The Australian National University

From the SelectedWorks of Robert Cribb

1991

The Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966: Studies

from Java and Bali
Robert Cribb, The Australian National University

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/robert_cribb/48/

THE INDONESIAN KILLINGS

OF 1965-1966

Studies from Java and Bali

edited by

Robert Cribb
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Published by
Centre of Southeast Asian Studies
Monash University
List of Illustrations iii

Monash Papers on Southeast Asia - No. 21 List of Maps iv

The Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966 Glossary v
List of Contributors xvi
c 1990 Robert Cribb
2nd Printing, slightly revised, 1991 Preface xvi ii

I.S.B.N..............•............0 7326 0231 9

I.S.S.N......................:..... 0727 6680
Introduction
CHAPTER l
Problems in the historiography
Typeset by of the killings in Indonesia
Winnie Koh Robert Cribb 1
Monash University

Indonesia
CHAPTER2
Printed and bound by Gestapu and state power .in Indonesia
Aristoc Press Pty. Ltd. Michael van Langenberg 45
Australia
CHAPTER3
Local and national influences in the violence of 1965
.Kenneth R Young 63

For information on other publications from the Centre, write to: CHAPTER 4 '
Making history: recent Indonesian literature
The Publications Officer and the events of 1965
Centre of Southeast Asian studies Keith Fou/cher 101
Monash University
Clayton, Victoria 3168
Australia
ii 111

Java · List of Illustrations

CHAPTERS 1. Captured PKI equipment, including bullets, berets and
Rural violence in Klaten and Banyuwangi a bicycle pump. 12
Centre for Village Studies, Gadjah Mada University 121
2. How to gouge an eye: a demonstration by a captured
CHAPTER6 member of the Pemuda Rakyat 36
Crushing the G30S/PKI in Central Java
3. One of the generals' bodies, shortly after exhaumation.
Dinas Sejarah TNI AD 159
After three days in the well at Lubang Buaya, the
bodies had begun to decay, and the resulting
CHAPTER 7
disfiguration gave rise to wild rumours that the
Additional data on Counter-Revolutionary Cruelty
generals had been tortured before death. 48
in Indonesia, especially in East Java
Anonymous 169 4. Cartoon from the Muslim newspaper Duta Masyarakat
of 19 October 1965, showing the PKI and its affiliated
CHAPTERS organizations lapping up the blood of the murdered
Schooling and village politics in Central Java generals. 50
in the time of turbulence
Kenneth Orr 177 5. Bodies of victims on the banks of the River Brantas in
East Java 81
CHAPTER9
The Purwodadi affair: two accounts 6. Frontispiece from Arswendo Atmowiloto's
Maskun Iskandar and Jopie Lasut 195 Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI. The PKI, in the form of a
worker and peasant brandishing a hammer and sickle,
CHAPTERlO stand behind the soldiers firing on the awakened general. 112
Survival: Bu Yeti's story 7. From Arifin C. Noer's 'Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI' (the
translated by Anton Lucas 227 violation of families by the coup plotters'. 114
8. From Arifin C. Noer's 'Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI' (the
Bali torture of the captured generals) 116
9. From Arifin C. Noer's 'Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI'
CHAPTER 11
(Detail from the recovery of the bodies of the
The mass killings in Bali
murdered generals) 118
Robert Cribb, Sae Hok Gie et al 241
10. Colonel Sarwo Edhie, commander of the RPKAD
paracommando unit 162
Index 261
11. The killing of PKI detainees 170

12. PK! detainees 205

iv v

List of Maps Glossary

For terms marked with an asterisk (*), see also pp. xiv - -x:v.
1 Indonesia xix
aksi sepihak direct, or unilateral action by the PKI or
2 Central and East Java 120 associated organizations to implement land
reform legislation in the countryside
3 Kabupaten Klaten 122
ARMED,
4 Banyuwangi 148 Artileri Medan Field Artillery
5 Puiwodadi 196 Ansor Muslim youth organization affiliated with the
Nahdatul Ulama
6 Bali 242 ., bakul small trader

bambu nmcing sharpened bamboo spear

BAMUNAS,
Badan Musyawarah
Nasional consultative body of ethnic Indonesian
businessmen
BAPERKI,
Badan Permusyawaratan
Kewarganegaraan
Indonesia Deliberative Association for Indonesian
Citizenship, an Indonesian Chinese political
organization considered close to the PKI
BKKS,
Badan Koordinasi
Komando Siaga Coordinating Body for the Vigilance Command

ENI,
Barisan Nelayan
Indonesia Indonesian Fishermen's Front, fishermen's
organization affiliated to the PKI

BT!,
Barisan Tani
Indonesia Indonesian Peasants' Front, peasant
organization affiliated to the PKI
vi vii

bupati* 'regent', head of a kabupaten, the major DPR-GR,

administrative division between province and Dewan Perwakilan
village Rakyat-
BUTERPRA, Gotong Royong Gotong Royong People's Representative
Bintara Urusan Assembly
Territorial
DPRD,
Pertahanan Rakyat Territorial and Civil Defence Officer Dewan Perwakilan
camat* •• Rakyat Daerah Regional People's Assembly
head of a kecamatan
carik Front Nasional National Front
clerk, village secretary
CDB, GERWANJ,
Comite Daerah Besar Gerakan Wanita
regional committee (of the PKI)
Indonesia Indonesian Women's Movement, women's
Darn! Islam Lit. the Abode of Islam, radical Muslim organization close to, though not formally
movement which fought in many parts of affilited with the PKI
Indonesia, especially West Java, between 1948
GMNJ,
and the mid-1960s to establish an Islamic state
Gerakan Mahasiswa
desa village, a territorial administrative unit, not Nasional Indonesia National Students' Movement of Indonesia
necessarily a physical cluster of houses
GSNJ,
DETGA, Gerakan Siswa
Detasemen Gerilya guerrilla detachments (of the PKI) Nasional Indonesia Indonesian National School Pupils' Movement,
affiliated to the PNI
Dewan Jendral Council of Generals, a group of army generals
allegedly plotting a military coup before 30 G30S,
September 1965 Gerakan Tiga Puluh
September Thirtieth September Movement, formal name
Dewan Revolusi Revolutionary Council, steering body set up of the movement which launched the coup, also
by the coup organizers in Jakarta and allegedly known as Gestapu, Gerakan September Tiga
elsewhere as a kind of governing council Puluh
GWNJ,
Gerakan Wanita
Nasional Indonesia Indonesian National Women's Movement,
women's organization affiliated with the PNI
GPIB,
Gereja Protestant
Indonesia Barat Protestant Church of Western Indonesia
viii ix

GSBJ, kabupaten* territorial administrative division, headed by

Gabungan Serikat a bupati
Buruh Indonesia Federation of Indonesian Trade. Unions,
affiliated to the PNI KAMI,
Kesautuan Aksi
haji one who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca Mahsiswa Indonesia Indonesian Students' Action Front
HANRA, kampung hamlet, cluster of dwellings
Pertahanan Rakyat People's Defence, a kind of village guard
working in conjunction with the armed forces •• KAP-Gestapu,
Komando Aksi
HANSIP, Pengganyangan Gestapu Action Command to Crush Gestapu
Pertahanan Sipil Civil Defence, similar to Hanra
KAPP!,
Hari Peringatan Kesatuan Aksi Pelajar
Pancasila Sakti Sacred Pancasila Memorial Day Pemuda Indonesia Indonesian Student and Youth Action Front
HMJ, KASI,
Himpunan Mahasiswa Kesatuan Aksi
Islam Muslim Students' Association Sarjana Indonesia Indonesian Graduates' Action Front
!KIP, kecamatan* territorial administrative division between
Institut Keguruan kabupaten and kelurahan
Ilmu Pendidikan Teachers Training College
kelurahan* formal administrative term for desa, or village
INPRES, KIAPMA,
Instruksi Presiden Presidential Instruction (describing Konperensi Internasional
projects 'directly' initiated by the Anti Pangkalan
President rather than proceeding from Militer Asing International Conference against Foreign
the normal administrative process) Military Bases
IP!, KODAM,
Ikatan Pelajar Komando Daerah
Indonesia Union of Students of Indonesia, affiliated to Militer• regional military command
the PKI
IPKI, KODIM,
Komando District
Ikatan Pendukung Militer• district military command
Kemerdekaan Indonesia League of Supporters of Indonesian
Independence KOPKAMTIB,
Komando Operasi
ITB, Pemulihan Keamanan
Institut Teknologi dan Ketertiban Operational Command for the Restoration of
Bandung Bandung Institute of Technology Security and Order
x xi

KORAMIL, Muhammadiyah modernist Muslim organization, chiefly involved

Komando Rayon in religious education
Militer• local military command
NASAKOM,
KOREM, nasionalisme,
Komando Ressort agama, komunisme Nationalism, religion, communism, official
Militer• sub-district military command doctrine of Guided Democracy
KOSTRAD, NEKOLIM Neocolonialist-imperialist.
Komando Cadangan
Strategis Angkatan NU,
Darat Army Strategic Reserve Nahdatul Ulama Lit. the Awakeing of the Muslim Scholars, a
Muslim political party, the main vehicle for
KOT[, conservative Islamic scholars
Komando Operasi
Tertinggi Supreme Operational Command OPSUS,
operasi khusus special operations
kuli kenceng A small farmer owning a house and some
agricultural land padi unhusked rice

k:yai Islamic teacher pagar praja village militia

LEKRA, panglim a senior military commander

Lembaga Kebudayaan
PARKINDO,
Rakyat Institute for People's Culture, cultural
Partai Kristen
organization affiliated with the PKI
Indonesia Indonesian Christian (i.e. Protestant) Party
LKN,
patih deputy to a bupati
Lembaga Kebudayaan
Nasional National Cultural Institute, cultural Pemuda Marhaenis Marhaenist Youth, youth organization affiliated
organization affiliated with the PNI to the PNI
lurah* village head, head of a kelurahan Pemuda Pancasi/ais Pancasila-ist Youth, general term for anti-
communist youth groups not affiliated with
modin religious official who calls Muslim
Muslim organizations
faithful to prayer
Pemuda Rakyat People's Youth, youth organization affiliated
Monumen
with the PKI
Pancasi/a Sakti Sacred Pancasila Monument
PEPELRADA,
MPRS,
Penguasa Pelaksanaan
Majelis Regionaf [Military] Authority to Implement
Dwikora Daerah
Permusyawaratan
Dwikora
Rakyat Sementara Provisional People's Consultative Assembly
 •
xii xiii

PEPERKUPER, PUTERPRA,
Pembantu Pelaksana Perwira Urusan
Penguasa Perang Assistant Martial Law Administrator Territorial dan
Pertahanan Rakyat Territorial and Civil Defence Officer
pesantren Islamic school
PESINDO, REPEL/TA,
Rencana Pembangunan
Pemuda Sosialis
Lima Tahun Five Year Development Plan
Indonesia Indonesian Socialist Youth
PETRUS, RPKAD,
Resimen Para
penembakan misterius mysterious killings Komando Angkatan
petut gangsters Darat Army Paracommando Regiment

PGRI, RT,
Persatuan Guru Rukun Tetangga Neighbourhood Association [head]
Republik Indonesia
sawah irrigated rice field
Non-Vaksentral Teachers' Union of the Indonesian Republic,
unaffiliated SD,
Sekolah Dasar Primary School
PII,
Pelajar Islam SH,
Indonesia Muslim Students of Indonesia, affiliated to sarjana hukum a law degree
former Masyumi party
SMA,
PK!, Sekolah Menengah
Partai Komunis Atas Senior Secondary School
Indonesia Indonesian Communist Party
SMEA,
PNI, Sekolah Menengah
Partai Nasional Ekonomi Atas Senior Economic Secondary School
Indonesia Indonesian Nationalist Party
SMP,
PPAN, Sekolah Menengah
Persatuan Pejuang Pertama Junior Secondary School
Agama dan Nasional Union of Religious and National (i.e. PNI)
Fighters SNMI,
Serikat Nelayan
PPDI, Muslimin Indonesia Indonesian Muslim Fishermen's Association
Persatuan Pamong
Desa Indonesia Union of Indonesian Village Officials
xiv

