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Business Horizons (2019) 62, 199—205

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A new way to look at an old problem:

International joint venture partner
selection via constrained systematic search
Tommie Welcher

University of Louisville, 2301 S. Third Street, Louisville, KY 40292, U.S.A.

KEYWORDS Abstract Although international joint ventures (IJVs) provide many benefits to
International joint multinational enterprises (MNEs), IJVs continue experiencing high dissolution rates;
ventures; there is a pressing need to re-evaluate the partner selection process for IJVs. In this
Partner selection; article, I utilize constrained systematic search (CSS) as the proposed process by which to
Constrained systematic improve the partner selection process and reduce IJV dissolution rates. CSS is a process
search; MNEs can utilize to gain private information about potential IJV partners. The imple-
Information asymmetry mentation of CSS can improve the success rates for an MNE entering an IJV in two ways:
MNEs can more effectively identify (1) information withholding/misleading behavior of
potential partners and (2) complementary resources in potential partners.
# 2018 Kelley School of Business, Indiana University. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights
reserved.

1. Solving the information gathering
problem
International joint ventures (IJVs) have been an
attractive option for multinational enterprise
(MNE) expansion (Lane & Beamish, 1990; Triki &
Mayrhofer, 2016). IJVs offer many advantages to
MNEs, including fast entry into a new market, gain-
ing access to local knowledge and distribution chan-
nels, and utilizing the reputation or trust previously
E-mail address: trwelc01@louisville.edu
established by the local partner (Inkpen & Beamish,
1997). Yet, IJV is known for its high rates of dissolu-
tion with studies finding dissolution rates between
50% and 70% (Bleeke & Ernst, 1991; Lowen & Pope,
2008; Park & Ungson, 1997).
Information asymmetry, a condition in which one
potential partner possesses information the other
does not have, can create an additional challenge in
selecting a partner with complementary resources
(Reuer & Koza, 2000). Complementary resources
are what a company needs to succeed in a new
market but does not possess itself. Asymmetric
information makes it likely that a firm miscalculates
the resources a potential partner possesses (Reuer

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2018.08.011
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 200
& Koza, 2000). An international venture not only
brings together two firms separated by geographic
distance and diverse corporate cultures, but also
two firms with different national cultures. Research
has identified lack of complementary resources as a
primary cause of such high rates of dissolution
among IJVs (Chowdhury, 1992; Killing, 2013). Thus,
to enhance the likelihood of IJV survival and suc-
cess, a primary need in the evaluation of a partner is
reliable information about the potential partner’s
resources. Information about a potential partner’s
resources may not be publicly available. In this
case, the MNE is either to rely on the potential
partner’s assertion of their assets or use private
information from third parties to ascertain an ac-
curate representation of the potential partner’s
resources. If a potential partner does not disclose
pertinent information to an MNE, it becomes impor-
tant for the MNE’s alliance manager to find another
way to obtain it. Systematically collected private
information could be the complement to public
information MNE alliance managers need.
A corporation is a social community of individuals
and information search is carried out by individuals.
I argue and demonstrate that constrained system-
atic search (CSS), a theory conceptualized for indi-
vidual entrepreneurs to collect private information,
can be used by MNEs to evaluate and select the
proper partner for an IJV. Fiet (2007) conceptual-
ized CSS from a process successful entrepreneurs
utilize to gain private information by systematically
searching through their private networks. CSS gives
its users a competitive advantage over those relying
purely on general knowledge that is publicly avail-
able. CSS not only provides an advantage to general
knowledge, it also provides an advantage over con-
ducting due diligence. The reliability of information
collected through due diligence is limited; however,
information obtained through CSS will be reliable.
The reliability of information obtained through CSS
comes from the quality and trustworthiness of in-
formation channels used. For alliance managers,
utilizing CSS could lead to a higher probability of
choosing a partner with complementary resources,
and ultimately a more successful IJV.
2. Information asymmetry in partner
selection and IJV success
When a publicly traded MNE is entering a developing
country, its public financial records will allow a
corporation in a developing country to see what
assets are available. On the other hand, the infor-
mation a multinational company values (e.g., com-
patibility in business and local market access) may
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T. Welcher
not be as readily available, particularly from com-
panies in developing countries. This lack of infor-
mation can create information asymmetry as a local
company within the developing country may have
private information an MNE cannot access.
