Great 2010 American Earthquakes: Lessons for Seismic

Design and Construction

Raul D. Bertero, M.ASCE 1
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Abstract: At the beginning of 2010, two large earthquakes struck the Americas. The January 12 Haiti earthquake with a magnitude
M w ¼ 7.0 produced about 300,000 deaths (second by the number of fatalities in the world history after the 1556 Shaanxi China earthquake).
A month later, the February 27 Maule Chilean earthquake with a magnitude M w ¼ 8.8 (an energy release 500 times larger than that from
the Haiti earthquake) produced 500 deaths, most due to the resulting tsunami. However, the Chilean earthquake caused more than $30 billion
of direct damage, left nonoperational dozens of hospitals and thousands of schools, and caused for several hours a general blackout as well as
the loss of service of essential communications facilities, crucial to take control of the chaotic after-earthquake situation. In this paper, the
severity of both earthquakes is compared. It is shown that their effects on the life and economy of the affected countries as well as the features
of the seismic codes or the absence of codes offer important lessons regarding the seismic design and construction. From these lessons,
specific and distinctive recommendations regarding the seismic design and construction of essential facilities, conventional buildings, and
nonengineered, auto constructed low-income houses are offered. DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0000697. © 2013 American Society
of Civil Engineers.
Author keywords: Earthquakes; Seismic design and construction; Maule Earthquake; Haiti Earthquake; Seismic Codes; Construction
materials and methods.

Main Geological Characteristics
Table 1 shows a comparison of the main geological characteristics
of both earthquakes. The magnitude 8.8 of the Chilean earthquake
(EQ) implies a 500 times greater energy release than the magnitude
7.0 Haiti EQ, and indicates the difference in the rupture area
(700 × 150 km in Chile, against 65 × 10 km in the Haiti EQ, as
can be seen in Fig. 1, where both failure zones are shown in the
same scale).
Regarding the fault type, the Chilean EQ was caused by the
subduction of the Nazca plate beneath the South American tectonic
plates as can be seen in Fig. 2, while the Haiti EQ occurred follow-
ing the strike-slip fault between the Caribbean plate and the North
American plate, on one of the faults that cross south of Cuba,
Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic.
Population Affected by the Earthquakes—Intensities
Since the magnitude is primarily associated to the area of failure
rupture, an EQ of greater magnitude implies a much larger affected
area, but not necessarily a greater effect on structures in the area
near the epicenter. Damage becomes greater when the fault rupture
occurs close to large urban concentrations such as Port-au-Prince,
a city with 700,000 inhabitants, located only 25 km away from
the epicenter. On the other hand, the Chilean cities of Concepción,
Chillan, and Talca, with a population of 200,000 each, were 100 km
away from the Maule EQ epicenter. As a result, the Modified
1
Profesor Titular de Análisis Sísmico, Universidad de Buenos Aires,
C1127AAR Argentina. E-mail: rbertero@freyreyasoc.com.ar
Note. This manuscript was submitted on April 5, 2012; approved on
February 12, 2013; published online on December 13, 2013. Discussion
period open until May 13, 2014; separate discussions must be submitted
for individual papers. This paper is part of the Journal of Construction
Engineering and Management, © ASCE, ISSN 0733-9364/B4013003
(9)/$25.00.
Mercalli levels reached to IX in Port-au-Prince, and VIII in the
mentioned Chilean cities (Fig. 3), despite the exceptional magni-
tude of the Maule EQ, which was clearly felt in tall buildings
situated over 1,000 km away from the epicenter, such as Buenos
Aires in Argentina and Sao Pablo in Brazil.
As can be seen from Table 2, even though the population affected
by intensities equal to or greater than VIII is comparable for both
earthquakes (3,100,000 in Haiti and 5,540,000 in Chile), the num-
ber of fatalities is dramatically higher in the case of Haiti: 300,000
deaths versus the few 521 in Chile. Additionally, many of the fatal-
ities in Chile were caused by the tsunami associated with the earth-
quake [according to a report of the Ministerio Público de Chile
(2011), the tsunami caused 156 deaths and 25 missing people].
But, the number of homeless people after the earthquakes is com-
parable in the two cases: 1,000,000 in Haiti and 800,000 in Chile.
Differences in seismic design and construction between both
countries were clearly noted when observing the number of fatal-
ities, but not when considering the number of homeless people and
damage level in essential facilities caused by the Chile EQ. This
will be detailed later in this paper.
These results should not be surprising taking into account that
Haiti is the poorest country in the Americas, with a great number of
self-constructed homes without engineering design or application
of seismic code regulations. On the other hand, Chile, considered a
developed country in relation to its seismic resistant preparation
and construction, uses the NCh433 (1966) seismic code, which es-
tablishes explicitly the following: “This code is oriented to obtain
structures that: a) resist without damage earthquakes of moderate
intensity; b) limit the damage of non-structural elements under
earthquakes of medium intensity; and c) avoid collapse during
earthquakes of severe intensity”
From the above considerations it is concluded that the use of
a seismic code (in its current conception together with careful con-
struction and inspection) is adequate for minimizing the number of
victims and avoiding collapses, but it is insufficient for limiting
damage to levels tolerable for the society’s needs and expectations.

