#0 RICKY v.

JD3A
G.R. No. 12345 | February 24, 2020

When to file notice of strike against Ricky. (syllabus topic)

FACTS:

ISSUE: 

RULING:

#529 OMNI HAULING SERVICES v. BON

G.R. No. 199388 | September 3, 2014

Principal test to determine a project employee

FACTS:

Omni Hauling Services was awarded a 1 year service contract by the LGU of Quezon City to
provide garbage hauling services from July 1, 2002 to June 30, 2003. For this purpose, the
company hired Bon and others as garbage truck drivers and paleros who were paid on a per trip
basis. The service contract was renewed for another year and Omni required Bon and others to
sign employment contracts which provided that they will be “re-hired” only for the duration of the
same period. However, Bon and others refused to sign such contracts claiming they were regular
employees since they were engaged to perform activities which were necessary and desirable of
Omni’s usual business or trade. For this reason, Omni terminated the employment of Bon and
others, causing Bon and the others to file cases for illegal dismissal among others. The Labor
Arbiter ruled that Bon and others were not illegally dismissed. It found that Bon and others were
informed by Omni that their employment will be limited for a specific period of one year and was
co-terminus with the service contract with the LGU of Quezon City. Thus, they were not regular but
merely project employees whose hiring was solely dependent on the service contract. The NLRC
affirmed LA’s decision. CA reversed NLRC’s decision holding that it failed to consider the glaring
fact that no contract of employment exists to support Omni’s allegation that Bon and the other truck
drivers and paleros are fixed-term (or properly speaking, project) employees. CA also pointed
out that at the time respondents were asked to sign the employment contracts, they
already became regular employees by operation of law.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not Bon and others are project employees.

RULING:

No, Bon and others are not project employees. In this case, records are bereft of any evidence to
show that respondents were made to sign employment contracts explicitly stating that they were
going to be hired as project employees, with the period of their employment to be co-terminus with
the original period of Omni’s service contract with the Quezon City government. Neither is
petitioners’ allegation that respondents were duly apprised of the project-based nature of their
employment supported by any other evidentiary proof. Thus, the logical conclusion is that
respondents were not clearly and knowingly informed of their employment status as mere project
employees, with the duration and scope of the project specified at the time they were engaged. As
such, the presumption of regular employment should be accorded in their favor pursuant to Article
280 of the Labor Code which provides that “[employees] who have rendered at least one year of
service, whether such service is continuous or broken [– as respondents in this case –] shall be
considered as [regular employees] with respect to the activity in which [they] are employed and
[their] employment shall continue while such activity actually exists.” Add to this the obvious fact
that respondents have been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable
in the usual business or trade of Omni, i.e., garbage hauling, thereby confirming the strength of the
aforesaid conclusion.

The determination that respondents are regular and not merely project employees resultantly
means that their services could not have been validly terminated at the expiration of the project, or,
in this case, the service contract of Omni with the Quezon City government. As regular employees,
it is incumbent upon petitioners to establish that respondents had been dismissed for a just and/or
authorized cause. However, petitioners failed in this respect; hence, respondents were illegally
dismissed.

#555 BRENT SCHOOL v. ZAMORA

G.R. No. L-48494 | February 5, 1990

Concept of fixed period employment

FACTS:

Doroteo Alegre was engaged as athletic director of Brent School Inc under an employment
contract for 5 years. Three months before the expiration of the stipulated period, Alegre was given
a copy of a report filed by Brent with the Department of Labor advising the termination of his
services, the ground was “completion of contract, expiration of the definie period of employment”. A
month or so Alegre signed a receipt for the amount of P3,177 in full payment for his service for a
month. However, at the investigation conducted by a Labor Conciliator of said report of termination,
Alegre protested the termination. He argued that although the contract did not stipulate that the
same would be terminated, since his services were necessary and desirable in the usual business
of his employer, and his employment had lasted for 5 years, he acquired the status of a regular
employee and thus, he could not be removed except for valid cause. The Labor conciliator ordered
Brent to reinstate Alegre to a permanent employee. Brent filed an MR which the Regional Director
denied. The Secretary of Labor sustained the Regional Directors’ decision.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not Alegre was a regular employee.

