Ancient Philosophy 15 (1995)

©Mathesis Publications 135

Plotinus and Iamblichus on TIpoutPEOtc;

John Phillips

Perhaps the most farniliar aspect of the Neoplatonic psychology of Iamblichus

and his successors in the Athenian school is its rejection of the doctrine,
attributed to a group of philosophers that includes Plotinus, that there is a part of
the human soul that remains undescended and in continuous contemplation of the
intelligible Forms. Iamblichus is the first of the post-Plotinian Neoplatonists to
reject this doctrine outright, maintaining that the whole soul descends and thus
insisting on a stricter metaphysical di vision between soul and the higher
hypostases-Intellect (VOUC;), the gods, daimons, and greater kinds-than was to
be found in his predecessors. 1 The fullest extant account of his objections to the
doctrine come in his commentary on Aristotle's De anima, where he concentrates
on the way in which philosophers determined the relationship among the differ-
ent grades of soul according to the variously perceived relationships of soul' s
acts to its essence. 2 A different approach comes in a weIl known passage from
Proclus' In Timaeum (iii p. 334, 3ff. Diehl), where he is almost certainly repro-
ducing the arguments of Iamblichus. 3 Here Proclus, following the 'divine'
Iamblichus, is concerned specifically with Plotinus, calling attention to various
problems posed by the Plotinian distinction between the two phases of the soul,
the higher self that is impassible (a1ta8E<;) and always thinking (aEt voouv) and
the lower self or compound being subject to the irrational passions of the body:
The divine Iamblichus also is right when he contends with
those who hold this view [i.e., 'Plotinus and the great
Theodofus', among others who 'preserve in us something
impassible and always intelligizing' (7-9)]; for what is it that is
sinless in us, whenever with the stirring of our irrational part
we hurry after an undisciplined appearance? Is it not our inten-
tion (prohairesis)? And how would it not be this? For it is by
this that we differ from those who are prone to unbridled imag-
ination. But if prohairesis sins, how is the soul sinless? And
what is it that makes our entire life happy? Is it not having rea-

1 Iamblichus does say, however, that the true account can be found in apx<xtot 1tav't€<;, such as
Plato, Pythagoras, and Aristotle. See Dillon 1973, 42.
2 apud Stobaeus Eclo. i 365.5-366.11; 372.4-373.8; 454.16-22. For an excellent discussion of
this controversy in later Platonism, see Steel 1978, especially chapters 1 and 2.
3 Dillon incIudes this section as one of the fragments (#87) of Iarublichus' commentary on the
Timaeus. Cf. Festugiere 1953, 252n3 and Steel 1978, 40n32.
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son as our proper virtue? We shall say that, indeed, it iso But if
whenever the best part in us is perfect then the whole of us also
is happy, what prevents us, all men, from being happy even
now, if the highest part of us is always intelligizing and is
always directed toward the divine? For if Intellect is this high-
est part, then it has no bearing on the soul; but if it is a portion
of soul, then the rest of soul is also happy. [12-22]4
A central point of attack against Plotinus' doctrine of the undescended soul for
both Iamblichus and Proclus, then, was to demonstrate the absurdity of the posi-
tion that one part of the soul can act without affecting the rest of the soul. This is
especially clear from Iamblichus' claim in the first part of his argument that the
higher soul must be conscious of and involved in any actions of the lower soul, so
that even irrational, sinful acts must be intentional, the result of prohairesis, since
otherwise such acts would be indistinguishable from the purely impulsive acts of
nonrational creatures. And in the second part of the argument his assertion that if
the higher soul is always happy then ipso facto we-that is, 'the whole of us' ('to
öAOV ;'J..loov)-would always be happy, is in part grounded on the assumption that
the disposition of the entire soul is determined solely by the disposition of its
highest part, so that the higher soul necessarily influences the whole being.
Hence either Plotinus is wrong in holding that the higher soul enjoys complete
detachment from the passional experiences of the lower soul and so is sinless, or,
if such detachment and sinlessness are possible, the higher soul, here closely
associated with prohairesis, would then, in fact, no longer be soul, but pure Intel-
lect (vou~), which for Iamblichus is properly separable from life of the human
being. 5
But did Plotinus indeed make prohairesis part of the undescended soul? In a
paper published some years ago, John Rist 1975 argues that he did not and that
the assumption of Iamblichus and Proclus that he did reflects a basic misunder-
standing of Plotinus' doctrine. Plotinus associates prohairesis, he says, with
rational calculation (logismos); hence sinful actions cannot result from rational
choice, si.nce sin for Plotinus is fundamentally irrational. To be sure, Plotinus rec-
ognizes that we are, as rational agents, responsible for the evil we commit, but
this does not commit hirn to the view that sin is an act of prohairesis. Sin is

4 'ti yap 'to CxJlo.p'teXvov EV 'hJltV, ö'to.v 'tfte; &Aoyio.e; KlvllaeXalle; 1tpOe; &KoAo.a'tov <po.v'to.aio.v
E1tlöpeXJlcoJlev; &p' oux 'h 1tpoo.ipeale;; Ko.t 1troe; OUX o.Ü'tl1; Ko.'ta yap 'to.u'tllV Ölo.<p€pOJlev 'trov <po.v-
'to.a8€v'tcov 1tpo1te'troe;. ei Öe 1tpoo.ipeale; CxJlo.p'teXvel, 1troe; &Vo.JleXp'tll'toe; 'h 'VUX-rl; 'ti Öe 'to 1tOlOUV
euöo.iJlovo. 'tllv ÖAllv 'hJlrov ~CO-rlV; &p' ou 'to 'tov Aoyov axetv 'tllv oiKeio.v &pe't-rlv; 1teXv'tcoe; Ö-rl1tOU
n,
<p-rlaoJlev. ei Öe ö'to.v 'to ev 'hJltV KpeX'tla'tov 't€AelOV Ko.t 'to ÖAOV TtJlrov eüÖo.lJloV, 'ti KcoAuel Ko.t
vuv l;Jlfte; euöo.iJlovo.e; e'{vo.l &v8pO:>1toue; cx1tav'tae;, ei 'to &Kpo'ta'tov l;JlroV &e1. voet Ko.t &et 1tpOe; 'tOte;
8eiole; Ea'tiv; ei JlEv yap () voue; 'tou'to, ouÖev 1tpOe; 'tllV 'VuX-rlv. ei öe JlOPlOV 'Vuxfte;, euöo.iJlcov Kat Tt
M)l1t-rl (following Dillon's text, 1973, fr. 87).
5 Cf. reflections on this passage in Dillon 1973, 43 and 382f., and Steel 1978, 40ff. In particular:
(a) Steel, 41 and n34, finds Stoic tenninology in lines 4-8; (b) Dillon, 382, notes that, with regard to
the individual soul, Iamblichus' argument is 'from experience', which is, as Steel, 59ff. observes, typ-
ical of his psychological analyses.
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always voluntary but never reasoned, 'deliberate' , but never 'deliberated', that is
to say, never a matter of rational choice. What lamblichus and Proclus failed to
realize, then, is that '[flor Plotinus acts of the soul are not necessarily acts of the
prohairesis, for the soul may act while the prohairesis remains dormant' (Rist
1975, 116). With this statement Rist makes a most remarkable claim: prohairesis
is not part of the undescended soul at all, but occupies a mediate position
between that higher soul and the lower, irrational phase of soul. It ' ... resembles
the undescended soul in that it cannot sin, but is unlike it in that, when the lower
soul falls, prohairesis is, as it were, put to sleep, while the upper soul, as we
know, continues perpetually in contemplation of the Forms' (117).
Although Rist provides no textual support for his notion of a 'dormant' pro-
hairesis occupying some intermediate position between the higher and lower
souls in the Enneads, his claim that the Plotinian prohairesis must in some sense
be inactive when the irrational soul sins is convincing. His argument goes astray,
however, in using this fact as apremise to his conclusion that prohairesis cannot
then be part of the undescended soul, a claim that direct1y contradicts many pas-
sages in the Enneads where Plotinus makes it amply clear that it iso What Rist
failed to realize, and what 1 shall try to show, is that there are certain principles of
Plotinus' psychology, specifically those having to do with the relationship
between the higher and lower souls, that allow hirn to say that prohairesis can in
a certain respect and on certain occasions-most notably, of course, during the
commission of sin-be inactive yet still be considered part of the higher phase of
soul in ceaseless contemplation of the Forms.
Let us begin by considering in further detail the context for lamblichus' criti-
cism of Plotinus as quoted by Proclus. We have noted that lamblichus' rejection
of the concept of a sinless prohairesis is part of a multifaceted argument against
the doctrine that part of the soul does not experience descent, so that reversion to
the realm of intelligibles is a turning inward toward this higher, independent soul
and away from the lower soul' s attachment to the material body. Such autonomy
is denied the soul by lamblichus, for whom reascent of the soul, now fully
descended, comes by divine grace to which mortals appeal through the ritual
actions of theurgy. He also affirrns a corresponding diminution of the power and
scope of soul' s rational powers, that become necessary but not sufficient condi-
tions for ascent. Within this conceptual framework prohairesis has a somewhat
special significance. Its place in the hierarchy of soul's faculties is evident in sev-
eral passages in the De mysteriis:
(1) Dur soul' s innate knowledge of the gods, that is part of our essence, is
stronger than all judgment and prohairesis, and precedes reason and logical
demonstration. Such knowledge coexists with soul' s essential tendency toward
the Good. (De myst. 1.3 [7] Parthey)6