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 Table 1. Comparison of Main Geological Characteristics of Both Earthquakes
Geological characteristics
Magnitude Mw
Date and time
Location of the epicenter
Fault type
Depth of the epicenter
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Haiti Maule, Chilea
7.0 8.8
January 12, 2010, 4:53 p.m. February 27, 2010, 3:34 a.m.
18.443°N, 72.571°W 35.909°S, 72.733°W
Strike-slip fault where the Caribbean plate shifts about Thrust fault caused by the subduction of the Nazca plate
20 mm=year in relation to the North American plate. beneath the South American tectonic plates
Rupture length: 65 km with a mean slip of 2 m (80 mm=year). Rupture length: over 700 km with
a displacement of 7 m
13 km 35 km

Distances to the epicenter Port-au-Prince, Haiti: 25 km SE of Miami, Chillan, Chile: 95 km Concepción, Chile: 105 km Talca,
Florida: 1125 km Chile: 115 km Santiago, Chile: 335 km Buenos Aires,
Argentina: 1,350 km
a
Precision measurements made with Global Positioning System (GPS) showed that all the South American plate moved westward following the earthquake.
The city of Concepcion moved 3.04 m, Santiago 24 cm, and even the city of Buenos Aires was shifted 3.9 cm.

Acceleration Estimation
In order to evaluate a buildings’ seismic performance, it is neces-
sary to know the accelerations in the foundations during the earth-
quake. The USGS has published a map showing the estimated peak
accelerations for both earthquakes (Fig. 4). Dark dots in the figure
show the location of seismic instrumentation.
As can be seen in the figure, the estimated peak accelerations
in the areas where the maximum intensities were registered are
about 0.30 g (30% of gravity acceleration) (i.e., of the same order
of magnitude for both earthquakes).
In the case of the Haiti EQ, no seismic records near the epicenter
are available. On the other hand, Boroschek et al. (2010) have pub-
lished preliminary reports with noncorrected data for the Maule
EQ. Most of these records confirm the estimations made by the
USGS. Other records that exhibit higher accelerations are being
reviewed as they could have been affected by the soil structure in-
teraction. Among Boroschek conclusions, it is mentioned the long
duration of the earthquake (140 seconds overall, and 40–50 s of
strong shaking), and the existence of an important energy contri-
bution between 0.8 and 2 s (i.e., an important effect for building 10
stories or higher).
Effects on Structures
To compare the effect on structures, it is necessary to comment on
the seismic codes used in Haiti and Chile.
When the earthquake occurred, Haiti had no enforceable seismic
regulations, and no specific licensure was required for architects,
engineers, or contractors. Seismic design was not even included
in the civil engineering courses of the country’s universities. Those
engineers in Haiti that followed some form of code seemed to have
used either the French code [Beton Arme aux Etats Limites
(BAEL)], which does not include any specification for seismic de-
sign or the provisions for nonseismic structures of the American

Fig. 1. Fault length (in the same scale) of the Haiti and Maule, Chile, 2010 earthquakes (USGS 2010)

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Fig. 2. Width and depth of the Maule, Chile, earthquake fault (USGS 2010)

Fig. 3. Modified Mercalli Intensity and population affected (USGS 2010)

Concrete Institute (ACI 318). Even though there are some laws Table 2. Comparison of the Populations Affected by the Earthquake
requiring building permits and inspections, they seem to be neither
Earthquake consequences Haiti Maule, Chile
obeyed nor enforced (Fierro and Perry 2010).
On the contrary, Chile is a country with many professionals Population affected by the earthquake 3,100,000 5,540,000
and prestigious professors and researchers with a solid knowl- (modified Mercalli Intensity ≥ VIII)
edge of seismic problems. Seismic design is widely studied in Deaths 300,000 521
Homeless people after the earthquake 1,000,000 800,000
its universities. The Chilean code for building seismic design,

