by him in the Sirkai Tileraj
water. At this part of the frontier the line will be drawn as follows:
From the crest of the Khwaja Amran range near the Psha Kotal,
which remains in British territory, the line will run in such a direc-
tion as to leave Murgha Chaman and the Sharobo spring to Afghanistan,
and to pass half-way between the New Chaman Fort and the Afghan
outpost known locally as Lashkar Dand. The line will then pass halfway
between the railway station and the hill known as the Mian Baldak,
and, turning southwards, will rejoin the Khawja Amran range, leav-
ing the Gwasha Post in British territory and the road to Shorawak to
the west and south of Gwasha in Afghanistan. The British Government
will not exercise any interference within half a mile of the road.
6. The above articles of agreement are regarded by the Government
of India and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan as a full and
satisfactory settlement of all the principal differences of opinion which
have arisen between them in regard to the frontier; and both the
Government of India and His Highness the Amir undertake that
any difference of detail, such as those which will have to be con-
sidered hereafter by the officers appointed to demarcate the bound-
ary line, shall be settled in a friendly spirit, so as to remove for the
238 appendices
future as far as possible all causes of doubt and misunderstanding

between the two Governments.
7. Being fully satisfied of His Highness’s goodwill to the British
Government, and wishing to see Afghanistan strong, the Government
of India will raise no objection to the purchase and import by His
Highness of munitions of war, and they will themselves grant him
some help in this respect. Further, in order to mark their sense of
the friendly spirit in which His Highness the Amir has entered into
these negotiations, the government of India undertake to increase by
the sum of six lakhs of rupees a year the subsidy of twelve lakhs
now granted to His Highness.
Kabul, November 12, 1893
E. The Covenants of Unanimity, 1896
Following is an English translation only of the covenant, which the

Mohammadzay sardars gave to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan after
Kafiristan was conquered in 1896. All other groups of the people
throughout Afghanistan followed their example—the Hindus, arti-
sans, businessmen, nomads, soldiers, and civil and military officials.
Some of these covenants were identical with the one that the
Mohammadzay sardars gave. Others were slightly different, but all
were signed by the mullas, tribal elders, countersigned and officially
sealed by the muftis and qazis. All stated that the covenants were
issued with the “free” consent of the people. On 26 Asad 1275 H.Sh.
(7 Rabi' al-Awwal 1314 H.Q., 17 August, 1896) a grand total of
194 covenants were presented to the amir, who named that day
Jashn-e-Mutafiqqiya (The Festival of Unanimity). In the covenants
the people undertook in strong words to confer the title of Zia al-
Millat-e-wa al-Din (The Light of the Nation and Religion) on the
amir. They also pledged themselves to defend the boundaries of
Afghanistan, now fixed for the first time. They likewise undertook
to obey and observe the religious and secular arrangements that the
amir had made, to remain faithful to him and his descendants, and
to accept the hasht nafari (one out of eight) system of conscription.
appendices 239
The Covenant
“The purpose of this covenant is this. Since the Almighty God, out
of extreme graciousness, has chosen a leader of the religion and the
state of Afghanistan from among the Mohammadzay tribe, and made
us and the other tribes of Afghanistan subjects of this august exis-
tence, and since by following is meant obedience, and obedience
makes incumbent upon the followers to follow the sovereign, and
since we, the above-mentioned tribe, because of close relationship,
are the first in obedience and following, so obedience in the sense
of following became our right. The other tribes of Afghanistan should
follow our lead.”
“Therefore, we state that, since the title of imam is obligatory on
behalf of the Almighty God and, since our King who, out of reli-
giosity expelled from the country the tribes opposing the religion,
has certainly and evidently not failed to fulfil the five religiously and
worldly commandments, their safeguarding became our right.”
“And again, since he has improved the disorganized state of the
land, its consolidation has become obligatory on us.”
“Again, since he defined the boundaries with our close neighbors
and with those far away, their safeguarding became our duty.”
“Again, since he reconstructed the fallen and ruined mosques and
pulpits, and fulfilled religious commandments by appointing the pres-
ident, the muhtasibs and prayer leaders, their preservation became
our duty.”
“Again, since he manifested honesty in state affairs we are duty
bound not to commit treachery to its integrity. Now that our sov-
ereign has fully fulfilled his responsibility, it is incumbent upon us
followers to act accordingly so that it should not happen that while
our imam has fully fulfilled his duties, we stand shameful when we
present ourselves before the real King, in accordance with the real
promise of the day, when all the people go forward with their imam
as has been mentioned in the Quran.”
“Therefore we, the Mohammadzay tribe who, in line with the
general principle, considered ourselves the number one followers,
observed and understood and held God as guarantor and His Prophet,
(may peace be upon him), as witness, swore on the Quran, which
has been sent by God, not to give away his acquired land to any-
one so long as we have the power and the strength.”
240 appendices
“Secondly, not to disrupt the arrangements he has made.”

“Thirdly, to safeguard the boundaries, which are the frontline so
long as we have the soul and life in our body.”
“Fourthly, not to dispute the right of the religion and to strengthen
our religious arrangements of God and the Prophet.”
“Fifthly, to recognize his sons as the inheritors to his crown and
kingdom, not to deviate from his will, to keep on obeying whether
he is alive or dead, be on guards to dangers all the time, not to be
ignorant of our responsibilities to our selves, to our religion and
honor and of the other Muslims, and it is for his sons, neither for
us nor for our descendants to choose the inheritors, so that we may
have acted in accord with the heavenly dispensation and are not
shamed in this world and the next.”
“And also whoever puts forward claims for amirate, during the
lifetime or after the death of our king, is either the untrue son of
his father, or is not from our religion, or has intended a new destruc-
tion. And also since we would like to see his name remembered for-
ever in Islam we add the title of Zia al-Millat wa al-Din after his
blessed name. 1313.”
Signed and sealed by the descendants of the Amir-e-Kabir,

Sardar Amir Mohammad Khan and Wazir Fatih Khan
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242 select bibliography
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GLOSSARY
amir Ruler; king; chief military commander of a province in medieval

