ALEJANDRO ESTRADA v. SOLEDAD S.

ESCRITOR
A.M. No. P-02-1651 (August 4, 2003)

Facts:

Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has
been living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years
and had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered
into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.

Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate

respondent. According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain
employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—

the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society.
They allegedly have a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness under the approval of their
congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it
impossible for a couple to legalize their union.

Issue:

WON the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

Held:

No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom
of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental
rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human
rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in
order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State
has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against
respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation
of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and
religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres

the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as
required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow
for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to
further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that
the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the
state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the
law based on her right to freedom of religion.
 ELISEO F. SORIANO v. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA
G.R. No. 164785 (April 29, 2009)
Facts:

In the evening of 10 Aug 2004, petitioner Eliseo Soriano as hose of the program Ang Dating
Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made the following remarks directed towards private respondent Michael
Sandoval, a minister of the Iglesia ni Cristo and a host of the program Ang Tamang Daan:

Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling.  Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang

babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang
gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang
babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.

            Two days after, complaints were lodged by Jessie Galapon and other private respondents, all
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo before the MTRCB.  On 16 Aug 2004, the MTRCB issued an order
preventively suspending Ang Dating Daan for 20 days in accordance with Sec 3(d) of PD 1986. Petitioner
sought for reconsideration praying that respondent Chairperson Consoliza Laguardia recuse themselves
from hearing the case but later withdrew his motion followed by the filing for certiorari and prohibition to
nullify the preventive suspension order.

            On 27 Sept 2004, the MTRCB issued a decision imposing 3 months suspension from the
program Ang Dating Daan.

Issue:

1. WON petitioner’s utterance was religious speech protected by religious freedom.

2. WON petitioner’s utterance was protected by freedom of speech and expression.

Ruling:

1. No. The Court ruled that there is nothing in petitioner’s statements subject of the complaints
expressing any particular religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The
fact that he came out with his statements in a televised bible exposition program does not
automatically accord them the character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed
at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitioners attempts
to place his words in context show that he was moved by anger and the need to seek retribution,
not by any religious conviction.
2. No. The Court held that be it in the form of prior restraint, e.g., judicial injunction against
ublication or threat of cancellation of license/franchise, or subsequent liability, whether in libel and
damage suits, prosecution for sedition, or contempt proceedings, are anathema to the freedom of
expression. Prior restraint means official government restrictions on the press or other forms of
expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. The freedom of speech may be
regulated to serve important public interests and it may not be invoked when the expression
touches upon matters of essentially private concern. The freedom to express ones sentiments
and belief does not grant one the license to vilify in public the honor and integrity of another. Any
sentiments must be expressed within the proper forum and with proper regard for the rights of
others. A speech would fall under the unprotected type if the utterances involved are no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step of truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.

The Petitioner’s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average
child, and thus his utterances cannot be considered as protected speech. Citing decisions from
the US Supreme Court, the Court said that the analysis should be context based and found the
utterances to be obscene after considering the use of television broadcasting as a medium, the
time of the show, and the “G” rating of the show, which are all factors that made the utterances
susceptible to children viewers. The Court emphasized on how the uttered words could be easily
understood by a child literally rather than in the context that they were used.
 PASTOR DIONISIO V. AUSTRIA v. NLRC
GR No. 124382 (August 16, 1999)

Facts:

Pastor Dionisio V. Austria worked with the Seventh-Day Adventists (SDA) for twenty eight (28) years
from 1963 to 1991. He started as a literature evangelist and worked his way up until he became District Pastor
of the Negros Mission of the SDA. In January 1991, Austria was transferred to Bacolod City. He held the
position of District Pastor until his services were terminated on October 31, 1991. Before his termination,
Austria had received communications from Mr. Eufronio Ibesate, the treasurer of the Negros Mission, asking
Austria to admit accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by his wife, Mrs.
Thelma Austria, in his district which amounted to P15,078.10, and to remit the same to the Negros Mission.
Austria reasoned in his written explanation dated October 11, 1991 that he should not be made accountable for
the unremitted collections since it was Pastor Gideon Buhat and Mr. Eufronio Ibesate who authorized his wife
to collect the tithes and offerings since Pastor Austria was very sick to do the collecting at that time.