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Fig. 4. Estimated peak ground acceleration (%g) of Chile and Haiti earthquakes (different scale maps) (USGS 2010)

NCh 433, has evolved through the years with similar and even
improved comprehensiveness, in relation to the UBC code of the
United States.
Haiti Earthquake
According to the preceding analysis, the Chilean and the Haiti
earthquakes have affected a comparable population with similar
intensities. However, the number of fatalities in Haiti was dramati-
cally higher. The reason for so many deaths in Port-au-Prince was
the collapse of 250,000 homes and buildings, which turned into
deadly traps for the inhabitants. A sampling of 107 buildings in
downtown Port-au-Prince showed that 28% were completely de-
stroyed. A similar sampling in Léogâne (located at the same dis-
tance from the epicenter but of a lower economy condition),
showed that 62% of the buildings collapsed indicating the higher
vulnerability of the constructions in the poorest neighborhoods
(Eberhard et al. 2010).
According to an estimate made by Wald et al. (2010), 89% of the
fatalities resulted from faulty construction of reinforced concrete
columns and slabs, using masonry enclosures formed by nonrein-
forced concrete blocks.
This type of construction presents several features which may
contribute to their vulnerability (Eberhard et al. 2010): (1) defective
in situ preparation of structural or masonry concrete, resulting in a
mixture of very poor quality and resistance; (2) 15-cm width slabs
and roofs, constructed using blocks in the thickness (to reduce the
concrete volume) located close to the columns and, therefore,
reducing the punching shear capacity, see Fig. 5; (3) use of square
columns of small dimensions (20- to 25-cm wide) reinforced with
four bars of 12 mm (in many cases smooth steel) and stirrups of
6 mm with 20- to 25-cm spacing (i.e., nonconfined columns with-
out ductility), see Fig. 6; and (4) internal and external shear-walls
made of blocks without reinforcement, built after the concrete

Fig. 6. Use of nonconfined columns without ductility (Fierro and Perry

Fig. 5. Dwelling construction with reinforced concrete columns and 2010; source: PEER; photographer: E. Fierro, used with permission
slabs lightened by blocks (Eberhard et al. 2010; source: USGS) from Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research Center)

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 structure, increasing the building mass without augmenting the
structural resistance.
Even though there are no seismic records of the Haiti EQ, indi-
rect evidence suggests that the earthquake would not have caused
the collapse of buildings and homes if adequate engineering and
construction techniques had been applied, as evidenced by the
U.S. Embassy and other structures with concrete walls that, even
without ductility details, suffered only minor damage.
In summary, the number of fatalities caused by the Haiti EQ—
considered one of the greatest human catastrophes in history—
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could have been reduced to the Chilean EQ levels or even less

if structural typology, element dimensions, and detailing and con-
struction practices would have been adequate to resist earthquake
ground motions of great intensity.
Unfortunately, it is expected that collapses as showed in
Figs. 7 and 8 will continue taking place in other cities in underde-
veloped countries around the world, particularly in the poorest sec-
Fig. 8. Uncompleted three-story structure collapsed in the first story
tors of these urban areas. To avoid such catastrophes, there is an
and remained supported by the contiguous buildings; heavy slabs
urgent need for educating professionals and, specially, those people
over weak columns without ductility detailing contributed to the col-
who effectively build their own homes in economically stressed lapse (Fierro and Perry 2010; source: PEER; photographer: E. Fierro,
neighborhoods (most of the time this is a consequence of self- used with permission from Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research
construction of precarious homes due to the internal migration of Center)
people toward the largest cities). This is even clearer when it is
noted that the people of Haiti are reconstructing their homes today
following the same procedures and detailing that were used prior to
the devastating earthquake of January 2010 (Fig. 9). In the conclu- that the shear wall/floor area ratio is higher than 3% (Mohele
sions of this paper some actions aimed to correct this situation are
2010). For regular buildings up to 15 stories high, without geom-
suggested.
etry changes in plant or elevation, this ratio produces a structure
with sufficient strength for minimizing the ductility demand and,
Maule, Chile, Earthquake therefore, the structural damage that could lead to the collapse of
the structure (Fig. 10).
Chile is a country with a developed seismic-resistant design prac- Building performance during the Maule EQ seems to confirm
tice and skillful construction practices while at the same time dif- these conclusions (Mohele 2010). Of 9,974 buildings of three or
ferent to the prevailing practices in the United States and Japan. more stories inventoried in the affected area, only four collapsed,
The Chilean methodology of fundamentally using RC-shear walls and some 50 must be demolished because of damage. This repre-
as a lateral load-resisting system has led to international studies sents 0.5% of the total, which is a significantly lower number com-
and has been praised due to its effectiveness in avoiding the pared to the destruction percentage caused by the Haiti EQ. If the
collapse of buildings without crucially depending on detailing, as 1,939 buildings with nine or more stories are considered, percent-
occurs with reinforced concrete frame structures. In practice, the age of collapses does raise to 2.8%.
Chilean design is based on proportioning a number of walls such