6 auvu1tapxet yap l1Jltv au1'11 1'11 ouai~ l11tept 8erov eJl<Pu1'o~ yvroat~, Kpiaero~ 1'e 1taall~ ea1't
Kpei1'1'oov Kat 1tPOatpeaeoo~, AOYOU 1'e Kat a1toöei~eoo~ 1tpoü1tapxet· ...1'11 1tPÜ~ 1'aya8üv ouatroÖet
tft~ 'Vuxi1~ e<peGet auvu<Pea1'l1Kev.
138

(2) The last level of divine kinds is Soul purified of bodies. Ungenerated and
uncorrupted, it is in essence beyond passion but its impassibility is not like that
found in prohairesis, that inclines in both directions [i.e., toward good and evil],
nor like that coming from habit and potency, that acquire immutability as an
addition. (De myst. 1.10 [35-36] Parthey)7
(3) The irradiation from the gods is manifested through divine activity and per-
fection, and excels the soul' s free movement as much as the divine will
(ßouAllat<;) of the Good transcends the prohairetic life ('t11<; 1tpOatpE'ttK11<;
~roi1<;).8 (De myst. 1.12 [40-41] Parthey)9
In each of these passages the prohairesis is set apart from attributes of soul' s
essence (ouaia). They are thus expressions of Iamblichus' position that the vari-
ous levels of soul can be distinguished according to the different relationships
between souls' actions and their essence. Whereas the actions of divine souls
produce results that are identical with their essence, those of human souls, insofar
as they are externally directed, often conflict with their natures. IO It is in this light
that we are to understand the description of prohairesis in De myst. 1.10 [36] as
'inclining in both directions'. Clearly the term as used here has the Aristotelian
sense of a calculated choice among equally viable options; the soul may choose
to avoid or to embrace the passions, to pursue good or evi1. 11 That it is capable of
choosing evil demonstrates its potential for doing what opposes its essence.
When referring to the volition of the gods, on the other hand, Iamblichus consis-
tently uses the term ßOUAllcrt<;, by which we are to understand that the gods nec-
essarily will only those actions the effects of which are in complete accord with
their natures as gods. 12 Elsewhere Iamblichus employs this distinction to argue
that the gods are not responsible for evil in the world: what the gods give to
humans comes without determined purpose (a1tpOaipE'to<;) and without evil; it is
rather we who transfonn these gifts to evil purposes, drawing them by deliberate
choice (Ka'tu 1tpOaipEcrtv) to ends which are contrary to what is just (De myst.
4.10 [193f]; cf. De comm. mathe 94.15). Since divine ßOUAllcrt<; is, by the very
nature of the gods, good (De myst. 4.6 [189]) and since prohairesis involves the
possibility of choosing evil, there can be no element of choice in what the gods

n
7 ... 1tPOO'tl1 'VuXTt, au'tn Ka9' Eau't"v EO'ttV cXYEVVl1'toe; Kat ä<p9ap'toe;, ... au't~ Ka9' Eau'tTtv
EO'ttV &'tpE1t'tOe;, cOe; KpEi't'toov o-ooa Ka't' ouoiav 'tOU 1taOXEtV, cXAA' oux cOe; EV 1tpOatpEOEt 'ttVt. 'tft
pE1tOUOn 1tpOe; <XfJ.<po'tEpa 'to cX1ta9Ee;, ouö' cOe; EV fJ.E'touoi~ E~EOOe; ~ ÖUvafJ.EOOe; 1tpOoAaßouoa E1tiK'tl1-
, 'tov 'tO ä't pE1t'tOV.
8 On the 'prohairetic life', see also Protrep. iii [12] Pistelli.
9T, Öux 'trov KA"OEOOV EAAafJ.'Vte;...Öux 'tfle; 9Eiae; 'tE EVEPYEiae; Kat 'tEAEtO'tl1'tOe; 1tPOEtOtV Eie; 'to
EJl<paVEe;, Kat. 'tooou'tql 1tpOEXEt 'tfle; EKouoiou KtVTtOEOOe;, ÖOOV T, 'tcXya9ou eEia ßOUA110te; 'tfle;
1tpOatpE'ttK11e; U1tEpEXEt ~oofle;.
10 On the importance of the relationship betweens soul's acts and its essence for Iamblichus'
doctrine of the soul, see Festugiere 1953, 252ff. and Dillon 1973, 44.
11 For Proclus' view, see further Prov.fato v, vii, x, Col. 191,23-31, and Decem dub. vi (both in
Boese, Procli Opuscula); also Finamore 1985, 71f. and n21 and BeielWaltes' comments in Rist 1975,
118. ~_
12 Cf. Smith 1974, 109. Iamblichus is indebted to the Chaldaean Oracles; cf. Cremer 1969, 102.
 139

do. Prohairesis thus belongs exclusively to the fully descended human soul and
denotes to Iamblichus its bipolar nature, its choice either to act in concert with or
in opposition to its natural tendency toward the Good.
Iamblichus does grant to the descended soul a degree of impassibility, albeit
inferior to that of the completely purified Soul of the divine kinds (De myst. 1.10
[36]). Moreover, he links attainment of the highest human good directly to the
prohairesis, for it is by our free choice of the purified life that we gain freedom
from the passions. 13 Yet because we are always capable of giving in to our irra-
tional impulses and because this lapse is the result of a choice no less rational
than that through which we pursue the good, what is a1taeE~ in us is quite differ-
ent from the permanent and essential impassibility enjoyed by the pure souls of
the divine kinds: it is not part of our nature, but apparently is, like habit and
potency, gained as an addition to soul's essence.t 4 In Iamblichus' view Plotinus'
mistake was to have confused these two levels of impassibility, an error occa-
sioned by bis inability-or unwillingness-to distinguish sufficiently the differ-
ent grades of soul. In claiming for the higher soul permanent impassibility along
with permanent intellection, Plotinus raises it to a level of divine beings to whom
it is no longer appropriate to attribute prohairesis. To use the words of
Iamblichus, he has made soul vou~.15
If we turn now to Plotinus' treatment of prohairesis in the Enneads, we shall
begin to see the manner in which Iamblichus' criticism is misconceived. In the
first place, a carefullook at passages where Plotinus discusses human prohairesis
reveals that all previous attempts to measure what he says there against the Aris-
totelian tradition are entirely misguided, for there is no evidence of direct indebt-
edness to Aristotle or later thinkers for his understanding of the term. What we do
find instead is that in almost every instance of his use of the word there is an
express or implicit reference to Plato's account of the soul's choice of lives
(atpEat~ ßt&v) in Republic 617d-620e, and it is therefore clear that his under-
standing of human prohairesis derives almost exclusively from his extraordinary
interpretation of that account. 16 In Plato's text, with its references to the atpEat~