India; title of rulers of the Mohammadzay dynasty. The dynasty’s
founder, Amir Dost Mohammad Khan adopted the title for the
first time in modern Afghanistan; he was known as Amir al-
Mu"minin as well as amir-e-kabir (‘the great amir’).
amir al-Mu"minin Commander of the faithful.
amirate Reign or domain of an amir.
'awam Commoners as distinct from the khawass (elite).
badal Revenge; retaliation.
badshah King; ruler; chief.
Badshah Khel ruling clan of a tribe such as the Hotakay, Sadozay and Moham-
madzay.
Bar Durranay (s) Literary Durranays of the highland; name given by Ahmad
Shah Durranay to the Pashtuns living in the region between
Kabul and the Indus.
borjan Kafir term for ‘slaves’.
chakari Herb boiled for consumption in Badakhshan.
daha Decade; Persian term for the Mongol military formation of ten
soldiers.
dai Probably a corruption of daha. Originally a Mongol military
formation of ten soldiers; now a prefix of territorial as well as
tribal designation among the Hazaras such as Dai Zangi, Dai
Kundi and Dai Mirdad.
darbar Court of rulers; princes and governors.
darwesh Member of a religious order; a pious person indifferent to mate-
rialism.
dawlat State; wealth.
Dogan Kafir term for ‘spirits’.
eljari (s) Tribal levies; all kinds of irregular recruits assisting the gov-
ernment in suppressing a rebellion in conjunction with the reg-
ular army.
fatwa Expression of opinions of the 'ulama on legal matters; legal
ruling.
firman Royal or official edict.
ghazi Fighter against infidels in the cause of Islam.
ghamza Opium-potion used mainly in Badakhshan and Seistan.
ghulam bacha Page-boy
gund Traditional political faction or block among Pashtuns, especially
the Bar Durranays. Among the latter some communities are
divided into speen gund (‘white faction’) and tore gund (‘black fac-
tion’); others into samil and ghar. In modern times gund indi-
cates a political party.
hakim Subgovernor.
hamsaya Client; a person or a group of people living with others in a
subordinate position; neighbor.
hazara Mongol military formation of one thousand soldiers.
hazaragi The form of Persian spoken among the Hazaras.
248 glossary
ilkhan Head of a tribe.

imam Leader of prayer; chief of the Muslim community. Originally,
the imam was the Prophet, Muhammad, himself; subsequently,
his successors (khalifas or caliphs) held the office. To the Shi'as,
imams are those who belong to the family of the Prophet. The
title is hereditary in the line of 'Ali through his wife Fatima, the
daughter of the Prophet. However, the Sunni concept of the imam
requires that he be chosen by consensus.
Isma'ili(s) Followers of Imam Isma'il, the controversial seventh imam; the
“seveners” as distinct from the “twelvers” or imami Shi'as.
jam"bast Assessment of land revenue on a tribal community as a whole
in 1896.
Jashn-e-mutafiqqiya Festival of unanimity established throughout Afghanistan by Amir
'Abd al-Rahman Khan.
jazya Poll tax paid by non-Muslims to Muslim rulers in return for pro-
tection.
jirga Council of elders; deputation of elders. In some Pashtun com-
munities every male adult is required to attend the jirga. However,
members of the client groups (hamsayas) are excluded from attend-
ing it, unless they are a party in the dispute under consideration.
kafir Infidel, non-Muslim, especially the European aggressor; utterly
cruel.
karez Subterranean canal for irrigation.
khalifa Caliph; successor to the Prophet; head of a guild and occupa-
tional profession; master.
khalisa State land.
khassadar Militia.
khan Big landlord; one who had under him many maliks (village head-
men) and provided levies and military service to the government
in return for allowances or a grant of land or both; now a com-
plimentary title.
khan-e-mulla Chief judge; khan-e-'ulum.
khawass Elite; privileged persons.
khirqa The reputed robe of the Prophet; also its location.
khutba Friday sermon in which the name of the Muslim ruler is men-
tioned; no mention of the ruler is tantamount to rebellion.
khums one-fifth; share of the state in booty.
kotwal head of the department which dealt with security affairs; roughly
the minister of the interior.
lala Tutor
mir Probably a corruption of the term amir; head of kinship groups
among the Hazaras, Tajiks of Badakhshan and the Hotak Pashtuns.
mufti Adviser to the court or qazi in legal affairs.
mujtahid Someone especially among the Shi'as who has attained such pre-
eminence in religious scholarship which permits him to issue
opinions on matters of faith.
mustaufi head of the central diwan or financial office.
namcha kunda ‘Kafir’ term for the uttering of invocations.
Naqshbandiyya A Sufi tariqa (mystic order) ascribed to Baha al-Din Naqshband
(1318–1389) based in a village near Bukhara in Central Asia.
Unlike the majority of other tariqas that trace their descent through
'Ali, the Naqshbandiyya traces its descent through Abu Bakr.
Also, unlike other tariqas, the Naqshbandiyya has “insisted on
political activity for the sake of Muslim welfare and the service
glossary 249
of God” and has recently devoted itself “to the cause of supremacy
of the Shari'a and the ascendancy of the Islamic ideal in Muslim
society”.
nawa Valley; community.
neemcha A ‘kafir’ of former Kafiristan converted to Islam.
nizam al-dawla Order of the state; title granted to elders of some tribes.
olga Region, district; fatherland; a term used only in the Hazarajat.
pacha Pashto term for badshah; king; title of the sayyeds of Konarr.
pir Head of a sufi tariqa (mystic order); a religious person with pro-
found influence over his disciples.
qazi Judge.
ra'iyyat (ra"iyya) Subjects of a ruler.
sada Mongol military formation of one hundred soldiers; century.
sada-e-qabr Hazara medieval tribal term.
sada-e-sueka Hazara medieval tribal term.
safed-posh ‘White-robed’ tribal ‘kafir’.
sardar Originally a military general; title granted by a king to an elder,
especially the head of a tribe or a section of it.
se-kot Three portions, the system of taxation according to which the
state exacted one-third of the land production as revenue.
sayyed Actual or claimed descendant of the Prophet through his daugh-
ter, Fatima.
shah King; title of Sadozay rulers and also of rulers of certain local
communities in Badakhshan; derived from the Avestan word,
khshatra.
Sharik-e-dawlat Partner of the state.
shaykh Title of religious persons, especially of the disciples of a pir;
‘Kafirs’ of Kafiristan converted to Islam before 1896.
sigha (or seegha) Temporary marriage sanctioned by the Shi'i sect and practiced
among the Hazaras of Afghanistan.
ta"ifa Section of a tribe.
talib Student of Islamic studies.
tanga Coin with a value of one-third of a rupee.
tariqa An Islamic mystic order.
tuman Mongol military division of 10,000.
wali Governor of a province.
'ulama Sunni religious scholars, plural of 'alim, a learned man.
urey Common council in former Kafiristan.
'ushr Tithe; Islamic tax.
wali 'ahd Heir apparent.
Wakil British Muslim diplomatic agent in the court of Kabul.
yaghistan Autonomous principalities or khanates; the land of rebels.
zimmi ‘Protected’; non-Muslim subjects of a Muslim ruler.
INDEX
'Abd al-Rahman Khan, Sardar, as a 'Abd al-Quddus Khan, Sardar,

