Engineering Structures 25 (2003) 103–114

www.elsevier.com/locate/engstruct

Performance of reinforced concrete buildings during the August

17, 1999 Kocaeli, Turkey earthquake, and seismic design and
construction practise in Turkey
H. Sezen a,∗, A.S. Whittaker b, K.J. Elwood a, K.M. Mosalam c
a
Graduate Student Researcher, Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research Center, University of California, Berkeley, 1301 South 46th Street,
Richmond, CA 94804-9471,USA
b
Associate Professor, Department of Civil, Structural, and Environmental Engineering, 230 Ketter Hall, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY
14260, USA
c
Assistant Professor, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of California, Berkeley, 733 Davis Hall, Berkeley, CA
94720-1710, USA

Received 26 March 2002; received in revised form 17 July 2002; accepted 17 July 2002

Abstract

A large number of reinforced concrete buildings collapsed or were heavily damaged during the 7.4 magnitude earthquake that
struck northwestern Turkey on August 17, 1999. Recorded peak ground accelerations were relatively low (0.3 g–0.4 g) compared
to the magnitude of the structural damage, and the elastic acceleration response spectra from the recorded motions were comparable
with the elastic design spectra specified in the current Turkish seismic code. Seismic code requirements are discussed and compared
with observed details. Many structural deficiencies were highlighted by the earthquake damage, including: reinforced concrete
columns with insufficient confinement and transverse reinforcement, 90-degree hooks at the end of column ties, poor detailing in
beam-column joint regions, strong-beam and weak-columns, soft and weak stories, and poor quality construction. Buildings with
shear wall structural elements generally performed well.
 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: 1999 Turkey earthquake; Earthquake damage; Reinforced concrete; Seismic behavior; Codes; Design

1. Introduction

On August 17, 1999, a Mw 7.4 earthquake occurred

on the 1500-km-long North Anatolian fault in northwest-
ern Turkey. The epicenter of the earthquake was near
Izmit, 90 km east of Istanbul (Fig. 1). Following the
earthquake, the Pacific Earthquake Engineering
Research Center dispatched a reconnaissance team to the
epicentral region to learn first hand about the perform-
ance of the civil infrastructure. The geographic region
that was impacted by the earthquake was somewhat nar-
row banded and centered around the fault, and stretched
from Istanbul in the west to Gölyaka and Düzce in the Fig. 1. Map of affected region showing recorded peak ground accel-
erations in circles (as percentage of acceleration of gravity).
east. Damage to building construction was severe and
widespread (Sezen et al. [1], Aschheim [2], Scawthorn
[3]). Estimates for economic losses were around 20
∗
Corresponding author. Tel.: (510) 231-9510; fax: (510) 231-9471. billion US dollars. The official death toll was over
E-mail address: sezen@ce.berkeley.edu (H. Sezen). 17,200, with some 44,000 people injured and thousands

