JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON

G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs HENRY T. GO

FACTS:
An information was filed against Henry Go for alleged violation of entering into a
contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government and for
having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile. On September
16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to
indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
While there was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was
no longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding
probable cause. On January 13, 2005 in an information respondent was charged
before the Sangguniang Bayan that on or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the late ARTURO ENRILE, then Secretary of the Department
of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), committing the offense in relation to
his office and taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy with accused, HENRY T.
GO, Chairman and President of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc.
(PIATCO), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a
Concession Agreement which terms are more beneficial to PIATCO while manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the government of the Republic of the Philippines. On
March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order that the prosecution is given a period of ten
(10) days to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused considering that the accused is a private person and
the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not
an accused in this case. The prosecution complied with the above Order contending
that the SB has already acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent by reason
of his voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation and when he
posted bail. The prosecution also argued that the SB has exclusive jurisdiction over
respondent's case, even if he is a private person, because he was alleged to have
conspired with a public officer. On April 28, 2005 Henry Go filed a Motion to Quash the
Information filed against him on the ground that the operative facts adduced therein do
not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the show
cause order of the SB, also contended that, independently of the deceased Secretary
Enrile, the public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired, respondent, who
is not a public officer nor was capacitated by any official authority as a government
agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019
ISSUE:
Whether respondent Henry Go, a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in
violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged
to have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the Information.
RULING:
Yes. As a rule, respondent Henry Go, a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy
in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was
alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the Information. Conspiracy is
in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone. The crime depends
upon the joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one
person cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or death of a co-
conspirator does not remove the bases of a charge for conspiracy, one defendant may
be found guilty of the offense. The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as
alleged in the Information filed against respondent, which is deemed hypothetically
admitted in the latter's Motion to Quash, he (respondent) conspired with Secretary
Enrile in violating Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 and that in conspiracy, the act of one is
the act of all. Hence, the criminal liability incurred by a co-conspirator is also incurred
by the other co-conspirators. Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the
avowed policy of the State and the legislative intent to repress "acts of public officers
and private persons alike, which constitute graft or corrupt practices,"20 would be
frustrated if the death of a public officer would bar the prosecution of a private person
who conspired with such public officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law.

G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006

JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON
vs.
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO

FACTS:
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon,
Isabela, which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer
Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness
protection program. Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo
Leaño, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu,
SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and
Elizer Tuliao in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City. The venue was later
transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all of the accused
and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who
was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to this
Court on automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused
therein on the ground of reasonable doubt. Sometime in September 1999, SPO2
Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn confession and
identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P.
Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for
the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao. Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal
complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and
submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding
Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2
Maderal. On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary
investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest. In the
hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of
petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that,
since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be
properly heard by the court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court has lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.

HELD:
Yes, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by
the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases
when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction
over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused
can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the
person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of
the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law. In
cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the
accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon
seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in
the custody of the law. The following cases best illustrate this point, where we granted
various reliefs to accused who were not in the custody of the law, but were deemed to
have placed their persons under the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these
cases involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information due to lack
of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.

G.R. No. 199113 March 18, 2015

RENATO M. DAVID
vs.
EDITHA A. AGBAY and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by
naturalization. Upon their retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines.
Sometime in 2000, they purchased a 600-square meter lot along the beach in
Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential house.
However, in the year 2004, they came to know that the portion where they built their
house is public land and part of the salvage zone. On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a
Miscellaneous Lease Application3 (MLA) over the subject land with the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said application, petitioner
indicated that he is a Filipino citizen. Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the
application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own
land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents under
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (I.S. No. 08-6463) against the petitioner.
In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application, he had
intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and that he had been assured by a
CENRO officer that he could declare himself as a Filipino. He further alleged that he
bought the property from the Agbays who misrepresented to him that the subject
property was titled land and they have the right and authority to convey the same. On
January 8, 2008, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its Resolution 7 finding
probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of Article 172 of the RPC and
recommending the filing of the corresponding information in court. Petitioner
challenged the said resolution in a petition for review he filed before the Department of
Justice (DOJ). On July 26, 2010, the petition for review filed by petitioner was denied
by the DOJ which held that the presence of the elements of the crime of falsification of
public document suffices to warrant indictment of the petitioner notwithstanding the
absence of any proof that he gained or intended to injure a third person in committing
the act of falsification. Consequently, an information for Falsification of Public
Document was filed before the MTC (Criminal Case No. 2012) and a warrant of arrest
was issued against the petitioner. On February 11, 2011, after the filing of the
Information and before his arrest, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Re-
Determination of Probable Cause in the MTC. Interpreting the provisions of the law
relied upon by petitioner, the said court denied the motion, holding that R.A. 9225
makes a distinction between those who became foreign citizens during its effectivity,
and those who lost their Philippine citizenship before its enactment when the governing
law was Commonwealth Act No. 63 (CA 63). Since the crime for which petitioner was
charged was alleged and admitted to have been committed on April 12, 2007 before he
had re- acquired his Philippine citizenship, the MTC concluded that petitioner was at
that time still a Canadian citizen. Thus, the MTC ordered for lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused, and for lack of merit, the motion was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the MTC had no jurisdiction over the person of the accused as the
motion filed by the accused was filed prior to his arrest.

RULING:
No. The MTC has jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Considering that the
petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his motion for re-determination of probable
cause, the MTC had jurisdiction. The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby
the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to
the merits or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain
the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before the
custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest
or voluntary surrender. In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative
relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by
impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, cases involving special
appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is
neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person
invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself
to the custody of the law. Hence, considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in
filing his motion for re-determination of probable cause, the MTC clearly erred in stating
that it lacked jurisdiction over his person. Notwithstanding such erroneous ground
stated in the MTC's order, the RTC correctly ruled that no grave abuse of discretion
was committed by the MTC in denying the said motion for lack of merit.

Arnold Alva vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 157331, April 12, 2006
(Bail)

FACTS:
Arnold Alva was accused of defrauding YUMI VERANGA HERVERA that in or about
and during the period covered between October 18, 1993 up to December 18, 1993,
inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there
willfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously defraud YUMI VERANGA y HERVERA by
means of false manifestation and fraudulent representation which he made to said
YUMI VERANGA y HERVERA to the effect that he could process the latter’s
application for U.S. Visa provided she would give the amount of P120,000.00, and by
means of other similar deceit, induced and succeeded in inducing said YUMI
VERANGA y HERVERA to give and deliver, as in fact she gave and delivered to said
accused the amount of P120,000.00 on the strength of said manifestation and
representation said accused well knowing that the same were false and untrue for the
reason that the U.S. Visa is not genuine and were made solely to obtain, as in fact he
did obtain the amount of P120,000.00 which amount once in his possession with intent
to defraud, he willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and
converted the said amount to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of the said YUMI VERANGA y HERVERA in the aforesaid amount
of P120,000.00, Philippine Currency. Petitioner was charged of the crime of estafa.
The RTC found petitioner guilty of estafa and direct the promulgation of its decision in
absentia and issuance of arrest warrant against petitioner for his failure to appear
before it despite due notice. However, the record of the RTC a document personal bail
bond issued by mega Pacific insurance corporation that it appeared that Alba admitted
to bail anew after his conviction. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the
RTC. On appeal, the CEO dismissed it stating that appellant has failed to submit
himself under the jurisdiction of the court since his conviction in 1999.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner failed to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court or to the
custody of the law despite the posting of the subject bail bond.

RULING:
Moreover, jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost at the instance of parties, as when an
accused escape from the custody of the law, but continues until the case
is terminated. Evidently, petitioner is correct in that there is no doubt that the RTC
already acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused petitioner when he
appeared at the arraignment and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged
notwithstanding the fact that he jumped bail and is now considered a fugitive. The
Court cannot say that petitioner has placed himself under the custody of the CIA, for
being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby
deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the
law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. Petitioner,
being a fugitive, until and unless he submits himself to the custody of the law, in the
manner of being under the jurisdiction of the courts, he cannot be granted any relief by
the CA.

CHANGE OF VENUE TO AVOID MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE

LUTGARDA CRUZ vs Court of Appeals

GR NO. 123340, AUGUST 29, 2002

FACTS:
The petitioner, Lutgarda Cruz is charged with the crime of estafa thru falsification of
public documents before the Manila Regional Trial Court. The accused allegedly
executed an Affidavit of Self – Adjudication of a parcel of land stating that she is the
sole surviving heir when the truth is there were other surviving heirs. The offended
party did not reserve the right to file a separate civil action arising from the criminal
offense, the civil action was deemed instituted in the criminal case. After the
prosecution of the case, the RTC rendered its decision acquitting the accused on the
ground of reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the Court also declared that the judgment on
the civil aspect of the case, ordering the return of the parcel of land to the surviving
heirs located in Bulacan. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the
court’s ruling on the civil aspect of the case. However, RTC denied the petitioner’s
motion on the ground that there was nothing to show that the office of the city
prosecutor (OCP, for brevity) was actually furnished or served with a copy of the said
motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period of fifteen days from receipt
by the accused. The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the
Court of Appeals (CA, for brevity) to nullify the two assailed orders of the trial court to
resolve her motion for reconsideration however CA denied the petitioner’s motion and
upheld the decision of RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether the court of appeals erred in finding that the regional trial court of manila had
jurisdiction to render judgment on the civil aspect of criminal case no. 87-57743 for
falsification of public document, involving a property located in Bulacan.

RULING:
No. There are three important requisites which must be present before a court can
acquire criminal jurisdiction. First, the court must have jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Second, the court must have jurisdiction over the territory where the offense
was committed. Third, the court must have jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
In the instant case, the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter as the law has
conferred on the court the power to hear and decide cases involving estafa through
falsification of a public document. The trial court also had jurisdiction over the offense
charged since the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction. The trial court
also acquired jurisdiction over the person of accused-petitioner because she voluntarily
submitted to the court’s authority. Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter and over the person of the accused, and the crime was committed within its
territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the
law requires the court to resolve. One of the issues in a criminal case is the civil liability
of the accused arising from the crime. Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that "Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." Article 104 of the
same Code states that "civil liability includes restitution." The action for recovery of civil
liability is deemed instituted in the criminal action unless reserved by the offended
party. In the instant case, the offended party did not reserve the civil action and the civil
action was deemed instituted in the criminal action. Although the trial court acquitted
petitioner of the crime charged, the acquittal, grounded on reasonable doubt, did not
extinguish the civil liability. Thus, the Manila trial court had jurisdiction to decide the
civil aspect of the instant case - ordering restitution even if the parcel of land is located
in Bulacan. Consequently, while we find no reversible error in the decision of the Court
of Appeals as to proof of service and the trial court’s jurisdiction on the civil aspect, we
remand this case for further proceedings in the interest of justice.

AAA vs. BBB G.R. No. 212448 - January 11, 2018

Facts:
Petitioner AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in Quezon City. They had
two children. BBB started working in Singapore as a chef on May 2007 and acquired a
permanent resident status on September 2008. BBB sent little to no financial support
and only sporadically. This allegedly compelled AAA to fly extra hours and take
additional jobs to augment to her income as a flight attendant. There were also
allegations of virtual abandonment, mistreatment of her and their son CCC, and
physical and sexual violence. To make matters worse, BBB supposedly started having
an affair with a Singaporean woman who he has been living with in Singapore. On April
19, 2011, when AAA and BBB had a violent altercation at a hotel room in Singapore
during her visit with their kids. The investigating prosecutor found sufficient basis to
charge BBB with causing AAA mental and emotional anguish through his alleged
marital infidelity. A warrant of arrest was issued against BBB. AAA was also able to
secure a Hold-Departure Order against BBB who continued to evade the warrant of
arrest. Consequently, BBB filed a Motion to Quash which the trial court on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction and thereby dismissed the case.

Issue:
Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over complaint for psychological
abuse under Republic Act No. 9262 otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against
Women and their Children Act of 2004 when committed through marital infidelity
outside the country.

Ruling:
Yes. Philippine courts have jurisdiction over complaint for psychological abuse under
Republic Act No. 9262 otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and their
Children Act of 2004 when committed through marital infidelity outside the country.
Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the
mental or emotional anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the
means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the
effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. It is necessary,
for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive conduct or act of violence
under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 in relation to Section 3(a), Paragraph (C) was
committed outside Philippine territory, that the victim be a resident of the place where
the complaint is filed in view of the anguish suffered being a material element of the
offense. In the present scenario, the offended wife and children of respondent husband
are residents of Pasig City since March of 2010. Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may
exercise jurisdiction over the case.

JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER

GUEVARRA Vs ALMODOVAR
G.R. No.: 75256 , January 26, 1989

Facts:
Petitioner John Philip Guevarra, then 11 years old, was playing with his best friend
Teodoro Almine, Jr. and three other children in their backyard in the morning of 29
October 1984. They were target-shooting a bottle cap (tansan) placed around fifteen
(15) to twenty (20) meters away with an air rifle borrowed from a neighbour. In the
course of their game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collar bone which caused
his unfortunate death. After conducting a preliminary investigation, the examining
Fiscal exculpated petitioner due to his age and because the unfortunate occurrence
appeared to be an accident. The victim's parents appealed to the Ministry of Justice,
which ordered the Fiscal to file a case against petitioner for Homicide through reckless
Imprudence on the ground that the petitioner acted with discernment. On 25 October
1985, petitioner moved to quash the said information on the grounds that the facts
charged do not constitute offense; that the information contains averments which if true
would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and that this honorable court has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged and the person of the defendant. This motion, in
an Order dated 4 April 1986, was denied with respect to the first and third grounds
relied upon. However, the resolution of the second ground was deferred until evidence
shall have been presented during trial. On 26 July 1986, Mr. Guevarra present petition
for certiorari implying that discernment connotes intent.
Issues:
Whether or Not the court had jurisdiction over the case notwithstanding the fact that it
did not pass thru the barangay Lupon.

Ruling:
Yes. P.D. 1508 is not jurisdictional. It is contended by the petitioner that the case
against him should have first been brought before the Lupong Tagapayapa pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1508, Section 2(3). The petitioner, in his arguments, asserts
that since P.D. 1508 has not been complied with, the trial court has no jurisdiction over
the case. This is not correct. The jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is
determined by the penalty imposable under the law for the offense and not the
penalty ultimately imposed. This erroneous perception has been corrected long
before. As intimated in the case of Royales vs. IAC, 127 SCRA 470. Thus, the petition
is dismissed for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 188694 February 12, 2014

RICARDO L. ATIENZA AND ALFREDO A. CASTRO, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
This case involves crimes of Robbery and Falsification of Public Document against
Atienza and Castro. Atienza and Castro (petitioners) are employees of the CA,
particularly assigned to its Budget Division and holding the positions of Budget Officer I
and Utility Worker I. Atibula, Custodian of CA decisions was invited by Castro to attend
Atienza's party where the latter introduced Atibula to a certain Dario and asked him to
assist in searching for the CA decision. Thereafter, Atibula and Dario returned to the
office and searched for the decision. Dario requested Atibula to insert a decision in one
of the volumes of CA Original Decisions where the latter refused and immediately left.
Atienza offered Atibula 50,000 in exchange for records. Atibula reported the incident.
He further discovered that some of the volumes were missing which he also reported
Nelson de Casto, Clerk IV detailed at the CA Reporter's Division handed to Atibula a
bag containing a gift-wrapped package which turned out to be the missing records. He
claimed that it was Castro who asked him to deliver the said package to Atibula. The
contents of the returned records were reviewed by Atibula and it was found that there
were new documents inserted therein. Upon Atibula's comparison, it was found that the
duplicate original decisions did not bear such promulgations. On investigation, it was
found that the signatures of the justices were forged. Atienza denied the allegations.
RTC found that there is conspiracy. CA affirmed RTCs decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC have jurisdiction to take cognizance of Criminal Case No. 01-
197426.

RULING:
No. It bears mentioning that the RTC did not have jurisdiction to take cognizance of
Criminal Case No. 01-197426 since Falsification of Public Document under Article
172(1) of the RPC, which is punishable by prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods (or imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) and a
fine of not more than ₱5,000.00, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
pursuant to Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, otherwise known as the
"Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," as amended by RA 7691. While petitioners
raised this jurisdictional defect for the first time in the present petition, they are not
precluded from questioning the same. Indeed, jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred only by the Constitution or the law and cannot be acquired through a waiver
or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the
court. The rule is well-settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings. Hence, questions of jurisdiction may be
cognizable even if raised for the first time on appeal.

Panfilo M. Lacson v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999

FACTS:
Petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as a principal in eleven (11)
information for murder before the Sandiganbayan's Second Division. Upon motion by
all the accused in the 11 information, the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a motion
for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's action. After conducting a reinvestigation, the
Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996, eleven (11) amended informations before the
Sandiganbayan, wherein the petitioner was charged only as an accessory, along with
Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and others. One of the accused was dropped
from the case. On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations,
the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2
(paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975. They contend that the said law limited
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the "principal
accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (S.G.) 27 or higher or PNP
officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The
highest-ranking principal accused in the amended information has the rank of only a
Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least S.G. 27. On May 17, 1996, the
Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for reconsideration, insisting that the cases
should remain with the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by the petitioner and some
of the accused.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over criminal case where one or more
of the "principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (S.G.) 27 or
higher or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or
higher.

RULING:
No. In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to
salary Grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military
and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be
vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court,
and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their jurisdictions as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions, or orders of
regional trial courts, whether in the exercise of their original jurisdiction or their
appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over petitions of the issuance of the writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and
processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature,
including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed
under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the
jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
Considering that herein, the petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder,
which is a felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing
on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A.
8249. Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of
murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused
PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and,
therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, not the
Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan was directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos.
23047 to 23057 (for multiple murders) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
which has exclusive original jurisdiction over the said cases.

G.R. No. 152398. April 14, 2005

EDGAR CRISOSTOMO, Petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.

