13. COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, Kho).

Kho). The split among the ranks of SENIOR CITIZENS came about not long after. According to
INC. [SENIOR CITIZENS PARTY-LIST], represented herein by its Chairperson and First the Datol Group’s petition, the members of SENIOR CITIZENS held a national convention on
Nominee, FRANCISCO G. DATOL, Jr., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, November 27, 2010 in order to address “the unfulfilled commitment of [Rep. Arquiza] to his
respondent. constituents.” Further, a new set of officers and members of the Board of Trustees of the
G.R. Nos. 206844-45. July 23, 2013. organization were allegedly elected during the said convention. SENIOR CITIZENS’ third
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., was supposedly elected as the organization’s Chairman.
(SENIOR CITIZENS), represented by its President and Incumbent Representative in the Thereafter, on November 30, 2010, in an opposite turn of events, Datol was expelled from SENIOR
House of Representatives, ATTY. GODOFREDO V. ARQUIZA, petitioner, vs. CITIZENS by the Board of Trustees that were allied with Rep. Arquiza.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. 206982. July 23, 2013.* Thenceforth, the two factions of SENIOR CITIZENS had been engaged in a bitter rivalry as both
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: groups, with their own sets of officers, claimed leadership of the organization.
The Resignation of Rep. Kho
The present petitions were filed by the two rival factions within the same party-list organization, the On December 14, 2011, Rep. Arquiza informed the office of COMELEC Chairman Sixto S.
Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Phil., Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS) that are now Brillantes, Jr. in a letter dated December 8, 2011 that the second nominee of SENIOR CITIZENS,
praying for essentially the same reliefs from this Court. Rep. Kho, had tendered his resignation, which was to take effect on December 31, 2011. The fourth
nominee, Remedios D. Arquiza, was to assume the vacant position in view of the previous
One group is headed by Godofredo V. Arquiza (Rep. Arquiza), the organization’s incumbent expulsion from the organization of the third nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr.
representative in the House of Representatives. This group shall be hereinafter referred to as the
Arquiza Group. The other group is led by Francisco G. Datol, Jr., the The letter of Rep. Arquiza was also accompanied by a petition dated December 14, 2011 in the
organization’s erstwhile third nominee. This group shall be hereinafter referred to as the Datol name of SENIOR CITIZENS. The petition prayed that the “confirmation and approval of the
Group. replacement of Congressman David L. Kho, in the person of the fourth nominee, Remedios D.
Arquiza, due to the expulsion of the third nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., be issued immediately
The above petitions were filed pursuant to Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, both in order to pave the way of her assumption into the office.” Attached to the petition before the
assailing the Omnibus Resolution COMELEC En Banc disqualifying SENIOR CITIZENS from COMELEC was the resignation letter of Rep. Kho,
participating in the May 13, 2013 elections and ordered the cancellation of its registration and which was addressed to the Speaker of the HoR.
accreditation as a party-list organization.
In the interim, during the pendency of the petition before the COMELEC, COMELEC Resolution
FACTS: On March 16, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc accredited SENIOR CITIZENS as a party- No. 9366 was promulgated on February 21, 2012. Pertinently, Section 7 of Rule 4 thereof provided
list. SENIOR CITIZENS participated in the May 14, 2007 elections. However, the organization that:
failed to get the required 2% of the total votes cast. Thereafter, SENIOR CITIZENS was granted SEC. 7. Term sharing of nominees.—Filing of vacancy as a result of term sharing
leave to intervene in the case of BANAT v. COMELEC. In accordance with the procedure set forth agreement among nominees of winning partylist groups/organizations shall not be
in BANAT for the allocation of additional seats under the party-list system, SENIOR CITIZENS allowed.
was allocated one seat in Congress. Rep. Arquiza, then the organization’s first nominee, served as a
member of the HoR. On March 12, 2012, the Board of Trustees of SENIOR CITIZENS that were allied with Rep.
Arquiza issued Board Resolution No. 003-2012: Recalling the acceptance of the Board in
Subsequently, SENIOR CITIZENS was allowed to participate in the May 10, 2010 elections. Resolution No. 11-0012 of the resignation of Congressman David L. Kho and allowing him to
continue representing the Senior Citizen’s Party-List in the HoR, allowing him to continue his term
On May 5, 2010, the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed an agreement, entitled Irrevocable and imposing certain conditions on him to be performed with the coalition.
Covenant. The essence of the provisions are as follows:
List of Candidates: COMELEC en Banc issued a resolution dismissing Senior Citizen’s petition (Arquiza Group). The
1.Godofredo V. Arquiza pertinent portions of the Resolution stated, thus:
2. David L. Kho First, resignation of Kho, pursuant to the party nominees’ term-sharing
3.Francisco G. Datol, Jr. agreement, cannot be recognized and be given effect so as to create a vacancy in the
4.Remedios D. Arquiza list and change the order of the nominees.
5.Linda Gaddi David
Under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7941, the withdrawal in writing of the nominee of
If only one (1) seat is won If three (3) seats are won: his nomination is one of the three (3) exemptions to the rule that “[n}o change of names
No. 1 nominee= 2 years No. 1 nominee= 3 years or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been
No. 2 nominee= 1 year No. 2 nominee= 2 years submitted to the COMELEC.” While we can consider the resignation of Rep. Kho as
No. 3 nominee= 2 years akin to the withdrawal of his own nomination, we are constrained however NOT to
If two (2) seats are won No. 4 nominee= 1 year recognize such resignation but only in so far as to change the order of petitioner’s
No. 1 nominee= 3 years No. 5 nominee= 1 year nominees as submitted to the Commission.
No. 2 nominee= 1 1/2 years
No. 3 nominee= 1 1/2 years All beginning July 1, 2010 xxxx
Considering that it is an admitted fact that the resignation of Rep. Kho was made by
After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 elections, SENIOR CITIZENS ranked second among all the virtue of a prior agreement of the parties, we resolve and hereby rule that we cannot
party-list candidates and was allocated two seats in the HoR. The first seat was occupied by its recognize such arrangement and accordingly we cannot approve the movement in the
first nominee, Rep. Arquiza, while the second was given to its second nominee, David L. Kho (Rep. order of nominees for being contrary to public policy. The term of office of public
 officials cannot be made subject to any agreement of private parties. Public office is directed no less than by the Constitution of the Philippines. Section 7, Article VI of the
not a commodity that can be shared, apportioned or be made subject of any private 1987 Constitution states:
agreement. Public office is vested with public interest that should not be reined by “Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a
individual interest. term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at
noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.”
In fact, to formalize the policy of disallowing term sharing agreements among party list
nominees, the Commission recently
But following the term-sharing agreement entered into by SENIOR CITIZENS, David
promulgated Resolution No. 9366, which provides:
Kho’s term starts on June 30, 2010 and ends on December 31, 2011, the date of
“SEC. 7. Term sharing of nominees.—Filing of vacancy as a result of term
effectivity of Kho’ s resignation. By virtue of the term-sharing agreement, the term of
sharing agreement among nominees of winning party-list
Kho as member of the House of Representatives is cut short to one year and six months
groups/organizations shall not be allowed.”
which is merely half of [the] three-year term. This is totally opposed to the prescription
of the Constitution on the term of a Member of the House of Representatives. Hence,
Considering all these, we find the term sharing agreement by the nominees of the
when confronted with this issue on term sharing done by SENIOR CITIZENS, this
Senior Citizen’s Party-List null and void. Any action committed by the parties in
Commission made a categorical pronouncement that such term-sharing agreement must
pursuit of such term-sharing arrangement including the resignation of Congressman
be rejected.
David Kho — cannot be recognized and be given effect. Thus, in so far as this
Commission is concerned, no vacancy was created by the resignation of Rep. Kho and
xxxx
there can be no change in the list and order of nominees of the petitioner party-list.
From the foregoing, SENIOR CITIZENS failed to comply with Section 7, Article VI of
Second, the expulsion of Datol — even if proven true — has no effect in the list and
the 1987 Constitution and Section 7, Rule 4 of Comelec Resolution No. 9366. This
in the order of nominees, thus Remedios Arquiza (the fourth nominee) cannot be
failure is a ground for cancellation of registration under Section 6 of RA. 7941 which
elevated as the third nominee.
states:
“Section 6. [Refusal] and/or Cancellation of Registration. —The COMELEC
It must be noted that the list and order of nominees, after submission to this
may, motu proprio or upon verified [complaint] of any interested party,
Commission, is meant to be permanent. The legislature in crafting RA 7941 clearly
[refuse} or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
deprived the party-list organization of the right to change its nominees or to alter the
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the
order of nominees once the list is submitted to the COMELEC, except for three (3)
following grounds:
enumerated instances such as when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in
writing his nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes incapacitated.
xxxx
Thus, even if the expulsion of Datol in the petitioner party-list were true, the list and
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to
order of nominees of the Senior Citizen’s party-list remains the same in so far as we are
elections; xxx
concerned as it does not fall under one of the three grounds mentioned above. Neither
does it have an automatic effect on the organization’s representative in the House of
The rival factions of SENIOR CITIZENS challenged the above resolution before this Court by
Representatives, for once a party-list nominee is “elected” into office and becomes a
filing their respective petitions for
member of the House, he is treated similarly and equally with the regular district
certiorari.
representatives. As such, they can only be expelled or suspended upon the concurrence
of the two-thirds of all its Members and never by mere expulsion of a party-list
Guided by the six new parameters enunciated by the SC on Atong Paglaum, Inc vs COMELEC, on
organization.
