MARK DAVID DACULA

THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED

FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO
MANALO

G.R. No. 180906 (October 7, 2008)

Facts:
On February 14, 2006, brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were forcibly taken by
several armed soldiers allegedly because their brother was suspected to be one of the leaders of
the New People’s Army (NPA). They were held in captivity and tortured for eighteen months.
During their captivity, they learned that members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical
Unit (CAFGU), military units, and members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, led by
General Jovito Palparan are accountable for their abduction and torture. On August 13, 2007, the
Manalo brothers escaped the house where they were held captive in Pangasinan and boarded a
bus bound for Manila.

On August 23, 2007, the respondents (therein petitioners) filed a Petition for Prohibition,
Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). However, because the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007, therein petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus
Motion to Treat Existing Petition as an Amparo Petition. On December 26, 2007 the Court of
Appeals granted their petition for the Privilege of the Writ of Amparo requiring the Secretary of
National Defense and AFP Chief of Staff to furnish to the therein petitioners and to this Court
within five days from notice of this decision all official and unofficial reports of investigation,
places of official assignment of implicated military officers, and medical reports of therein
petitioners in connection with their case.

The herein petitioners filed an appeal before the Supreme Court alleging that the Court of
Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and giving full faith and credit to the
testimony of Raymond Manalo, and for requiring them to submit the abovementioned
information.

Issue:
WON the Court of Appeals erred in granting the petition for the Privilege of the Writ of
Amparo

Ruling:
No, the grant of the Privilege of the Writ of Amparo is valild. According to Section 1 of
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The
writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. Under Section
17 of the same Rule, the burden of proof required in this petition is substantial evidence.

Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. After careful perusal of the evidence
presented, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that respondents were abducted from
their houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14,
2006 and were continuously detained until they escaped on August 13, 2007. The abduction,
detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by respondent Raymond Manalo
in a clear and convincing manner. His account is dotted with countless candid details of
respondents' harrowing experience and tenacious will to escape, captured through his different
senses and etched in his memory.
 MARK DAVID DACULA

REVEREND FATHER ROBERT P. REYES vs. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity

as the Secretary of the Court of Appeals, Secretary Department Of Justice, and
COMMISSIONER MARCELINO C. LIBANAN, in his capacity as the Commissioner Of
the Bureau of Immigration

G.R. No. 182161     (December 3, 2009)

Facts:

On December 1, 2007, upon the request of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG), respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold Departure Order
(HDO) No. 45 ordering respondent Commissioner of Immigration to include in the Hold
Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) the name of petitioner Rev.
Father Robert P. Reyes and 49 others arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November
30, 2007 in the interest of national security and public safety.

On December 2, 2007, after finding probable cause against petitioner and 36 others for
the crime of Rebellion, the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors filed an Information before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 150 of Makati City. On December 13, 2007, the RTC issued an Order
dismissing the charge for Rebellion against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause.

On January 3, 2008, petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo
claiming that despite the dismissal of the rebellion case against petitioner, HDO No. 45 still
subsists. On January 24, 2008, respondents represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed the Return of the Writ contending that the Secretary of Justice is authorized to issue
Hold Departure Orders under the DOJ Circulars No. 17, Series of 1998 and No. 18 Series of
2007 and that the lifting of HDO No. 45 is premature in view of public respondent’s pending
Motion for Reconsideration dated January 3, 2008 in the dismissal of the criminal case against
herein petitioners.

On February 4, 2008, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and denying the
privilege of the Writ of Amparo. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
WON the petitioner's right to liberty has been violated by the issuance of the HDO No.
45, which would entitle him to the privilege of the Writ of Amparo

Ruling:
No, the petitioner's right to liberty has not been violated by the issuance of HDO No. 45.
The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. As we have stated in
Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, “a person’s right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed
by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused
should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the court’s
sound discretion." 

Here, the restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of

the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that
his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious
violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal
recourse or remedy. Under Section 22 on the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, “when a criminal
action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the
writ shall be available by motion in the criminal case.”
 MARK DAVID DACULA

Pursuant to the aforementioned Section 22, petitioner should have filed with the RTC-
Makati a motion to lift HDO No. 45. Petitioner, however, did not file in the RTC-Makati a
motion to lift the DOJ’s HDO.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS
DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, et al.

G.R. No. 191805               (November 15, 2011)

Facts:
On 6 September 2009, at 5:00 p.m., Rodriguez had just reached Barangay Tapel,
Cagayan onboard a tricycle driven by Hermie Antonio Carlos (Carlos), when four men forcibly
took him and forced him into a car. Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti
Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng
Pilipinas (KMP), which the military tagged as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay
Laya.

He was brought and held captive in a camp which belonged to the 17th Infantry Battalion
of the Philippine Army. He was subjected to torture to force him to admit his membership in the
New Peoples’ Army (NPA) and to share information about the said organization. In addition to
this, he was made to sign several documents to declare that he is a surenderree. On September
17, 2009, petitioner was released, and his mother and brother together with members of the
CHR, took him home with them to Manila. Subsequently a member of the CHR and 2 military
members went inside their house and took pictures for 30 minutes despite the efforts of
Rodriguez to stop them. Another event followed where Rodriguez and his girlfriend noticed that
they were being followed wherever they went.

Because of this, Rodriguez filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the
Writ of Habeas Data against former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and other officers of
the AFP on December 7, 2009. In the Return of Writ, the respondents alleged that Rodriguez was
a double agent serving for the military to get intel from the NPA.

The Court of Appeals, on April 12, 2010, ruled in favor of Rodriguez.Hence, this Petition
for Certiorari.

Issue:
WON the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in writs of amparo and habeas
data cases

Ruling:

Yes, the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in writs of amparo and habeas
data cases. In Rubrico v. Arroyo, command responsibility pertains to the "responsibility of
commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons
subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict." To hold someone liable under
the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must obtain: (a.) the existence of
a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator of the
crime as his subordinate; (b.) the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about
to be or had been committed; and (c.) the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.
In the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine
whether respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez
in order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing
precludes this Court from applying the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo
proceedings to ascertain responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases
in order to identify those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement
 MARK DAVID DACULA

whatever processes an amparo court would issue. In such application, the amparo court does not
impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best
position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party.