On October 29, 1991, Austria received a letter of dismissal citing misappropriation of denominational
funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties, and commission of an
offense against the person of employer’s duly authorized representative as grounds for the termination of his
services. Austria filed a complaint on November 14, 1991 before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal against
the SDA and its officers and prayed for reinstatement with back wages and benefits, moral and exemplary
damages and other labor law benefits. On February 15, 1993, Labor Arbiter Cesar D. Sideo rendered a
decision in favor of the petitioner. The SDA appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC which
vacated the findings of the Labor Arbiter on August 26,1994 and dismissed the case for lack of merit. Austria
filed a motion for reconsideration but the NLRC issued a Resolution reversing its original decision. The SDA
filed a motion for reconsideration saying that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the complaint due to the
constitutional provision on the separation of church and state since the case allegedly involved an
ecclesiastical affair to which the State cannot interfere. The NLRC, without ruling on the merits of the case,
reversed itself once again, sustained the argument posed by SDA and, accordingly, dismissed the complaint of
Austria. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a manifestation and motion saying it cannot sustain the
resolution of the NLRC and submitting that the termination of petitioner of his employment may be questioned
before the NLRC as the same is secular in nature, not ecclesiastical.

Issue:

WON the termination of Pastor Austria’s services an ecclesiastical affair and, as such, involved the
separation of church and state?

Ruling:

No. An ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the church and its members and relates
to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation. Examples of so-called
ecclesiastical affairs to which the State cannot meddle are proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of
religious ministers, and administration of sacraments. While the matter at hand relates to the church and its
religious minister, it does not give the case a religious significance. What is involved is the relationship of the
church as an employer and the minister as an employee. It is purely secular and has no relation whatsoever
with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the church. Pastor Austria was not excommunicated or
expelled from the membership of the SDA but was terminated from employment.

As pointed out by the OSG in its memorandum, the grounds invoked for Austria’s dismissal are all
based on Article 282 of the Labor Code which enumerates the just causes for termination of employment. It is
palpable by this alone that the reason for Austria’s dismissal from the service is not religious in nature. Coupled
with this is the act of the SDA in furnishing NLRC with a copy of Austria’s letter of termination which again is an
eloquent admission by the SDA that NLRC has jurisdiction over the case. Aside from these, SDA admitted in a
certification issued by Mr. Ibesate that Austria has been its employee for twenty-eight (28) years. SDA even
registered petitioner with the Social Security System (SSS) as its employee. As a matter of fact, the worker’s
records of Austria have been submitted by SDA as part of their exhibits. It is clear from all of these that when
the SDA terminated the services of Austria, it was merely exercising its management prerogative to fire an
employee which it believes to be unfit for the job. As such, the State, through the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC,
has the right to take cognizance of the case and to determine whether the SDA, as employer, rightfully
exercised its management prerogative to dismiss an employee. This is in consonance with the mandate of the
Constitution to afford full protection to labor.
 ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC (IDCP) V. OFFICE OF THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 153888 (July 9, 2003)

Facts:

Petitioner is a non-governmental organization internationally accredited to issue halal

certifications in the Philippines. To carry out its functions, it formulated internal rules and
procedures based on the Qur’an and Sunnah for food analysis and inspection, and began to
issue certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers for a fee.

Later, respondent Office issued Executive Order 46 which created the Philippine Halal
Certification Scheme. Such order vested exclusive authority on the Office on Muslim Affairs
(OMA) to issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities. OMA then
warned Muslim consumers to buy only products with its official halal certification since those
without said certification had not been subjected to careful analysis and therefore could contain
pork. It also began to send letters to food manufacturers asking them to secure the halal
certification only from OMA lest they violate the order. As a result, the IDCP lost revenues after
food manufacturers stopped securing certifications from it.

Hence, petitioner filed a petition to nullify EO 46, contending that it is unconstitutional for
the government to formulate policies & guidelines on the halal certification scheme because it is
a function that only religious organizations can lawfully & validly perform for the Muslims.

Issue:

WON EO 46 is unconstitutional for violating the non-establishment and free exercise

clauses guaranteed under Art. III, Sec. 5 of the 1987 Constitution.

Ruling:

Yes. Classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards
used are drawn from the Qur’an & Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify
food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations to
interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption; by arrogating to
itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its
own interpretation of the Qur’an & Sunnah on halal food.

Only the prevention of an immediate & grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the
seriousness & immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.

In the case at bar, the Court finds no compelling justification for the government to
deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product
as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by
assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion
of the Muslim Filipinos right to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to
by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit
for human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach
on the religious freedom of Muslims.
 BROTHER MARIANO “MIKE” Z. VELARDE v. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY
G.R. No. 159357 (April 28, 2004)

Facts:

SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional provisions,
specifically on the separation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of
the acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the
members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.