13 lamblichus discusses this at some length in Ad Maced. #43, #45, and #47 (apud Stobaeus
Eclo. ii 173-176).
14 And if there are different levels of impassibility, then there are different levels of souls. On
lamblichus' distinction of grades of soul, cf. Dillon 1973, 43ff. and Festugiere 1953,257.
15 That certain of their predecessors should have confused soul with intellect as weIl as with
other higher beings provoked strong criticism elsewhere from lamblichus and, following hirn, from
Proclus. Cf. Steel 1978, 24ff. and 46 and passages cited there. Hence lamblichus also opposed the
doctrine of the unity of souls as it is found in Plotinus and, in its extreme form, in Plotinus' student,
Amelius. Cf. Steel, 28 and 156.
16 In addition to the passages cited below, cf. ii 3.14-15, iii 2.7, 4.3 and .6, iv 3.12 and .14. Ofthe
few remaining occurrences of the word in the context of human choice, three are brief references
within polemies conceming unre1ated theories of other schools (iv 7.5 [Stoics], vi 1.12 and vi 3.26
[Aristotle and the Peripatetics]), where Plotinus seems to be employing the term in the sense in which
these schools employed it. I am, of course, exempting from this list those passages where Plotinus
speaks of the prohairesis of divine souls. The Republic passage was a locus classicus for Neoplatonic
140

ßt&V and to 'virtue which has no master' (apEt~ aÖE<J1totov; cf. Kristeller 1929,
85), Plotinus saw an excursus on the nature of the undescended soul, particularly
its autonomy and freedom from the effects of the passions. He summarizes the
significance of Plato's atpE<Jt~ ßt&v in iii 4.5.2-4: it is an 'enigmatic' allusion,
an intimation on a universal and absolute level of soul's 'purpose and disposi-
tion' (t1,v tll~ 'VuXll~ 1tpoatpE<JtV Kat Öui8E<JtV Ka86Aou Kat 1tavtaxou aiVtttE-
'tat).17 In what follows Plotinus gives each of these terms a technical sense. In
general both 1tpoatpE<Jt~ and Öt(X8E<Jt~ are associated with the character (~80~)
of soul that preexists its descent into body. More specifically, prohairesis is the
'whoie' purpose (t1,v ÖA1lV 1tpOatpE<Jtv) of soul unaffected by the contingencies
of its empiricallife (14); it is the ruling principle (ta KUptOV) which determines
the kind of life it will have. 18 The diathesis of soul is said to be similar in form to
the ÖUX8E<JtC; of the Soul of the universe, and is thereby the psychic equivalent to
the intelligible cosmos within us all, the 'arrangement' of powers and actions
which brings soul into harmony with itself and all other beings. 19 To this we may
compare a passage in the late treatise iv 3 [27], again an interpretation of Plato's
atpE<Jt~ ßt&v, where Plotinus associates these same two terms with the
ineluctable law of cosmic harmony that ordains that soul's individual form corre-
spond to its 'original purpose and disposition' (1tpoatpE<JE(o~ Kat Öta8E<JE(o~
apXE'tU1tOU) of which its form is the image (iv 3.13.1-4). Thus soul's subsequent
descent into body-and into evil-is not an act of choice, since all of its activity
follows necessarily from its primordial prohairesis and diathesis in accordance
with the predetermined order ofthe universe (.13.18-20).20
Both of these passages, so important, as we shall see, for our own understand-
ing of Plotinus' treatment of prohairesis throughout the Enneads, reveal a con-
ception of human intention unlike anything to be found in later Neoplatonism. In
the Enneads the primary meaning of prohairesis as it applies to the human soul is
not, as it is certainly for Iamblichus and Proclus, and as most modern interpreters
have presumed,21 some version of the Aristotelian definition, viz., a calculated

accounts of the kinds of embodied lives to which souls descend; cf. Porphyry apud Stobaeus Eclo. ii
163ff.; Iamblichus De myst. 1.8 Parthey; Proclus In Tim. iii, pp. 277 and 279 Diehl; and see Finamore
1985, 71.
17 Here and elsewhere Plotinus, like Proclus after hirn, follows the well-known rule of 'explain-
ing Plato by Plato' when confronted with an enigmatic text. On Proclus, cf. Saffrey and Westerink
1968, Notes complementaires, 132 (on Theol. Plat., i 2, p. 10,2-4) and Stee11978, 8n7.
18 Plato gives this ruling principle to souls which then 'arrange' (Öta:tteEi(Ja.t~) what is given
them according to their own natures (17f.).
19 iii 4.6.21-28 and cf. i 5. 10.1 Off. and vi 8.5. On the meaning of diathesis, see Gollwitzer 1900,
27f. and Kristeller 1929, 87.
20 For discussions of both of these passages, see Gollwitzer 1900, 11 and 37ff., Kristeller 1929,
87 and Rist 1975, 106. Plass 1982,255, points to the 'pretemporal dimension' of soul's prohairesis in
iii 4.5.
21 This predisposition to interpret Plotinian prohairesis according to the Aristotelian modelied
both Gollwitzer and Kristeller to draw spurious distinctions in the meaning of the term in the
Enneads. Gollwitzer 1900, 10ff., determined thatprohairesis could mean either an individual choice
or the power (Öuva.J..lt~) to make a choke. Passages such as iii 4.5 and iv .3.13, however, suggested to
 141

choice made from options presented to soul by the contingencies of its embodied
life. This tradition upon which the later Neoplatonists drew, by associating pro-
hairesis with both deliberation (bouleusis) and desire (orexis) and so defining it
as a deliberative desire for a particular object,22 must have seemed far too restric-
tive to Plotinus, not the least because according to it prohairesis properly con-
cerns the means to the final objectives of our actions rather than to the objectives
themselves. 23 By contrast, the Plotinian prohairesis carries the sense of the uni-
versal, permanent, and preestablished purpose or intention of the undescended
soul that, at least in the context of Plotinus' discussions of the descent of soul, is
partially determinative of the level of intellectual and empirical activity it will
have after its embodiment. Plotinus makes clear in another late treatise, however,
that the significance of Plato' s atpEcrt~ ßt&v goes far beyond the assumption of a
particular kind of embodied life, although that is certainly part of it. In ii 3.9,24 he
cites Republic 616c ff. among other passages in the dialogues as a text alluding to
the double nature of rational beings, by which he means the higher and lower
phases constitutive of all souls, divine and human, including the Soul of the All
(31-39). In each soul the experiences of one phase are entirely distinguishable
from those of the other, so that the affections of the lower phase are not in any
way feIt by the higher. Here Plotinus virtually identifies soul' s higher phase with
its 1tpOaipE(Jt~, and it is clear from its use in this context that the word does not
refer to soul' s choice of an embodied life after descent, but rather denotes some
sort of metaphysical purpose or intention belonging to the higher phase of each
soul and directed away from empirical activity of the lower phase toward con-
templation of the Good; this is what Plotinus means in iii 4.5.14 by the 'whoIe
purpose' of the soul that is unaffected by external circumstances. If we are virtu-
ous and separate ourselves from the passions tying us to destiny, then we are liv-
ing according to our 'purpose' and, moreover, have attained to the contemplative