SOBS!, ParaUel to this civilian administrative structure stands. the territorial administration of
Sentral Organisasi the Indonesian armed forces (ABRI), responsible for general supervision of security matters,
broadly defined, in the countryside. Although the boundaries and status of the military and
Buruh Seluruh civilian territorial hierarchies do not always exactly coincide, the Komando Daerah Militer
Indonesia All-Indonesia Trade Union Federation, (KODAM), or regional military command, covers roughIY the jurisdiction of a province, the
affiliated to the PKI J(omando RessortMiliter (KOREM) that of a kabupaten,Komando DistrictMiliter (KODIM)
that of a kewedanaan, and the Komando Rayon Mililer (K.ORAMIL) that of a kecamatan.
SUPERSEMAR,
Surat Perintah
Sebelas Maret Instruction of 11 March
TKK,
Taman Kanak-kanak kindergarten
TPR,
Tentara
Pembebasan Rakyat People's Liberation Army
ulama Muslim scholar
Undang-undang
Dasar '45 1945 State Constitution
wedana* head of a kewedanaan, a now abolished
administrative unit between desa and kabupaten
ZIP UR,
Zeni Tempur Combat Engineers

*NOTE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND MILITARY TERMS

Indonesia in 1965·66 was divided administratively into a hierarchy of territorial divisions

which may not be familiar to all readers of this volume. The country is divided into a number
of province (propinsz), each headed by a governor (gubemw)and divided in tum into a number
of 'regencies' (an old Dutch term), or kabupaten, headed by a regent or bupati. Beneath
the kabupaten was formerly the kawedanaan, headed by a wedana; this unit has now been
done away with, though pembantu bupati, assistants to the bupati, play a role similar to that
of wedana in some regions. Thekecamatan, or district, headed by a camat, is now the principal
administrative unit beneath the bupati, and the ea.mat in tum supecvises a number of kehuahan,
each headed by a Iwah. These were known formerly as desa, or villages, but since they were
territorial units covering rice fields and forest as well as settlements, the term kelurahan is
technically more accurate as well as administratively correct. Within a kelurahan are further
administrative divisions, thenJcun kampung and beneath it the rukun warga, conSisting of
no more than a few families. The term kampung (occasionally perdukuhan), however, refers
more commonly to a physical cluster of house.5; in rural areas it is perhaps best translated
as 'hamlet', in urban areas as jneighbourhood'.
 xvi xvii

renneth Orr is retired from the Department of Education, James Cook University
List of contributors ' of North Queensland. His writings include Appetite for education in
Antony Caminos is a graduate of Griffith University and currently Assistant English contemporary Asia (1977).
Teacher with the JET Programme working for the Sannohe-machi Board
'oe Hok Gie was a prominent young Indonesian intellectual during late Guided
of Education in Sannohe, Sugisawa and Oshita Junior High Schools,
' Democracy and the early New Order. He died in a mountaineering
Aomori Prefecture, Japan. He is author of Dwipa Nusantara Aidit: accident in December 1969, but his diary has since been published as
an annotated bibliography (1988) and translator of Ismid Hadad, Political Catatan seorang demonstran.
culture and social justice in Indonesia (1989).
renneth R. Young is lecturer in Anthropology in the Department of Anthropology
Robert Cribb is lecturer in Southeast Asian History at the University of and Sociology at Monash University. He is (with Richard Tanter) editor
Queensland. He is author of Gangsters and Revolutionaries: the Jakarta
of and contributor to The politics ofmiddle class Indonesia (1989), and
People's Militia and the Indonesian Revolution (1990).
author of '"The Cultivation System in West Sumatra: economic stagnation
Keith Foulcher is senior lecturer in Asian Studies at Flinders University. His and political stalemate', in Anne Booth, W.J. O'Malley and A
writings includePujangga Baru: literature and nationalism in Indonesia Weidemann, eds, Essays in Indonesian economic history (1990).
1933-1942 (1980) and Social commitment in literature and the ans: the
Indonesian 'Institute of People's Culture; 1950-1965 (1986).
Mas/am Iskandar worked as a journalist for the newspaper Indonesia Raya.
Michael van Langenberg is a senior lecturer in the Department of Indonesian
and Malayan Studies and Fellow of the Research Institute for Asia
and the Pacific, both at the University of Sydney. His recent publications
include 'Indonesia: God, capital and cadres', Current Affairs Bulletin
64 no 8 (1988), pp. 23-31, and 'The New Order state: language,
legitimacy, hegemony', in Arief Budiman, ed., State and civil society
in Indonesia (1990).
Jopie Lasut worked as a journalist for the newspaper Sinar Harapan.
Anton Lucas is senior lecturer in Asian Studies at Flinders University. He is
author of One Sou~ One Struggle: Region and Revolution in Indonesia
(1990) and editor of Local opposition and underground resistance to
the Japanese in Java I942-1945 (1986).
xvi ii
r xix

Preface
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b
This volume has its origins in a conference on 'The trauma· of 1965 ~
~
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in Indonesia' held at Monash University in 1987 and a panel on the killings
of 1965-69 at the biennial conference of the Asian Studies Association
of Australia in Canberra in 1988. Some of the papers for the original
sessions have not been included, while others, including all the translations, ill ~
were produced especially for this volume. ~

In accepting the task of editing the collection, I was aware, of course,

that the killings are a topic of unusual sensitivity. Both in Indonesia and
amongst Indonesianists there has been a deep reluctance to recall the killings
and to examine them deeply or systematically. My hope is that this volume
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will encourage those - from both participants and observers - with memories
of the events of 1965-69 to see that they are recorded, and that it will .. t ~ --~
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stimulate further academic investigation of what were perhaps the most ~
traumatic years of modern Indonesian history.

I should like to thank the contributors for their cooperation and patience
. g;:! ~ '
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during the protracted compilation of this volume, as well as Ben Anderson, ' ~ ~<~
Ruth McVey and Ron Hatley for their encouragement and assistance with
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the project at various stages. The Department of Pacific and Southeast g;~
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Asian History at the Australian National University, the Netherlands 5' b ~ • ~
Institute for Advanced Study in Wassenaar and the Department of History :~ ".
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at the University of Queensland provided facilities for its preparation.

David Bourchier and David Chandler offered much valuable help and advice ~
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throughout the editing process. Mrs Pilar van Breda-Burgueno typed several w
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of the contributions and Ian Heyward of the Cartography Section of ANU's
Research School of Pacific Studies did a fine job of preparing the maps.
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Robert Cribb jlm
November 1990
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xx

Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

PROBLEMS IN THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF

THE KILLINGS IN INDONESIA
Robert Cribb

The killing of several hundred thousand people in Indonesia in the

aftermath of the 1965 coup attempt ofthe30 September Movement ranks
as one of the twentieth century's more extensive mass murders. It is striking,
however, how little prominence this event has been given in general histories
oflndonesia. The massacre, it is true, is almost invariably mentioned in
standard works, though authors vary widely in the detail they give. Missing
in most cases, however, are attempts to explain and to draw conclusions
from the killings. 1 In most accounts, the killings burst suddenly upon