May 10, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc rendered the assailed Omnibus Resolution affirming its
earlier Resolution ruling in this wise:
The Datol Group filed A Very Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the above resolution, but the
The sole ground for which the petitioner Senior Citizens was disqualified was because
same remained unresolved.
of the term-sharing agreement between its nominees, which the Commission En Banc
found to be contrary to public policy. It will be noted that this ground is independent of
The Review of SENIOR CITIZENS’ Registration
the six parameters in Atong Paglaum, and there is nothing in the doctrine enunciated in
Meanwhile, the Datol Group and the Arquiza Group filed their respective Manifestations of Intent
that case which will absolve the petitioner Senior Citizen of what, to the Commission En
to Participate in the Party-list System of Representation in the May 13, 2013 Elections under the
Banc, is a clear bastardization of the term of office fixed by Section 7, Article VI of the
name of SENIOR CITIZENS. By a vote of 4-3, the COMELEC En Banc ordered the cancellation
Constitution as implemented by Section 14 of R.A. No. 7941, which expressly provides
of the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS. The resolution explained that:
that Members of the House of Representatives, including party-list representatives, shall
It shall be recalled that on June 27, 2012, this Commission promulgated its resolution in
be elected for a term of three years. A term, in the legal sense, is a fixed and definite
a petition that involved SENIOR CITIZENS titled “In Re: Petition for Confirmation of
period of time during which an officer may claim to hold office as a matter of right, a
Replacement of Resigned Party-List Nominee” and docketed as EM No. 12-040. In the
fixed interval after which the several incumbents succeed one another. Thus, service
process of resolving the issues of said case, this Commission found that SENIOR
of the term is for the entire period; it cannot be broken down to accommodate those
CITIZENS nominees specifically nominees David L. Kho and Francisco G. Datol, Jr.
who are not entitled to hold the office.
have entered into a term-sharing agreement. x x x.
On May 13, 2013, the elections proceeded. Despite the earlier declaration of its SENIOR
Nominee David Kho’s term as party-list congressman is three (3) years which starts on
CITIZENS still obtained 677,642 votes.
June 30, 2010 and to end on June 30, 2013 as
Questioning the cancellation of SENIOR CITIZENS’ registration and its disqualification to
participate in the May 13, 2013 elections, the Datol Group and the Arquiza Group filed the instant
petitions.
The Datol Group argues that the public policy prohibiting term-sharing was provided for under
Section 7, Rule 4 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366, which was promulgated only on February
21, 2012. Hence, the resolution should not be made to apply retroactively to the case of SENIOR
CITIZENS as nothing therein provides for its retroactive effect. When the term-sharing agreement
was executed in 2010, the same was not yet expressly proscribed by any law or resolution.
Furthermore, the Datol Group points out that the mere execution of the Irrevocable Covenant
between the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS for the 2010 elections should not have been a ground
for the cancellation of the organization’s registration and accreditation
because the nominees never actually implemented the agreement.
In like manner, the Arquiza Group vehemently stresses that no term-sharing actually transpired
between the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS. It explained that whatever prior arrangements were
made by the nominees on the term-sharing agreement, the same did not materialize given that the
resignation of Rep. Kho was disapproved by the Board of Trustees and the members of SENIOR
CITIZENS.
Still, granting for the sake of argument that the term-sharing agreement was actually implemented,
the Arquiza Group points out that SENIOR CITIZENS still cannot be held to have violated Section
7 of Resolution No. 9366. The term-sharing agreement was entered into in 2010 or two years prior
to the promulgation of said resolution on February 21, 2012. Likewise, assuming that the resolution
can be applied retroactively, the Arquiza Group contends that the same cannot affect SENIOR
CITIZENS at it already earned a vested right in 2010 as party-list organization.
ISSUE: WON COMELEC committed GAD when it cancelled SENIOR CITIZEN’S Certificate of
Registration/Accreditation solely on account of its purported violation of the prohibition against
term-sharing
RULING: YES.
RATIONALE: Article 4 of the Civil Code states that “[l]aws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided.” As held in CIR v. Reyes, “[t]he general rule is that statutes are
prospective. However, statutes that are remedial, or that do not create new or take away vested
rights, do not fall under the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes.” We also
reiterated in Lintag and Arrastia v. NPC that:
It is a well-entrenched principle that statutes, including administrative rules and
regulations, operate prospectively unless the legislative intent to the contrary is manifest
by express terms or by necessary implication because the retroactive application of a
law usually divests rights that have already become vested. This is based on the Latin
maxim: Lex prospicit non respicit (the law looks forward, not backward).
True, COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 does not provide that it shall have retroactive effect.
Nonetheless, the Court cannot subscribe to the argument of the Arquiza Group that SENIOR
CITIZENS already earned a vested right to its registration as a party-list organization.
Montesclaros v. COMELEC teaches that “[a] public office is not a property right. As the
Constitution expressly states, a ‘[P]ublic office is a public trust.’ No one has a vested right to any
public office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office.” Under Section
2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC is entrusted with the function to “[r]egister,
after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other
requirements, must present their platform or program of government.” In fulfilling this function, the
COMELEC is duty-bound to review the grant of registration to parties, organizations, or coalitions
already registered in order to ensure the latter’s continuous adherence to the requirements
prescribed by law and the relevant rulings of this Court relative to their qualifications and eligibility
to participate in party-list elections.
The Arquiza Group cannot, therefore, object to the retroactive application of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9366 on the ground of the
impairment of SENIOR CITIZENS’ vested right.
Be that as it may, even if COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 expressly provided for its retroactive
application, the Court finds that the COMELEC En Banc indeed erred in cancelling the registration
and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS.
The reason for this is that the ground invoked by the COMELEC En Banc, i.e., the term-sharing
agreement among the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS, was not implemented. This fact was
manifested by the Arquiza Group even during the April 18, 2012 hearing conducted by the
COMELEC En Banc in E.M. No. 12-040 wherein the Arquiza Group manifested that it was
withdrawing its petition for confirmation and approval of Rep. Kho’s replacement. Thereafter, in its
Resolution dated June 27, 2012 in E.M. No. 12- 040, the COMELEC En Banc itself refused to
recognize the term-sharing agreement and the tender of resignation of Rep. Kho. The COMELEC
even declared that no vacancy was created despite the execution of the said agreement.
Subsequently, there was also no indication that the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS still tried to
implement, much less succeeded in implementing, the term-sharing agreement. Before this
Court, the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group insist on this fact of non-implementation of the
agreement. Thus, for all intents and purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold his seat and served
his term as a member of the House of Representatives, in accordance with COMELEC
Resolution No. 9366 and the COMELEC En Banc ruling in E.M. No. 12-040. Curiously, the
COMELEC is silent on this point.
Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto, it
appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had been unfairly and arbitrarily
penalized by the COMELEC En Banc. Verily, how can there be disobedience on the part of
SENIOR CITIZENS when its nominees, in fact, desisted from carrying out their agreement? Hence,
there was no violation of an election law, rule, or regulation to speak of. Clearly then, the
disqualification of SENIOR CITIZENS and the cancellation of its registration and accreditation
have no legal leg to stand on.
14. DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO C. LUCABAN, JR.,
RONYL S. DE LA CRUZ and AGUSTIN C. DOROGA, respondents.
G.R. No. 189466. February 11, 2010.*
CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN, JR., petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET), DR. REYNALDO LESACA,
JR., CRISTINA PALABAY, RENATO M. REYES, JR., ERLINDA CADAPAN, ANTONIO
FLORES and JOSELITO USTAREZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 189506. February 11, 2010.*
ABAD, J.:
FACTS: In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat
Tayo party-list organization that won a seat in the HoR during the 2007 elections.
Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr., Ronyl S. Dela Cruz, and Agustin C. Doroga, all registered
voters, filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against Aangat Tayo and its
nominee, petitioner Abayon. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a partylist seat in
the House of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors.
Respondent Lucaban and the others with him further pointed out that petitioner Abayon herself was
not qualified to sit in the House as a party-list nominee since she did not belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district
representative. She moreover lost her bid as party-list representative of the party-list organization
called An Waray in the immediately preceding elections of May 10, 2004.
Petitioner Abayon countered that the COMELEC had already confirmed the status of Aangat Tayo
as a national multi-sectoral party-list organization representing the workers, women, youth, urban
poor, and elderly and that she belonged to the women sector. Abayon also claimed that although
she was the second nominee of An Waray party-list organization during the 2004 elections, she
could not be regarded as having lost a bid for an elective office.
Finally, petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over the petition
for quo warranto since respondent Lucaban and the others with him collaterally attacked the
registration of Aangat Tayo as a party-list organization, a matter that fell within the jurisdiction of
the COMELEC. It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the HoR, and not Abayon who was
just its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal
concerns of Aangat Tayo.
On July 16, 2009 HRET dismissed the petition as against Aangat Tayo but upholding its
jurisdiction over the qualifications of petitioner Abayon. The latter moved for reconsideration but
the HRET denied the same prompting Abayon to file the present petition for SCA of certiorari.
In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group
that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the HoR. Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca,
Jr., Cristina Palabay, Renato M. Reyes, Jr., Erlinda Cadapan, Antonio Flores, and Joselito Ustarez
are members of some other party-list groups.
Shortly after the elections, respondent Lesaca and the others with him filed with respondent HRET
a petition for quo warranto against
Bantay and its nominee, petitioner Palparan. Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was
ineligible to sit in the HoR as party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels,
Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards. Lesaca
and the others said that Palparan committed gross human rights violations against marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and organizations.
Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was
actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the HoR.
Palparan claimed that he was just Bantay’s nominee. Consequently, any question involving his
eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought, he
said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET.
On July 23, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order dismissing the petition against Bantay for the
reason that the issue of the ineligibility or qualification of the party-list group fell within the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to the Party-List System Act. HRET, however, defended its
jurisdiction over the question of petitioner Palparan’s qualifications. Palparan moved for
reconsideration but the HRET denied it by a resolution dated September 10, 2009,4 hence, the
recourse to this Court through this petition for special civil action of certiorari and prohibition.
Since the two cases raise a common issue, the Court has caused their consolidation.
ISSUE: WON respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners
Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-list organizations,
respectively, who took the seats at the HoR that such organizations won in the 2007 elections.
RULING: YES.