0141-0296/03/$ - see front matter  2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
PII: S 0 1 4 1 - 0 2 9 6 ( 0 2 ) 0 0 1 2 1 - 9
104 H. Sezen et al. / Engineering Structures 25 (2003) 103–114
left homeless. Some 77,300 homes and businesses were
destroyed, and 244,500 were damaged. The majority of
deaths and injuries were in the cities of Kocaeli, Sakarya,
and Yalova.
This paper describes briefly the state-of-practice for
building seismic design and construction in Turkey, and
compares the US and Turkish codes. The performance
of the reinforced concrete frame and wall buildings and
their components during the 1999 Kocaeli earthquake is
presented, and evaluated considering the seismic design
and construction practice in the epicentral region.
2. Turkish code requirements for reinforced
concrete construction
Two codes influence the design and construction of
reinforced concrete buildings in Turkey: the “earthquake
code” (Specification for Structures to be Built in Disaster
Areas, [4,5]) and the ‘building code’ (TS-500, Building
Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete [6]). The
earthquake code includes procedures for calculating
earthquake loads on buildings. The building code
presents requirements for the design and detailing of
reinforced concrete components but does not include
ductile detailing requirements for use in seismic design.
Such requirements are found in the earthquake code.
2.1. Building code requirements for reinforced
concrete
The building code is similar to ACI 318-95 [7] but
does not address design and detailing for earthquake
loads. The engineer is referred to the earthquake code
[4,5] for such information. Early editions (e.g., 1969) of
the building code were based on allowable stress design.
Major changes were introduced into the code in 1981
and 1985. The latest version of the code [6] permits both
allowable stress and ultimate strength design. For the
latter, earthquake effects are considered using two load
combinations,
U ⫽ G ⫹ P ⫹ E and U ⫽ 0.9G ⫹ E (1)
where U is the required strength, G, P and E are the
dead, live, and earthquake load effects, respectively.
Earthquake loads are calculated following the pro-
cedures defined in the seismic code of the time.
2.2. Earthquake codes
Major earthquakes in Turkey have led to substantial
changes in the practice of seismic design and construc-
tion. Fifty-seven destructive earthquakes struck Turkey
in the 20th century, most occurring along the 1500-km-
long North Anatolian fault. The M 7.9 Erzincan earth-
quake of December 27, 1939, in northeastern Turkey,
was the largest of these earthquakes. Following the Erz-
incan earthquake, the first seismic design code for build-
ings was published in 1940. The base shear, V, was cal-
culated as the product of a lateral force coefficient, C,
and the weight of the building, W, namely:
V⫽CW (2)
The value of C was set equal to 0.10 regardless of the
location of the designed structure in Turkey. The base
shear force was distributed over the height of the build-
ing using a uniform load pattern.
In 1968, the earthquake code was substantially
changed. In addition to introduction of limitations on the
cross-sectional dimensions of reinforced concrete
components, modern concepts relating to spectral shape
and dynamic response were included. The uniform load
profile of earlier codes was replaced with a first mode
(inverted triangle) profile similar to that used in current
US codes such as the 1997 Uniform Building Code [8].
In 1975, important provisions were added to the seis-
mic code, including new methods for calculating earth-
quake loads on buildings and ductile detailing require-
ments for reinforced concrete structures. The lateral
force coefficient of the 1975 code was defined as
C ⫽ CoKIS (3)
where Co was a seismic zone coefficient and varied
between 0.10 and 0.03, K was a coefficient related to
the type of framing system, I was an importance factor,
and S a spectral coefficient.
Geometry and detailing requirements for reinforced
concrete components were modified in the 1975 code.
With respect to transverse reinforcement spacing and
detailing requirements, columns were divided into three
regions as shown in Fig. 2a: confinement regions at each
end of the column clear height, middle region, and beam-
column joint regions. A maximum tie spacing (s1 in Fig.
2a) of 200 mm or 12 times the longitudinal bar diameter,
and 135-degree hooks were required on ties in confine-
ment regions. In the middle region, the amount of trans-
verse reinforcement was based on satisfying gravity and
earthquake forces that were calculated using Eq. (3).
Response-spectrum and linear and nonlinear dynamic
analysis procedures were introduced in the 1998 edition
of the seismic code. The lateral force coefficient C of
the 1975 code was replaced by
A(T) AoIS(T)
C⫽ ⫽ (4)
Ra(T) Ra(T)
where A is the spectral acceleration coefficient; T is the
fundamental period; and Ao is the effective ground accel-
eration coefficient. The importance factor varies between
1 and 1.5, and is equal to 1.0 for ordinary structures.
The spectrum coefficient, S, which defines the design