I should like to thank David Bourchier, David Chandler, Gavan Daws, Donald
Denoon, Herb Feith, Jacques Leclerc, Ruth McVey, John Maxwell and Tony Reid for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this introduction. Frank Palmoswas also an invaluable
source of information and comment on several aspects of the question. None of them, of
course, bears any responsibility for this final version.
Demonstrating an absence of attention to the massacres in the literature is obviously
more difficult than demonstrating its presence. In the following works, however, all recent
general histories of Indonesia, I believe that the reader wiU not find significant allusions to
the killings in the discussion of any period other than the 1960s.
The most enensive general accOunts of the killings are Harold Crouch, The army and
politics in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), eh. 5, 'The aftermath of
the coup auempt'; and John Hughes, Indonesian upheaval (New York: McKay, 1967) [also
published as The end ofSukarno (London: Angus & Robertson, 1968)). Hany Aveling, ed.,
17Je development of Indonesian society (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1979);
J.D. Legge, Indonesia (Sydney: PrenticeMHaII, 3rd ed., 1980); Elaine McKay, Studies in
Indonesian history (Carlton, Vic.: Pitman, 1976); M.C. Ricklefs,Ahistoryofmodemindonesia
(London: Macmillan, 1981); and Bernhard Dahm, History ofIndonesia in the twentieth century
(London: Pall Mall, 1971).
 'I
2 Robert Cribb
the scene and then are over, having arrived and departed with the rapidity
I; I!1'
and evanescence of a tropical thunderstorm. Historians oflndonesia seem
to have found it difficult to identify both those aspects of Indonesian society
I I might have alerted us to the fact that the killings would take place and
any traces they have left on the present political order.
This is surprising, because events of this kind and magnitude often
pro~oke deep introspection. The historiography of modern Germany,
for mstance, has been confronted massively by the fact of the Holocaust.
The tracing of its origins and its implications for the present is one of
the mo:e important endeavours in modern German historiography. In
an earlier century, the massacre of French Protestants in Paris on St
Bartholomew's Day, 24 August 1572, is seen by many as a pivotal event
in European history. 2 Similarly, the historiography of Cambodia has been
transformed irreversibly by the killings carried out under Pol Pot. And
a~though Japanese historians tend to avoid the issue of Japanese military
vmlence before and during World War II, it is clearly a major preoccupation
amongst Western writers who see it as a possible clue to contemporary
and future Japanese patterns of behaviour.
The purpose of this volume therefore is to begin mapping the significance
of th~ 1965-66 killings for Indonesian history, both by bringing together
what IS known about them and by offering a number of fresh interpretations
of the events and their significance. It is a first attempt rather than a final
statement, for the analysis of the killings presents an unusually difficult
~et of problems in contemporary Indonesian history, problems of
mformation, problems of philosophy and problems of interpretation. By
confronting these problems, however, we take at least one step towards
resolving them.
2 and in the final months of Guided Democracy Indonesian press publishers
The St Bartholomew massacre offers fascinating comparisons with the Indonesian
killings. Both ~e.re inte~~ed to extirpate a radical political movement which appeared to
threaten the existing pohttcal order. Both sets of victims were not only tainted with treason
but also associated with foreign powea, the Netherlands and England in the case of the
Huguenots~ China in _the.case o~ the PKI. Both were sprung upon with little warning and
went to thetrdeaths wnh little resIStance, pleading loyalty to their respective national leaders,
Charles IX and Sukarno. And both massacres were initiated by the authorities but carried
out to a large extent by mobs.
r
';:'
Introduction 3
problems of information
we know surprisingly little about the massacres which followed the
1965 coup attempt. The broad outline of events is clear enough. The
killings began a few weeks after the coup, swept through Central and East
Java and later Bali, with smaller scale outbreaks in parts of other islands.
,, In most regions, responsibility for the killings was shared between army
units and civilian vigilante gangs. In some cases the army took direct part
in the killings; often, however, they simply supplied weapons, rudimentary
training and strong encouragement to the civilian gangs who carried out
. the bulk of the killings. The massacres were over for the most part by
1
March 1966, but occasional flare-ups continued in various parts of the
., country until 1969. Detailed information on who was killed, where, when,
why and by whom, however, is so patchy that most conclusions have to
be strongly qualified as provisional.
'~ There are many reasons for this shortage of information. First, there
'< were relatively few Western journalists or academics in Indonesia at the
I time, and those who were present often depended on the military for access
to sources and stories. Travel was difficult and often dangerous and the
scope for collecting accounts of the killing at close hand was limited. Travel
in Indonesia of course has become much easier in subsequent years, but
with the regime which oversaw and approved the killings still in power,
those who have stories to tell against it are understandably reticent about
what took place in 1965-66, lest they themselves become victims.'
Even when people do talk to foreign scholars of Indonesia, those scholars
are often understandably cautious about publishing information which
may put their informants at risk.
The Indonesian domestic press of the time was similarly hampered.
Not only was access to stories outside the main cities severely limited,
but the investigative qualities of Indonesian journalism had been greatly
undermined under late Guided Democracy. Twenty-one newspapers had
been banned by the government in early 1965 for supporting the creation
of an anti-communist Sukarnoism Front (Barisan Pendukung Sukarnciisme),
1J
!
3
Lea Jellinek describes the deep reluctance of kampung dwellers in Jakarta to discUM
the killings or even to admit any knowledge of them: See Lea Olga Jellinek, 'Kebun Kacang:
an oral history of a poor inner city community in Jakarta from the 1930s to the 1980s' (P~D
thesis, Monash University, 1987), pp. 64, 299.
4 Robert Cribb
laid emphasis on ideological correctness (and often political caution) rather
than journalistic investigation.' In the two accounts of the 1969 Puiwodadi
killings translated in this volume, we see investigative journalists back
at work, but the sensitivity of the authorities to their questions in this
case indicates the immense difficulties which would have faced any probing
of the earlier, greater killing.
Even after the worst of the killings had passed and the trails which
might have led to individual killers had gone cold, Indonesians continued
to be most reluctant to record any details of the killings. As Michael van
Langenberg suggests, a sense of shame for the blood-letting may be partly
responsible for this; although many Indonesians today express satisfaction,
even pride, at the elimination of the communist party, few seem to think
that manner of the party's destruction was praiseworthy. Thus, to my
knowledge, only three substantial accounts of the killing have been prepared
by Indonesians, aside from the official reports. One, translated in this
volume as 'Additional data on counter-revolutionary cruelty in Indonesia,
especially in East Java', was probably written some time in the 1970s and
is a catalogue of incidents apparently compiled from the reports ofothers.
The second is a brief but gripping personal account, written in 1989 by
a member of a left-wing youth organization, probably Pemuda Rakyat,
who escaped death himself but witnessed many killings from hiding. His
account, translated as 'By the banks of the Brantas', has recently been
published in the West.' In neither case, however; do we know the identity
of the authoror any of the circumstances which led to the writing of these
accounts. The third is a fascinating memoir by Pipit Rochijat, entitled,
'Am I PKI or Non-PKI?', especially interesting because it speculates on
the significance of the killings for contemporary Indonesia.• A far richer
source for Indonesian visions of the killings is a group of short stories
which appeared in Indonesian literary magazines in the years immediately
';
" See Crouch,Anny and politics, pp. 65-66; Oey Hong Lee, Indonesian govem~ent
and press during Guided Democracy (Hull: University of Hull, 1971). , ,·
s 'Appendix A:. Excerpt from "By the banks of the Brantil.s": an eye-witn~ account
of the 1965 killings', Injustice, persecution, eviction: a human rights update o'n Indonesia &
East Timar (New York: Asia Watch, 1990), pp. 87-90.
6 9
Pipit Rochijat, "Am I PK! or non-PK!?", Indonesia 40 (1985), pp. 37-52.
,~ • Introduction 5
after the killings. Collected and translated by Harry Aveling7, these stories
give us a sharp image of what the killings may have meant to a range of
Indonesians, though their literary form and the political circumstances
of their composition make them no more than a partial mirror of the events
concerned.
From the start, too, there has been something of an absence of
international moral outrage at the killings which has discouraged outside
investigation.• The killings took place at the height of the Cold War,
when the West felt itself to be engaged in a global struggle with communism
which would determine the course of history for decades or centuries to
come. Counting the casualties in this struggle was secondary to rolling
back the so-called communist tide, hence the often quoted callousness
of Time magazines's description of the PKI's suppression as 'The West's
best news for years in Asia.'' Western governments and much of the
Western media preferred Suharto and the New Order to the PKI and the
Old, and have been in many cases comfortable with the simple statement
that some hundreds of thousands of 'communists' were killed. A close
investigation of who was being killed - and why- ran the risk not just of
complicating a simple story but ofuncovering skeletons in the New Order
1 Hany Aveling, ed. and trans., Gestapu: Indnnesian short stories on the abortive
communist coup of 30th September 1965 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Southeast Asian
Studies Working Paper no 6, 1975).
8 See, for ex.ample, the subdued reporting of Donald Kirk, 'Bali exorcises an evil
spirit', The Reporter 15 December 1965, pp. 42-53. No less an authority than the United
States Central Intelligence Agency has commented:
In terms of the numbers killed, the antiMPKI massacres in Indonesia rank as one
of the worst mass murders of the 20th century, along with the Soviet purges of the
1930's, the Nazi~ murders during the Second World War, and the Maoist bloodbath
of the early 1950's. In this regard, the Indonesian coup is certainly one of the most
significant events of the 20th century, far more significant than many other events
'
that have received much greaterpublicity. (Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate
of Intelligence, Intelligence Report: Indonesia -1965, the coup that backfired [Washington
DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1968], p. 71n).
For a summary of international responses to the killings, see Arnold C. Brackman, The
Communist collapse in Indonesia (NeYI York: Norton, 1969), pp. 120M127, and John Henry
Sullivan, 'The United States and the "NeYI Order" in Indonesia' (Ph.D. thesis, American
University, 1969), pp. 187-193.
'Vengeance with a smile', T111Je, 15 July 1966, p. 26.
 6
closet. The Purwodadi investigations, Kenneth Orr's study of 'Margosari'
and 'Kalimangko', and Sae Hok Gie's report on Bali all hint at awkward
Robert Cribb
details which any careful investigation might have revealed..The fact, too,
that the victims were Asian, not European, probably diminished the interest
they aroused in Western audiences, though this has not prevented Cambodia
and Idi Amin's Uganda from entering the Western world's gallery of horror
stories in our own age and the 1937 Rape of Nanking, when Japanese
troops m~r~ere~ a~d raped t~ous.ands of people after the fall of the city,
from rece1vmg s1m1lar notonety m an earlier one.
~ven the Le~'. however, has shown little inclination to dig deeply into '.:'.,
details of the killings. Malcolm Caldwell's Ten Years' Military Terror in ' dispersed, nocturnal and by small groups - was such that no-one could
Indo~e~ia sharply criticized conservativescholars for neglecting to examine
the killings, but proceed.ed to give virtually no attention to them itself. 1'
This hesitancy stems perhaps partly from an awareness that the PKI was
attac~ed b.ecause it proposed a full-scale restructuring of Indonesian society
and m domg so had already created its own victims amongst those it saw
as the beneficiaries and upholders of the established social ·order. Those
who k_illed, in s~me cases at least'.were not lashing out in a blind spirit
of a~t1-commumsm but were reacting to specific grievances built up over
preV1ous deca~es. The retali~ti.on may have been out of all proportion :·,,'
to the provocat10n, but the Lefts unage of events in 1%5-66 has also seemed
better served by~ vague ac~o~nt of white terror than by detailed analysis
of the events l~dmg to ~e ~~· The report of Gadjah Mada University's
Centre for Village St~~!~ 1s a Victors' view of events, but it helps make
~!ear what fear theact1V1t1es of the party aroused amongst its class enemies ':-1
m the Javanese countryside. A somewhat similar reluctance to investigate
details .of the killings can be found amongst those authors who have argued
for l'.mted States complicity in the killings, on the grounds that American
offi~ials not only fa~l~d to use their influence with the Indonesian army
to discourage the killings but appear to have actively colluded with the
army in planning thePKI's destruction. An argument which locates blame
JO Malcolm CaJdweIJ, ed., Ten years'miliJmy lelTor in Indonesia (Nottingham: Spokes'~an
Books, 1975), pp. 13-17. Dierdre Griswold, Indonesia: the bloodbath that was (New York·
World View Publishers,_ 1975 [reprint of Indonesia: the second greatest crime of the ceniw;,
(New York: Youth Against War and Fascism, 1970)]), gives a little more detail, but relies
on sketc~~ newspaper repo~: For Indonesian leftist material giving similarly brief attention
to the ~lhn~, see J~uf AdJitorop, 'Unite and canyon the struggle for the overthrow of
