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REPEAL AND REVIVAL OF STATUTES

INTRODUCTION
For the purpose of law reforms official bodies exist or may be constituted from
time to time and the work of these bodies can have considerable influence on
the development or reforms of statute law. The most important of these
bodies is the Law Commission of India, which has a significant contribution in
criminal, civil and other law reforms in India. After the commencement of the
Constitution of India it became absolutely necessary to review the existing
laws. Recommendations of such official bodies for law reforms are a
continuous process, but law making is the power of the competent legislative
authority. It is to be noticed that power to make law with regard to any subject
carries with it allancillary and incidental powers to make it effective and
workable, to prevent its evasion, to amend and even to repeal it.1

MEANING OF REPEAL
Repeal means to revoke, abrogate or cancel particularly a statute. Any statute
may repeal an Act in whole or in part, either expressly or impliedly by enacting
matter contrary to and inconsistent with the prior legislation. Thus a statute
frequently states that certain prior statutory provisions are thereby repealed.
The courts will treat matter as repealed by implication only if the earlier and
later statutory provisions are clearly inconsistent. When a repealing provision
is itself repealed, this does not revive any provision previously repealed by it,
unless intent to revive is apparent, but it may allow common law principles
again to apply.

According to General Clauses Act, 1897, Section 6 “Repeal” connotes

abrogation or obliteration of one statute by another, from the statute book as
completely “as if it had never been passed.” When an Act is repealed “it must
be considered (except as to transactions past and closed) as if it had never
existed.”

1
Ab kafaltiya, Interpretation of Statutes, pg.- 307.
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Modification is no repeal

Repeal is not a matter of mere form but one of substance, depending upon the
intention of the legislature. This intention may be of total or protanto repeal or
it may be merely to modify the former enactment by engrafting an exception
or granting an exemption or by super adding conditions, or by restricting,
intercepting or suspending its operation. Such modification would not amount
to repeal.2 Section 6 of the General Clauses Act applies even in case of a partial
repeal or repeal of part of an Act applies even in case of a partial repeal or
repeal of part of an Act.3

PERPETUAL AND TEMPORARY STATUTES

A statute may be perpetual or temporary. A perpetual statute is one for the
duration of which no time is fixed. It remains in force until it is repealed.
Perpetual statute is so known not because it cannot be repealed but because it
is not abrogated by efflux of time or by non-user. A statute is temporary when
its duration is only for a specified time and such a statute expires on the expiry
of the specified time unless it is repealed earlier. Simply because the purpose
of a statute, as mentioned in its preamble, is temporary, the statute cannot be
regarded as temporary when no fixed period is specified for its duration. The
duration of a temporary statute may be extended by a fresh statute or by
exercise of a power conferred under the original statute.

POWER TO REPEAL
A power to make a law with respect to the topics committed to Parliament or
State Legislature carries with it a power to repeal a law on those topics. In
Ramakrishna v. Janapadad Sabha,4 the Supreme Court had laid down that
“subject to any constitutional restriction, the general rule is that “the power of
a legislative body to repeal a law is co-extensive with its power to enact such a
law and a Legislature which has no power to enact a law on a particular
subject-matter has also no power to repeal the same.” A Legislature, however,
has no power to bind itself or its successor as to the course of future legislation
for to acknowledge such a power will remain that a Legislature can curtail its

2
India Tobacco Co. Ltd. V. CTO, (1995) 3 SCC 512, 517-518.
3
G. Ekambarappa v. Janpad Sabha, AIR 1962 SC 1281.
4
(1962) Supp 3 SCR 70; AIR 1962 SC 1073.
 Page |3

own or its successor’s powers which are conferred by the Constitution and
which cannot be restricted or taken away except by an amendment of the
Constitution. It is an axiom of British Constitutional law that “Acts of
Parliament derogatory from the subsequent Parliament bind not.” Because the
Legislature being in truth the sovereign power is always of equal and always of
absolute authority. It acknowledges no superior upon earth, which the prior
Legislature must have been, if its ordinances could bind a subsequent
Parliament.