The subsequent proceedings were recounted in the challenged Decision in these words:

“x x x. Bro. Eddie Villanueva submitted, within the original period [to file an Answer], a Motion to
Dismiss. Subsequently, Executive Minister Eraño Manalo and Bro. Mike Velarde, filed their Motions to
Dismiss. While His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, filed a Comment and Bro. Eli Soriano, filed an
Answer within the extended period and similarly prayed for the dismissal of the Petition. All sought the
dismissal of the Petition on the common grounds that it does not state a cause of action and that there
is no justiciable controversy. They were ordered to submit a pleading by way of advisement, which was
closely followed by another Order denying all the Motions to Dismiss. Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie
Villanueva and Executive Minister Eraño Manalo moved to reconsider the denial. His Eminence Jaime
Cardinal L. Sin, asked for extension to file memorandum. Only Bro. Eli Soriano complied with the first
Order by submitting his Memorandum.

The Court denied the Motions to Dismiss, and the Motions for Reconsideration filed by Velarde,
Villanueva and Manalo, which raised no new arguments other than those already considered in the
motions to dismiss.

The trial court said that it had jurisdiction over the Petition, because “in praying for a
determination as to whether the actions imputed to the respondents are violative of Article II, Section 6 of
the Constitution, [the Petition] has raised only a question of law.” It then proceeded to a lengthy
discussion of the issue raised in the Petition – the separation of church and state – even tracing, to some
extent, the historical background of the principle. Through its discourse, the court a quo opined at some
point that the “endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of
the separation clause.”

After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial court failed to include a dispositive portion in
its assailed Decision. Thus, Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsideration which, as
mentioned earlier, was denied by the lower court.

Issue:

WON the challenged decision complied with the aforesaid form

Ruling:

No. The challenged decision did not comply with the proper form of a decision.

In general, the essential parts of a good decision consist of the following:

(1) statement of the case; (2) statement of facts; (3) issues or assignment of errors; (4) court
ruling, in which each issue is, as a rule, separately considered and resolved; and, finally, (5) dispositive
portion. The ponente may also opt to include an introduction or a prologue as well as an epilogue,
especially in cases in which controversial or novel issues are involved.

Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in clear violation of the Constitution, because it made
no findings of facts and final disposition. Hence, it is void and deemed legally inexistent. Consequently,
there is nothing for this Court to review, affirm, reverse or even just modify.

Failure to comply with the constitutional injunction is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Decisions or orders issued in careless disregard of the constitutional
mandate are a patent nullity and must be struck down as void. Indeed, the RTC’s Decision cannot be
upheld for its failure to express clearly and distinctly the facts on which it was based. Thus, the trial court
clearly transgressed the constitutional directive.
 DOMINADOR L. TARUC v. BISHOP PORFIRIO B. DE LA CRUZ
G.R. No. 144801 (March 10, 2005)

Facts:
Respondent Bishop de la Cruz petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine
Independent Church for disobedience to duly constituted authority in the Church; inciting
dissension, resulting in division in the Parish of Our Mother of Perpetual Help, Iglesia Filipina
Independiente, Socorro, Surigao del Norte when they celebrated an open Mass at the Plaza on
June 19, 1996; and for threatening to forcibly occupy the Parish Church causing anxiety and
fear among the general membershipreasons
Petitioners filed a complaint contending that their expulsion was illegal because it was done
without trial thus violating their right to due process of law.

Issue:
WON the courts have jurisdiction to hear a case involving the expulsion/excommunication
of members of a religious institution.

Ruling:
The case at bar is purely ecclasiastical matters which is considered to be outside the
providence of the court due to the form of government where the complete separation of civil
and ecclesiastical authority is insisted upon. Hence, the civil courts must not allow themselves
to intrude unduly in matters of an ecclesiastical nature.

Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a religious organization except for the
protection of civil or property rights. Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court,
and the courts have jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title, use, or possession
of church property.

Those who unite to an ecclasiastical body do so with implied consent to submit to the
Church government and they are bound to submit to it. The power to exclude membership from
the church of those considered unworthy lies solely to the Church thus it is outside the province
of the civil court.

The expulsion of membership of the petitioners was legally made. They have not violated the
due process of law because they were given apportunity to be heared when they were also
warned of the consequences of their actions.