FACTS:
Accused Pat. Edgar T. Crisostomo, from Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, a public officer, being
then a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed at Solano Police
Station and a jailer thereat, taking advantage of his public position and thus committing
the offense in relation to his office, conspiring, confederating and conniving with his six
co-accused who are inmates of the Solano Municipal Jail, with intent to kill and with
treachery, taking advantage of superior strength and with the aid of armed men or
employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford
impunity, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and assault one
Renato Suba, a detention prisoner, with the use of rough-surfaced instruments,
including fist blows, inflicting upon him serious injuries causing his internal organs to be
badly damaged such as his liver, mesentery and stomach resulting to the death of said
Renato Suba to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the latter. Crisostomo was
charged with the murder of Renato. The Information alleged that Crisostomo conspired
with his co-accused, all inmates at the Solano Municipal Jail, in murdering Renato.
Crisostomo assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter,
trial ensued. The Sandiganbayan found sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict
Crisostomo and Calingayan of murder. The Sandiganbayan relied on the autopsy and
exhumation reports in disregarding the defense theory that Renato committed suicide
by hanging himself with a blanket. The Sandiganbayan thus held Edgar Crisostomo
and Mario Calingayan guilty of the crime of murder.
ISSUE:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the crime of murder charged against
Crisostomo who is a Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) at the time of the filing of the
information against him.
RULING:
Yes. The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to try the case. The Information alleged that
Crisostomo "a public officer, being then a member of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) stationed at Solano Police Station and a jailer thereat, taking advantage of his
public position and thus committing the offense in relation to his office" conspired,
confederated and connived with his co-accused who are inmates of the Solano
Municipal Jail to kill Renato, "a detention prisoner." If the victim were not a prisoner,
the Information would have to state particularly the intimate relationship between the
offense charged and the accused public officer’s office to vest jurisdiction on the
Sandiganbayan. This is not the case here. The law restrains the liberty of a prisoner
and puts him under the custody and watchful eyes of his jail guard. Again, the two-fold
duties of a jail guard are to insure the safe custody and proper confinement of
persons detained in the jail. The law restricts access to a prisoner. However, because
of the very nature of the work of a jail guard, he has access to the
prisoner. Crisostomo, as the jail guard, could not have conspired with the
inmates to murder the detention prisoner in his cell if Crisostomo were not a
"jailer." The Information accused Crisostomo of murdering a detention prisoner, a
crime that collides directly with Crisostomo’s office as a jail guard who has the duty to
insure the safe custody of the prisoner. Crisostomo’s purported act of killing a detention
prisoner, while irregular and contrary to Crisostomo’s duties, was committed while he
was performing his official functions. The Information sufficiently apprised Crisostomo
that he stood accused of committing the crime in relation to his office, a case that is
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, not the Regional Trial Court. There was no
prejudice to Crisostomo’s substantive rights. However, the prosecution failed to prove
Crisostomo and Calingayan’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the court acquitted
Crisostomo and Calingayan.

G.R. Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993

ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, petitioner,
vs.
The Honorable HARRIET O. DEMETRIOU (in her capacity as Presiding Judge of
Regional Trial Court, NCR, Branch 70, Pasig), The Honorable FRANKLIN DRILON
(in his capacity as Secretary of Justice), JOVENCITO R. ZUÑO, LEONARDO C.
GUIYAB, CARLOS L. DE LEON, RAMONCITO C. MISON, REYNALDO J. LUGTU,
and RODRIGO P. LORENZO, the last six respondents in their official capacities
as members of the State Prosecutor's Office), respondents.
FACTS:
The Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the filing of appropriate charges
against several persons, including the petitioner, in connection with the rape-slay of
Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez. The Panel of State Prosecutors
of the Department of Justice conducted a preliminary investigation on August 9, 1993.
Petitioner Sanchez was not present but was represented by his counsel, Atty.
Marciano Brion, Jr. PNP Commander Rex Piad issued an "invitation" to the petitioner
requesting him to appear for investigation. Sanchez was positively identified by Aurelio
Centeno, and SPO III Vivencio Malabanan, who both executed confessions implicating
him as a principal in the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. After the
hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez in connection with Criminal Cases
Nos. 93-124634 to 93-124637 for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 1, of R.A.
No. 6713. The respondent prosecutors filed with the Regional Trial Court of Calamba,
Laguna, seven informations charging Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio
Corcolon, Pepito Kawit, Baldwin Brion, Jr., George Medialdea and Zoilo Ama with the
rape and killing of Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Because of the tense and partisan
atmosphere in Laguna in favor of the petitioner and the relationship of an employee, in
the trial court with one of the accused the Court ordered to transfer the venue of the
seven cases to Pasig, Metro Manila, where they were raffled to respondent Judge
Harriet Demetriou. The seven informations were amended to include the killing of Allan
Gomez as an aggravating circumstance. The petitioner filed a motion to quash the
informations substantially on the grounds now raised in this petition. After oral
arguments, the respondent judge denied the motion. Sanchez then filed with this Court
the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining
order/writ of injunction. The petitioner argues that the seven informations filed against
him should be quashed because he was denied the right to present evidence at the
preliminary investigation; only the Ombudsman had the competence to conduct the
investigation; his warrantless arrest is illegal and the court has therefore not acquired
jurisdiction over him, he is being charged with seven homicides arising from the death
of only two persons; the informations are discriminatory because they do not include
Teofilo Alqueza and Edgardo Lavadia; and as a public officer, he can be tried for the
offense only by the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the accused.

RULING:
No. The crime of rape with homicide with which the petitioner stands charged obviously
does not fall under paragraph (1), which deals with graft and corruption cases. Neither
is it covered by paragraph (2) because it is not an offense committed in relation to the
office of the petitioner. The office must be a constituent element of the crime as defined
in the statute, such as, for instance, the crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two
to Six, Title Seven, of the Revised Penal Code. Public office is not of the essence of
murder. The taking of human life is either murder or homicide whether done by a
private citizen or public servant, and the penalty is the same except when the
perpetrator being a public functionary took advantage of his office, as alleged in this
case, in which event the penalty is increased. It is apparent from these allegations that,
although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in abstract, as
committed by the main respondents herein, according to the amended information, the
offense therein charged is intimately connected with their respective offices and was
perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their
official functions. Indeed, they had no personal motive to commit the crime and they
would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. The co-
defendants of respondent Leroy S. Brown, obeyed his instructions because he was
their superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan City. The SC find no allegation therein that
the crime of rape with homicide imputed to the petitioner was connected with the
discharge of his functions as municipal mayor or that there is an “intimate connection”
between the offense and his office. It follows that the said crime, being an ordinary
offense, is triable by the regular courts and not the Sandiganbayan.

GR No. 154886 July 28, 2005

Ludwig H. Adaza
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (the First DIVISION composed of Justices GREGORIO S.
ONG, CATALINO R. CASTANEDA, JR. and FRANCISCO H. VILLARUZ, JR. and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by SPECIAL PROSECUTION
OFFICE
FACTS:
The Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) of the 1st District of
Zamboanga del Norte awarded to the Parents and Teachers Association (PTA) of
Manawan National High School (MNHS) a contract for the construction of a school
building consisting of two classrooms at an agreed consideration of ₱111,319.50.
Petitioner at that time was municipal mayor of Jose Dalman. Upon verification with the
DPWH, PTA President Felix Mejorada (Mejorada) was informed by Hazel Peñaranda
(Peñaranda), Cashier II of the 1st Engineering District of Zamboanga del Norte, that
the check for ₱20,847.17 had been released to petitioner. Confronted with
Disbursement Voucher No. B-1019707309 issued by the DPWH, the signature above
the printed name thereon acknowledging receipt of the check from Releasing Officer-
Cashier Peñaranda was noticed that petitioner’s signature was affixed on the voucher.
Upon perusal of DBP Check issued to payee and drawn by OIC Assistant District
Engineer Jesus G. Sy and District Engineer Estimo, Mejorada noticed that there were
two signatures at the dorsal portion thereof, his forged signature and another which he
found to be that of Aristela Adaza (Aristela), wife of petitioner. The complaint, for
falsification of public document, was forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman. The
Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding probable cause against
petitioner and Aristela. The petitioner was charged in two Informations filed before the
Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty in the first case, and
acquitted him and his wife Aristela in the second case for insufficiency of evidence.
Petitioner’s present petition for certiorari faulting the Sandiganbayan to have committed
grave abuse of discretion. The law office of Atty. Felipe Antonio B. Remollo entered its
appearance for petitioner filed a Supplement to the petition raising the honorable
respondent Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the offense charged of falsification
of public documents under article 172 paragraph 1 in relation to article 171 paragraph 1
of the revised penal code against the accused (former) municipal mayor (with salary
grade 27) who did not take advantage of his official position in the alleged commission
of the crime as ruled by the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense charged of falsification
of public documents under article 172 paragraph 1 in relation to article 171 paragraph 1
of the revised penal code against the accused municipal mayor with salary grade 27.

RULING:
No. Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the offense charged of falsification of
public documents under article 172 paragraph 1 in relation to article 171 paragraph 1 of
the revised penal code against the accused municipal mayor with salary grade 27.
There is no showing that the alleged falsification was committed by the accused, if at
all, as a consequence of, and while they were discharging, official functions. The
information does not allege that there was an intimate connection between the
discharge of official duties and the commission of the offense. Clearly therefore, as the
alleged falsification was not an offense committed in relation to the office of the
accused, it did not come under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It follows that all
its acts in the instant case are null and void ab initio. As for petitioner’s assertion that
the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the offense of falsification under Article 172
in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, to buttress which he argues that
the offender under Article 172, paragraph 1 is not supposed to be a public official who
takes advantage of his position, thus equating the requirement of "taking advantage of
one’s public position" as stated in the aforementioned provisions of the Revised Penal
Code with the prerequisite "in relation to one’s office" for the acquisition of jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan as provided for in R.A. 8249, the same must be discredited. The
offender under Article 172 must be a private individual or maybe a public officer,
employee or notary public who does not "take advantage of his official position." Under
Article 171, an essential element of the crime is that the act of falsification must be
committed by a public officer, employee or notary who "takes advantage of his official
position." The Decision dated June 19, 2002 and Resolution dated July 3, 2002 of the
Sandiganbayan are set aside and declared null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

G.R. No. 180010 July 30, 2010

CENITA M. CARIAGA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Facts:
Cenita M. Cariaga, as the Municipal Treasurer of Cabatuan, Isabela with a salary
grade of 24 was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan City in Isabela
with three counts of malversation of public funds, defined under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code. The first case a public officer, being the Municipal Treasurer of
Cabatuan, Isabela, and as such is accountable for taxes, fees and monies collected
and/or received by her by reason of her position, acting in relation to her office and
taking advantage of the same, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, misappropriate and convert to her personal use the amount of TWOTHOUSAND
SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTYFIVE PESOS (P2,785.00). The two other Informations in
the second and third criminal cases, Nos. 1294 and 1295, contain the same allegations
except the malversed amounts which are ₱25,627.38 and ₱20,735.13, respectively.
Branch 20 of the Cauayan RTC, by Joint Decision convicted petitioner in the three
cases finding the accused CENITA M. CARIAGA, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of MALVERSATION and in the absence of any mitigating circumstance.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals dismissed petitioner’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that it is the
Sandiganbayan which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereon. Jurisdiction over the
offense is vested with the Regional Trial Court considering that the position of
Municipal Treasurer corresponds to a salary grade below 27. It is the Sandiganbayan,
to the exclusion of all others, which enjoys appellate jurisdiction over the offense.
Conviction for malversation of public funds was improperly made.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA has a jurisdiction over the matter?

RULING:
No. Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that the dismissal of improper
appeal to the Court of Appeals an appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals
shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright. That
appellate jurisdiction in this case pertains to the Sandiganbayan is clear. Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, so directs
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No.
6758,or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction
thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to
their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of
their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. Rules
of procedure must be viewed as tools to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that
any rigid and strict application thereof which results in technicalities tending to frustrate
substantial justice must always be avoided. The judge was expected to know and
should have known the law and the rules of procedure. He should have known when
appeals are to be taken to the CA and when they should be forwarded to the
Sandiganbayan.

G.R. No 227577, January 24, 2018

ANGEL FUELLAS DIZON, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.

FACTS:
That on or about July 4, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
being then an employee of the Manila Traffic and Parking Bureau, City of Manila,
holding the position of Clerk II, hence, a government and/or public employee, entrusted
in the collection of parking fees from various establishments with the corresponding
obligation on the part of the accused to remit the collections made by him and submit
the triplicate copy of the official receipt to the City Treasurer of Manila and therefore,
responsible and accountable for the funds collected and received by him by reason of
his duties as such, with intent to defraud the City Government of Manila, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit the crime of malversation of public
funds through falsification of public document the said accused prepared, forged and
falsified and/or caused to be prepared, forged and falsified Official Receipt (OR) No.
3272946 C which is similar and/or an imitation of the Official Receipt No. 3272946 C
issued by the City Treasurer of the City of Manila and therefore, a public document, by
then and there printing and/or causing to be filled in the blank spaces thereon,
consisting, among others, the date "7/4/06" and the amount of Php200.00, thereby
making it appear as it did appear, the said O.R. No. 3272946 C in the said amount
Php200.00 is genuine as he remitted the sum of Php200.00 to the City Treasurer of
Manila and submitted the triplicate copy of said receipt in the said amount of
Php200.00, when in truth and in fact, as the said accused fully well knew, such is not
the case in that said document is an outright forgery because the true and original
amount appearing in the original O.R. No. 3272946 is Php12,000.00 and not
Php200.00, thus, having the difference of Php11,800.00, and once in possession of the
said amount of Php11,800.00, said accused, with intent to defraud and grave abuse of
trust and confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate, embezzle and take away from the funds of the City Government of
Manila the said amount of Php11,800.00 which he misappropriated, misapplied and
converted to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of City
Government of Manila, represented by Franklin Gacutan, Jr., in the aforesaid amount
of Php11,800.00, Philippine Currency.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioner’s Motion to Endorse Case
to the Sandiganbayan.

RULING:
The petition is meritorious. It is undisputed that petitioner is a low-ranking public officer
having a salary grade below 27, whose appeal from the RTC's ruling convicting him of
six (6) counts of Malversation of Public Funds Through Falsification of Public
Documents falls within the appellate jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, pursuant to
Section 4 (c) of RA 8249 prior to its amendment by RA 10660. "In cases where none of
the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade '27' or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers mentioned
above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial
court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court as the
case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, as amended. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders or regional trial courts whether in
the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein
provided. The trial court, on the other hand, was duty bound to forward the records of
the case to the proper forum, the Sandiganbayan. It is unfortunate that the RTC judge
concerned ordered the pertinent records to be forwarded to the wrong court, to the
great prejudice of petitioner. Cases involving government employees with a salary
grade lower than 27 are fairly common, albeit regrettably so. The judge was expected
to know and should have known the law and the rules of procedure. He should have
known when appeals are to be taken to the CA and when they should be forwarded to
the Sandiganbayan. He should have conscientiously and carefully observed this
responsibility specially in cases such as this where a person's liberty was at stake. The
Court therefore finds that a more thorough review and appreciation of the evidence for
the prosecution and defense, as well as a proper application of the imposable penalties
in the present case by the Sandiganbayan, would do well to assuage petitioner that his
appeal is decided scrupulously. In fine, the Court holds that petitioner's Motion to
Endorse should be granted. Consequently, the CA Resolutions dated June 16, 2016
and October 6, 2016 are set aside. The CA is hereby directed to remand the records of
this case, together with all the oral and documentary evidence, to the RTC for
transmission to the Sandiganbayan, with reasonable dispatch.

G.R. No. 133289 December 23, 1999

LICERIO A. ANTIPORDA, JR., ELITERIO RUBIACO, VICTOR GASCON and
CAESAR TALIA petitioners,
vs.
HON. FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, HON.
CATALINO CASTAÑEDA, JR. in their capacity as Presiding Justice and
Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan, respondents.
Facts:
The kidnapping of Elmer Ramos was filed with the First Division of the Sandiganbayan,
comprised of the petitioners. The information did not allege the pertinent details to be
clear that the crime was office related. The court wanted to clarify the propriety of the
proceeding with the information as it stands. Prosecutor informed court that there was
indeed inadequacies in the information so she was allowed to submit an amendment.
At a later date, the court issued an order giving the prosecution thirty days to amend
the information which it complied further indicating thereon the office related character
of the accused and the same was admitted by the Sandiganbayan. The amendment
contained such details like Antiporda being the Municipal Mayor, Gallardo being a
Barangay Captain, and Rubiaco being a barangay councilman. The
petitioner was brought to the residence of the Mayor and stayed for more than 5
days. In light of the amendment, accused then filed Urgent Omnibus Motion praying
that a reinvestigation of the case be conducted and the issuance of warrants of arrest
be deferred. Motion was denied since there was nothing in the amended information
that was added to the original information so that the accused could not claim a right to
be heard separately in an investigation. Also, since none of them submitted themselves
to the jurisdiction of the court, the accused were not in a position to be heard on the
matter. Accused then filed a Motion to Quash amended information for lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged but denied since the accused have failed to
submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court. The amended information vests the
court jurisdiction as it includes the office related character of the offense. A motion for
reconsideration was filed and that their filing of the motion to quash and the
appearance of their counsel during the scheduled hearing amounted to voluntary
submission to the court

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense charged.

HELD
Yes. The Sandiganbayan exercises not only civil but also criminal
jurisdiction involving offenses or felonies committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office. Criminal jurisdiction is the authority to hear and try
a particular offense and impose the punishment for it. The requirements wherein a
court acquires jurisdiction to try a criminal case are first, the offense is one
which the court is by law authorized to take cognizance of; second, the
offense must have been committed within its territorial jurisdiction; and
lastly, the person charged with the offense must have been brought in to its forum for
trial, forcibly by warrant of arrest or upon his voluntary submission to the court. The
Sandiganbayan insisted that said court acquired jurisdiction over their motion to quash
which is a tantamount to a voluntary submission to the Court’s authority. For therein, it
was ruled that the voluntary appearance of the accused at the pre-suspension hearing
amounted to his submission to the court’s jurisdiction even if no warrant of arrest has
yet been issued. Furthermore, it was they who "challenged the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court over the case and clearly stated in their Motion for
Reconsideration that the said crime is work connected”. Therefore, the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction over the case because of estoppel and it was thus vested with the
authority to order the amendment of the Information. In reference with Section 14, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court provides "SECTION 14. Amendment. The information or
complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time
before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form,
by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without
prejudice to the rights of the accused. As an aside, an offense is considered committed
in relation to office when it is intimately connected with their respective offices and was
perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their
official functions.

[G.R. NO. 155573 : April 24, 2009]

PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. ALFREDO L.
BENIPAYO, Respondent.

Facts:
Benipayo was then the Chairman of the COMELEC delivered a speech in a
“Forum on electoral problems: Roots and responses in the Philippines” and later on
publish in Manila to Bulletin. Petitioner Photokina Marketing Corporation
believing as one being alluded to by the respondent through its counsel filed an
affidavit complaint for libel considered respondent statement as defamatory.
Respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the office of the City prosecutor
arguing that he was an impeachable officer. The trial court dismissed the case for
lack of jurisdiction considering that alleged libel was committed by respondent
in relation to his office as unofficial COMELEC Chairman and it was
Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to hear the libel case.

Issue: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over libel cases to the exclusion of all other
courts.

Ruling:
The grant to the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over offenses committed in
relation to public office, similar to the expansion of the jurisdiction of the MTC’s,
did not divest the RTC of its exclusive and jurisdiction. To try written defamation cases
regardless of whether the offense is committed in relation to the office. The broad and
general phraseology of Section 4, PD No.1606 as amended by RA number 8249
cannot be construed to have impliedly repeated. Or even simply modified such
as exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC period since jurisdiction over
written defamations exclusively rest in the RTC without qualification, it is unnecessary
and futile for the parties to argue on whether the crime is committed in relation to the
office. Thus, the conclusion reached by the trial court that the respondent committed
libel in relation to this office is a gross error.

