BONIFACIO v.

RTC OF MAKATI (2010)

FACTS: Private respondent Jessie John Gimenez (Gimenez) filed, on behalf of the Yuchengco family
and of the Malayan Insurance Co. a criminal complaint before the RTC of Makati for 13 counts of libel
under Art 355 in relation to 353 of the RPC against herein petitioners who are officers of Parents
Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc (PEPCI). Pepci is a large group of disgruntled planholders of Pacific
Plans, Inc (PPI) – a wholly owned subsidiary of Great Pacific Life Assurance Corp, also owned by
Yuchengco Group of Companies (YGC) – who had previously purchased traditional pre-need
educational plans but were unable to collect thereon due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate
rehabilitation with prayer of suspension of payments before the Makati RTC.

Decrying PPI’s refusal to honor its obligations under the educational plans, PEPCI sought to provide a
forum by which the planholders could seek redress for their loss under the policies by maintaining a
website with the address of www.pepcoalition.com. Gimenez alleged that the same website is easily
accessible to the public. He further alleged that upon accessing the above-stated website in Makati on
various dates, he was appaled to read numerous articles which maliciously and recklessly casued to be
published by PEPCI containing highly derogatory statements and false accusations against the
Yuchengco Family, YGC, and Malayan.

By resolution, the Makati Prosecutor’s Office filed 13 counts of libel after finding probable cause to indict
the accused. Several of the accused appeled the Prosecutor’s resolution to the Secretary of Justice
which reversed the finding of probable cause and directed the withdrawal of the information on the
ground that internet libel, as a crime, is inexistent.

Petitioner then filed before the Makati RTC a Motion to Quash the information on the ground that it failed
to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC. Citing Macasaet v people, petitioners maintained that the
information failed to allege a particular place within the trial court’s jurisdiction where the subject article
was printed and first published or that the offended party resided in Makati at the time the alleged
defamatory material was printed and first published. The RTC of Makati, despite finding probable cause,
quashed the information, but upon motion for reconsideration, allowed the prosecution to amend the
information and the latter moved to have the amended information admitted. Petitioners once more
moved to have the amended information quashed on the same ground but the RTC ruled that the
information was sufficient in form.

ISSUE: W/N the RTC of Makati acted with grave abuse of discretion in admitting the amended
information despite the failure to allege that the libelous articles were printed and first published by the
accused in Makati.

HELD: Yes, the venue of the action seeks to prevent undue harassment on the part of the publisher by
the complainant who, if the amended information would be allowed, can file in all other locations where
the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed.

RATIO: Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed
determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction. It is clear
that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only two places.
1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense, and 2) where the
alleged defamatory article was printed and first published. The amended information in the present case
opted to lay the venue by availing of the second. RA 4363 amended Art 360 of the RPC which sets the
venue for the filing of an information for a libel case. The old rule allows the filing of an action for libel in
any jurisdiction where the libellous article was published or circulated. Clearly, the evil sought to be
prevented by the amendment was the indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of the venue in libel cases in
distant, isolated or far-flung areas, meant to accomplish nothing more than harass or intimidate an
accused. To credit Gimenez’s premise of equating his first access to the defamatory article on
petitioner’s website in Makati with printing and first publication would spawn the very ills that the
amendment to Art 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. For the Court to hold that the
amended information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the
defamatory article was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all
other locations where the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed.

TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY (23 SCRA 29)

FACTS: Tijam filed for recovery of P1,908 + legal interest from Sibongahanoy. Defendants filed a
counter bond with Manila

Surety and Fidelity Co (Surety). Judgement was in favour of the plaintiffs, a writ of execution was issued
against the defendant. Defendants moved for writ of execution against surety which was granted. Surety
moved to quash the writ but was denied, appealed to CA without raising the issue on lack of jurisdiction.

CA affirmed the appealed decision. Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view of the effectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the filing of
the petition for recovery. Act placed original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions for
demands not exceeding 2,000 exclusive of interest. CA set aside its earlier decision and referred the
case to SC since it has exclusive jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court
is in issue.

ISSUE: WON Surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CFI Cebu for the first time
upon appeal.YES

RATIO: SC believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea after almost
fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for
the first time - A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for
different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel
by laches. Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier -
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse
decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court
-"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only
if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

: Other merits on the appeal : The surety insists that the lower court should have granted its motion to
quash the writ of execution because the same was issued without the summary hearing - Summary
hearing is "not intended to be carried on in the formal manner in which ordinary actions are
prosecuted" (83 C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a procedure by which a question is resolved "with dispatch,
with the least possible delay, and in preference to ordinary legal and regular judicial proceedings" (Ibid,
p. 790). What is essential is that "the defendant is notified or summoned to appear and is given an
opportunity to hear what is urged upon him, and to interpose a defense, after which follows an
adjudication of the rights of the parties - In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs'
motion for execution and of the date when the same would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the
surety's counsel was present in court when the motion was called, and it was upon his request that the
court a quo gave him a period of four days within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that period to
lapse without filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was
deprived of its day in court.

The orders appealed from are affirmed.

Antiporda vs Garchitorena
Facts:
· Municipal Mayor Antiporda and others were charged with the crime of kidnapping one Elmer
Ramos. It was filed with the First Division of the Sandiganbayan. The Information reads as follows:
“That on September 1, 1995, in Sanchez Mira, Cagayan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused Eliterio Rubiaco, Caesar Talla, Vicente Gascon and Licerio Antiporda, Jr…did
then and there… kidnap Elmer Ramos from his residence in Marzan, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan against
his will with the use of a Maroon Tamaraw FX motor vehicle…“

· Sandiganbaya ordered the prosecution to submit an amendment to the Information:

[Sandiganbayan] expressed anxiety as to the Court's jurisdiction over the case considering that it
was not clear whether or not the subject matter of the accusation was office related.

For this purpose, Prosecutor Agcaoili is given 30 days to submit the amendment embodying whatever
changes necessary in order for the Information to effectively describe the offense herein charged…

· The prosecution filed an Amended Information:

“That on September 10, 1997, at Sanchez Mira, Cagayan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused Licerio Antiporda, Jr., being the Municipal Mayor of Buguey, Cagayan in the exercise
of his official duties as such and taking advantage of his position, ordered, confederated and conspired
with Juan Gallardo, Barangay Captain of San Lorenzo, Buguey, Cagayan (now deceased) and
accused Eliterio Rubiaco, barangay councilman of San Lorenzo, Buguey, Cagayan, Vicente Gascon and
Caesar Talla… kidnap and abduct the victim Elmer Ramos… and detain him illegally at the residence of
Antiporda for more than five (5) days.”

· Accused then filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that a reinvestigation of the case be
conducted and the issuance of warrants of arrest be deferred.

· Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto denied the Omnibus Motion.

