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American Economic Association

Financial Decision-Making: Are Women Really More Risk-Averse?


Author(s): Renate Schubert, Martin Brown, Matthias Gysler and Hans Wolfgang
Brachinger
Source: The American Economic Review, Vol. 89, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the One
Hundred Eleventh Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May, 1999), pp.
381-385
Published by: American Economic Association
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/117140
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GENDER AND ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS

Financial Decision-Making: Are Women Really


More Risk-Averse?

By RENATE SCHUBERT, MARTIN BROWN, MATrHIAS GYSLER,


AND HANS WOLFGANG BRACHINGER *

A widespread view concerning financial Alexandra Bernasek, 1998; Annika E. Sunden


decision-making is that women are more risk- and Brian J. Surette, 1998). Also, when asked
averse than men. A consequence of this ste- about their attitudes toward financial risks,
reotype is statistical discrimination which women seem to report a lower risk propensity
diminishes the success of women in financial than men (Robert B. Barsky et al., 1997). Fi-
and labor markets. The perception that female nally, experimental evidence suggests that
managers are less risk-prone than men has women may be more risk-averse than men to-
been put forward as a major cause of "glass ward gambles (Irwin P. Levin et al., 1988).
ceilings" in corporate promotion ladders It is questionable, however, whether ste-
(Johnnie E. V. Johnson and Philip L. Powell, reotypic risk attitudes can be confirmed by the
1994). Women are less trusted than men to above survey and experimental evidence.
make the risky decisions that may be neces- First, in survey data, gender-specific risk atti-
sary for a firm's success. Anecdotal evidence tudes may be confounded with differences in
from financial markets suggests that similar individual opportunity sets. Survey studies of
stereotyping by investment brokers is possibly individual wealth composition provide only
to the disadvantage of female clients. Women weak control for gender-specific information on
are expected to be more conservative investors choice options and gender-specific wealth con-
than men and are consequently offered invest- straints in the underlying financial decisions.
ments with lower risks and therefore lower ex- Second, behavior in abstract gambling ex-
pected returns (Penelope Wang, 1994). periments may not correspond to risk behavior
Given that preconceptions concerning the in contextual decisions, as has been shown by
risk propensities of men and women seem to John Hershey and Paul J. H. Schoemaker
affect their economic success, it is important (1980). Thus, while abstract gambling exper-
to examine whether the above stereotype re- iments provide strong control of the economic
flects actual economic behavior. There is environment surrounding risky decisions, their
some evidence supporting the view that women data may not be adequate for drawing conclu-
are more risk-averse than men in financial sions on gender-specific risk attitudes of in-
decision-making. Recent survey data suggest vestors and managers.
that wealth holdings of single women are less The objective of the study reported here is
risky than those of single men of equal eco- to circumvent the above problems in analyzing
nomic status (Nancy Ammon Jianakoplos and gender-specific risk attitudes. We conducted
an experiment in which subjects not only made
abstract gambling decisions, but were also
* Schubert, Brown, and Gysler: Center for Economic confronted with financially motivated risky
Research, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, CH- decisions embedded in an investment or in-
8092 Zurich, Switzerland; Brachinger: Statistics Seminar, surance context. The implementation of such
University of Fribourg, CH-1700 Fribourg, Switzerland. contextual decisions allowed us to examine
We thank Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr, Simon Gachter, and
gender-specific risk propensities in contexts
Patrik Schellenbauer for helpful comments. Reto Bleisch,
Hannes Egli, and Michael St6ve provided excellent re- which may be relevant to financial and labor
search assistance. markets. At the same time, compared to survey
381

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382 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS MAY 1999

studies, the application of experimental meth- TABLE 1-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN


ods provided stronger control of the economic
environment in which decisions were made.' Treatment Subjects Decision frames