refugee in Samarqand in 1865, 4, occupation of Herat by, 61, 130,
again in 1868, 11–12; internal and 132
external problems of the amir, 5; 'Abd al-Rahman Barakzay,
administrative system of, 5; as amir Khan-e-mulla, 42
of “Northern Afghanistan”, 5; arrival 'Ajab Khan Afriday, 191
of, in Badakhshan, 38–39; claim for 'Asmat Allah Jabar Khel, 89
an undivided Afghanistan, 41; com- 'Abd al-Hamid, Caliph Sultan of
munication of, with all Afghan sides, Ottoman Turkey, 214
41; British negotiations with, 41–42; Abgan, 76
declaration as amir of, in Charikar, Aboot, James, 193
42; reasons for, to become amir, Abu Rihan al-Beruni, 139n
43–44; generous on the way to Achaemenian Persia, 98
Kandahar in 1881, 58, 85–86; Achakzays, 187
strained relations of, with Russia, Acvaka, 76, 85
105, 117, 150, 208, 216; religious Adamec, Ludwig, author, 216
policy of, 137, 167; aversion of, to Afghan army, strength of, during the
British meddling in internal affairs, reign of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, 17
171–172; improvements in Afghan, 2n, 76
relationship of, with India, 172–173; Afghanistan, a buffer state, 5, 118–119,
strained relations of, with India, 222, 224; British invasion of, in
173–174; suspicion of, of Russia and 1878, 27; reunification of, 4;
Britain, 176–177, efforts of, toward Lytton’s scheme of fragmentation
independence, 176–177, 188, of, 38; fragmentation of, after the
190–191, 197–198, 203–204; view fall of Sadozays, 160; relations of,
of, on defense of Afghanistan, 206, with Russia, 193; with Ottoman
206n; visit to India of, 206; policy Turkey, 214–215; with Persia,
of balance of power, 209–210; 210–214; claim of, to the Turkman
respectful to sultan of Turkey, land, 203
214–218, 220–221, 223–224; novel Afridays (Apridays), divisions of, 80;
and traditional administrative agreement of, with the British, 81;
measures of, 226; consequences of relations of, with Amir 'Abd
measures adopted by, 226; treatment al-Rahman Khan, 81
of ethnic groups by, 228; efforts by, Afzal al-Mulk of Chitral, 111
to save society at the expense of Afzal Hotak, Mir, 89
individuals, 229–230 Agha Khan of Bombay, 112
'Abd al-Rahim, Mawlawi, killing of, Agreement of 1873, 115n, 195
by the amir, 61 Ahmad Shah Durranay, 83–84, 106,
'Abd al-Karim, Mulla, 91–93 129, 163, 216, 229
'Abd Allah Jan, Crown prince, 17 Ahmed Khel, Battle of, 128
'Abd Allah Khan Tokhay, Sardar, Ahriman, 96
governor of Badakhshan, 102, 113 Ahura Mazda, 96, 98n
'Abd Allah Nasir, Sardar, 60 Aimal Khan Mohmand, anti-Mughal
'Abd al-Qadir, Qazi, as adviser to struggles of, 80
Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, 18; as British Airyana Vaejo, 98n
correspondent in Kabul, 170, 199 Akbar Ahmad, anthropologist, 188
252 index
Akhund Baba (Mulla Ilyas), 77 Barikot, 152