This asymmetric information between potential
partners becomes a problem if one party leverages
the asymmetry to mislead the other party. For
instance, a company entering an IJV that possesses
private information could intentionally provide mis-
leading or incomplete information about the re-
sources it has. In this case, the company with
private information is intentionally and unethically
leveraging information asymmetry to achieve a de-
sired outcome. Smaller firms in developing coun-
tries may leverage information asymmetry to gain
entry into an IJV since they have higher production
costs competing against an MNE than they would if
they were in a partnership (Wong & Leung, 2001).
Thus, if an MNE has resources the local firm needs,
there is an incentive for the local firm to mislead the
MNE if its management team believes entering a
joint venture will lead to higher profits (Wong &
Leung, 2001).
Identification of private information can play a
significant role in overcoming information asymme-
try, which is made evident by the IJV between XALT
Energy, LLC (XALT) and Hybrid Kinetic (HKG). XALT is
involved with the design and manufacturing of ad-
vanced lithium-based energy storage and battery
cells in Midland, MI and HKG is an electric vehicle
manufacturer headquartered in Hong Kong. In the
IJV, the two firms were developing a specific type of
battery pack. The IJV supply agreement specified
that HKG would provide XALT with capital funding
through deposit and letters of credit and that HKG
would purchase every battery cell manufactured at
the XALT plant (Townsend Ventures LLC et al. v.
Hybrid Kinetic Group Limited et al., 2017). During
the negotiations of the IJV, HKG made claims to
XALT about the level of orders it already had for the
buses that would use the new batteries. HKG also
claimed it had acquired Huanghai Bus, but later said
that it never owned any bus companies (Townsend
Ventures, LLC et al. v. Hybrid Kinetic Group Limit-
ed, et al., 2017). HKG also made assertions that it
would provide XALT with various letters of credit,
although XALT never received any letters of credit
from HKG. XALT alleged that HKG misrepresented
itself in most, if not all, of the representations it
made during negotiations. XALT alleged that HKG
made these misrepresentations to show investors
that it had secured the services of a U.S. manufactur-
ing plant. In this case, HKG leveraged its information
asymmetry to establish an IJV with XALT. HKG subse-
quently admitted to misrepresenting its resources
 International joint venture partner selection via constrained systematic search
when it falsely claimed ownership of a bus company
(Townsend Ventures LLC et al. v. Hybrid Kinetic
Group Limited et al., 2017).
There is a gap in the research as to how private
information can complement publicly available in-
formation and help MNEs overcome information
asymmetry. Private information will reduce infor-
mation asymmetry among partners. Reducing infor-
mation asymmetry between partners will increase
IJV success in two ways. First, potential partners
that are providing misleading information will be
eliminated from consideration. Second, private in-
formation will confirm the information other poten-
tial partners are providing and help the MNE to
develop trust. In the venture between XALT and
HKG, the level of misrepresentation was very high
as HKG misrepresented itself in multiple ways. Any
IJV formed with this level of misrepresentation has
a high likelihood of failure, and by eliminating these
firms from consideration, an MNE can increase its
chances of having a successful IJV.
In the IJV between XALT and HKG, HKG knew its
financial position; the firm knew not only whether it
could provide promised funds but also if it could
obtain promised letters of credit. This asymmetry
was not a problem so long as HKG was forthright in
its communication with XALT. HKG also knew its
ownership status with Huanghai Bus (or lack there-
of) when it asserted to XALT that it owned Huanghai
Bus. It is reasonable that XALTwould have wanted to
confirm the assertions of HKG before entering into
the partnership. The inherent problem with state-
ments of financial position is that unless a company
is publicly traded, financial records are not public.
HKG’s assertion of ownership of Huanghai Bus, how-
ever, provided an opportunity for XALT to confirm
the representations made by HKG.
When working to confirm the assertions made by
a potential partner, there is a limited amount of
public information available to assist an alliance
manager. Such as with the assertion made by HKG,
there is a publicly available website for Huanghai
Bus that does confirm there is a Huanghai Bus
founded in 1951 in the Liaoning province of China.
However, what an alliance manager needs to con-
firm most assertions made by a potential partner is
private information. Private information is difficult
to access through public search and can be both
difficult and expensive to transfer between agents
(Jensen & Meckling, 1992).
While CSS appears similar to simple due dili-
gence, it goes a step further. Conducting due dili-
gence could result in an alliance manager cold
calling a firm in the same geography as a potential
partner. While the cold-called firm possesses pri-
vate information, the reliability of any information
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201
obtained through a cold call is limited since there is
no relationship or trust between the two parties.