RATIONALE: Petitioners Abayon and Palparan have a common theory: RA7941, the Party-List
System Act, vests in the COMELEC the authority to determine which parties or organizations have
the qualifications to seek party-list seats in the HoR during the elections. Indeed, the HRET
dismissed the petitions for quo warranto filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications of
Aangat Tayo and Bantay. Since petitioners Abayon and Palparan were not elected into office but
were chosen by their respective organizations under their internal rules, the HRET has no
jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their qualifications as nominees.
If at all, says petitioner Abayon, such authority belongs to the COMELEC which already upheld
her qualification as nominee of Aangat Tayo for the women sector. For Palparan, Bantay’s
personality is so inseparable and intertwined with his own person as its nominee so that the HRET
cannot dismiss the quo warranto action against Bantay without dismissing the action against him.
But, although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the
organization that sits as and becomes a member of the HoR. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution,5 identifies who the “members” of that House are:
“Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations.”
Clearly, the members of the HoR are of two kinds: “members x x x who shall be elected from
legislative districts” and “those who x x x shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.” This means that, from the Constitution’s
point of view, it is the party-list representatives who are “elected” into office, not their parties or
organizations. These representatives are elected, however, through that peculiar party-list system
that the Constitution authorized and that Congress by law established where the voters cast their
votes for the organizations or parties to which such party-list representatives belong.
Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like
manner. They have the same deliberative rights, salaries, and emoluments. They can participate in
the making of laws that will directly benefit their legislative districts or sectors. They are also
subject to the same term limitation of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms.
It may not be amiss to point out that the Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees
as “members of the HoR thus:
“Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy.—The State shall promote proportional representation in
the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list
system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined
political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of
the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a
full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation
of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their
chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest
scheme possible.”
As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. COMELEC, a party-list
representative is in every sense “an elected member of the House of Representatives.” Although the
vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its
nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the HoR.
Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds for
disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the Constitution, states:
“Sec. 9. Qualification of Party-List Nominees.—No person shall be nominated as party-
list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, bona fide member of the party
or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the
day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not
more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral
representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue until the expiration of his term.”
In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and
Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that
they ought to represent. The Party-List System Act provides that a nominee must be a “bona fide
member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent.”
It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nominee—the need
for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organization—in the
context of the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparan’s relation to Aangat Tayo and
Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably
embody.
Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of course point out that the authority to determine the
qualifications of a party-list nominee belongs to the party or organization that nominated him. This
is true, initially. The right to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and, eventually, to choose
five from among them after all belongs to the party or organization that nominates them. But where
an allegation
is made that the party or organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to become its
party-list representative in the lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position,
the resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand.
Parenthetically, although the Party-List System Act does not so state, the COMELEC seems to
believe, when it resolved the challenge to petitioner Abayon, that it has the power to do so as an
incident of its authority to approve the registration of party-list organizations. But the Court need
not resolve this question since it is not raised here and has not been argued by the parties.
What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of
the HoR. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are “elected members” of the HoR no
less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their
qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization
of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed
office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the
petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its
jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated petitions and AFFIRMS the Order dated
July 16, 2009 and Resolution 09-183
dated September 17, 2009 in HRET Case 07-041 of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal as well as its Order dated July 23, 2009 and Resolution 09-178 dated September 10, 2009
in HRET Case 07-040.
SO ORDERED.
15. ATTY. ISIDRO Q. LICO, RAFAEL A. PUENTESPINA, PROCULO T. SARMEN,
AMELITO L. REVUELTA, WILLIAM C. YBANEZ, SILVERIO J. SANCHEZ, GLORIA G.
FUTALAN, HILARIO DE GUZMAN, EUGENE M. PABUALAN, RODOLFO E. PEREZ,
HIPOLITO R. QUILLAN, MARIO ARENAS, TIRSO C. BUENAVENTURA, LYDIA B.
TUBELLA, REYNALDO C. GOLO & JONATHAN DEQUINA, in their individual
capacities, and as legitimate members and officers of ADHIKAING TINATAGUYOD NG
KOOPERATIBA (ATING KOOP PARTY LIST), petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS EN BANC and the self-styled sham ATING KOOP PARTYLIST represented
by AMPARO T. RIMAS, respondent.
G.R. No. 205505. September 29, 2015.*
SERENO, CJ.:
FACTS: Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization which was registered on 16
November 2009 under RA No. 7941, also known as the Party-List System Act (Party-List Law).
Under Ating Koop’s Constitution and By-Laws, its highest policy-making body is the National
Convention. The Central Committee, however, takes over when the National Convention is not in
session.
On 30 November 2009, Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List
System of Representation for the 10 May 2010 Elections. On 6 March 2010, it filed with the
COMELEC the list of its nominees, with petitioner Lico as first nominee and Roberto Mascariña as
second nominee.
On 8 December 2010, COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the winning party-list groups.
Based on the procedure provided in BANAT Party-List v. COMELEC, Ating Koop earned a seat in
the HoR. Petitioner Lico subsequently took his oath of office on 9 December 2010 before the
Secretary-General of the HoR, and thereafter assumed office.
Several months prior to its proclamation as one of the winning party- list organizations, or on 9
June 2010, Ating Koop issued Central Committee Resolution 2010-01, which incorporated a term
sharing agreement signed by its nominees. Under the agreement, petitioner Lico was to serve as
Party-list Representative for the first year of the three-year term.
On 14 May 2011, Ating Koop held its Second National Convention, during which it introduced
amendments to its Constitution and By-laws. Among the salient changes was the composition of
the Central Committee, which would still be composed of 15 representatives but with five each
coming from Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao (5-5-5 equal representation). The amendments likewise
mandated the holding of an election of Central Committee members within six months after the
Second National Convention.
In effect, the amendments cut short the three-year term of the incumbent members (referred to
hereafter as the Interim Central Committee) of the Central Committee. The Interim Central
Committee was dominated by members of the Rimas Group.
On 5 December 2011, or almost one year after petitioner Lico had assumed office, the Interim
Central Committee expelled him from Ating Koop for disloyalty. Apart from allegations of
malversation and graft and corruption, the Committee cited petitioner Lico’s refusal to honor the
term-sharing agreement as factual basis for disloyalty and as cause for his expulsion under Ating
Koop’s Amended Constitution and By-laws. MR was denied.
On 21 January 2012, the Rimas Group held a Special National Convention in Parañaque City (the
Parañaque convention), at which a new Central Committee and a new set of officers were
constituted. Members of the Rimas Group won the election and occupied all the corresponding
seats.

On 16 March 2012, the Rimas Group, claiming to represent Ating Koop, filed with COMELEC a
Petition against Lico group praying
that petitioner Lico be ordered to vacate the office of Ating Koop in the HoR, and for the
succession of the second nominee, Roberto Mascariña as Ating Koop’s representative in the House.
Rimas Group alleged that Ating Koop had expelled Congressman Lico for acts inimical to the
party-list group, such as malversation, graft and corruption, and that he had “boldly displayed his
recalcitrance to
honor party commitment to be upright and consistently honest, thus violating basic principles of the
Ating Koop.
In a Resolution dated 18 July 2012, the COMELEC Second Division upheld the expulsion of
petitioner Lico from Ating Koop and declared Mascariña as the duly qualified nominee of the
partylist group. The Second Division characterized the issue of the validity of the expulsion of
petitioner Lico from Ating Koop as an intra-party leadership dispute, which it could resolve as an
incident of its power to register political parties. MR before COMELEC en banc was denied.
In arriving at its Resolution, the COMELEC En Banc held that it had no jurisdiction to expel
Congressman Lico from the HoR, considering that his expulsion from Ating Koop affected his
qualifications as member of the House, and therefore it was the HRET that had jurisdiction over the
Petition.
At the same time, the COMELEC upheld the validity of petitioner Lico’s expulsion from Ating
Koop, explaining that when the Interim Central Committee ousted him from Ating Koop, the said
Committee’s members remained in holdover capacity even after their terms had expired; and that
the COMELEC was not in a position to substitute its judgment for that of Ating Koop with respect
to the cause of the expulsion.
Finally, the COMELEC En Banc recognized the Rimas Group as the legitimate representative of
Ating Koop considering that: 1) it found nothing in the records to show that the Lico Group made a
valid call for the special election of Central Committee members as
required under the Amended Constitution and By-Laws; 2) there is nothing on record indicating
that a minimum of 100 attended the
Cebu meeting; and 3) the Parañaque convention was in accordance with Ating Koop’s Amended
Constitution and By-Laws.
Hence, this Petition: the Lico Group now comes before Us, praying for a review of the COMELEC
Resolutions.
ISSUE:
1. WON COMELEC has jurisdiction over the expulsion of a member of the HoR from his
party-list organization
2. WON Rimas Group is the legitimate representative of Ating Koop
RULING:
1. NO.
The COMELEC notably characterized the Petition for expulsion of petitioner Lico from
the HoR and for the succession of the second nominee as party-list representative as a
disqualification case. For this reason, the COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of
jurisdiction, insofar as it relates to the question of unseating petitioner Lico from the
HoR.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the HRET with jurisdiction to
resolve questions on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-
list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon
proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of
office as member of the HoR. In this case, the COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a
winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and he assumed office in the
HoR. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the
disqualification case.
What We find to be without legal basis, however, is the action of the COMELEC in
upholding the validity of the expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop, despite its
own ruling that the HRET has jurisdiction over the disqualification issue. These findings
already touch upon the qualification requiring a party-list nominee to be a bona fide
member of the party-list group sought to be represented.
The COMELEC justified its Resolution on the merits of the expulsion, by relying on the
rule that it can decide intra-party matters as an incident of its constitutionally granted
powers and functions. It cited Lokin v. COMELEC, where We held that when the
resolution of an intra-party controversy is necessary or incidental to the performance
of the constitutionally-granted functions of the COMELEC, the latter can step in and
exercise jurisdiction over the intra-party matter. The Lokin case, however, involved
nominees and not incumbent members of Congress. In the present case, the fact that
petitioner Lico was a member of Congress at the time of his expulsion from Ating
Koop removes the matter from the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
The rules on intra-party matters and on the jurisdiction of the HRET are not parallel
concepts that do not intersect. Rather, the operation of the rule on intra-party matters is
circumscribed by Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and jurisprudence on
the jurisdiction of electoral tribunals. The jurisdiction of the HRET is exclusive. It is
given full authority to hear and decide the cases on any matter touching on the
validity of the title of the proclaimed winner.