We elicited data which call into question the Contexta 36 males, 32 females investment
prevalence of stereotypic risk attitudes in fi- (gain domain)
insurance
nancial decision-making. First, we find that the
(loss domain)
comparative risk propensity of male and fe-
male subjects is strongly dependent on the fi- Abstractb 40 males, 33 females gain-gambling
(gain domain)
nancial decision setting. Second, and more
loss-gambling
important, we observe no gender differences (loss domain)
in risk propensity when subjects face contex-
tual decisions. Since in practice financial de- a Contextual frames.
cisions are always contextual, our results Abstract gambling frames.

suggest that the above gender stereotype may


not reflect true male and female attitudes to-
ward financial risks. ance decisions. Each investment and insurance
decision incorporated a choice between a risky
I. Gender-Specific Risk Behavior: An lottery and a certain payoff. With the series of
Experimental Design choices implemented in the two frames we
elicited our subjects' certainty equivalents for
Our experiment was designed to examine the same four risky lotteries (LI, L2, L3, L4)
gender-specific risk propensity in decisions in both contexts.:
relevant for investors and managers. Table 1 We implemented two frames in the context
gives an overview of the experimental design.2 treatment in order to measure the risk propen-
In the main treatment, we implemented risky sity of subjects toward both perceived gains
choices in the form of investment and insur- and perceived losses.4 In both frames, all pos
ance decisions. Choice behavior in this treat- sible payoffs for each decision were positive.
ment (henceforth called the context treatment) In the investment frame these payoffs were
directly measures the risk behavior of male also presented as gains, while in the insurance
and female subjects in contextual financial de- frame the same payoffs were presented as
cisions. We also ran a control treatment in losses relative to an initial endowment. There-
which the same risky choices were presented fore, elicited certainty equivalents in the in-
as abstract gambling decisions. This control vestment frame measure subjects' risk
treatment (henceforth called the abstract treat- propensities in the gain domain, while cer-
ment) allows us to validate the risk behavior tainty equivalents in the insurance frame mea-
induced by our experimental procedure in sure risk propensity in the loss domain. If, in
the light of the above-mentioned gambling contextual financial decisions, female subjects
evidence. are generally more risk-averse than men, our
In the context treatment, subjects were con- results should display, ceteris paribus, lower
fronted with risky choices in two different de- female certainty equivalents in both the in-
cision contexts. Subjects first had to complete vestment and insurance frames.
a series of investment decisions. They were
then presented with a series of identical
choices, this time, however, framed as insur-

'The four lotteries (LI, L2, L3, and L4) each had two
possible outcomes. Payoffs in Swiss francs (1 SFr =
$0.60) and their probabilities were (30 SFr, '/6; 10 SFr,
' Wealth effects from income differences outside the 5/6), (30 SFr, 1/2; 10 SFr, 1/2), (30 SFr, 5/6; 10 SFr, 1/6), and
laboratory may still affect risk behavior in our experiment. (50 SFr, 1/2; 20 SFr, I/2), respectively.
They are controlled for in our model. 4Experimental evidence suggests that individual risk
2Experimental instructions are available in German propensity will vary systematically between the gain and
from the authors or in English from our web page: loss domain (Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky,
(www.wif.ethz.ch/publikationen.htm). 1979).

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VOL. 89 NO. 2 GENDER AND ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS 383

In the abstract treatment we confronted a Context Treatment


different group of subjects with exactly the
same risky decisions as those in the main treat- 2 E Investment Insurance
ment. However, as mentioned before, all
choices in this control treatment were framed 1W
U-
as abstract gambling decisions. Again, two
frames were implemented. In the gain-
gambling and loss-gambling frames we mea-
-2
sured the risk attitudes of subjects toward
LI L2 L3 LA LI L2 L3 LA
gambles in the gain and loss domain,
respectively.
Subjects in both treatments were told in ad-
Abstract Treatment]
vance that one of their choices would deter-
mine their experimental earnings.5 Further, all 2 2 Gain-Gambling Loss-Gambling
subjects completed a post-experimental ques-
tionnaire which yielded information on each
subject's disposable income. This information
0 -1
is necessary to exclude wealth effects due to
income differences outside the laboratory as
-2
an explanation of gender-specific choice
LI L2 L3 L4 LI L2 L3 L4
behavior.
FIGURE 1. DIFFERENCES IN MEAN CERTAINTY
II. Results EQUIVALENTS (CE) BETWEEN MALE AND FEMALE
SUBJECTS, BY FRAME

A. Descriptive Evidence Note: Certainty equivalents (and male-female differ-


ences) are measured in Swiss francs.