Also, firms that expediently enter an IJV and a new
market may not carry out due diligence with suffi-
cient rigor to gain the needed information. It is
likely that XALT conducted due diligence to confirm
the assertions made by HKG. However, due dili-
gence alone may not be enough to overcome infor-
mation asymmetry. Just carrying out due diligence
could have led XALT to obtain inaccurate informa-
tion through unreliable channels. Had XALTused CSS
to access reliable information about HKG, it would
have been more likely to overcome the information
asymmetry and realize HKG was leveraging the
asymmetry to misrepresent themselves. CSS is a
concerted systematic approach to establishing an
evolved network through which future information
can be obtained. This separates the private infor-
mation obtained through CSS from that obtained
through basic due diligence. The private informa-
tion obtained through CSS will be information that
comes from trusted channels and, therefore, more
reliable.
2.1. The need for private information
After the initial decision is made to engage in an
international alliance, the next critical decision is
partner selection (Hitt, Tyler, Hardee, & Park,
1995). Although there is a growing amount of liter-
ature that emphasizes to managers the importance
of selecting the proper partner (i.e., Gnanasamban-
dam & Uhl, 2017; Killing, 1982), limited research
prescribes how to collect private information
through established information channels as part
of a strategic partner selection process. Systemati-
cally collected private information could comple-
ment the publicly available information and help
establish a more accurate and complete profile of a
potential partner.
When an MNE enters an IJV, the alliance manager
must first determine what resources the firm has,
what resources the firm needs, and what the de-
sired outcome of the joint venture is. CSS proposes
that if an actor knows what resources he/she has,
what resources he/she needs, and the desired out-
come, he/she will be led to search within a specific
set of information channels to gain relevant specific
knowledge of the opportunity he/she is considering
(Fiet, 2007). Private information becomes even
more beneficial when there is limited public infor-
mation available about the potential deal. When an
MNE evaluates a local firm for an IJV, there may be
limited public information about the local firm,
increasing the utility of accurate and relevant pri-
vate information.
 202
2.2. Information asymmetry scenarios
Multiple scenarios can create information asymme-
try. In the IJV example of HKG and XALT, the informa-
tion asymmetry was partially a result of HKG not
being a publicly traded company and its financial
position not being made publicly available. In some
cases, information asymmetry is a result of ongoing
negotiations being kept confidential to maintain the
integrity of a process. This occurred when Integrated
Healthcare Holdings (IHH) and RHC Healthcare (RHC)
were both attempting to acquire Singapore-based
Parkway Holdings. Both IHH and RHC were in nego-
tiations to acquire a controlling interest in Parkway
and details of the negotiations were kept private
(Pandeya, 2010). This created a scenario in which
both IHH and RHC had private information. However,
IHH leveraged this private information by releasing
false information to the Singapore board of trade that
the majority of stockholders had approved the offer
by IHH when only about 35% of stockholders had
actually approved the offer (Pandeya, 2010). In an
IJV negotiation, this misleading assertion could af-
fect the decision of a potential IJV partner.
In other situations, there is information asymme-
try because the pertinent information tends to be
difficult to confirm. This was the case when Olivier
Family Interests (OFI) partnered with local entre-
preneurs to take construction materials into the
international market. OFI was required to provide
the capital for the arrangement, which it did, and
one of the local entrepreneurs stated it had lined up
buyers with purchasing potential that would exceed
three times the initial investment made by OFI
(Lauck, 2012). The local entrepreneur with inter-
national contacts was unable to close a single con-
tract in the 1.5 years the arrangement lasted
(Lauck, 2012). Even though the entrepreneur could
identify several contacts during depositions indicat-
ing that he/she did have ties, it is difficult to
accurately assess the strength of a potential part-
ner’s ties and ability to turn those ties into sales.
CSS will lead an MNE to search known channels and
collect accurate and relevant information regarding
potential partners.
3. CSS as a method for private
information collection
3.1. The concept of CSS
The concept of CSS is described in this way:
“Searching is a bounded attempt to find signals
related to a specific set of criteria. A signal is
new information that changes our understanding
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T. Welcher
about the future, particularly as it relates to the
creation of new wealth” (Fiet, 2007, p. 593). An
alliance manager for an MNE can utilize CSS to
search the known channels and trusted contacts
of the alliance manager and MNE to gain signals
about a prospective partner. Upper-level managers
develop searchable channels for an MNE through a
combination of business and personal interactions.