the fascist militaty regune, for a free and democratic new Indonesia', OISRAA Bulletin (Peking)
2 (June 1978), pp. 1-6.
r
~
~.
Introduction
for the killings in Washington DC does not demand detailed information
7
\l\ on the killings themselves. 11 .
"'
~}
Political reasons apart, our comparatively. meagre knowledge of the
killings is partly a consequence of the fact that the relatively efficient record-
keeping of the Nazis in Europe and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia had
no parallel in Indonesia. Uncertainty about the identity of the killers is
a major obstacle to analysis of the significance of any killings, and these
problems of information hover over any attempt to go beyond the initial
journalistic descriptions of the killings. Uncertainty extends to the number
of people who were killed. The nature of the killing in 1965-66 - commonly
possibly have had first or even second hand involvement in more than
a tiny proportion of the total number of deaths. Any estimate of the total
number who perished must therefore bea composite of numerous reports,
themselves probably also composites of reports. The first official figure
for the number killed was 78,50012, and was produced by a Fact Finding
11 For examples of this genre of writing, see David Ransome, 'The Berkeley Mafia
and the Indonesian massacre', Ramparts 9 no.4 (Oct. 1970), pp. 27-29, 4049, Ralph W.
McGehee, Deadly deceits: my 25 years in the CIA (New York: Sheridan Square, 1983), pp.
57-58, and Gabriel Kalka, Confronting the Third World: US foreign policy 1945-1980 (New
York: Pantheon, 1989), pp. 177-183. The issue re-surfaced recently with claims, confirmed
by United States former diplomats and intelligence officers, that embassy and CIA officials
provided the Indonesian army with a list of five thousand names of PK! leaders and cadres.
Embassy officials reportedly checked off the people on the list as they were then killed.
Five thousand was only a tiny proportion of the total number killed, and several observers
have pointed out that the IndonesiananD.ywouldhardlyhaveneededAmerican lists to identify
the top echelon of the party. The significance of the lists, however, was probably that they
listed clandestine party members, agents and associates, especially within the armed forces,
rather than well-known public figures such as Aidit. In the shadowy world of Indonesian
intelligence and espionage, where the PKI and the army were each infiltrated by the other's
agents and basic loyalty was virtually impossible to pick, Indonesian military intelligence
authorities must have been aware of the possibility that PKI agents would plant lists in order
to eliminate anti-communist officers. Under these circumstances, the American list:; would
have come into the army's hands with an air of reliability which no Indonesian document
could have enjoyed. Thus, although the lists contributed to the total death toll in only a
,, minor way, they were an important element in the destruction of PKI influence. See Kathy
'I Kadane, 'Ex-agents say CIA compiled death lists for Indonesians', San Francisco Examiner
20 May 1990, pp. 1, 22; for sceptical responses, see Peter Hastings, 'A chilling stoty that
jus~ doesn't add up' ,Sydney MomingHerald28May1990; Michael Vatikiotisand Mike Fonte,
'Rustle of ghosts', Far Eastern Economic Review 2 August 1990, pp. 18-19.
12
Crouch, Anny and politics, p. 155.
 ! I! 8 Robert Cribb
• ; I
1 I Commission under Major-General Sumarno, appointed by Sukarno in
late December 1965"3 This figure has been derided as too low, even
by meinbers of the commission itself14; it was produced in any case well
before the killings were over. It may nonetheless represent the number
of identifiable individuals whose place and time of death can be stated
with some certainty. How high our estimates for the total death toll go
above this figure, however, depends on judgement more than evidence.
Some suggestions are as high as two million. 15 The only serious attempt
to calculate the number killed on the basis of direct evidence was a survey
conducted apparently by KOPKAMTIB using 150 'university graduates'
in 1966 and made selectively available to various Western journalists and
academics. This report, said to have been twenty-five pages in length,
concluded that around one million people died, 800,000 of them in Central
and East Java, 100,000 each in Bali and Sumatra.16 The reported scale
of the investigation suggests that it was a genuine attempt to obtain reliable
figures, but its conclusions cannot be accepted with any certainty.
The scope for the over-reporting of deaths is clear. Individual incidents
may have been reported many times. Several observers who cast doubt
on the higher estimates have pointed out that a village burnt or a body
floating down a river may be noticed by many people and recorded many
times. Part of the anecdotal evidence forthe scale of the killings has been
the story of householders in Surabaya rising each morning to push back
into the canals bodies which had beached on their back landings during
13
One account, apparently referring to this report, cites an official figure of 1801000.
See Horace Sutton, 'Indonesia's night of terror', Saturday Review 4 February 1967, p. 27.
u Crouch, Anny and politics, p. 155; Hughes, Indonesian upheaval, pp. 185~ 186.
15 Bridget Mellor, 'Political killings in Indonesia', New Statesman 5 Augtist 1966,
p. 189. This figure is also said to have been reached by emigre members of the PKI, though
I have not been able to discover a reference to this in print. In 1978, the party exiles in China
were still citing a figure of around half a million. See Ibrahim Isa, 'Suharto's swindle in
"releasing" political prisoners', OISRAA Bulletin, special edition (Jan. 1978), p. 1. ,
16 [Frank Palmos], 'One million dead?', 1heEconom/st 20August1966, pp. 727-728;
this article appeared in a slightly different form as FrankPalmos, 'Massacre tolf in Indonesia',
The Advertiser (Adelaide), 6 August 1966. See also Bruce Cleland, 'Greatest bloodbath in
Indonesia's history' ,Dawn 2August 1966. The KOPKAMTIB report on which Palmos based
his story has never been published, though other researchers have described to me seeing
material which was probably the same document.
Introduction 9
the night, an event that must have given rise to much double counting. 17
'[he more horrific of incidents, moreover, were perhaps more likely to
1tave been reported in the first place, and if these were interpreted as typical
rather than exceptional cases the figure for the entire country would have
been inflated. Nor is it impossible that figures were more or less deliberately
I inflated in the process of collection. Village heads, from whom many of
I the local estimates were collected, probably felt considerable incentive
[i to demonstrate that vigorous action had been taken locally against the
~. communists and would have been inclined to report that their people had
~ killed many communist, whether or not this was the case. Once the notion
~. that a huge massacre had taken place was firmly established, researchers
' would have been under some pressure to show they had been doing their
~ work by coming up with suitably large figures. The ease with which large,
~ round figures can be bandied about demands caution in the absence of
} firm data. Some scepticism towards the figure of one million is also
suggested by the absence of demographic evidence indicating major
population loss. Suggestions that one third of the population in the Solo
region were killed are not borne out by later population figures. Large
numbers of people from certain occupation groups were missing when
the dust of the killings has settled. Teachers, for instance, poorly looked
after under Guided Democracy, had been extensively recruited by the PKI
as the key to influencing future generations (see Kenneth Orr's chapter),
and they were consequently an especial target of the violence of 1965-66.
Another report claims that the price of Balinese wood carvings and of
Javanese batik cloth soared in 1966 because many of the artists had been
associated with the left wing cultural organizations LEKRA and had
disappeared or been killed. 18 The fate of specific groups such as these,
however, cannot be taken as representative of that of the population as
a whole.
!'Iii
The absence of reports in later years of mass graves being uncovered,
:,~· as has happened recently in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, is also
a little puzzling, especially given the continuing construction bOomin New
1
fj
'~
17
Nicholas Turner, 'Indonesian killings may exceed 300,000', The Guardian 7 April
:: 1966, p.12; Seth S. King, 'The great purge in lndonesia',New York Times Magazine 8 May
1966, p. 89.
18 See Seymour Topping, 'Slaughter of Reds gives Indonesia a grim legacy', New
York Times 24 August 1966, p.16; 'Reign of terror in Central Java', Canberra Times 19 April
1966.
 1111 10 Robert Cribb
Order Indonesia. It is possible that grave sites, selected on the whole for
1 I 11 .1
their secluded location, are still known and are avoided for all forms of
.' I '.
construction; there are sporadic accounts of rice fields in parts of Central
II Java which are no longer tilled because they conceal mass graves. It is
likely, too, that anyone discovering a mass grave would think carefully
before reporting it, if only because the response of the authorities to this
I
I kind of discovecy has not been tested. The authorities would not necessarily
consider a mass grave to be politicaily damaging, since it could readily
be attributed to Communist massacres of opponents in 1965 or even 1948,
but in the absence of strong reasons for wanting to find graves - reasons
of the kind which have led to the exhumations in Cambodia and Eastern
Europe - the authorities would probably prefer to leave the ground
undisturbed.
Conditions of burial, however, may be most important in accounting
for this lack of skeletal evidence. Reports of the killings refer to bodies
being dumped in a wide variety of locations, from rivers, isolated forests
and rubber plantations to cane fields, weils and shailow -urban graves.
There is also some indication that significant numbers were dumped in
the limestone caves of southern Central Java; this was certainly done
systematically during the so-cailed petrus killings of the early 1980s. In
most of these locations, a combination of abundant rain and a high level
of acidity caused by decaying plant material would have quickly reduced
skeletons to fragmentaty remains, difficult for anyone but an expert to
identify with certainty. In some circumstances, decay can make bones
unrecognizable within a year, though survival up to fifty years is not unsuaL
Perhaps the best chance of preservation is in the limestone caves, but burial
places there are likely to be disturbed only by open cut mining on behalf
of cement factories, itself a rather destructive activity. 19
On the other hand, there must also have been considerable scope for
under-reporting of the killings. So many killings took place over many
19
On the survival of bones in the tropics, see P.E. Hare, 'Organic geochemistry of
bone and its relation to the survival of bone in the natural environment', in Anna K.
Behrensmeyer and Andrew P. Hill, eds, Fossils in the making: vertebrate tajJhonOmy and
paleoecology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 208-219. For mention of
graves well after the killings, see Topping, 'Slaughter of Reds', p.16, Brian May, The Indonesian
tragedy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 123; Philippe Gavi, Konterrevolution
in Indonesien (Frankfurt am Main: Europiiische Verlagsanstalt, 1968), pp. 12-13; and Lasut
in this volume. For rare photographs of graves, see Jean Contenay, 'Another bloodbath?',
Far Easteni Economic Review 23 November 1967, pp. 357, 364.
Introduction 11
months that keeping an accurate track of deaths would have been difficult
even if the operation had been the kind of coordinated genocide carried
out by the Nazis. No group of investigators could have surveyed an the
killings which took place given the time and resources available. It is
impossible to know whether people actuaily involved in the kiIIings would
have reported accurately - if they had indeed bothered to keep close count -
or would have exaggerated or under-estimated, but it is likely that they
were reluctant to be specific and would have under-stated their own personal
involvement. There is ample incidental evidence of reluctance on the part
of killers to be identified. Some executioners wore masks; a Western
visitor to Kupang in Timor was invited by the local army and police to
attend some of the killings, but only on condition that he take part, so
that he would share the complicity of the killers. It has also been reported
that in many cases party members were killed along with their entire families
in order to prevent the possibility of retaliation in thefuture.20 Reluctance
to report accurately would have been even stronger where killings were
used as an opportunity to even old scores. Paul Webb cites a case of
villagers punished because theykiiled non-communists and this possibility
must have inhibited, at vecy least, the fuII disclosure of events.21
In the years immediately after the killings, therefore, scholars on the
whole discounted both the low Fact Finding Commission figure and the
high KOPKAMTIB one, settling, mainly on the grounds of plausibility,
for something around a quarter of a million.22 A third set of official
figures became available in July 1976, when security officials, including
the KOPKAMTIB commander Admiral Sudomo suggested that somewhere
20 Mellor, 'Political killings in Indonesia', p. 189; Topping, 'Slaughter of Reds', p.
~ 16; 'Reign of terror in Java', Canberra Tunes 19 April 1966; GJ. Resink, 'From the old
I Mahabharata- to the New Ramayana-Order', Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde
131 no 2/3 (1975), p. 221. The Western visitor to Ku pang is mentioned, but not identified,
I
r:
k
in Nicholas Turner, 'Indonesian killings may exceed 300,000', The Guardian 7 April 1966,
p. 12, and King, 'The great purge', pp. 89-90.
21 R.AF. Paul Webb, 'The sickle and the cross: Christians and Communists in Bali,
Flores, Sumbaand Timor, 1965-67' ,loumalofSoutheastAsian Studies 17 no. 1(March1986),
~
r1 p. 107. See also Crouch,Anny andpolitics, p. 155 and the claim by General Widodo in mid-1966
f,i that the death toll in Central Java had been a mere five thousand; Rakshay Puri, 'Report
on Indonesia', Hindustan Times 22 August 1966.
22
See, for eicample, Peter Polomka, Indonesia since Sukonw (Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1971), p. 161.
 12 Robert Cribb /ntroducUon 13