acceleration spectrum, is given by three equations in the
short-period, constant acceleration, and constant velocity
 H. Sezen et al. / Engineering Structures 25 (2003) 103–114
Fig. 2. Column details from (a) 1975 and (b) 1998 Turkish seismic codes.
ranges. These ranges are delineated by spectrum charac-
teristic periods, which vary as a function of soil type.
The maximum spectral amplification is 2.5, which is
identical to that of US codes [8] for 5% damping. The
seismic load reduction factor, Ra, is similar to the
response modification factor in US codes, except that the
seismic load reduction factor reduces linearly from the
maximum value of structural behavior factor, R, which
is tabulated in the code, to 1.5 at zero period. The
maximum value of R depends on the assumed ductility
(high or nominal) of the system and varies between 3
and 8.
In the 1998 edition of the earthquake code, reinforced
concrete buildings are classified as systems of either high
or nominal ductility, based on the detailing of the
components. Detailing requirements are more stringent
for systems with high ductility. The detailing require-
ments for columns being designed for high or nominal
ductility levels are very similar. Information on the
transverse reinforcement requirements along the height
of a column is shown in Fig. 2b. All hoops must have
135-degree seismic hooks at both ends. The shear
strength of a column must exceed the shear force asso-
ciated with the plastic moment in the column. The only
major provision that is not applicable for columns
designed for a nominal ductility level is the spacing of
transverse reinforcement in the confinement zones,
which is required to be half the spacing used in the col-
umn middle region. For columns in frames of nominal
ductility, the maximum spacing of the transverse
reinforcement between the confinement zones was
increased by a factor of 2 over the spacing shown in
Fig. 2b.
105
3. Design and construction practice prior to the
1999 Kocaeli earthquake
From discussions with local engineers in Turkey and
inspection of buildings, it is clear that the Turkish earth-
quake code provisions were rarely enforced for the
engineering of commercial and residential construction
in the epicentral region prior to the August 17, 1999
earthquake [9]. The ductile reinforcement details
described in the 1975 earthquake code were rarely
observed in buildings inspected by the authors after the
August 17, 1999, earthquake. Details of the seismic
design and construction practice prior to the 1999 Koca-
eli earthquake are provided in [1].
4. Response spectra
Fig. 3 presents 5% damped linear elastic acceleration
response spectra for rock and soft soil sites calculated
using the provisions of the 1997 Uniform Building Code
[8] and the 1998 Turkish earthquake code [5] for the
regions of highest seismicity in each country. The Uni-
form Building Code (UBC) spectra shown in the figure
include near-field amplification factor of 1.0. The elastic
spectral demands of the two current codes are very simi-
lar.
The peak ground accelerations (PGA) recorded in the
region affected by the earthquake are shown in Fig. 1.
Recorded peak ground accelerations were relatively low
(0.3 g–0.4 g) compared to the extent of the structural
damage. Fig. 3 includes the elastic response spectra at
5% damping from one horizontal component of the
106 H. Sezen et al. / Engineering Structures 25 (2003) 103–114
Fig. 3. Elastic response spectra for 5% damping.
ground motion recorded at the following sites: YPT
station in Yarimca near Gölcük (PGA 0.23 g, soft soil),
SKR station in Adapazari (PGA 0.41 g, stiff soil), and
the DZC station to the east of Gölyaka (PGA 0.32 g,
soft soil). The elastic acceleration response spectra from
the recorded motions are not substantially different from
the elastic design spectra specified in the current US and
Turkish seismic codes.
Fig. 4 presents lateral-force-coefficient spectra (C in
Eq. (1)) for the 1975 and 1998 Turkish codes and the
1997 UBC for reinforced concrete moment-resisting
frames on soft soil sites. Such frames were chosen for
the purpose of comparison because reinforced concrete
moment-resisting frames are the most common seismic
framing system in Turkey for building construction. To
construct the spectra for the 1975 Turkish code, K was
taken as 0.80 and 1.50 for ductile and nonductile
Fig. 4. Lateral-force-coefficient spectra for the 1975 and 1998 Turk-
ish seismic codes and the 1997 Uniform Building Code.
reinforced concrete moment frames, respectively; Co was
set equal to 0.10. These allowable stress design spectra
were scaled to the strength level by multiplying the spec-
tral ordinates by 1.4. To construct the spectra for the
1998 Turkish code, Ao and the importance factor, I, were
set equal to 0.40 and 1.0, respectively; and R was set
equal to 4 and 8 for reinforced concrete moment-
resisting frames of nominal and high ductility, respect-
ively. To construct the spectra for the 1997 UBC, soil
type SE was assumed; near-field factors were not con-
sidered; the importance factor was set equal to 1.0, and