The amount of information that can be accessed
through searching information channels is bounded
by the channels’ quality and quantity. Through
consciously working to improve the quantity and
quality of searchable channels, management of an
MNE can increase its ability to obtain private infor-
mation.
3.2. The firm is a social community
A firm is a social community specializing in the
creation and internal transfer of knowledge (Kogut
& Zander, 1993). MNEs arise out of their superior
efficiency as an organizational vehicle by which to
transfer knowledge (Kogut & Zander, 1993). Due to
this superior efficiency, the alliance manager can
leverage the community to gather and transfer
private information. The alliance manager can uti-
lize the community members to draw on their con-
tacts and experiences, as well as the corporation’s
contacts. To do this, other members of the commu-
nity will need to understand how to use CSS to gain
private information. A benefit of CSS is that the
process of systematically searching information
channels is one that can be learned (Fiet & Patel,
2008). Once an alliance manager decides to imple-
ment CSS, he/she can facilitate learning the process
of systematically searching information channels
with other members of the community.
The alliance manager needs to look among the
members of the community for previous experien-
ces that can be leveraged to gain private informa-
tion. These community members will then, in turn,
need to solicit their established contacts to gain
private information about a potential partner. Rel-
evant contacts can either: (1) have a relationship
with the potential partner or (2) are headquartered
in the same region as the potential partner and can
gain private information about them. This search
should not focus solely on the resources the poten-
tial partner possesses but should also search for
information about culture compatibility, the politi-
cal climate of the region, and the compatibility of
the top management team. Not all potential part-
ners or potential new markets represent an IJV
opportunity for an MNE, but careful evaluation of
private information can lead to recognizing this lack
of an opportunity before the MNE enters an IJV
 International joint venture partner selection via constrained systematic search
destined for failure. To gain this private informa-
tion, team members will need to search information
channels.
3.3. Developing information channels
Having trusted information channels through which
to obtain reliable information is essential to con-
ducting CSS. To increase the number of information
channels available to an MNE, alliance managers
need to create an evolved network. An evolved
network is one in which the company’s network
includes unrelated companies in unrelated indus-
tries rather than solely having a network of related
companies. It has been shown that a network can
evolve through conscious efforts from a collection
of actors with shared interests into a carefully
managed network to enable the dispersion of het-
erogeneous knowledge (Elfring & Hulsink, 2007).
The alliance manager will need the foresight to
identify which markets the MNE plans to expand
into so he/she can evolve the corporation's network
into one in which pertinent heterogeneous knowl-
edge can be obtained. Creating interlocks with
unrelated firms is one way an alliance manager
can accomplish this.
Interlocks can occur when a member of upper
management of one company sits on the board of
other companies (Granovetter, 1983). If a member
of upper management sits on the board of an unre-
lated company, a tie is then created between the
two unrelated companies, even though no other ties
between the companies exist (Granovetter, 1983).
Upper-level managers–—especially alliance manag-
ers of MNEs looking to enter IJVs–—should actively
pursue opportunities to sit on the boards of unre-
lated companies. Alliance managers should primar-
ily target relationships with companies that have
ties to previously identified markets for expansion.
Creating relationships with unrelated firms will al-
low the alliance manager to obtain private infor-
mation. At first, the relationship between unrelated
companies may not be strong or filled with mutual
trust. This relationship can–—over time, like a
network–—evolve and grow.
Environmental scanning is the process of gathering
information about events in an organization’s envi-
ronment. Environmental scanning will lead an alli-
ance manager to survey and search for information
about events in a market identified for future expan-
sion. This act leads an MNE’s alliance manager to
discover networking opportunities in identified mar-
kets such as the Africa’s Big 7 exhibition in Johannes-
burg. The Africa’s Big 7 Exhibition was a convention
held in South Africa to bring together southern
African firms and international firms interested in
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203
operating in southern Africa. To establish the trusted
networks required to conduct CSS, alliance managers
attending these types of events would need to engage
in intensive networking. Several Chinese business-
men were engaging in these types of activities at
the Africa’s Big 7 exhibition, as several said they were
trying to develop long-term relationships at the event
(“Chinese Firms,” 2017). Over time, the relationships
between these unrelated firms will grow stronger, and
this stronger relationship will lead to the companies
developing higher levels of both network embedded-
ness and trust (Uzzi, 1999). Network embeddedness
leads to social ties through which members of the
network can conduct business transactions (Uzzi,
1999). Social ties create the basis of information
channels needed to access private information. Alli-
ance managers of MNEs can utilize these ties to access
private information about potential partners.