Alaman, raids committed by Uzbeks Bashgal valley, 180, 183
against Tajiks, 110 Beaconsfield, see Disraeli
Alder, G. J., author, 119 Beett, see Pashtun, 2n
Alexander II, Russia’s emperor, 164, Bellew, Henry W., 217
202 Besus, ruler of ancient Balkh, 98
Alexander the Great, 45, 76, 98, 157 Bibi Hawa, widow of Sardar Rahimdil,
Aman Allah Khan, King, 7 52
Ambia Khan, Sardar, elder of Taimani Bonair, 69
tribe, 57 British embassy in Kabul, destruction
Andkhoy, 102, 108 of, 29, 167
Anglo-Afghan Wars, First, 1838–1841, Buffer zone, emergence of, as a
2, 164; consequences of, First, concept, 222, see also Afghanistan
160–161; Second, 4, 26–27, 166 Bukhara, 111, 113, 194
Aparytae, see Afriday Burnes, Alexander, 160, 193
Apriday or Afriday, 2n Burrows, Major General G.R.S. takes
Arsari, Turkmen tribe, 203 position in Maiwand, 47
Asmar, 75–76, 86 Buryat, 123
Aspasians, 76, 85
Asva-ghana, 76, see also Pashtun Caro, Sir Olaf, author, 179
Auckland, Lord, viceroy of India, Cavagnari, Major Piere Louis, 28, 33;
160 death of, 29, 166–167
Azmat Hayat Khan, 183 Cavagnarizays (pro-Cavagnari or
pro-English party), 37
Babuqara, 77 Chaghatay, 123
Babur, Mohammad Zahir al-Din, Chagheh, 180
Founder of Mughal dynasty, 69, Chamberlain, Neville, mission of, 26,
128, 149 166
Bactra, see Balkh Char Aimaq of Herat, 57, 208
Bactria, see Balkh Char Asia, Battle of, 30
Bactriana, see Balkh Charmang, 77
Bactrians, 1n, 85 Chinggis Khan, 122
Badakhshan, 109–110; slavery in, 113, Chitral, 29, 118, 139, 150; mehter of,
115 77, 79, 151–152, 180, 185
Badal (revenge), 68 Churchill, Winston, Sir, 189
Baha al-Din, Khwaja, founder of the Civil war of the 1860s, 4, 10; causes
Naqshbandiyya order, 101 of, 12–15
Baha al-Din, Sayyid, of Konarr, Conolly, Captain Arthur, 194
69–70 Crimean war (1854–56), 194, 223
Bahadur Khan Kabuli, 23 Curzon, Lord, Viceroy of India, 175
Bajaur, 75–76, 78, 180, 185–186
Bajgah, Battle in 1864 of, 11 Darab Shah, 114
Bakhdi, see Balkh Darius, emperor, of Achamaenid
Bakhtar, 96, 149 Persia, 98, 157
Balkh, 96, 98–99 Darwaz, district of, 109
Baluches, 187 Darwesh 'Ali Hazara, 129
Baluchistan, 19, 58; India’s treaty with, Darya Khan Apriday, 80
in 1876, a feudatory of Afghanistan, Dawars, 81
26 Dawlatabad, 102
Bamiyan, 128 Delawar Khan, wali of Maymana, 107;
Bar Durranays and Afghanistan, 8, 83 attempts of, to become a Russian or
Bar Panja, 112 British protégé, 107–108
Barakzays, 1, 106 Din Mohammad, Mulla, see Mulla
Bareches, 187 Mushk-e-'Alam
index 253
Dir, 75–76 Ghazni, 34

Disraeli, Benjamin, British premier, 38, Ghazni, battle of, in 1868, 12
165, 220 Ghaznigak, battle of, 102, 104
Dost Mohammad Khan, Amir, founder Ghilzays, uprising of, 87; divisions of,
of Mohammadzay dynasty, 1–3, 7; 87; reasons for uprising of, 94–95;
biography and death of, 9, 11; new taxes on, 90, 92–94
disunity among sons of, 13; Ghobar, Mir Ghulam Mohammad,
character of, 14, 69–70, 86, 98, historian, 34, 141, 149, 182, 203
106, 160, 162, 169, 186, 193, 218 Ghor, 2n, 84, 87
Dupree, Louis, author, 186 Ghorgasht, see Pashtun
Durand Agreement, 5, 83, 86; Ghous al-Din, General, 204
conclusion and purpose of, 177; Ghulam Haydar Khan Charkhay,
British pressure for, 178–179; Sipah Salar, 34; as viceroy in
proceedings in Kabul about, 180; eastern province, 73; arrival of,
fear the cause of the, 181–182; at Asmar, 75–76, 78, 151–152,
invalidity of, 183; Mohmand and, 189
184–186 Ghulam Haydar Khan Orakzay,
Durand Line, 2n, 183, 186–189, 191; General, 73, 92, 94, 104
maintaining status quo by, 185–186, Ghulam Haydar Wardak, General,
224 military commander at Mazar, 39
Durand, Sir Henry Mortimer, Foreign Gladstone, William, British premier,
secretary of India, 83, 116–117; 220
arrival at Kabul of, 178–179, Gomal, 81
181–182, 184–185 Gorthchakov, Alexandr M. Russia’s
Durranay Empire, rise and fall of, 9 foreign minister, 164; deterministic
Durranays, main divisions of, 45–46, view of, 202; memorandum of,
66, 87, 92–93, 95 202–203
Goshta, 66
Effendi, 'Abd al-Qadir, 7 Green, Peter, historian, 76
Elgin, Lord, Viceroy of India, 188 Griffin, Lepel Sir, British diplomat, 40;
Elliot, Sir H. M., 139n official recognition of Amir 'Abd
Elphinstone, Mountstuart, 159–160 al-Rahman 42; letter by, on
Anglo-Afghan relations, 168, 170
Faqir, Mulla, 189 Gulzad, Zalmay, author, 179
Fath 'Ali Shah, king of Persia, 160 Gushtasp, 96
Fath Allah Khan, elder of Firozkohis,
49, 108 Habib Allah Khan, Sardar, the amir’s
Fatwa, failure of Amir 'Abd son, 209
al-Rahman to obtain, against the Habib Allah Wardak, Mustaufi, 21,
Ghilzays, 94; of Kandahar ulama 33; dispatch of, to Ghazni, 40;
against the amir, 58–59 deportation of, to India, 42
Fayz Mohammad, historian, 92 Hafiz Allah Ghilzay, Na"ib Sipah
Forward policy of British India toward Salar, 60
Afghanistan, 25–26 Haji Khan Kakar, 129
Frank Holt, 98 Haji Khan Uzbek, 106
Hamsayas, 76
Game, The Great, about Central Harrison, Frederick, 32
Asian states, 6, 179, 194–195, 209, Hashtadan, occupation of, by Persia,
223 212; partition of, 212
Gandahara, 2n Hazara war, The, as a sectarian war,
Gandaharii, 2n 132–133; peace overtures during,
Gharj, district, 87 134; intensity of, 138; consequences
Gharzay, 87 of, 138
Ghazni Party, or National Party, 36 Hazara-British relationship, 128, 133
254 index
Hazarajat (Hazaristan, or Barbaristan), Kabul Convention, see the Durand