OBJECT OF REPEALING ACTS

Repeal is not a matter of mere form but one of substance, depending upon the
intention of the Legislature. If the intention indicated expressly or by necessary
implication in the subsequent statute was to abrogate or wipe out off the
former enactment, wholly or in part then it would be a case of total or pro
tanto repeal. Broadly speaking the principal object of a repealing statute and
amending Act is to ‘excise dead matter, prune off superfluities and reject
clearly inconsistent enactments.’ A repealing Act is an enactment which
otherwise expressly or by necessary implication revokes another statute. It can
be said an edited revision of law intended to excise dead matter from the
statute book and so to reduce its volume. Repealing Acts may have purposes
such as to remove inconsistencies in law, to revise Acts, to strike out the
unnecessary enactments, to reduce the increasing spate of legislation and to
remove duality of law. In Jagannath Barapatre v. Hemaji Hraman Bakde,5 the
Bombay High Court said that the sole object of repealing Act is to get rid of a
certain quantity of obsolete matter. Its normal effect is to obliterate it from the
statute book as completely as if it had never been passed; it must be
considered as a law that never existed. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act,
1897 however, provides an exception to this rule.

The provisions of an earlier Act may be revoked or abrogated by

subsequent Act either by express language or inference from the language
used. Pre-existing laws may be repealed by the enactment of new and
independent legislation, or by amendments, by revision and codification.
Majority of repealing Acts are those, which subsequently re-enact the law on
the same subject matter. In essence there is no distinction between such laws
5
AIR 1958 Bom 507; (1959) 61 Bom LR 1141: ILR 1958 Bom 361.
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and laws which merely profess to amend. If the amendment of the existing law
is small, the Act is amending one, and if it is extensive, it repeals the previous
law and re-enact it. An amending provision can certainly give guidance to
interpretation of existing provisions. Thus, it is a matter of construction as to
what is repealed and what is remaining there in the same subject. The words
“repeals”, “re-enacts” and the “provisions so repealed” occurring in Section 8
of the General Clauses Act, 1897 are important and very significant, and limit
the very operation of the rule of construction of “references” only where any
provision of a former enactment is repealed and re-enacted. In such a case it is
only the particular re-enacted provision that can be read in place of the
repealed provision. The rule of construction laid down in Section 8 does not
authorize the substitution of any provision whatsoever of the repealing
enactment for the provision repealed of a former enactment.6

MODES OF REPEAL
Parliament has the power to make a law and to repeal any existing law- be it
temporary statute or a perpetual statute. Repeal may be brought by the
Legislature in the two following ways:

 The Legislature may enact a distinct repealing enactment to declare that

an earlier Act has been abolished. It is called Express Repeal.
 The Legislature may enact an enactment which is so inconsistent with
the earlier Act that no harmony between the two is possible or it covers
the entire subject matter of the earlier statute. This is called Implied
Repeal.

No repeal can be brought unless there is express repeal of an earlier Act by a

later Act or two Acts cannot stand together.7

EXPRESS REPEAL
The use of any particular form of words is not necessary to bring about an
express repeal. All that is necessary is that the words used show an intention
to abrogate the Act or previous provision in question. The usual from is to use
the words ‘shall cease to have effect’ is also not uncommon. When the object

6
Vino C, & P. Works (P) Ltd. V. Commissioner of Income Tax, AIR 2000 SC 1623.
7
T. Bhattacharya, The Interpretation of Statutes, Pg. - 348.
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is to repeal only a portion of an Act words ‘shall be omitted’ are normally used.
The legislative practice in India shows that ‘omission of a provision is treated as
amendment which signifies deletion of that provision and is not different from
repeal. It has been held that “there is no real distinction between repeal and
amendment.” It has also been held that “where a provision of an Act is omitted
by an Act and the said Act simultaneously re-enacts a new provision which
substantially covers the field occupied by the repealed provision with certain
modification, in that event such re-enactment is regarded having force
continuously and the modification or changes are treated as amendment
coming into force with effect from the date of enforcement of re-enacted
provision.

This type of repeal as the expression shows is always in so many words clearly
laid down as for example:-

a) “Is or are hereby repealed,”

b) “Shall cease to have effect,”
c) “Shall be omitted,”
d) “All provisions inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed,”
e) “Shall to the extent necessary to give effect to the provisions of this Act
be deemed to have been repealed or modified.”