Table I: Number of people killed according to various estimates

Kirk (1966) 23 150,000

Anderson and McVey (1966) 23 200,000
Turner (1966? 17 300,000-600,000
King (1966) 1 300,000
Topping (1966) 18 150,000-400,000
The Economist, citing KOPKAMTIB (1966) 16 1,000,000
Mellor (1966) 16 2,000,000
Wertheim (1966) 23 400,000
Hughes (1967) 1 200,000
Fact Finding Commission (late 1965)• 78,000
Fact Finding Commission membe..- 780,000
Adam Malik" 160,000
L.N.Palar" 100,000
Washington Posfi 500,000
Contenay (1967) 19 100,000-200,000
Grant (1967) 23 200,000-300,000
Vittachl (1967) 23 300,000-500,000
Paget (1967/68) 23 .. 100,000-300,000
Moser (1968)23 400,000
Sullivan (1969) 8 300,000-500,000 Captured PKI equipment, including bullets, berets and a bicycle pump.
Lyon (1970)23 200,000-500,000
Henderson (1970) 23 400,000-200,000
Dahm (1971) 1 200,000
Sloan (1971 )23 300,000 23 DonaldKirk, '1llestruggleforpowerinindonesia',TheReporter24February1966,
Polomka (1971) 22 150,000-300,000 p. 38; Benedict R. Anderson and Ruth T. McVey~ A p~eliminary analysis o! lhe CJ_ctober 1,
Legge (1972) 22 200,000-250,000 1965, coup in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Umversity Modem Indonesia ProJect-1971
Neil (1973) 23 750,000 [reprint of document prepared in 1966]), p. 63; Don Moser, 'Where the rivers ran crimson
Palmier (1973) 23 200,000 from butchery',Life 61 (1July1966), p. 24; W.F. Wertheim, 'Bloed zonder tranen', Groene
Sievers (1974) 23 200,000-400,000 Amsterdammer 1 October 1966; Bruce Grant, Indonesia (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967),
I Repression and Exploitation (1974) 23 500,000-1,000,000 p. 86; Tanie Vittachi, The fall ofSukarno (London: Mayfiowe: 1967), ?.138; Roger K.-Paget,
Admiral Sudomo, KOPKAMTIB COMMANDER (July 1976)23 450,000-500,000 'The military in Indonesia politics: the burden of power',PacificAffaus 40no 3/4 (1967-68),
Fryer & Jackson (1977) 23 100,000-500,000 p. 313; Margo L Lyon, Bases of conflict in nual Java (Berkeley: University of California
Plwier (1978) 23 500,000-i ,000,000 Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, 1970), p. 71; John W. Henderson et al, Area
Caldwell and Utrecht (1979) 23 500,000 handbook for Indonesia (Washington DC: American University Foreign Area Studies, 3rd
Legge (1980) 1 250,000 ed., 1970), p. 2%; Stephen Sloan, A stu4' in poUtical violence: the Indonesian e.xperimce (alicago:
Ricklefs (1981) 1 500,000 Rand McNally, 1971), p. 73; Leslie Palmier, Communists in Indonesia (London: Weidenfeld
Frederick (1983)7° 750,000 & Nicolson, 1973), p. 248; Wilfred T. Neil, Twentieth-century Indonesia (New York: Columbia
Anderson (1985) 23 500,000-1,000,000 University Press, 1973), p. 354; Allen M. Sievers, The mystical world of Indonesia: culture
Mody (1987) 23 500,000-1,000,000 &: economic development in conflict (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1974), p.
8
182; Repression and exploitation in Indonesia (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1974), p. 9; Donald
Cited in Hughes. W. Fryer and James C. Jackson, Indonesia (London/Boulder: Benn/Westview, 1977, p. 106;
Jan Pluvier, Indonesie, Kolonialism£, onajhank&jkheid, neokolonialisme: een politieke geschiedenis
Note: Superscript fig~res refer to the footnote in which full bibli.graphical -details of the van 1940 tot heden (Nijmegen: Socialistische Uitgeveriji, 1978), p. 271; Malcolm Caldwell
work cited can be found. In citing these estimates, I have omitted indefinite qualifiers and Ernst Utrecht, Indonesia: an akemative history (Sydney: Alternative Publishing Co-operative,
such as 'more than' and 'up to', 1979); Benedict Anderson, 'Afterword [to pipit Rochijat, "Am I PKI ornon-PKl'T ,Indoneiia
40 (1985), p. 53; Nawaz B. Mody, Indonesia under Suharto (New Delhi: Sterling, 1987), p.
~ .
 14
around half a million people had died. It is not clear what evidence, ~
24
if any, was used to reach this new figure, but it has prompted a general '
upward revision of the casualty figure and probably a little more interest
in the earlier KOPKAMTIB figure. We are unlikelyriow to find empirical
evidence to resolve this question. . issues. While it may seem unacceptable to some to ~u.ggest that there
Problems of philosophy
Behind the technical problems lie deep theoretical ones. Atrocity is
an abiding source of fascination. 'One of the great needs of the twentieth
century is a scientific study of atrocity and of the moral issues involved',
wrote Herbert Butterfield. 25 A major reason for this is the window which
atrocity appears to open into the human soul. Some time after an earlier
massacre in Indonesia, that of the Chinese in Batavia in 1740, a Dutch
participant wrote:
I myself also had to join in. As I knew that my Chinese
neighbour had a fat pig, I intended to take it away from him
and bring it into my house. When my boss, the master-
carpenter, saw this, he slapped me and told me to kill the
Chinese first and then to plunder. I therefore took a rice
pounder and with it beat to death my neighbour with whom
I so often had drunk and dined. 26
As far as atrocity literature goes, this is mild stuff, but it illustrates a concern
for the tearing question: how can human beings treat each other in so
inhumane a way? The mind of the torturer, the hangman, the mass
murderer has been a perennial fascination for novelists and historians
alike. This, I think, is one of the main reasons why events such as the
Holocaust and the killings in Cambodia continue to demand attention:
24
'Setelah wawancara Sudomo', Tempo 10 July 1976, p. 7.
25
Herbert Butterfield, History and human relations (London, 1951 j, p. 125, in H.C.
Koenigsberger, 'Introduction' in Alfred Soman, ed., The massacre ofSt. Bartholomew: reappraisals
and conjectures (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974), p. 1.
26
Leonard Bluss~, Strange company: Chinese settlers, mestizo women and the Dutch
in VOC Batavia (Dordrecht: Faris, 1986), p. 95.
Robert Cribb
r.:-rroduction 15
look into the hearts of mass murderers and wonder whether we are
we
in fact looking into those of our coIIeagues, our 1am1
' ·1·1es, ourselves.
The Indonesian massacres, however, have not appeared to raise such
can be degrees of inhumanity, the manner of the kill~ngs reache~ no
extremes of barbarism, at least as far as we know. It was a ~e of gr~tmtous
slaughter, unsophisticated cruelty and unplanned brutality of a kind t~at
. regrettably familiar from the pages of the press. On the whole, the studies
~ this volume have avoided graphic description of acts of violence, but
~ome hint of what went on can be found in Kenneth Orr's description
of'Margosari' and in the report 'Additional data on count~r-revolutionary
cruelty'. The Indonesian killings brought no new techmcal refinements
to the business of mass killing: there were no gas chambers, no ghastly
medical experiments, no sense that advanced technology and modern science
had been turned against humanity. The killing was done with knives, clubs
and firearms. The victims were not moved hundreds of kilometres in order
to meet their deaths in technologically advanced instruments of
extermination; most indeed perished within a few kilometres of their homes.
Nor was a grand vision being implemented. Part of the fascination of
the massacres of Hitler, Stalin and Pol Pot is the fact that they were all
driven by an ideologically determined vision of a new world to be created.
Ideological motives were there in the Indonesian case, of course, along
with fear, revenge, adventure and so on but for the most part the perceived
need to kill arose out of a sense of self-interest and self-defence, and was
in no way dictated by a formal ideological world view. One looks in vain
in the Pancasila, Indonesia's current state ideology, for reasons why
communists should be exterminated rather than, say, gently re-educated.
Only from Islam did an apparently ideological basis for mass killing
come in the form of rhetoric calling for holy war against the infidel
comn:unists. Even for radical Muslims, however, the purpose of the killings
was relatively limited. Western observers, following modernist Muslim
scholars such as Syed Ahmad Khan, have tended to see holy war or jihad
as a special state, the resort to apocalyptic warfare after a suspension of
the normally peaceful coexistence between Islam and non-Islam. The term
jihad, however, strictly applies to a much wider range of activities for
promoting Islam, from writing, reflection and peaceful proselytization t?
outright warfare. In traditional Islam, the jihad never ceases, though 1t
may take many different forms from time to time. When various religious
teachers in East Java announced holy war, therefore, they were reminding
16 Robert Cribb
their followers of their obligations as good Muslims, rather than changing
the rules of the game. In the context of the time, jihad was directed at
eliminating a particular set of opponents of Islam, rather than at establishing
an Islamic state.27
If anything, the Indonesian killings have been treated as if they fall
into an anomalous category of 'accidental' mass death. Commonly it is
death from starvation and disease which is treated in this manner, as in
the Ukraine in the 1920s, in Bengal in 1943, in China during the Japanese
occupation and again during Great Leap Forward and even in Indonesian-
occupied EastTimor. In all these cases, neglectful, sometimes deliberately
neglectful, government policies resulted in the deaths of large numbers
of people under circumstances which allowed the governments concerned
to claim that mass death. was not their intention but was a consequence
of circumstances beyond their control. 28 . The killings in Germany and
occupied Europe were unambiguously the work of representatives of the
state and, although some scholars have debated whether responsibility
for these actions went right to the top of the Nazi state apparatus, the
state as an institution clearly stands guilty. In the Indonesian case, on
the other hand, the government was at least in some cases simply a bystander
in the killings. This seems to put the massacres in part into the class of
communal violence of the kind that accompanied the partition of India
in 1947 or the expulsion of the Greeks from Asia Minor in 1922.29
27
On the question of jihad in Islamic philosophy, see Rupert Peters, 'Jiha:d', i"n The
Encyclopedia ofReligion (New York: Macmillan; 1987), vol. 8, pp. 88-91; and Majid Khadduri,
JVar and peace in the low of Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955).
28
The literature on each of these cases is substantial and involves subtle argumentation
on either side. Byway of example, see George C. Hildebrand and Gareth Porter, Cambodia:
starvation and revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976), which argues that Khmer
Rouge population policies were a consequence, not a cause, of massive food shortages in
Cambodia.
The theoretical literature on mass killings is dominated by cases of inter~ethnic
massacre, or genocide: Armenians in Turkey, Ukrainians in the Soviet Union, Je.vs and Gypsies
in German-occupied Europe, Hutu in Burundi, Tibetans in the People's Republic of China
and so-on, and tends to disregard more narrowly political killings such as those in Indonesia.
The difficulty, however, wit Ji extending to concept of'genocide to other forms .of mass violence
is the absence of theoretical grounds for distinguishing mass political killings such as those
in Indonesia from smaller scale killings. For various attempts to grapple with these issues,
see Leo Kuper, Genocide: its political use in the twentieth century (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press, 1981); Israel W. Charny, How can we conunit the unthinkable? genocide:
Introduction 17
. Nor is there much sign that the killers themselves felt morally challenged
by the killings, despite the fact that those· who slew generally confronted
their victims personally, commonly beheading them with broad-bladed
J<nife, rather than in the somewhat less personal setting of a firing squad
or gas chamber. Novelists in particular have been fascinated by the mental
adjustment which those committing inhumane acts must make in order
to retain their sense ofhumanity.30 This may be a mistaken view in many
cases; there is evidence enough that plenty of mass murderers remain
unaffected by what they do, but it is a plausible enough position. Indonesia's
mass killers, however, as far as we can identify them, have shown little
evidence that they feel this particular moral difficulty.31 Michael van
Langenberg's suggestion, therefore, that a deep sense of shame over the
killings is an important part of the political base of the New Order is a
valuable window on this issue.
This apparent 'routineness' of the massacre is compounded by the fact
that the killings, extensive though they were, remained within the bounds
of recent human experience. Even a figure of one million deaths in the
Indonesian killings is still a good deal fewer than the six million Jews who
perished in the Holocaust. Certainly a much smaller percentage of the
total Indonesian population perished than the 5 percent of Cambodians
the human canc<r (Boulder Col.: Westview, 1982); living Louis Horowitz, Taking lives: genocide
and state power (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1982); Israel W. Chamy, ed., Towards
the understanding and prevention ofgenocide: proceedini;s of the International Conference on
the Holocaust and genocide (Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1984); Israel W. Charny, Genocide:
a critical bibliographical review (London: Mansell, 1988); Ervin Staub, The roots of evil: the
origins ofgenocide and other group violence(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989);
Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, The history and sociology of genocide: analyses and case
studies (New Haven, c.Onn.: Yale University Press, 1990).
30 See, for instance, J.M. Coetz.ee, Wailing for the barbarians (Hannondsworth: Penguin,
1982), and 'The Vietnam project', in JJw*1ands (Harmonds\vorth: Penguin1 1983); also William
Styron, Sophie's choice (London: Gape, 1979).
31 See, for instance, the way in which the issue is shrugged off in Pipit Rochijat, 'Am
IPKI or non-PKI?', p. 45. One single exception is Usamah's short story, 'War and humanity',
translated by Helen Jarvis, Indonesia 9 (1970), pp. 89-100 and also published in Aveling,
Gestapu, pp. 12-22.
18 Robert Cribb
who are said to have died at the hands of Pol Pot and his colleagues."
Nor has there been much tendentiousness in the discussion of how many
perished; even government representatives, although highly wary of detail,
are generally not embarrassed by broad suggestions that a million may
have died. This contrasts with attempts by Nazi and Khmer Rouge
apologists to minimize the number of killings carried out by those regimes,