division of, into 15 regions, 120; Agreement
government inroads in, 126, 129 Kabul, occupation of, by Sardar 'Abd
Hazaras, 93; religion and number of, al-Rahman, et al., 11; Sardar Wali
122; origin of, 122, 125n, 123; Mohammad as governor of, 37;
relations of, with neighbors, British occupation of, 29, 46; capital
125–128; religious groups of, 131; of Afghanistan since 1776, 46
submission by agreement of the, Kafiristan, 2n, 8; interpretation and
130; uprising of the, 131; fighting historical development of, 139, 139n;
between the, and government invasion of, 153; renaming of, as
forces, 134; submission of the, Nuristan, 155; construction of roads
135; settlement of the, 135–137; in, 155; European societies against
enslavement of the, 136; flight of, occupation of, 156; lauding of Amir
to Quetta and Central Asia, 137; 'Abd al-Rahman Khan for conquest
pastures of, to nomads, 137; forced of, 157
conversion of, to Sunnism, Kafirs, religious beliefs of, 1; pattern of
137–138 settlement of, 2; tribes and tribal
Hekmat Khan, Wali, 106 councils of, 143–146; slave
Helmand, 85 population (borjan) of, 143, 145–146;
Herat, 10; fall of, to the amir’s forces position of women of, 146; marriage
in 1881, 61, 90, 203 and other customs of, 147; relations
Herodotus, 1n, 2n, 85 of, with Muslims, 148; history of,
Hill-Jones, Major General, Sir James, 149–150; negotiations with, 152;
governor of Kabul, 30, 36 conversion of, to Islam, 154
Hindu Kush, 909 Kahaka (Qahqah), Zoroaster governor
Hindus, looting of the houses of of Balkh, 112
pro-British Hindus, 35 Kajbaz, battle in 1865 of, 11
Hopkirk, Peter, 195 Kakars, 93
Hunza, 18 Kalat, 87
Hussayn Ali Qizilbash, Sipah Salar, 60 Kam, ‘Kafir’ tribe, 2n
Hussayn Beg, Mir, leader of the Kandahar, occupation of, by Sardar
Hazara rebellion, 132 Mohammad Yaqub Khan, 12; a
separate principality, 45; inhabitants
Indus River, 85 of, 45; commercial and strategic
Ivanoff, M. M., Russian scholar, 115 significance of, 46; Lytton’s view of,
'Izzat Allah, 193 46; declaration of, as an independent
principality, 38, 46; handover of, to
Jahandadar Shah, mir, of Badakhshan, Amir 'Abd al-Rahman in April
39, 111 1881, 56; occupation of, by Sardar
Jahandar Khan Qibchaq, Qazi, 57 Mohammad Ayyub, 58; battle of
Jahangir, Mughal emperor, 149 Chilzeena in, 60; plunder of, by the
Jalal al-Din Akbar, Mughal emperor, amir’s soldiers, 61; foundation of the
67, 149 city of, by Alexander the Great, by
Jam" bast, 90 Nadir Shah Afshar, and by Ahmad
Jamal al-Din Afghani, Sayyed, Shah, 45–46, 90
expulsion of, from Kabul, 15, Karatigin, 112, 114
16n, 215 Kauffmann, General Constantine von,
Jamshedis, 203; removal of, to interior Russia’s governor-general in
of Herat Turkestan, 26, 166, 195–197
Jandol, 77 Kazaks, 123
Jashn-e-mutafiqqiya (festival of Khalil Mohmand, Mulla, 150
unanimity), 157, 227 Khan Agha, elder of Jamshedi tribe,
Jirgas (councils), 22 57
index 255
Khan, position and significance of, Mahmud Pacha, Sayyed, submission of,
among eastern Pashtuns, 77 to the British, 70; view of, on
Khattak, 2n Afghanistan, 70; British guarantee to,
Khiva (Kharazm, Khorezm), 194 70; communication between the
Khojak Range, cutting a tunnel British and the Amir on, 71;
through the, 83 abandonment of, by the British, 72;
Khojeh Saleh, 115, 115n flight to India of, 71
Khoqand, 194–195 Maiwand, battle of, 4; account and
Khudayar Khan of Yarkand, 111 casualties of, 50–52; consequences
Khyber Pass, 4, 80–81; loss of, to of, 53–55
Afghanistan, 38, 166 Makhdum Quli Khan, ruler of Merv,
Kipling, Rudyar, 194 204
Kirghiz, 117, 123 Mamund (Watalai), 77
Kisay Ghar, 2n, 84, 87 Manakai, Mulla of, 189
Kohzad, Ahmad 'Ali, historian, 2n Marquis of Salisbury, 164
Kokcha River, 115 Masayzay code, 66
Konarr (Kunar), 69; strategic Massion, Charles, 129, 139n
significance of, 71, 75–76 Massyd (Massoud), 81–82
Krubast, custom of, 124 Maymana, 8, 62, 90, 100, 102; history
Kulab, 114 of, 106; pacification of, in 1884,
Kurma (Kurram), district of, 4; loss of, 109; besiegement of, by Sardar 'Abd
to Afghanistan, 38, 79 al-Rahman in 1868, 197
Mayo, Lord, Viceroy of India,
Ladakh, 118 163–164
Lalpura, 66 Mazar-e-Sharif, 90, enlargement of, 98
Lansdowne, Viceroy of India, 119; Mclean, General, 212
warning of, about Waziristan, 83; Mehdi 'Ali Khan, 193
warning of, for the Durand Merv, occupation of, by Russia, 201
agreement, 178 Michni Pass, 4; loss of, to Afghanistan,
Lawrence, John, Viceroy of India, 38
222 Mir Baba of Badakhshan, 39
Lockhart, Colonel, 150, 158 Mir Baba of Kohistan, 34
Logar, 87 Mir Wais Hotak, liberator of
Lomakin, Russian General, 201 Kandahar, 45, 87, 89
Lord, Percival, 193 Mohammad 'Alam Khan, Na"ib,
Lumsden, Sir General Peter, 205 governor of Afghan Turkestan, 98
Lyall, Alfred, foreign Secretary, visits Mohammad 'Ali Khan, death of
Kandahar, 55 Prince, 11
Lytton, Edward Robert, L. B., viceroy Mohammad 'Azim, Sardar, elder of
of India, 4, 32; “new order” of, for Se-pai Hazaras, 130
Afghanistan, 36–38, 165–166, 187; Mohammad 'Omar of Badakhshan, 38
view of, of Afghanistan as a Mohammad A'zam Khan, Amir,
geographical entity, 219; as a rebellion of, in 1864, 10; becomes
nation, 219; proposed partition of amir in 1867, 12–13; death of, 12,
Afghanistan, 220, 222; guide lines 101, 107
on Afghanistan to Grifin, 40; see Mohammad Afzal Khan, Sardar,
also Afghanistan rebellion of governor, 10–11;
becomes amir in 1866, 12; death of,
Ma"sum Khan, mission of, in Kabul, in 1867, 12–13, 70, 98
211–212 Mohammad Afzal, Sardar, British
MacGregor, Major General Sir agent, 197
Charles, M., 8, 30–32, 34, 39 Mohammad Afzal, the Amir’s supposed
Mahmud Hotak, Shah, 87 uncle in Samarqand, 209
256 index
Mohammad Akbar Khan, of Lalpura, Mohammad Sadiq, Mirza, Russian