R was set equal to 3.5 and 8.5 for ordinary moment-
resisting frames (OMRF) and special moment-resisting
frames (SMRF), respectively. (The OMRF and SMRF
of the UBC correspond approximately to frames of nom-
inal and high ductility in the Turkish earthquake code,
respectively.)
For modern reinforced concrete moment-resisting
frames of high ductility (equivalent of SMRF in the US),
the ordinates of the 1998 Turkish lateral-force-coef-
ficient spectra exceed those of the 1997 UBC. Recogniz-
ing that the prescriptive details of the 1997 UBC and the
1998 Turkish code for frames of high ductility are very
similar, the performance of buildings designed to either
code should be similar if the construction standards are
similar and the fundamental period exceeds 0.2 sec. For
short-period buildings and identical construction stan-
dards, buildings designed and detailed according to the
1998 Turkish earthquake code will be stronger than
buildings designed and detailed using the 1997 UBC [8].
5. Typical moment-resisting frame construction
The construction quality for residential and commer-
cial buildings in the epicentral region varied widely.
Although the general construction quality for residential
building was poor according to US standards, many of
the engineered reinforced concrete commercial buildings
(e.g., office buildings) were observed to have satisfactory
construction quality. Many of the failures and collapses
of engineered commercial construction observed by the
reconnaissance team, and reported in Sezen et al. [1],
can be attributed to the use of nonductile details and not
poor quality construction.
Residential buildings in the epicentral region typically
range in height from two to seven storeys. Fig. 5a shows
a photograph of a three-storey moment resisting frame
building that was under construction at the time of the
earthquake. A plan of the second floor is shown in Fig.
5b. Note that ten of the columns are stronger in the x-
direction (parallel to the street), whereas five columns
are stronger in the y-direction. The column orientations
and locations are such that all of the moment-resisting
frames include one or more columns with their weak
axis perpendicular to the frame direction. These obser-
 H. Sezen et al. / Engineering Structures 25 (2003) 103–114
Fig. 5. 3-storey building near Golcuk; (a) elevation, (b) floor plan.
vations, which were typical of most buildings in the
epicentral region, would suggest that the framing system
is much stiffer and stronger in the direction perpendicu-
lar to the street assuming that similar rebar are used in
all beams and all columns. Such framing likely possesses
limited strength and stiffness, which if coupled with non-
ductile reinforcement details, results in a vulnerable
building in the event of earthquake shaking.
6. Behavior of moment-resisting frame construction
Reinforced concrete moment-resisting frame buildings
behaved poorly during the Kocaeli earthquake. Accord-
ing to official estimates, more than 20,000 moment-
frame buildings collapsed, and many more suffered
moderate to severe damage. Three- to seven-storey
apartment buildings were hard hit, although many had
been constructed in the past 20 years. These apartment
buildings were likely designed and detailed to comply
with the requirements of the building code [6] and 1975
earthquake code [4] for construction in a first-degree
seismic zone. Many of the collapses are attributed to the
formation of soft first storeys that formed as a result of
differences in framing and infill wall geometry between
the first and upper stories, the use of nonductile details,
and poor quality construction in some cases.
Fig. 6 shows two six-storey nonductile moment-frame
Fig. 6. Variability of building response.
107
buildings in Gölcük. One of the buildings collapsed
completely, whereas the adjacent building exhibited
shear cracks in the first storey. Careful inspection of the
first storeys in both buildings showed that the buildings
had a similar plan footprint and construction details. It
is likely that the two buildings were nominally identical
and that both buildings were constructed by the same
contractor. Both buildings were likely subjected to simi-
lar levels of earthquake shaking, yet one building perfor-
med well, while the other collapsed. This raises many
questions regarding the limit state for nonductile
moment frames. Small differences in the strength of
these nonductile buildings possibly caused by the vari-
ation in material strength, construction practice, and
workmanship could account for the drastic difference
in performance.
7. Role of infill walls in response of moment-frame
buildings
Hollow clay tile and gas–concrete masonry infill walls
are widely used in the epicentral region. Many of the
buildings were constructed with hollow clay tile infill
walls in the frames perpendicular to the sidewalk.
Frames parallel to the sidewalk were often infilled with
hollow clay tile only above the first storey to allow for
commercial space on the ground level. Such an arrange-
108 H. Sezen et al. / Engineering Structures 25 (2003) 103–114