and by the parallel attempts of their opponents to inflate the numbers.
Yet the fact that we habitually assess massacres by the total number
of casualties, and by the percentage of victims from amongst the total
population, encourages us to disregard the speed with which the Indonesian
killings took place. Hitler's extermination of the Jews was a massive.and
costly operation, taking many years and requiring the construction of camps,
the requisition of strategically vital railway rolling stock and the extensive
use of troops and other staff. Even Pol Pot took four years and a good
deal of organization to accomplish his destructive work in Cambodia.
The Indonesian killings, by contrast, were largely over within a few months
and were carried out with a minimum of organization and technical
infrastructure.33 We may routinely refer to both the scale and the intensity
of mass killings, but intensity is a difficult notion to define and there is
something especially distasteful about applying statistical analysis to the
rate of killing during an atrocity. Even if the Indonesian killings stand
out from the global experience because of the relatively short space of
time they took to be completed, they are unlikely draw special attention
on that account.
History as a discipline is poorly equipped to deal with massacres. While
history's attention tci empirical detail perhaps equips it well to discover
As with Indonesia, the exact" number of deaths is uncertain. Michael Vickery,
32
who has examined the available figures with greatest care has concluded that probably around
740,000 more Cambodians than nonnal died during the Khmer Ro.age years, out of a 1975
population of about 7.1 million. Ofthls 740,000, approximately half were executed, the remained
dying mainly of disease and statvation. See Michael Vickery's letter to the editors, of the
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 20 no. 1 (1988), pp. 70-73. Region-by-region, though,
the contrast may not be so strong: the killing in Bali, for instance; reached_levels not dissimilar
to those in parts of Camlxxlia. See Ben Kiernan, 'Wtld chickens, .farm chickens·al).d cormorants:
Kampuchea's Eastern Zone under Pol Pot', in David P. Chandler and Ben Kiernan, eds.,
Revolution and its aftennath in Kampuchea: eight essays (New Haven: Yale University, 1983),
p. 142.
33 I am grateful to Ruth McVey for this point.
19
JiJtroduction
he 'facts' of massacre, the dominant trend in modern historiography is
:0 analyze structu~a~ change in time, an approach which disco~nts the
"gnificance of indlVldual events such as massacres. Sukarno d!Splayed
siirue historian's consciousness (and political insensitivity) when he descnbed
:he killing of the generals on 30 September/! October 1965 as a 'ripple
·n the ocean of the Revolution'." Massacres, moreover, create a literal
~ea:d-end for many of the protagonists. Whig historians, as Butterfield
has pointed out, prefer winners, or at least survivors. They like continuity;
change, when it comes, is preferred in long inexorable movements, not
sudden hiatus. One of the distinguishing characteristics of historiography
is its ability to set its subjects in the context of their pasts and their futures.
Subjects whose future has been curtailed are less attractive. The abrupt
departure of the PT? fro~ the Indonesian political sce~e m~kes it now
a·difficulttopicfor d1scuss10n unless one can trace, as DaV!d HHI has done,
the re-emergence of a leftist literature, or can believe, in line with public
pronouncements of the Indonesian Minister of Defence Benny Murdani,
in the existence of an active underground party.35
A comparison of the historiography of Australia and South Africa
suggests that history is generally kinder to killers than to enslavers. However
brutal or extensive a massacre, it is an act which retreats steadily into the
past; there is a kind of historical statute of limitations beyond which it
seems to make little sense to pursue the guilt of mass murderers.
Enslavement on the other hand is constantly present; contemporary criticism
of the Indonesian government, which focuses on current conditions rather
than past crimes, reflects this sense of historical priorities.
"
p. 398.
Quoted in J.D. Legge, Sukarno: a political biography (New York: Praeger, 1972),
35 David T. Hill, Who~ Left? Indonesian literature in the early 1980's (Claytpn, Vic.:
Monash University Centre of SoutheastAsianStudies WorkingPaperno. 33, 1984). Although
government warnings of a continuing 'communist threat' at tim~ appear to be no more than
sCaremongering, it is worth bearing in mind the resilience of the PKI in maintaining an
underground organization in the face of Dutch and Japanese repression in the years 1928-1945.
On this, see Jacques Leclerc, 'Underground nationalist activities and their double (Amir
Syarifuddin's relationship with Indonesian coinmunism)', Kabar Seberang 17 (June 1986),
pp. 72-98, and Anton Lucas, ed.,Lacal opposition and underground resistance lo the Japanese
in Java 1942-1945 (Clayton, Vic.: Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies,
1986).
20 Robert Cribb
The meekness with which PKI members are often believed to have
gone to theslaughter also hampers the serious historiographical treatment
of their fate. Perhaps the strongest image we have of the massacre is of
PKI members on Bali lining up, dressed in their white funeral clothes,
to be executed methodically.36 A deep historiographical problem arises
here from the fact that history commonly focuses on those who accomplish
change or who at least seek it Massacres, however, are catastrophes visited
upon a group of people, and so the historical dynamic must inevitably
appear to be external to the victims. 37 Lack of will, for whatever reason
is for many historians an abdication from being historical agents at all.'
'Death in the fury of battle is [considered) glorious, ... but meekness in
the hour of death is curiously culpable, a sign of weakness, and it
compromises in the eyes of history."8 A strong philosophical rebuttal
of this position can be made, by arguing that precisely in facing death with
serenity, in accepting it as a consequence ofone's principles, victims retain
their humanity up to the moment of death", but it helps to be able to
believe that the principle and the cause will survive after the deaths.
36
Hughes, Indonesian upheaval, p. 181, also p. 160. For other reports of meekness,
see Gavi, KontetTevolulion in Indonesien, pp. 13, 32. Outside Indonesia one of the most striking,
though little known, instances of meekness was the passivity with which the Hutu of Burundi
faced massacre by the Tutsi in 1972. See Chalk and Jonassohn, History and sociology of
genocide, pp. 388-389.
37
In a Gestapo example, Sal Tas attempts to argue that the PKI brought its destruction
on its own head, but he expresses it as an issue of moral rather than historical responsibility.
See Sal Tas, Indonesia: the underdeveloped freedom (IIidianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1974), pp.
319-321.
38
Philipp Fehl, 'Mass murder, or humanity in death', Theology Today 28 no. 1 (April
1971 ), p. 64.
39
Ibid., pp. 69-71.
JntrDduction 21
problems of interpretation
Aside from the problems of information and philosophy, the central
difficulty for historians of Indonesia in attempting understand the massacres
has been the problem of reconciling their national and local dinlensions.
The killings were precipitated by a national event, the attempted coup
in Jakarta and they involved avowedly national actors - the army, the PKI,
organized Islam - and yet the relatively scanty information we possess
suggests that a host of local factors in each region determined the scope
and scale of each bout of killing.
some national dimensions of the killings have been thoroughly discussed
in the existing literature. The works of Crouch, McVey and Sundhaussen'°
have shown convincingly the origins and development of political rivalry
between the Indonesian army high command and the PKI. Each saw the
other as fundamentally antagonistic to its own sectional interests as well
as to the national interest and each desired as far as possible to remove
the other from political influence. When the opportunity arose,
anticommunist army units, especially KOS1RAD and the RPKAD, moved
swiftly to destroy the PKI, both by direct killing and by encouraging, arming
and training civilian vigilantes who were then sent out to do the job. In
most cases, the killings did not begin until elite military units had arrived
in a locality and had sanctioned violence by instruction or example. A
significant number of those killed had already been detained by the
authorities and were either killed in jail or handed over to vigilantes for
killing. At the same tinle, rural tension was sharpened by disputes over
land, with the PKI promoting land reform by means of aksi sepihak, or
unilateral actions, in the face of deeply entrenched opposition from
40
Ruth T. McVey, 'The post-revolutionary transformation of the Indonesian army',
Indonesia 11 (April 1971), 131-176; 13 (April 1972), 147-182; Ulf Sundhaussen, The road
to power: InMnesian militarypolitics 1945-1967 (Kuala Lumpur: OUP, 1982); Crouch, Army
and politics.
 22 Robert Cribb
landlords.41 These factors alone help explain some of the violence which
followed the coup, but they do not satisfactorily explain massacres.
Although the elimination of the PKI was necessary for the establishment
of army rule, the scale of the violence of 1965-66 seems gratuitous when
compared with the nature of the political change which it ushered in.
When one considers that the massacre of St Bartholomew, to which
historians have given a pivotal position in the rise of absolutism in France
and the development of the Counter Reformation, achieved its notoriety
with a death toll of no more than two thousand", out of an admittedly
much smaller population in sixteenth century Paris, the violence of 1%5-66
seems incomprehensibly excessive. In 1966, it is true, the change in style
and policy brought about by Suharto's accession to power seemed to make
the·coup and the massacres a major watershed in modern Indonesian history.
. [ Since that time, however, the scholarly consensus has been retreating steadily
from this position. Crouch in particufar has drawn attention to the
'.:•
:111 continuity of army power and of political structures between the Old and
New Orders, which suggests that the transformation was Tuore superficial
'
than was first thought. Even those who have persisted in seeing the Old
Order as holding dramatic possibilities now closed off by the New have
tended to accept a continuity in state power ·from the Dutch colonial era
up to the present. If the destruction of the PKI and the removal ofleftist
influence from the levers of power were the sole aim of the army, then
it is hard to see that the rise to power of Suharto or the success of his ·
41 Lyon, Bases of conflict in Mal Java; Jacob .W;lkin, •The Moslem-Communi~t
confrontation in East Java, 1964-1965', Orbis 1i (1969), pp: 822-847; and W.F. ·Wertheim,
'From aliran to class struggle in the countryside of Java', Pacific Viewpoint 10 (1969), pp.
1-17.
This combination of sharp social tension and official complicity is reminiscent of the
White Terror in France in 1794-1795. During this extended series of massacres, the authorities
commonly allowed crowds to seize and slaughter imprisoned Jaoobins and proved most reluctant
to prosecute killers, even when their identities were known. Other features in common with
the Indonesian killings were a disregard for legal process, wide variation in the extent of the
killings from region to region, the prominence of secret gangs and rural criminals, the use -
of death lists and the broad targeting of all who had been prominent on the left, regardless .
of their personal role in the defeated order, and the frequent killing of whole families. See
Jacques Godechot, The counter-revolution: doclrineandactionl 789-1804 (London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1972), pp. 246-254j and Richard Cobb, Reactions to the French revolution
(London: _Oxford University Press, 1972).
42 Soman, The massacre of SL Bartholomew, p. viii. This figure refers to the killings
in Paris alone; subsequent m~cres in other French cities claimed more lives.
Introduction 23
subsequent policies would have been any mar~ imperilled had the death
toll in 1965-66 been 10,000 or even 1000. Similar qualifications apply
to the effects of the land reform campaign. Although the aksi sepihak
generated great bitterness and considerable violence, they are widely
acknowledged to have been a failure for the PKI. The occasions on which
land redistribution could be carried out were far outnumbered by those
on which deterntined and violent resistance by landlords and their associates
not only prevented re-distribution but rolled back PKI influence in the
villages." Although there were scores to be settled and lessons to be
reinforced in 1965, the land reform issue alone hardly explains the ferocity
of the killings.
On initial inspection, that ferocity seems to have been a product of
local factors. To appreciate this, we need to look briefly at each region
in turn. As Ken Young stresses, no central set of events encapsulates
the massacres as a whole; the killings were scattered in time and space
and whatever we know about one massacre only dimly illuminates the others.
Only in some regions is it even possible to paint a broad picture of events.
In strongly Muslim Aceh, where the PKI's support was minuscule and
largely confined to the towns, cadres and their families are reported to
have been eliminated swiftly in early October... We know little more,
but the fact that Aceh's history contains a number of instances of the rapid
and ruthless elimination of political opponents when the opportunity
presented itself makes this brief account plausible. Immediately to the
south, the plantation area of East Sumatra had been an area of endemic
social conflict and labour unrest since the 1940s and the PKI was influential
through its affiliated plantation workers' union SARBUPRL Labour tension
was exacerbated by hostility between Malays, Bataks and Javanese. Extensive
killings certainly took place, though itis not clear what share in the killings
was taken by the army under local divisional commander Kemal Idris and
anti-communist youth groups with army backing. Just how many people
were killed and who, precisely, they were also remains unknown. Stoler,
who has studied the political economy of the plantation region most closely,
was able to do no more than note that the total estate workforce of283,000
" Rex Mortimer,Indorn:Oan co11111lUJ)i.sm wuler Sukarno: idea/ow andpolilics, 1959-1965
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 309-328.
Crouch, Anny and politics, pp. 142-143.