him that Plotinus was not always held to the restricted sense of the term given to it by Aristotle; that it
sometimes means the basic direction of the will to an action, that Gollwitzer considers a higher level
of prohairesis. Kristeller 1929, 85ff., whose interpretation is strongly influenced by that of Goll-
witzer, attributes both a 'moral' and a 'formal' sense to the word. In its 'moral' sense, that he takes to
be the original sense of the tenn, prohairesis means freedom of choice. From this he thinks is derived
a weaker concept, found most commonly in passages where Plotinus shows the soul in relation to the
world as an abstract agent, whereby prohairesis means the principle of action, the power to make
decisions that Kristeller construes as only a fonnal property of the soul somehow removed from its
empiricallife. In fact, Plotinus draws no such distinctions between kinds of choice, although, as we
shall see, he does attribute prohairesis to divine as weIl as human souls. For another Aristotelian ren-
dering of prohairesis in the Enneads, see Schwyzer 1960, 372.
22 In NE 1113a10f. Aristotle defines 1tpOOatpEOU; as 'a deliberative desire for what is in our
power' (ßOUAEU'ttK1, ÖPE~tC; 'trov e<p' T,lltv). This association of the desiderative and rational is consis-
tent in his treatment of prohairesis in book 3; cf. 1112a15f. and 1139a23, where he concludes that
prohairesis is either OPEK'ttKOC; VOUC; or ÖPE~tC; Ötavoll'ttKTt. Questions regarding a possibly different
analysis of prohairesis in book 6 are irrelevant here.
23 Cf. NE 1113b3f. We will (ßoUAllOtC;) the end of our actions and deliberate and choose the
means to that end.
24 Here again Plotinus is interpreting Plato' s 'choice of lives'; cf. iii 9.1-6 and 17.
142

autonomy of the divine heavenly bodies, whose higher souls are free from the
taint of this world's evil because their prohaireseis are, in like manner, 'looking'
away from their lower phases toward 'the best' (1tpOatpEO'EOl<; 'tou äO''tpou Kat
",\lX11<; 't11<; ÖV'tOl<; au'tou 1tpo<; 'to äptO''tov ßAE1tOUO'11<;).25 In one sense, then, the
object of our prohairesis so construed is uninterrupted contemplation of the
Good; in another, our prohairesis just is such contemplation.
Here, then, Plotinus makes explicit what is implied in iii 4.5 and iv 3.13, that
we are to regard Plato's aYpEO't<; ßt&v, or simply 1tpOaipEO't<;, as an enigmatic
allusion to the timeless, conditionless 'purpose' of his own higher, undescended
soul. Thus for Plotinus prohairesis is closely associated with-perhaps even
identified with-soul' s impassible contemplative activity transcending the condi-
tioned experience of the lower phase of soul, and, as an activity shared by divine
and human souls alike, it forms one component of his theory of the interrelation-
ship of all souls. And these passages are not anomalies of Plotinus' thought, for
bis novel interpretation of prohairesis presented therein informs his discussions
of human intention and responsibility throughout the Enneads. This ÖAll
1tpOaipEO't<;, in other words, is not some higher intention distinguishable from a
more Aristotelian prohairesis associated with discursive reason. So far this inter-
pretation raises more questions than it answers, but we can so far with confidence
make two claims. First, the tendency immediately to consider Plotinus' use of
prohairesis in the Enneads in light of Aristotle' s definition of the term is wholly
mistaken and must be resisted. Second, it is wrong to conclude, as Rist does, that
the Plotinian prohairesis operates at the level of discursive reasoning.
Some will see a problem, however, with making prohairesis part of divine
nature, since Plotinus repeatedly and emphatically denies that the creative activ-
ity of his higher h.ypostases as well as of divine souls is purposive. 26 Although
the universe is just as it would be if Intellect had created it according to intention
(00<; ;, 'tou 1tOtouv'to<; 1tpOaipEO't<; ~eEAllO'E), the intelligibles are beyond purpose
(E1tEKEtva 1tpOatpEO'EOl<;), enjoying complete intellectual quietude (vi 8.17.1-9;
cf. iii 3.3.18ff.). And in his lengthy discussion of the relationship of human souls
to the So~l of the All in iv 4, Plotinus emphasizes several times that the creative
activity of divine souls-Le., the Universal Soul and the souls inhabiting the
heavenly bodies-is without purpose-is not an act of prohairesis-, insisting
that it would not be right that gods intend to do what is inappropriate to them;
that is, whatever evil results from the exercise of their powers in the universe

25 iii 9.30-39. All translations from the Enneads in this paper are Armstrong's (1978-88), except
where noted. I do take exception to Armstrong' s rendering of the section quoted in Greek; I take the
participle ~A.€1tOu(Jll~ with 1tpOatpE(J€ro~ rather than with 'Vuxft~ and read the section as follows:
' ... while the intention of the star and of the soul which is really itself is looking to the Best'. This fits
better with Plotinus' idea of the unity of intention among all souls, as we shall see.
26 Of the One, Plotinus says in v 4.1 that its productive power is as much like the activity of both
lifeless things which have some effect on other things and ensouled entities that grow 'without
choice' (äv€u 1tpOatpE(J€ro~) as it is like the activity of entities possessing choice.
 143

simply cannot have been intentiona1. 27 What the gods give to us come
a1tpOatpE'ta, through the natural necessity that brings them into contact withthis
world. 28 Of the Soul of the All Plotinus says in iv 4.36 that it creates without
need of prohairesis, since it is 'earlier in birth' than prohairesis (1totEt yap Kat
1tpoatpeoEro~ OU OE1l8ev, ä'tE 1tpoatpeoEro~ OV 1tpoYEveo'tEpov: 25-26).
To the extent, then, that the creative activity of divine souls is unintentional,
Plotinus' view bears striking resemblance to Iamblichus' notion that the gifts of
the gods come to us aprohaireta. A closer examination of the account in iv 4,
however, will reveal that for Plotinus divine souls present a special case. For
unlike the beings of bis intelligible world and Iamblichus' gods, they do not tran-
scend prohairesis. As we analyze the seminal ideas presented in this important
treatise,29 it will become clear that when Plotinus says that divine souls act with-
out need of intention, he has in mind exclusively their empirical activity in the
visible universe and his primary intent, as always, is to exempt them from the
taint of association with this world' s evil. He is therefore careful in this treatise to
keep separate the internal and extemallives of divine souls: although the produc-
tive activity of all heavenly bodies is entirely non-calculated and non-rational,
they do possess a purified, impassible prohairesis that, as part of their 'ruling
principle', is always self-directed and so independent of their empiricallives. In
them all passional experience, and hence all evil, extends only to their corporeal
parts,30 leaving them impassible 'in themselves' since their prohaireseis are
impassible (a1ta8fl ...au'ta [sc. 'ta äo'tpa] Etvat 't0 'tE 'ta<; 1tpoatpEOEt<; Kat
au'tot~ a1ta8Et<; Etvat: iv 4.42.19-29). If we remember that throughout the
Enneads Plotinus makes imitation of the souls of the universe and stars the ethi-
cal ideal for the human soul,31 we should expect, by looking in more detail at
what Plotinus says about this divine purpose elsewhere in iv 4, in particular its
role in bis doctrine of the unity of souls, to get a more definitive picture of the
status of human prohairesis. In fact, as we shall see, it is by virtue of its special
kinsbip with the transcendent prohairesis of the gods that the human prohairesis
is to be regarded as divine.
Plotinus' universe-the All ('to 1tuv)-is a single living creature ('to EV) with