ment of tile infill walls created stiffness discontinuities

in these buildings, which may have contributed to their
collapse by concentrating the drift demands in the first
storey. These walls are almost always unreinforced and
abut the frame columns without being tied to frame
members. The high in-plane stiffness of the masonry
infill walls, which is developed by diagonal strut action,
can dictate the response of the more flexible moment-
resisting frame. Damage to masonry infill walls was con-
centrated in the lower stories of buildings because of
higher story shear demands on the strength of the
moment frame-infill wall system.
Fig. 7 shows views of a collapsed apartment building
in Gölcük. The first two storeys of this building failed
completely, but damage in the upper four storeys with Fig. 8. Failure of two stories of a moment-frame building with infill
unbroken glass windows was limited. The long infill masonry walls.
walls in the upper four storeys have significant elastic
strength and stiffness—probably much greater stiffness in the back face of the building and in the two faces
and strength than the moment-resisting frame. If the perpendicular to the sidewalk. The front of the building
infill walls in the upper four storeys of the building are was open in the first storey. The lateral stiffness of the
indicative of the infill in the failed storeys, the first- and building was considerably larger in the direction perpen-
second-storey infill walls likely played an important role dicular to the sidewalk compared with parallel to the
in the collapse of the building. The brittle fracture of sidewalk. Deformations are concentrated in the first sto-
the first- and second-storey masonry infill walls prior to rey of this building parallel to the sidewalk, due to the
flexural yielding of the columns would have overloaded weakness and flexibility of the moment frame because
the nonductile first- and second-storey columns in shear, of lack of masonry infill walls in the front of the build-
likely resulting in the observed gravity load failure. ing. The first-storey columns in this building were sever-
The first two storeys of the building in Fig. 8 col- ely damaged and likely close to failure due to gravity
lapsed. The masonry infill walls and moment-frame con- load instability.
struction in the third and fourth storeys (first and second
storeys in the photograph of the collapsed building) suf-
fered major damage. Damage in this building reduced 8. Detailing and response of components of
with increased height above the ground. Failure of the moment-frames
masonry infill in the first and second storeys of the build-
ing likely precipitated the collapse of the building. Previous sections of this paper on moment-frame con-
Irregular placement of masonry infill walls can pro- struction have focused on the response of moment-frame
duce discontinuities of stiffness in moment- frame build- systems. This section addresses the response of the
ings. Consider the building in Fig. 9 in which the components of moment frames, namely beams, columns,
moment frame is both flexible and weak in the first sto- and beam-column joints. Based on the authors’ obser-
rey by comparison with the upper storeys. In the first vations, typical details for an existing column and beam
storey of this building, masonry infill walls are present reinforcing bar details are shown in Fig. 10. Bent-up bars

Fig. 7. Views from a collapsed apartment building in Golcuk.

 H. Sezen et al. / Engineering Structures 25 (2003) 103–114 109

are shown in the typical beam section. Corner column

bar are spliced above the floor slab with lap lengths of
40–70 bar diameters. Side-face column rebar are either
spliced per corner rebar or terminated above and below
the joint with 180-degree hooks as shown Fig. 10. No
additional transverse reinforcement for the purpose of
confinement is provided in the hinge, joint, or splice
regions. In general, typical 80-mm–120-mm thick
reinforced concrete floor slabs performed well. Vulner-
abilities and description of the damage to the commonly
used joisted floor slab framing system are provided in
Sezen et al. [1].

8.1. Beams

Typical beam spans ranged between 3 and 5 m. Beam

widths and depths ranged between 200–250 mm and
500–600 mm, respectively. Transverse ties are smooth
reinforcing bars of 6–10 mm diameter with 90-degree
hooks. Bent-up longitudinal reinforcing bars, often used
for reasons of economy to provide shear resistance to
gravity loads and to increase negative moment-resistance

Fig. 9. Formation of a soft and weak storey.

