NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS

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Food Sovereignty in Latin America:

Confronting the ‘New’ Crisis

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ÞÊ*iÌiÀÊ,œÃÃiÌ

D
URING THE FIRST MONTHS OF 2007,
Mexicans took to the streets to pro-
test a sudden doubling of the price of
corn tortillas, the mainstay of the national diet.
Peter Rosset resides Government officials and industry blamed the
in Chiapas, Mexico, increase of corn prices in the global market on
where he is a the widespread promotion of ethanol produc-
researcher for the
tion from corn as part of the agro-fuels initia-
Center for the Study
of Rural Change in tives being promoted by then President George
Mexico (CECCAM) W. Bush and President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva
and co-coordinates of Brazil. While speculation on corn futures to
the Land Research feed ethanol plants did contribute to the price
can corn harvest for 1,650 pesos per ton. It then
withheld its inventory from the market, creating
an artificial shortage, which drove prices up to
3,500 pesos in January, when it finally began to
sell, making a handy profit.2
Throughout 2007, Venezuelans periodically
faced milk shortages, which sometimes gener-
ated lines several hours long at supermarkets.
President Hugo Chávez accused transnational
dairy giants Nestlé and Parmalat of buying and
exporting milk from the Venezuelan market,
precisely when the population most needed it.
JAN SOCHOR / ZUMA PRESS

Action Network
rise, it later turned out that hoarding and price While the Venezuelan government eventually
(landaction.org). He
is also part of the speculation by private grain-trading corpora- purchased a huge milk-processing facility from
technical support tions like Cargill, which benefited from Mexico’s Parmalat, it is possible that these transnational
team of La earlier privatization of national grain reserves, corporations (TNCs) were following an old
Vía Campesina played at least as big a role.1 In fact, Cargill Washington script, by which artificial shortages
(viacampesina.org).
bought a healthy chunk of the late-2006 Mexi- of food and other products are used to create

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long lines at shops to undermine the legitimacy of gov- cases of looting illustrate the desperation of the hungry,”
ernments that the U.S. government doesn’t like.3 Even if Schuller reported, “Haiti also has a still-extant tradition
the script did not come from Washington, it is clear that of youn ede lòt—one helping the other. Although foreign-
these companies were using their near monopoly power to ers may not see these invisible ties, even in the crowded
undermine government price controls and pro-consumer capital city ordinary Haitians often share what little they
policies. In a scenario eerily similar to that in Venezuela, have with neighbors and extended kin. . . .”5
President Evo Morales of Bolivia had to temporarily ban Haiti lost its food self-sufficiency during previous de-
exports of cooking oil, chicken, beef, wheat, corn, and cades of neoliberal policies and foreign donor interfer-
rice in 2007, as the private sector hoarded and exported ence. In the 1990s the United States used the Food for
much needed foodstuffs, creating artificial shortages and Peace aid program to flood Haitian markets with cheap
long lines.4 rice and other foodstuffs, undercutting Haitian produc-
Thus did Latin America, like the proverbial canary in the tion and the local food economy, placing it squarely in the
mine shaft, prefigure the world crisis of food prices that ex- hands of TNCs.6 Such food aid programs represent a free
ploded into global headlines in late 2007 and throughout government service designed to help grain-trading com-
most of 2008. While manipulating markets to panies expand both their current and fu-
make windfall profits and to undermine gov- œ>À`ˆ˜}Ê>˜`Ê«ÀˆViÊ ture sales. Food aid sales generate the same
ernments are not the same thing, they both ëiVՏ>̈œ˜ÊLÞÊÊ profits for the big U.S. grain companies as
result from the central feature of the crisis ev- does any other commercial export. The only
VœÀ«œÀ>̈œ˜ÃʏˆŽiÊÊ
erywhere: the iron grip that TNCs maintain difference is that the U.S. government im-
over our food systems, made possible by the
>À}ˆ]Ê܅ˆV…ÊÊ mediately pays the bill. From the point of
runaway trade liberalization and privatization Li˜iwÌi`ÊvÀœ“Ê view of the grain corporations, then, food
during the neoliberal decades of the 1980s aid creates immediate markets through the
and 1990s. When TNCs control critical food i݈Vœ½ÃÊi>ÀˆiÀÊÊ U.S. government’s financing of purchases
supplies, consumers and entire nations are at «ÀˆÛ>̈â>̈œ˜ÊœvÊÊ that otherwise might not have been made.
their mercy. They can hoard food, create ar- The recipient countries, meanwhile, come
˜>̈œ˜>Ê}À>ˆ˜ÊÊ
tificial shortages, and take speculative profits to depend on these foreign food supplies.
on soaring prices, thereby delegitimizing gov- ÀiÃiÀÛiÃ]Ê«>Þi`ÊÊ When the aid stops, governments are pres-
ernments not friendly to their interests. And >ÊLˆ}ÊÀœiʈ˜ÊÊ sured to keep importing the commodities on
their behavior in times of crisis is the exact commercial terms. The inflow of food aid—
opposite of the public sector’s: While govern- ÀˆÃˆ˜}Ê«ÀˆVið even in many emergency cases—has proved
ments release food from publicly owned re- time and again to harm local farm econo-
serves to ease the effects of a crisis, private traders can mies. Cheap, subsidized, or free U.S. grains undercut the
withhold their stocks from the market to drive prices still prices of locally produced food, driving small farmers out
higher—a problem since biblical times (in Isaiah 23, God of business and into cities.7
punishes grain-hoarding merchants and restores justice: This, combined with the permanent opening of the
“It will not be stored or hoarded, but [Tyre’s] merchandise Haitian market to imports through structural adjust-
will supply abundant food. . . .”). ment programs imposed by the World Bank and Inter-
By early 2008, most of Latin America and the world national Monetary Fund, turned Haiti into a basket-case
woke to a full-blown food crisis. In April viewers of in- food economy, fully dependent on the global economy
ternational TV news were treated to images of rioters and vulnerable to its price swings. Thus, it should have
in Port-au-Prince and other Haitian cities burning tires, been no surprise that Haiti became a poster child for the
blocking major thoroughfares, and looting local stores. food crisis in early 2008. More recently Haitian peasant
We also saw U.N. peacekeepers—actually the troops of organizations, both members and non-members of La Vía
foreign occupation—firing rubber bullets and tear gas Campesina—the international alliance of peasant and
at crowds. These images obscured both the history and family farmers, farmworkers, indigenous people, landless
structural causes of the food crisis, and the fact that, as peasants, and rural women and youth—have formed a
analyst Mark Schuller reported, most Haitians helped one national peasant coalition to push for structural reforms,
another out, and few did any actual looting. including a rollback of free trade and support for peasant
“While the rising sale of ‘dirt cookies’—biscuits made food production, to address the structural causes of the
of clay, salt, and oil—and the food protests and isolated food crisis in their island nation.8