In the present case, the Petition for petitioner Lico’s expulsion from the HoR is
anchored on his expulsion from Ating Koop, which necessarily affects his title as
member of Congress. A party- list nominee must have been, among others, a bona fide
member of the party or organization for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of
the election. Needless to say, bona fide membership in the party-list group is a
continuing qualification. We have ruled that qualifications for public office, whether
elective or not, are continuing requirements. They must be possessed not only at This is
not the first time that this Court has passed upon the issue of HRET jurisdiction over the
requirements for bona fide membership in a party-list organization. In Abayon v. HRET,
it was argued that the petitioners did not belong to the marginalized and under-
represented sectors that they should represent; as such, they could not be properly
considered bona fide members of their respective party-list organizations. The Court
held that it was for the HRET to interpret the meaning of the requirement of bona fide
membership in a party-list organization. It reasoned that under Section 17, Article VI
of the Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests when it comes to
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives.
Consequently, the COMELEC failed to recognize that the issue on the validity of
petitioner Lico’s expulsion from Ating Koop is integral to the issue of his qualifications
to sit in Congress. This is not merely an error of law but an error of jurisdiction
correctible by a writ of certiorari; the COMELEC should not have encroached into the
expulsion issue, as it was outside its authority to do so.
2. NO.
At the outset, We reject the Lico Group’s argument that the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction to decide which of the feuding groups is to be recognized, and that it is the
RTC which has jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies. Indeed, the COMELEC’s
jurisdiction to settle the struggle for leadership within the party is well-established. This
power to rule upon questions of party identity and leadership is exercised by the
COMELEC as an incident of its enforcement powers.
That being said, We find the COMELEC to have committed grave abuse of discretion in
declaring the Rimas Group as the
legitimate set of Ating Koop officers for the simple reason that the amendments to the
Constitution and Bylaws of Ating Koop were not registered with the COMELEC.
Hence, neither of the elections held during the Cebu meeting and the Parañaque
conference pursuant to the said amendments, were valid.
Both the Lico Group and the Rimas Group indeed assert that their respective elections
were conducted pursuant to the amendment introduced in the Second National
Convention held on 14 May 2011. In particular, Section 1 of Article VI of Ating Koop’s
By-laws called for the conduct of an election of Central Committee members within six
months after the Second National Convention.
There is no showing, however, that the amendments were actually filed with the
COMELEC.
A party-list organization owes its existence to the State and the latter’s approval must
be obtained through its agent, the COMELEC. In the 2013 case of Dayao v.
COMELEC, We declared that it is the State, acting through the COMELEC, that
breathes life to a party-list organization. The implication, therefore, is that the State,
through the COMELEC, is a party to the principal contracts entered into by the party-
list organization and its members — the Constitution and By-laws — such that any
amendment to these contracts would constitute a novation requiring the consent of all
the parties involved. An amendment to the by-laws of a party-list organization should
become effective only upon approval by the COMELEC. Such a prerequisite is
analogous to the requirement of filing of the amended bylaws and subsequent
conformity thereto of the SEC under corporation law. Under the Corporation Code,
an amendment to a bylaw provision must be filed with the SEC. The amendment shall
be effective only upon the issuance by the SEC of a certification that it is not
inconsistent with the Corporation Code.
There being no showing that the amendments on the by-laws of Ating Koop were filed
with and subsequently approved by the COMELEC, any election conducted pursuant
thereto may not be considered valid. Without such requisite proof, neither the Lico
Group nor the Rimas Group can claim to be the legitimate set of officers of Ating
Koop.
Even assuming arguendo that the amendment calling for a special election were
effective, this Court still cannot declare any of the feuding groups as the legitimate set of
officers considering that the respective sets of evidence presented were evenly balanced.
With respect to the Lico Group’s Cebu meeting, the COMELEC correctly found — and
the records bear out — that the notices sent were deficient and that there was no
sufficient proof of quorum. Hence, the Cebu meeting was held to be invalid. On the
other hand, the COMELEC failed to appreciate the fact that the Parañaque convention
suffered from the same infirmity: the records of the said convention, consisting merely
of the Minutes thereof, likewise fail to establish due notice and a quorum.
Accordingly, as neither group can sufficiently lay claim to legitimacy, the equipoise
doctrine comes into play. This rule provides that when the evidence in an issue of fact is
in equipoise, that is, when the respective sets of evidence of both parties are evenly
balanced, the party having the burden of proof fails in that issue. Since neither party
succeeds in making out a case, neither side prevails. The courts are left with no other
option but to leave them as they are. The consequence, therefore, is the dismissal of the
complaint/petition.
The Rimas Group, being the petitioner before the COMELEC, had the burden of
proving that it is the petitioner, and not the Lico Group, that is the legitimate group.
As the evidence of both parties are in equipoise, the Rimas Group failed to discharge
its burden. The COMELEC should have dismissed the petition of the Rimas Group
insofar as it sought to be declared the legitimate group representing Ating Koop.
Yet, the COMELEC held that the Parañaque convention “appeared to be in conformity”
with Ating Koop’s Amended Constitution and By-Laws. It should be stressed that the
COMELEC did not even substantiate this conclusion.
The Court ordinarily refrains from reviewing the COMELEC’s appreciation and
evaluation of the evidence. But when the COMELEC’s assessment of the evidence is so
grossly unreasonable that it turns into an error of jurisdiction, the Court is compelled to
intervene and correct the error.
As seen in the above discussions, neither of the parties was able to establish its
legitimacy. The evaluation of the evidence by the COMELEC in deciding the issue of
which group legitimately represents Ating Koop was therefore grossly unreasonable,
which amounts to a jurisdictional error that may be remedied by certiorari under Rule
65.
The final, and most important question to be addressed is: if neither of the two groups is
the legitimate leadership of Ating Koop, then who is?
We find such legitimate leadership to be the Interim Central Committee, whose
members remain as such in a holdover capacity.
In Señeres v. COMELEC, the validity of the Certificate of Nomination filed by Buhay
Party-List through its President, Roger Robles, was questioned on the ground that his
term had expired at the time it was filed. The Court applied by analogy the default rule
in corporation law to the effect that officers and directors of a corporation holdover after
the expiration of their terms until such time as their successors are elected or appointed.
Señeres ruled that the holdover principle applies in the absence of a provision in the
constitution or bylaws of the party-list organization prohibiting its application.
In the present case, We have gone through the Constitution and By laws of Ating
Koop and We do not see any provision forbidding, either expressly or impliedly, the
application of the holdover rule. Thus, in accordance with corporation law, the
existing Interim Central Committee is still a legitimate entity with full authority to
bind the corporation and to carry out powers despite the lapse of the term of its
members on 14 November 2011, since no successors had been validly elected at the
time, or since.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The COMELEC En Banc
Resolution dated 31 January 2013 and the COMELEC Second Division Resolution dated 18 July
2012 in E.M. No. 12-039 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE insofar as it declares valid the
expulsion of Congressman Lico from Ating Koop and it upholds the ATING KOOP Party-list
Group represented by its President, Amparo T. Rimas, as the legitimate Party-list Group.
A new one is entered DECLARING that the legitimate Central Committee and set of officers
legitimately representing Ating Koop are the Interim Central Committee and set of officers prior to
the split of Ating Koop.
SO ORDERED.
15. ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST (ABANG LINGKOD), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. 206952. October 22, 2013.*
REYES, J.:
FACTS: ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of peasant
farmers and fisherfolks, and was registered under the party-list system on December 22, 2009. It
participated in the May 2010 elections, but failed to obtain the number of votes needed for a seat in
the HoR.
On May 31, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD manifested before the COMELEC its intent to participate
in the May 2013 elections. On August 2, 2012, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9513, which,
inter alia, required previously registered party-list groups that have filed their respective
Manifestations of Intent to undergo summary evidentiary hearing for purposes of determining their
continuing compliance with the requirements under RA 7941 and the guidelines set forth in Ang
Bagong Bayani- OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC.
Accordingly, on August 9, 2012, the COMELEC issued a Resolution, which set the summary
evidentiary hearing of previously registered party-list groups. The COMELEC scheduled three (3)
dates — August 17, 31 and September 3, 2012 — for the summary hearing of ABANG
LINGKOD’s Manifestation of Intent, to enable it to show proof of its continuing qualification
under the party-list system.
On August 16, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD, in compliance with the COMELEC’s August 9, 2012
Resolution, filed with the COMELEC pertinent documents to prove its continuing compliance with
the requirements under R.A. No. 7941.
After due proceedings, the COMELEC En Banc, in a Resolution dated November 7, 2012,
cancelled ABANG LINGKOD’s registration as a party- list group. The COMELEC En Banc
pointed out that ABANG LINGKOD failed to establish its track record in uplifting the cause of the
marginalized and underrepresented; that it merely offered photographs of some alleged activities it
conducted after the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Banc further opined that ABANG
LINGKOD failed to show that its nominees are themselves marginalized and underrepresented or
that they have been involved in activities aimed at improving the plight of the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors it claims to represent.
ABANG LINGKOD then filed with SC a petition for certiorari, alleging that the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in cancelling its registration under the party-list system. The said
petition was consolidated with the separate petitions filed by 51 other party -list groups whose
registration were cancelled or who were denied registration under the party-list system. The said
party-list groups, including ABANG LINGKOD, were able to obtain status quo ante orders from
SC.
On April 2, 2013, SC, in Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC, laid down new parameters to be
observed by the COMELEC in screening parties, organizations or associations seeking registration
and/or accreditation under the party-list system, viz.:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major
or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections
only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral
wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking
in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the
special interests and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and
underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political
constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of the sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
‘‘marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented”
sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that
lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees
of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” or that
represent those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record or advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona fide members of such
parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
Thus, SC remanded to the COMELEC the cases of previously registered party-list groups,
including that of ABANG LINGKOD, to determine whether they are qualified under the party-list
system pursuant to the new parameters laid down by the Court and, in the affirmative, be allowed to
participate in the May 2013 party-list elections.