66; agreement of, with the British, agent, 198–199
68; income of, 68; submission of, to Mohammad Shah Hotak, 91
Kabul, 69 Mohammad Shah Surkhabay, 34
Mohammad Akbar Khan, Sardar, 10, Mohammad Sharif Khan of Dir, 78;
14, 35, 70, 98 as nawab, 79
Mohammad Amin Khan, Sardar, Mohammad Ya"qub Khan, Amir, in
rebellion of, 11 league against his father, 23;
Mohammad Aslam Khan, Sardar, 10 imprisonment of, in 1874, 24;
Mohammad Aslam, Kabul Kotwal, 32 becomes amir in 1878, 27; concludes
Mohammad Ayyub Khan, Sardar, the Gandumak treaty, 28–29;
victor of Maiwand, 4, 7; flight to resignation of, 30; deportation of,
Mashhad of, 24, 42; in possession of to India, 33, 38, 40, 81, 166, 175,
Herat, 48, 56; occupation of 196–197, 211, 218, 220
Kandahar by, 47–48; biography of, Mohammadzay sardars, 1, official posts
48; influence of clergy on, 48; to pro-British, 36, in a state of
instigation of army by, 49; failed decline, 37, made sharik-e-dawlat,
negotiations of, with the British, 53; 95, 106
proposal of, for a federal system, 59; Mohmand Baba, 66
failed uprising of the Heratis against, Mohmand, history of, 65; divisions of,
56–57; occupation of Kandahar by, 65–66; significance of, 68; rising of,
57; as a refugee in India and death in 1879, 68; remained
of, 62, 82, 86, 89–91, 93–94, undemarcated, 183–184, 187
107–108, 130, 169–170, 175, Mongols, destruction of Tajiks and
210–211; arrival of, in Lahore, 212, Pashtuns by, 123–124
221, 225, 228 Morcha Khan Mohmand, founder of
Mohammad Gul Mohmand, 105 Morcha Khel, 67
Mohammad Hasan, Shahzada, Muqur, Battle of, in January 1867, 12
opposition of, to Sardar 'Abd Murgha, 66
al-Rahman in 1880, 38 Murghab River (Ak-su), 109, 113,
Mohammad Hashim, Sayyed, of 115, 163
Konarr, 70 Murghab, District of, 108
Mohammad Hashim Khan, Sardar, Murzad Wali Baba, 67
claimant to kingdom, 40, 211 Musa Jan, Sardar, minor son of
Mohammad Hassan Khan, Sardar, Amir Mohammad Ya"qub Khan,
senior official, 30, 195 36, 211
Mohammad Hussayn Khan, Mir, 106, Mushk-e-'Alam, Mulla, preaching of
108–109 jihad by, 34, 89; estrangement of,
Mohammad Ilkhan, Mir, 130 90; death of, in 1886, 90–91
Mohammad Ishaq Khan, becomes
governor of Mazar in 1880, 39, 90, Nadir Shah Afshar, 45, 150
100; rebellion of, 101; sudden flight Najm al-Din, mulla, 189
of, 104; reasons for revolt of, Naqshbandiyya order, 100
104–105; consequences of the revolt, Nasr Allah Khan, Sardar, the Amir’s
105, 108, 208, 212, 225 son journey to England, 175, 209
Mohammad Isma'il Khan, Sardar, son National Party (Ghazni Party), partisan
of Ishaq Khan, 102 of the house of Amir Sher 'Ali, 40,
Mohammad Jan Wardak, General, 218, 221
34–35, 36n, 89–90 Nawagai, 77
Mohammad Khan Nizam al-Dawla, Nicholas II, Russia’s emperor, 202
elder of the Hazaras of Qal'a-e-Nao, Ningrahar, 87
57 Noelle, Christine, historian, 67
Mohammad Nabi, Afghan official, 195 Northbrook, Lord, Viceroy of India,
Mohammad Rafi' Ludin, General, 15 164–165
index 257
Northern Afghanistan, Scheme of, Qamar Jan (Mohmand), wife of Amir