G.R. No. 144261-62 May 9, 2001

PRUDENTE D. SOLLER, M.D., PRECIOSA M. SOLLER, M.D., RODOLFO I.
SALCEDO, JOSEFINA B. MORADA, MARIO M. MATINING, and ROMMEL M.
LUARCA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:
In the evening of March 14, 1997, Jerry Macabael, a municipal guard, was shot and
killed along a national highway at Bansud, Oriental Mindoro while driving a motorcycle
together with petitioner Soller‘s son. The body was then brought to a medical clinic
located in the house of Petitioner Dr. Prudente Soller and his wife Dr. Preciosa Soller,
who were the municipal mayor and municipal health officer, respectively. The crime
was investigated by co-petitioner SPO4 Mario Matining. An autopsy was then
conducted on the same night the victim was brought to the clinic with the assistance of
petitioners Rodolfo Salcedo, Sanitary Inspector, and petitioner Josefina Morada, Rural
Health Midwife. When the autopsy report was released, the widow of Macabael filed a
complaint with the office of the Ombudsman charging the petitioners with conspiracy to
mislead the investigation of the fatal shootout by (a) altering his wound (b) concealing
his brain; (c) falsely stating in police report that he had several gunshot wounds when
in truth he had only one; and d) falsely stating in an autopsy report that there was no
blackening around his wound when in truth there was. Petitioners denied the
allegations. The Office of the Ombudsman recommended filing an information for
obstruction of justice (violation of PD 1829). Two Informations were filed with the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioners filed a motion to quash on the ground that the
Sandiganbayan was without jurisdiction over the offenses charged. Motion to quash
was denied on the ground that” the accusation involves the performance of the duties
of at least one (1) of the accused public officials, and if the Mayor is indeed properly
charged together with that official, then the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
entire case and over all the co-accused.” A motion for reconsideration was filed but
was subsequently denied by the Sandiganbayan. Thus, the petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an offense committed by a
Municipal Mayor who was not acting in his official capacity.

RULING:
No. The Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, which is provided for in Sec. 4 of PD 1606
provides, among others, that: The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:(a)Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where
one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense: [xxx](5) All other national and local officials classified as
Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989. [xxx](b) Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crime
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this
section in relation to their office. In the case at bar, the petitioners claim that for the
Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction, the information should allege that the offense
committed was intimately related to their offices and perpetrated by them in their official
functions. The Supreme Court, citing previous jurisprudence, ruled that it is not
necessary that the phrase “committed in violation to public office” appears in the
information. What is controlling in the determination of the jurisdiction is the specific
factual allegation in the information that would indicate close intimacy between the
discharge of the accused’s official duties and the commission of the offense charged in
order to qualify the crimes as having been committed in relation to public office. The
respondents’ failed to establish an intimate relationship between the offenses charged
and the discharge of petitioners’ official duties in the information. It is not within the
function of a Municipal Mayor to conduct an autopsy of a crime victim. Thus, the failure
to indicate in the information that the charges are intimately related to the offenders’
official functions, the case falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, not the
Sandiganbayan.

G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada
as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term. Petitioner discussed with
President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman. Petitioner, with
her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the
Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). One of the projects of the
OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex. President Estrada gave Fifteen
Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed
renovation. The source of the funds, according to the information, was the Office of the
President. The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The succeeding
student regent and the Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide
alliance of student councils within the state university, consequently filed a complaint
for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman. The
Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict petitioner and her
brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa. Petitioner moved to quash the information. She
claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense
charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent, claiming that she
was not a public officer since she merely represented her peers, in contrast to the other
regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity. She added that she was a
simple student and did not receive any salary as a student regent. The OMB opposed
the motion. As a member of the BOR, she has the general powers of administration
and exercises the corporate powers of UP. The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s
motion for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petitioner UP student regent.

RULING:
Yes. Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petitioner. Petitioner UP student
regent is a public officer. Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary
Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student. This is bereft of merit. It is
not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606.
Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by
express provision of law. Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explicitly vested the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan
pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a
non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer
as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606. Moreover, it is well established that compensation
is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is merely incidental to the public
office. Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment
in an individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.

G.R. Nos. 162144-54 November 13, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MA. THERESA L. DELA TORRE- YADAO, Respondents.
FACTS:
The combined forces of the Philippine National Police’s Anti-Bank Robbery and
Intelligence Task Group (PNP ABRITG) composed of Task Force Habagat killed 11
suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang along Commonwealth Avenue in
Quezon City. Subsequently, SPO2 Eduardo Delos Reyes of the Criminal Investigation
Command told the press that it was a summary execution, not a shoot-out between the
police and those who were slain. Upon respondents’ motion, the Sandiganbayan
ordered the transfer of their cases to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on the
ground that none of the principal accused had the rank of Chief Superintendent or
higher. Pending the resolution of the Office of the Special Prosecutor’s motion for
reconsideration of the transfer order, Congress passed Republic Act 8249 that
expanded the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction by deleting the word principal from the
phrase principal accused to apply to all pending cases where trial had not begun. As a
result of this new law, the Sandiganbayan opted to retain and try the Kuratong
Baleleng murder cases. Respondent Lacson challenged the constitutionality of RA
8249 in GR 128096 but this Court upheld its validity. Nonetheles, the Court ordered the
transfer of the trial of the cases to the RTC of Quezon City since the amended
informations contained no allegations that respondents committed the offenses
charged in relation to, or in the discharge of, their official functions as required by RA
8249. On March 29, 1999 the RTC of Quezon City ordered the provisional dismissal of
the cases for lack of probable cause to hold the accused for trial following the
recantation of the principal prosecution witnesses and the desistance of the private
complainants. On March 27, 2001 PNP Director Leandro R. Mendoza sought to revive
the cases against respondents by requesting the Department of Justice to conduct
another preliminary investigation. Thus, on June 12, 2003 the panel of prosecutors
found probable cause to hold Lacson and his co-accused liable as principals for 11
counts of murder, resulting in the filing of the separate informations against them in
Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 81, now
presided over by respondent Judge Ma. Theresa L. Yadao. On October 12, 2003 the
parents of two of the victims submitted birth certificates showing that they were minors.
Apparently reacting to this, the prosecution amended the informations to show such
minority and asked respondent Executive Judge Ma. Natividad M. Dizon to recall the
assignment of the cases to Branch 81 and re-raffle them to a family court. The request
for recall was denied. On November 12, 2003 Judge Yadao issued an order, denying
the prosecution’s motion for reraffle to a family court on the ground that Section 5 of
RA 8369 applied only to living minors. She also granted the motions for determination
of probable cause and dismissed the cases against the respondents since the
affidavits of the prosecution witnesses were inconsistent with those they submitted in
the preliminary investigations before the Ombudsman for the crime of robbery.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she dismissed the
criminal actions on the ground of lack of probable cause.

RULING:
No. The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she
set the motions for determination of probable cause for hearing, deferred the issuance
of warrants of arrest, and allowed the defense to mark its evidence and argue its case.
The general rule of course is that the judge is not required, when determining probable
cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests, to conduct a de novo hearing. The judge
only needs to personally review the initial determination on of the prosecutor finding a
probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. But here, the
prosecution conceded that their own witnesses tried to explain in their new affidavits
the inconsistent statements that they earlier submitted to the Office of the
Ombudsman. Consequently, it was not unreasonable for Judge Yadao, for the purpose
of determining probable cause based on those affidavits, to hold a hearing and
examine the inconsistent statements and related documents that the witnesses
themselves brought up and were part of the records. The SC held that the evidence on
record clearly fails to establish probable cause against the respondents. The
prosecution points out that, rather than dismiss the criminal action outright, Judge
Yadao should have ordered the panel of prosecutors to present additional evidence
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court gives the trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal information: (1)
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause;
(2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt as to the
existence of probable cause. But the option to order the prosecutor to present
additional evidence is not mandatory. The court’s first option under the above is for it to
“immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause.” That is the situation here: the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause against the respondents. In the absence of probable cause to
indict respondents for the crime of multiple murder, they should be insulated from the
tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.

G.R. No. 193253 September 8, 2015

BUREAU OF CUSTOMS,
vs.
THE HONORABLE AGNES VST DEVANADERA, et. al

Facts:
Private respondent UNIOIL Petroleum Philippines, Inc. is engaged in marketing,
distribution, and sale of petroleum, oil and other products, while its correspondent
OILINK International, Inc. is engaged in manufacturing, importing, exporting, buying,
selling, or otherwise dealing in at wholesale and retails of petroleum, oil, gas and of
any and all refinements and by-products thereof. On January 30, 2007, Commissioner
Napoleon L. Morales of petitioner Bureau of Customs issued Audit Notification Letter
informing the President of OILINK that the Post Entry Audit Group of the BOC will be
conducting a compliance audit, of all pertinent records of OILINK’s import transactions
for the past three-year period counted from the said date. Upon recommendation,
Commissioner approved the filing of an administrative case against OILINK for failure
to comply with the audit required documents. UNIOIL requested the District Collector to
allow it to withdraw the base oils from OILINK’s temporarily closed terminal. This was
granted by the Commissioner. UNIOIL requested the District Collector to allow it to
withdraw the base oils from OILINK’s temporarily closed terminal. This was granted by
the Commissioner. In a complaint-affidavit dated December 15, 2008, Atty. Balmyrson
M. Valdez, a member of the petitioner BOC’s Anti-Oil Smuggling Coordinating
Committee that investigated the illegal withdrawal by UNIOIL of oil products consigned
to OILINK, accused the private respondents of violation of Tariff and Customs Code of
the Philippines (TCCP). The complaint-affidavit was dismissed for lack of probable
cause. Dissatisfied, the BOC filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by
the public respondent, the Acting Secretary of Justice Agnes VST Devanadera.

Issues:
Whether or not the CTA, and not the CA, has jurisdiction over the petition assailing the
DOJ resolution involving tax and tariff offenses.

Ruling:
Yes. While there is no express grant of such power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law
and that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that
the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in
issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction
of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases. The elementary rule is that the CA
has jurisdiction to review the resolution of the DOJ through a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground that the Secretary of Justice
committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
However, with the enactment of Republic Act No. 9282, amending RA No. 1125 by
expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA, enlarging its membership and elevating its rank
to the level of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction, it is no longer clear which
between the CA and the CTA has jurisdiction to review through a petition for certiorari
the DOJ resolution in preliminary investigations involving tax and tariff offenses.

G.R. Nos. 160054-55 July 21, 2004

MANOLO P. SAMSON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. REYNALDO B. DAWAY, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 90, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
CATERPILLAR, INC., respondents

FACTS:
On March 7, 2002, two informations for unfair competition under Section 168.3 (a), in
relation to Section 170, of the Intellectual Property Code (Republic Act No.
8293),similarly worded save for the dates and places of commission, were filed against
petitioner Manolo P. Samson, the registered owner of ITTI Shoes. The accusatory
portion of said informations read: above-named accused, owner/proprietor of ITTI
Shoes/Mano Shoes Manufacturing Corporation located at Robinson’s Galleria, EDSA
corner Ortigas Avenue, Quezon City, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously distribute, sell and/or offer for sale CATERPILLAR products which are
closely identical to and/or colorable imitations of the authentic Caterpillar products and
likewise using trademarks, symbols and/or designs as would cause confusion, mistake
or deception on the part of the buying public to the damage and prejudice of
CATERPILLAR, INC., the prior adopter, user and owner of the following internationally:
“CATERPILLAR”, “CAT”, “CATERPILLAR & DESIGN”, “CAT ANDDESIGN”,
“WALKING MACHINES” and “TRACK-TYPE TRACTOR & DESIGN.” Petitioner filed a
motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings in view of the existence of an
alleged prejudicial question involved in Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 for unfair
competition pending with the same branch; and also in view of the pendency of a
petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice assailing the Chief State
Prosecutor’s resolution finding probable cause to charge petitioner with unfair
competition. The trial court denied the motion to suspend arraignment and other
proceedings. On August 20, 2002, petitioner filed a twin motion to quash the
informations and motion for reconsideration of the order denying motion to suspend,
this time challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court over the offense charged. He
contended that since under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, the penalty of imprisonment
for unfair competition does not exceed six years, the offense is cognizable by the
Municipal Trial Courts and not by the Regional Trial Court, per R.A.No. 7691. In its
assailed March 26, 2003 Order, the trial court denied petitioner’s twin motions. Hence,
the instant petition alleging that respondent Judge gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the assailed orders

ISSUE:
Which Court has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases for violation of intellectual
property rights.

RULING:
The SC held that under Section 163 of the IPC, actions for unfair competition shall be
brought before the proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws. The
law contemplated in Section 163 of IPC is RA 166 otherwise known as the Trademark
Law. Section 27 of the Trademark Law provides that jurisdiction over cases for
infringement of registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of origin and
false description or representation, is lodged with the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court). Since RA 7691 is a general law and IPC in relation to Trademark
Law is a special law, the latter shall prevail. Actions for unfair competition therefore
should be filed with the RTC

G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006

LT. (SG) EUGENE GONZALES, LT. (SG) ANDY TORRATO, LT. (SG) ANTONIO
TRILLANES IV, CPT. GARY ALEJANO, LT. (SG) JAMES LAYUG, CPT. GERARDO
GAMBALA, CPT. NICANOR FAELDON, LT. (SG) MANUEL CABOCHAN, ENS.
ARMAND PONTEJOS, LT. (JG) ARTURO PASCUA, and 1LT. JONNEL
SANGGALANG, Petitioners,
vs.
GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, and B. GEN. MARIANO M. SARMIENTO, JR., in his capacity as
the Judge Advocate General of the Judge Advocate General’s Office
(JAGO), Respondents.

FACTS:
On July 27, 2003, 321 heavily-armed soldiers led by Antonio Trillanes IV, with an
intention to destabilize the government, took over the Oakwood Premier Luxury
Apartments on Ayala Avenue, Makati City. They disarmed the security guards and
planted explosive devices around the building. They voiced their grievances against
the then administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo for the alleged graft and
corruption in the military and the government, and declared their withdrawal of support
to their Commander-in-Chief. After hours of negotiation, the petitioners surrendered to
authorities. After the investigation of the NBI, the DOJ filed before the Makati RTC an
Information for coup d’etat against the petitioners. Meanwhile, respondent General
Naciso Abaya, then AFP Chief of Staff, ordered the arrest and detention of the
petitioners and created a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel, tasked to determine the
propriety of filing with the military tribunal charges for violations of Commonwealth Act
No. 408, as amended by R.A. 7055. The panel recommended in its Final Pre-Trial
Investigation Report that following the “doctrine of absorption,” those charged with
coup d’etat before the RTC should not be charged before the military tribunal for
violation of the Articles of War. The RTC then issued an Order stating that “all charges
before the court martial against the accused are hereby declared not service-
connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d’etat.
After reviewing the findings of the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel, Judge Advocate
General’s Office (JAGO) OIC Julius Magno recommended that 29 of the officers
involved in the Oakwood incident, including petitioners, be prosecuted before a general
court martial for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman) of the Articles of War. The AFP Judge Advocate General then directed
petitioners to submit their answer to the charge. Instead of complying, they filed in the
Supreme Court the instant Petition for Prohibition praying that respondents be ordered
to desist from charging them with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War. They
invoked the RTC’s determination of the offense as not service-connected. They
maintained that the crime of coup d’etat absorbed the said offenses and that the
military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction.

ISSUES:
It is clear from the foregoing that RA No. 7055 did not divest the military courts of
jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of Articles 54 to 70, Article 72 to 92, and
Articles of War as these are considered “service-connected crimes or offenses.” In fact,
it mandates that these shall be tried by the court-martial. Moreover, the observation
made by Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio during the deliberation of this case is worth
quoting, thus the trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding
that the charge of Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is absorbed and
in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup d’etat. Firstly, the doctrine of absorption of
crimes is peculiar to criminal law and generally applies to crimes punished by the same
statute, unlike here where different statutes are involved. Secondly, the doctrine
applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, connected
offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of
crimes is not applicable to this case. The military justice system is disciplinary in
nature, aimed at achieving the highest form of discipline in order to ensure the highest
degree of military efficiency. Military law is established not merely to enforce discipline
in times of war, but also to preserve the tranquility and security of the State in times of
war, but also to preserve the tranquility and security of the State in time of peace; for
there is nothing more dangerous to the public peace and safety than a licentious and
undisciplined military body. The administration of military justice has been universally
practiced. Since time immemorial, all the armies in almost all countries of the world
look upon the power of military law and its administration as the most effective means
of enforcing discipline. For this reason, the court martial has become invariably an
indispensable part of any organized armed forces, it being the most potent agency in
enforcing discipline both in peace and in war. The Court held that the offense is
service-connected. It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns
the alleged violation of their professional conduct or behavior as military officers.
Equally indicative of the service-connected nature of the offenses is the penalty
prescribed for the same dismissal from the service imposable only by the military court.
Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the
military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military
discipline.
JURISDICTION DETERMINED BY ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT OR
INFORMATION

G.R. No. L-47448 May 17, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. EMETERIO C. OCAYA, as District Judge, 15th Judicial District, Branch VI,
Province of Bukidnon, and ESTERLINA MARAPAO, LETICIA MARAPAO and
DIOSDADO MARAPAO, respondents.
FACTS:
A charge of serious physical injuries was filed against private respondents but Judge
Ocaya after scanning the records and noting that the medical certificate stated that the
injuries would require medical attention from seven (7) to ten (10) days and therefore
may either be slight or less serious physical injuries only and without receiving the
evidence or hearing the witnesses, precipitately dismissed the information for lack of
jurisdiction on the erroneous notion that in physical injury cases, the duration of the
treatment of the injury inflicted on the victim as indicated in the medical certificate
determines the jurisdiction of the court. The MR was denied; hence, the fiscal filed the
petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the case.

RULING:
Yes. Respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in precipitately
dismissing the case for alleged lack of jurisdiction on the mere basis of his totally
wrong notion that what governs in the filing of a physical injury case is the medical
certificate regarding the duration of treatment and not what the victim declares because
the same is self-serving. It is elemental that the jurisdiction of a court in criminal cases
is determined by the allegations of the information or criminal complaint and not by the
result of the evidence presented at the trial, much less by the trial judge’s personal
appraisal of the affidavits and exhibits attached by the fiscal to the record of the case
without hearing the parties and their witnesses nor receiving their evidence at a proper
trial. It is equally elementary that the mere fact that evidence presented at the trial
would indicate that a lesser offense outside the trial court’s jurisdiction was committed
does not deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction which had vested in it under the
allegations of the information as filed since" (once) the jurisdiction attaches to the
person and subject matter of the litigation, the subsequent happening of events,
although they are of such a character as would have prevented jurisdiction from
attaching in the first instance, will not operate to oust jurisdiction already attached.