· The accused filed a Motion for New Preliminary Investigation and to Hold in Abeyance and/or
Recall Warrant of Arrest Issued which was also denied "on the ground that there was nothing in the
Amended Information that was added… so that the accused could not claim a right to be heard
separately in an investigation in the Amended Information.
· Also, the Court ruled that "since none of the accused have submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the Court, the accused are not in a position to be heard on this matter at this time"

· The accused filed a Motion to Quash the Amended Information for lack of jurisdiction over the
offense charged.

· Sandiganbayan ignored the Motion to Quash since the accused have continually refused to
submit themselves to the jurisdiction of this Court.

· A MR was filed wherein it was alleged that the filing of the Motion to Quash and the appearance
of their counsel during the scheduled hearing amounted to their voluntary appearance and invested the
court with jurisdiction over their persons.

· Sandiganbayan denied the MR.

Issues:

Can the Sandiganbayan, which has no jurisdiction as charged in the original complaint, acquire
jurisdiction through the amendment of Information? NO, petitioners barred by estoppel.

Sandiganbayan Jurisdiction
· Sec. 4, par (a) of P.D. 1606, as amended by P.D. 1861:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office…
· Criminal Jurisdiction Requisites:
(1) the offense is one which the court is by law authorized to take cognizance of (SUBJECT MATTER)
(2) the offense must have been committed within its territorial jurisdiction (VENUE OR TERRITORY)
(3) the person charged with the offense must have been brought in to its forum for trial (PERSON OF
THE ACCUSED)
a) forcibly by warrant of arrest
b) or upon his voluntary submission to the court.

PERSON OF THE ACCUSED

· Petitioners:
o Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction since the original information did not allege that one of the
petitioners, took advantage of his position as mayor.
o Court lacking jurisdiction cannot order the amendment of the information.
· Court:
o They cannot question the assumption of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan because they insist that
said court acquired jurisdiction over their motion to quash.

SUBJECT MATTER
WON the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the offense charged?

· NO. The original Information did not mention that the offense committed by the accused is office-
related.
· BUT, the petitioners are estopped for in the MR filed with the Sandiganbayan, it was they
who "challenged the jurisdiction of the RTC over the case and clearly stated in their MR that the said
crime is work connected.
· A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent,
and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
· Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case because of estoppel and it was thus vested with the
authority to order the amendment of the Information.

Can the amended information be allowed without conducting anew a preliminary investigation
for the graver offense charged therein?

· Reinvestigation is not necessary anymore. It is proper only if the accused's substantial rights
would be impaired. The amendments merely describe the public positions and where the victim was
brought when he was kidnapped.
· A preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and
but determines only whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty.

· The purpose of a preliminary investigation has been achieved already and we see no cogent nor
compelling reason why a reinvestigation should still be conducted.

Miranda et al. v. Tuliao, G.R. No. 158763, March 31, 2006

Crim Pro - Jurisdiction
Facts:
On March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon, Isabela which were later identified as
the bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of the private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now
under the witness protection program.

Two Informations for murder were filed against 5 police officers including SPO2 Maderal in the RTC of
Santiago City. The venue was later transferred to the RTC of Manila. The RTC convicted the accused
and sentenced them two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be
arraigned at that time being at large. Upon automatic review, the SC acquitted the accused on the
ground of reasonable doubt.

In Sept. 1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn confession and identified the petitioners as
the ones responsible for the death of the victims, so, Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against
the petitioners. Acting Presiding Judge Tumaliuan issued a warrant of arrest against the petitioners and
SPO2 Maderal.

Then, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and
to recall or quash the warrant of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent motion, Judge Tumaliuan noted the
absence of the petitioners and issued a Joint order denying the urgent motion on the ground that since
the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the
court.

Issues: Whether or not an accused can seek judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the
jurisdiction of the court.

Whether or not a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.

Held. No, one who seeks affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the Jurisdiction of the Court.
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.

Citing Santiago v. Vasquez, there is a distinction between the custody of the law and jurisdiction over the
person. Custody of the law is required before the Court can act upon the application for bail, but is not
required for the adjudication of other relief sought by the dependant where by mere application, thereof,
constitutes a waiver of the defence of lack of jurisdiction over the person accused.

Delima vs Guerrero
Background
The Memorandum is the final submission of Senator Leila M. De Lima as petitioner in the case of De
Lima v. Judge Guerrero et. al. pending with the Supreme Court. The petition was filed by De Lima to
assail the issuance of a warrant of arrest against her by Judge Juanita Guerrero of the Regional Trial
Court of Muntinlupa, Branch 204 in the criminal case for Illegal Drug Trading filed by the government
after the resolution of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Department of Justice. After
hearing the case in oral arguments, the Supreme Court directed the parties to submit their
memorandum.

On Constitutional Violations
The weakness of the government case against De Lima is at once apparent because of the confusion of
the government on the nature and cause of the accusation against her. From consummated drug
trading, the charge against her was changed by the government to conspiracy to commit drug trading,
but without following the procedure in the substitution of the Information. The change was made
because the Information did not allege the dangerous drugs traded and the government does not have
these drugs in evidence. Evidence of the drugs is required in prosecutions for violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. The government theory is that evidence of the drugs is not necessary in proving
conspiracy to commit illegal drug trading. But even this theory is erroneous.

Because of this change in the government’ position, several constitutional violations were at once
committed even at the level of the Supreme Court proceedings alone. First, the change of the nature of
accusation against her without the proper substitution or amendment of the Information violates her
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. Second, De
Lima was therefore charged, arrested and detained for a crime that was not the one intended to be filed
against her. The government wants her tried for conspiracy to commit drug trading but the Information
filed against her was for consummated drug trading. She was therefore arrested for a crime that,
according to the government’s theory, was not the one that she committed. Third, from the very start,
she was already adjudged by the government to be guilty even before any fact-finding or preliminary
investigation was conducted against her, when she was publicly tried with prejudice by the House of
Representatives, and by no less than the President, his cabinet officials, and congressional allies in
public statements declaring her guilt.
All the constitutional violations and disregard of the law and procedure in the filing of cases against her,
as well as the orchestrated public statements of senior government officials attacking her, reveal a
pattern of political persecution, rather than legitimate prosecution.

On Jurisdiction
The position of Senator De Lima from the outset is that neither the DOJ nor the regular trial courts has
jurisdiction over her case, whether it be for illegal drug trading as charged by the DOJ in the Information,
or conspiracy to commit illegal drug trading as proposed by the Office of the Solicitor General in its
Comment to the Petition, or direct bribery, which De Lima thinks should be the proper charge given the
allegations in the Information. She maintains that being a public official with salary grade 31 at the time
of the alleged offenses, with said offenses having been allegedly committed using her power, authority
and position, the proper agencies that have jurisdiction over her case are the Ombudsman and the
Sandiganbayan.