On May 10, 2013, the COMELEC issued the herein assailed Resolution, which, inter alia, affirmed
the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD’s registration under the party-list system. The COMELEC
issued the Resolution dated May 10, 2013 sans any summary evidentiary hearing, citing the
proximity of the May 13, 2013 elections as the reason therefor.
In maintaining the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD’s registration, the COMELEC held that:
The Commission maintains its position in the previous en banc ruling
cancelling the registration of ABANG LINGKOD. To reiterate, it is not
enough that the party-list organization claim representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented because representation is easy to claim
and to feign. It is but reasonable to require from groups and organizations
consistent participation and advocacy in the sector it seeks to represent,
and not just seasonal and “sporadic” programs which are unrelated to its
sector.
ABANG LINGKOD submitted pictures showing a seminar held on 10 July
2010, Medical Mission on 11 November 2010, Disaster Management
Training on 21 October 2011, Book-giving on 28 June 2011, and Medical
Mission on 1 December 2011.
And as if to insult the Commission, the photographs submitted appear to
have been edited to show in the banners that ABANG LINGKOD
participated in the activities. ABANG LINGKOD’s name and logo was
superimposed on some banners to feign participation in the activities
(Joint Medical Mission, Book-giving).
Under the party-list System Act, a group’s registration may be cancelled
for declaring unlawful statements in its petition. Photoshopping images to
establish a fact that did not occur is tantamount to declaring unlawful
statements. It is on this ground that the Commission cancels ABANG
LINGKOD’s registration.
In support of the instant petition, ABANG LINGKOD claims that the COMELEC gravely abused
its discretion when it affirmed the cancellation of its registration sans a summary evidentiary
hearing for that purpose, asserting that the COMELEC should have allowed it to present evidence
to prove its qualification as a party-list group pursuant to Atong Paglaum. It claims that there was
no valid justification for the COMELEC to cancel its registration considering that it complied with
the six-point parameters in screening party-list groups laid down in Atong Paglaum.
On the other hand, the COMELEC avers that the instant petition should be dismissed for utter lack
of merit. It asserts that ABANG LINGKOD was not denied due process when the COMELEC
affirmed the cancellation of its registration since it was given every reasonable opportunity to be
heard. The COMELEC further claims that it did not abuse its discretion when it cancelled ABANG
LINGKOD’s registration on the ground that it failed to establish a track record in representing the
marginalized and underrepresented. Further, the COMELEC alleges that its finding of facts may
not be passed upon by this Court as the same is supported by substantial evidence.
ISSUE: WON the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling ABANG LINGKOD’s
registration under the party-list system.
RULING: YES.
RATIONALE: The COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD’s registration on
the ground that it declared untruthful statement in its bid for accreditation as a party-list group in
the May 2013 elections, pointing out that it deliberately submitted digitally altered photographs of
activities to make it appear that it had a track record in representing the marginalized and
underrepresented. Essentially, ABANG LINGKOD’s registration was cancelled on the ground that
it failed to adduce evidence showing its track record in representing the marginalized and
underrepresented.
The flaw in the COMELEC’s disposition lies in the fact that it insists on requiring party-list
groups to present evidence showing that they have a track record in representing the
marginalized and underrepresented.
Track record is a record of past performance often taken as an indicator of likely future
performance. As a requirement imposed by Ang Bagong Bayani for groups intending to participate
in the party-list elections, track record pertains to the actual activities undertaken by groups to
uplift the cause of the sector/s, which they represent.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 however provides:
Sec. 5. Registration.—Any organized group of persons may register as a party,
organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the
COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its
president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a
national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or
organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, bylaws, platform or program of
government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the
COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.
R.A. No. 7941 did not require groups intending to register under the party-list system to submit
proof of their track record as a group. The track record requirement was only imposed in Ang
Bagong Bayani where the Court held that national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations
seeking registration under the party-list system must prove through their, inter alia, track record that
they truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented, thus:
x x x In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines,
culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other
words, it must show — through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws,
history, platform of government and track record — that it represents and seeks to
uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership
should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that
in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.
Track record is not the same as the submission or presentation of “constitution, bylaws, platform
of government, list of officers, coalition agreement, and other relevant information as may be
required by the COMELEC,” which are but mere pieces of documentary evidence intended to
establish that the group exists and is a going concern. The said documentary evidence presents
an abstract of the ideals that national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations seek to
achieve.
This is not merely a matter of semantics; the delineation of what constitutes a track record has
certain consequences in a group’s bid for registration under the party-list system. Under Section 5
of R.A. No. 7941, groups intending to register under the party-list system are not required to
submit evidence of their track record; they are merely required to attach to their verified petitions
their “constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of officers, coalition agreement, and
other relevant information as may be required by the COMELEC.”
In Atong Paglaum, the Court has modified to a great extent the jurisprudential doctrines on who
may register under the party-list system and the representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented. For purposes of registration under the party-list system, national or regional
parties or organizations need not represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector; that
representation of the marginalized and underrepresented is only required of sectoral
organizations that represent the sectors stated under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 that are, by their
nature, economically marginalized and underrepresented.
There was no mention that sectoral organizations intending to participate in the party-list elections
are still required to present a track record, viz.:
x x x In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent
party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
xxxx
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and
underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough
that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns of their
sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political
constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
Contrary to the COMELEC’s claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG
LINGKOD, are no longer required to adduce evidence showing their track record, i.e., proof of
activities that they have undertaken to further the cause of the sector they represent. Indeed, it is
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
Otherwise stated, it is sufficient that the ideals represented by the sectoral organizations are
geared towards the cause of the sector/s, which they represent.
If at all, evidence showing a track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors is only required from nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented who do not factually belong to the sector represented by their
party or organization.
To submit to the dissent’s (Leonen) insistence on varying track records, which are required of those
intending to register under the party-list system, depending on the nature of their group, would
result into an absurd and unjust situation. Under the “varying track record requirement,” sectoral
organizations must present evidence showing their track record in representing the marginalized
and underrepresented, i.e., actual activities conducted by them to further uplift the cause of the
sector/s they represent. On the other hand,
national and regional parties or organizations need only prove that they exist as bona fide
organizations which, as the dissent suggests, may be done through the submission of their
constitution, bylaws, platform of government, list of officers, coalition agreement, and other
relevant information required by the COMELEC.
However, submission of a group’s constitution, bylaws, platform of government, list of officers,
coalition agreement, and other relevant information required by the COMELEC, as explained
earlier, is not synonymous with the track record requirement. In such case, only sectoral
organizations would be required to present a track record (actual activities conducted by them to
further the cause of the marginalized and underrepresented); while national and regional
organizations need not present their track record as they are only required to submit documentary
evidence showing that they are bona fide organizations.
There is no logic in treating sectoral organizations differently from national and regional parties or
organizations as regards their bid for registration under the party-list system. The “varying track
record requirement” suggested by the dissent would unnecessarily put a premium on groups
intending to register as national and regional parties or organizations as against those intending
to register as sectoral organizations. The imposition of an additional burden on sectoral
organizations, i.e., submission of their track record, would be plainly unjust as it effectively deters
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors from organizing themselves under the party-list
system.
Likewise, that there was no explicit reversal of the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani in Atong
Paglaum does not mean that groups intending to register under the party-list system are still
required to submit a track record. The track record of groups intending to register under the
party-list system was required under the first guideline of Ang Bagong Bayani for a very specific
purpose — to show that the national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations that would
be allowed to participate in the party-list elections are truly representative of the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors. It was necessary then to require groups seeking registration under
the party-list system since representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, as
understood in the context of Ang Bagong Bayani, is easy to claim and feign.
There exists no reason to further require groups seeking registration under the party-list system to
submit evidence showing their track record. Pursuant to Atong Paglaum, not all groups are required
to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors and, accordingly, there is no longer any
incentive in merely feigning representation of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
In the case of sectoral organizations, although they are still required to represent the marginalized
and underrepresented, they are likewise not required to show a track record since there would be no
reason for them to feign representation of the marginalized and underrepresented as they can just
register as a national or regional party or organization. Thus, the Court, in Atong Paglaum, stated
that, for purposes of registration under the party- list system, it is enough that the principal
advocacy of sectoral organizations pertains to the sector/s they represent.
There is thus no basis in law and established jurisprudence to insist that groups seeking registration
under the party-list system still comply with the track record requirement. Indeed, nowhere in R.A.
No. 7941 is it mandated that groups seeking registration thereunder
must submit evidence to show their track record as a group.
The dissent likewise suggests that the deceit committed by ABANG LINGKOD goes into its
qualification as a party-list group since it seriously puts in question the existence of ABANG
LINGKOD as a group per se and the genuineness of its representation of the farmers and fisherfolk.
It must be stressed that the COMELEC cancelled ABANG LINGKOD’s registration solely on the
ground of the lack of its track record — that it falsely represented, by submitting digitally altered
photographs of its supposed activities, that it had a track record in representing the marginalized
and underrepresented. The existence of ABANG LINGKOD as a party-list group per se and the
genuineness of its representation of the farmers and fisherfolks were never raised in the proceedings
before the COMELEC. It would thus be the height of injustice if the Court, in this certiorari action,
would scrutinize the legitimacy of ABANG LINGKOD as a party-list group and the genuineness of
its representation of the farmers and fisherfolk, and affirm the cancellation of its registration, when
the issue is limited only to the track record of ABANG LINGKOD.
Moreover, ABANG LINGKOD had been previously registered as a party-list group, as in fact it
participated in the May 2010 party-list elections, and it was able to obtain a sufficient number of
votes in the May 2013 party -list elections to obtain a seat in the House of Representatives. These
are circumstances, which clearly indicate that ABANG LINGKOD is indeed a legitimate party-list
group.