WHEN INJUNCTION MAY BE ISSUED TO RESTRAIN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION

GR. NO. 123504 - Samson vs. Guingona

FACTS:
Petitioners and several other police officers were the subject of a complaint for murder
with the Department of Justice in connection with the fatal shooting of Datu Gemie
Sinsuat, a son of a politician from Cotabato. An information was thereafter filed with the
RTC against petitioners. The trial court, however, on the basis of the evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation, found no probable cause for the
issuance of arrest against petitioner. It then ordered the reinvestigation of the case
against them. Petitioners did not file a motion for reconsideration but instead filed with
this Court a petition for injunction to enjoin the Department of Justice from further
proceeding with the reinvestigations of the case.

ISSUE:
Whether the Writ of Injunction should be granted.

RULING:
No. As a general rule, the Court will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction
preliminary or final, to enjoin or restrain, criminal prosecution. With more reason will
injunctions not lie when the case is still at the stage of preliminary investigation or
reinvestigation. However, in extreme cases, we have laid the exceptions when the
injuction is necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the
accused; when it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions; when there is a prejudicial question which is
subjudice; when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; where the
prosecution is under an invalid law; ordinance or regulation; when double jeopardy is
clearly apparent; where the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense; where it is a
case of persecution rather than prosecution; where the charges are manifestly false
and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and when there is clearly no prima facie case
against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied.
Petitioners have not shown that the case at bar falls within any oof the recognized
exceptions above set forth. Petitioners only on the probability that a reinvestigation
may result in the remand of the case to the court and the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. The Supreme Court finds petitioners’ plea for a writ of injunction or temporary
retraining order utterly without merit. As a rule, the SC do not interfere in the conduct of
preliminary investigations or reinvestigations and leave to the investigating prosecutor
sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes
sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of information against
an offender.

RULE 110

LUZ M. ZALDIVIA v. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., et al.

G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, Cruz, J.

Facts:
Luz M. Zaldivia was charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without Mayor’s
permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2 Series of 1988 of the Municipality of Rodriguez in
the Province of Rizal. An information was filed with the MTC of Rodriguez. Zaldivia
moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed, invoking
that under Act No. 3326, violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe
after two months from the commission of the offense governed by the Rules on
Summary Procedure. The prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was
suspended upon the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor,
saying that Rule 110, Section 1, last paragraph of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
which provides that “in all cases such institution interrupts the period of the prescription
of the offense charged,” applies to all cases including those falling under the Rule on
Summary Procedure.

Issue:
Whether or not the prescriptive period was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with
the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor.

Ruling:

No. As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the
offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the
charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of
Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110. Where paragraph
(b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to Section
32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts: (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all
offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or
a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment,
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability
arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or
amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the
imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos. These offenses are not
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary
Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court without need of
a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that
this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary
investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only
when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary
investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on
the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that. This
interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the
period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial
proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include
administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law
does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does. At any rate, the Court feels that if
there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule
110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law.
And if there be a conflict between Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-
making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under
Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a
substantive right. Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to
the petitioner commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended
two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326.
It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial
proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with
the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990,
after the crime had already prescribed.
SANRIO COMPANY LIMITED v. EDGAR C. LIM, doing business as ORIGNAMURA
TRADING
G.R. No. 168662, February 19, 2008
Facts:
Sanrio, a Japanese corporation, manufactures Hello Kitty products and distributes
them in the Philippines. It was divulged to Sanrio that its products were being
counterfeited by Edgar Lim. The executive judge then issued a search warrant on May
30, 2000. Agents of the NBI searched the premises of Orignamura Trading. They were
able to seize various Sanrio products. It was only almost two years later on April 4,
2002 that Sanrio filed a complaint-affidavit in the DOJ against Edgar Lim for violation of
Section 217 of the Intellectual Property Code (IPC). However, it was dismissed due to
insufficiency of evidence. On May 3, 2003, Sanrio filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA but it was dismissed on the ground of prescription because no complaint was filed
in court within two years after the commission of the alleged violation. Sanrio
contended that filing of the complaint in DOJ tolled the two-year prescriptive period.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent’s violation already prescribed.

Ruling:
No. Section 2 of Act 3326 provides that the prescriptive period for violation of special
laws starts on the day such offense was committed and is interrupted by the institution
of proceedings against respondent. Petitioner in this instance filed its complaint-
affidavit on April 4, 2002 or one year, ten months and four days after the NBI searched
respondent's premises and seized Sanrio merchandise therefrom. Although no
information was immediately filed in court, respondent's alleged violation had not yet
prescribed. The filing of the complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation
interrupts the period of prescription of criminal responsibility. Thus, the prescriptive
period for the prosecution of the alleged violation of the IPC was tolled by petitioner's
timely filing of the complaint-affidavit before the TAPP.

AMENDMENT AND SUBSTITUTION OF COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION

DATU GUIMID P. MATALAM v. THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 165751, April 12, 2005.

Facts:
An information was filed before the Sandiganbayan, charging Matalam, et al. with
violation of Sec. 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, for their refusal to pay the money
claims of DAR employees during the period when said employees were illegally
terminated. After the defense had presented its evidence, the court admitted the
amended information submitted by the prosecution. The amended information charged
only Matalam still with violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, but this time for
the illegal dismissal of the DAR employees. Matalam prayed for another preliminary
investigation.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to a new preliminary investigation because the
amended information alleges a new and distinct offense

RULING:
Yes. Before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the
complaint or information may be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea,
only a formal amendment maybe made but with leave of court and if it does not
prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is
proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused. A substantial amendment
consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. In this case, the
amendment was substantial. In the original information, the prohibited act allegedly
committed by petitioner was the illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay the monetary
claims of the private complainants, while in the amended information, it is the illegal
dismissal from the service of the private complainants. However, it cannot be denied
that the alleged illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay monetary claims is related to,
and arose from, the alleged illegal dismissal from the service of the private
complainants. Thus, the rule is: Before or after a plea, a substantial amendment in an
information entitles an accused to another preliminary investigation. However, if the
amended information contains a charge related to or is included in the original
information, a new preliminary investigation is not required. While it is true that the
charges in the original and amended information are related, this fact should not
necessarily deprive an accused to his right to a new preliminary investigation. As
above-stated, the rule is that a new preliminary investigation is needed if there is a
substantial amendment. The exception, charge is related or included in the original
information, should not be applied automatically. The circumstances in every case
must be taken into consideration before the accused is deprived of another preliminary
investigation. If petitioner is not to be given a new preliminary investigation for the
amended charge, his right will definitely be prejudiced because he will be denied his
right to present evidence to show or rebut evidence regarding the element of evident
bad faith and manifest partiality on the alleged dismissal. He will be denied due
process. Preliminary investigation is a statutory and substantive right accorded to the
accused before trial. To deny their claim to a preliminary investigation would be to
deprive them of the full measure of their right to due process.

SSGT. JOSE M. PACOY v. HON. AFABLE E. CAJIGAL, PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES and OLYMPIO L. ESCUETA
G.R. No. 157472, September 28, 2007.

Facts:
An information for homicide was filed, alleging that SSGT. Jose M. Pacoy “with intent
to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot his commanding
officer x x x.” The information likewise contains the statement, “With the aggravating
circumstance of killing [his commanding officer] in disregard of his rank.” The accused
pleaded not guilty to the charge of homicide.
On the same day after the arraignment, Hon. Afable E. Cajigal ordered the prosecutor
to amend the information to murder, based on the Judge’s view that the aggravating
circumstance of disregard of rank qualified the crime to murder. The designation of the
offense in the information was amended accordingly.

Issue:
 Whether the change in the designation of the offense requires another preliminary
investigation

Ruling:
No. Where the new information charges an offense which is distinct from that initially
charged, a substitution is in order, which results in the dismissal of the original
information, the conduct of another preliminary investigation, and another arraignment
under the new information.
A change in the designation of the offense as found in the caption of the information
constitutes a mere formal amendment and not a substantial amendment or a
substitution of the original information. Apart from the caption containing the
designation of the offense, no other change was made regarding the recital of facts
which constitute the offense charged or determine the jurisdiction of the court.

Ampatuan Jr. vs Leila De Lima

GR No. 197291, April 3, 2013
FACTS:
Relying on the twin affidavits of one Kenny Dalandag, the panel of prosecutors
charged 196 individuals with multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre.
Dalandag was thereafter admitted into the witness protection program of the
Department of Justice (DOJ). Datu Andal Ampatuan Jr. is then mayor of the
Municipality of Datu Unsay and one of the principal suspects in the massacre, wrote to
Secretary Leila De Lima requesting the inclusion of Dalandag in the information for
murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed his participation in the
massacre through his two sworn declarations. Secretary De Lima denied Ampatuan
Jr.’s request, prompting Ampatuan Jr. to file a petition for mandamus before the RTC,
seeking to compel Secretary De Lima to charge Dalandag as another accused.

ISSUE:
Whether the Secretary De Lima may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge
Dalandag as a co-accused in the Maquindanao massacre despite his admission as
state witness.

RULING:
No, Dalandag's exclusion as an accused from the informations did not at all amount to
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the panel of prosecutors whose procedure in
excluding Dalandag as an accused was far from arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or
despotic, which requires that "the complaint or I information shall be xxx against all
persons who appear to be responsible for the offense involved," albeit a mandatory
provision, may be subject of some exceptions, one of which is when a participant in the
commission of a crime becomes a state witness. While it is true that, as a general rule,
the discharge or exclusion of a co-accused from the information in order that he may
be utilized as a Prosecution witness rests upon the sound discretion of the trial court,
such discretion is absolute and may not be exercised arbitrarily but with due regard to
the proper administration of justice. Anent the requisite that there must be an absolute
necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is sought, the trial court
has to rely on the suggestions of and the information provided by the public prosecutor.
The reason is obvious the public prosecutor should know better than the trial court, and
the Defense for that matter, which of the several accused would best qualify to be
discharged in order to become a state witness. The public prosecutor is also supposed
to know the evidence in his possession and whomever he needs to establish his case,
as well as the availability or non-availability of other direct or corroborative evidence,
which of the accused is the ‘most guilty’ one, and the like.

Union Bank of the Philippines and Desi Tomas

Vs.
People of the Philippines
GR No. 192565, February 28, 2012

FACTS:
Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code
for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The accusation
stemmed from petitioner Union Bank’s two complaints for sum of money with prayer for
a writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe.
The first complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0717, was filed before the RTC,
Branch 109, and Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint, docketed as
Civil Case No. 342000, was filed on March 15, 2000 and raffled to the Me TC, Branch
47, and Pasay City. Both complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the
Certification against Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately
violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate
against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not commence any other
action or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should be
Makati City, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay
City, where the Certification was presented to the trial court.

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court denied the petition and hold that the MeTC-Makati City is the
proper venue and the proper court to take cognizance of the perjury case against the
petitioners. Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal
case not only in the court where the offense was committed, but also where any of its
essential ingredients took place. In other words, the venues of action and of jurisdiction
are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the offense was
committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. Based on these considerations, the court hold the ruling in
SyTiong is more in accord with Article 183 of the RPC and Section 15 (a), Rule 110 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To reiterate for the guidance of the Bar
and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed through the making of a false affidavit
under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and
swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of
perjury are executed. When the crime is committed through false testimony under oath
in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the
testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony
made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is
submitted, venue may either be at the place where the sworn statement is submitted or
where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the submission are both
material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases, determination of venue shall
be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime
committed.
 Manolet Lavides vs. Court of Appeals
GR No. 129670, February 1, 2000

FACTS:
Manolet Lavides was arrested for child abuse under R.A. No. 7610. His arrest was
made without a warrant as a result of an entrapment conducted by the police. The
parents of Lorelie San Miguel reported to the police that their daughter, then 16 years
old, had been contacted by Lavides for an assignation that night at Lavides'room at a
hotel. Apparently, this was not the first time the police received reports of Lavides'
activities. An entrapment operation was therefore set in motion. Based on the sworn
statement of complainant and the affidavits of the arresting officers, and was filed
against Lavides in the RTC. Lavides filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause;(2) For the Immediate Release of the Accused
Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of
Adverse Resolution of the Above Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a
Matter of Right under the Law on Which he is Charged. Nine more informations for
child abuse were filed against Lavides by Lorelie San Miguel and by three other minor
children. In all the cases, it was alleged that Lavides had sexual intercourse with
complainants who had been "exploited in prostitution and given money as payment for
the said acts of sexual intercourse." No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, Lavides
filed separate applications for bail in the nine cases. The RTC resolved Lavides'
Omnibus Motion entitling him to bail in all the cases. He was granted the right to post
bail in the amount of P80,000.00 for each case or a total of P800,000.00 for all the
cases under the following conditions: a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver
of appearance during the trial of these cases. He shall and must always be present at
the hearings of these cases; b) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail
bonds shall be automatically cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be
immediately issued and the cases shall proceed to trial in absentia ;c) The hold-
departure Order of this Court dated April 10, 1997 stands; and d) Approval of the bail
bonds shall be made only after the arraignment to enable this Court to immediately
acquire jurisdiction over the accused; Lavides was arraigned during which he pleaded
not guilty to the charges against him and then ordered him released upon posting bail
bonds. Lavides filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, assailing the trial
court's order denying his motion to quash and maintaining the conditions set forth in its
order. The appellate court invalidated the first 2 conditions imposed in the order for the
grant of bail to Lavides but ruled that the issue concerning the validity of the condition
making arraignment a prerequisite for the approval of Lavides' bail bonds to be moot
and academic. The Court of Appeals thought that the aforesaid conditions in the order
were contrary to Art. III, §14(2) of the Constitution which provides that "after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the condition that makes arraignment a prerequisite to the approval of
bail bonds valid.

RULING:
In requiring that Lavides be first arraigned before he could be granted bail, the RTC
apprehended that if Lavides were released on bail he could, by being absent, prevent
his early arraignment and thereby delay his trial until the complainants got tired andlost
interest in their cases. Hence, to ensure his presence at the arraignment, approvalof
Lavides' bail bonds should be deferred until he could be arraigned. After that, even if
Lavides does not appear, trial can proceed as long as he is notified of the date of
hearing and his failure to appear is unjustified, since under Art. III, §14(2) of the
Constitution, trial in absentia is authorized. This seems to be the theory of the trial court
in its order conditioning the grant of bail to Lavides on his arraignment. Under Rule
114, §2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that "the
accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so required by the court or
these Rules," while under Rule 116, §1(b) the presence of the accused at the
arraignment is required. On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused
on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose
between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until
his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing
the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be
released on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the accused's constitutional
right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to
charge him with a crime and his right to bail. It is the condition in the May 16, 1997
order of the trial court that "approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after
arraignment," which the Court of Appeals should instead have declared void. The
condition imposed in the trial court's order of May 16,1997 that the accused cannot
waive his appearance at the trial but that he must be present at the hearings of the
case is valid and is in accordance with Rule 114. For another condition of bail under
Rule 114, §2(c) is that "The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without
justification despite due notice to him or his bonds man shall be deemed an express
waiver of his right to be present on the date specified in the notice. In such case, trial
shall proceed in absentia." Art. III, §14(2) of the Constitution authorizing trials in
absentia allows the accused to be absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the
proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt, (b)
during trial whenever necessary for identification purposes, and (c) at the promulgation
of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case the accused may appear by
counsel or representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required
and cannot be waived. Although this condition is invalid, it does not follow that the
arraignment of Lavides was also invalid. Contrary to Lavides' contention, the
arraignment did not emanate from the invalid condition that "approval of the bail bonds
shall be made only after the arraignment." Even without such a condition, the
arraignment of Lavides could not be omitted. In sum, although the condition for the
grant of bail to Lavides is invalid, his arraignment and the subsequent proceedings
against him are valid.

RULE 114 BAIL

Jose Antonio Leviste vs. The Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines
GR No. 189122, March 17, 2010

FACTS:
Jose Antonio Leviste was charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas. He was
convicted by the RTC of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as a
minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as a maximum. He appealed
to CA, but his appeal is pending, and he filed an urgent application for admission to
bail, citing his advanced age and health condition and claiming the absence of any risk
or possibility of flight on his part. CA denied invoking the bedrock principle in the bail
pending appeal that the discretion to extend bail during appeal should be exercised
with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or
aged detainee. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, and he
questioned the denial of his application for bail as grave abuse of discretion,
considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioner's theory
is that when the trial court's penalty is more than six years but not more than 20 years
and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail
must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the application
for bail of Leviste.

RULING:
No. Under Section 5 of Rule 114 bail is discretionary, upon conviction by the RTC of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. Under
paragraph 3 of the same rule if the penalty impose is more then 6 years the accused
shall be denied bail, or his bail be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with
notice to the accused, of the following or other circumstances that he is recidivist,
quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration; that he has previously escaped from legal confinement,
evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification; that
he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon; that the
circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or that
there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal. That bail is expressly declared to be discretionary pending appeal and it cannot
be said that CA committed grave abuse of discretion. After conviction by the trial court,
the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to
bail ends, from then on the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion.

People of the Philippines vs. Victor Keith Fitzgerald

GR No. 149723, October 27, 2006
FACTS:
Victor Keith Fitzgerald, an Australian citizen, drugged and induced “AAA,” a minor, to
engage in prostitution by showering said minor with gifts, clothes, and food and having
carnal knowledge of her. Respondent was charged with violation of Art. III, Section 5,
paragraph (a), sub-paragraph (5) of RA No. 7610 or the Special Protection of Children
against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act. The RTC found Fitzgerald
guilty. Fitzgerald applied for bail but was denied by the RTC on the ground that the
circumstances of the accused indicate probability of flight and that there is undue risk
that the accused may commit a similar offense, if released on bail pending appeal. The
CA affirmed the denial and modified the penalty imposed. Fitzgerald filed a Motion for
New Trial on the ground that new evidence not previously available had surfaced. The
CA granted Fitzgerald’s Motion for New Trial. The CA ordered that (1) the case be
remanded to the RTC and directed the presiding judge to receive the new evidence
and (2) the RTC must submit back to the CA the said evidence together with the
transcript of stenographic notes and the records of the case. Petitioner filed with the
SC a Petition for Review on Certiorari but it was dismissed. Fitzgerald filed with the CA
a Motion for Early Transmittal of the Records and for the Re-Examination of the
Penalty Imposed and a Motion for Bail. The CA granted Fitzgerald’s bail application.
Though the CA maintained that the evidence of guilt is strong, they have taken a
second look at appellant’s plea for temporary liberty considering primarily the fact that
appellant is already of old age and is not in the best of health. CA directed appellant to
post a bail bond in the amount of Php 100, 000.00 for his temporary liberty. Hence, this
petition to have the August 31, 2001 CA Resolution annulled and set aside.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in granting respondent Fitzgerald’s Motion for Bail despite
the fact that the latter was charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and
the evidence of his guilt is strong.