40–41 Sher 'Ali Khan, 67
Nur Mohammad Foshanji, Prime Qataghan, arrival of Sardar 'Abd
Minister, 21 al-Rahman at, 39
Nurzays, 187 Qays 'Abd al-Rashid, 2n
Qizilbahses, 32; looting of the quarters
'Omara Khan of Jandol, 77–78, of pro-British, 35, 37; forced
150–151 conversion of, to Sunnism, 137
Opras (strangers), 46 Quetta, 58
Ormurr, 81
Oxus River (Amu Darya), 3, 90, 128, Rahmat Khan Wazir, Malik, 82
163 Rangit Singh, 160
Rawlinson, Henry, 224
Pakthas, see Pashtun Rebellions, list of over 40 minor,
Paktues (Pakthas, Pactyes), 1n, 85 63n–64n
Paktya, 87 Religious minority, discrimination
Palam Mullah, 189 against, 227
Pamir, 90 Ripon, Lord, Viceroy of India, 42,
Pandiali, 66 170–171, 199, 204, 210
Pan-Islamic movement, 215 Rishtia, Sayyed Qasim, historian, 34
Panja River, 109, 113, 115, 163 Riyazi, Mohammad Yusuf, 7, 57
Panjdeh, 150, 179; inhabitants of, 200; Roberts, Frederick, General, British
Russian occupation of, 206; Russia supreme commander in Kabul, 30,
disputes occupation of, by Afghans, 35–37; brutalities of, 31; view of,
201, 203–204; the Amir’s reasons regarding the Kabul uprising,
for not defending, 204–206, 206n; 31–32; proposed mission of, to
international crisis on, 207; Kabul, 178
consequences of occupation of, by Robertson, George, 143–144, 156, 158
Russia, 208–209, 223 Roshan, district of, 8, 109; people of,
Panjsher, battle of, in September 1867, and their characteristic 110; division
12 of, between Afghanistan and
Paropamisade, 84 Bukhara, 116
Pashto titles for government officials, Roshaniyya movement, 80
20
Pashtun, 1; ancestors and divisions of, Sa"adat Khan Mohmand, Khan of
1n, 63, 85–86, 106, 124 Mohmands, personality, anti-British
Pashtunwali, 22, 63, 75 struggles, 67, 85
Pathan, see Pashtun Sa"d al-Din, governor of Herat, 203
Patna, district in India, 2n Sadozays, 1, 85, 106
Payanda Khan Mohmmadzay, Sardar, Safdar Khan of Bajaur, 78
37 Salor Turkmen, 108
Persia, intention of, to occupy Afghan Samarqand, 100
Seistan, 210 Sapays, 75, 77
Perso-Afghan, worsening of, relations, Sarbun, 66, 77
213 Sarik, Turkmen tribe, 108, 200–201,
Peshawar, 66, 85; pressure for recovery 203
of, 161–162 Sarikol (Lake Victoria), 117–118
Pishin, district of, 4 Sarwar Khan of Chinarak (Chikkai)
Plehve, Russia’s home minister, 184 occupies Lower Kurma, 79;
Political trends, emergence of new, expulsion of, from Kurma, 79–80
217 Sayyed 'Ali Termizi (Pir Baba), 69
Popalzays, 1 Sayyed Khan, Russian envoy, 198
Potinger, Eldred, 193 Sayyedabad, battle of, in 1866, 12
Powindas, 81 Sayyeds, in Aghanistan, 2n
258 index
Scientific Frontier, real aim of policy against, 74; submission of, in 1892,
of, 26, 83; emergence of, as a 74, 86, 187
concept, 177, 224 Shurtan, 78
Se-kot, 91 Sibi, district of, 4
Shah 'Abbas, Safavi emperor, 128 Singhal, D. P., historian, 30, 197
Shah Jahan, Mughal emperor, 128 Sittagydae, 2n
Shah Mahmud Hotak, 11 Skobelev, Russian General, 201
Shah Mohammad, minister of external Speen gund, 82
affairs, deportation to India of, 33 Spin Ghar Mountain, 73
Shah Rukh Mirza, 123 Spitamenes, ruler of ancient Balkh, 98
Shah Shuja' Sadozay, 11, 159–160 St John, Political Agent in
Shah-e-Khamosh, 112 Kandahar, 47, 49; in Baluchistan,
Shahpisand Khan Barakzay, 23 58,
Shahzadah of Waziristan, 82 Stewart, General Donald, replaces
Shams al-Nahar, 217 Roberts as Supreme Commander,
Shaykhs (or neemchas), 149 39–40, 42
Sher 'Ali Khan Jaghuri, Sardar, 129 Stolietoff, General, mission of, to
Sher 'Ali Khan, Amir, 1, 7; accession Kabul, 166, 195–196
of, in 1863, 10; takes refuge in Subsidies to Afghanistan, 171, 180
Khirqa, 11; becomes active again, Sulaiman Khel Ghilzay, 90, 92
11; enters triumphantly in Kabul in Sultan Mahmud, Emperor, 22, 149
September 1868, 12; meets Lord Sultan Murad, mir of Qataghan, 39
Mayo in India, 10–11, 15; reforms Sumner, B. H., historian, 184
of, 15–22; taxation system and Sur Kamar, 77
income during the reign of, 19; why, Surmatash (Somatash), Afghan
does not fight the invaders, 27; military post near Pamir, 115;
death of, in 1879, 27; strained Russian occupation of, 116–117
relations of, with his sons, 23, 98, Swat, 75–77, 180, 186
106, 126, 150, 166, 179, 190, Sykes, Sir Percy, author, 188
196–197, 203, 210, 217–218, 220
Sher 'Ali, Sardar, wali of Kandahar, Taj Mohammad Ghilzay, General,
46; recognition of, as an 60, 91
independent wali of Kandahar by Tajiks, 58, 93, 106, 124
the Queen-Empress, 46; opposition Talkhakzar, battle of, 92
to, 47; declaration of jihad against, Tarkanays, 187
49; becomes refugee in India, 56 Tartars, see Mongols
Sher Khan Kharotay, 105 Tarzi, Mahmud, 7, 17n, 168
Sher Mohammad (William Campbell), Tashkand, 197; Russia’s occupation
11 of, 194
Sherpur (or Sher Abad), New Tekke, Turkmen tribe, 200–203
cantonment of, 21 Three Days and Nights in Kabul,
Shighnan, district of, 8, 109; traits and Battle of, 34
divisions of people of, 110; mirs of, Timur Lane, 123, 149, 204
autonomous and powerful, 111; Timur Shah Durranay, 14
relations of mirs of, with Tirin Khan, Malik, 82
neighboring lands, 111; trade of, Tore gund, 82
with neighboring lands, 111; Torkmanchai, Treaty of (1828), 160
history of, 112; flight of people of, Traditional animosity between
114; claim and counter-claim on, Ghilzays and Durranays, 59
115 Treaty, Anglo-Afghan, of 1809, 159;
Shinwaray, Pashtun tribe of, 2n; of 1855, 36, 161; of 1857, 36;
divisions of, 72; se-kot on the, 73, of Gandumak, 4, 28, 38, 79, 81,
75; rising of, 73; tribal militias 166, 167n
index 259
Trousdale, William, 26, 29, 32, 166, Ya"qub Beg of Kashghar, 111
179 Ya"qub, Mulla, Russian news writer,
Turburi (rivalry among paternal 198
cousins), 13 Ya"qubzays (pro-Ya"qub Khan party),
Turkestan, 91, 96 37
Turkestan, Russian protectorate, 194 Yaghistan, 76
Turkmen, 106 Yahya Khan, Sardar, deportation to
India of, 33, 37
Uprising, Afghan, against the British, Yapp, Malcolm Edward, historian, 69
34 Yar Mohammad Alkozay, wali of
Uzbeks, 100, 106 Herat, 106
Yarkand, 114
Vedas, 85 Yashil Kul, 117
Vitkevitch, Paul Captain, 193–194 Yate, Sir West Ridgeway, 207
Yufuzays, 2n, 66, 76
Wakhan, 109, 112; inhabitants of, Yusuf 'Ali Shah, Shah, mir of
117–119 Roshan, 113
Wali Mohammad Khan, Sardar, 30;
as governor of Kabul, 37 Zakaria Khan, Sardar, deportation
War of reunification in 1881, 58, 60; to India of, 33
defeat of Ayyub Khan’s army, 60; Zar Pacha Surkhabay, 34
consequences of, 61 Zariaspa, ancient name of Balkh,
Wars, Anglo-Afghan, First, 164; 96
consequences of First, 160–161; Zimma, 59; the Amir-Griffin
Second, 166 meeting at, 167–169
Waziristan, 8, 83 Zimmis, 152
Wazirs, characteristics of, 82, 187 Zoroaster, 96, 98n
Wood, John, 193 Zoroastrianism, 96, 112
BRILL’S
INNER ASIAN LIBRARY
Editors
NICOLA DI COSMO
DEVIN DEWEESE
CAROLINE HUMPHREY
ISSN 1566-7162
The Brill’s Inner Asian Library Series is dedicated to the scholarly research of
every aspect of the history, literature, religion, arts, economy and politics of
Inner Asian cultures and societies. The Series aims to contribute to the
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scholarly traditions.
1. Di Cosmo, N. and D. Bao, Manchu-Mongol Relations on the Eve of the