The last two types of repeal are in uncertain terms and require to be construed
by the Court as to what and how much is to be repealed.

It is also noted that where a new provision is substituted by the legislature in

place of the existing provision, and the later new provision was declared invalid
due to the want of competency of the legislature, such repeal shall have no
effect.

In Indian New Papers v. Union Of India,8 the Supreme Court observed that
when repeal of an existing provision is accompanied by enactment of a new
provision, which is the case when a new provision is substituted in place of an
existing provision, the declaration of invalidity of the new provision on the
ground of want of competence will also invalidate the repeal; but if the
declaration of invalidity is on other grounds e.g., arbitrariness or violation of
fundamental rights, the repeal speaking generally will be effective although the
8
(1985) 1 SCC 641: AIR SC 515: (1984) 2 Comp LJ 853(SC): 1985(4) ECC 111: 1984 (2) SCALE 853: 2 SCR 287.
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new provision is declared invalid unless from the totality of circumstances and
the context it is found that there was no intention to repeal in the event of the
new provision being struck down.

Where no direct reference is made by the Legislature to a particular Act or

Section but merely stated “all provisions inconsistent with this Act” are hereby
repealed, effect of such general repeal can be determined by applying the
principles of construction governing the cases of implied repeal. In Abdul Kadir
v. State of Kerala,9 the Supreme Court has observed that in interpreting such
provisions if there is similarity or correspondence between the repealed and
repealing Act then the repeal shall be effected, but where there is no
correspondence, both the Acts are substantially differing in their scope, the
repeal is ineffective.

When a Central Act has been adopted under Article 252 by a State by a
resolution passed by the House or Houses of the Legislature of the State, the
amendment or repeal of the Central Act by the Parliament does not affect its
continuance as a State Act is also adopted under Article 252 by the State by a
resolution of the House or Houses of the Legislature.10

Essentials of Express Repeal

The essential ingredients of an express repeal are as mentioned below:-

 There must be a subsequent repealing Act.

 Such subsequent Act must seek to repeal an earlier Act.
 Specific words such as ‘…..is hereby repealed’, ‘….shall cease to have
effect’ must be used in this subsequent repealing Act showing clear
intention to effect repeal of an earlier Act.

IMPLIED REPEAL

9
AIR 1962 SC 922: (1962 Supp 2 SCR 741.
10
State of West Bengal v. Pronob Kr. Sur, AIR 2003 SC 2313.
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In this case, the Legislature does not use the words to precisely show its
intention to repeal a law. Instead, it enacts a law which is so contradictory to
an existing law that both cannot be given effect to. This implies abrogation of
the existing law. Thus, implied repeal is the result of inconsistent subsequent
legislation. The implied repeal takes place in the following two ways:-

When subsequent Act is so inconsistent with earlier Act that only one of the
two can remain in force

When a subsequent Act covers whole subject matter of the earlier Act and
intended to be a substitute for the earlier Act

In Atal Tea Co. Ltd. V. Regional P.F. Commr., 11 it was held that that a repeal
may be express or implied. If provisions of a later enactment are so
inconsistent or repugnant with the provisions of an earlier one that the two
cannot stand together, the earlier Act can be said to have been repealed by
implication. There is no real distinction in essence between repeal and an
amendment. In this case question was relating to Section 14-B of Employees
Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. This Section was
amended in 1988. By way of amendment, power of Commissioner to levy
damages was curtailed. Formerly it was up to 100% and now it is as per sliding
table under Para 32-A of the scheme. Point is whether this curtailment of
power is prospective or applied also in connection with defaults prior to
amendment for which no action was initiated prior to amendment. It was held
that there is no saving clause. There is a presumption against retrospectivity.
This rule may be overcome not only by express words in the Act but also by
circumstances sufficiently strong to displace it. The amended and unamended
Section 14-B is really incompatible and inconsistent with one another so far as
rates of levy of damages are concerned. By this amendment, provisions of
Section 14-B so far as it conferred the discretionary power to determine the
rates at which damages would have to be levied can be said to have been
repealed by implication. The discretionary power to levy damages stands
curtailed by virtue of amendment.