27 iv 4.31.49ff.; .35.5ff. and 21ff.; .36-37; .39.23ff. Cf. ii 3.2. 16ff., where Plotinus seems to leave
unanswered the question as to whether or not the stars possess prohaireseis, saying only that if they
do, they are nonetheless incapable of doing deliberate evil.
28 Cf. iv 4.35.42ff. The same term is used to describe the activity of nature (iv 4.13.9), although
for very different reasons. For even living beings that have no prohairesis can create other living
beings; cf. v 4. 1.26ff. and the discussion ofiv 4.37 below. It is interesting that whereas in the case of
divine souls non-deliberative activity is natural and necessary, to a1tpoatpetov when attributed to the
human soul carries the sense of an irrational impulse characteristic of the lower soul and the source of
sin (i 2.5.14 and .6.3f.).
29 On the significance of iv 4 within the Plotinian corpus, see Smith 1978, 299.
30 Here, as in ii 3.9, 1ta9l" and therefore evil, are possible only in beings that have parts (note the
reasoning in line 23: l(aS6crov JlEv Jlepl1, tix 1taSl1). The 'ruling principle', being partless, is thus nec-
essarily impassible.
31 Cf. ii 9.18.31-35 and see Plass 1982,247 and 255, and Smith 1978, 299f.
144

one soul and, as he takes pains to show in iv 4, one overriding, unalterable, eter-
nal purpose (cf. iv 4.10-11). Several times in iv 4 (cf. also .8.46ff. and .35.14) he
likens the All to a dancer whose many movements, when seen as a whole, follow
a single rational pattern. This pattern is, as it were, the sole object of the dancer' s
prohairesis, bis purpose or intention that guides and controls the various move-
ments of his body while at the same time looking beyond these external actions
to the requirements of the dance as a whole (iv 4.33.8ff.). His intention is, then,
strictly internalized such that he never wills the movement of any part of his
body. But, although the dancer' s bodily movements are in themsel ves
a1tpOaipEta, unintentional, they naturally follow the pattern in accordance with
the unifying power of his prohairesis. Similarly the Soul of the All, through its
prohairesis, is able to govern and assure universal hannony while remaining at
all times detached from it; like the dancer it is unaware of the spontaneous distri-
butions of its lower powers to the different parts of its 'body' (iv 4.35). Hence the
creation and governance of the world are both the unintentional effects of the
external movements of the cosmic body, and yet are in perfeet conformity to the
Universal Soul's singular purpose. The same is true of creation in the world,
since many beings come to be through powers in other beings that are non-ratio-
nal (OuvaJ,1tv clAoyoV), so that the latter create without prohairesis (ou tft
1tpOatpeOEt) and through no conscious effort:
For living beings could be generated from a living being when
its intention is inactive 32 (ou tll~ 1tpoatpeoEro~ 1totoUOll~), nor
[is there] any diminution of the originalliving being, nor any
consciousness of what is happening: for the intention would be
inactive, if he had it, or it would not be the intention which
would be operative (&pyo~33 yap ~v 'h 1tpOaipEOt~, Ei Exot, 11
OUlC ~v 'h 1totouoa). But if a living being had no intention, still
more would there be an absence of consciousness. (iv 4.37.17-
26)
The transcendence of divine souls to the physical world is thus predicated in iv
4 largely.on the metaphysical and psychological independence of their delibera-
tive activity from their non-deliberative, unconscious agency, an independence
that, almost paradoxically, holds true of all living beings capable of intentional
activity.34 What separates divine souls from other living beings in tbis regard is,

32 My translation in place of Armstrong's 'without any act of deliberate choice'. Here and in
other translations I have replaced Armstrong's translation of 1tpOaipEcrt~ as 'choice' with 'intention'
or 'purpose' .
33 Reading apy6~ with Armstrong, who follows the editio minor of Henry and Schwyzer.
34 See also v 4.1.26-34. Cf. Stee11978, 34f., Warren 1964, and Smith 1974, 22ff., and 1978, pas-
sim, for analyses of Plotinus' treatment of conscious and unconscious activity of the soul. Smith's
inability in his earlier work to see the relationship between prohairesis and unconscious activity,
however, leads him to the mistaken assertion, influenced by his reading of iv 3.13, that for Plotinus
'free choice in the case of souls in the intelligible world is not a deliberative process but rather
instinctive' (36n24). On the close relationship between prohairesis and consciousness, see Smith
1978,298.
 145

of course, their level of intentional activity. As the creative forces of the Plotinian
universe, divine souls are by nature empirically active; yet insofar they partic-
ipate in the intelligible world, the ruling principles of their higher phases are
impassible and engaged in a higher intentional activity directed away from the
physical movements of their bodies. Because their prohaireseis are 'ineffective'
(ou 1totouoat) in their external activity, they approach the tranquility-i.e., the
inactivity-characteristic of all intelligibles. We now understand Plotinus'
remark in the previous section that the All has no need of prohairesis (.36.25): he
is speaking there exclusively of the external, creative life of the All, the lower
activity of Soul that is entirely without purpose. The prominence ofthis manner
of conceiving souls' transcendence in iv 4 is due in large part to Plotinus' con-
cern there to deal with the aporia concerning the gods' responsibility for the exis-
tence of evil. His solution to the puzzle comes in iv 4.39.25ff.: in a clear
reference to .37.22-24, he says that the 'gift of evil' from the gods is the result
solely of their empirical actions, the spontaneous outflow of their creative ener-
gies that come by 'natural necessity', their prohaireseis being in no way 'effec-
tive' ('tep Jl~'tE 1tpoatpEOEt<; Et.vat 'ta<; 1totouoa<;). These powers become evil
only later, when in mixture (iv 8.7.24ff.).
There is an obvious conceptual correlation of this view of the divine prohaire-
sis with that of the impassible, sinless prohairesis of the human undescended
soul. It is precisely the same distinction we have already seen Plotinus make else-
where between the physical and theoretical activities of both celestial and human
souls, where the theoria of these souls is described as their prohaireseis looking
away from their bodies toward the Good. The metaphysical principle underlying
this correlation is expressed in iv 4.35. There is a 'singular purpose' of the one
living being (Jlia yap ~ 1tpOaipEOt<; EVo<; ~cPou) and just as Plotinus' doctrine of
cosmic harmony requires that the non-deliberative actions of the universal Soul
(and of all other souls) conform to its directing intention, so it also requires that
this JllcX 1tpOatpEOt<; be the paradigmatic act of volition to which the intentional
activity of alllesser souls necessarily conforms. The non-rational activity in the
universe, once again said to take place 'apart from intention' (XIDpi<; ['t11<;]
1tpoatpEoEID<;) and associated with the 'parts' of the cosmic body, is in perfect
harmony with the one purpose of the universal Soul (10-24). In the same way all
of the many prohaireseis that are in the one living being are focussed upon the
same contemplative object-the Good-upon which the universal Soul's Jlta
1tpOaipEOt<; is focussed (öoat Ö' EV au'tip 1tpOatpEOEt<;, 1tpo<; 'to au'to, 1tpo<; ö Kat
~ 'tou 1tav'to<; ~ Jlta: 24-27). This is 'the right purpose which transcends the pas-
sions' (~ open 1tpOaipEOt<; ~ U1tEp 'ta 1tus,,), playing its role in the attainment of
the one universal purpose, just as when those working for another man fulfill the
commands of their master, while at the same time their desire for the Good (~ ÖE
'tou uyaeou ÖPE~t<;) is directed toward the same end as that of their illaster (32-
37).
146