Fig. 7. Modern colonial construction of four stories with partial col- Fig. 9. Dwelling reconstruction in Haiti (late January 2010) following
lapse of lower stories (Fierro and Perry 2010; source: PEER; photogra- the same procedures used prior to the earthquake (Fierro and Perry
pher: E. Fierro, used with permission from Pacific Earthquake 2010; source: PEER; photographer: E. Fierro, used with permission
Engineering Research Center) from Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research Center)

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Fig. 10. Fourteen-story building in Viña del Mar showing the Chilean typical load-resistant system based on reinforced concrete walls (Mohele 2010;
source: PEER)
However, a broader look at the earthquake consequences pro-
vides a much less favorable conclusion about the efficiency of the
seismic design and construction practices in Chile (and other coun-
tries with similar codes), particularly when observing the capacity
of constructions to keep providing the function for which they were
designed.
For example, in the case of one- or two-story buildings, 800,000
people were left homeless after the earthquake as a consequence
of the damage produced to their homes, particularly in the cases
of adobe block houses (Mohele 2010; Astroza et al. 2010). About
45% of the damaged houses (old in general) had this type of con-
struction (still very common in rural areas and smaller cities) that
belong to a dwelling inventory that had been built, in many cases
self-constructed, with no seismic regulations nor consideration of
engineering practices. This situation highlights the need for a plan
to seismically retrofit or replace the existing adobe constructions
(Medina et al. 2010). Moreover, considering the earthquake effects
over the remaining 55% damaged houses that were constructed
under the influence of construction and inspection regulations and
codes, it can be inferred that these are not efficient enough for con-
trolling the level of damage, since the number of people forced to
leave their homes was comparable to the number of homeless peo-
ple after the Haiti EQ.
The Chilean EQ also generated a general blackout that af-
fected 93% of the country’s population, and some towns did not
have power restored for several days (Ricke 2010). According to
President Michelle Bachelet, the out-of-service communications
facilities prevented the government from reacting quickly to avoid
the chaos and rampages produced in the affected areas during the
days following the earthquake (BBC 2010).
The global impact to the Chilean economy produced by the
earthquake damages is devastating. The new president of Chile,
Sebastián Piñera, who was inaugurated on March 11, 2010, esti-
mated the costs of the reconstruction at about $30 billion (Pueblo
en Línea 2010), an amount approximately equal to the annual
budget of the country.
Over 1.2 million students could not initiate their academic year
due to the collapse or severe damage caused by the earthquake to
their schools, especially in the regions of Bío Bío and Maule
(Pueblo en Línea 2010).
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Of the 100 existing hospitals in the affected region (which
should have continued to operate in an earthquake emergency),
17 have to be completely reconstructed, 8 suffered major dam-
ages, and 54 require minor repairs (Holmes 2010). In many cases,
hospitals had to be evacuated due to damaged equipment and
facilities (Figs. 11 and 12).
It is interesting to point out that at the time of the Maule EQ, two
hospitals with base isolation existed in Santiago de Chile [where
spectral displacement for a 2-s period reached, according to the
obtained records, peaks between 12 and 23 cm (Álvarez 2010)].
While the facilities with base isolation of these two hospitals
(San Carlos de Apoquindo and Hospital Militar de la Reina) did
not suffer any damage and continue operating after the earthquake,
other buildings not isolated that belonged to the same hospitals suf-
fered nonstructural damage (falling of coatings and ceilings) and
even minor structural damage.
After the earthquake, land communications between Santiago
and Concepción were hampered because of the failure of a number
of bridges along the route. Several bridges fell because the pier caps
were not designed with a width greater than the displacement of the
girders (Kawashima et al. 2011) (Fig. 13).
In the case of many bridges constructed after the mid-1990s,
the failures were the result of their lack of integrity. Many of the
bridges that failed lacked diaphragms and shear keys (commonly
referred to as “stoppers”) to limit girder transversal displacements.
This deficiency was more pronounced in oblique bridges because
of the deck’s rotation as a rigid body (Kawashima et al. 2011)
(Fig. 14). It is interesting to note that bridges built before the