The rationale for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan applies in De Lima’s case. The three-justice
system of the Sandiganbayan was envisioned as a safeguard to counter the political influence of
powerful public officials accused before it, or to check any element of political persecution against the
political enemies of incumbent authorities. The single-judge system of the regular judiciary is not
designed to fulfill this purpose of the Anti-Graft Court, and is therefore more prone to powerful and
irresistible political influences in its decision-making.

On top of this are the basic statutory conditions for the exercise of Sandiganbayan jurisdiction: public
officials with Salary Grade 27 and above charged with crimes committed in relation to their office. The
allegations against De Lima constitute an Information for direct bribery, not for drug trading, simply
because according to the statements in the Information itself, what she was interested in was the
delivery of money from whatever source, whether this came from the trading of illegal drugs or not.
Direct bribery committed by officials with Salary Grade 27 and above involving more than one million
pesos squarely falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

On Judge Guerrero’s abuse of discretion

Judge Guerrero committed grave abuse of discretion when she issued a warrant of arrest against De
Lima before ruling on the issue raised by De Lima questioning her jurisdiction. She violated the
Benchbook for Trial Court Judges, the officially-adopted bible for judges and the judiciary, which
provides in its Procedural Checklist that before issuing a warrant of arrest, any judge should first check if
she has jurisdiction over the case. Admittedly, Judge Guerrero issued a warrant of arrest first before
checking on her jurisdiction, upon the erroneous assumption that she has to order the arrest of De Lima
first before she can rule on issues raised against her jurisdiction.

Even without the Benchbook to remind judges of this procedure, basic substantive law and procedural
considerations put the primacy of jurisdiction over all other matters in criminal trials, because a court
that tries a case without jurisdiction cannot pass any valid judgment. The proceedings held before it will
always be null and void.

In a sense, Judge Guerrero was reckless in asserting her inexistent jurisdiction, when the first
consideration of a judge is to ascertain her jurisdiction because it affects her case load and most
importantly, the exercise of her power, ignorance of which can lead to the imposition of administrative
penalties against her. Rather than be cautious because of all the red flags on her jurisdiction already
raised by De Lima in her Motion to Quash, Judge Guerrero chose to ignore these red flags, contrary to
the tradition of judicial deliberation and mindfulness, especially in a case where the liberty of a person is
at stake.

Lastly, by issuing a warrant of arrest, Judge Guerrero found probable cause on the basis of the
testimonies and affidavits of convicted criminals who are disqualified by the Dangerous Drugs Act, the
WPP Law, and the Rules of Court from being discharged as State witnesses. Since these convicts
cannot be allowed by law to testify in court as witnesses for the State against De Lima, the government
basically has no case against her.

On Procedural Issues
De Lima claims that she did not violate the rules on the hierarchy of courts, exhaustion of judicial
remedies, and against forum-shopping in filing the petition. Direct recourse to the Supreme Court may
be allowed if the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, or where exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify the availing of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of the
Supreme Court’s certiorari jurisdiction.

According to De Lima, her petition is a matter of national interest and has serious implications. It
warrants a deviation from the rule on hierarchy of courts as it involves questions of first impression, the
answers to which will significantly impact the power of public institutions and the rights of citizens. The
petition also involves questions of law, the resolution of which will not only affect her but all citizens of
the country. It also warrants an exercise of the Supreme Court’s primary jurisdiction in the interest of
speedy justice and to avoid future litigation.

She also claims that her petition was properly notarized and fully complied with the substantial
requirements of notarization. According to De Lima, the Supreme Court has more substantive and
relevant issues to resolve than be bothered with such narrow, formalistic pettiness and legal nitpicking
on the proper accomplishment of her petition’s verification.

In the end, De Lima asked the Supreme Court to order her immediate release from detention.

Jadewell Parking vs Lidua

FACTS:
Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly authorized to
operate and manage the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It is also
authorized under Section 13 of the City Ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its
wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked.

Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru its General Manager Norma Tan and Jadewell
personnel Januario S. Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 17,
2003, the respondents Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe dismantled, took and carried
away the clamp attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure with Plate No. WRK 624
owned by Edwin Ang. Accordingly, the car was then illegally parked and unattended at a Loading and
Unloading Zone. The value of the clamp belonging to Jadewell which was allegedly forcibly removed
with a piece of metal is P26,250.00. The fines of P500.00 for illegal parking and the declamping fee of
P500.00 were also not paid by the respondents herein.

Jadewell filed two cases against respondents for Robbery it was filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Baguio City on May 23, 2003. A preliminary investigation took place on May 28, 2003.
Respondent Benedicto Balajadia likewise filed a case charging Jadewell president, Rogelio Tan, and
four (4) of Jadewell's employees with Usurpation of Authority/Grave Coercion.

On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City
dated July 25, 2003.

Respondent Benedicto Balajadia and the other accused through their counsel Paterno Aquino filed on
January 20, 2004 a Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation[8] on February 2, 2004.

In an Order[10] dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge Nelson F. Lidua, Sr., Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, granted the accused's Motion to Quash and dismissed
the cases. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27, 2004 responding to the
February 10, 2004 Order.

Respondents argued that in Zaldivia v. Reyes held that the proceedings mentioned in Section 2 of Act
No. 3326, as amended, refer to judicial proceedings. Thus, this Court, in Zaldivia, held that the filing of
the Complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor was not a judicial proceeding. The prescriptive
period commenced from the alleged date of the commission of the crime on May 7, 2003 and ended two
months after on July 7, 2003. Since the Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court on October
2, 2003, the respondent judge did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the cases.

The RTC of Baguio City, Branch 7 favored the respondents. In a Decision dated April 20, 2005, the RTC
of Baguio City Branch 7, through Judge Clarence F. Villanueva, dismissed the Petition for Certiorari.

Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Regional Trial
Court in an August 15, 2005 Order.

ISSUE:
Whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolled the
prescription period of the commission of the offense charged against respondents Balajadia, Ang, "John
Does," and "Peter Does."

HELD:
The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive law and the procedural rules
governing the prosecution of the offense. With regard to the prescription period, Act No. 3326, as
amended, is the only statute that provides for any prescriptive period for the violation of special laws and
municipal ordinances. No other special law provides any other prescriptive period, and the law does not
provide any other distinction. Petitioner may not argue that Act No. 3326 as amended does not apply.

In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo, this Court defined the parameters of prescription: In resolving the issue
of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1) the period of prescription
for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the
prescriptive period was interrupted.

With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two months for the offense
charged under City Ordinance 003-2000.

The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the petitioner on
the same day. These actions effectively commenced the running of the prescription period.

As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the
prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance. The respondent judge was
correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes. In Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal
ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal also featured similar facts and issues with the present case. In that case,
the offense was committed on May 11, 1990. The Complaint was received on May 30, 1990, and the
Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990.

Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed
directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both
parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary
investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in
court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the
running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on
any date before that.

Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of the Prosecutor who then
files the Information in court, this already has the effect of tolling the prescription period.

Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5, 2003, the period
had already prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not err when he ordered the
dismissal of the case against respondents. According to the Department of Justice National Prosecutors
Service Manual for Prosecutors, an Information is defined under Part I, Section 5 as: SEC. 5.
Information. - An information is the accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed
by the prosecutor, and filed with the court. The information need not be placed under oath by the
prosecutor signing the same.

Chiok vs People
Facts:
Chiok was charged with estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Code, in an Information that reads:

That sometime in June, 1995 in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received in trust from Rufina Chua the
amount of P9,563,900.00 for him to buy complainant shares of... stocks, under the express obligation on
the part of the accused to deliver the documents thereon or to return the whole amount if the purchase
did not materialize, but the accused once in possession of the said amount, far from complying will his
obligation as aforesaid, with... intent to defraud the complainant, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously misapply, misappropriate and convert lo his own personal use and benefit the said
amount of P9,563,900.00, and despite repeated demands failed and relused and still fails and refuses
to... return the said amount or to account for the same, to the damage and prejudice of the complainant
Rufina Chua in the aforementioned amount of P9,563,900.00.

According to the Prosecution, petitioner Rufina Chua (Chua) met Chiok in mid-1989, during which he
offered to be her investment adviser. Convinced by Chiok's representations and the fact that he is
Chinese, Chua made an initial investment of P200,000.00, allegedly to buy Meralco... and PLDT shares.
She rolled over the original investment and profits, and this went on until 1994. For each of their
transactions, Chua claimed she was not given any document evidencing every stock transaction and
that she only relied on the assurances of Chiok. In mid-1995, she... accepted his proposal to buy shares
in bulk in the amount of P9,563,900.00. Chua alleged that she deposited P7,100,000.00 to Chiok's Far
East Bank, Annapolis account on June 9, 1995 and delivered to him P2,463,900.00 in cash later that
same date at the Han Court Restaurant in Annapolis, Greenhills. As proof, she presented a deposit slip
dated June 9, 1995 of Chiok's Far Bast Bank Annapolis account. There was no receipt or memorandum
for the cash delivery

Chua narrated that she became suspicious when Chiok later on avoided her calls and when he failed to
show any document of the sale. He reassured her by giving her two interbank checks, Check No.
02030693 dated July 11, 1995 for P7,963,900.00 and Check No. 02030694 dated August 15, 1995 in
the amount of P1,600,000.00 (interbank checks). The interbank checks were given with the request to
deposit the first check only after 60-75 days to enable him to generate funds from the sale of a property
in Hong Kong. Both interbank checks were ultimately... dishonored upon presentment for payment due
to garnishment and insufficiency of funds. Despite Chua's pleas, Chiok did not return her money. Hence,
she referred the matter to her counsel who wrote a demand letter dated October 25, 1995. Chiok sent
her a letter-reply dated November 16, 1995 stating that the money was Chua's investment in their
unregistered partnership, and was duly invested with Yu Que Ngo. In the end, Chua decided to file her
complaint-affidavit against him in the Pasig Prosecutor's Office.

In his defense, Chiok denied that he enticed Chua to invest in the stock market, or offered her the
prospect of buying shares of stocks in bulk. Chiok maintained that from the time he met her in 1991 and
until 1995, he previously only had dollar transactions with Chua. It was in 1995 when both of them
decided to form an unregistered partnership. He admitted that the P7,963,900.00 she gave him before
she left for the United States was her investment in this unregistered partnership. Chua allegedly
instructed him to invest according to his best judgment... and asked him to issue a check in her name
for her peace of mind. Chiok denied having received the P2,463,900.00 in cash from her In a
Decision[16] dated December 3, 1998, the RTC convicted Chiok of the crime of estafa (RTC conviction)

On September 20, 1999, the CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction[28] enjoining the arrest of Chiok.
The CA ruled that Chiok... should not be deprived of liberty pending the resolution of his appeal because
the offense for which he was convicted is a non-capital offense, and that the probability of flight during
the pendency of his appeal is merely conjectural.

The CA found that the RTC conviction did not contain findings of fact on the prosecution's evidence but
merely recited the evidence of the prosecution as if such evidence was already proof of the ultimate
facts constituting estafa. Instead of relying on the strength of... the prosecution's evidence, the trial court
relied on the weakness of the defense

The OSG did not file a motion for reconsideration on the ground of double jeopardy. Chua, on the other
hand, filed a motion for reconsideration[39] on August 8, 2007. Chiok also filed his own motion for
reconsideration,[40] on the... civil liability imposed on him.

In a Resolution[41] dated October 3, 2007, the CA denied Chua's motion for reconsideration and its
supplement on the ground that acquittal is immediately final and the re-examination of the record of the
case would violate the guarantee against double... jeopardy. It also denied the motions tor
reconsideration of both parties on the civil aspect of the case.

Hence, these consolidated petitions questioning the CA acquittal by way of a petition for certiorari and
mandamus, and the civil aspect of the case by way of appeal by certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the case is an exception to the rule on finality of acquittal and the doctrine of double
jeopardy

Ruling:
II. The appeal from the judgment of acquittal will place Chiok in double jeopardy.
The 1987 Constitution, as well as its predecessors, guarantees the right of the accused against double
jeopardy.[53] Section 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 and 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure strictly adhere to
the constitutional proscription against double... jeopardy and provide for the requisites in order for
double jeopardy to attach. For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must concur: (1) a valid
information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged; (2) a court of
competent... jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was
convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent.[54]

In order to give life to the rule on double jeopardy, our rules on criminal proceedings require that a
judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable, and
immediately executory upon its promulgation.[55]

This is referred to as the "finality-of-acquittal" rule. The rationale for the rule was explained in People v.
Velasco:[56]

The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into "the
humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought in
unequal contest with the State, x x x." Thus, Green... expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea,
one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State
with sill its resources and power should not be allowed to make repealed attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged... offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility
that even though innocent, he may be found guilty."
Principles:
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to
the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this
rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of... the paramount importance criminal justice
system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction." The interest in the
finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need
for "repose," a desire... to know the exact extent of one's liability. With this right of repose, the criminal
justice system has built in a protection lo insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests
upon a jury's leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.

Related to his right of repose is the defendant's interest in his right to have his trial completed by a
particular tribunal. This interest encompasses his right to have his guilt or innocence determined in a
single proceeding by the initial jury empanelled to try him, for... society's awareness of the heavy
personal strain which the criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the
willingness to limit Government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in
enforcement of criminal laws. The... ultimate goal is prevention of government oppression; the goal finds
its voice in the finality of the initial proceeding. As observed in Lockhart v. Nelson, "(t)he fundamental
tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State should not be able to oppress...
individuals through the abuse of the criminal process." Because the innocence of the accused has been
confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be
unfair.