Byöcrat Ö' EV alrtep 1tpoatpEcrEt~ Plotinus does not refer only to celestial souls
that, having completely mastered matter, have impassible prohaireseis,35 but to
all rational souls that collectively constitute the one Living Being. The op8l,
1tpOatpEcrt<; is, then, the deliberative faculty of each rational soul through which
it transcends the non-rational-or, in case of descended souls, the irrational-
affectations and attains the intellectual quietude of the Universal Soul. 36 By
directing its intellectual vision toward the Good, the undescended soul aligns its
purified intention with the ~ta 1tpoatpEcrt<; of Universal Soul, like a serf seeking
to fulfill the will of his master. 37
We now see why Plotinus in ii 3.9 links human 1tpoatpEcrt<; with that of the
gods: by virtue of the full integration of our souls with the one prohairesis of the
Universal Soul, we participate direcdy in the theoreticallife of the gods and
ascend to the intelligible realm. In divine souls of the gods, rational choice and
external action are psychologically separate although ultimately related func-
tions; in effect, they lead two lives that are at once independent and in perfect
accord. Because the undescended soul acts in concert with the singular purpose
of the Universal Soul, the human prohairesis is the same as that of the gods, viz.,
detached contemplation of the Good. Our lives can thus mirror that of the Uni-
versal Soul, our practical activity so completely separate from our prohairetic
activity that we are able to lead a fully empiricallife while at the same time pre-
serving a concentrated 8Eropta upon the transcendent world. 38 Hence the rational

35 Cf. iv 4.42.25f.; on the visible gods as the masters of the matter that is 'with' them, see i
8.5.31ff.
36 See Kristeller's 1929, 85, reading of this passage. For him opffil1tpOatpEOt<; corresponds to
what Plotinus means by €AE08at 't~v apE'tTtv in vi 8.5.
37 A similar but more informative simile comes in iv 8.2.27ff. There Plotinus distinguishes two
possible sorts of care (€1ttll€AEta) with which the Universal Soul governs the All: one a universal care
whereby soul governs by an inactive command (l(EAEUOEt a1tpaYIlOvt) according to 'royal authority',
and the other the particular care of a soul that by 'contact' with its action is filled with its nature and is
thus affected by it. The divine soul directs the All by the first of these €1tEIlEAEtat and by virtue of it
transcends the world it generates, sending its 'last power' into the world while its higher part remains
above (30-33). Moreover, Plotinus says in agreeing with Plato himself, 'our soul' can share in this
'royal' governance ofthe universe when it reaches the levelofthat perfect soul ofthe All (19-20). By
'our soul' Plotinus means our undescended soul whose mode of transcendence, we now see, is
exactly that of all divine souls, i.e., its power simultaneously to control all functions associated with
the body and to preserve its own intellectual inactivity.
38 Smith 1974 reaches the same conclusion, finding in Plotinus (as weB as in Porphyry) an 'opti-
mistic approach' to the idea of the 'philosophical separation' of soul from its physicallife, according
to which 'a man may both live a fully noetic life whilst at the same time conducting his earthly life in
anormal manner' (25: his discussion ofi 4.13 is particularly illuminating). In this way we share in the
pure activity of the universal Soul which contemplates what is below it without experiencing the evils
therein (a1ta8Et Oe l(al(oov o15on 8Eropt~ 'tE 1tEptVOEtV 'tu 1>1t' aU-nlv: iv 8.7.28).
The concept of soul's double activity is familiar from Plotinus' theory of consciousness and
much has been written about it in that context (see, e.g., Schibli 1989, Smith 1974 and Warren 1964
and sources cited there). What I am stressing here is (1) the relevance of this concept generally to
Plotinus' treatment of moral responsibility and specifically to his treatment of prohairesis, (2) the
dose relationship between the double activity of the human soul and that of the Soul of the universe,
 147

human soul achieves the same freedom from passions and responsibility for sin
that divine souls enjoy without effort, and does so by leading a similarly double
life. That this sort of double life can be maintained in a single living being is at
the heart of Plotinus' argument for the impassibility of all rational souls, their
transcendence to the world they create and direct, and theirexculpation from that
world' s evil.
Here, then, is Plotinus' full interpretation of the enigmatic 'archetypal' pro-
hairesis of Plato's Republic. Although at times he virtually identifies it with the
eternal intelligizing of the undescended phase of the soul, 1tpoa{pE(Jt~ is perhaps
more accurately to be seen as the term that for hirn expressed the purposive
nature of that intelligizing. He restricts all intentional action to soul' s unde-
scended phase and links it directly with the one, all-governing 1tpoa{pE(Jt~ of the
Soul of the universe. In iv 4 he grounds his argument for the impassibility of this
higher soul on his related concepts of cosmic sympathy and of the unity of all
souls: the state of perfect compatibility of theoretical and practical modes of
activity in divine souls is the universal paradigm in accordance with which he
fonnulates his accounts of the virtue and contemplative detachment of the unde-
scended phase of the human soul. And the prohairesis is explicitly made part of
this self-directed phase immune to the 'charms' of soul's practicallife. 39
But any claim for impassibility of the undescended human soul is, of course,
much more problematic than it is in the case of divine souls. The transcendence
of the latter, with their complete mastery of matter, assures not only that their
deliberative powers are perpetually self-directed, but also that they never in their
empiricallives experience, nor are in any way influenced by, anything contrary
to their natures; all influx of external affection and efflux of energy are impercep-
tible to them (iv 4.42.20ff.). By contrast, the faculty of perception in partial
souls-that is, soul conceived as the compound being of rational and irrational
selves-can lead them to conscious apprehension of-and irrational concern
for-things contrary to their rational natures (iv 8.7. 16ff.).4o Yet in the Enneads
many of the same arguments for ascribing a sinless nature to divine souls apply
as well to the question of the blameworthiness of the human soul for its sinful
acts. When in his late treatises Plotinus again takes up his them.e of the impassi-
bility of the higher soul, he accommodates many of the same elements of his dis-

and, in what follows, (3) the exact sense in wbich Plotinus wants to say that the powers of the higher
soul may be understood to be simultaneously active and inactive in the human soul.
39 Cf. iv 4.40.23f.: the irrational soul, not the prohairesis or reason (A6yo~), is charmed by
music. Again, in iv 4.43 we are told that only the irrational soul is subject to the enchantment of
magic, and Plotinus goes so far as to say that all of the practicallife of the soul is enchanted (Ö10 Ko.t
1tiiO'o.1tpii~l~ Y€YOTl't€U'to.l Ko.t 1tii<; <> 'tou 1tpo.K'tlKOU ßio~: 18-19), the theoreticallife remaining unaf-
fected.
40 It is worth noting that the same distinction between divine and human souls becomes for