1990s based on Chile’s original practice which included the use
of diaphragms and shear keys did not suffer major damages.
This means that even though the design and construction prac-
tices in Chile seem to be successful for minimizing collapses and,
therefore, the number of deaths, they turned out to be insufficient
for limiting the damage to acceptable levels for society, particularly
in the case of ensuring the operability of essential facilities such as
hospitals, telecommunications, energy, bridges, and roads (even in
modern infrastructure). In the conclusion, a way for improving
these aspects is suggested, which applies not only to Chile but to
the majority of the present seismic codes.
J. Constr. Eng. Manage.
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Fig. 11. Damage to masonry in one of the patient rooms of the Felix
Bulnes Hospital in Santiago (Holmes 2010; source: EERI; photogra-
pher: W. Holmes, with permission from Earthquake Engineering
Research Institute)
Fig. 12. Los Angeles Hospital the morning after the earthquake
(Holmes 2010; source: EERI; photographer: W. Holmes, with permis-
sion from Earthquake Engineering Research Institute)
Conclusions and Recommendations
The analysis of the effects to structures caused by the earthquakes
that took place in Haiti and Chile in 2010, two countries with a very
different level of seismic preparation, allows for conclusions ap-
plicable to seismic-resistant design, construction, inspection, and
maintenance practices of almost every seismic region around the
world, particularly in Latin American countries along the Andes
and even for the United States, in relation to the conclusions aimed
to improve essential facilities and conventional buildings earth-
quake response.
In order to classify the lessons from the aftermath of destruc-
tion and fatalities occasioned by the great American earthquakes
of 2010, conclusions and recommendations may be divided into
three groups: (1) essential facilities (hospitals, telecommunications,
energy, main bridges) which must continue operating immediately
after an earthquake; (2) conventional buildings designed and
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Fig. 13. Tubul bridge. Simply supported steel beams; collapse due to
lack of enough support length [“Damage of Bridges due to the 2010
Maule, Chile, Earthquake,” Kawashima, K., Unjoh, S., Hoshikuma, J.
and Kosa, K., Journal of Earthquake Engineering 15: 1036–1068,
2011, reprinted by permission of the publisher (Taylor & Francis Ltd,
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals)]
Fig. 14. Hospital overpass bridge of highway No. 5 at a crossing over
two lines of railways and a local road; the north-bound overpass was a
skewed PC girder bridge with a skew angle of 45°; oblique bridge with-
out diaphragms and effective stoppers suffered extensive damage due to
in-plane rotation [“Damage of Bridges due to the 2010 Maule, Chile,
Earthquake,” Kawashima, K., Unjoh, S., Hoshikuma, J. and Kosa, K.,
Journal of Earthquake Engineering 15: 1036–1068, 2011, reprinted by
permission of the publisher (Taylor & Francis Ltd, http://www.tandf.co
.uk/journals)]
constructed by standard professionals; and (3) dwellings without
engineering or self-constructed, usually by individuals of very
limited financial means.
Essential Facilities
Almost all seismic codes around the world establish the need of a
greater reliability for essential facilities by introducing an impor-
tance factor (as it is called in the NCh 433 code) (Table 3). Using
this factor, the seismic design forces are amplified, but the rest of
J. Constr. Eng. Manage.
 Table 3. Importance Factors Defined in the NCh 433 Code
Classification Importance
of buildings factor I
A 1.20
B 1.20
C 1.00
D 0.60
the design and construction processes follow essentially the tradi-
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tional methodology. This practice has proved to be insufficient and
inconvenient to ensure the continuous behavior of the essential
facilities after an earthquake.
The hospitals showed in Figs. 11 and 12 can be mentioned
as examples. They had to be evacuated due to damage in the
facilities and to equipment even when the structure resisted with
minor damages seismic forces significantly higher than the de-
sign forces.
Fig. 15. Performance Objective Matrix (adapted from Bertero and
Bertero 2002, with permission from Wiley)
Fig. 16. Examples of prescriptive manuals for dwelling self-construction [Nisnovich J. (1994); this drawing is part of “Manual Práctico de la
Construcción” from Arq. Jaime Nisnovich–Edic. Nisno, used with permission]
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The same limitation of present codes can be noted for bridges,
as the one indicated in Fig. 13, where a probabilistic optimi-
zation based on the expected performance of the structure would
have determined larger cap support widths than those obtained