Enrile vs People
Facts:
Year 2014, Sen. Enrile was charged with plunder before the Sandiganbayan for their alleged
involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriation under the PDAF. When his warrant was
issued, Sen. Enrile voluntarily surrendered to the CIDG and was later confined and detained at the PNP
General Hospital, he then filed a motion to fix bail where he argued that:
He should be allowed to post bail as a matter of right;

Although charged with plunder his penalty would only be reclusion temporal considering that there are
two mitigating circumstances, his voluntary surrender and that he is already at the age of 90;

That he is not a flight risk and his medical condition must be seriously considered.

The Sandiganbayan however, denied his motion on the grounds that:

He is charged with a capital offense;
That it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of his bail because the prosecution have not yet
presented its evidences.
Sen. Enrile then filed a certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction for denying his motion to fix bail?

Ruling:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail and
unwarrantedly disregarded Sen. Enrile’s fragile health and advanced age. Bail is a matter right and is
safeguarded by the constitution, its purpose is to ensure the personal appearance of the accused during
trial or whenever the court requires and at the same time recognizing the guarantee of due process
which is the presumption of his innocence until proven guilty. The Supreme Court further explained that
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged should be allowed
independently of the merits charged, provided his continued incarceration is injurious to his health and
endanger his life. Hence, the Sandiganbayan failed to observe that if Sen. Enrile be granted the right to
bail it will enable him to have his medical condition be properly addressed and attended, which will then
enable him to attend trial therefore achieving the true purpose of bail.

PEOPLE VS. JUGUETA

2016
FACTS:
Ireneo Jugueta y Flores (appellant) was accused, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel,
of using firearms to shoot on the house occupied by the family of Norberto Divina. Two of the children of
Norberto, namely, Mary Grace (13 years old) and Claudine (3 1/2 years old), died from gunshot wounds.
Norberto Divina, his wife Maricel Divina and children Elizabeth and Judy Ann Divina, both minors, were
not hit.

Appellant Jugueta was charged with the Double Murder of Mary Grace Divina and Claudine Divina, both
minors. The crime was alleged to have been committed with treachery, evident premeditation, in the
dwelling of the offended party, and the accused taking advantage of nighttime to facilitate the
commission of the offense. He was also charged, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel,
with Multiple Attempted Murder, for the shooting attack on the other family members of Norberto Divina,
who fortunately, were not hit.

ISSUE:
1. Whether appellant and other accused are co-conspirators.

2. Whether complex crime under Article 48 of RPC exists in this case.

3. Whether the aggravating circumstance of dwelling must be appreciated.

RULING:
1. Yes. Appellant and the two other malefactors are equally responsible for the death of Norberto's
daughters because they clearly conspired to kill Norberto's family. Conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement regarding the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of a
prior meeting between the perpetrators to discuss the commission of the crime is not necessary as long
as their concerted acts reveal a common design and unity of purpose. In such case, the act of one is the
act of all. Here, the three men undoubtedly acted in concert as they went to the house of Norberto
together, each with his own firearm. It is, therefore, no longer necessary to identify and prove that it is
the bullet particularly fired from appellant's firearm that killed the children.

2. A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is
the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shot, such acts constitute separate and
distinct crimes.
Appellant and the two others, in firing successive and indiscriminate shots at the family of Norberto from
their respective firearms, intended to kill not only Norberto, but his entire family. When several gunmen,
as in this case, indiscriminately fire a series of shots at a group of people, it shows their intention to kill
several individuals. Hence, they are committing not only one crime. What appellant and his cohorts
committed cannot be classified as a complex crime because as held in People v. Nelmida, " each act by
each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each particular moment at different
persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to a complex crime.”

Yes. The Court notes that both the trial court and the CA failed to take into account dwelling as an
ordinary, aggravating circumstance, despite the fact that the Informations contain sufficient allegations to
that effect.

It has been held that dwelling is aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy which the law accords to
human abode. He who goes to another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who
offends him elsewhere." Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of
the offended party provided that the latter has not given provocation therefor. The testimony of Norberto
established the fact that the group of appellant violated the victims' home by destroying the same and
attacking his entire family therein, without provocation on the part of the latter. Hence, the trial court
should have appreciated dwelling as an ordinary aggravating circumstance.

Art. 8. Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony –

Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are punishable only in the cases in which the law specially
provides a penalty therefor.

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it.

CRIMPRO TOPIC:
However, the Court must make a clarification as to the nomenclature used by the trial court to identify
the crimes for which appellant was penalized. There is some confusion caused by the trial court's use of
the terms "Double Murder" and "Multiple Attempted Murder" in convicting appellant, and yet imposing
penalties which nevertheless show that the trial court meant to penalize appellant for two (2) separate
counts of Murder and four (4) counts of Attempted Murder.

The facts, as alleged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 7698-G, and as proven during trial, show
that appellant is guilty of 2 counts of the crime of Murder and not Double Murder, as the killing of the
victims was not the result of a single act but of several acts of appellant and his cohorts. In the same
vein, appellant is also guilty of 4 counts of the crime of Attempted Murder and not Multiple Attempted
Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G. It bears stressing that the Informations in this case failed to
comply with the requirement in Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court that an information
must charge only one offense.

As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is
defective. The reason for the rule is stated in People of the Philippines and AAA v. Court of Appeals,
21st Division, Mindanao Station, et al.,[30] thus:

The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give the accused
the necessary knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his
defense. The State should not heap upon the accused two or more charges which might confuse him in
his defense. Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or
information under Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in
a motion to quash before he enters his plea, otherwise, the defect is deemed waived.

However, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment and failed to move for the
quashal of the Informations, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the same. Section 9 of
Rule 117 provides that "[t]he failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he
pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to
allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the
grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule."

It is also well-settled that when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information
but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are
charged and proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for each offense.[31] Appellant can
therefore be held liable for all the crimes alleged in the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and
7702-G, i.e., 2 counts of murder and 4 counts of attempted murder, respectively, and proven during trial.