ABANG LINGKOD, notwithstanding the cancellation of its registration three days prior to the May
13, 2013 elections, was able to obtain a total of 260,215 votes out of the 26,722,131 votes that were
cast for the party-list,14 thus entitling it to a seat in the House of Representatives. This is indicative
of the fact that a considerable portion of the electorate considers ABANG LINGKOD as truly
representative of peasant farmers and fisherfolk.
Anent the photographs submitted by ABANG LINGKOD, these only show book-giving and
medical missions, which are activities it
conducted. Suffice it to state, however, that said activities do not specifically or directly pertain to
the interest or advocacy espoused by ABANG LINGKOD. As such, the misrepresentation
committed by ABANG LINGKOD with regard to said activities would not necessarily militate
against its representation of the farmers and fisherfolk.
Lest it be misunderstood, the Court does not condone the deceit perpetrated by ABANG
LINGKOD in connection with its bid for continued registration under the party-list system. That
ABANG LINGKOD, to establish its track record, submitted photographs that
were edited to make it appear that it conducted activities aimed at ameliorating the plight of the
sectors it represents is a factual finding
by the COMELEC, which the Court, considering that it is supported by substantial evidence, will
not disturb. The Court does not tolerate ABANG LINGKOD’s resort to chicanery and its shabby
treatment of the requirements for registration under the party-list system.
Similarly, a declaration of an untruthful statement in a petition for registration under Section
6(6) of R.A. No. 7941, in order to be a ground for the refusal and/or cancellation of registration
under the party-list system, must pertain to the qualification of the party, organization or
coalition under the party-list system. In order to justify the cancellation or refusal of registration
of a group, there must be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact, which would
otherwise render the group disqualified from participating in the party-list elections.
The digitally altered photographs of activities submitted by ABANG LINGKOD to prove its
continuing qualification under R.A. No. 7941 only pertain to its track record, which, as already
discussed, is no longer a requirement under the new parameters laid down in Atong Paglaum.
Simply put, they do not affect the qualification of ABANG LINGKOD as a party-list group and,
hence, could not be used as a ground to cancel its registration under the party-list system.
Further, the Court notes that the COMELEC, in its Resolution dated November 7, 2012, asserted
that ABANG LINGKOD failed to adduce evidence that would show the track record of its five
nominees, composed of a non-government organization worker, an employee and three farmers, in
uplifting the cause of the sector that the group represents. The COMELEC opined that the failure of
ABANG LINGKOD to present a track record of its nominees justified the cancellation of its
registration as a party-list group.
The Court does not agree. Assuming arguendo that the nominees of ABANG LINGKOD, as opined
by the COMELEC, indeed do not
have track records showing their participation in activities aimed at improving the conditions of the
sector that the group represents, the same would not affect the registration of ABANG LINGKOD
as a party-list group.
To stress, in Atong Paglaum, the Court pointed out that “[t]he nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the ‘marginalized and underrepresented,’ or that represent those who
lack ‘well-defined political constituencies,’ either must belong to their respective sectors, or must
have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. Stated otherwise, the nominee of a
party-list groups may either be: first, one who actually belongs to the sector which the party-list
group represents, in which case the track record requirement does not apply; or second, one who
does not actually belong to the sector which the party-list group represents but has a track record
showing the nominee’s active participation in activities aimed at uplifting the cause of the sector
which the group represents.”
In the case under consideration, 3 of the 5 nominees of ABANG LINGKOD are farmers and, thus,
are not required to present a track record showing their active participation in activities aimed to
promote the sector which ABANG LINGKOD represents, i.e., peasant farmers and fisherfolk. That
2 of ABANG LINGKOD’s nominees do not actually belong to the sector it represents is immaterial
and would not result in the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD’s registration as a party-list group.
This is clear from the sixth parameter laid down by the Court in Atong Paglaum, which states that
“[n]ational, regional and sectoral organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees
are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.” At the very
least, ABANG LINGKOD has 3 qualified nominees, being farmers by occupation. Indeed, the
disqualification of one or some of the nominees of a party -list group should not automatically
result in the disqualification of the group. Otherwise it would accord the nominees the same
significance, which the law holds for the party-list groups; it is still the fact that the party-list
group satisfied the qualifications of the law that is material to consider. The disqualification of
the nominees must simply be regarded as failure to qualify for an office or position. It should
not, in any way, blemish the qualifications of the party-list group itself with defect. The party-list
group must be treated as separate and distinct from its nominees such that qualifications of the
latter must not be considered part and parcel of the qualifications of the former.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Resolution dated May 10, 2013 issued by the Commission on Elections in SPP Case No. 12-238
(PLM), insofar as it affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD’s registration and disallowed
it to participate in the May 13, 2013 elections is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Commission on Elections is hereby ORDERED to PROCLAIM ABANG LINGKOD as one of
the winning party-list groups during the May 13, 2013 elections with the number of seats it may be
entitled to based on the total number of votes it garnered during the said elections.
SO ORDERED.
26.1 ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner, vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY
OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE
AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND
SECURITY, respondents.
G.R. No. 180643. March 25, 2008.*
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhing Xing Telecommunications
Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network
(NBN) Project in the amount of U.S.$329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project
was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China.
Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain personalities
and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner was among those invited. He was
summoned to appear and testify on September 18, 20, and 26 and October 25, 2007. However, he
attended only the September 26 hearing, claiming he was “out of town” during the other dates.
In the September 18, 2007 hearing, businessman Jose de Venecia III testified that several high
executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN
Project by the NEDA. It appeared that the Project was initially approved as a Build-Operate-
Transfer (BOT) project but, on March 29, 2007, the NEDA acquiesced to convert it into a
government-to-government project, to be financed through a loan from the Chinese Government.
On September 26, 2007, petitioner testified before respondent Committees for eleven (11) hours.
He disclosed that then COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in
exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed PGMA about
the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed
further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking
“executive privilege.” In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not
PGMA followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c)
whether or not she directed him to approve.
Unrelenting, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner, requiring
him to appear and testify on November 20, 2007.
However, in the Letter dated November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita requested
respondent Committees to dispense with petitioner’s testimony on the ground of executive
privilege. The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the
information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with
the People’s Republic of China.
Blue Ribbon Committee asked Sec. Neri to appear on November 22, 2007 but he did not and he
was thus asked by the Committee for an explanation why he should not be cited for contempt. Neri
answered that he had no intention to ignore the Senate hearing for he thought that the only
remaining questions were those covered by the executive privilege. Further, he attached a letter
stating among others that: (1) his non-appearance was upon the order of the President; and (2) his
conversation with President Arroyo dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and
diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials
and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines. The letter
ended with a reiteration of petitioner’s request that he “be furnished in advance” as to what else he
needs to clarify so that he may adequately prepare for the hearing.
Finding Neri’s explanation unsatisfactory, he was cited for contempt and his arrest and detention
were ordered until after such time he agreed to give his testimony.
In view of Committees’ issuance of the contempt Order, petitioner filed on February 1, 2008 a
Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (With Urgent Application for TRO/Preliminary Injunction),
seeking to restrain the implementation of the said contempt Order.
On February 5, 2008, the Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order (a) enjoining respondent
Committees from implementing their contempt Order, (b) requiring the parties to observe the status
quo prevailing prior to the issuance of the assailed order, and (c) requiring respondent Committees
to file their comment.
Petitioner contends that respondent Committees’ show cause Letter and contempt Order were
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. He stresses that
his conversations with President Arroyo are “candid discussions meant to explore options in
making policy decisions.” According to him, these discussions “dwelt on the impact of the bribery
scandal involving high government officials on the country’s diplomatic relations and economic
and military affairs and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the
Philippines.” He also argues that he is precluded from disclosing communications made to him in
official confidence under Section 7 of RA 6713, otherwise known as Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees, and Section 2413 (e) of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.
Respondent Committees assert the contrary. They argue that (1) petitioner’s testimony is material
and pertinent in the investigation conducted in aid of legislation; (2) there is no valid justification
for petitioner to claim executive privilege; (3) there is no abuse of their
authority to order petitioner’s arrest; and (4) petitioner has not come to court with clean hands.
On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking EO 464 and
Memorandum Circular No. 108. She advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide
by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v.
Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.
ISSUE: WON the communications elicited by the subject three questions covered by executive
privilege
RULING: YES.
RATIONALE: At the outset, a glimpse at the landmark case of Senate v. Ermita becomes
imperative. Senate draws in bold strokes the distinction between the legislative and oversight
powers of the Congress, as embodied under Sections 21 and 22, respectively, of
Article VI of the Constitution, to wit:
“SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.
SECTION 22. The heads of department may upon their own initiative, with the consent
of the President, or upon the request of either House, or as the rules of each House shall
provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their
departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the
Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled
appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover
matters related thereto. When the security of the state or the public interest so requires
and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive
session.”
Senate cautions that while the above provisions are closely related and complementary to each
other, they should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. Section 21
relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Its aim is to elicit information that
may be used for legislation. On the other hand, Section 22 pertains to the power to conduct a
question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight
function. Simply stated, while both powers allow Congress or any of its committees to conduct
inquiry, their objectives are different.
This distinction gives birth to another distinction with regard to the use of compulsory process.
Unlike in Section 21, Congress cannot compel the appearance of executive officials under
Section 22. The Court’s pronouncement in Senate v. Ermita is clear:
“When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are
implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as
imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads
must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section
22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their
appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance
is ‘in aid of legislation’ under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same
reasons stated in Arnault.
In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process
only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with
the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under
section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of
separation of powers. While the executive branch is a coequal branch of the legislature,
it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its
demands for information.”
The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. This is based on the
proposition that a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change.
Inevitably, adjunct thereto is the compulsory process to enforce it. But, the power, broad as it is, has
limitations. To be valid, it is imperative that it is done in accordance with the Senate or House duly
published rules of procedure and that the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries be respected.
