1) a) Yes, the motion to dismiss will prosper.

Under the Rule 16 paragraph (h) of Rules of Court, motion to dismiss may be made when
claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff's pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or
otherwise extinguished.

In the case at hand, C freely and voluntarily executed an Affidavit of Desistance and
Release of Claim after the accident, making the claim already deemed waived or
extinguished.

Thus, the motion to dismiss will prosper.

b) Allegations and defenses alleged by A and B are unmeritorious.

Under Article 1755 of the New Civil Code, it states that a common carrier is bound to
carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.

In the present case, the driver A did not exercise extra ordinary diligence in transporting
passengers C and D because they were instructed to sit on an empty beer case which is
not intended for passengers. The defense of A and B that A gave instructions to the
passengers but C tried to disembark would not be a valid defense because it failed to
exercise utmost diligence of very cautious persons required of a carrier when A made C
and D sit on an emty beer case.

Also, in the case of Yobido v. CA, the court ruled that an accident caused by the defects
in the automobile or through negligence of the driver is not caso fortuito. Applying the
ruling in the present case, the loss of power would not be considered as a fortuitous event.

Therefore, the allegations made by A and B cannot be given merit.

2) Under Article 1318 of the New Civil Code, there is no contract unless the following
requisites concur: (1) Consent of the contracting parties; (2) Object certain which is the
subject matter of the contract; (3) Cause of the obligation which is established.

There is consent when there has been a meeting of the minds between the parties on the
subject matter and the cause which are to constitute the contract. Object on the other hand is
the obligation created, and cause is the proximate purpose which the contracting parties have
in view at time of entering in to the contract. Contra

In the case at hand, consent has been given because there has been there has been a meeting
of the minds between C and A when the jeepney stopped in front of C at 4:00 pm. Thus, the
contract is perfected at 4:00 pm.
3) a) In the case of Jesusa vda. De Nueca vs. The Manila Railroad Company the court defined a
passenger as a person who has a:

1.) bona fide intention to use the facilities of the carrier;

2.) possesses sufficient fare with which to pay his passage; and
3.) present himself to the carrier for transportation in the place and manner
provided.

Romeo’s suit for breach of contract will not prosper since he is not considered a
passenger because he does not possess a sufficient fare to pay his passage.
Samuel’s suit will also not prosper because he does not have a bona fide intention
to use the facilities of the carrier; his intention was to steal from other passengers.
Teresita is not considered as passenger because her intention is to accompany the
driver in his trips and not to be transported from one place to another. Jose is also
not considered a passenger since his intention is to sell and not to use the facilities
of the carrier.

On the other hand, Uriel and Pedro’s suit for breach of contract will prosper. The law
provides that a passenger is one who travels in a public conveyance by virtue of contract,
express or implied, with the carrier as to the payment of fare or that which is accepted as
an equivalent thereof. Uriel’s suit will prosper because he is a passenger since his free
riding pass is accepted as an equivalent of fare. Pedro’s suit will prosper as well because
a person may still be considered as a passenger even though he didn’t pay fare if the
driver or the operator agreed to carry such person gratuitously.

b) Yes, Romeo, Samuel, Teresita, Uriel, Jose and Pedro have a cause of action for damages
against UTI.

Under the New Civil Code, whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict.

In case at hand, Romeo, Samuel, Teresita, Uriel, Jose and Pedro have no pre-existing
contractual relation with UTI, and since there was fault or negligence on the part of UTI,
their cause of action is based on quasi-delict.

Thus, Romeo, Samuel, Teresita, Uriel, Jose and Pedro have a cause of action for damages
against UTI.

c) The defenses available to CTC are: 1.) proof that they observed extraordinary
 diligence and 2.) proof that the injury or death was brought about by a fortuitous event.

In the case of UTI on the other hand, the only defense available to them is proof that they
exercised the due diligence required to them and that there was no fault on their part.

4) Yes, the complaint for breach of contract against TMBI and BM will prosper.