Meanwhile, in People v. Nelmida,[32] the Court explained the concept of a complex crime as defined in
Article 48[33] of the Revised Penal Code, thus:

In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes of the law and in
the conscience of the offender they constitute only one crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed. There
are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known as a compound crime, or when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies while the other is known as a complex crime proper,
or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The classic example of the first kind
is when a single bullet results in the death of two or more persons. A different rule governs where
separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various
victims expire from separate shot, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.[34]

Here, the facts surrounding the shooting incident clearly show that appellant and the two others, in firing
successive and indiscriminate shots at the family of Norberto from their respective firearms, intended to
kill not only Norberto, but his entire family. When several gunmen, as in this case, indiscriminately fire a
series of shots at a group of people, it shows their intention to kill several individuals. Hence, they are
committing not only one crime. What appellant and his cohorts committed cannot be classified as a
complex crime because as held in People v. Nelmida,[35] "each act by each gunman pulling the trigger
of their respective firearms, aiming each particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and
individual acts which cannot give rise to a complex crime."[36]

Furthermore, the Court notes that both the trial court and the CA failed to take into account dwelling as
an ordinary, aggravating circumstance, despite the fact that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos.
7698-G and 7702-G contain sufficient allegations to that effect, to wit:

Criminal Case No. 7698-G for Double Murder:

That the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given provocation for
the attack and the accused took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense.[37]

Criminal Case No. 7702-G for Multiple Attempted Murder:

xxx the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, armed with short firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery,
with evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the said firearms the house occupied by the family of
Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the commission of the crime of Murder, directly by overt acts, but
did not perform all the acts of execution which would have produced it by reason of some cause or
accident other than the spontaneous desistance of the accused x x x[38]

In People v. Agcanas,[39] the Court stressed that "[i]t has been held in a long line of cases that dwelling
is aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy which the law accords to human abode. He who goes
to another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere."
Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party
provided that the latter has not given provocation therefor.[40] The testimony of Norberto established the
fact that the group of appellant violated the victims' home by destroying the same and attacking his
entire family therein, without provocation on the part of the latter. Hence, the trial court should have
appreciated dwelling as an ordinary aggravating circumstance.
In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify the penalties
imposed on appellant. Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, thus, with an ordinary
aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the imposable penalty is death for each of two (2) counts of
murder.[41] However, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, proscribing the imposition of the death
penalty, the penalty to be imposed on appellant should be reclusion perpetua for each of the two (2)
counts of murder without eligibility for parole. With regard to the four (4) counts of attempted murder, the
penalty prescribed for each count is prision mayor. With one ordinary aggravating circumstance, the
penalty should be imposed in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum penalty should be from ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor,
while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional, in any
of its periods, or anywhere from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. This Court finds it apt to
impose on appellant the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, for
each of the four (4) counts of attempted murder.

Leviste vs Alameda
Facts:
On January 16, 2007, an Information was filed against Jose Antonio Leviste charging him with homicide
for the death of Rafael de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the RTC of Makati. The private
complainants-heirs of de las Alas filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying for the deferment of the
proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct a
reinvestigation to determine the proper offense. The RTC thereafter issued the Order granting the
motion by the complainants, thus, allowing the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation. Later, the trial
court issued the other order that admitted the Amended Information for murder and directed the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioner questioned these two orders before the appellate court.

Upon arraignment, the petitioner refused to plead. The trial court entered the plea of "not guilty" for him.
Prior to this, the petitioner filed an Urgent Application for Admission to Bail Ex Abundanti Cautela, which
the trial court granted on the ground that the evidence of guilt of the crime of murder is not strong. The
trial court went on to try the petitioner under the Amended Information. Then, the trial court found the
petitioner guilty of homicide. From the trial court's decision, the petitioner filed an appeal to the CA. The
appellate court confirmed the decision of the trial court. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied. Hence, this petition to the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is considered a
substantial amendment, which would make it not just a right but a duty of the prosecution to ask for a
preliminary investigation.

Held: Yes. A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The test as to whether
a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the information as it originally
stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might
have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other.

An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does
not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet
the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance. here is no substantial
distinction between a preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation since both are conducted in the
same manner and for the same objective of determining whether there exists sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial.

What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the charge of murder
after the claimed circumstances were made known to him as early as the first motion. Petitioner did not,
however, make much of the opportunity to present countervailing evidence on the proposed amended
charge. Despite notice of hearing, petitioner opted to merely observe the proceedings and declined to
actively participate, even with extreme caution, in the reinvestigation.

Liong vs Lee
Facts:
Petitioner Lee Pue Liong, a.k.a. Paul Lee, is the President of Centillion Holdings, Inc. (CHI), a company
affiliated with the CKC Group of Companies (CKC Group) which includes the pioneer company
Clothman Knitting Corporation (CKC). The CKC Group is the subject of intra-corporate disputes
between petitioner and his siblings, including herein respondent Chua Pue Chin Lee, a majority
stockholder and Treasurer of CHI.
On July 19, 1999, petitioner's siblings including respondent and some unidentified persons took over
and barricaded themselves inside the premises of a factory owned by CKC. Petitioner and other factory
employees were unable to enter the factory premises. This incident led to... the filing of Criminal Case
against , Andy Lee, Chua Kipsi a.k.a. Jensen Chua and respondent, which are now pending in different
courts in Valenzuela City.[7]...

In June 14, 1999, petitioner on behalf of CHI (as per the Secretary's Certificate[8] issued by Virginia Lee
on even date) caused the filing of a verified Petition[9] for the Issuance of an Owner's Duplicate Copy of
Transfer Certificate... of Title which covers a property owned by CHI. The case was docketed as LRC
Record No. 4004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 4. Petitioner submitted before the
said court an Affidavit of Loss[11]... stating that: (1) by virtue of his position as President of CHI, he had
in his custody and possession the owner's duplicate copy of TCT issued by the Register of Deeds for
Manila; (2) that said owner's copy of TCT was inadvertently lost or misplaced from... his files and he
discovered such loss in May 1999; (3) he exerted diligent efforts in locating the said title but it had not
been found and is already beyond recovery; and (4) said title had not been the subject of mortgage or
used as collateral for the payment of any obligation... with any person, credit or banking institution.
Petitioner likewise testified in support of the foregoing averments during an ex-parte proceeding.

In its Order[12] dated September 17, 1999, the RTC granted the petition and directed the Register of
Deeds of Manila to issue a new Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 232238 in lieu of the lost one.

Respondent, joined by her brother Nixon Lee, filed an Omnibus Motion praying, among others, that the
September 17, 1999 Order be set aside claiming that petitioner knew fully well that respondent was in
possession of the said Owner's Duplicate Copy, the latter being the Corporate Treasurer and custodian
of vital documents of CHI. Respondent added that petitioner merely needs to have another copy of the
title because he planned to mortgage the same with the Planters Development Bank. Respondent even
produced the Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 232238 in open court. Thus, on November 12, 1999,
the RTC recalled and set aside its September 17, 1999 Order.[13]

Before this Court is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, seeking the reversal of the May 31, 2007 Decision2 and the January 31, 2008
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 81510. The CA affirmed the Orders4 dated
August 15, 2003 and November 5, 2003 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila denying (a)
the Omnibus Motion5 for the exclusion of a private prosecutor in the two criminal cases for
perjury pending before the MeTC, and (b) the Motion for Reconsideration6 of the said order denying the
Omnibus Motion, respectively.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

I

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR

WHEN IT UPHELD THE RESOLUTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT THAT THERE IS A
PRIVATE OFFENDED PARTY IN THE CRIME OF PERJURY, A CRIME AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST;

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD THE
RESOLUTIONS OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH IN TURN UPHELD THE RIGHT OF RESPONDENT,
AN ALLEGED STOCKHOLDER OF CHI, TO INTERVENE IN THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR PERJURY AS
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT ON BEHALF OF THE CORPORATION WITHOUT ITS AUTHORITY.36

Petitioner claims that the crime of perjury, a crime against public interest, does not offend any private
party but is a crime which only offends the public interest in the fair and orderly administration of laws.
He opines that perjury is a felony where no civil liability arises on the part of the offender because there
are no damages to be compensated and that there is no private person injured by the crime.