RULING:
Yes. Respondent was charged with violation of Art. III, Section 5 paragraph (a), sub-
paragraph (5) of RA No. 7610, a crime which carries the maximum penalty of reclusion
perpetua. He was later convicted by the RTC. These circumstances are not altered
when the CA granted a new trial. CA retained appellate jurisdiction over the case even
as it ordered the remand of the original records thereof to the RTC for reception of
evidence. In retaining appellate jurisdiction, it set aside only its own September 27,
1999 Decision but left unaltered the May 7, 1996 RTC Decision which remained
operative. Under said Decision, respondent stood sentenced to an imprisonment term
exceeding 6 years. Moreover, both the RTC and CA were unanimous in their findings
of the existence of strong evidence of the guilt of respondent. These findings were not
overturned when the CA granted a new trial. The grant of a new trial allows for
reception of newly-discovered evidence already presented or on record. There is a
finding of record on the potential risk of respondent Fitzgerald committing a similar
offense which was noted by the RTC in its August 1, 1996 Order. The foregoing finding
was traversed or overturned by the CA in its questioned Resolution. Such finding
remains controlling. It warranted the outright denial of respondent’s bail application.
The CA erred when it granted respondent’s Motion for Bail.

Juan Ponce Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan

GR No. 213847, August 18, 2015
FACTS:
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed from the case dated August 18, 2015. Under
the original case the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile, 90 years of age, and
several others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported
involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). Upon voluntary surrender, Enrile filed his
Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital, and his Motion to Fix Bail. Enrile
claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of
right; that it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively
that Enrile comes under the exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right
to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is
punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the presence of two mitigating
circumstances his age and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come
forward with proof showing that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he
should not be considered a flight risk taking into account that he is already over the
age of 90, his medical condition, and his social standing. In its Comment, the
Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as he is charged with a
capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted
to determine whether there is strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that
entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant
circumstances.

ISSUE:
Whether or not bail was rightfully granted.

RULING:
Yes. The general rule is, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal
offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an
offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of
his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or
restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional
liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with
a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Once it has been established that
the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.

All criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable as
matter of right because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or
offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a
matter of right prior to conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or even prior to
conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment
when evidence of guilt is not strong.

The granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC has
imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the
circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as
follows: (a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; (b) That he has
previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification; (c) That he committed the offense while
under probation, parole, or conditional pardon; (d) That the circumstances of his case
indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or (e) That there is undue risk that he
may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.

For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt
is strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. But,
as the Court has held in Concerned Citizens v. Elma, “such discretion may be
exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused
for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty.” It is
axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion
on the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to the
Prosecution.

In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is
expected to comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral, to wit: 1. In all
cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section
18,Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended); 2. Where bail is a matter of discretion,
conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong
for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion;(Section 7 and 8,
supra) 3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution; 4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the
accused upon the approval of the bail bond. (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition
should be denied.

This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those
charged in criminal proceedings but also to extradites upon a clear and convincing
showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
(2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances. In our view,
his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the
authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape
from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his
indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the
legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many
years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal
processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was not
seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his public and his private life, his
long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be
granted bail. The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling
justification for his admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.

Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should
be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued
incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life.
Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true
objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.

G.R. No. 179817 June 27 2008

Antonio F. Trillanes IV vs Oscar Pimentel et al.

Facts:
Trillanes, while in detention for his infamous coup d’etat, won a seat in the Senate. He
filed a petition requesting the court to allow him to, among others, go to the Senate
during Mondays to Thursday, from 8AM to 7PM to perform his duties as a duly-elected
Senator. Since the court a quo, in dismissing his petition, invoked the case of Rep.
Jalosjos, wherein the Supreme Court recognized that the accused rapist can still
somehow accomplish legislative results while being detained, Trillanes provided
numerous reasons as to why the aforementioned case should not apply to him, to wit:
(1) Jalosjos was already convicted, while Trillanes, as a mere detention prisoner, still
enjoys the presumption of innocence. (2) Jalosjos committed a crime involving moral
turpitude, Trillanes's crime is commonly regarded as a political offense. (3) Trillanes
posits that he has the duty to perform his mandate as a Senator since the people, in
their sovereign capacity, elected him to such position.

Issue:
Whether or not the contentions raised by Respondent are meritorious.

Ruling:
No, the distinctions cited by the petitioner are not elemental to the pronouncement in
the case of Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in
criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and
restricted in liberty of movement. Further, in the case of People vs Maceda, it was
stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence
cannot practice their profession nor hold office, whether elective or appointive. Lastly,
his argument that his election provides the legal justification to serve his mandate,
following the doctrine of condonation in administrative law, cannot prosper because
said doctrine does not apply to criminal cases.

Janet Lim Napoles vs. Sandiganbayan

GR No. 224162, November 7, 2017
FACTS:
Napoles was charged with plunder before the Sandiganbayan and placed under
preventive detention, prompting Napoles to apply for bail. The Napoles camp did not
present any evidence at the bail hearings but when the Sandiganbayan denied the
petition for bail, Napoles contended that the denial of the application was a grave
abuse of discretion because the prosecution failed to adduce direct proof connecting
Napoles to the NGOs involves in the misappropriation nor proof of any agreement with
Enrile to obtain kickbacks from the implementation of the former senator’s PDAF
projects. Napoles also assailed the credibility of the whistleblowers and argued that
they were also conspirators and their testimonies should be regarded with grave
suspicion as they come from a polluted source. Whether there is strong evidence of
guilt on the part of Napoles was resolved by the Sandiganbayan in accordance with the
relevant laws, and jurisprudence in the application for bail in capital cases.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in denying Napoles’ application for bail.

RULING:
No. As a rule, bail may be granted as a matter of right prior to conviction. Except when
it involves a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong; or when the accused is
a flight risk. In such cases, the grant of bail is a matter of discretion. The duties of the
trial court in applications for bail is first, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application or require him to submit his recommendation, whether the application for
bail is a matter of right or discretion; second, where bail is a matter of discretion,
conduct a hearing on the application regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence, to enable the court to exercise its sound discretion; third,
decide whether the evidence of guilt is strong; fourth, if so, discharge the accused
upon the approval of the bail bond; otherwise, petition should be denied. In this case,
Napoles was charged with Plunder which is punishable by reclusion perpetua. She
cannot, thus, be admitted to bail when the evidence of her guilt is strong. The burden
of proof to show such is on the prosecution. The prosecution can discharge its burden
by proving that the evidence shows evident proof of guilt or a great presumption of
guilt. Hence, no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan scheduled hearings to allow the parties to submit their respective
pieces of evidence. The prosecution submitted numerous testimonial and documentary
evidence. Napoles, on the other hand, opted not to submit any evidence on her behalf
and relied instead on the supposed weakness of the prosecution’s evidence. The
evidence of the prosecution was summarized accordingly, effectively complying with
the due process requirements. It even extensively discussed the available evidence in
relation to the elements of Plunder, which the prosecution intended to prove point by
point for purposes of demonstrating Napoles’ great presumption of guilt.

G.R. No. 121917 March 12, 1997ROBIN CARIÑO PADILLA @ ROBINHOOD

PADILLA, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

FACTS:
Enrique Manarang and his compadre Danny Perez (CRUZ) noticed a vehicle, a
Mitsubishi Pajero, running fast down the highway, immediately after the vehicle had
passed, they heard a screeching sound produced by the sudden and hard braking of a
vehicle running very fast followed by a sickening sound of the vehicle hitting
something. Manarang, decided to report the incident to the PNP. By the time Manarang
completed the call, the vehicle had started to leave the place of the accident taking the
general direction to the north Manarang went to the location of the accident and found
out that the vehicle had hit somebody. He asked Cruz to look after the victim while he
went back to the restaurant, rode on his motorcycle and chased the vehicle. During the
chase he called the Viper through the radio once again reporting that a vehicle,
heading north with plate number PMA 777 was involved in a hit and run accident.
SPO2 Miranda went to the vehicle with plate number PMA 777 and instructed its driver
to alight. They recognized the driver as Robin C. Padilla, appellant in this case.
Appellant was wearing a short leather jacket such that when he alighted with both his
hands raised, a gun tucked on the left side of his waist was revealed. SPO2 Borja
made the move to confiscate the gun. After disarming appellant, SPO2 Borja told him
about the hit and run incident, which was angrily denied by appellant. Appellant,
however, arrogantly denied his misdeed and, instead, played with the crowd by holding
their hands with one hand and pointing to SPO3 Borja with his right hand saying "iyan,
kinuha ang baril ko". His gesture exposed a long magazine of an armalite rifle tucked in
appellant 's back right, pocket. SPO2 Mercado saw this and confiscated the magazine
from appellant. SPO2 Mercado saw a baby armalite rifle lying horizontally at the front
by the driver 's seat. It had a long magazine filled with live bullets in a semi-automatic
mode. He asked appellant for the papers covering the rifle and appellant answered
angrily that they were at his home. SPO2Mercado modified the arrest of appellant by
including as its ground illegal possession of firearms. SPO2 Mercado then read to
appellant his constitutional rights. The police officers brought appellant to the Traffic
Division where appellant voluntarily surrendered a third firearm, a pietro berreta pistol.
Appellant also voluntarily surrendered a black bag containing two additional long
magazines and one short magazine. During the investigation, appellant admitted
possession of the firearms stating that he used them for shooting. He was notable to
produce any permit to carry or memorandum receipt to cover the three firearms.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid arrest, search and seizure.

RULING:
Yes. Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances: Sec. 5. Arrest
without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;(b) When an
offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;(c) When the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. The Court
acknowledges police authority to make the forcible stop since they had more than mere
"reasonable and articulable" suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle has been
engaged in criminal activity. Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with
possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammunition, petitioner's warrantless arrest
was proper as he was again actually committing another offense (illegal possession of
firearm and ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a peace officer.

WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE:

The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property is
valid, are as follows:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of which are:(a). a prior valid
intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in
the pursuit of their official duties;(b). the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the
police who had the right to be where they are;(c). the evidence must be immediately
apparent, and (d). "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further
search.

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's

inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thorough fares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause
that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search; and

5. Customs search in conformity with respondent court's observation, it indeed appears

that the authorities stumbled upon petitioner's firearms and ammunitions without even
undertaking any active search which, as it is commonly understood, is a prying into
hidden places for that which is concealed. The seizure of the Smith & Wesson revolver
and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they came within "plain view" of the
policemen who inadvertently discovered the revolver and magazine tucked in
petitioner's waist and back pocket respectively, when he raised his hands after
alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies to the confiscation of the M-16
armalite rifle, which was immediately apparent to the policemen as they took a casual
glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally near the driver's seat. Thus, it
has been held that: (W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a
criminal offense, the police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being
committed by any person, they are not precluded from performing their duties as police
officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of the corpus delicti.
Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain view are
subject to seizure even without a warrant. With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black
bag containing assorted magazines, petitioner voluntarily surrendered them to the
police. This latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of his right against the alleged
search and seizure, and that his failure to quash the information estopped him from
assailing any purported defect. ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. In crimes
involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be established:(1) the
existence of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or
possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess.

People of the Philippines vs. Pat. Florestan Nitcha y Dulay

GR No. 113517, January 19, 1995

FACTS:
On October 1990 in the evening, Jojo Belmonte went to buy some cigarettes at a
nearby store. Before he could buy the cigarettes, Doro Nitcha arrived and then started
mauling him. May Villarica, Joselito, Agustin, and Marcelina all had the surname of
Sibuyan arrived at the store. May and Joselito tried to pacify Jojo and Doro, however
their efforts were futile. The fighting stopped when Doro’s sister, Victoria Copuz,
arrived. She dragged Doro away and brought him home. The others likewise went
home. Not long after, Forestan Nitcha, the brother of Doro arrived at the store with a
gun and shouted “Walang hiya kayo, putang ina ninyo, papatayin ko kayong lahat!”
Florestan then fired his gun at the direction of the Sibuyans, which hit May at the back
of her head. He also aimed for Joselito but missed. May died while she was being
transferred from Eastern Pangasinan District Hospital to a hospital in Dagupan City.
Florestan went to the police station and surrendered himself together with his service
firearm. The trial court found him guilty on account of the positive identification made
by the witnesses. He alleges, among others that his arrest and detention was illegal
and there was no preliminary investigation conducted.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the posting of bail is an obstacle to Nitcha’s incarceration.

RULING:
No. The subsistence of a bail bond is not a legal obstacle to the accused’s immediate
incarceration after the promulgation of a decision involving a felony punishable by
reclusion perpetua. Acting of posting a bail bond, a part from the fact that he entered a
plea of not guilty, is tantamount to foregoing the right to question the assumed
irregularity; Bail is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by
reclusion perpetua; if accused is convicted by the crime reclusion perpetua, bail is
neither a matter of right nor a matter of discretion. Bail must not be granted. The clear
implication therefore, is that if an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by
reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a
penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on
the part of the court. In such situation, the court would not have only determined that
the evidence of guilt is strong which would have been sufficient guilt to deny bail even
before conviction it would have likewise ruled that the accused’s guilt has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be granted to the accused during the
pendency of his appeal from the judgment of conviction.

Anita Esteban vs. Hon. Reynaldo A. Alhambra

G.R. No. 135012

FACTS:
The case came to the SC as a petition for certiorari filed by Anita Esteban, sister in law
of the accused, to reverse the two petitions for the annulment of cash bail of Gerardo
Esteban amounting to P20,000 each. Anita, originally posted the bail for Gerardo,
however, he committed another crime while out on bail; she got "fed up", and moved
for the cancellation of the posted money to the court and surrendered the accused to
the City Jail Warden. However, this was denied, so was her motion for reconsideration.
Anita now pleads that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and that the issue is one of "first impression". She
cites that under Sec 19, now Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Judge Alhambra committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when he refused to cancel the bail petition of Anita
Esteban.

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the cash bail cannot be cancelled. The petitioner did
not surrender the accused, charged in four criminal cases, to the trial court. Gerardo
Esteban was arrested and detained because he was charged in a subsequent criminal
case. Sec. 22 of Rule 114 contemplates a situation where, among others, the surety or
bondsman surrenders the accused to the court that ordered the latter’s arrest.
Thereafter, the court, upon application by the surety or bondsman, cancels the Bail
bond. Moreover, the bail bond was posted for the accused in the form of a cash
deposit which, as mandated by Section 14 of Rule 114, shall be applied to the payment
of fine and costs, and the excess if any shall be returned to the accused or to any
person who made the deposit. This rule treats a cash bail differently from other bail
bonds. Cash bond may be posted either by the accused or by any person in his behalf.
Insofar as the State is concerned, the money deposited is regarded as the money of
the accused. It can be applied in payment of any fine and costs that maybe imposed by
the Court. Unlike other bail bonds, the money may then be used in the payment of that
in which the State is concerned the fine and costs. The right of the government is in the
nature of a lien on the money deposited. The money should be treated as the property
of the accused and may be applied in payment of any fine imposed and of the costs.

JOSE ANTONIO C. LEVISTE v. ELMO M. ALAMEDA

GR No. 182677, August 3, 2010

Facts:
An information for homicide was filed and charged Jose Antonio C. Leviste for the
death of Rafael de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati City. Petitioner was placed under police custody while confined at the Makati
Medical Center. After petitioner posted a bond which the trial court approved, he was
released from detention, and his arraignment was set. The private complainants-heirs
of De las Alas filed, with the conformity of the public prosecutor, an Urgent Omnibus
Motion praying, inter alia, for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the public
prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct a reinvestigation to
determine the proper offense. The RTC thereafter issued the (1) Order of January 24,
2007 deferring petitioner’s arraignment and allowing the prosecution to conduct a
reinvestigation to determine the proper offense and submit a recommendation within
30 days from its inception, inter alia; and (2) Order of January31, 2007 denying
reconsideration of the first order. Petitioner assailed these orders via certiorari and
prohibition before the Court of Appeals. Petitioner posits that the prosecution has no
right under the Rules to seek from the trial court an investigation or reevaluation of the
case except through a petition for review before the Department of Justice (DOJ). In
cases when an accused is arrested without a warrant, petitioner contends that the
remedy of preliminary investigation belongs only to the accused.

Issue:
Whether or not private respondent has the right to cause the reinvestigation of the
criminal case when the criminal information had already been filed with the lower court.

Held:
Yes. A preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a complaint or
information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four years,
two months and one day without regard to fine. As an exception, the rules provide that
there is no need for a preliminary investigation in cases of a lawful arrest without a
warrant involving such type of offense, so long as an inquest, where available, has
been conducted. Inquest is defined as an informal and summary investigation
conducted by a public prosecutor in criminal cases involving persons arrested
and detained without the benefit of a warrant of arrest issued by the court for the
purpose of determining whether said persons should remain under custody and
correspondingly be charged in court. The accelerated process of inquest, owing to
its summary nature and the attendant risk of running against Article 125, ends with
either the prompt filing of an information in court or the immediate release of the
arrested person. Notably, the rules on inquest do not provide for a motion for
reconsideration. Contrary to petitioner’s position that private complainant should have
appealed to the DOJ Secretary, such remedy is not immediately available in cases
subject of inquest. Noteworthy is the proviso that the appeal to the DOJ Secretary is by
"petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of Justice may
prescribe." The rule referred to is the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on
Appeal, Section 1 of which provides that the Rule shall "apply to appeals from
resolutions in cases subject of preliminary investigation/ reinvestigation." In cases
subject of inquest, therefore, the private party should first avail of a preliminary
investigation or reinvestigation, if any, before elevating the matter to the DOJ
Secretary. In case the inquest proceedings yield no probable cause, the private
complainant may pursue the case through the regular course of a preliminary
investigation. Once a complaint or information is filed in court, the rules yet provide the
accused with another opportunity to ask for a preliminary investigation within five days
from the time he learns of its filing. The Rules of Court and the New Rules on Inquest
are silent, however, on whether the private complainant could invoke, as respondent
heirs of the victim did in the present case, a similar right to ask for a reinvestigation.
The Court holds that the private complainant can move for reinvestigation, subject to
and in light of the ensuing disquisition.
RULE 115 RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

People of the Philippines vs Ariel Quiñones

G.R. No. 250908 November 23, 2020

Facts:
At around 3:40 in the afternoon of June 14, 2015, Jail Officer Niel A. Romana (JO
Romana) was conducting a roll call of the inmates at the second floor of the Camarines
Norte Provincial Jail when he accosted Rogelio B. Caparas (Caparas), a minor and
trustee-inmate, and asked him where he was going. When Caparas answered that he
was heading to the cell of inmate Frederik Cua (Cua), JO Romana bodily searched him
and recovered from his pocket a small piece of paper sealed with black electrical tape.
When he opened it, he saw a handwritten note, a small plastic sachet containing
0.0944 gram of white crystalline substance, and a rolled aluminum foil. JO Romana
confiscated the items. Caparas testified that the items confiscated was from herein
accused-appellant, hence he was charged with attempted illegal sale of prohibited
drugs.

Issue: Whether there is an attempted illegal sale of prohibited drugs.