Under Art. 1732 of the Civil Code, it states that common carriers are persons, firms or
associations engaged in the business of transporting passengers or goods, by land, water, or air,
for compensation, offering their services to the public. There is no difference between one whose
principal business activity is the carrying of goods and one who undertakes this task only as an
ancillary activity.

In the present case at hand, TMBI was contracted to process, withdraw, and deliver the shipment
from the port to Sony’s warehouse in Laguna and BMTS was subcontracted by TMBI. Both
companies are deemed common carriers.

Therefore, the complaint for breach of contract against TMBI and BMTS will prosper.

5) A) No, I do not agree with X’s argument that he is not a common carrier.

Under Art. 1732 of the Civil Code common carriers are persons, firms or associations
engaged in the business of transporting passengers or goods, by land, water, or air, for
compensation, offering their services to the public. The law does not distinguish between one
whose principal business activity is the carrying of goods and one who undertakes this task
only as an ancillary activity.

In the present case, X picks up his friends as passengers and they are paying him for a fare.
Therefore, X is considered as a common carrier.

b) Yes, X is still liable for any damage or injury resulting from any cause to passengers and
their properties.

Under Article 1757 of the New Civil Code, it states that responsibility of a common carrier
for the safety of passengers as required in articles 1733 and 1755 cannot be dispensed with or
lessened by stipulation, by the posting of notices, by statements on tickets, or otherwise.

In the case at hand, the verbal agreement between X and passengers exonerating him from
liability is void. Thus, X would still be liable.
 c) Yes. A common carrier’s obligation includes both safety of passengers and vigilance over
goods. Even if the contents of the bags and personal effects were not disclosed it will only
have the effect of limiting the common carrier’s liability under Article 1749 of the Civil
Code.

6) a) I would not sustain the argument of Alejandro.

Under Art. 1732 of the Civil Code, it states that common carriers are persons, firms or
associations engaged in the business of transporting passengers or goods, by land, water, or air,
for compensation, offering their services to the public. There is no difference between one whose
principal business activity is the carrying of goods and one who undertakes this task only as an
ancillary activity.

In the case at hand, Alejandro loads his trucks with various merchandise of other merchants in
Alegria and the neighboring municipalities of Badian and Ginatila, and he charges them freight
rates. The activity of alejandro involves contract of carriage.

Thus, he is considered as a common carrier.

b) The contention of Alejandro that he is not a liable is tenable.

Under Article 1745 (6) of the Civil Code, a common carrier is held responsible and will not be
allowed to divest or to diminish such responsibility even for acts of strangers like thieves or
robbers, except where such thieves or robbers in fact acted with grave or irresistible threat,
violence, or force.

In the present case, the robbers were armed and were able to kidnap the driver and his helper,
which is deemed act of robbers with grave or irresistible threat, violence, or force.

Therefore, Alejandro as a common carrier will not be liable for the stolen boxes of sardines.

7) a) Yes, A can be held liable for damages.

The “registered owner rule” states that the person who is the registered owner of a vehicle is
liable for any damages caused by the negligent operation of the vehicle although the same was
already sold or conveyed to another person at the time of accident.

In the present case, even though the jeepney was already sold to B, A is still the registered
owner.

Therefore A is still liable for the death of the child.

b) Yes, the jeepney can be attached to answer for the claim of the heirs of the child.

In the case of Santos vs. Sibug, it was ruled that the jeepney, although sold but remained
registered in the name of the original owner should be considered the property of the registered
owner under the registered owner rule. In the case at bar, since A remains to be the registered
owner of the jeepney, it follows that the same is considered his property.

Thus, the jeepney can be attached to answer for the claim of the heirs of the child against the
registered owner A.

8) Yes, the claim will prosper.

In the case of Pan Malayan Insurance vs. CA, it was ruled that the right of subrogation is not
dependent upon nor does it grow out of any privity of contract. Payment to the insured makes the
insurer an assignee in equity.