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As world market rice prices tripled

in 2008, wheat prices more than dou- Figure 1: Volatile international grain prices ($U.S./ton)
bled, and corn prices almost doubled
(see figure 1, at right), food protests 1,000
and riots broke out in countries as di-
verse as Bangladesh, Brazil, Burkina 900
Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, 800

ADAPTED FROM UN FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION (FAO) GLOBAL INFORMATION AND EARLY WARNING SYSTEM (WWW.FAO.ORG/GIEWS/ENGLISH/EWI/CEREALPRICE/2.HTM)
Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Mozam-
700
bique, Pakistan, Myanmar, Panama, Rice
the Philippines, Russia, Senegal, and 600
Somalia and other countries around 500
the world. But, as the Haitian case de-
manded that we ask, was the crisis re- 400
ally new, or was it a manifestation of Wheat
300
long-standing problems? Corn
200

W
HEN PRICES JUMPED, WE WERE 100
told that the world was M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M
facing a new crisis and 2007 2008 2009
that food prices, like petroleum pric- Prices refer to monthly averages; for March 2009, two weeks’ average.
es under “peak oil,” would now stay
up forever. But prices soon began to
drop (although in March analysts pre-
dicted they will rise again).9 The key point is that we have what raw materials like corn and wheat may cost. This is
apparently moved into a new era of more volatile, wildly a function of corporate power in the marketplace. Finally,
fluctuating commodity prices. For example, The New York even when crop prices were up in 2007 and 2008, small
Times reported in April 2008 that U.S. farmers were experi- farmers scarcely benefited, as rising costs of petroleum-
encing—and expecting to continue to face—monthly price based inputs like fertilizer ate up their earnings, as did the
swings for corn, wheat, and soybeans several times greater predatory and monopolistic practices of commodity cor-
than usual.10 In the global market, after a low and stable porations.12 The unregulated market created by deregula-
25-year trend, prices of agriculture commodities started to tion, privatization, and free trade hurts both farmers and
rise slightly between 2004 and 2005, followed by an accel- consumers, while benefiting TNCs, the private sector, and
eration between the end of 2007 and the summer of 2008, speculators of all kinds.
when prices increased 3.2 times for rice, 2.1 for wheat, and When prices began to rise, it seemed quite odd to find
2.5 for corn. Following the dramatic hikes, the prices for ourselves in a crisis of high food prices, when the past 20
rice and wheat fell by 55% in late 2008 and corn fell 64%.11 to 30 years had seen a crisis of low prices—prices so low
Then in January rice prices began increasing again. These that millions of peasant and family farmers around the
kinds of fluctuations are largely due to the deregulation of world were driven off the land and into national and inter-
international trade in foodstuffs, the privatization of grain national migrant streams. Indeed, before all the headlines
and other food markets within countries, and, more recently, in 2008, there was already a crisis in the food and farming
the entry of speculative capital into commodity trading. systems of Latin America and many other regions. Those
Several points are worth mentioning about this type of low crop prices resulted from corporate monopolies that
market. First, the more a market fluctuates, the more small unilaterally set low prices for farmers, together with free
producers, farmers in this case, are hurt. Large farmers trade policies that let those companies dump cheap food
have financial reserves to weather a price drop and wait for commodities in the local markets of developing countries.
the next upswing, while a proportion of peasants and fam- These are some of the same conditions behind the current
ily farmers are wiped out every time prices crash. Second, malaise, which is in fact nothing more than a new face of
the prices that farmers get for their crops may drop, but the the same old rural crisis.
prices that consumers pay for food are “sticky”; that is, they To confront the earlier, low-crop-price version of the
go up and “stick,” hardly ever dropping again, no matter crisis, La Vía Campesina developed a comprehensive al-