3.4. Using information channels
An MNE’s alliance manager can use CSS to gain private
information about potential partners. This will allow
the alliance manager to both gain information about
potential partners with complementary assets and
determine if a potential partner is leveraging infor-
mation asymmetry to mislead them. IJV contracts
inherently have multiple assertions made by each
party. When entering an IJV, some of these assertions
will be easier to confirm than others. If the alliance
manager learns the potential partner is leveraging
information on any of their assertions, it should be a
red flag and the potential partner should be elimi-
nated from consideration. As mentioned earlier, XALT
could have utilized CSS to gain private information
and confirm HKG’s ownership of Huanghai Bus.
In the example of OFI partnering with local en-
trepreneurs, one entrepreneur was supposed to
bring quality international contacts to secure sales
(Lauck, 2012). The other entrepreneur was to bring
a patent of which he asserted himself to be the sole
owner (Lauck, 2012). Short of requiring contracts in
hand, it may be difficult to confirm the quality of
the entrepreneur’s contacts. However, patents are
public record and as such, it is easier to access their
information. OFI could have confirmed that the
patent existed and who was listed as the owner
of the patent through public information. Also, the
alliance manager could have used CSS to gain pri-
vate information and learn if the entrepreneur still
had sole ownership of the patent or if he/she made
any other promises or arrangements regarding the
patent. Had the alliance manager done so and
learned that the entrepreneur had transferred own-
ership of the patent to a company, he/she would
have seen that at least one of the entrepreneurs was
 204
leveraging the information asymmetry that existed.
One way to gain this private information from firms
is by leveraging the MNE’s social capital.
3.5. Leveraging social capital
An MNE with an evolved network develops social
capital known as bridging. Bridging is the social
capital that occurs between heterogeneous firms
(e.g., corporations from different countries or in-
dustries) and is consistent with evolved networks
9
(Macerinskien e_ & Vasiliauskaite,
_ 2007). Developing
social capital between heterogeneous firms can
prove difficult, as natural affiliations do not exist.
However, once established, the evolved network
facilitates the transmission of information, further
enabling confidence between partners
(Ma9cerinskiene_ & Vasiliauskaite,
_ 2007). To increase
the amount of bridging social capital an MNE has,
the alliance manager needs to engage in informa-
tion transmission with these unrelated firms. The
alliance manager will need to engage in information
sharing with the unrelated firms so that he/she can
more easily gather private information from unre-
lated firms in the network. The creation of bridging
social capital is a primary reason alliance managers
should actively work to develop an evolved corpo-
rate network.
4. Setting IJVs up for success
This article suggests that CSS is a tool by which IJV
partner selection teams can gain private informa-
tion about potential partners. Each corporation can
have different processes. However, it is important
that alliance managers both develop information
channels through which they can later gather pri-
vate information and facilitate learning the process
with other members of the firm so they can partici-
pate. Alliance managers can then leverage social
capital to gather private information through these
established information channels. The MNE’s poten-
tial benefit from this process has two parts: (1) by
obtaining private information, an MNE is more likely
to choose a partner with complementary resources
and experience a successful IJV and (2) by utilizing
private information, an MNE can reduce information
asymmetry and avoid potential partners that are
intentionally misrepresenting themselves.
By utilizing CSS to gain private information, an
MNE can increase the amount of reliable informa-
tion it has about potential partners. This can be
utilized by a wide variety of firms in nearly all
industries that are initiating a venture in which
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T. Welcher
information asymmetry could exist. CSS is a method
through which alliance managers can gain private
information to complement the public information
available about potential partners. This will create
a scenario in which the alliance manager can con-
firm the information provided to him/her by a
potential partner and not rely solely on the infor-
mation provided by the potential partner. This is
necessary as potential partners may intentionally
misrepresent themselves during IJV negotiations.
Utilizing CSS to obtain private information about
potential partners is not without limitations. As
mentioned earlier, conducting CSS requires fore-
sight into which markets an MNE will expand. If
the alliance manager has not identified the market
the MNE is expanding into and developed informa-
tion channels to obtain information in that market,
they will be unable to conduct CSS. Also, this article
addresses MNEs that are expanding and looking to
enter into IJVs. The processes of CSS may not be
appropriate for smaller firms. While MNEs likely
possess sufficient resources to develop information
channels and conduct CSS, small firms may not
possess these necessary resources.
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