There is a presumption against a repeal by implication; and the reason of this

rule is based on the theory that the Legislature while enacting a law has a

11
(1998) 1 CALLT 257 HC, 1998 (79) FLR 372, 1997 LablC 1207.
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complete knowledge of the existing laws on the same subject-matter, and

therefore, when it does not provide a repealing provision, it gives out an
intention not to repeal the existing legislation.

Implied repeal may operate on a part of statute or on its entirety. If

repugnancy relates to a part of statute, the part of statute will stand repealed
only to the extent of repugnancy.

Repeal shall not be inferred if two Acts can be read together and some
application may be made of words in earlier Act.

Presumption against implied repeal

There is a presumption against repeal by implication. Reason is based on the

theory that Legislature while enacting a law has complete knowledge of
existing laws on the same subject matter and therefore, when it does not
provide a repealing provision, it gives out an intention not to repeal existing
legislation.12

TEST OF REPEAL BY NECESSARY IMPLICATION

Although law does not favor repeal by implication and it is only in the last
resort that Courts hold that one enactment is repealed by another even
without express words. Repeal by implication is the consequence of
contradictory or inconsistent legislation. But it is not necessary for the
legislature to repeal always by express words, and if the repeal is not express,
it may flow from necessary implication in the following cases:-

 A statute is repealed if its provisions are plainly repugnant to those of a

subsequent statute. In other words, if the earlier and the later laws are
in direct conflict with each other.
 If the previous statute and the subsequent statute standing together
would lead to wholly absurd consequences.
 If the entire subject-matter of the first is taken away by the second.
 Whether two laws occupy the same field. In Harish Chandra v. State of
M.P.,13 it was held that if two laws “operate in the same field” without
collision, they cannot be said to “occupy the same field” and there will
12
G.P. Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Pg.- 638.
13
AIR 1965 SC 932.
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be no inconsistency and no implied repeal, unless later law intends to be

exhaustive code.
 If the Legislature intended to lay down an exhaustive Code in respect of
subject matter replacing earlier law.

Implied repeal could therefore be inferred only when the earlier and later law
operate in the same field and occupy the same field but are so inconsistent
with each other that both of them cannot co-exist in harmony and only one
can survive. Implied repeal may also be concluded when legislative intent is to
bring exhaustive Code in respect of subject matter replacing earlier law. In
such cases, the earlier law is deemed to have been repealed by implication.

In State of M.P. v. Kedia Leather and Liquor Ltd. And Others,14 is was observed
that the doctrine of implied repeal is based on the theory that the Legislature,
which is presumed to know the existing law, did not intend to create any
confusion by retaining conflicting provisions and therefore, when the Court
applies the doctrine, it does not more than give effect to the intention of the
Legislature by examining the scope and the object of the two enactments and
by comparison of their provisions. The matter in each case is one of the
construction and comparison of the two statutes. The Court leans against
implying repeal. Unless two Acts are so plainly repugnant to each other that
effect cannot be given to both at the same time, repeal will not be implied, or
that there is necessary inconsistency in the two Acts standing together. To
determine whether a later statute repeals by implication an earlier, it is
necessary to scrutinize the terms and consider the true meaning and effect of
earlier Act. Until this is done, it is impossible to ascertain whether any
inconsistency exists between the two enactments.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF IMPLIED REPEAL

1) Only prior legislation is repealed by implication

14
2004(1) Mh LJ SC 306.
 P a g e | 10

Where the provisions of subsequent Act directly contradict the provisions of

the earlier Act and there is no possibility of reconciliation between them or
when the subsequent Act covers whole subject matter of the earlier Act,
implied repeal may be inferred. It may be appreciated that in these
circumstances, it is the previous law which stands repealed by implication, not
the later one.

In Maya Mathew v. State of Kerala,15 it was held that the rules of

interpretation when a subject is governed by two sets of Rules are well settled.
When a provision of law regulates a particular subject and a subsequent law
contains a provision regulating the same subject, there is no presumption that
the later law repeals the earlier law. The rule making authority, while making
the later rule, is deemed to know the existing law on the subject. If the
subsequent law does not repeal the earlier rule, there can be no presumption
of an intention to repeal the earlier rule.