Iamblichus a key point in bis argument, directed against Plotinus and other adherents to the theory of
the unity of souls, that these two grades of soul are distinct in kind (cf. Dillon 1973, 43f. and the pas-
sages cited there). But then, for Iamblichus there is no undescended phase of the soul that could
remain immune to the effects of those of its actions which conflict with its essence.
148

cussion of divine souls in iv 4 to show how the manner in which the human soul
responds to the 'intrusion' of external affections determines its moral condition.
If we compare the account in iv 4 with the views expressed in these later works,
we find that, in effect, the soul becomes virtuous by imitating the transcendent
activity of divine souls, its higher self governing its practicallife while remaining
essentially apart from it. In i 1.9 Plotinus defines this condition as one in which
the undescended soul is capable of simultaneous awareness of both its theoretical
and practical activities. 41 Thus fully cognizant of its higher powers, that then
properly govern its lower activities, the virtuous soul is motivated in all of its
empiricallife by the dictates of a higher Good. The sinful soul, on the other hand,
is controlled by its irrational impulses and so loses touch with these higher pow-
ers. 42 In order to dissociate the higher soul from the misdeeds of the lower soul,
Plotinus on occasion simply adapts the argument he used in iv 4 to exempt divine
souls from responsibility for evil in the world, an argument framed by the same
dualistic view of their theoretical and practical activities. When we commit sin,
he explains, the powers of our higher souls are at the same time active and inac-
tive; that is, they are continuously active in themselves, i.e., in their contempla-
tion of the Good, but are nonetheless contemporaneously inactive in us, i.e., 'we'
understood as compound beings engaged in empirical activity:
So then, men have another principle, but not all men use all
that they have but some use one principle, some the other, or
rather a number of others, the worse ones. But those higher
principles are there, but not acting upon them, though certainly
not inactive in themselves (K&.KEtVa.t OUK EVEpyouaa.t Ei~
a:\)'toue;, oü 'tl yE a:u'tat apyouoal); for each one of them does
its own work. (iii 3.4.13-18)
And again in i 1.11, within his discussion of the sinlessness of the higher soul, we
find this:
While we are children the powers of the compound (OUV8E'tOU)
are active, and only a few gleams come to it from the higher
principles. But when these are inactive as regards us their
activity is directed upwards C'Otav 0' apm Eie; 'hllae;, EVEP'YE\
1tpOe; 'to ävro): it is directed towards us when they reach the
middle region. (1-4)43
Both of these passages are essentially versions of the distinction made in iv 4.37

41 Here Plotinus describes the convergence of our higher and lower activities: our reasoning
(öuxvoux) can reflect upon the impressions that come from perception while at the same time contem-
plating fonus, so that there is a similarity and community (0J,10to't1lC; Kat KotvroVta) between what is
internal and what is external (18-23). Cf. also vi 8.5.2f., where Plotinus distinguishes pure intellect
from soul that is at the same time active with respect to intellect (Ka'tu vouv evepyou(rrÜ and engaged
in practical activity with respect to virtue (Ka'tu ape'tllv 1tpa't'touoll). This convergence would allow
Plotinus to say that the prohairesis is impassively involved in the human soul's rational choices.
42 Sin is therefore for Plotinus a wholly passive eXPerience; cf. iii 1.9-10.
43 Cf. also vi 4.14.29-31. In both ii 3.9.37-40 and iv 4.42.19-29, we recall, prohairesis is associ-
ated with the essential soul whose activity is directed exclusively inward.
 149

between the deliberative activity of any rational being and the exercise of its
'unreasoned' powers, with respect to which its prohairesis is inactive (apyo<; yap
~v " 1tpOaipEOt<;: 24) and of which it is thus unconscious. And, it will be
recalled, it is by virtue of this distinction that Plotinus Iater in the same treatise
absolves divine souls from blame for the world'sevil. The undescended soul,
then, is, like celestial souls, never involved in sin, and for precisely the same rea-
son, i.e., because its prohairesis, along with the rest of its higher principles, is
never active in the compound being when the irrational soul follows its irrational
impulses.
We must therefore reconsider Rist's answer to the question: What does the
Plotinian prohairesis 'do' when the soul sins? We recall Rist's conclusion that
human prohairesis represents a mediate phase between the higher and lower
souls: on the one hand, it is not involved in the sinful activity of the lower soul,
yet, on the other, it is, in a sense never fully explained by Rist, 'put to sleep'
when the lower soul sins, so that it cannot be part of the higher soul that is in per-
petual vision ofthe Forms. We may only with strong qualification agree with hirn
that the prohairesis is dormant when the irrational soul 'falls'. It is true, as we
have seen, that the prohairesis is inactive in the commission of sin; but Rist went
too far in assuming that it is therefore at such times inactive per se and that con-
sequently Plotinus could not have made it part of the undescended soul, since the
latter is forever active in its contemplation of the Forms. 44 Against this notion,
even if we ignore other contexts that clearly show that Plotinus regarded the pro-
hairesis as one of the principles of the undescended soul, our evidence points to
the following conclusions: that on those occasions when t.he human prohairesis
is inactive it is so only in the limited sphere of soul's external activity (as, indeed,
are alt of the rational principles of the higher soul), but continues always in its
own proper activity;45 that in this regard it acts in unison with the prohaireseis of
divine souls, that are in just the same sense inactive in the creation and gover-
nance of the universe, activities that constitute their empiricallives; and that
human prohairesis, properly understood as the intentional activity of the higher
self, therefore shares in the unified prohairetic life of all divine souls, that is to
say, in uninterrupted theoria of the Forms.
Several important elements of lamblichus' opposition to Plotinus now come
into focus:
(1) Both agree that what the gods give to this world is aprohaireta, i.e., is not !he
outcome of deliberate choice. But with this point their agreement ends. For by
aprohaireta lamblichus means that the gods possess a higher form of divine will
(ßoUAllot<;) superior to human rational choice; the term thus serves to contrast
divine activity with all action proceeding from the human will and its tendency

44 Indeed, far from being dormant, the prohairesis is part of what Plotinus terms in i 4.9.22 the
'sleepless activity' (äu1tVoC; EvepYEtCx) of the higher soul.
45 We need not assurne that the prohairesis is inactive only when the lower soul sins. Plotinus
was weIl aware that some of our actions are in accordance with virtue, yet do not proceed from ratio-
nal deliberation; cf. iv 3.13.20.
150

toward both good and evil. For Plotinus, on the other hand, aprohaireta is used
with reference to powers to be found in all things in the universe; most notably it
describes (a) the nonrational productive activity of divine souls that comes to us
through the necessity of their natures, not by intention or will, and (b) the irra-
tional affections of human souls that cause them to lose sight of their higher pro-
haireseis of the Good. 46
(2) Iamblichus' strong assertion that prohairesis is an exclusively human power
is directly at odds with that tenet of Plotinian psychology, either expressed or
implied throughout the Enneads, that holds that all rational souls, divine as well
as human, necessarily possess the power of deliberative choice. As an attribute of
all impassible souls prohairesis is their eternally ongoing choice of the theoreti-
callife, and thus represents the purposiveness of their contemplation of the
Good. The epitome of this pure life is the Universal Soul, the transcendent cre-
ator whose relationship to its creation is like that of a king ruling his realm from
afar, so that it governs without coming into direct contact with or being in any
manner affected by what it governs. Its transcendence is largely determined by its
singular purpose, its prohairesis of the theoreticallife, that allows it to remain
both unconscious of what it does in the universe through its non-deliberative
movements and unaffected by its contemplative regard for the effects of those
movements.
(3) These two points of disagreement reflect very different interpretations of the
provenance of evil. The primary concern of both philosophers in this regard is to
deal with the vexing problem of how the gods, as creators of this world, can be
entirely freed from responsibility for the evil that is all too obviously part of their
creation. Both, taking the Platonist position that the gods choose only the good,47
argue that what they give to the world cannot be evil in itself, but becomes evil
subsequent to the giving through admixture of impure elements. They also agree
that only descended souls are capable of sinning because, unlike the gods,
descended souls are receptive to affections contrary to their nature. They differ
fundamentally, however, in their conceptions of the nature of this reception. For
Plotinus, whose psychology accommodates independent phases of the soul, sin is
a purely passive, nondeliberative experience48 of the irrational self; it is action