with the application of an arbitrary risk factor like the one of
Table 3.
Therefore, there is an urgent need for implementing, at least for
essential facilities and other special structures, performance-based
codes together with a comprehensive methodology that considers
explicitly the damage levels of structural and nonstructural compo-
nents and facilities, ensuring with a given probability the operation
of the facilities after the earthquake (Bozorgnia and Bertero 2004).
In a methodology as proposed (Bertero and Bertero 1996), the
seismic hazards in a given place are represented by a number of
earthquakes with specified occurrence probability (frequent, occa-
sional, rare, very rare). Performance goals include typically multi-
ple objectives that consider explicitly the design levels of forces,
accelerations, displacements, and damages. For example, for a
conventional facility the performance objectives could be remain
completely operational for an earthquake with a return period of
10 years, ensure life of the inhabitants for an earthquake with a
return period of 500 years, and avoid collapse for an earthquake
of a return period of 1,000 years. The combination of earthquake
ground movement levels and performance levels can be represented
in a Performance Objective Matrix as shown in Fig. 15.
Conventional Buildings
In both Haiti and Chile the study of conventional building failures
showed that most were due to ignorance of seismic-resistant con-
cepts and detailing well known in the academic world. However,
some failures were also due to human errors made by the profes-
sionals involved in design, construction, or inspection.
Therefore, it is of fundamental importance to undertake (1) the
implementation of a procedure for continuous education and
certification of design and construction professionals; (2) the
implementation of a well-trained municipal inspection corps,
with a comprehensive knowledge of seismic-resistant design, con-
struction, and maintenance concepts (including the effects on
J. Constr. Eng. Manage.
 nonstructural elements and contents of the edification); and (3) the
development of a graphical and simplified code, complementary to
the main code, which should be easily utilized by those professio-
nals who are not experts in seismic issues. This simplified code
would be for designing buildings of limited size and height [with
objective similar to the American Concrete Institute produced
document “Essential Requirements for Reinforced Concrete Build-
ings” (ACI 2002); such a code could be quickly adopted by many
countries].
Regarding structural typologies, the Chilean methodology of us-
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ing a high density of RC walls as the basic structural system, which
do not crucially depend on fabrication detailing (unlike RC-framed
structures), proved to be efficient for avoiding major damage in
conventional buildings provided the slenderness (for avoiding high
axial forces) and irregularities in vertical configuration are limited
(Mohele 2010).
Dwellings without Engineering or Self-Constructed
Slums
An important factor contributing to the destruction in Haiti and
to the great number of people homeless after the Chilean EQ is
the substandard housing constructed without any planning or
engineering. These dwellings are in many cases self-construction
by individuals lacking financial resources and who build following
traditional methods.
Until economic development allows converting constructions
and settlements of this type into a housing program with urban
and social sense, it is urgent to transform the local building tradition
with a set of procedures that are inexpensive and rely on local
materials and practices, but that ensure minimum damage from
major earthquakes.
For this purpose, it is necessary to locally develop and then dis-
tribute to the people who build the dwellings a prescriptive hand-
book with graphic guidelines. This publication has to be easy to
read for people with no technical training, for example, in the way
of comics, as it has been printed in Argentina for self-housing con-
struction in nonseismic regions (Nisnovich 1994) (Fig. 16) and in
Peru for masonry constructions (Blondet 2005).
References
Alvarez, M. (2010). “Sistemas de protección sísmica. Estructuras en Chile.”
Sirve, Seismic Protection Technologies, Santiago, Chile.
American Concrete Institute (ACI). (2002). “Essential requirements for
reinforced concrete buildings.” IPS-1, Farmington Hills, MI.
Astroza, M., et al. (2010). “Intensidades sismicas en el área de daños
del terremoto del 27 de febrero de 2010.” Departamento de Ingeniería
Civil Facultad de Ciencias Físicas y Matemáticas, Universidad de Chile,
Santiago.
BBC. (2010). “Bachelet rechaza críticas por terremoto.” 〈http://www.bbc
.co.uk/mundo/america_latina/2010/03/100303_1952_chile_terremoto
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