Held: No. In order to secure the conviction of an accused charged with Attempted
Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must be able to prove: (a) the
identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and ( b ) the
fact that the sale of the illegal drugs was attempted. A crime is attempted when the
offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution, which should produce the felony, by reason of some
cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

Normally, the identities of the seller and the buyer are proven by the testimonies of the
apprehending officers, especially in cases involving buy-bust operations where the
accused was caught in inflagrante delicto. This case, however, is peculiar, in that
accused-appellant was not himself found in possesion of the illegal drugs subject of the
attempted sale. Instead, the entire basis of the charge against him and of his eventual
conviction as well-was the testimony of Caparas, a fellow inmate in whose custody the
shabu was actually found and who named accused-appellant as the source/seller
thereof. Caparas likewise identified another inmate, Cua, as the intended
recipient/buyer of the shabu.

However, Caparas’ bare testimony ascribing criminal liability upon accused-appellant is

neither trustworthy nor sufficient to convict the latter.

In all criminal prosecutions, the prosecution bears the burden to establish the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In discharging this burden the prosecution’s
duty is to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the information to
warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for any other crime necessarily included
therein. The prosecution must further prove the participation of the accused in the
commission of the offense. In doing all these, the prosecution must rely on the strength
of its own evidence and not anchor its success upon the weakness of the evidence of
the accused. The burden of proof placed on the prosecution arises from the
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused that no less than the Constitution has
guaranteed. Conversely, as to his innocence, the accused has no burden of proof,
hence, he must then be acquitted and set free should the prosecution not overcome
the presumption of innocence in his favor. In other words, the weakness of the defense
put up by the accused is inconsequential in the proceedings for as long as the
prosecution has not discharged its burden of proof in establishing the commission of
the crime charged and in identifying the accused as the malefactor responsible for it.

People v. Vicente Lugnasin and Devincio Guerrero

GR 208404, February 24, 2016

Facts:
Nicassius Cordero narrated that in the evening of April 20, 1999, while opening the
garage door of his residence three armed men who was later made known to him as
Devincio Guerrero, Tito Lugnasin and Elmer Madrid. Thereafter another cohort, Celso
Lugnasin, rode with them and fifteen minutes after the Superhighway they switched the
car with a jeepney, and the driver was known to be as Commander who was later
identified as Vicente Lugnasin. Cordero was kept in a small house for 4 days while they
negotiated with Saleena, his sister-in-law, for the ransom money. Thereafter, Cordero
was released without ransom money being paid. Vicente Lugnas unclaimed that he
only saw Cordero for the first time at the DOJ and Cordero could not even identify him.
He recounted that on May 14, 1999, while preparing for the town fiesta celebration;
policemen came to his residence and arrested him and his brother, Tito, and cousin,
Excelsio, for alleged involvement in a robbery case. They were tortured, and then put
on display for media men to feast on and for alleged victims to identify. Devincio
Guerrero denies his involvement in the kidnapping of Cordero. He recalled that nearing
Holy Week in 2002, five uniformed policemen arrested him without a warrant in Lucena
City, where he used to buy smoked fish to sell. RTC ruled Guilty Beyond Reasonable
Doubt whether or not Cordero’s identification of Vicente Lugnasin and Devincio
Guerrero as among his kidnappers is reliable. The RTC pointed out that Cordero was
able to identify both accused-appellants as he saw their faces before he was
blindfolded.CA ruled affirmed the Decision of RTC. In the Devincio’s argument that his
warrantless arrest was illegal since it did not fall under Section 6, Rule 109 of the Rules
of Procedure, as amended, CA held that accused-appellant Devincio’s right to question
his arrest and subsequent inquest/preliminary investigation is deemed waived due to
his failure to raise such argument before his arraignment.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused during
custodial investigation.

Ruling:
No. The SC did not give credit to Devincio’s bare-faced claim that his rights under RA
7438 were violated while he was under custodial investigation. Devincio did not
execute an extrajudicial confession or admission. In the case of People vs. Buluran
and Valenzuela, it was held that “There is no violation of the constitutional rights of the
accused during custodial investigation since neither one executed an extrajudicial
confession or admission. In fact, the records show that appellant Cielito Buluran opted
to remain silent during custodial investigation. Any allegation of violation of rights
during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an
extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of
their conviction.
 People vs. Baloloy
GR No. 140740, April 12, 2002

FACTS:
Jose Camacho was looking for his daughter, Genelyn Camacho, the victim, who never
returned after being sent to borrow rice from their neighbor. Accused Juanito Baloloy
informed Jose that he saw a dead body at the waterfalls, whose foot was showing. It
was later found out that the body was Genelyn’s. Jose reported the incident to
barangay Captain Luzviminda Ceniza. At the victim’s wake, Ceniza noticed that the
accused was uneasy. Ceniza further revealed that while she was on her way to Jose’s
house, someone gave her a black rope, which was reportedly found at the spot where
the dead body of Genelyn was retrieved. Ceniza then asked the people at the wake
about the rope. Baloloy, who was among those present, claimed the rope as his. She
brought the accused away from the others and asked him why his rope was found at
the place where Genelyn’s body was discovered. Juanito eventually confessed that he
killed the victim. Baloloy told Ceniza that his intention was only to frighten Genelyn, not
to molest and kill her. When Genelyn ran away, he chased her. As to how he raped
her, Baloloy told Ceniza that he first inserted his fingers into the victim’s vagina and
then raped her. Thereafter, he threw her body into the ravine. Baloloy was then brought
to the police headquarters. Meanwhile, MTC presdiding Judge Dicon testified that
when he arrived in his office one morning, several people, including Ceniza were
already in his courtroom to swear to their affidavits before him. After reading the
affidavit of Ceniza, he asked Ceniza whether her statements were true. Ceniza
answered in the affirmative and pointed to Baloloy as the Culprit. Judge Dicon turned
to Baloloy and asked him whether the charge against him was true. Baloloy replied that
he was demonized. While Judge Dicon realized that he should not have asked the
accused as to the truthfulness of the allegations against him, he felt justified in doing
so because the latter was not under custodial investigation. During trial, Baloloy put up
the defense of alibi.

ISSUE:
Whether or not accused’s constitutional rights during custodial investigation were
violated by Judge Dicon when the latter propounded to him incriminating questions.

RULING:
Yes. His constitutional rights during custodial investigation were violated by Judge
Dicon when the latter propounded to him incriminating questions without informing him
of his constitutional rights. It is settled that at the moment the accused voluntarily
surrenders to, or is arrested by, the police officers, the custodial investigation is
deemed to have started. So, he could not thenceforth be asked about his complicity in
the offense without the assistance of counsel. Although no complaint has yet been filed
and that neither was said Judge conducting a preliminary investigation, the fact
remains that at that time, accused was already under the custody of the police
authorities, who had already taken the statement of the witnesses who were then
before Judge Dicon for the administration of their oaths on their statements. Moreover,
while it was claimed that the accused was brought to the police headquarters for his
own protection, records shows that he was, in fact, arrested. If indeed Baloloy’s safety
was the primordial concern of the police authorities, the need to detain and deprive him
of his freedom of action would not have been necessary. Arrest is the taking of a
person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an
offense, and it is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his
submission to the person making the arrest. At any rate, while it is true that Baloloy’s
extrajudicial confession before Judge Dicon was made without the advice and
assistance of counsel and hence inadmissible in evidence, it could however be treated
as a verbal admission of the accused, which could be established through the
testimonies of the persons who heard it or who conducted the investigation of the
accused.

People of the Philippines vs. Nelia Nicandro

GR No. L-59378, February 11, 1986

FACTS:
Appellant was convicted of violation of Section 4, Article II and Article I, of Republic
Act 6425, as amended. His conviction was based on her oral confession. On
November 6, 1981, an entrapment operation was organized by the police officer after
the verification of complaints and reports received by the office. The police team
formed to carry out the entrapment plan was alerted of the presence of the drug
pusher, the appellant Nelia. The informant asked to buy some marijuana cigarette and
gave appellant the two marked Php 5 bills. Thereupon, the appellant delivered to
informant four sticks of marijuana cigarette. Immediately the police team closed in and
nabbed the appellant, was frisked and got from the right front pocket of her pants the
two, marked Php 5 bills, and from the left pocket of her pants the marijuana flowering
tops wrapped in a piece of newspaper. Upon being investigated and after having been
duly apprised of her constitutional rights, appellant orally admitted to selling of four
sticks of marijuana cigarettes and the ownership of the marijuana flowering tops taken
from her pocket, but refused to reduce her confession to writing.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Nelia Nicandro’s confession be admissible as evidence.

RULING:
No. When the Constitution requires a person under investigation to be informed of his
right to remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory
recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a rule, therefore, it would not be
sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under investigation the
provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell
the person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in
practical terms. According to Pat. Joves, he informed appellant of her constitutional
rights when she was under custodial investigation. What specific rights he mentioned
to appellant, he did not say. Neither did he state the manner in which the appellant was
advised of her constitutional rights so as it make her understand them. This is
particularly significant in the instant case because appellant is illiterate and cannot
upon merely hearing an abstract statement thereof. As it is the obligation of the
investigating officer to inform a person under investigation of his right to remain silent
and to counsel, so it is the duty of the prosecution to affirmatively establish compliance
by the investigating officer with his said obligation. Absent such affirmative showing,
the admission or confession made by a person under investigation cannot be admitted
in evidence.
 Zenon R. Perez vs. People
GR No. 164763, February 12, 2008

FACTS:
Zenon Perez, the herein petitioner, seeks a review of his conviction by the
Sandiganbayan for malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code. That on December 28, 1988, an audit team headed by Auditor I Arlene R.
Mandin, Provincial Auditor’s Office, Bohol, conducted a cash examination on the
account of petitioner, who was then the acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol.
Petitioner was absent on the first scheduled audit at his office. Audit team embodied
their findings, incurring a shortage; missing funds. As a result of the audit, Provincial
Auditor of Bohol recommending the filing of the appropriate criminal case against
petitioner. Also, an administrative case was filed against petitioner. The petitioner was
charged before the Sandiganbayan with malversation of public funds. On March 1,
1990, the petitioner assisted by counsel de parte, entered a plea of not guilty. Pre-trial
was initially set on June 4 to 5, 1990 but petitioner’s counsel moved for postponement.
The Sandiganbayan, however, proceeded to hear the case on June 5, 1990, as
previously scheduled, due to the presence of prosecution witness Arlene R. Mandin,
who came all the way from Bohol. Petitioner further testified that on July 30, 1989, he
submitted his Position Paper before the Office of the Ombudsman, Cebu City and
maintained that the alleged cash shortage was only due to oversight. On September
24, 2003, the disposition of the Sandiganbayan is guilty.
The petitioner then appealed at the SC claiming that he was violated the right to a
speedy trial and due process, as over 13 years had passed before the case had been
filed against him and that the sentence imposed upon him is cruel and violates section
19 of Art III of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner contention in his First Answer should not have been given
probative weight because it was executed without the assistance of counsel is valid

RULING:
No. There is no law, jurisprudence or rule which mandates that an employee should
be assisted by counsel in an administrative case. On the contrary, jurisprudence is in
unison in saying that assistance of counsel is not indispensable in administrative
proceedings. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in
writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or accused during
custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may be invoked or rejected in a
criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. While
investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal
proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative
inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the
charges and of respondent’s capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such
body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. Thus, the right to counsel is
not imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted
merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against
erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of
government service. There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-
litigation proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such
representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers,
while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the due
process clause such that without the participation of its members, the safeguard is
deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot
validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side did not give a reasonable excuse
for its disappearance. An accountable public officer may be convicted of malversation
even if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation and the only evidence is
shortage in his accounts which he has not been able to explain satisfactorily. Verily, an
accountable public officer may be found guilty of malversation even if there is no direct
evidence of malversation because the law establishes a presumption that mere failure
of an accountable officer to produce public funds which have come into his hands-on
demand by an officer duly authorized to examine his accounts is prima facie case of
conversion. Because of the prima facie presumption in Article 217, the burden of
evidence is shifted to the accused to adequately explain the location of the funds or
property under his custody or control in order to rebut the presumption that he has
appropriated or misappropriated for himself the missing funds. Failing to do so, the
accused may be convicted under the said provision.

RONALD IBAÑEZ, EMILIO IBAÑEZ, and DANIEL "BOBOT" IBAÑEZ

vs.
PEOPLEOFTHE PHILIPPINES
[G.R. No. 190798. January 27, 2016.]

FACTS:
For allegedly stoning, hitting and stabbing Rodolfo M. Lebria (Rodolfo), the petitioners
together with their co-accused, Boyet Ibañez (Boyet) and David Ibañez (David), who
have remained at large, were charged with the crime of frustrated homicide. The RTC
found the petitioners guilty as charged which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
One of the Issues raised before the Supreme Court was the alleged violation of
petitioners’ right to counsel. During the proceedings before the RTC, Atty. Antonio
Manzano was appointed by the trial court as counsel de oficio for all accused. Atty.
Manzano was informed that the trial for the presentation of prosecution evidence was
set on June 18, 2003. The prosecution witnesses completed their respective
testimonies during the June 18, 2003 hearing. However, Atty. Manzano failed to
appear at the said hearing despite prior notice. The RTC declared that Atty. Manzano
was deemed to have waived his right to cross examine the prosecution witnesses.
Eventually, the trial court appointed petitioner’s current counsel de oficio, Atty. Juan
Sindingan (Atty. Sindingan) who has been representing the petitioners since then. With
his help, all three petitioners finally appeared before the trial court on May 5, 2005.
Atty. Sindingan handled the cross-examination of another prosecution witness,
Salvacion, as well as the presentation of evidence for the defense.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners were deprived of their constitutionally guaranteed right to
counsel.

RULING:
There was no denial of right to counsel as evidenced by the fact that the petitioners
were not only assisted by a counsel de oficio during arraignment and pre-trial but more
so, their counsel de oficio actively participated in the proceedings before the trial court
including the direct and cross-examination of the witnesses. As aptly found by the CA,
the petitioners were duly represented by a counsel de oficio all throughout the
proceedings except for one hearing when their court appointed lawyer was absent and
Rodolfo and PO2 Sulit presented their testimonies. As previously stated, it was during
said hearing when the trial court declared that the cross-examination of the said two
prosecution witnesses was deemed waived. The right of a party to confront and cross-
examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in
proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental
right which is part of due process. However, the right is a personal one which may be
waived expressly or impliedly, by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of
cross- examination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross- examine a
witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine
and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or
allowed to remain in the record.

SPOUSES PEDRO and ANGELINA TELAN

Vs.
Court of Appeals
GR No. 95026, October 4, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioner PEDRO is a retired government employee and high school graduate who
settled in 1973 on a property a butting the national highway in Guibang, Gamu,
Isabela. In 1977, when the government needed the land, PEDRO was compelled to
transfer his residence to the other side of the national. PEDRO set up business
enterprises such as a vulcanizing shop and an eatery. Shortly thereafter, his cousins,
the herein private respondents Roberto Telan and Spouses Vicente and Virginia Telan
(hereinafter ROBERTO, VICENTE, and VIRGINIA), followed suit by setting up their
own eatery within the same lot. In 1984, PEDRO and his spouses ANGELINA received
a Notice to Vacate from the DBP.This was followed by a letter from VIRGINIA herself,
reiterating the said demand. Apparently, VICENTE and VIRGINIA had executed a
Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage with Sia over the said lot shared by PEDRO
and ANGELINA. DBP thereafter foreclosed the mortgage. In the same year, 1984, the
DBP and the Spouses VICENTE and VIRGINIA TELAN filed a suit at the Regional
Trial Court of Ilagan, Isabela to evict PEDRO TELAN's family from the lot. The case
was dismissed. In 1986, ROBERTO TELAN was able to secure a Certificate of Title in
his name over the contested lot and then filed a complaint for Accion Publiciana
against the Sps PEDRO TELAN. Wherein the latter hired the services of Atty. Antonio
Paguiran to defend them in the suit. The lower court awarded the possession of the
property to ROBERT TELAN, et. al. Spouses PEDRO TELAN wanted to appeal,
however, Atty. Paguiran was disposed not to do so, PEDRO and ANGELINA asked
another person to sign for them petitioner ANGELINA TELAN became acquainted with
Ernesto Palma who represented himself to be a "lawyer." Having no counsel to assist
them in their appeal, Angelina asked "
Atty. Palma" to handle their case. he consented and the petitioners paid his "lawyer's
fees.” In 1989, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution which considered the appeal
interposed by petitioners as abandoned and dismissed "for failure ... to file an appeal
brief within the reglementary period, pursuant to Section 1 (f), Rule 50 of the Rules of
Court. The petitioners were not aware of the dismissal of their appeal. They only came
to know about it on May 1990, when somebody in the Isabela Provincial Capitol at
Ilagan informed PEDRO TELAN immediately verified the facts. "Atty. Palma" could no
longer be found. PEDRO in verifying the existence of "Atty. Palma" in the Roll of
Attorneys with the Bar Confidant's Office. This was followed by the filing of Criminal
Case No. 389-90 for Estafa against "Atty. Palma." By now PEDRO had realized that
"Atty. Palma" was a fake. In 1990, the presiding judge of the lower court issue the Writ
of Demolition for the enforcement of the decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the representation of the petitioner by a fake lawyer amounts to a
deprivation of his right to counsel and hence a lack of due process.

RULING:
The SC rule for the petitioners. The Sc hold that they had not been accorded due
process of law because they lost them to appeal when deprived of the right to counsel.
The right to counsel in civil cases exists just as forcefully as in criminal cases, specially
so when as a consequence, life, liberty, or property is subjected to restraint or in
danger of loss. In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to be assisted by a
member of the bar is immutable. Otherwise, there would be a grave denial of due
process. Thus, even if the judgment had become final and executory, it may still be
recalled, and the accused afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel.
There is no reason why the rule in criminal cases has to be different from that in civil
cases. The preeminent right to due process of law applies not only to life and liberty but
also to property. There can be no fair hearing unless a party, who is in danger of losing
his house in which he and his family live and in which he has established a modest
means of livelihood, is given the right to be heard by himself and counsel. Even the
most experienced lawyers get tangled in the web of procedure. To demand as much
form ordinary citizens whose only compelle intrare is their sense of right would turn the
legal system into an intimidating monstrosity where an individual may be stripped of his
property rights not because he has no right to the property but because he does not
know how to establish such right. The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked
at all times. More so, in the case of an on-going litigation, it is a right that must be
exercised at every step of the way, with the lawyer faithfully keeping his client
company. This is the reason why under ordinary circumstances, a lawyer cannot
simply refuse anyone the counsel that only the exercise of his office can impart.