The power extends even to executive officials and the only way for them to be exempted is through
a valid claim of executive privilege. This directs us to the consideration of the question—is there a
recognized claim of executive privilege despite the revocation of E.O. 464? YES.
Elements of presidential communications privilege, to wit:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power.”
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational
proximity” with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome
by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important
evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the
ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy
decision-making process” and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put, the
bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to
diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three
(3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications
relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into
an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into
executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized
in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the
President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor,
being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a
compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
The third element deserves a lengthy discussion.
United States v. Nixon held that a claim of executive privilege is subject to balancing against
other interest. In other words, confidentiality in executive privilege is not absolutely protected by
the Constitution. The U.S. Court held:
“[N]either the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-
level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential
privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances.”
The foregoing is consistent with the earlier case of Nixon v. Sirica, where it was held that
presidential communications privilege are presumptively privileged and that the presumption can
be overcome only by mere showing of public need by the branch seeking access to conversations.
The courts are enjoined to resolve the competing interests of the political branches of the
government “in the manner that preserves the essential functions of each Branch.” Here, the record
is bereft of any categorical explanation from respondent Committees to show a compelling or
critical need for the answers to the three (3) questions in the enactment of a law. Instead, the
questions veer more towards the exercise of the legislative oversight function under Section 22 of
Article VI rather than Section 21 of the same Article. Senate v. Ermita ruled that the “the
oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it
is performed in pursuit of legislation.” It is conceded that it is difficult to draw the line between an
inquiry in aid of legislation and an inquiry in the exercise of oversight function of Congress. In this
regard, much will depend on the content of the questions and the manner the inquiry is conducted.
Respondent Committees argue that a claim of executive privilege does not guard against a possible
disclosure of a crime or wrongdoing. We see no dispute on this. It is settled in United States v.
Nixon that “demonstrated, specific need for evidence in pending criminal trial” outweighs the
President’s “generalized interest in confidentiality.” However, the present case’s distinction with
the Nixon case is very evident. In Nixon, there is a pending criminal proceeding where the
information is requested and it is the demands of due process of law and the fair administration of
criminal justice that the information be disclosed. This is the reason why the U.S. Court was quick
to “limit the scope of its decision.” It stressed that it is “not concerned here with the balance
between the President’s generalized interest in confidentiality x x x and congressional demands for
information.” Unlike in Nixon, the information here is elicited, not in a criminal proceeding, but in
a legislative inquiry. In this regard, Senate v. Ermita stressed that the validity of the claim of
executive privilege depends not only on the ground invoked but, also, on the procedural setting
or the context in which the claim is made. Furthermore, in Nixon, the President did not interpose
any claim of need to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets. In the present
case, Executive Secretary Ermita categorically claims executive privilege on the grounds of
presidential communications privilege in relation to her executive and policy decision-making
process and diplomatic secrets.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive privilege
violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern. We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all.
But petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was
questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer
more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of
executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III
provides:
“The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.”
The provision itself expressly provides the limitation, i.e. as may be provided by law. Some of these
laws are Section 7 of RA 6713, Article 229 of the RPC, Section 3 (k)53 of R.A. No. 3019, and
Section 24(e)54 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. These are in addition to what our body of
jurisprudence classifies as confidential and what our Constitution considers as belonging to the
larger concept of
executive privilege. Clearly, there is a recognized public interest in the confidentiality of certain
information We find the information subject of this case belonging to such kind.
More than anything else, though, the right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain
information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the people’s right to public information.
The former cannot claim that every legislative inquiry is an exercise of the people’s right to
information. The distinction between such rights is laid down in Senate v. Ermita:
“There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which
underlies the power of inquiry and the right of people to information on matters of public concern.
For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to
information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by
Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from
government officials. These powers belong only to Congress, not to an individual citizen.
Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow,
except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are
exercising their right to information.”
The members of respondent Committees should not invoke as justification in their exercise of
power a right properly belonging to the people in general. This is because when they discharge their
power, they do so as public officials and members of Congress. Be that as it may, the right to
information must be balanced with and should give way, in appropriate cases, to constitutional
precepts particularly those pertaining to delicate interplay of executive legislative powers and
privileges which is the subject of careful review by numerous decided cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The subject Order dated January 30, 2008, citing
petitioner Romulo L. Neri in contempt of the Senate Committees and directing his arrest and
detention, is hereby nullified.
SO ORDERED.
26.2 ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner, vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY
OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE
AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND
SECURITY, respondents.
G.R. No. 180643. September 4, 2008.*
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS: Assailed in this motion for reconsideration is our Decision dated March 25, 2008 (the
“Decision”), granting the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Romulo L. Neri against the
respondent Senate Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, Trade and
Commerce, and National Defense and Security (collectively the “respondent Committees”).
In their Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Committees devote an unusually lengthy
discussion on the purported legislative nature of their entire inquiry, as opposed to an oversight
inquiry.
ISSUE: WON respondent Committees have shown that the communications elicited by the three
(3) questions are critical to the exercise of their functions
RULING: NO.
RATIONALE: At the outset, it must be clarified that the Decision did not pass upon the nature of
respondent Committees’ inquiry into the NBN Project. To reiterate, this Court recognizes
respondent Committees’ power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. However, this
Court cannot uphold the view that when a constitutionally guaranteed privilege or right is validly
invoked by a witness in the course of a legislative investigation, the legislative purpose of
respondent Committees’ questions can be sufficiently supported by the expedient of mentioning
statutes and/or pending bills to which their inquiry as a whole may have relevance. The
jurisprudential test laid down by this Court in past decisions on executive privilege is that the
presumption of privilege can only be overturned by a showing of compelling need for disclosure
of the information covered by executive privilege.
In the Decision, the majority held that “there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that
would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere
by an appropriate investigating authority.” In the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent
Committees argue that the information elicited by the three (3) questions are necessary in the
discharge of their legislative functions, among them, (a) to consider the three (3) pending Senate
Bills, and (b) to curb graft and corruption.
We remain unpersuaded by respondents’ assertions.
In U.S. v. Nixon, the U.S. Court held that executive privilege is subject to balancing against other
interests and it is necessary to resolve the competing interests in a manner that would preserve
the essential functions of each branch. There, the Court weighed between presidential privilege
and the legitimate claims of the judicial process. In giving more weight to the latter, the Court
ruled
that the President’s generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific
need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.
The Nixon Court ruled that an absolute and unqualified privilege would stand in the way of the
primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to do justice in criminal prosecutions. Xxx
Xxx the allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal
trial would cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the basic
function of the courts. A President’s acknowledged need for confidentiality in the
communications of his office is general in nature, whereas the constitutional need for
production of relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding is specific and central to the fair
adjudication of a particular criminal case in the administration of justice. Without access to
specific facts a criminal prosecution may be totally frustrated. The President’s broad interest in
confidentiality of communication will not be vitiated by disclosure of a limited number of
conversations preliminarily shown to have some bearing on the pending criminal cases.
We conclude that when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for
use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot
prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of
criminal justice. The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific
need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.”
In the case at bar, we are not confronted with a court’s need for facts in order to adjudge liability in
a criminal case but rather with the Senate’s need for information in relation to its legislative
functions. This leads us to consider once again just how critical is the subject information in the
discharge of respondent Committees’ functions. The burden to show this is on the respondent
Committees, since they seek to intrude into the sphere of competence of the President in order to
gather information which, according to said respondents, would “aid” them in crafting legislation.
Clearly, the need for hard facts in crafting legislation cannot be equated with the compelling or
demonstratively critical and specific need for facts which is so essential to the judicial power to
adjudicate actual controversies. Also, the bare standard of “pertinency” set in Arnault cannot be
lightly applied to the instant case, which unlike Arnault involves a conflict between two (2)
separate, co-equal and coordinate Branches of the Government.
Whatever test we may apply, the starting point in resolving the conflicting claims between the
Executive and the Legislative Branches is the recognized existence of the presumptive presidential
communications privilege.
The presumption in favor of Presidential communications puts the burden on the respondent
Senate Committees to overturn the presumption by demonstrating their specific need for the
information to be elicited by the answers to the three (3) questions subject of this case, to enable
them to craft legislation. Here, there is simply a generalized assertion that the information is
pertinent to the
exercise of the power to legislate and a broad and non-specific reference to pending Senate bills.
It is not clear what matters relating
to these bills could not be determined without the said information sought by the three (3)
questions.
Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, it must be stressed that respondent Committees’
need for information in the exercise of this function is not as compelling as in instances when the
purpose of the inquiry is legislative in nature. This is because curbing graft and corruption is merely
an oversight function of Congress. And if this is the primary objective of respondent Committees in
asking the three (3) questions covered by privilege, it may even contradict their claim that their
purpose is legislative in nature and not oversight. In any event, whether or not investigating graft
and corruption is a legislative or oversight function of Congress, respondent Committees’
investigation cannot transgress bounds set by the Constitution.
The general thrust and the tenor of the three (3) questions is to trace the alleged bribery to the
Office of the President. While it may be a worthy endeavor to investigate the potential culpability
of high government officials, including the President, in a given government transaction, it is
simply not a task for the Senate to perform. The role of the Legislature is to make laws, not to
determine anyone’s guilt of a crime or wrongdoing. Our Constitution has not bestowed upon the
Legislature the latter role. Just as the Judiciary cannot legislate, neither can the Legislature
adjudicate or prosecute.
Respondent Committees claim that they are conducting an inquiry in aid of legislation and a
“search for truth,” which in respondent Committees’ view appears to be equated with the search for
persons responsible for “anomalies” in government contracts.
No matter how noble the intentions of respondent Committees are, they cannot assume the
power reposed upon our prosecutorial bodies and courts. The determination of wh is/are liable
for a crime or illegal activity, the investigation of the role played by each official, the
determination of who should be haled to court for prosecution and the task of coming up with
conclusions and finding of facts regarding anomalies, especially the determination of criminal
guilt, are not functions of the Senate. Congress is neither a law enforcement nor a trial agency.