Petitioner argues that the CA’s invocation of our pronouncement in Lim Tek Goan, cited by Justice
Regalado in his book, is inaccurate since the private offended party must have a civil interest in the
criminal case in order to intervene through a private prosecutor. Dissecting Lim Tek Goan, petitioner
points out that said case involved the crime of grave threats where Lim Tek Goan himself was one of the
offended parties. Thus, even if the crime of grave threats did not have any civil liability to be satisfied,
petitioner claims that Lim Tek Goan, as a matter of right, may still intervene because he was one of the
offended parties.

Petitioner submits that the MeTC erred in allowing the private prosecutor to represent respondent in this
case despite the fact that the latter was not the offended party and did not suffer any damage as she
herself did not allege nor claim in her Complaint-Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit that she or CHI
suffered any damage that may be satisfied through restitution,37 reparation for the damage
caused38 and indemnification for consequential damages.39 Lastly, petitioner asserts that respondent
is not the proper offended party that may intervene in this case as she was not authorized by CHI. Thus,
he prayed, among others, that Atty. Macam or any private prosecutor for that matter be excluded from
the prosecution of the criminal cases, and that all proceedings undertaken wherein Atty. Macam
intervened be set aside and that the same be taken anew by the public prosecutor alone.40

On the other hand, respondent counters that the presence and intervention of the private prosecutor in
the perjury cases are not prohibited by the rules, stressing that she is, in fact, an aggrieved party, being
a stockholder, an officer and the treasurer of CHI and the private complainant. Thus, she submits that
pursuant to our ruling in Lim Tek Goan she has the right to intervene even if no civil liability exists in this
case.41

The petition has no merit.

Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that
"[e]very person criminally liable x x x is also civilly liable."42 Underlying this legal principle is the
traditional theory that when a person commits a crime, he offends two entities, namely (1) the society in
which he lives in or the political entity, called the State, whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual
member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or
damaged by the same punishable act or omission.43

Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.—(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with
the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

For the recovery of civil liability in the criminal action, the appearance of a private prosecutor is allowed
under Section 16 of Rule 110:

SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action.—Where the civil action for recovery of civil
liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by
counsel in the prosecution of the offense. (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 12, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, defines an offended
party as "the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed." In Garcia v.
Court of Appeals,44 this Court rejected petitioner’s theory that it is only the State which is the offended
party in public offenses like bigamy. We explained that from the language of Section 12, Rule 10 of the
Rules of Court, it is reasonable to assume that the offended party in the commission of a crime, public
or private, is the party to whom the offender is civilly liable, and therefore the private individual to whom
the offender is civilly liable is the offended party.

In Ramiscal, Jr. v. Hon. Sandiganbayan,45 we also held that:

Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may also be
a private individual whose person, right, house, liberty or property was actually or directly injured by the
same punishable act or omission of the accused, or that corporate entity which is damaged or injured by
the delictual acts complained of. Such party must be one who has a legal right; a substantial interest in
the subject matter of the action as will entitle him to recourse under the substantive law, to recourse if
the evidence is sufficient or that he has the legal right to the demand and the accused will be protected
by the satisfaction of his civil liabilities. Such interest must not be a mere expectancy, subordinate or
inconsequential. The interest of the party must be personal; and not one based on a desire to vindicate
the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party.46 (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, the statement of petitioner regarding his custody of TCT No. 232238 covering CHI’s
property and its loss through inadvertence, if found to be perjured is, without doubt, injurious to
respondent’s personal credibility and reputation insofar as her faithful performance of the duties and
responsibilities of a Board Member and Treasurer of CHI. The potential injury to the corporation itself is
likewise undeniable as the court-ordered issuance of a new owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 232238 was
only averted by respondent’s timely discovery of the case filed by petitioner in the RTC.

Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case being tried in the MeTC,
this Court declared in the early case of Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco,47 cited by both MeTC and CA, that
whether public or private crimes are involved, it is erroneous for the trial court to consider the
intervention of the offended party by counsel as merely a matter of tolerance. Thus, where the private
prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings, that right must be respected. The right
reserved by the Rules to the offended party is that of intervening for the sole purpose of enforcing the
civil liability born of the criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused. Such intervention,
moreover, is always subject to the direction and control of the public prosecutor.48

In Chua v. Court of Appeals,49 as a result of the complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent who is
also the corporation’s Treasurer, four counts of falsification of public documents (Minutes of Annual
Stockholder’s Meeting) was instituted by the City Prosecutor against petitioner and his wife. After private
respondent’s testimony was heard during the trial, petitioner moved to exclude her counsels as private
prosecutors on the ground that she failed to allege and prove any civil liability in the case. The MeTC
granted the motion and ordered the exclusion of said private prosecutors. On certiorari to the RTC, said
court reversed the MeTC and ordered the latter to allow the private prosecutors in the prosecution of the
civil aspect of the criminal case. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA which dismissed his
petition and affirmed the assailed RTC ruling.

When the case was elevated to this Court, we sustained the CA in allowing the private prosecutors to
actively participate in the trial of the criminal case. Thus:

Petitioner cites the case of Tan, Jr. v. Gallardo, holding that where from the nature of the offense or
where the law defining and punishing the offense charged does not provide for an indemnity, the
offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of the offense.

Petitioner’s contention lacks merit. Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the
fundamental postulate that every man criminally liable is also civilly liable. When a person commits a
crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the
State whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of the society whose person, right,
honor, chastity or property has been actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act
or omission. An act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability
not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Additionally, what gives
rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the
damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, whether done intentionally or
negligently. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty
imposed by law for the commission of the crime. The civil action involves the civil liability arising from
the offense charged which includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for
consequential damages.

Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action
pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.
Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, "[w]hen a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless
the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action."

Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to institute it separately,
nor institute the civil action for damages arising from the offense charged. Thus, we find that the private
prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the criminal action.

Petitioner avers, however, that respondent’s testimony in the inferior court did not establish nor prove
any damages personally sustained by her as a result of petitioner’s alleged acts of falsification.
Petitioner adds that since no personal damages were proven therein, then the participation of her
counsel as private prosecutors, who were supposed to pursue the civil aspect of a criminal case, is not
necessary and is without basis.