Emeterea Villaflor vs. Ricardo Summers

GR No. 16444, September 8, 1920

FACTS:
In a criminal case pending before the CFI of Manila, EMETERIA VILLAFLOR and
FLORENTINO SOUINGCO are charged with the crime of adultery. On this case
coming on for trial before the Hon. Pedro Concepcion, Judge of First Instance, upon
the petition of the assistant fiscal for the city of Manila, the court ordered the defendant
Villaflor, petitioner herein, to submit her body to the examination of one or two
competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. The accused refused to
obey the order on the ground that such examination of her person was a violation of
the constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination. Thereupon she was found in
contempt of court and was ordered to be imprisoned in Bilibid Prison until she should
permit the medical examination required by the court. The sole legal issue arising from
the facts is whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by
physicians to determine if she is pregnant, violates that portion of the Philippine Bill of
Rights and that portion of the Code of Criminal Procedure which find their origin in the
Constitution of the United States, providing that
no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
Counsel for petitioner argues that such bodily exhibition is an infringement of the
constitutional provision; the representative of the city fiscal contends that it is not an
infringement of the constitutional provision. The trial judge in the instant case has held
with the fiscal; while it is brought to our notice that a judge of the same court has held
on an identical question as contended for by the attorney for the accused and
petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not compelling a woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians
to determine if she is pregnant, violates that portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights and
that portion of our Code of Criminal Procedure providing that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.

RULING:
No. The constitutional guaranty that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial
self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the
body of the accused is permissible. Perhaps the best way to test the correctness of our
position is to go back once more to elements and ponder on what is the prime purpose
of a criminal trial. As we view it, the object of having criminal laws is to purge the
community of person who violates the laws to the great prejudice of their fellow men.
Criminal procedure, the rules of evidence, and constitutional provisions, are then
provided, not to protect the guilty but to protect the innocent. No rule is intended to be
so rigid as to embarrass the administration of justice in tis endeavor to ascertain the
truth. No accused person should be afraid of the use of any method which will tend to
establish the truth. For instance, under the facts before us, to use torture to make
defendant admit her guilt might only result in including her to tell a falsehood. But no
evidence of physical facts can for any substantial reason be held to be detrimental to
the accused except in so far as the truth is to be avoided in order to acquit a guilty
person.

Francisco Beltran v. Felix Samson

G.R. No. 32025, September 23, 1929 53 Phil. 570 (1929)

FACTS:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein the petitioner complains that the
respondent judge ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal to take dictation in
his own handwriting from the latter. The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for
the purpose of comparing the petitioner’s handwriting and determining whether or not it
is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified. There is no question as to
the facts alleged in the complaint filed in these proceedings; but the respondents
contend that the petitioner is not entitled to the remedy applied for, inasmuch as the
order prayed for by the provincial fiscal and later granted by the court below, and again
which the instant action was brought, is based on the provisions of section 1687 of the
Administrative Code. Of course, the fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative
Code, and the proper judge, upon motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be
present at the investigation of any crime or misdemeanor. But this power must be
exercised without prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cited to appear. And
the petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded, seeks refuge in the
constitutional provision contained in the Jones Law and incorporated in General
Orders, No. 58. Therefore, the question raised is to be decided by examining whether
the constitutional provision invoked by the petitioner prohibits compulsion to execute
what is enjoined upon him by the order against which these proceedings were taken.

ISSUE:
Whether the complainant be compelled to write down what the fiscal dictates and used
the said handwritten letters to compare the latter with the letter-evidence against the
complainant.

RULING:
No. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers;
writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence
and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to
furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the
respondent fiscal clearly states. The court said that, for the purposes of the
constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a
document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in
both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. But even
supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the
means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right
guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may
succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not
constitute the raison d’ etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the
protection of innocent persons.

[G.R. NO. 148220 : June 15, 2005]

ROSENDO HERRERA, v. ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother
ARMI A. ALBA, and HON. NIMFA CUESTA-VILCHES, Presiding Judge

FACTS:
On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba (respondent), represented by
his mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition,
support and damages against petitioner. Petitioner denied that he is the biological
father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with respondent’s mother.
Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate
the proceedings. Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has
not gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates
his right against self-incrimination. The trial court granted respondents motion to
conduct DNA paternity testing on petitioner, respondent and Armi Alba. Petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration and he asserted that under the present circumstances, the
DNA test [he] is compelled to take would be inconclusive, irrelevant and the coercive
process to obtain the requisite specimen, unconstitutional. The trial court denied
petitioner’s MR. On July 18, 2000, petitioner filed before the appellate court a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner maintained
his previous objections to the taking of DNA paternity testing. The appellate court
stated that the proposed DNA paternity testing does not violate his right against self-
incrimination because the right applies only to testimonial compulsion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not DNA paternity testing violates the accused’s right against self-
incrimination

RATIO:
No. Section 17, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that no person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself. Petitioner asserts that obtaining samples
from him for DNA testing violates his right against self-incrimination. Petitioner ignores
our earlier pronouncements that the privilege is applicable only to testimonial evidence.
Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the respondent in
a paternity case, contrary to the belief of respondent in this action, will not violate the
right against self-incrimination. This privilege applies only to evidence that is
communicative in essence taken under duress. The Supreme Court has ruled that the
right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an
exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be material. As such, a
defendant can be required to submit to a test to extract virus from his body; the
substance emitting from the body of the accused was received as evidence for
acts of lasciviousness; morphine forced out of the mouth was received as proof; an
order by the judge for the witness to put on pair of pants for size was; and the court
can compel a woman accused of adultery to submit for pregnancy test, since the gist of
the privilege is the restriction on testimonial compulsion. The policy of the Family Code
to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children,
especially of illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the right of the putative parent
to claim his or her own defenses. Where the evidence to aid this investigation is
obtainable through the facilities of modern science and technology, such evidence
should be considered subject to the limits established by the law, rules, and
jurisprudence.

People of the Philippines vs Judge Ayson

GR No. 85215, July 7, 1989

FACTS:
Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio
City station. It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane
tickets, and the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be con-ducted.
That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and
Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine
Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent
by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the
Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also
stating that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise
however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against
Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos’ writ-
ten admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the confession was
taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer. The Respondent Judge did
not admit those stating that the accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors
was denied. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the
admission and statement of accused.

RULING:
No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-in-
crimination (only to witnesses other than accused, unless what is asked is relating to a
different crime charged- not present in case at bar). This is accorded to every person
who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil,
criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is not to "be compelled to be a witness
against himself.” It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions
and not a prohibition of inquiry." the right can be claimed only when the specific
question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed
at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to
decline to ap-pear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify
altogether. It is a right that a witness knows or should know. He must claim it and could
be waived. Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the
rights of the accused include first, he shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right; second, nor force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the freewill shall be used against him;
and third, any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in
evidence. The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree
to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such rights and waivers are
demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of
interrogation can be used against him.

G.R. No. 146689, September 27, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. FERNANDO MONJEY ROSARIO
FACTS:
Fernando (Ferdinand) Monje y Rosario alias Fernan, together with Lordino
(Bernard)Maglaya y Alvarez alias Odeng, Christopher Bautista y Rosario alias Totde
and Michael Castro y Osias alias Iking were charged with rape with homicide for the
brutal rape and killing of 15-year old Imee Diez Paulino. On 13 November 2000, after
trial, the Regional Trial Court, acquitted Maglaya, Bautista and Castro but convicted
Monje of the crime charged and sentenced him to death, and to indemnify the heirs of
the victim. As the trial court found, in the evening of 24 April 1997 at around 9:00
o'clock Imee Diez Paulino asked permission from her mother to play bingo at the
house of their barangay captain at Francisco Homes, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.
Three (3) days later, Imee's lifeless body was found lying in the rice fields naked,
except for her brassiere, with several injuries including a fractured skull that caused
massive brain hemorrhage. The body was already in a state of decomposition. The
medico-legal officer surmised that the injuries on the skull were caused by fist blows or
by a hard-blunt instrument. The genital examination disclosed that Imee was brutally
raped before she was killed. The blood clots in the vaginal area showed that Imee was
still alive when the object was forced into her. Nobody saw the actual commission of
the crime. But death now lurks upon accused-appellant Monje on the basis alone of the
following circumstantial evidence put together by the court. After his initial cross-
examination by defense counsel, witness Cordero failed and refused to return to court
for the continuation of his cross-examination. In other words, except for his brief cross-
examination which had barely scratched the surface, so to speak, and despite the
insistence of the defense counsel to pursue his cross-examination and the repeated
warnings from the trial court that it would be constrained to strike out and disregard his
testimony should he fail to appear again, the witness stubbornly refused to return to
court for his cross-examination.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused may invoke the right to cross-examine, to meet the
witnesses face-to-face.

RULING:
Yes. It bears stressing that the cross-examination of a witness is an absolute right, not
a mere privilege, of the party against whom he is called. With regard to the accused, it
is a right guaranteed by the fundamental law as part of due process. Article III, Sec. 14,
par. (2), of the 1987 Constitution specifically mandates that "the accused shall enjoy
the right to meet the witnesses face to face," and Rule 115, Sec. 1, par. (f), of the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure enjoins that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
be entitled to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Cross-
examination serves as a safeguard to combat unreliable testimony, providing means
for discrediting a witness' testimony, and is in the nature of an attack on the truth and
accuracy of his testimony. The purpose of cross-examination, however, is not limited to
bringing out a falsehood, since it is also a leading and searching inquiry of the witness
for further disclosure touching the particular matters detailed by him in his direct
examination, and it serves to sift, modify, or explain what has been said, in order to
develop new or old facts in a view favorable to the cross-examiner. The object of cross-
examination therefore is to weaken or disprove the case of one’s adversary, and break
down his testimony in chief, test the recollection, veracity, accuracy, honesty and bias
or prejudice of the witness, his source of information, his motives, interest and memory,
and exhibit the improbabilities of his testimony. In other words, the ultimate purpose of
cross-examination is to test the truth or falsity of the statements of a witness during
direct examination. Unfortunately, for the accused, these objectives of cross-
examination were never attained in this case because of the continued failure and
refusal of witness Cordero to appear for his cross-examination. We discussed at length
in Seneris the effects of the absence or the incomplete cross-examination of a witness
on the admissibility in evidence of his testimony on direct examination. The basic rule
is that the testimony of a witness given on direct examination should be stricken off the
record where there was no adequate opportunity for cross-examination. Of course,
there are notable modifications to the basic rule which make its application essentially
on a case-to-case basis. Thus, where a party had the opportunity to cross-examine a
witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits his right to cross-examine
and the testimony given by the witness on direct examination will be allowed to remain
on record. But when the cross-examination is not or cannot be done or completed due
to causes attributable to the party offering the witness, or to the witness himself, the
uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent and inadmissible in evidence.
The direct testimony of a witness who dies before the conclusion of the cross-
examination can be stricken only insofar as not covered by the cross-examination, and
the absence of a witness is not enough to warrant striking of his testimony for failure to
appear for further cross-examination where the witness has already been sufficiently
cross-examined, which is not true in the present case, or that the matter on which
further cross-examination is sought is not in controversy.

GR No. 166606, November 29, 2005

GUILLERMO T. DOMONDON and VAN D. LUSPO vs. HON. FIRST DIVISION,
SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:
The case arose from the investigation initiated by a letter-complaint of then Police Sr.
Superintendent Romeo M. Acop to the Ombudsman where it appears that payrolls of
2,000 enlisted men of the Cordillera Regional Command (CRECOM), who were
allegedly recipients of the P20,000,000 appropriated for combat, clothing, and
individual equipment (CCIE) allowance, were falsified. On May 4, 1994, an information
was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging petitioners Domondon and Luspo, and
the above-named accused, with violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. On December 3, 2003 a motion to dismiss claiming that the failure to
arraign them within the period set under Republic Act (RA) No. 8493 or the Speedy
Trial Act of 1998 have resulted in denial of their rights to speedy trial. On September
13, 2004 Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion to dismiss. On January 11, 2005
Sandiganbayan dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Petitioners allege
that speedy trial is not a flexible concept. They explained that prior to the enactment of
RA 8493, as implemented by Supreme Court (SC) Circular No. 38-98, the concept of
speedy trial was deemed flexible because the number of days to determine whether an
accused is deprived of his constitutional right to speedy trial, was not specified. The
courts were given enough latitude to make a judicial determination of whether the
delays could be considered as vexatious, capricious, and oppressive to constitute a
violation of the right to speedy trial. Petitioners claim that with the enactment of RA
8493, any delay in excess of the allowable number of days within which trial should be
conducted will give rise to the violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the right to speedy trial of the petitioners were denied.

RULING:
No. Petitioners’ contention lacks merit. While the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 sets the
time limit for the arraignment and trial of a case, these however do not preclude
justifiable postponements and delay when so warranted by the situation. Section 2 of
SC Circular 38-98provides that the period of the pendency of a motion to quash, or for
a bill of particulars, or other causes justifying suspension of arraignment, shall be
excluded. The Supreme Court ruled in a preceding case that the right to a speedy trial
is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive delays; when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured;
and when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In the application of the constitutional
guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be
taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. The Court further
explained that in determining whether the constitutional right to speedy trial of
petitioners has been violated, the factors to consider and balance are the duration of
the delay, reason therefor, assertion of the right or failure to assert it and the prejudice
caused by such delay. The denial of petitioners’ motion to dismiss is justified that
although the scheduled arraignments were postponed several times, they were
however postponed for valid reasons. The respondent court cited a number of
justifiable causes of postponements, thus, one is due to the request of one of the
accused to reset the arraignment since the counsel of record is not available on the
scheduled date. To proceed with the arraignment despite the noted absence of one of
the counsels would result in inequity on one of the accused-movants co-defendants.
Another postponement, as pointed out by the accused-movants, was the time given by
the Court to allow the prosecutor to file an opposition to Brizuelas Bill of Particulars.
The comment made by accused-movants is discriminatory and unjust. They claim that
the delay caused by the filing of a motion for bill of particulars by a co-accused should
not be attributable to them as they did not join the same, and consequently such is a
violation of their right to speedy trial. They have forgotten that they themselves had
caused a long delay in this case by filing a motion for reinvestigation and the petition
for certiorari and prohibition with the Honorable Supreme Court, which is, if such
reasoning is to be followed, to the detriment of the other accused in this case. The
Court find no reason to deviate from the findings and conclusions of the respondent
court. A careful examination of the records would show that the postponements were
caused by numerous pending motions or petitions. The delays caused by the filing and
resolution of these motions and petitions cannot be categorized as vexatious,
capricious or oppressive. After all, it is the judicious and deliberate determination of all
the pending incidents of a case, with a genuine respect for the rights of all parties and
the requirements of procedural due process, that should be the primordial
consideration in the full resolution of a case, more than the mere convenience of the
parties or of the courts, so that justice and fairness would be served thereby. Thus, as
a rule there being no oppressive delay in the proceedings, and no postponements
unjustifiably sought, the Supreme Court concur with the conclusion reached by the
Sandiganbayan that petitioners right to speedy trial had not been violated. Hence, the
dismissal of petitioners’ motion to dismiss must be upheld.

Rafael L. Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan, et al.

Edwin N. Nacionales, et al v. Sandiganbayan, et al,
G.R. No. 191411/G.R. No. 191871 July 15, 2013

Facts:
Coscolluela served as governor of the Province of Negros Occidental for three full
terms which ended on June 30, 2001. During his tenure, Nacionales served as his
Special Projects Division Head, Amugod as Nacionales’ subordinate and Malvas as
Provincial Health Officer. On November 9, 2001, a letter-complaint from People’s
Graftwatch was received by the Office of the Ombudsman, requesting for assistance to
investigate the anomalous purchase of medical and agricultural equipment for the
province in the amount of P 20,000,000.00. After the Case Building Team of the Office
of the Ombudsman conducted its investigation, a Final Evaluation Report dated April
16, 2002 upgraded the complaint into a criminal case against petitioners. A Resolution
dated March 27, 2003, was prepared by Graft Investigation Officer Butch Cañares,
finding probable cause against petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
3019, otherwise known as “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.” The Information
prepared and signed by Cañares was submitted to Deputy Ombudsman for the
Visayas Primo Miro who recommended the approval of the Information on June 5,
2003. However, the final approval of Acting Ombudsman Orlando Casimiro came only
on May 21, 2009, and on June 19, 2009, the Information was filed before the
Sandiganbayan. Coscolluela filed a Motion to Quash on July 9, 2009, arguing that his
constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was violated as the criminal charges
against him were resolved only after almost eight (8) years since the complaint was
instituted. Nacionales, Malvas and Amugod later adopted Coscolluela’s motion. An
Opposition to Motion to Quash dated August 27, 2009, was filed by the respondents on
the ground that the Information has to go through careful review and revision before its
final approval. The Sandiganbayan denied petitioners’ Motion to Quash in a Resolution
dated October 6, 2009 for lack of merit. It held that the period of delay cannot be
deemed as inordinate and petitioners’ constitutional right to speedy disposition of
cases was not violated. On November 6 and 9, 2009, petitioners filed their respective
Motions for Reconsideration, which were later denied by the Sandiganbayan in its
Resolution dated February 10, 2010, for lack of merit. Hence, these consolidated
Petitions for Certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in finding that petitioners’
right to speedy disposition of cases was not violated.

RULING:
The petitions are meritorious. The Court holds that petitioners’ right to a speedy
disposition of their criminal case had been violated due to the following grounds, first, it
is observed that the preliminary investigation proceedings took a protracted amount of
time to complete; second, the delay in the Ombudsman resolution of the case largely
remains unjustified; third, the Court deems that petitioners cannot be faulted for their
alleged failure to assert their right to speedy disposition of cases; and fourth, the Court
finally recognizes the prejudice caused to the petitioners by the lengthy delay in the
proceedings against them. Perforce, the October 6, 2009 and February 10, 2010
Resolutions of Sandiganbayan must be set aside and the criminal case against
petitioners be dismissed. The acquittal of the petitioners does not necessarily follow
that petitioners are entirely exculpated from any civil liability as provided for by Section
2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, unless the judgment of acquittal explicitly declares
that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Moreover,
the Court is unable to make a definite pronouncement as to whether petitioners indeed
committed the acts or omissions from which any civil liability on their part might arise
as prescribed under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, thus, the Province is not
precluded from instituting a subsequent civil case based on the delict if only to recover
the amount of P 20, 000, 000.00 in public funds attributable to petitioners’ alleged
malfeasance.

MARIO FL. CRESPO,

vs.
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL
G.R. No. L-53373, June 30, 1987
FACTS:
On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the
Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit
Criminal Court of Lucena City. When the case was set for arraignment the accused
filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for
review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal for the filing of the information. In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding
judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. A motion for
reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the
arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the
matter to the appellate court. A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a
preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in the Court of Appeals that was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06978. In an order of August 17,1977, the Court of
Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused
until further orders of the Court. In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General he
recommended that the petition be given due course. On May 15, 1978 a decision was
rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining the judge
from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the
Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review. On March 22,
1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition
for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the
fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. A
motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated
April 10, 1978 with the trial court, attaching thereto a copy of the letter of
Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978, the private prosecutor was
given time to file an opposition thereto. On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the
motion and set the arraignment.

ISSUE:
WON the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial
Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for
review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the
merits.