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ternative proposal for restructuring food production and
consumption at the local, national, and global levels,
called “food sovereignty.” Under food sovereignty, and in
contrast to the “one size fits all” proposals of the World
Trade Organization (WTO), every country and people is
deemed to have the right to establish its own policies con-
cerning its food and agriculture system, as long as those
policies don’t hurt other countries, which has been the
case when major agro-export powers dump foodstuffs in
the markets of other countries at prices below the cost of
production. Food sovereignty would allow countries to
protect their domestic markets against such practices.
But now that we have shifted from a period of artifi-
cially low prices to one of super-volatile prices, does food
sovereignty still make sense? To answer that question, we
must examine the causes of the recent crisis.
The signing of the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment meant locking in the trade liberalization in agri-
cultural products that had begun during the previous
decade as conditionality for debt relief under structural
adjustment and continued as unilateral liberalization
by the Mexican government in preparation for NAFTA.
The process was broad in its reach over policies impor-
tant to farmers, including reductions in import tariffs
and quotas, steep cuts in agricultural subsidies and price
supports, the privatization of government-sponsored
marketing mechanisms, and the disappearance of afford-
able and accessible credit for peasant and family farmers.
The same has been true for other trade agreements, like
the Dominican Republic–Central American Free Trade
Agreement, which have similarly locked-in policies that
have dismantled peasant agriculture.
It is peasants and family farmers who feed the peoples

T
HERE ARE BOTH LONG- AND SHORT-TERM CAUSES OF THE of the world, by and large, whereas large agribusiness pro-
extreme food price hikeS. Among the former, the ducers in most any country have an export “vocation.”
cumulative effect of three decades of neoliberal But policy decisions have stripped small producers of
budget-cutting, privatization, and free trade agreements minimum-price guarantees, access to parastatal market-
stands out. In most Latin American countries, national ing boards, credit, technical assistance, and above all,
food production capacity has been systematically dis- markets for their produce. Local and national food mar-
mantled and replaced by a growing capacity kets were first inundated with cheap imports,
to produce agro-exports and agro-fuels, stimu- œÜÊ̅>ÌÊÜiÊ and then, when TNCs had captured the bulk of
lated by enormous government subsidies to the market share, the prices of the food imports
agribusiness, using taxpayer money. The recent
…>ÛiÊňvÌi`Ê on which countries now depend, as shown in
fluctuating prices and corporate market manip- vÀœ“Ê>Ê«iÀˆœ`Ê figure 2 (following page) have been drastically
ulations are built upon the long-term condition œvÊ>À̈wVˆ>ÞÊ jacked up. It is akin to giving drugs away free at
of small producers’ displacement from the land. first, charging only when the victim is addicted
The case of Mexico is typical, as recounted by œÜÊ«ÀˆViÃÊÊ (to imported food).
food policy analyst Ana de Ita of the Center for ̜ʜ˜iʜvÊ Meanwhile the World Bank and the IMF have
the Study of Rural Change in Mexico: forced governments to sell off their public-sector
Beginning in 1989, the [Mexican] government ÃÕ«iÀ‡Ûœ>̈iÊ grain reserves and inventories. The result is that
began deepening neoliberal reforms in the coun- «ÀˆViÃ]ÊÊ we now face one of the tightest margins in re-
tryside. State intervention diminished; credit was cent history between food reserves and demand,
`œiÃÊvœœ`ÊÊ
individualized, and the rural development bank which generates both rising prices and greater
reduced the amount of credit available for each ÜÛiÀiˆ}˜ÌÞÊ market volatility. In 2008 world cereal supply
farmer as well as the number of farmers and crops Ã̈Ê“>ŽiÊ (stocks plus production) was at an estimated
eligible for credit; subsidies fell; most of the public 30-year low.14 In other words, many countries
sector enterprises that manufactured farm inputs, Ãi˜Ãi¶Ê no longer have either sufficient food reserves or
or that collected, marketed, or processed farm prod- sufficient productive capacity. They now depend
ucts, were privatized; state services like agricultural extension, on imports, whose prices are skyrocketing. Another long-
crop insurance, and grain storage were privatized; the subsi- term cause of the crisis, though of far lesser importance,
dies that were implicit in floor prices were eliminated, and the has been changing patterns of food consumption in some
subsidies of numerous other public sector goods and services parts of the world, like increased preference for meat and
were slashed; protection against farm imports was reduced; dairy products.15
and then in 1994 NAFTA came into effect, effectively func- Among the short-term causes of the crisis, by far the
tioning as the padlock on the door that prevents any return to most important was the relatively sudden entry of specu-
previous policies.13 lative financial capital into food markets. Hedge, index,