Fig. 10. Typical beam and column rebar details observed by the
reconnaissance team. Fig. 11. Damage to nonductile reinforced concrete beam.
110 H. Sezen et al. / Engineering Structures 25 (2003) 103–114

for gravity loads at supports, however do not properly
resist cyclic shear forces induced by earthquake shaking.
Little damage to interior moment-frame beams was
observed by the reconnaissance team because columns
were generally weaker than beams. One type of beam
damage is shown in Fig. 11. The building in this figure
suffered a partial storey collapse because the fault rup-
tured beneath the building. The beams shown were for-
ced to accommodate the partial collapse and were badly
damaged at the beam-column connection due to slip of
the smooth longitudinal beam reinforcing bars. In many
cases, beam bottom reinforcing bars were inadequately
anchored through the beam-column joint.
8.2. Columns
Column plan dimensions range between 150 mm×500
mm–250 mm×800 mm. Most columns in residential con-
struction are blade columns with a depth-to-width ratio
of approximately three. The longitudinal rebar ratio
ranges between 1% and 2%; 12–16 mm diameter smooth
rebar are generally used. Transverse ties are smooth
rebar of 6–10 mm diameter with 90-degree hooks. The
spacing of transverse ties is typically 200–250 mm uni-
form along the clear height of the column. Table 1 shows
the column dimensions and details observed by the
reconnaissance team for a typical building, and compares
with those dimensions and details given in Chapter 21
of ACI 318-95 [7], the Turkish building code [6], and
recent Turkish seismic codes, [4,5]. The data of Table
1 coupled with field observations clearly show that the
Turkish earthquake code provisions were not followed
in detailing reinforced concrete columns, especially in
potential plastic hinge zones at the end of the columns.
In damaged columns, the authors did not observe a tie
spacing of less than 100 mm or 135-degree hooks at the
end of column ties as required by all codes except for
the Turkish building code, TS-500 [6], which in general
does not include ductile detailing requirements for col-
umns.
The majority of moment-frame component failures
was in columns and was due to (a) the use of nonductile
details and unconfined lap splices, (b) excessive beam
strength, and (c) interaction between the columns and
the masonry infill walls. Lap splices in moment-frame
columns were typically made immediately above the
floor framing or the foundation. The exposed lap splice
of Fig. 12a is from a moment-frame building in Adapaz-
ari. The lap splices in this column were approximately
35 bar diameters in length and were located in a plastic

Table 1
Observed and code specified column detailing and dimensions

ACI 318–95 Turkish 1975 Turkish 1998 Observed

Ductile Nonductile
Turkish 1975 TS500-1985

Min width (W) ⱖ300 mm ⱖ250 mm ⱖ250 mm ⱖ250 mm typical:

ⱖ0.4∗D ⱖH/20 250 mm
ⱖD/3 common:
200 mm

Min depth (D) ⱖ300 mm ⱖ250 mm ⱖ250 mm ⱖ300 mm typical:

400–600 mm

ρ (longitudinal) 0.01ⱕρⱕ0.06 0.01ⱕρⱕ0.04 0.008ⱕρⱕ0.04 0.01ⱕρⱕ0.04 typical:

0.01 to 0.02

Column middle ⱕ150 mm s2ⱕ200 mm ⱕ200 mm suⱕ200 mm typical:

zone: ⱕ6∗(db) long. s2ⱕ12∗(db) long. ⱕ12∗(db) long. suⱕW/2 150–250 mm
Tie spacing s2ⱕD/2
Hooks 135° 90° or 135° 135° all 90°

Column end ⱕ100 mm s1ⱕ100 mm scⱕ100 mm typical:

zones: ⱕW/4 s1ⱖ50 mm scⱖ50 mm 150–250 mm
Tie spacing scⱕW/3 100 mm or less
not observed
Hooks 135° 135° 135° 135° all 90° hooks
no 135° hooks