2) Implied repeal may not operate on entire statute

It is not necessary that the whole statute is impliedly repealed. Implied repeal
may affect only a part of the earlier Act, where certain provisions of later
enactment are similar to or are in agreement with the earlier law and both can
stand and operate together, there is no implied repeal in respect of such
provisions,. The question of implied repeal in such cases shall be confined to
only those provisions of previous Act which have been contradicted in the later
Act.

3) Implied repeal of earlier law can be inferred only when subsequent law
occupies the same field, yet contradicts the earlier one

Implied repeal cannot be inferred if the previous law and later law can be read
together and both of them can be applied, may be to limited extend, without
interference. There could be implied repeal of earlier legislation when the later
law operates in the same field and occupies the same field, but cannot co-exist
with it due to inconsistency and contradiction.

15
AIR 2010 SC : 2010 (3) SCC 34.
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In Delhi Municipality v. Shivshankar,16 it was held that the Prevention of Food

Adulteration Act, 1954 and Rules made there under relating to vinegar were
not impliedly repealed by the subsequent Essential Commodities Act, 1955.
Although both contained regulating provisions and laid down standards of
quality and composition of vinegar, it cannot be said that the two laws could
not stand together. The former does not render compliance with latter
impossible, nor compliance of former involves violation of latter.

4) Implied repeal may be concluded when exhaustive Code is intended

When legislative intent is to replace earlier law by an exhaustive Code in

respect of subject matter, implied repeal of an earlier Act may be inferred. In
such cases, the earlier law stands repealed by implication.

In Nagar Mahapalika v. Vibha Shukla,17 the Respondent 1 was appointed

under the 1959 Act but claiming benefit of regularization under the 1921 Act. It
was held that an Act enacted later would prevail over the earlier one.

5) Prior special law is not repealed by later general law

Ordinarily, a prior particular law or special law is not readily inferred to be

repealed by a later general law. The basis of this doctrine is the principle of
“generalia specialibus non derogant” which means that general things do not
derogate from special things. Therefore, in the absence of clear and
unequivocal words, a special law cannot be abrogated by a subsequent general
Act.

In Municipal Council Palai v. T.J. Joseph,18 the provisions of Municipal Act were
in question which empowered a Municipal Authority to provide for bus stands.
The subsequent Motor Vehicle Act empowered the Government to do the
same. It was held that provisions of Municipal Act were not repealed by the
provisions of Motor Vehicles Act. Reason for reaching this conclusion was that
Municipal Act was special law which applied to Municipal area but Motor
Vehicles Act was general Act applying to all areas in general. Both the
provisions were enabling ones and there could be no question of conflict till

16
AIR 1971 SC 815.
17
(2007) 15 SCC 161.
18
AIR 11963 SC 1561.
 P a g e | 12

the authority in later Motor Vehicle Act also provided for bus stand in some
areas for which bus stands had already been provided under Municipal Act.

6) A prior general law may be affected by subsequent particular Act

Where the subject matter of a later particular Act was being governed by a
general Act, such general law may be affected by later special law. To law and
subsequently the Legislature enacts a special law on such matters, then earlier
general law is affected by the later special law. The basis of this doctrine is the
principle of ‘generalibus specialia derogant” which means that special things
derogate from general things. In such case, operation of particular Act may
have effect of partially repealing general Act.

In Ethiopian Airlines v. Ganesh Narain Saboo,19 it was held that specific

statutes which come later in time supersede the prior general statutes by more
recent and special statutes. Consumer Protection and Carriage by Air Acts
being more focused and specific statutes and later to CPC, must be deemed as
special Acts with respect to cases covered by them. Provisions of CPC have only
limited applicability to them.

7) Affirmative enactment is not repealed by a subsequent affirmative Act

One affirmative enactment is not easily taken to be repealed by another later

affirmative enactment. But if later Act is precise negative of whatever authority
existed under earlier Act, the repeal shall be inferred.