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and risk funds invested heavily in the

futures markets for commodities, in- Figure 2: Domestic grain production versus imports
cluding grains and other food prod- in 11 Latin American countries (thousands of tons)
ucts. With the collapse of the home Grain production Commercial grain imports
mortgage market in the United States,
investors’ already desperate search for 3,500
new avenues of investment led them
to discover these markets for futures 3,000
contracts. Attracted by high price vol-
atility in any market, since they take 2,500
their profits on both price rises and
drops, speculators bet like gamblers 2,000
in a casino—gambling, in this case,
with the food of ordinary people. The 1,500
lure of quick, spectacular profits “has
attracted a torrent of new investment
1,000
from Wall Street, estimated to be as
much as $300 billion,” according to
The New York Times.16 500
All of this new investment capital
inflated a price bubble, pushing the 0
cost of basic foodstuffs beyond the 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
reach of poor people in country after
country. And when the bubble inevita- À>ˆ˜Ê«Àœ`ÕV̈œ˜Êˆ˜Ê>̈˜Ê
“iÀˆV>]ÊÜÊvœVÕÃi`ʜ˜ÊiÝ«œÀÌÃ]ʅ>ÃÊLii˜Ê՘>LiÊ̜ʎii«ÊÕ«Ê܈̅Ê`œ“iÃ̈VÊ
bly burst, it brought crop prices back `i“>˜`°Ê/…iÊ`ˆvviÀi˜ViʈÃÊLiˆ˜}ʓ>`iÊÕ«ÊLÞÊ>Ê}ÀœÜˆ˜}ÊۜÕ“iʜvʈ“«œÀÌðÊ
down, though consumer prices have of
course stayed up. Here we have the ne-
farious interplay of two kinds of speculation: On the one regulate the food commodity markets that were deregu-

SOURCE: ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, USDA (WWW.ERS.USDA.GOV/PUBLICATIONS/GFA18)

hand, financial speculation inflated a price bubble that lat- lated under neoliberalism, but regulate them better than
er collapsed, while traditional or “biblical-style” hoarding they were before, with genuine supply management,
of grains and price speculation by TNCs and the private making it possible to set prices that are fair to farmers
sector exacerbated the price hikes, preventing consumer and consumers alike. That necessarily means a return to
prices from falling once the speculative bubble burst and protecting the food production of nations, both against
crop prices collapsed. the dumping of artificially cheap food and the importa-
Another important short-term factor is the boom in agro- tion of artificially expensive food, which we face today.
fuels, the crops for which compete for planting area with It means renationalizing and rebuilding national grain
food crops and cattle pasture. Major global price increases reserves and parastatal marketing boards, in new and
in the costs of chemical inputs for conventional farming, improved versions that actively include farmer organi-
directly resulting from the high price of petroleum, were zations as owners and administrators of public reserves.
also a major short-term causal factor. Given this panorama That is a key first step.
of failed, decades old neoliberal policies and the recent on- Latin American countries urgently need to stimulate
slaught of speculative capital, food sovereignty is the only the recovery of their national food-producing capac-
alternative proposal that is up to the challenge of wresting ity located in the peasant and family farm sectors. That
control over national food systems from the TNCs. means public sector budgets, floor prices, credit, and
other forms of support. Agrarian reform is also urgently

U
NDER THE FOOD SOVEREIGNTY PARADIGM, LA VÍA needed in many countries to rebuild the peasant and
Campesina and a growing number of progres- family farm sectors, whose vocation is growing food
sive and semi-progressive governments, in Ven- for people, since the largest farms and agribusinesses
ezuela, Bolivia, Argentina, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, seem to only produce for cars and for export. And many
Honduras, and elsewhere, propose that we not only re- countries need to implement export controls, as a num-