Qing Conquest. A Documentary History.
ISBN 90 04 11777 6
2. Williams, B.G., The Crimean Tatars. The Diaspora Experience and the
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5. Gross, J. and A. Urunbaev, The Letters of Khw§ja ‘Ubayd All§h AÈr§r and
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10. Dale, S.F., The Garden of the Eight Paradises. B§bur and the Culture of
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11. Amitai, R. and M. Biran, Mongols, Turks, and Others. Eurasian Nomads
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12. Frank, A.J. and M.A. Usmanov, An Islamic Biographical Dictionary of the
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16. Newby, L.J., The Empire and the Khanate. A Political History of Qing
Relations with Khoqand c. 1760-1860. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14550 8
17. Kakar, M.H., A Political and Diplomatic History of Afghanistan, 1863-1901.
2006. ISBN-13: 978-90-04-15185-7, ISBN-10: 90-04-15185-0

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A POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

© Copyright 2006 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands

Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal

printed in the netherlands

Chapter One: The Reign of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan ........ 9

Chapter Ten: Relations with the British Government

Conclusion .................................................................................. 217

My ﬁrst work in English entitled, Afghanistan, A Study in Internal

ARAMFA The Archives of the Royal Afghan Ministry

* References to the records without ARAMFA or NAI indicate records of the

SJD Sawal wa Jawab-e-Dawlati (Amir 'Abd al-Rahman’s interviews

Dost Mohammad Khan assumed power ﬁrst as the governor of

sources as ‘Asvaka’, ‘Asva-Ghana’, ‘Abgan’, ‘Apakan’, ‘Avagana’, ‘Ap-o-kien’ and,

(1838–1841) that came to be known in the Afghan sources as the

British were to conduct the external relations of the country, and

resulted in over 40 rebellions of which I have studied only the major

and Africa Collections), and in the Royal Ministry of External

One important work in English is War in Afghanistan, 1878–80, the

THE REIGN OF AMIR SHER 'ALI KHAN

After Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, the founder of the Mohammadzay

grandsons helped him extend his authority throughout the country.

The Civil War

twenty-ﬁve thousand troops, and had ruled the important frontier

Sardar Mohammad Afzal Khan become amir in Kabul, in May

had done earlier, and they, therefore, regarded themselves as auto-

non-Mohammadzay general, Mohammad Raﬁ' Ludin, they only

The civil war in Afghanistan coincided with the gigantic stride of

for the conclusion of an alliance between “the Russian and Afghan

practice previously.27 The military expenditure strained the economy,

time the government opened a school along with a military acad-

The Sons against the Father

The intrigue surfaced when Sardar Mohammad Ya"qub Khan “set

THE BRITISH AFGHAN WAR AND THE ACCESSION OF

After Lord Edward Robert L. B. Lytton assumed power as gover-

already possessed a rich culture, including the attributes of Islamic

The Second Anglo-Afghan War

The Kaufmann scheme succeeded, and this provided an excuse for

he declared war on Afghanistan, on November 21, 1878. The Second

to eventually become a part of the British Empire as Baluchistan

The Destruction of the British Embassy in Kabul

The amir claimed that by concluding the Gandumak treaty he had

The British Occupation of Kabul

Following the massacre the British armies occupied the cities of

is no official policy pronouncement to confirm this, the British officials

whether their regiments were in Kabul or not—for soldiers caught

The instructions strengthened him still further in his resolve, since

The Afghan Response

The takeover of the administration, the brutal punishments, the

general retreat.36 This is a scapegoat view of history. A more likely

however, only a retreat, not a defeat. Thereafter, the insurgents con-

The “New Order” for Afghanistan

As a result of the December uprising the Kabul administration headed

Homecoming of Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan

In January 1880, when the ex-Amir, Mohammad Ya"qub Khan, had

mir of Badakhshan, Shahzadah Mohammad Hasan, opposed the entry

demonstrated, the Afghans opposed the occupation of their home-

al-Rahman Khan had been communicating regularly with both sides,

The Accession of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan

After it became known that the British had started negotiations

The accession of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan was the result of

with neither, and consequently, he was unwilling to ally himself with