In the present case at hand, since U Insurance made payment to the insured S Corp.for the
damaged containers, U Insurance was subrogated to the rights of S Corp.

Therefore, a claim against WS, A Inc., BS, O Inc. and OF will prosper.

9) Yes, my answer will still be the same if KMC shipped the goods through M/V Harvest by
entering into a Charter Party with WS. A charter party is a contract by which the entire ship or
some principal part thereof is let by the owner to another person for a specified period of time or
use. Since M/V Harvest is the vessel in of the cargo, which is owned by WS, who is the owner of
such vessel. Liability is then directly passed to the owner of the vessel, WS.

10) No. In the case of Westwind Shipping vs. UCPB General Insurance, it was ruled that the
legal relationship between the consignee and the arrastre operator is akin to that of a depositor
and a warehouseman. The relationship between the consignee and the common carrier is similar
to that of the consignee and the arrastre operator. The carrier and the arrastre operator are
charged with and obligated to delover the goods in good condition to the consignee. In the case,
the consignee is not barred from recovering from the carrier and the arrastre operator even if
there was a note in the bill of lading that the “receipt was in good order.”

11) The period to file the case by U Insurance against WS, A Inc., and OF is ten (10) years under
Matime Law. The period will commence from the time the cause of action arises, or before
December 16, 2028.

12) No, KMC is not correct. The obligation of the carrier is terminated if the goods are delivered
even If the bill of lading was not surrendered. The surrender of such bill of lading is not
necessary for the discharge of the obligation of the carrier. Under Article 353 of the Code of
Commerce, the consignee must give a receipt of the goods to the carrier in case of loss of the
bill. As ruled in the case of Designer Baskets vs. Air Sea Transport, there was nothing in the
applicable laws that require the surrender of bills of lading before the goods may be released to
the buyer or consignee.
13) The period to file a claim is already barred by prescription. When a claim is to be filed with
the carrier, the shipper must file immediately if damage is apparent or within 24 hours from
delivery if damage is not apparent. In this case, damage was apparent which means that the claim
should have been filed upon discovery of the damage, as provided in Article 366 of the Code of
Commerce.

14) A) Yes, the general rule under Article 1756 of NCC, in case of death of or injuries to
passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. The
exception is if it is proved that such common carriers observed extraordinary diligence.
Therefore, a common carrier is presumed to be liable when there is death or injury to its
passengers.

B) Under Article 1755 of NCC, a common carrier is bound to carry passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with
due regard for all the circumstances. This utmost diligence is also known as extraordinary
diligence.

C) Yes, common carriers are still responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of
the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier’s
employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have
prevented or stopped the act or omission, as stated in Article 1763 of NCC.

15) A) No. Depending on the circumstances revolving every case, not all stated damages may be
availed by the victim or plaintiff. There are some damages that exclude another. There is breach
of contract in question 1, under the Civil Code, the carrier may be held liable for breach of
obligation through fraud, negligence, delay or through any other manner that contravenes the
tenor of the obligation.

B) No. Article 2217 of the NCC provides that moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may
be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission. It is
granted when there is death of a passenger and if it is proven that the carrier was guilty of fraud
and bad faith, even if death does not result. In the case at bar, there was no clear showing of bad
faith. Hence, additional claims for damages needs to be presented.

C) In the case at bar, C was made to sit with D on her lap in an empty beer case in the middle
portion of the jeepney near the back exit of the vehicle is a breach. And in case of such breach,
the carrier is liable for actual and compensatory damages that may be established including
damages that may be established including damages for loss of earning capacity. The damage or
injury of C, with her leg amputated, means that C may claim damages for loss of earning
capacity. Also, attorney’s fees and exemplary damages may be available depending on the case.
However, moral damages cannot be claimed since under the Code, the rule is that moral damages
are not recoverable in an action based on breach of contract. Unless the passenger died and if
there is fraud, bad faith, or gross negligence. In the case at hand, the passenger, C, sustained
injury and there was breach, however, moral damages cannot be claimed.