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ber of governments have done in recent months, to stop Furthermore, Venezuela has provided financing to boost
the forced exportation of food desperately needed by domestic food production in other countries in the region
their own populations. through its Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA)
Finally, agriculture must be based on respect for na- and Petrocaribe programs. A question that is somewhat
ture, local cultures, and traditional farming knowledge. in dispute in Venezuela’s new regional food enterprise,
It has been scientifically demonstrated that such farming however, is whether it will prioritize purchases from the
systems can be more productive, can better resist drought small farmer sectors or from domestic agribusinesses in the
and other manifestations of climate change, and are more member countries. This is a crucial distinction in terms of
economically sustainable because they use less fossil fuel. real food sovereignty.
We can no longer afford the luxury of food whose price Meanwhile, the recently approved constitutions of Bo-
is linked to the price of petroleum, much less whose in- livia and Ecuador both contain food sovereignty clauses,
dustrial monoculture production model—with pesticides although there was hot debate in February, and even street
and genetically engineered crops—damages protests by dissenting organizations on the left,
the future productive capacity of our soils.17 œœ`ÊÜÛiÀiˆ}˜ÌÞÊ when Ecuador passed the Organic Law for a
Some of the leftist governments of Latin Regime of Food Sovereignty on the basis of the
ˆÃÊ̅iʜ˜ÞÊÊ
America, though far from achieving food new constitution. The criticisms were based in
sovereignty, have moved in that direction. «Àœ«œÃ>Ê̅>ÌʈÃÊÊ part on a perception that the law does not ad-
In March, the government of Venezuela took Õ«Ê̜Ê̅iÊV…>i˜}iÊ equately limit the role of TNCs in the domestic
major actions against TNC and private sector food economy. In Argentina, the government
hoarding of basic foodstuffs, in which com- œvÊÜÀiÃ̈˜}ÊVœ˜ÌÀœÊ of President Cristina Fernández, after battling
panies like Cargill withheld inventories from œÛiÀʘ>̈œ˜>ÊÊ right-wing agribusiness unions for months,
the market in order to force price increases. At announced in March that it was considering
press time it had expropriated Cargill’s major
vœœ`ÊÃÞÃÌi“ÃÊÊ the creation of a public sector agency to reg-
rice-processing facility and had temporarily vÀœ“Ê̅iÊ/
Ã°Ê ulate grain and cereal prices in the domestic
taken over a plant owned by Polar, Venezue- market. The agency would protect small- and
la’s largest private food producer. In February, the United medium-sized farmers and consumers from the vagaries of
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) had the free market, and limit hoarding.
praised Venezuela for “the efforts of the national govern- Cuban president Raúl Castro has taken a number of
ment to introduce policies, strategies, and programs to measures over the past year to reduce dependence on food
confront the global economic crisis and the volatility of imports and boost domestic production, including raising
food prices, and at the same time to protect the food and prices paid to peasant farmers and initiating a new phase
nutritional security of the Venezuelan people.”18 The com- of agrarian reform by giving out idle lands. An ongoing
ments singled out Venezuela’s national subsidized food grassroots debate in rural Cuba concerns the extent to
market, Mercal, its growing system of public cafeterias, which production increases will be based on Cuba’s recog-
the state-run Venezuelan Food Production and Distribu- nized prowess in ecological farming, or on newly available
tion company (PDVAL), which sells food at regulated agrochemicals arriving from Venezuela under the terms of
prices, the expansion of access to arable land through ALBA. Again, this a key point in terms of food sovereignty.
land reform, and the promotion of family farms under Whether we are speaking of countries with progressive
the Chávez administration. or reactionary governments, or countries virtually with-
According to government figures, agricultural produc- out governments (Haiti), the interplay of forces between
tion in Venezuela rose by 3% in 2008, bringing the total peasant, consumer, and environmental social movements,
increase in agricultural production to 24% since Chávez governments, TNCs, and the domestic private sector will
took office a decade ago. During the last decade corn pro- determine the extent to which the structural causes of the
duction has increased by 205%, rice by 94%, sugar by food crisis are addressed or not.
13%, and milk by 11%, reducing dependency on food It remains to be seen how this will play out. For its part, La
imports.19 Venezuela still has a way to go to become food Vía Campesina has clearly identified TNCs and international
sovereign, as 80 years of petrodollars have structurally finance capital as “our most important common enemies,” in
depressed the nation’s agriculture, since it was always eas- the declaration drafted in October at its Fifth International
ier to import than to produce. Nevertheless, the Chávez Conference in Maputo, Mozambique. There, the movement
government now sees food sovereignty as an imperative. vowed to “bring our struggle to them more directly.”