RULING:

No, Alegre was not a regular employee. It must be worth-noting that at the time of the perfection of
the contract, the Labor Code was not yet in effect. Thus, under the Civil Code, as a general
proposition, fixed-term employment contracts are not limited (as they are under the present Labor
Code) to those by nature seasonal or for specific projects with pre-determined dates of completion,
they also include those to which the parties by free choice have assigned a specific date of
termination. Alegre's contract of employment with Brent School having lawfully terminated with and
by reason of the expiration of the agreed term of period thereof, he is declared not entitled to
reinstatement and the other relief awarded and confirmed on appeal in the proceedings.

#581 TAMSON’S ENTERPRISES v. CA

G.R. No. 192881 | November 16, 2011

Limitations on employer’s power to terminate a probationary employee.

FACTS:

Rosemary Sy was hired by Tamson’s as Assistant to the President. Despite the title, she did not
act as such, she was directed to act as payroll officer, though she actually worked as a payroll
clerk. 4 days before she completed her sixth month of working in Tamson’s, Ng, the Sales Project
Manager, called her to a meeting. During the meeting, they informed Sy that her services would be
terminated due to inefficiency. She was asked to sign a letter of resignation and quitclaim. She was
told not to report for work anymore because her services were no longer needed. She filed a
complaint for Illegal Disimissal against Tamson’s Enterprises.

Sy claimed that the remarks of her superiors about her alleged inefficiency were ill-motivated and
made without any basis. She had been rendering services for almost 6 months before she was
arbitrarily and summarily dismissed. Her dismissal was highly suspicious as it took place barely 4
days prior to the completion of her 6-month probationary period.  Tamson asserted that before Sy
was hired, she was apprised that she was being hired as a probationary employee for six months,
subject to extension as a regular employee conditioned on her meeting the standards of
permanent employment set by the company.
The Executive Labor Arbiter ruled that Sy was Illegally Dismissed by Tamson’s Enternprises.
Tamson’s filed an appeal with the NLRC. NLRC reversed the ELA’s decision, dismissing the case.
NLRC reasoned out that pursuant to Article 281 of the Labor Code, there are two general grounds
for the services of a probationary employee to be terminated: (a) Just cause or (b) failure to qualify
as a regular employee. In effect, failure to qualify for regular employment is in itself a just cause for
termination of probationary employment. To the NLRC, the Tamson’s were in compliance with the
mandate of the said provision when Sy was notified one month in advance of the expiration of her
probationary employment due to her non-qualification for regular employment. Sy’s MR was denied
so she elevated the case to the CA. CA reversed the NLRC decision. It explained that at the time
Sy was engaged as a probationary employee she was not informed of the standards that she
should meet to become a regular employee. Citing the ruling in Clarion Printing House, Inc v.
NLRC, the CA stated that where an employee hired on probationary basis was not informed of the
standards that would qualify her as a regular employee, she was deemed to have been hired from
day one as a regular employee. As a regular employee, she was entitled to security of tenure and
could be dismissed only for a just cause and after due compliance with procedural due process.
Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: 

Whether the termination of Sy, a probationary employee, was valid or not.

RULING:
No, the termination of Sy was not valid. It is undisputed that Sy was hired as a probationary
employee. As such, she did not enjoy a permanent status. Nevertheless, She is accorded the
constitutional protection of security of tenure which means that he can only be dismissed from
employment for a just cause or when she fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with
reasonable standards made known to him by the employer at the time of her engagement. There
was no evidence that a standard of performance had been made known to her and that she was
accorded due process.

#607 PH AEOLUS AUTOMOTIVE CORP v. NLRC

G.R. No. 124617 | April 28, 2000

Elements of Misconduct
FACTS:

Rosalinda Cortez was a company nurse of Philippine Aeolus Automotive. A memorandum was
issued addressed to her requiring her to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against
her (a) for throwing a stapler at Plant Manager William Chua, her superior, and uttering invectives
against him; (b) for losing the amount of P1,488.00 entrusted to her by Plant Manager Chua to be
given to Mr. Fang of the CLMC Department and, (c) for asking a co-employee to punch-in her time
card thus making it appear that she was in the office. The memorandum however was refused
Cortez although it was read to her and discussed with her by a co-employee. She did not also
submit the required explanation, so that while her case was pending investigation the company
placed her under preventive suspension for thirty (30) days. While Cortez was still under
preventive suspension, another memorandum was issued by the corporation asking her to explain
why no disciplinary action should be taken against her for allegedly failing to process the ATM
applications of her nine (9) co-employees with the Allied Banking Corporation. She also failed to
receive the memorandum. Meanwhile, Cortez submitted a written explanation with respect to the
loss of the P1,488.00 and the punching-in of her time card by a co-employee. A 3rd memo was
issued to her this time informing her of her terminations under the grounds of gross and habitual
neglect of duties, serious misconduct and fraud or willful breach of trust. Cortez filed with the LA a
complaint for Illegal Dismissal. LA rendered a decision holding Cortez’ termination valid and legal.
NLRC reversed LA’s decision holding that Cortez was illegally dismissed and ordered the company
to reinstate her with full backwages. The company filed an MR which was denied. Thus, the
present petition.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not Cortez was dismissed with just cause.

RULING:
No, Cortez was not dismissed with just cause. Her dismissal was illegal. The Supreme Court, in a
litany of decisions on serious misconduct warranting dismissal of an employee, has ruled that for
misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal (a) it must be serious; (b) must
relate to the performance of the employees duties; and, (c) must show that the employee has
become unfit to continue working for the employer. The act of private respondent in throwing a
stapler and uttering abusive language upon the person of the plant manager may be considered,
from a lay man's perspective, as a serious misconduct. However, in order to consider it a serious
misconduct that would justify dismissal under the law, it must have been done in relation to the
performance of her duties as would show her to be unfit to continue working for her employer. The
acts complained of, under the circumstances they were done, did not in any way pertain to her
duties as a nurse. Her employment identification card discloses the nature of her employment as a
nurse and no other. Also, the memorandum informing her that she was being preventively
suspended pending investigation of her case was addressed to her as a nurse.

#633 BUGHAW JR v. TREASURE ISLAND INDUSTRIAL CORP

G.R. No. 173151 | March 28, 2008

Drug us inside company premises and during working hours constitutes serious misconduct.

FACTS:

Eduardo Bughaw was employed as production worker by Treasure Island Industrial Corp. Treasure
Island was receiving information that many of its employees were using prohibited drugs during
working hours and within the company premises. One of its employees, Loberanes was caught in
flagrante delicto by the police officers while in possession of shabu. In the course of police
investigation, Loberanes admitted the commission of the crime. He implicated Bughaw in the
crime. Treasure Island served a memo to Bughaw requiring him to explain why no disciplinary
action should be imposed against him for his alleged involvement in illegal drug activities, he was
also asked to appear at the legal office of the company for hearing on the matter. For the
meantime, he was placed on preventive suspension. Bughaw failed to appear at the legal office.
Treasure Island again, directed Bughaw to appear at the legal office, he did not appear.
Consequently, the corporation sent a third letter to Bughaw terminating his employment for using
illegal drugs within their premises during work hours and for refusal to attend the administrative
hearing and submit written explanation of the charges hurled against him. Bughaw filed a
complaint for Illegal Dismissal against Treasure Island before the LA. He alleges that he has been
working for the company for 15 years and that he was suspended for 30 days because of an
unfounded allegation. When he reported back after his suspension, he was no longer allowed by
the company to enter the premises and was told not to report back to work.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not Bughaw was illegally dismissed by Treasure Island.

RULING:
No, Bughaw was not illegally dismissed by Treasure Island. The charge of drug abuse inside the
company's premises and during working hours against petitioner constitutes serious misconduct,
which is one of the just causes for termination. Misconduct is improper or wrong conduct. It is the
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not merely an error in judgment. The
misconduct to be serious within the meaning of the Act must be of such a grave and aggravated
character and not merely trivial or unimportant. Such misconduct, however serious, must
nevertheless, in connection with the work of the employee, constitute just cause for his separation.
This Court took judicial notice of scientific findings that drug abuse can damage the mental
faculties of the user. It is beyond question therefore that any employee under the influence of drugs
cannot possibly continue doing his duties without posing a serious threat to the lives and property
of his co-workers and even his employer. Bughaw failed to controvert Loberanes' claim that he too
was using illegal drugs. Records reveal that Treasure Island gave Bughaw a first notice and even a
second notice but he did not reply nor appear to present any evidence to support his stand.