24 Robert Cribb
just before the coup had been reduced by 16% - 47,000 people - .a year
later'', but this figure does not take into account those who fled or were
dismissed, nor family members of workers who may have been killed along
with them, nor additional workers recruited after October 1965. In the
southern Sumatra province of Lampung, there.was a good deal of killing
near the town of Metro. Here the victims seem to have .been Javanese
transmigrant settlers, while their killers were local Muslims, resentful of
Javanese intrusion into the area.46
Paul Webb's valuable report" on the killings in Nusatenggara is a
model for the kind of report we need on those many areas which were
not acknowledged PKI strongholds. His account draws out a multitude
of local factors in the killings, local particularities of the kind emphasized
by Ken Young. Especially important here was the strength of Christianity
and of traditional religions. The ambiguous, or at least less uncompromising,
relationship between Christianity and Communism which is hinted at in
the Purwodadi Affair, appears also in Nusatenggara. In Timar, sections
of the Protestant church aligned themselves with poor -peasants on the
land reform issue, and Protestant clergy, staff of the local university and
teachers in general were an early target, many killed by local vigilante
groups. The Catholic church in Flores, though generally not at all associated
with the PKI, forbade its followers from participating in the killings, and
in doing do directly countermanded an order by the local ntilitary
commander for mass action against the communists.48 In Solar, parts
of Timar and elsewhere, communism became entwined with local cargo
cults, such as the Timorese makdok movement and though the cult followers
had ntinimal understanding of PKI ideology they were caught up in the
security sweep along with.their erstwhile associates. Some unfortunate
followers of traditional religions simply told army investigators that they
Ann Laura Stoler, Capitalism and confrontaJion in Sumalra's plantation bell, llfl0-1979
(New Haven, Conn' Yale University Press, 1985), pp.163-164. See also Gavi, Konrem:volution
in Jndonesien, pp. 38-39; King, 'The great purge in Indonesia', p. 90.
Frank Palmos, personal communication.
47
Webb1 1Thesickle and the cross'. A slightly different version of thiS article appears
in R.AF. Paul Webb, Palms and the cross: socio-economic development in Nusatenggara
(Townsville: James Cook University of Norih Queensland, 1986), pp. 149-161.
48 See also Gavi, Konterrevo/ution in Indo_nesien, p. 33.
/ntroducOon 25
belonged to none of the 'official' religions; they were then assumed to
be communists and were dealt with accordingly. In Lombok, local memories
report 50,000 killings in early 1966. Here the killers seem to have been
carried out predominantly by Muslim Sasaks, with the majority of victims
Balinese - traditionally the ruling elite in the western part of the island -
and Chinese, who controlled the commercial sector.
More killing took place in West Kalimantan, although there the worst
massacres were in October and November 1967, well after the massacres
had peaked in more other regions. The victims were almost exclusively
Chinese, the killers predominantly indigenous Dayaks. Before the coup,
west Kalimantan had been one of the bases for Indonesian operations
against Malaysia, which included sponsorship of ethnic Chinese guerrilla
forces across the border in Sarawak. When Indonesian politics turned
abruptly to the right after 1965, and especially after the recognition of
Malaysia in August 1966, some of these guerrillas began operations on
the Indonesian side of the border, finding support amongst the large and
predominantly rural Chinese community. Cappel, the only scholar to
examine these killings closely, links them both to Chinese guerrilla attacks
on Dayak villages and to a deliberate 'psychological warfare' campaign
by the Indonesian army to incite t.he Dayaks against the Chinese."
Of killings in the rest of Sumatra and Kaliniantan, Sulawesi and Maluku,
we know virtually nothing.50 It is probable that the killings in these areas
were on a much lesser scale, if only because fewer communists were available
to be killed. Scholars studying perennially violent Madura off the northeast
coast of Java report that the left had been largely eliminated well before
1965 and that the island was consequently quiet during the killings."
The 1955 general elections which definitively marked the rise of the PKI
on Java gave it only meagre representation in other provinces, except North
Charles A Coppel, Indonesian Chinese in crisis (Kuala Lumpur: OUP, 1983), pp.
145-149. See also Justus M. van derKroef,lndonesiasince SukOTno (Singapore: Asia Pacific
Press, 1971), pp. 110-113.
Brief reference to killings in North Sulawesi is made in Anderson and McVey,
A preliminary analysis, p. 63 and May, The Indonesian tragedy, p. 123. Roger Kent Paget,
'Youth and the wane of Soekarno's government' (Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, 1970),
pp. 72-93, describes anti-communist organization prior to the killings in several regions.
,, Contenay, 'Another bloodbath?', p. 358, on the other hand, identifies Madura as
a place of especially unrestrained killing.
 26 Robert Cribb
and South Sumatra, and in South Sumatra the army had been arresting
PKI members since late 1956: After the declaration of martial law in 1957
and with much of the archipelago under direct army rule, expressing
allegiance to the PKI had been dangerous well before 1965.
On Java, a number ofrelatively spectacular anti-communist riots took
place in the cities, especially against the PKI headquarters in Jakarta and·
against the communist mayors of Cirebon, Magelang, Solo, Salatiga and ·
Surabaya. In Surabaya, whose corpse-clogged canals were widely reported
in the Western media, Muslim Madurese apparently carried out most of
the killings. By far the worst massacres, however, took place in the _
countryside. The main killers were army units, especially the paracommando ,
unit RPKAD, arid civilian vigilantes, most commonly drawn from youth
groups associated with anti-communist political parties. Of these the Muslim
youth group Ansor, affiliated with the Nahdatul Ulama, is reported to· .
have played the greatest role. West Java was relatively untouched by mass '
violence, mainly because the local Siliwangi Division, having spent fourteen
years from 1948 to 1962 attempting to crush the fundamentalist Muslim
'' i i ' Darul Islam movement in the West Javanese countryside, was most reluctant
i ' to encourage Muslim youth groups to take political matters into their
I ' own hands.
''
1:
I
' ! The main exception in West Java appears to have been the Iridramayu
i;I area between Subang and Cirebon, an area of endentic poverty where the
PKI had been relatively strong. The focus of tension in Indramayu was
the occupation of government teak forests by squatters;who had resisted
violently when police tried to remove them, leaving one policeman dead:
The killings in 1965 were then carried out by vengeful members of the
police force. 52
In Central and East Java, the main killing grounds, there were clear
differences in the scope of the massacres from region to region. In Central
Java, killing was heaviest in the Solo-Klaten area, in Pati to the north
and in Banyumas, at the western end of the province; here the army's.para-
commando unit RPKAD commanded by Sarwo Edhie presided over most
52
See Hughes, Jndone.sian upheaval, p. 157; Crouch, Anny and politics, p. 142;
Sundhaussen, The road to power, p. 217. One report mentions Garut as the site of major
killings; see Einar Schlereth and Batjo Daeng Bin tang, Indonesien: Analyze eines Massakers
(Frankfurt: Marz Archiv, 1970), p. 177.
11itfoducUon 27
of the killings." In East Java, theKediri region (discussed by Ken Young),
p.tobOlinggo/Pasuruan, Situbondo and Banyuwangi appear to have been
!he worst areas.54 Throughout Central and East Java, the ferocity of the
)<illings seems to have been associated particularly with ancient hostility
betweencul:ur~l-religi_o~groups, theso-calledab:inga~,MuslimJavanes~
whose relig10n is heaVIly mfluenced by pre-Islamic beliefs, and the sanm,
wlio are more orthodox and more avowedly Muslim. In Bali, discussed
iii the concluding section of this volume, killing was concentrated in the
tliree western kabupaten of Jembrana, Buleleng and Tabanan, and seems
to have been associated both with the defence of Hinduism and with long-
standing rivalries between patronage groups. Both army units and PNI
vigilantes called Tantins took part in the killings. In all these cases, the
Jiillings peaked at some stage between early November 1965 and late January
1%6, though they continued at a reduced level for a good deal longer
and localized outbreaks of more numerous killings took place for another
tliree years. The Purwodadi killings described by Iskandar and Lasut are
one such incident.
In this volume we can only begin to outline the probable connections
between local factors and the national scale of the killings. It is clear to
begin with that between national and local factors in the killings there
was at very least a multiplier effect. Ken Young shows in the case ofKediri
how the coincidence of national and local motives for killing in the unusual
absence of restraining forces, unleashed deep antagonisms in a fury of
murder. The failure of national politics to provide workable and working
institutions to fulfil the promises of independence threw the Indonesian
people back on loyalty to older social divisions which became polarized
around Islam and Communism. Old antagonisms which might once have
been mitigated by a shared national loyalty deepened instead into bitter
· JJ The best available reports of Banyumas are those of Frank Palmos, most easily
~cCessible as 'And how they died', The Economist 20 August 1966, p. 728. See also Palmos,
'M8ssacre toll in Indonesia'. Accounts of the killings in Central Java cari also be f.ound in
Gavi, Konterrevolution in Jndonesien, pp. 11-14 and 31-35.
Pipit Rochijat, 'Am I PKI or non-PKI?', Indonesia 40 (1985), pp. 37-52, offers
an extended personal account of the killings in East Java. An army intelligence on the situation
in East Java in late November 1965 has been translated as 'Report from East Java', Indonesia
41 (1986), pp. 134-149. A few brief reports from other areas can be found in Contenay,
1
Anotherbloodbath?', pp. 357-358, 'Massacres in East Java', Tapo!Bulletin 15 (April 1976),
p.. 3, and Gavi,Konterrevo/ution in Indonesien, pp. 35-37. For further discussion of East Java,
see Ken Young's chapter.
28 Robert Cribb
hatred. Many accounts assert that old grudges unconnected with the political ·
tensions of 1965 were settled when this opportunity arose, but that mis-states
the situation: in the highly charged atmosphere of 1965-66, very little
was not political in one sense or other, and grudges fell into that broader
pattern of social polarization.
But why did this tension lead to massacres rather than to civil war?
What special burden did the PKI carry in these critical months? Part of
the answer may lie in the international environment. The Cold War was
at its height, hot war was escalating in Vietnam, China had begun to tum
to the left again, and suppressing the rising tide of communism seemed
to anti-communists to demand extra effort. More important, however,
was the army's success in identifying the PKI as a transgressor of social
and political norms. Indonesia had come to independence with few .
established rules for the conduct of politics. Constitutions and constitutional \
practice had changed frequently and politics was characterized by constant ·
experimentation with new forms. Guided Democracy attempted to end
this volatility by restoring Indonesia's original 1945 constitution and by
insisting on an ideological orthodoxy defined by Sukarno. Political
manoeuvre, however, continued, the only serious restriction being the need
to cloak political actions in the ideological terminology of the day. The
PKI, the army and therest of the players in Indonesian politics all operated
competently within this somewhat ritualistic framework. For the mass
of the Indonesian people, however, the absence of conventions of political
behaviour and the habit of paying lip service to the ideology of Guided
Democracy made political judgement difficult at a time when unprecedented
economic decay and naked political rivalry made such judgement imperative.
Indonesians scouring the political horizon for signs of the future or of
the real political agendas of the major contenders did so in vain. The
Indonesian public, therefore, was ready for an event which would, as it
were, show the political players in their true colours.
When the coup of 30 September 1965 took place, its organizers probably
saw it as no more than another innovative manoeuvre in the Jakarta political
game." Just how the Indonesian public viewed the initial pronouncements
of Untung's coup group is not clear, but within a few days message from
55 Just how innovative a move it was depends on whether one sees the events in question
as a strictly limited attempt to eliminate certain senior generals or as bolder grab for power.
This is not, however,- the place to consider the competing theories concerning the identity
and intentions of the coup planners. Crouch,Anny and politics, assesses a range of views.
J;itf6duction 29
fill public relations units was clear: the..events of 30 September had
~a pKJ-planned attempt to seize power and to overthrow the delicate
a ·.
:~ance of national politics.56 The coup itself was presented as definitive
\ence that the PKI had at last gone too far, but this message was rammed
:Cme by careful exploitation o~ the alleged circums~nce;; of t~e coup.
Indonesian politics had been vrrtually free of assassmatmns smce the
revolution, and little effort was needed to portray the ~g of the generals
a transgression even of the tolerant standards of Gmded Democracy.
~o this was added a carefully orchestrated campaign of disinformat~on
bout events at Halim airforce base on the night of the coup portraymg
~he party, which had previously enjoyed an enviable reputationf?r chastity
and incorruptibility, as a hotbed of immorality. After the amval of the
captured generals at Halim, it was widely rumoured, members of the left
wing women's organization GERWANI stripped and performed a lascivious
'Dance of the Fragrant Flowers' before an audience of PKI cadres and
airforce officers, culminating in the ritual mutilation of the generals, livin.g
and dead. The frenzied women allegedly gouged out the eyes of their
victimS, cut off their genitals and, after dumping the remains down a nearby
a well, abandoned themselves to an orgy with the watching officers a~d
cadres, Aidit himself awarding medals to the most depraved." Official