8) Conferral of similar powers under two enactments at different levels

does not result in implied repeal of earlier Act

If the similar powers are conferred by two legislations at different levels, then
implied repeal of earlier Act cannot be inferred

In Rachandra Mawalal v. State of Uttar Pradesh,20 the Central Government

made notification under Essential Commodities Act, 1955 fixing higher rate of
price of an essential commodity. State Government issued an order under
Defence of India Rules clarifying that the higher rate could not be charged in
respect of the stock already existing since prior to upward revision of rate. It
was held that the State Government was competent to issue the order. It was
19
(2011) 8 SCC 539.
20
(1984) (Supp) SCC 28.
 P a g e | 13

observed that there is no legal bar to creating two sources of power to achieve
the same purpose and that there was no real inconsistency as the order of
state was supplementary to Centre’s notification.

9) Implied repeal can be inferred if later law imposes different punishments

for same offence

Where an offence created by an earlier Act is again described in a later Act and
the later Act varies the procedure or imposes different punishment for that
offence, in such a case the earlier Ac stands repealed by implication

But where offence described in later Act is different from offence described in
earlier Act, this principle has no application.

In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Veereshwar Rao,21 Section 26 of General

Clauses Act provides that where an act of omission constitutes an offence
under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be
punished under either or any of those enactments; but shall not be punished
twice for the same offence. Article 20(2) of the Constitution directs that no
person shall be prosecuted and punished for same offence more than once.
Both these provisions apply only when two offences are same. But if offence
under two enactments is not identical, none of these provisions shall apply.

EFFECT AND CONSEQUENCES OF REPEAL

General rule

Repeal of a statute completely obliterates it as if it never existed or if it had

never been enacted. Moreover, the proceedings pending there understand
discontinued,22 and no new proceeding can be started under it after repeal. As
observed in Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. V. Union of India,23 repeal of a
statute or deletion of a provision, unless covered by Section 6, General Clauses
Act, 1897 or a saving provision, is totally obliterated from the statute book and
the proceedings pending there under discontinued.24

21
AIR 1957 SC 592.
22
Om Prakash v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 458: 1957 SCR 423.
23
(2000) 2 SCC 536: AIR 2000 SC 811.
24
S. Krishnan v. State of Madras, AIR 1951 SC 301: 1951 SCR 621.
 P a g e | 14

A previous law may be repealed either expressly or by implication. In both the

cases, the consequences are the same. Following are the effects of repeal of an
enactment:

1) Later Act abrogates prior one.

2) Repealed Act ceases to exist and does not remain in force with effect
form the date of appeal.
3) As per general law, except in relation to the past and closed
transactions, a statute after repeal is completely obliterated as if it had
never been enacted. As such, all rights and causes of action under
repealed statute are destroyed.

In Jayantilal Amrathlal v. Union of India,25 it was held that in order to see

whether the rights and liabilities under the repealed law have been put to an
end by the new enactment, the proper approach is not to enquire if the new
enactment has by its new provisions kept alive the rights and liabilities under
the repealed law but whether it has taken away those rights and liabilities. The
absence of a saving clause in the new enactment preserving the rights and
liabilities under the repealed law is neither material nor decisive of the
question.

4) When an Act is repealed, all laws passed under it stand repealed unless
there is a saving provision.

In Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. V. Electricity Inspector,26 it was

held that a notification which is duly issued will continue to govern unless
repealed. In case the parent statute is repealed, the notification would also
stand repealed unless and to the extent, saved by the repealing Act.

5) No proceedings can be commenced or continued under an Act after its

repeal. However, those cases remain unaffected by such repeal in which
the proceedings have been brought to finality prior to repeal of the
statute. The cases already completed shall not be reopened by the
reason of repeal of law under which prosecution was made.
6) A law can be retrospectively amended to validate the transactions made
under it, even after its repeal.
25
AIR 1971 SC 1193.
26
(2007) 5 SCC 447.
 P a g e | 15

In State of Rajasthan v. Mangilal Pindwal,27 there was a rule which permitted

the Government to effect compulsory retirement of a government servant by
paying three month’s salary. This rule was subsequently repealed and in its
place, another rule was substituted. During the period earlier rule was in
operation, a government servant was retired on payment of an amount as
salary. When calculated later, the amount paid to that government servant
was found to be short of three month’s salary. Meanwhile this rule, under
which compulsory retirement was give, came to be repealed. As per the terms
of the rule, the retirement was invalid because non-payment of full amount of
three months salary. Therefore, in order to validate the action, an amendment
was brought to the rule after its repeal. This amendment was indeed
retrospective but was effective for the period during which the old rule
remained in operation. According to amendment, Government could retire a
government servant forthwith without paying him three month’s salary but
entitling him to claim salary after retirement. The amendment was held to be
valid.