Moreover, it bears stressing that no inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in
furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress, i.e. legislation. Investigations conducted solely
to gather incriminatory evidence and “punish” those investigated are indefensible. There is no
Congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure.
“Broad as it is, the power is not, however, without limitations. Since Congress may only
investigate into the areas in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire
into matters which are within the exclusive province of one of the other branches of the
government. Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary, it cannot inquire into matters
that are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it supplant the Executive in what
exclusively belongs to the Executive.”
WHEREFORE, respondent Committees’ Motion for Reconsideration dated April 8, 2008 is hereby
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUSTICE CARPIO
Executive privilege, however, is not absolute. The interest of protecting military, national security
and diplomatic secrets, as well as Presidential communications, must be weighed against other
constitutionally recognized interests. There is the declared state policy of full public disclosure of
all transactions involving public interest, the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern, the accountability of public officers, the power of legislative in quiry, and the judicial
power to secure testimonial and documentary evidence in deciding cases.
The balancing of interests—between executive privilege on one hand and the other competing
constitutionally recognized interests on the other hand—is a function of the courts. The courts will
have to decide the issue based on the factual circumstances of each case. This is how conflicts on
executive privilege between the Executive and the Legislature, and between the Executive and the
Judiciary,
have been decided by the courts.
The Judiciary, however, will consider executive privilege only if the issues cannot be resolved on
some other legal grounds. In conflicts between the Executive and the Legislature involving
executive privilege, the Judiciary encourages negotiation between the Executive and Legislature as
the preferred route of conflict resolution. Only if judicial resolution is unavoidable will courts
resolve such disputes between the Executive and Legislature.
Information covered by executive privilege remains confidential even after the expiry of the terms
of office of the President, Cabinet members and presidential advisers. Thus, a former President can
assert executive privilege. The character of executive privilege attaches to the information and not
to the person. Executive privilege is for the benefit of the State and not for the benefit of the office
holder. Even death does not extinguish the confidentiality of information covered by executive
privilege.
Executive privilege must be exercised by the President in pursuance of official powers and
functions. Executive privilege cannot be invoked to hide a crime because the President is neither
empowered nor tasked to conceal a crime. On the contrary, the President has the constitutional
duty to enforce criminal laws and cause the prosecution of crimes.
Executive privilege cannot also be used to hide private matters, like private financial transactions
of the President. Private matters are those not undertaken pursuant to the lawful powers and official
functions of the Executive. However, like all citizens, the President has a constitutional right to
privacy. In conducting inquiries, the Legislature must respect the right to privacy of citizens,
including the President’s.
Executive privilege is rooted in the separation of powers. Executive privilege is an implied
constitutional power because it is necessary and proper to carry out the express constitutional
powers and functions of the Executive free from the encroachment of the other co-equal and co-
ordinate branches of government. Executive privilege springs from the supremacy of each branch
within its own assigned area of constitutional powers and functions.
Executive privilege can be invoked only by the President who is the sole Executive in whom is
vested all executive power under the Constitution. However, the Executive Secretary can invoke
executive privilege “By Order of the President,” which means the President personally instructed
the Executive Secretary to invoke executive privilege in a particular circumstance.
Executive privilege must be invoked with specificity sufficient to inform the Legislature and the
Judiciary that the matter claimed as privileged refers to military, national security or diplomatic
secrets, or to confidential Presidential communications. A claim of executive privilege
accompanied by sufficient specificity gives rise to a presumptive executive privilege. A generalized
assertion of executive privilege, without external evidence or circumstances indicating that the
matter refers to any of the recognized categories of executive privilege, will not give rise to
presumptive executive privilege.
If there is doubt whether presumptive privilege exists, the court may require in camera inspection of
so much of the evidence as may be necessary to determine whether the claim of executive privilege
is justified. Once presumptive executive privilege is established, the court will then weigh the need
for such executive privilege against the need for other constitutionally recognized interests.
Executive privilege must be invoked after the question is asked by the legislative committee, not
before. A witness cannot raise hypothetical questions that the committee may ask, claim executive
privilege on such questions, and on that basis refuse to appear before the legislative committee. If
the legislative committee furnished in advance the questions to the witness, the witness must bring
with him the letter of the President or Executive Secretary invoking executive privilege and stating
the reasons for such claim.
If the legislative committee did not furnish in advance the questions, the witness must first appear
before the legislative committee, wait for the question to be asked, and then raise executive
privilege. The legislative committee must then give the witness sufficient time to consult the
President or Executive Secretary whether the President will claim executive privilege. At the next
hearing, the witness can bring with him the letter of the President or Executive Secretary, and if he
fails to bring such letter, the witness must answer the question.
The Legislature’s fundamental function is to enact laws and oversee the implementation of existing
laws. The Legislature must exercise
this fundamental function consistent with the people’s right to information on the need for the
enactment of laws and the status of their implementation. The principal tool used by the Legislature
in exercising this fundamental function is the power of inquiry which is inherent in every legislative
body. Without the power of inquiry, the Legislature cannot discharge its fundamental function and
thus becomes inutile.
The Constitution expressly grants to the “Senate, the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees” the power to “conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.” This power of
legislative inquiry is so searching and extensive in scope that the inquiry need
not result in any potential legislation, and may even end without any predictable legislation. The
phrase “inquiries in aid of legislation” refers to inquiries to aid the enactment of laws, inquiries to
aid in overseeing the implementation of laws, and even inquiries to expose corruption, inefficiency
or waste in executive departments.
Thus, the Legislature can conduct inquiries not specifically to enact laws, but specifically to
oversee the implementation of laws. This is the mandate of various legislative oversight committees
which admittedly can conduct inquiries on the status of the implementation of laws. In the exercise
of the legislative oversight function, there is always the potential, even if not expressed or
predicted, that the oversight committees may discover the need to improve the laws they oversee
and thus recommend amendment of the laws. This is sufficient reason for the valid exercise of the
power of legislative inquiry. Indeed, the oversight function of the Legislature may at times be as
important as its law-making function.
Aside from the purpose of the inquiry, the Constitution imposes two other limitations on the power
of legislative inquiry. One, the rules of procedure for the inquiry must be duly published.
Publication of the rules of the inquiry is an essential requirement of due process. Two, the rights of
persons appearing before the investigating committees, or affected by such inquiries, must be
respected. These rights include the right against self-incrimination, as well as the right to privacy of
communications and correspondence of a private nature. The power of legislative inquiry does not
reach into the private affairs of citizens.
Also protected is the right to due process, which means that a witness must be given “fair notice” of
the subject of the legislative inquiry. Fair notice is important because the witness may be cited in
contempt, and even detained, if he refuses or fails to answer. Moreover, false testimony before a
legislative body is a crime. Thus, the witness must be sufficiently informed of the nature of the
inquiry so the witness can reasonably prepare for possible questions of the legislative committee.
To avoid doubts on whether there is fair notice, the witness must be given in advance the questions
pertaining to the basic nature of the inquiry. From these advance questions, the witness can infer
other follow-up or relevant questions that the legislative committee may ask in the course of the
inquiry.
The Legislature has the inherent power to enforce by compulsion its power of inquiry. The
Legislature can enforce its power of inquiry through its own sergeant-at-arms without the aid of law
enforcement officers of the Executive or resort to the courts. The two principal means of enforcing
the power of inquiry are for the Legislature to order the arrest of a witness who refuses to appear,
and to detain a witness who refuses to answer. A law that makes a crime the refusal to appear
before the Legislature does not divest the Legislature of its inherent power to arrest a recalcitrant
witness.
The inherent power of the Legislature to arrest a recalcitrant witness remains despite the
constitutional provision that “no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge.” The power being inherent in the Legislature, essential for self-
preservation, and not expressly withdrawn in the Constitution, the power forms part of the
“legislative power x x x vested in the Congress.” The Legislature asserts this power independently
of the Judiciary. A grant of legislative power in the Constitution is a grant of all legislative powers,
including inherent powers.

The Legislature can cite in contempt and order the arrest of a witness who fails to appear pursuant
to a subpoena ad testificandum. There is no distinction between direct and indirect contempt of the
Legislature because both can be punished motu proprio by the Legislature upon failure of the
witness to appear or answer. Contempt of the Legislature is different from contempt of court.

Petitioner admits, and there can be no dispute about this admission, that his discussions with the
President dwelt on a bribery scandal involving high Government officials of the Philippines.
Executive privilege can never be used to hide a crime or wrongdoing, even if committed by high
government officials. Executive privilege applies only to protect official acts and functions of the
President, never to conceal illegal acts by anyone, not even those of the President.

The invocation of executive privilege on the three questions dwelling on a bribery scandal is clearly
unjustified and void. Public office is a public trust and not a shield to cover up wrongdoing.
Petitioner must answer the three questions asked by the Senate Committees.

The Ermita Letter merely raises a generalized assertion of executive privilege on diplomatic
matters. The bare claim that disclosure “might impair” diplomatic relations with China, without
specification of external evidence and circumstances justifying such claim, is insufficent to give
rise to any presumptive executive privilege. A claim of executive privilege is presumptively valid if
there is specificity in the claim. The claim of impairment of economic relations with China is
invalid because impairment of economic relations, involving “foreign investors and lenders in the
Philippines,” is not a recognized ground for invoking executive privilege.

The three questions that Executive Secretary Ermita claims are covered by executive privilege, if
answered by petitioner, will not disclose confidential Presidential communications. Neither will
answering the questions disclose diplomatic secrets.

Of course, it is possible that the follow-up questions to the three questions may call for disclosure
of confidential presidential discussions or diplomatic secrets. However, executive privilege cannot
be invoked on possible questions that have not been asked by the legislative committee. Executive
privilege can only be invoked after the question is asked, not before, because the legislative
committee may after all not ask the question. But even if the follow- up questions call for the
disclosure of confidential Presidential discussions or diplomatic secrets, still executive privilege
cannot be used to cover up a crime.