Our experiment was conducted with under-


graduates from different fields at the Univer-
sity of Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute alents in the gain-gambling frame, while they
of Technology (ETH). Figure 1 displays the display more risk-seeking behavior in the loss-
data from the context and abstract treatments. gambling frame.
The differences between average male and fe-
male certainty equivalents are shown for all 13. Gender-Specific Risk Attitudes
four lotteries in each decision frame.
In Figure 1 positive differences between In the above results, gender differences in
mean certainty equivalents of male and female risk attitudes are possibly confounded with
subjects imply lower average female certainty wealth effects due to gender-specific income
equivalents and thus less risky female choice differences outside the laboratory. We there-
behavior. The figure shows that, in the context fore conducted a regression analysis to test for
treatment, female subjects did not generally significant gender differences in risk behavior
make less risky choices than male subjects. controlling for possible wealth effects. Sepa-
Average male and female certainty equivalents rate regressions were run for each frame in
do not display systematic differences in either both treatments. Individual certainty equiva-
the investment or the insurance frame. How- lents, being our measure of individual risk pro-
ever, the situation is completely different in pensity, were entered as the dependent
the abstract treatment. Here female subjects variable.
display systematically lower certainty equiv- The data in each decision frame represent
repeated measures since certainty equiva-
lents of each subject were elicited for four
different lotteries. Consequently, in order to
5 On average, subjects earned 38 SFr (roughly $24)
including a 10 SFr show-up fee. Earnings were paid in allow for differences in behavior over ran-
cash immediately after the experiment. domly selected subjects, a model with random

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384 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS MAY 1999

intercepts varying over individuals was esti- TABLE 2-GENDER-SPECIFIC RISK PROPENSITY,
mated by generalized least-squares (GLS) CONTROLLING FOR WEALTH EFFECTS

analysis.6 We further controlled for differ-


Context treatment Abstract treatment
ences in behavior over lotteries by entering
Independent Gain- Loss-
three lottery dummies "L2," "L3," and
variable Investment Insurance gambling gambling
"L4" in each regression.
Intercept 16.09* 17.00* 14.23* 14.89*
Gender differences in elicited certainty (0.65) (0.84) (0.57) (0.72)
equivalents were captured by the gender
Female -0.37 -0.73 -o.9g 1.32*
dummy "Female." The coefficient of Female (0.59) (0.78) (0.46) (0.6)
measures, for any lottery, the average rise in Income -0.74 -0.58 2.03* 1.30t
certainty equivalents from male to female sub- (0.5) (0.66) (0.59) (0.72)

jects. Finally, to control for wealth effects, L2 4.15* 4.8* 4.35* 4.8*
(0.42) (0.51) (0.41) (0.53)
"Income" (measuring disposable income per
L3 9.9* 10.45* 9.32* 8.73*
month in thousands of Swiss francs) was in-
(0.42) (0.50) (0.41) (0.53)
troduced as an explanatory variable.?
L4 18.66* 18.95* 18.75* 17.97*
The regression results for the context and (0.44) (0.50) (0.42) (0.53)
abstract treatments are reported in Table 2.
R2: 0.83 0.77 0.86 0.78
Our two main findings are the following: Number of
observations: 254 248 269 260