W: Minimum member dimension (width), D: longer member dimension (depth), H: column height, ρ: longitudinal reinforcement ratio, (db) long.:
longitudinal bar diameter, s1, s2, sc, su : shown in Fig. 2.
 H. Sezen et al. / Engineering Structures 25 (2003) 103–114
Fig. 12.
hinge zone. Transverse reinforcement was widely spaced
with 90-degree hooks, and no cross ties were present.
The 90-degree hooks on the ties opened during the earth-
quake and the limited strength and confinement afforded
by the ties were lost.
The transverse tie details of Fig. 12b were common,
namely smooth rebar, widely and often unequally spaced
ties (200–250 mm), and 90-degree hooks. The wide
spacing of the ties resulted in shear failures (Figs. 12b
and 12d), buckling of longitudinal rebar (Fig. 12c), and
poor confinement of the core concrete.
8.3. Beam-column joints
Damage to beam-column joints is shown in Fig. 13.
Much of the framing (Fig. 13a) is essentially intact but
many of the beam-column joints are heavily damaged.
A view of one of the damaged joints is shown in Fig.
13b. Beam reinforcing bars anchorage in the joint is
inadequate and no transverse ties are present in the
joint region.
111
Column failures.
The photograph of a building (Fig. 14) that was under
construction in Adapazari at the time of the earthquake
shows severe damage in the beam-column joints, but the
horizontal transverse ties maintained the integrity of
the joints.
9. Behavior of shear-wall construction
Buildings constructed using shear walls as the primary
lateral load-resisting system performed quite well in the
1999 Kocaeli earthquake. Some buildings with a dual
wall-frame lateral load-resisting system were damaged
because the shear walls were not sufficiently stiff to keep
the displacements of the nonductile framing system in
the elastic range. Storey collapses were not observed in
buildings containing shear walls, but it should be noted
that shear walls were not widely used in the epicentral
region. The reconnaissance team toured a number of
buildings that would be classified as dual wall-frame sys-
tems in the United States. The most significant damage
112 H. Sezen et al. / Engineering Structures 25 (2003) 103–114

Fig. 13. Building collapse due to failure of beam-column joints.

umns shown (Fig. 15b) failed and shortened. These

Fig. 14. Damage to new moment-frame beam-column joint.
observed by the team in a dual wall-frame building is
shown in Fig. 15. The wall and first-storey exterior col-
components displaced out of the plane of the facade as
seen in Fig. 15b. Another example of damage to beams
and columns in a dual wall-frame building is shown in
Fig. 16. No cracks were observed in the shear wall, but
the right end settled approximately 500 mm due to bear-
ing failure of the supporting soils. Although the shear wall
was likely sufficiently stiff to protect the nonductile
frame, the rotation at the base of the shear wall and the
settlement of the footings beneath the moment-frame col-
umns contributed to the failure of the first-story columns.
Blade columns or narrow shear walls were often con-
structed near stairwells (Fig. 17). These walls or blade
columns were detailed similarly to regular moment-
frame columns with light transverse reinforcement with
90-degree hooks and no cross ties. The damage shown
in Fig. 17 is similar to that observed in moment-frame
columns.

Fig. 15. Collapsed dual wall-frame building in Adapazari, (a) view of collapsed 5-storey building, (b) failure of the shear wall and perimeter col-
umns.
 H. Sezen et al. / Engineering Structures 25 (2003) 103–114 113

10. Conclusions

Much has been written in the aftermath of the August

Fig. 16. Damaged wall frame building due to ground failure and
wall rotation.
17, 1999, earthquake about the poor quality of residential
and commercial construction in the epicentral region.
The detailing and quality of the residential construction,
perhaps most of it not rigorously engineered, was poor
by modern US and Turkish standards. The reconnais-
sance team also documented many collapses of commer-
cial reinforced concrete moment frame buildings that
were likely carefully engineered. Both poor construction
practices and the continued use of nonductile seismic
detailing were the primary reasons for most of the build-
ing collapses. Shear reinforcement was lacking in most
damaged columns observed by the authors. In contrast
with the code design provisions, common use of 90-
degree hooks for transverse reinforcement reduced the
lateral strength and confinement of columns. Short col-
umns, poor detailing in beam-column joints, strong-
beam weak-columns, and use of inconsistent unre-
inforced masonry infill walls were among other reasons
for the widespread destruction in the region affected by
the earthquake. For the most part, buildings with shear
walls survived with limited or no damage.

Acknowledgements

The work described in this paper made use of the

Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research Center shared
facilities supported by the Earthquake Engineering Cen-
ters Program of the National Science Foundation under
Award Number EEC-9701568. This support is grate-
fully acknowledged.

References

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