7) When an existing statute is repealed by a temporary statute, it is a

temporary repeal. After expiry of such temporary Act, the repealed Act
revives.

In Gooderham and Worts v. C.B. Corporation,28 it was held that the repeal
effected by the temporary legislation was only a temporary repeal. When by
the fiat of Parliament the temporary repeal expired, the original legislation
automatically resumed its full force. No enactment of it was required.

8) Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides the effect of repeal
as under:

S. 6 Effect of Repeal.—Where this Act, or any central Act or Regulation made

after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or
hereafter to be made, then unless a different intention appears, the repeal
shall not—

a. revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal
takes effect;
27
AIR 1996 SC 2181.
28
AIR 1949 PC 90.
 P a g e | 16

b. affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything

duly done or suffered there under, or

c. affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or

incurred under any enactment so repealed; or

d. affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any

offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or

e. affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any

such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or
punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or
remedy may be instituted, or continued or enforced and any such
penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act
or Regulation had not been passed.

REVIVAL OF STATUTES
The Common Law principle was that when a statute was repealed and the
repealing statute itself was repealed by another statute, the repeal of the
second statute itself was repealed by another statute the repeal of the second
statute would automatically bring back or revive the first statute provided
there was no intention that the original statute would remain repealed.
Section 11 (1) of the Interpretation Act, 1889 of United Kingdom states that
where an Act passed after 1850 repeals a repealing enactment, it shall not be
construed as reviving any enactment previously repealed, unless words are
added reviving that enactment.

In India, revival of statutes is governed by Section 7 of the General Clause Act,

1887. The first clause of which states that in any Central Act or regulation
made after the commencement of this Act, it shall be necessary, for the
purpose of reviving, either wholly or partially, any enactment wholly or
partially repealed, expressly to state that purpose. The second clause says that
this section applies also to all Central acts made after the third day of January,
1868, and to all regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of January,
1887. Section 6 (a) of the Act states that when this Act, or any Central act or
regulation made after the commencement of this Act repeals any enactment
hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then unless a different intention
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appears, the repeal shall not revive anything not in force or existing at the time
at which the repeal takes effect.29

In Ameer-un-Nissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum,30 the Supreme Court, while

following Section 7 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 held that once a repealing
statute is itself repealed, that does not mean the revival of the repealed
statute unless the language of the repealing statute so provides expressly.

CONCLUSION
In the end it can be concluded that Repeal means to revoke, abrogate or cancel
particularly a statute. Any statute may repeal any Act in whole or in part, either
expressly or impliedly by enacting matter contrary to and inconsistent with the
prior legislation. Thus a statute frequently states that certain prior statutory
29
D.N. Mathur, Interpreta P 282.
30
AIR 1995 SC 352.
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provisions are thereby repealed. The courts will treat matter as repealed by
implication only if the earlier and later statutory provisions are clearly
inconsistent. Repeal can be of two types i.e., express repeal and implied
repeal. Express repeal is where the intention to repeal is expressed in the
subsequent Act by the Legislature whereas in implied repeal the intention of
the Legislature is implied when the subsequent Act enacted is so inconsistent
with the previous one that only one of them can subsist. The provisions dealing
with repeal and revival of statutes is contained in Sections 6 and 7 of the
General Clauses Act, 1897.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 A.B. Kafaltiya, Interpretation of Statutes, Universal Law Publishing, New

Delhi, 2010.
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 B.M. Gandhi, Interpretation of Statutes, Jain Book Agency, 2014.

 D.N. Mathur, Interpretation of Statutes, Central Law Publications,
Allahabad, 2015.
 G.P. Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Wadhwa and Co., New
Delhi, 2014.
 T. Bhattacharyya, The Interpretation of Statutes, Central Law Agency,
Allahabad, 2015.