(i) As suggested by Figure 1, male and fe-


Notes: Not all certainty equivalents of each participant were sub-
male subjects do not differ in their risk jected to regression analysis due to missing decisions and income
propensities toward contextual decisions. statements (8.6 percent of the data were excluded). Standard errors
are reported in parentheses.
In both the investment and insurance Statistically significant at the 10-percent level.
frame the estimated coefficient for Fe- * Statistically significant at the 5-percent level.
male is not significant.8
(ii) In abstract gambling decisions, however,
gender differences in risk propensity do contextual decisions in our experiment. The
arise. In the gain-gambling frame the es- estimated coefficient on Income is insignifi-
timated coefficient of Female is negative cant in the context treatment. Interestingly,
and of borderline significance. In this wealth effects seem to matter in abstract gam-
frame, female subjects are more risk- bling decisions, with higher income increasing
averse than male subjects, confirming the risk tolerance. Finally, Table 2 shows that the
results of earlier gambling experiments. increase in expected payoffs from lottery LI
Yet, this result is reversed in the loss- to lottery L4 led to a corresponding rise in av-
gambling frame. Here the coefficient of erage certainty equivalents in both treatments.
the gender dummy is significantly posi- The coefficients of L2, L3, and L4, measuring
tive, suggesting that female subjects are the rise in certainty equivalents for those lot-
more risk-prone than male subjects. teries over those for LI, are all significantly
positive and increasing from L2 through L4.
Table 2 further indicates that disposable in-
come outside the laboratory was irrelevant for III. Discussion

In contrast to recent survey and experimen-


tal evidence, the results reported here question
6 A Lagrange multiplier test favors this random-effects
the prevalence of stereotypic gender-specific
model over ordinary least-squares analysis in each frame.
'Preliminary analyses showed that interactions of L2,risk attitudes. Under controlled economic con-
L3, L4, and Income with the gender dummy did not con- ditions, we find that female subjects do not
tribute to the explanatory power of the model. All relevant generally make less risky financial choices
gender differences in certainty equivalents are therefore
than male subjects.
captured by Female.
The data reported here show that the com-
8 This result is in stark contrast to evidence found by
Melanie Powell and David Ansic (1997) in experimental parative risk propensity of male and female
insurance decisions. subjects in financial choices strongly de-

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VOL. 89 NO. 2 GENDER AND ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS 385

pends on the decision frame. Gender-specific of Losses: An Expected Utility Analysis."


risk propensities arise in abstract gambles, Journal of Risk and Insurance, March
with men being more risk-prone toward 1980, 47(1), pp. 111-32.
gains but women more risk-prone toward Jianakoplos, Nancy Ammon and Bernasek,
losses. Moreover, when identical decisions Alexandra. "Are Women More Risk
are presented as investment and insurance Averse?" Economic Inquiry, October 1998,
choices, no gender differences in risk atti- 36(4), pp. 620-30.
tudes are found. Johnson, Johnnie E. V. and Powell, Philip L.
Our findings suggest that gender-specific "Decision Making, Risk and Gender: Are
risk behavior found in previous survey data Managers Different?" British Journal of
may be due to differences in male and female Management, June 1994, 5 (2), pp. 123 -
opportunity sets rather than stereotypic risk at- 38.
titudes. Our results also suggest that abstract Kahneman, Daniel and Tversky, Amos. "Pros-
gambling experiments may not be adequate for pect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under
the analysis of gender-specific risk attitudes Risk." Econometrica, March 1979, 47(2),
toward financial decisions. pp. 263-91.
In practice, risky financial decisions are Levin, Irwin P.; Snyder, Mary A. and Chapman,
inherently contextual. Our findings on con- Daniel P. "The Interaction of Experiential
textual financial decisions suggest that pre- and Situational Factors and Gender in a
conceptions concerning the risk attitudes of Simulated Risky Decision-Making Task."
female investors and managers may be more Journal of Psychology, March 1988,
prejudice than fact. 122(2), pp. 173-81.
Powell, Melanie and Ansic, David. "Gender
Differences in Risk Behavior in Financial
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