MAY/JUNE 2009
A New Model With Rough Edges
1. Luis Bonilla-Molina and Haiman El Troudi, Historia de la revolución bolivariana:
pequeña crónica, 1948–2004 (Caracas: Impresos Publigráfica, 2005), 232.
2. Hugo Chávez, Ahora la batalla es por el sí: discurso de presentación del
Proyecto de Reforma Constitucional (Caracas: Biblioteca Construcción del
Socialismo, 2007), 63–65.
3. Steve Ellner, Rethinking Venezuelan Politics: Class, Conflict and the Chávez
Phenomenon (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008), 176–80.
4. Américo Martín, “Segunda Parte,” in Martín and Freddy Muñoz, Socialismo
del siglo XXI: huida en el laberinto? (Caracas: Editorial Alfa, 2007), 160–70.
5. Teodoro Petkoff, “Comuna Comeflor,” Tal Cual, September 30, 2008.
6. See Roland Denis, “Venezuela: The Popular Movements and the Government,”
International Socialist Review 110 (spring 2006): 29–35, and Hilary Wain-
wright, “Democracy Diary,” Red Pepper, December 2007. For a discussion
of community council autonomy, see Sara C. Motta “Venezuela: Reinventing
Social Democracy From Below?” in Geraldine Lievesley and Steve Ludlam,
eds., Reclaiming Latin America: Experiments in Radical Social Democracy (Zed
Books, 2008), 84–88; George Ciccariello-Maher, “Dual Power in the Venezu-
elan Revolution,” Monthly Review 59, no. 4 (September 2007): 42–56.
7. Quoted in María Pilar García-Guadilla and Carlos Lagorio, “La cuestión del
poder y los movimientos sociales: reflexión pos-Foro Social Mundial Caracas
2006,” Revista Venezolana de Economía y Ciencias Sociales 12, no. 3 (De-
cember 2006).
8. Sujatha Fernandes, In the Spirit of Negro Primero: Urban Social Movements in
Chávez’s Venezuela (Duke University Press, forthcoming 2010).
9. Enrique Rodríguez, “Política social actual: una visión desde el gobierno,” in
Thais Maingon, ed., Balance y perspectiva de la política social en Venezu-
ela (Caracas: ILDIS and CENDES, 2006), 281–90; Camila Piñeiro Harnecker,
“Workplace Democracy and Collective Consciousness: An Empirical Study
of Venezuelan Cooperatives,” Monthly Review 59, no. 6 (November 2007):
27–40.
Food Sovereignty in Latin America
1. Ana De Ita, “Catorce años de TLCAN y la crisis de la tortilla,” article no. 5
in the Hungry for Justice: How the World Food System Fails the Poor series,
Center for International Policy, Americas Program, November 11, 2007.
2. Luis Hernández Navarro, “Cargill: el maíz de sus tortillas,” La Jornada, Janu-
ary 30, 2007.
3. “Desabastecimiento es considerado una estrategia para derrocar gobiernos,”
Agencia Bolivariana de Noticias (Venezuela), April 3, 2008.
4. “Luego de estabilizar precios Gobierno autoriza exportación de carne de pol-
lo,” Tarija Libre (Bolivia), March 29, 2008.
5. Mark Schuller, “Haitian Food Riots Unnerving but Not Surprising,” article no.
9 in the Hungry for Justice: How the World Food System Fails the Poor series,
Center for International Policy, Americas Program, April 25, 2008.
6. Debora Toler, “Harvest of Hunger: The United States in Haiti,” Institute for
Food and Development Policy Backgrounder 3, no. 3 (fall 1996), available at
foodfirst.org/en/node/1137.
7. For a thorough explanation of food aid and its deleterious effects, see “Myth
10: More U.S. Aid Will Help the Hungry,” in Frances Moore Lappé, Joseph
Collins, Peter Rosset, and Luis Esparza, World Hunger: Twelve Myths, 2nd
edition (Grove Press, 1998).
8. Charles Arthur, “Haiti: New Peasant Alliance Demands Action on Food Crisis,”
Inter Press Service, January 14, 2009.
9. Javier Blas, “Commodity Prices Forecast to Rise Again,” Financial Times,
March 2, 2009.
10. Diana B. Henriques, “Price Volatility Adds to Worry on U.S. Farms,” The New
York Times, April 22, 2008.
11. International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), “Food Price Volatility—
How to Help Smallholder Farmers Manage Risk and Uncertainty,” paper pre-
sented at the 32nd session of IFAD’s Governing Council (Rome), February, 18,
2009.
12. Timothy A. Wise and Alicia Harvie, “Boom for Whom? Family Farmers Saw