RULING:
Yes. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is done
and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts.
Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with
the presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to
arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted
or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the responsibility of appearing for the
People of the Philippines even under such circumstances much less should he
abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a private prosecutor for
then the entire proceedings will be null and void. The least that the fiscal should do is
to continue to appear for the prosecution although he may turn over the presentation of
the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his direction and control. The rule
therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused
rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and
control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he
cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on
what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be
addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not
matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion
was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the records of the investigation.

Rule 115
People v. Val de los Reyes
G.R. Nos. 139331 & 140845-46 | October 16, 2012
Facts:
December 22, 1994, at around 4pm, Imelda Brutas, upon the request of her sister
Clara, went to the house of de los Reyes to bring some pictures. Upon arrival thereat,
Imelda saw de los Reyes outside his house talking to another man, whom de los
Reyes introduced as Val de los Reyes (herein Val). Because it suddenly rained, the 3
of them took shelter inside de los Reyes’ house. De los Reyes and Val forced Imelda to
drink 2 bottles of beer, causing her to feel dizzy. It was under this condition that Val
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her against her will. Thereafter, de los
Reyes took his turn with Imelda, aided by Val who covered her mouth and held her
hands. Not satisfied, Val once again ravished Imelda, with the assistance of de los
Reyes who likewise covered her mouth and held her hands. Imelda filed criminal
complaints for rape against de los Reyes and Val. Unfortunately, the authorities were
able to arrest only appellant while Val remained at large. Thus, de los Reyes was
arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Before prosecution could conclude the presentation
of its evidence, he jumped bailing. Thus, he was tried in absentia. RTC Convicted de
los Reyes of 2 counts of rape and sentenced to suffer the death penalty. In view of the
penalty of death case was elevated to the Court on automatic review. Subsequently,
RTC revived the criminal cases against Val, who, after trial, was likewise found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of 3 charges of rape. The Court later ordered the
consolidation of the 5 cases. The Court en banc rendered a decision vacating the
judgment of conviction against Val finding that the RTC violated Secs. 1 and 2, Rule
132 and Sec. 1, Rule 133 of the ROC it would appear from the records that during
Val’s trial, the prosecution merely adopted the transcript of the stenographic notes
during the trial against de los Reyes and asked the prosecution witnesses to affirm
their previous testimonies. Thus, the Court remanded the cases to RTC for rehearing.
Meanwhile, the automatic review of the cases against de los Reyes was held in
abeyance. Val was tried anew before the RTC. RTC Convicted him for 3 counts of rape
and sentenced him to suffer the death penalty. CA affirmed conviction of Val, reduced
the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua.

Issue:
WON it is necessary to transfer these cases to the CA for immediate review

Ruling:
NO. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. At the outset, the Court notes that
these cases were elevated to Us on automatic review in view of the RTC’s imposition
of the death penalty upon appellant in its June 25, 1997 Decision. However, with the
Court’s pronouncement in the 2004 case of People v. Mateo, 433 SCRA 640[2004],
providing for and making mandatory the intermediate review by the CA of cases
involving the death penalty, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the proper course
of action would be to remand these cases to the appellate court for the conduct of an
intermediate review. Records reveal that the appellant jumped bail during the
proceedings before the RTC and was, in fact, tried and convicted in absentia. There is
death of evidence showing that he has since surrendered to the court’s jurisdiction.
Thus, he has no right to pray for affirmative relief before the courts. Once an accused
escape from prison or confinement, jumps bail as in appellant’s case, or fees to a
foreign country, he loses his standing in court, and unless he surrenders or submits to
the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief there
from. Thus, even if the Court were to remand these cases to the CA for intermediate
review, the CA would only be constrained to dismiss appellant’s appeal, as he is
considered a fugitive from justice. On this score, Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of
Court is relevant, which provides, Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to
prosecute. The Court of Appeals may, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio and
with notice to the appellant in either case, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file
his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except where the appellant is
represented by a counsel de oficio. The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the
appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or
confinement, jumps bail or fees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.
It bears to stress that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege, and, as such,
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.
The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the
Rules, failing which, the right to appeal is lost.

RULE 116
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALFREDO PANGILINAN y TRINIDAD
Facts:
Two charges of rape of his own daughter was filed against the accused Alfredo
Pangilinan. On May 5, 1997, appellant, who was arrested and detained with no bail
recommended, filed a petition for bail, but denied. On June 9, 1999, the trial court,
having discovered that appellant had not yet been arraigned, scheduled his
arraignment. On June 17, 1999, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio,
pleaded not guilty to the charges against him. Since the prosecution adopted all the
evidence it adduced during the hearing for the petition for bail as part of its evidence-in-
chief, which evidence the trial court admitted, the trial court deemed the cases
submitted for decision. On September 9, 1999, the trial court convicted appellant of two
counts of rape and imposed on him the capital punishment for each count. On
November 16, 2005, the CA affirmed the death penalties imposed by the trial court but
modified the amounts of damages awarded. On January 27, 2006, the CA elevated the
records of the case to the SC for automatic review.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellant’s rights were prejudice by the fact that there was late
arraignment.
Ruling:
No. This procedural defect was cured when his counsel participated in the trial without
raising any objection that his client had yet to be arraigned. In fact, his counsel even
cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. His counsel’s active participation in the
hearings is a clear indication that he was fully aware of the charges against him;
otherwise his counsel would have objected and informed the court of this blunder.
Moreover, no protest was made when appellant was subsequently arraigned. The
parties did not question the procedure taken. It is only now, after being convicted and
sentenced that appellant cries that his constitutional right has been violated. It is
already too late to raise this procedural defect. The Court will not allow such.

ISABELO A. BRAZA v. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 195032, February 20, 2013

FACTS:
A letter of complaint was filed before the PACPO, Ombudsman, alleging that the
ASEAN Summit street lighting projects were overpriced. Braza, being the president of
FABMIK Construction and Equipment Supply Company, Inc., was one of the
respondents. The Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas filed before the Sandiganbayan
for violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. 3019. The Sandiganbayan ruled that Braza would not
be placed in double jeopardy should he be arraigned a new under the second
information because his previous arraignment was conditional. It continued that even
if he was regularly arraigned, double jeopardy would still not set in because the second
information charged an offense different from, and which did not include or was
necessarily included in, the original offense charged. Braza was effectively discharged
from the first Information upon the filing of the second Information but said discharge
was without prejudice to his prosecution for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The
Sandiganbayan, however, deemed it proper that a new preliminary investigation be
conducted under the new charge.

ISSUE:
Whether or not double jeopardy has already set in basis of Braza "not guilty" plea in
the first Information and, thus, he can no longer be prosecuted under the second
Information.

RULING:
NO. The Sandiganbayan's Order clearly and unequivocally states that the conditions
for Braza's arraignment as well as his travel abroad, that is, that if the Information
would be amended, he shall waive his constitutional right to be protected against
double jeopardy and shall allow himself to be arraigned on the amended information
without losing his right to question the same. The relinquishment of his right to
invoke double jeopardy had been convincingly laid out. Such waiver was clear,
categorical and intelligent. Having given his conformity and accepted the conditional
arraignment and its legal consequences, Braza is now estopped from assailing its
conditional nature just to conveniently avoid being arraigned and prosecuted of the
new charge under the second information. There is simply no double jeopardy
when the subsequent information charges another and different offense, although
arising from the same act or set of acts. Prosecution for the same act is not prohibited.
What is forbidden is the prosecution for the same offense.

G.R. Nos. 163972-77 March 28, 2008

JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN vs. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
Joselito Raniero J. Daan and Benedicto E. Kuizon were charged of 3 counts of
malversation of public funds and falsification of public document by a public officer or
employee and entered a plea of not guilty to the cases filed against them. Thereafter,
they offered to withdraw their plea of not guilty and offered to substitute the same with
a plea of guilt provided that the mitigating circumstances of confession of plea of guilt
and voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if such
proposal is not acceptable, said accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of
not guilty to the crime of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee
with a plea of guilty, but to the lesser crime of falsification of a public document by a
private individual. On the other hand, the accused offered to substitute their plea of not
guilty to the malversation cases with a plea of guilty to the lesser crime of failure of an
accountable officer to render accounts. The Sandiganbayan denied their Motion to
Plea Bargain, despite favorable recommendation of the Prosecution on the ground that
no cogent reason was presented to justify its approval. The Sandiganbayan likewise
denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this case filed by Daan.

Issue:
WON the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion for denying the petition
for Plea Bargain?

Ruling:
Yes, the Sandiganbayan erred in denying the accused’s request to Plea Bargain.
Section 2, Rule 116 authorizes Plea bargaining which provides that: “At arraignment,
the accused, with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be
allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily
included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may
still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not
guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary.” Here, the Records
show that there was a favorable recommendation by the Office of the Special
Prosecutor to approve petitioner's motion to plea bargain. Moreover, the lesser offense
of Falsification by Private Individuals and Failure to Render Accounts by an
Accountable Officer are necessarily included in the crimes of Falsification of Public
Documents and Malversation of Public Funds. Specifically, in the charge for
Falsification of Public Documents, petitioner may plead guilty to the lesser offense of
Falsification by Private Individuals inasmuch as it does not appear that petitioner took
advantage of his official position in allegedly falsifying the time book and payroll of the
Municipality of Bato, Leyte. In the same vein, with regard to the crime of Malversation
of Public Funds, while the informations contain allegations which make out a case for
Malversation against petitioner, nevertheless, absent the element of conversion,
theoretically, petitioner may still be held liable for Failure to Render Account by an
Accountable Officer if it is shown that the failure to render account was in violation of a
law or regulation that requires him to render such an accounting within the prescribed
period. Given, therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses charged in
this case likewise constitute the lesser offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to
such lesser offenses.

RULE 117
G.R. No. 205952, February 11, 2015
ATTY. SEGUNDO B. BONSUBRE, JR. v. ERWIN YERRO, ERICO YERRO AND
RITCHIE YERRO

FACTS:
A criminal complaint for estafa filed by petitioner against respondents Erwin Yerro,
Erico Yerro, and Ritchie Yerro (respondents) before the RTC. In the course of the
proceedings, the counsel on record, private prosecutor Atty. Norberto Luna, Jr. (Atty.
Luna), manifested that there was an on-going settlement between petitioner and
respondents, and that they would file the necessary motion relative thereto. Although
a Compromise Agreement was reached between petitioner and respondents relative to
the civil aspect of the case, the prosecution failed to furnish the RTC a copy of the
same and file the necessary motion as manifested. As a result, the RTC, in an Order
dated September 18, 2001 (September 18, 2001 Dismissal Order), dismissed the case
for failure of the prosecution to comply with the court’s directive, as well as to take any
further step to prosecute the case, in view of the accused’s constitutional right to
speedy trial. On June 15, 2004, or more than 2 years from the issuance of the
September 18, 2001 Dismissal Order, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
claiming that he learned of the September 18, 2001 Dismissal Order only on June 7,
2004, and that he believed in good faith that the case was merely archived in
accordance with the terms of the Compromise Agreement. RTC denied petitioner’s
motions, holding that the dismissal, which was grounded on failure to prosecute, had
long become final and executory and thus can no longer be the subject of a motion for
reconsideration. CA affirmed the denial.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was provisional dismissal of the case.

RULING:
Yes. The provisional dismissal of a criminal case, which is a dismissal without
prejudice to the reinstatement thereof, is governed by Section 8, Rule117 of the Rules
of Court which reads: SEC. 8. Provisional dismissal. – A case shall not be provisionally
dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the
offended party. The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one
(1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect
to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional
dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the
case having been revived. Under the afore-cited provision, a case is provisionally
dismissed if the following requisites concur:(a) The prosecution with the express
conformity of the accused, or the accused, moves for a provisional dismissal (sin
perjuicio) of his case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for its provisional
dismissal;(b) The offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of
the case;(c) The court issues an Order granting the motion and dismissing the case
provisionally; and(d) The public prosecutor is served with a copy of the Order of
provisional dismissal of the case. In the case at bar, none of the foregoing requisites
were met. While it may appear that the respondents consented to a provisional
dismissal of the case under the Compromise Agreement, the prosecution neither
presented the same for the court’s approval nor filed the required motion to that effect
such that no order was in fact issued granting the provisional dismissal of the case.
Hence, petitioner’s assertion that the respondents are estopped from invoking their
right to speedy trial is without basis.

RULE 119
Estrada v. People, G.R. No. 162371. August25, 2005

FACTS:
An Information charging Mary Helen Estrada withestafa was filed with the RTC of Las
Piñas City.Estrada signed an undertaking that in case of herfailure to appear during the
trial despite due notice,her absence would constitute as an express waiver ofher right
to be present during trial and promulgation of judgment and the lower court would then
proceedwith the hearing in absentia. When the schedule forhearing and presentation
for evidence came, counselfor petitioner failed to appear. Estrada jumped bailand was
considered to have waived her right topresent evidence. The RTC thus rendered
judgmentbased only on prosecution evidence: JunimarBermundo (complainant)
applied for employment inJapan with Estrada and paid P68,700.00 for it.Estrada then
told Junimar to proceed to the JapaneseEmbassy to claim the plane tickets, however,
helearned that nothing was filed with the Embassy.Junimar decided to abandon his
plan of going toJapan and just get the money from Estrada which she failed to return
despite receipt of a demand letter.She was convicted of Estafa by means of false
pretenses and fraudulent misrepresentations by theRTC. The CA denied her Petition
for Certiorari, thus Estrada filed the present petition for review oncertiorari before the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court denied Estrada of her constitutional right to be heard and
to be assisted by counsel

RULING:
NO. At the outset, the undisputed fact that petitioner jumped bail while trial was
pending should be emphasized. In fact, it appears that from the beginning, the address
she furnished the trial court was incorrect. From such facts alone, petitioner’s
arguments regarding the validity of the proceedings and promulgation of judgment in
absentia for being in violation of her constitutional right to due process are doomed to
fail. The holding of trial in absentia is authorized under Section 14 (2), Article III of the
1987 Constitution which provides that “after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified
and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.”
The Court likewise upholds the validity of the promulgation in absentia of the RTC
judgment and the RTCs Order dated April 5, 2000, denying due course to petitioners
notice of appeal for being filed beyond the reglementary period. Section 6, Rule 120 of
the 1985Rules on Criminal Procedure, the Rule applicable in this case since
promulgation was held before the effectivity of The Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, provides:
The judgment is promulgated by reading the same in the presence of the accused and
any judge of thecourt in which it was rendered. However, if theconviction is for a light
offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel
orrepresentative. When the judge is absent or outsideof the province or city, the
judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court. If the accused isconfined or
detained in another province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the
executive judgeof the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place of
confinement or detention upon request of thecourt that rendered the judgment. The
court promulgating the judgment shall have authority toaccept the notice of appeal and
to approve the bailbond pending appeal. The proper clerk of court shallgive notice to
the accused personally or through hisbondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him
to be present at the promulgation of the decision. In casethe accused fails to appear
thereat the promulgationshall consist in the recording of the judgment in thecriminal
docket and a copy thereof shall be servedupon the accused or counsel. If the judgment
is forconviction and the accuseds failure to appear waswithout justifiable cause, the
court shall further orderthe arrest of the accused, who may appeal withinfifteen (15)
days from notice of the decision to him orhis counsel. Clearly, promulgation of
judgment in absentia isallowed under the Rules. In Pascua vs. Court of Appeals, it was
held that such promulgation is validprovided the following essential elements are
present:(a) that the judgment be recorded in the criminaldocket; and (b) that a copy
thereof be served uponthe accused or counsel. In the present case, therecords bear
out the fact that copies of the decisionwere sent by registered mail to the given
addressesof petitioner and her counsel, Atty. Herenio Martinez,and there is no
question that the judgment wasindeed recorded in the criminal docket of the
court.From the foregoing, petitioner is deemed notified ofthe decision upon its
recording in the criminal docketon September 3, 1997 and she only had fifteen
(15)days therefrom within which to file an appeal.Evidently, the notice of appeal filed
only on April 5,2000 was filed out of time

h.
Datu Andal Ampatuan Jr. v. Leila De Lima
GR No. 197291 Date: April 3, 2013
DOCTRINE: The admission as a state witness under RA 6981 also operates as an
acquittal, and said witness cannotsubsequently be included in the criminal information
except when he fails or refuses to testify. The immunity for thestate witness is granted
by the DOJ, not by the trial court.

FACTS:
Relying on the twin affidavits of one Kenny Dalandag, the panel of prosecutors
charged 196 individuals with multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre.
Dalandag was thereafter admitted into the witness protection program of the
Department of Justice (DOJ). Datu Andal Ampatuan Jr. is then mayor of the
Municipality of Datu Unsay and one of the principal suspects in the massacre, wrote to
Secretary Leila De Lima requesting the inclusion of Dalandag in the information for
murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed his participation in the
massacre through his two sworn declarations. Secretary De Lima denied Ampatuan
Jr.’s request, prompting Ampatuan Jr. to file a petition for mandamus before the RTC,
seeking to compel Secretary De Lima to charge Dalandag as another accused.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Justice can be compelled by writ of mandamus to
charge Dalandag as a co-accused in the Maguindanao massacre despite his
admission as state witness.

RULING:
No. Dalandag’s exclusion as an accused from the informations did not at all amount to
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the panel of prosecutors whose procedure in
excluding Dalandag as an accused was far from arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or
despotic. Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which requires that “the complaint
or information shall be xxx against all persons who appear to be responsible for the
offense involved,” albeit a mandatory provision, may be subject of some exceptions,
one of which is when a participant in the commission of a crime becomes a state
witness. While it is true that, as a general rule, the discharge or exclusion of a co-
accused from the information in order that he may be utilized as a Prosecution witness
rests upon the sound discretion of the trial court, such discretion is not absolute and
may not be exercised arbitrarily but with due regard to the proper administration of
justice. Anent the requisite that there must be an absolute necessity for the testimony
of the accused whose discharge is sought, the trial court has to rely on the suggestions
of and the information provided by the public prosecutor. The reason is obvious the
public prosecutor should know better than the trial court, and the Defense for that
matter, which of the several accused would best qualify to be discharged in order to
become a state witness. The public prosecutor is also supposed to know the evidence
in his possession and whomever he needs to establish his case, as well as the
availability or non-availability of other direct or corroborative evidence, which of the
accused is the ‘most guilty’ one, an the like. On the other hand, there is no requirement
under RA 6981 for the Prosecution to first charge a person in court as one of the
accused in order for him to qualify for admission into the Witness Protection Program.
The admission as a state witness under RA 6981 also operates as an acquittal, and
the said witness cannot subsequently be included in the criminal information except
when he fails or refuses to testify. The immunity for the state witness is granted by the
DOJ, not by the trial court. Should such witness be meanwhile charged in court as an
accused, the public prosecutor, upon presentation to him of the certification of
admission into the Witness Protection Program, shall petition the trial court for the
discharge of the witness. The Court shall then order the discharge and exclusion of
said accused from the information.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the
final order issued on June 27,2011 in Civil Case No. 10-124777 by the Regional Trial
Court in Manila; and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.