When the civil action is instituted with the criminal action, evidence should be taken of the damages
claimed and the court should determine who are the persons entitled to such indemnity. The civil liability
arising from the crime may be determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended party does not
waive to have it adjudged or does not reserve the right to institute a separate civil action against the
defendant. Accordingly, if there is no waiver or reservation of civil liability, evidence should be allowed to
establish the extent of injuries suffered.

In the case before us, there was neither a waiver nor a reservation made; nor did the offended party
institute a separate civil action. It follows that evidence should be allowed in the criminal proceedings to
establish the civil liability arising from the offense committed, and the private offended party has the right
to intervene through the private prosecutors.50 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)

In the light of the foregoing, we hold that the CA did not err in holding that the MeTC committed no grave
abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion to exclude Atty. Macam as private prosecutor in
Crim. Case Nos. 352270-71 CR.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated May 31, 2007 and
the Resolution dated January 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81510 are hereby
AFFIRMED and UPHELD

Amado vs Pamular
MAYOR AMADO CORPUS, petitioner vs. PAMULAR, defendant.
G.R. No. 186403. September 5, 2018.
TOPIC: Amendment or Substitution

FACTS:
Angelito Espinosa (Angelito) was shot by Carlito Samonte (Samonte) at Corpuz Street, Cuyapo, Nueva
Ecija on June 4, 2008, causing his death. Samonte was caught in flagrante delicto and thereafter was
arrested. After the inquest proceedings, an Information for murder was filed against him.

Upon arraignment, Samonte admitted the killing but pleaded self-defense.

Priscilla Alcantara-Espinosa (Priscilla), wife of the deceased, filed a complaint-affidavit before First
Assistant Prosecutor Floro F. Florendo (Florendo). Other affidavits of witnesses were also filed, one of
which was that of witness Alexander Lozano (Lozano) stating that Mayor Amado Corpus (Corpus) was
the one who instructed Samonte to kill Angelito

RTC dismissed Priscilla’s complaint and the attached affidavits of witness. Priscilla filed a motion for
reconsideration. Florendo reconsidered and set aside the Information/Resolution, and also instructed
Assistant Public Prosecutor Edwin Bonifacio (Bonifacio) to conduct the review.

Bonifacio was not able to comply with the directive to personally submit his resolution, prompting
Florendo to order him to surrender the records of the case. Florendo took over the the resolution of the
case based on the evidence presented by the parties.

Florendo then found probable cause to indict Corpus for Angelito’s murder. He directed the filing of an
AMENDED INFORMATION before the RTC, now alleging conspiracy between Corpus and Samonte in
committing the crime of murder.

Corpus and Samonte opposed this Motion by filing a Joint Urgent Manifestation/Opposition.

Judge Ramon Pamular of the RTC of Nueva Ecija issued an Order (assailed order) granting the motion
to amend the information and to admit the attached amended information, and also directed the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against Corpus.

Corpus and Samonte then filed directly to the Court a Petition for Certiorai with a prayer for an
immediate issuance of a TRO. Priscilla prayed that such TRO be lifted.

a) Petitioner’s Arguments (Corpus & Samonte – Lost)

Petitioners claim that due to the theory of conspiracy in the amended information, Samonte will have an
additional burden of setting up a new defense particularly on any acts of his co-accused since the “act of
one is the act of all.” They cited Rule 110, Section 14 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which
prohibits substantial amendment of information that is prejudicial to the rights of the accused after his or
her arraignment.

Petitioners claim that lifting the TRO would be a relief “too harsh and preposterous” since Corpus would
be immediately imprisoned and constrained to face trial due to a flawed amended information – he
would not be able to discharge his constitutional mandate/duty to his constituents as their duly elected
mayor.

Petitioners claim that respondent Judge should have suspended the action on the issuance of a warrant
considering that pendency of their Petition for Review before the DOJ.

b) Respondent’s Argument’s (Pamular- Won)

Pamular asserts that he made a careful perusal of the case records in issuing the assailed order. His
independent judgement on the existence of probable cause was derived from his reading and evaluation
of pertinent documents and evidence. There was a reasonable ground to believe in the existence of
probable cause for…the immediate apprehension and prosecution of Mayor Corpus.
OSG also adds that the insertion of the phrase “conspiring and confederating together’ in the amended
information will not affect Samonte’s substantial rights because conspiracy is not an essential or
qualifying element of the crime of murder.

The amended information merely added Corpus as a co-conspirator. Before respondent Judge issued
the assailed order, a prior hearing was held.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Judge Pamular committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when he allegedly admitted the Amended Information which proscribes substantial
amendment or information prejudicial to the right of the accused.

Whether or not respondent Judge Pamular committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when he conducted further proceedings on the Amended Information and
consequently issued a warrant of arrest against Corpus.

FINDINGS OF THE Lower Court:

RTC granted the motion to amend the information and admitted the attached amended information, and
also directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Corpus.

FINDINGS OF THE Court of Appeals:

N/A

RULING: (of the Supreme Court)

The petition for certiorari is partially granted. The case was remanded to the RTC for its preliminary
examination of probable cause and thereafter proceed to the arraignment of petition Amado Corpus.

Rule:

Rule 110, Section 14 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Prcedure provides:

Section 14: Amendment or substitution. –- A complaint or information may be amended, in

form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After
the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when
it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

Any amendment to an information which only states with precision something which has already been
included in the original information, and therefore, adds nothing crucial for conviction of the crime
charged is only a formal amendment that can be made any time. It does not alter the nature of the
crime, affect the essence of the offense, surprise, or divest the accused of an opportunity to meet the
new accusation.

The following are mere formal amendments:

(1) New allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose
in the event of conviction;
(2) An amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that
charged in the original one;
(3) Additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution’s theory of the case as to cause
surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and
(4) An amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused.

Application:

Once the accused is arraigned and enters his or her plea, Section 14 prohibits any substantial
amendment especially those that may prejudice his or her rights. One of these rights includes the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
or her, which is given life during arraignment.

There can be no substantial amendment after plea because it is expected that the accused
will collate his or her defenses based on the contents of the information.

In this case, since only petitioner Samonte has been arraigned, only he can invoke the above
rule. Petitioner Corpus cannot invoke this argument because he has not yet been arraigned.
 The facts alleged in the accusatory part of the amended information are similar to that of the
original information except as to the inclusion of Corpus as Samonte’s co-accused and the insertion of
the phrase “conspiring and confederating together.” The allegation of conspiracy does not alter the
basic theory of the prosecution that Samonte willfully and intentionally shot Angelito. Hence, the
amendment is merely formal.

However, it is undisputed that upon arraignment under the original information, Samonte admitted the
killing but pleaded self-defense. While conspiracy is merely a formal amendment, Samonte will be
prejudiced if the amendment will be allowed after his plea.

The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under
the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether
any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in
the other.

Applying the test, Samonte’s defense and corresponding evidence will not be compatible with the
allegation of conspiracy in the new information. Therefore, such formal amendment after plea is not
allowed.