46 In several respects Plotinus' use of ßouA.Tlat~ resembles Iamblichus', although it is never for
Plotinus said to be superior to 1tpoaipeat~: (I) ßouA.Tlat~ is ascribed to the higher hypostases,
whereas 1tpoaipeat~ is not; (2) ßouA.Tlat~, particularly in its divine form, is part of a being's nature (i
4.6.14ff.; ii 3.13.9); and (3) the will can only be will of the good (i 4.6. 14ff.; vi 8.6.37f.). It is note-
worthy also that in the Enneads ßouA.Tlat~, like 1tpoaipeat~, is identified with intellection (iv
4. 12.44ff.; v 2.2.10; vi 8.6.36ff.).
47 Porphyry refers in De abstin. ii 37, p. 166, 8 Nauck to 'certain Platonists' who have popular-
ized the idea that the Soul of the cosmos by nature chooses the good (1tpoatpetaSat Be 1teepuKUta 'to
KaA.&~). Cf. Elferink 1968,23 on this passage.
48 It bears repeating that, although there is adefinite conceptual correlation between the non-
intentional experience ('to ci1tpoaipe'tov) of human souls and that of divine souls, in the former con-
text, where it is identified with the passions and sin of the lower soul, the term carries the sense of
irrational experience (cf. i 2.5-6), while in the latter context, insofar as divine souls are not subject to
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upon which the scrutiny of the rational principles of the higher self is not active
and to which these principles are transcendent. Intention belongs to the higher
self and is ultimately reducible to a single, etelnally active choice for the Good,
the J..lta 1tpoatpEO't<; of the Soul of the Universe that unifies all souls; Plotinian
prohairesis thus bears little resemblance to the Aristotelian practical choice. To
prove the impassibility and sinlessness of his undescended soul, Plotinus
employs essentially the same argument by which he sought to remove celestial
souls from blame for evil, and justifies it by assimilating the prohaireseis of all
souls to the one transcendent prohairesis of the Soul of the All. Eternally active
in itself, the prohairesis may, depending on the moral condition of the whole
soul, be either active or inactive in the compound being's practical activity,49 and
is in either case passionless and sinless. To this argument, that he considered an
unwarranted conflation of divine and human natures, Iamblichus responded by
distinguishing a pure, divine will from human intention as much subject to the
passions of the body as it is to the sovereignty of reason. That one part of the soul
of a rational being could act while its other parts remained unaffected and that
metaphysically inferior beings could possess an impassible will were principles
that he could not countenance. His doctrine of the fully descended soul required
that if irrational affections seduce part of the soul, they must seduce the whole
soul. Hence the rational soul is capable of sinning, and does so when it makes a
deliberate choice to subvert the good gifts of the gods to its own evil purposes. 50
Rist is, then, also wrong in his assertion that Iamblichus and Proclus misunder-
stood the psychological status of the Plotinian prohairesis. Both, we may now
say, were sufficiently familiar with Plotinus' psychology to realize that he had
placed prohairesis within the undescended soul. It is probable, however, that
they misunderstood the unique manner in which Plotinus derived the sense of the
term from his interpretation of Plato's 'enigmatic' 'choice of lives', for his

passional experience even in their extemallives, tO a1tpoaipetov denotes simply non-rational activ-
ity (cf. n28 above).
49 In this respect the human soul differs from divine souls, whose Seropia plays no part in their
empirical activity.
50 It is worth looking briefly at Porphyry's position on this matter. As is often the case in his phi-
losophy, he seems to occupy amiddie ground between Plotinus and the later Neoplatonists in his
view of the status of prohairesis, apparently locating it in the 'theoretical' man who possesses the
cathartic virtues. The theoretical man is so named because he is in the process of ascending to the{Jria
and therefore ranks above the 'political' man who has achieved J.1etpto1taSeia, but is inferior to the
'perfectly theoretical' man who 'already contemplates' (~Öll Seatou) and has achieved complete
freedom from the passions (Sent. § 32, 22.14-23.3 Lamberz). He is a 'daimonic' man whose soul is
human and so below that of the divine man looking toward Intellect (1tPO~ vouv evopc.Ocrll~), but 'is
being purified and has been purified of the body and the irrational passions' (§32, 29.8-31.8; cf. also
§32, 34.2ff. and Ad Mare. xxiii 28.1f. pötscher). Furthermore, Porphyry argues, in reference to the
need for catharsis, that soul cannot be good by nature, since if it were it would not share in evil. All
we can say is that it can share in good and is a'YaSoetöe~. This view is in close accord with the theory
of Iamblichus and its followers that the soul is J.1ecrll by nature. Like Iamblichus, then, Porphyry wants
to grant to prohairesis only a degree of impassibility, although he does not explicitly restrict it to
human souls nor does he argue against confusing it with the activities of nous.
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understanding of prohairesis shares very litde with their own Aristotelian con-
cept of human choice. Furthermore, given lamblichus' strong antipathy toward
Plotinus' doctrine of the unity of souls, we should expect that, had he understood
the nature of Plotinian prohairesis, his criticism of it would have included
explicit reference to that doctrine.
For his part, Plotinus might have made the following responses to lamblichus'
criticisms:
(1) That prohairesis belongs to the undescended soul does not mean that all
'immoral' acts of humans would be equivalent to the acts of beasts and brotes,
that is, beings whose actions are determined by their natures and circumstances
and who are therefore not free nor subject to moral judgment. Sin does belong to
the irrational soul (i 8.4.7; ii 9.9) and so no one sins willingly. But we humans are
not such simple creatures as beasts, for in addition to those aspects of our exis-
tence over which we have no control we possess a free principle that we may or
may not employ (iii 3.4). We are therefore moral beings. To say that no one sins
willingly is to say only that the sin itself is not willed. We ourselves are not by
that fact absolved from moral bIarne, since such actions are indeed in our power.
As the agents of sin we are responsible (iii 2.10.7-11). Hence we must acknowl-
edge a voluntary (EKoualov) impulse in embodied soul that is to be distinguished
both from prohairesis and from the blind inclinations of beasts. 51
(2) Yes, deliberate choice is apower exclusive to rational souls; however, we
need not therefore conclude that it is thereby apower restricted to human souls.
Nor does the possession of an impassible, sinless, and essentially theoretical pro-
hairesis render the undescended soul another intellect-i.e., a non-soul; to the
contrary, it further confirms its position within the universal community of souls
whose activity is in perfect concord with the singular purpose of the Soul of the
All. It is through its kinship with the archetypal prohairesis of the Soul of the All,
that integrates all of the choices of human souls in a single contemplative activ-
ity, that the prohairesis of the higher soul enjoys transcendence to the manifold
and conflicting affections of conditioned existence, that for Plotinus means,
simultaneously, both cognitive involvement with and theoretical distance from
the physical world. If we can claim, then, that the prohairesis of the undescended
soul is impassible, divine and sinless, this does not commit us to granting to the
higher soul the transcendence of voü<;, but rather attests to the connectedness of

51 The key texts here are iv 3.13, iv 8.5, (both about soul's descent), and ii 3.13. Although volun-
tary, this impulse is likened in iv 3.13 to the spontaneous urge to jump or the desire for sexual inter-
course or to virtuous actions that do not proceed from rational calculation. Among other things
Plotinus is concemed to show that necessity and free will can be made compatible and that soul both
willingly and unwillingly descends.
I am indebted to Steven Strange for suggesting this as a possible strategy by Plotinus in reply to
Iamblichus.
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all souls both divine and human such that they are ultimately phases of the one
divine Soul of the universe. 52
Department of Philosophy and Religion
University of Tennessee at Chattanooga
Chattanooga TN 37403
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52 Aversion of this paper was originally presented as part of the International Society for Neo-
platonic Studies section of the Central Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association
in Chicago, and I benefited from comments from the audience there. I am especially grateful to
Steven Strange for his valuable suggestions for modifications to a later draft, and to this journal's
anonymous referees who pointed out several stylistic and conceptual errors.