JKPAO
Lower On-Farm Income Despite High Prices,” Tufts University, Global Develop-
ment and Environment Institute, policy brief no. 09-02 (February 2009).
13. Quoted in Peter M. Rosset, Food Is Different: Why We Must Get the WTO Out
of Agriculture (Zed Books, 2006), 55.
14. Commodities Bureau, “Tight Maize Supply to Keep Cereal Prices Firm in 2008,”
The Financial Express, July 29, 2008, available at financialexpress.com.
15. Daryll E. Ray, “Data Show That China’s More Meat-Based Diet Is NOT the
Cause of Ballooned International Corn Prices?” Agricultural Policy Analysis
Center, University of Tennessee, May 23, 2008, available at agpolicy.org.
16. Henriques, “Price Volatility Adds to Worry on U.S. Farms.”
17. See Susanne Retka Schill, “Perfect Storm for Fertilizer Prices,” Ethanol Pro-
ducer Magazine, June 2008, available at ethanolproducer.com.
18. James Suggett, “U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization Says Venezuela Pre-
pared for World Food Crisis,” February 27, 2009. VenezuelAnalysis.com.
19. Ibid.
Voices From Maputo
1. FAO Newsroom, “Number of Hungry People Rises to 963 Million,” December
8, 2008, available at fao.org/news.
2. These lessons are explained in “An Answer to the Global Food Crisis: Peasants
and Small Farmers Can Feed the World!” La Vía Campesina, Jakarta, April 24,
2008, available at viacampesina.org.
3. Position of La Vía Campesina on Food Sovereignty, “The Right to Produce
and Access to Land,” presented at the World Food Summit (November 13–17,
1996, Rome) and “What Is Food Sovereignty?” both available at viacampe-
sina.org.
4. Jean Ziegler, “Report by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food: Mis-
sion to Brazil,” United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 59th Session,
January 3, 2003; “Report Submitted by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to
Food, Jean Ziegler, in Accordance With Commission on Human Rights Resolu-
tion 2003/25,” United Nations commission on Human Rights, 60th Session,
February 9, 2004.
Is Biotechnology the Answer?
1. Sam Cage, “Food Prices May Ease Hostility to Gene-Altered Crops,” Reuters,
July 9, 2008; Jamie Lee, “GM Crops May Be Answer to Food Crisis: Ecologist,”
Reuters, June 30, 2008; Fiona Harvey and George Parker, “Top UK Scientist
Pushes for GM Crops,” Financial Times, July 8, 2008.
2. Bjorn Lomborg, “Another ‘Green Revolution,’ ” National Post (Canada), March
25, 2009.
3. U.S. funding research reached a record $44.825 billion (in Canadian dollars) in
2002 [(ETC Group, 2005a) ; (Munn-Venn and Mitchell, 2005: 4, with data from
the National Science Foundation)].
4. Statistics compiled by ETC Group, from ASAA and Monsanto: ETC Group,
2005b. TKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKT.
5. Eight percent of publicly traded biotechnology companies are based in Canada:
ETC Group, 2005a. Canada devoted $695 million (Canadian) to biotechnology
research and development in 2002: Munn-Venn and Mitchell, 2005: 4, with
data from Statistics Canada. TKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKT-
KTKTKT.
6. Gabriela Pechlaner and Gerardo Otero, “The Third Food Regime: Neoliberal
Globalism and Agricultural Biotechnology in North America,” Sociologia Rura-
lis 48, no. 4 (2008): 351–71.
7. Compiled from data in Monsanto, 2005 and Monsanto, 2007. TKTKTKTKTKT-
KTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKT
8. Tom Knudson, Edie Lau and Mike Lee, “Globe-Trotting Genes: Welcome or
Not, Modified Strains Pop Up in Crops Near and Far” Sacramento Bee, June
7, 2004; Agence France-Presse, “New Study Points to GM Contamination of
Mexican Corn,” February 23, 2009.
9. International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, avail-
able at: isaaa.org/resources/publications/briefs/39/pptslides/default.html.
10. Gabriela Pechlaner and Gerardo Otero, “The Neoliberal Food Regime: Neo-
regulation and the New Division of Labor in North America,” article under




JKPAO
review.
11. Mexican economist José Luis Calva, cited in G.L. Zaragoza, “Balance negativo
en el agro después de 14 años de TLCAN: académicos,” La Jornada (Mexico),
March 1, 2008.
12. Adjusting for income increases, CEPAL estimates that the figure will actually
be 10 million, but this estimate may not have properly taken into account the
overproduction glut that helped bring down food prices in 2008. United Na-
tions Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, “Food Price
Hikes May Increase Poverty and Indigence by Over Ten Million People in Latin
America and the Caribbean,” CEPAL News 28, no. 4: 1.
13. Notimex, “Subieron 15% los alimentos básicos y cayó 30% el consumo,”
January 7, 2009.
14. Miguel Teubal, “Genetically Engineered Soybeans and the Crisis of Argentina’s
Agriculture Model,” in Gerardo Otero, ed., Food for the Few: Neolibral Global-
ism and Biotechnology in Latin America (University of Texas Press, 2008).
15. Strong doubts about effective economic performance: Otero and Pechlaner,
2008b TKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTTKTKT; McAfee, 2008 TKTKTKTKT-
KTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTTKTKT; FAOI, 2007TKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTK-
TTKTKT; pesticide use: FOEI, 2008 TKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTTKTKT;
bias in favor of large transnational corporations: FAOI, 2009 TKTKTKTKTKTKT-
KTKTKTKTKTKTKTTKTKT; few benefits to small farmers or the hungry: Teubal,
“Genetically Engineered Soybeans and the Crisis of Argentina’s Agriculture
Model.”
16. Otero, 2008 TKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTTKTKT; Pechlaner and Otero,
“The Neoliberal Food Regime”; Teubal, “Genetically Engineered Soybeans.”
17. Robert Marquand, “Food Crisis Softens Resistance to Genetically Modified
(GM) Food,” The Christian Science Monitor, June 6, 2008.
18. A. Bartra, “Rebellious Cornfields: Toward Food and Labour Self-Sufficiency,”
pp. 18-36 in Otero, 2004 TKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTTKTKT; Barkin,
2005, TKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTKTTKTKT.
Soy: A Hunger for Land
1. Cámara Paraguaya de Exportadores de Cereales y Oleaginosas (CAPECO),
“Evolución del area de siembra de soja” (Asunción, 2009), available at capeco.
org.py/estadisticas.php.
2. La Vía Campesina and Food First Information and Action Network (FIAN),
“La reforma agraria en Paraguay. Informe de la misión investigadora sobre el
estado de la realización de la reforma agraria en tanto obligación de derechos
humanos” (Heidelberg, Germany, 2007).
3. Tomás Palau, Daniel Cabello, An Maeyens, Javiera Rulli, and Diego Segovia,
“Refugiados del modelo agroexportador. Impactos del monocultivo de soja en
las comunidades campesinas paraguayas” (Asunción: BASE Investigaciones
Sociales, October 2007).
4. Altervida, “Transgénicos” (Asunción, forthcoming 2009), altervida.org.py.
5. Altervida, “Informaciones socioeconómicas y ambientales por departamentos
y por temas específicos del Bosque Atlántico, Alto Paraná. Sistematización de
fichas técnicas” (Asunción, 2004).
6. Altervida, “Transgénicos.”
MALA: The Fun House Mirror
1. See Center for Economic and Policy Research, “U.S. Should Disclose Its Fund-
ing of Opposition Groups in Bolivia and Other Latin American Countries,” Sep-
tember 12, 2008, available at cepr.net.
2. The Hill publication Politico ran an article by Clint Rice, reporter for American
University newspaper The Eagle. Opinion pieces by journalist Amy Goodman
and CEPR co-director Mark Weisbrot also described Morales’s visit, but these
were not news articles.
3. The Associated Press, “Bolivia’s Morales Seeks International Support,” No-
vember 20, 2008. The Hill publication Inside U.S. Trade did mention the state-
ment, as did a McClatchy Tribune Information Services column by Weisbrot.
4. See Pamela Constable, “Bolivia’s Morales Diplomatic, Defiant in Visit to D.C.,”
The Washington Post, November 20, 2008.
5. Constable, “Bolivian President Evo Morales Visits Washington, Talks of Fresh
NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS
Start With U.S. Under Obama,” WashingtonPost.com, November 19, 2008.
6. Levin, Jonathan J. “Bolivia Seeks to Renew U.S. Ties, Choquehuanca Says
(Update2),” Bloomberg, January 29, 2009. Bloomberg articles are not archived
in Nexis.
7. Eduardo Garcia, “Foes of Morales Stage General Strike in Bolivia,” Reuters,
August 19, 2008.
8. Franz Chávez, “Bolivia: Divisions Emerge in Opposition Strategy,” Inter Press
Service, September 4, 2008.
9. Agence France-Presse, “Bolivia Orders US Ambassador Out, Warns of Civil
War,” September 10, 2008.
10. Frank Bajak, “Facebook Nixes Group Seeking Morales ‘Liquidation,’ ” Associ-
ated Press, January 27, 2009.
11. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Press Release, “IACHR Deplores
Violence in Bolivia and Urges Punishment of Those Responsible,” no. 22/08
(May 29, 2008), available at cidh.org.
12. Jack Chang and Alex Ayala, “Two More Bolivian Provinces Weigh Autonomy,”
The Miami Herald, May 30, 2008; Franz Chávez, “Bolivia: Armed Civilians Hu-
miliate Local Indigenous Leaders,” Inter Press Service, May 27, 2008.
13. Los Angeles Times, “Young Bolivians Fuel Mob Violence in Civil Conflict,”
September 20, 2008.
14. Mery Vaca, “UNASUR: ‘Hubo masacre en Bolivia,’” BBC Mundo, December
3, 2008.
15. Associated Press, “Bolivian Opposition Criticizes ‘Massacre’ Report,” Decem-
ber 5, 2008; Eduardo Garcia, “Bolivia Violence Was Massacre, Says Regional
Report,” Reuters, December 3, 2009 (Reuters is not archived in Nexis); Rick
Kearns, “Tensions Increase Between U.S. and Bolivian Governments,” Indian
Country Today, December 26, 2008; Alexei Barrionuevo, “At Meeting in Brazil,
Washington Is Scorned,” The New York Times, December 16, 2008.
16. See Corte Nacional Electoral, República de Bolivia, Referendum Revocatorio
2008 Resultados, available at www.cne.org.bo.
17. See results for the department of Santa Cruz in ibid.
18. Joshua Partlow, “Bolivian Deadlock Remains as President, Foes Are Returned
to Office,” The Washington Post, August 11, 2008.
19. Tyler Bridges, “Voters Give Morales and Foes a Stalemate,” The Miami Her-
ald, August 11, 2008.
20. Antonio Regalado, “Bolivians Projected to Approve New Constitution,” The
Wall Street Journal, January 26, 2009. See also Associated Press, “Bolivian
Constitution Vote Unlikely to Heal Divide,” January 23, 2009, and Chris Kraul,
“In Bolivia, Vote Unlikely to Heal Divide,” Los Angeles Times, January 25,
2009.
21. Editorial, “President Obama,” The New York Times, January 20, 2009; Janine
Jackson, “Let’s Talk About Race—Or Maybe Not,” Extra!, March 2009. Some
conservative commentators, disputing the existence of a strong electoral
mandate for Obama, tended to emphasize national disunity. See, for example,
Robert D. Novak, “No Mandate for Obama and No Lopsided Congress,” syndi-
cated column, November 6, 2008.
22. See uselectionatlas.org/results.
23. Richard Lapper and Hal Weitzman, “Morales Poised for Win in Bolivia,” Finan-
cial Times, December 19, 2005.
24. See, for example, Angus Reid Global Monitor, “President Morales Drops to
56% in Bolivia,” January 10, 2009, and “Bolivians Continue to Back Morales,”
December 6, 2008.