autopsies on the bodies of the generals, now published58, have shown
these stories to be fabrications. The killings were not an outraged response
to these specific 'events'; rather, in the highly charged atmosphere of the
time these 'revelations' were sufficient to make the party in general appear
to be a demonic force whose destruction would be a service to the nation.
People were willing to believe these stories not because they particularly
fitted with what was previously known about the PKI but because the crisis
of the age demanded a culprit. Once the PKI was identified as the guilty
party, no manoeuvring could save it.59
:56 See especially Paget, 'The Indonesian militruy and the burden of power', pp. 295-296.
57 Some of these details are recorded in Vittachi, The fall of Sukarno, pp. 79-80;
more lurid accounts, often presented as confessions by participants, began appearing in the
Indonesian press from mid-October 1965.
ss See Ben Anderson, 'How did the generals die?' Indonesia 43 (1987), 109-134.
59 This and the preceding paragraph draw substantially from ideas expressed by Ruth
Mcvey in her unpublished paper 'The great fear in Indonesia'.
 30 Robert Cribb
This argument helps to explain the frequency with which non-communists
described the killings as a kind of cleansing. It seems not improbable that
the killers allowed their depredations to-become all the more cataclysmic.
by comparing them to the Bharatayuddha, the final destructive battle of
the Mahabharata epic, which is the basis of Java's wayang kulit or shadow
puppet tradition.'° Another scholar has suggested intriguingly, though
without much elaboration, that the disfigurement of victims may have been
caused by a desire to make them formally imperfect and thus to disqualify
them from harmony with the universe and thus from obtaining cosmological .
power.61 Perhaps related is a story recently recounted by John Gittings ·
that the killers on Bali put whitewash into their victims' eyes so that 'the
eyes would not take their picture to the other world'.62 Those accounts
which deal with a significant number of specific killings - 'By the Banks .·
of the Brantas' and the account translated in this volume as 'Additional :
Data on Counter-Revolutionary Cruelty' - however, present a more complex
picture of gratuitous, rather than systematic, cruelty compounded by inexpen
techniques and a desire to make the bodies unrecognizable. The best known
case of mutilation is that of the PKI leader on Bali, I Gde Puger, a corpulent
man widely believed to have profited commercially from his close association
with the Balinese governor Suteja. Puger's punishment - to have the fat
cut from his body before he was shot in the head -was a matter of political
rather than spiritual symbolism.63 . Indonesian society is more violent than we first thought, however, is a
The fact that the killers frequently acted under the' banner of Islam is no barrier
to their having thought in terms of wayang stories; Resink cites no less an Islamic authority
than S.M Kartoouwir:yo. leader of the Darul Islam rebellion of 1948-1963, who wrote to Sukarno
in 1951 prophesying a Bharatayuddha. See Resink, 'From the old Mahabharata- to the new
Ramayana-Order', p. 214; Howard Palfrey Jones·, Indonesia: the possible dream (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), pp. 386-387.
61
Ronald Provencher, 'Cosmic revolutions: Indonesian perspectives of social upheaval',
in The rise and fall ofdemocracies in Third World societies (Studies in Third World Societies
pub. no 27, 1986).
62
John Gittings, 'The black hole of Bali', -Guardian Weekly 23 September 1'990, p.
22.
63
Sutton, ·~ndonesia's night of terror', p. 27. See also Moser, 'Where the rivers ran
crimson from butchety', -p. 26, for other incidents. It is hard to kn6w, of Course, whether
actions such as the beheading of victims were undertaken simply as a means of execution,
as a precaution to hamper the identification of bodies or for reasons of superstition. See,
for instance, 'By the banks of the Brantas', p. 89.
31
•-'fij;;Ouction
l.n,_,
;,;iit also seems likely that the killings drew on traditions of violence in
fudonesian society which are normally restrained or restricted by the forces
afilaw and order. In other words, whatever social disharmony may ~ave
:. ·ovoked the killings, once those on the left were marked out as victims,
f~e:\'iolence agains_t them ha_d a self-intensifying quality. A pr?bl~m here
: •.that the distracting paradigm of the peaceful Javanese, which IS often
~ated to become that of the peaceful Indonesian, still hovers over much
:vnting on Indonesia. This paradigm, created in colonial times and sustained
by popular reading of works such as Anderson's persuasive Mythology and
the tolerance of the Javanese64, sits so uncomfortably with the massacres
thllt it has inclined us to treat the massacres as an aberrant phenomenon,
the exceptional product of unpredictable and, one hopes, unrepeatable
circumstances and therefore having little to tell us about the true character
of.1ndonesian society. Anderson's main argument, however, was to propose
that wayang mythology gave Javanese a multitude of social role models
and made no suggestion thartolerance implied peaceableness. Indeed,
as·suggested above, the wayatzg tradition itself contains a strong element
of cataclysmic violence. There is, moreover, a host of circumstantial evidence,
trom the reputed violent traditions ofMadurese, Buginese and Makassarese
io the gory front page stories of the Jakarta popular daily Pos Kota which
imply a more .violent Indonesia than the stereotype. Suggesting that
good deal easier than suggesting a specific social location for that violence.
There are a few areas which we might fruitfully explore. One is the
place of men of violence in traditional Indonesian societies. It is becoming
clear that semi-criminal practitioners of violence have a long and deeply-
rooted history in Indonesian societies. They are by no means always
marginal figures, outlaws who simply plunder and rob where they can,
but often have close and complex relationships both with the power-holders
in society and with the oppressed. One of the characteristics of these
underworld figures has been a delight in gratuitous violence; at times such
61 Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, 1965. Anderson'sstudy
had the misfortune to appear just before the killings, which appeared to demolish any plausibility
in his argument that-the Javanese were especially tolerant. Anderson's point, however, was
that Javanese tolerance of different character traits was related tO their experience of similarly
varied character traits amongst figures in the wayang kulit stories. He did not suggest that
tolerance meant a peaceable dispositon; wayang kulif stories, after all, are peppered with
battles and brawls, and the Mahabharata itself concludes with the cataClysmic Bharatyudha.
Although one imagines that Anderson would have written somewhat differently a year lat~r,
his argument was not substantially rebutted by the killings.
32 Robert Cribb
as the arrival of the Japanese forces in 1942 or their departure in 1945>
these were people who killed wildly, confident that the chaos would permit
no retribution for their crimes. We find the same exultation in murde~
in Maskun Iskandar's Purwodadi 'James Bond' who was 'licensed to killed',
Gadjah Mada University's report on Klaten describes the PKI as working
both with and against local gangsters and it would be fascinating to know
whether and to what extent the violence of 1965-66 simply tapped the
violent potentials of gangsters on the other side. The Ansor and Tamin
gangs which were responsible for much killing in East Java and Bali
respectively bear some resemblance to the evanescent gangs which emerged
around politically conscious bandit leaders during the Indonesian national
revolution. Anecdotal evidence, including Bu Yeti's account in this volume,
suggests that a desire to seize property may have been a motive for at
least some of the violence; this was also the case in France's White Terror,
We are now accumulating a useful range of studies which deal directly
or tangentially with this social group" and during the next decade we
may be in a position to speak more generally about their contribution
to the violence of 1965-66. - suddenly breaks into indiscriminate, murderous violence which only ceases
The style of the 1965-66 killings also bears some resemblance to the
pemuda (youth) violence of the early revolution in 1945, when young
nationalists in collaboration with local underworld figures, launched a
campaign of terror against the Dutch who were attempting to return to
power on Java after World War II. As in 1965-66, this violence was partly
aimed at attrition of the enemy, but it aimed mainly to create an atmosphere .
This literature includes Sanono Kartodirdjo and Anton Lucas, 'Banditry-and IX>litical
change in Java', in Sartono Kartodirdjo, Modem Indonesia: tradition and transfonnation
(Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1984); J.R. Rush, 'Social control and influence
in nineteenth centuiy Indonesia: opium farms and the Chinese of Java', Indonesia 35 (1983),
pp. 53-64; Anton Lucas, 'Lenggaong, kyai, guru: three revolutionary biographies from North
Central Java' in Ron Hatley, et al., Other Javas: away from the: kraton (Clayton, Vic.: Monash
University, 1984); WJ. O'Malley,'Behind the mysterious killings: criminals, society, and
government in Indonesia', and R.B. Cribb, 'Her Majesty's Irregular Troops: a Jakarta gang
in the Indonesian independence struggle', inRJ. May,ed., Goons, raskolsandrebels: organized
non-stole violmce in Asia and the Pacific (Bathurs~ NSW: Crawford House Press, forthcoming);
and Robert Cribb, Gangsters and revolutionaries: the lakartaPeople's Militia and the Indonesian
revolution, 1945-1949 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1990).
33
efJhOrrifying menace which would cripple the ·adversaries' sense of
purpose."
;;·cA second dimension to explore is the extent to which the alleged
h~rmony of the traditional Indonesian village is based on social sanctions
whith could be enforced if necessary by communal violence. The collective
murder of thieves by villages is reported even today, and the West, from
lynch mobs to the recent retributions after the Romanian revolution, has
leilty of examples of its own. Violence of this kind may not represent
~,direct breaking down of the social order so much as a reaffirmation of
!l!)!lllllunity standards in the eyes of villagers.67
. Another suggestion has been that the killings were a kind of collective
rilnning amok (mengamuk).'" This idea, popular just after the killings,
does not match up to what we now know of amok as a psychological
phenomenon. Amok has two classical forms, individual and collective.
Jn-the individual form, a person facing ruin, shame or social humiliation
when he (the amokker is invariably male) is killed by appalled bystanders
ot·'by the forces of law and order. Collective amok is more calculated
and resembles the Viking berserkr: typically a group of soldiers adopts
violent frenzy against opposing troops as a military tactic in the face of
defeat or overwhelming odds. Both forms of amok involve the redemption
of honour by frenzied violence resulting in the death of the amokker. 69
There is little in the character of the 1965-66 killings which matches this
description; with their death lists and clandestine killing grounds, and with
.
. See P.M. van Wulfften Palthe, Psychological aspects of the Indonesian problem
(Leiden: Brill, 1949); and Benedict R.O'G. Anderson,lava in a time ofrevolution: occupation
and.resistance, 1944-1946 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972); and Cribb, Gangsters
(/!Id revolutionaries, chapter 5.
61
Something along these lines is argued in James T. Siegel, Solo in the New Order:
~age and hierarchy in an Indonesian city (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1987),
pp..40-52.
·.f' CLM. Penders, The life and times of Sukarno (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1974),
p;-·189; PaJmoo, 'Mas.sacre toll in Indonesia'; Sutton, 'Indonesia's night of terror', p. 28; Topping,
'Slaught~r of Reds', p. 16; Webb, Palms and the cross, p. 150.
~~'~· See John C. Spores, Running amok: an historical inquiry (Athens; Ohio: Ohio
University Center for International Studies, 1988). ·
 j!lilli 34
Robert Cribb
'
'I' ,I clearly no suicidal motive, the killers have little in common with the typical
amokker. Indeed, one would be more inclined to expect amok under these
.!I i
. '
. circumstances on the part of the communists, though there is no evidence
'I ·,,'
of this. 70
; 1· .'
Even this, however, fails to explain the meekness, mentioned above,
11 '
with which many victims seem to have gone to their deaths. Just how
,I , ' I
I Ii
i meek party members were is, like so much else, a matter of dispute, and
it may well be that isolated incidents of striking passivity have been taken :
I' 11
wrongly as the norm. Several studies here strongly qualify this image of
I .. meekness. We have not only the official view that the PKI was planning
a campaign of armed rebellion to follow up the coup of 30 September
in Jakarta, but a variety of anecdotes discussing PKI resistance."
Ii 1·
Newspaper accounts of the period give a somewhat similar picture, with
repeated reports of armed PKI movements in the countryside, though it i
'I·.
1.·:·· is doubtful whether these can be trusted as factual. Against this must:
I'
be placed the reported casualty figures for the RPKAD paracommandos ·
in their extensive operations in Central Java and Bali: a total of two."
The eventual complete failure of PKI resistance has led us perhaps to
underplay its extent in the first months after the coup, but even if we add
together all the scattered cases of resistance to the better known operations
in Blitar and West Kalimantan, we still do not come up with anything
approaching a period of civil war.
Some scholars have extended the wayang theme by explaining the
reported passivity of party members in the face of destruction by suggesting
that the PKI's place on the political left put it also on the symbolic left;
in the wayang kulit shadow puppet play, the left hand side of the screen
70
Gavi, Konterrevolution in lndonesien, p. 41, uSes the term amok to describe and
explain the apparent suicidal submission of the left, but without accompanying violence it
is hard to accept this categorization. Topping, 'Slaughter of Reds', p.16, is one or'the few
to report cases of suicide by PKI members. p2141Y
71
See also the fictional account of PK.I military operations in Umar Kayam, 'Bawuk',
translated by John H. McGlynn, in William H. Frederick and John H. McGlynn, eds, Reflection
on rebellion: stories from the Indonesian upheavals of 1948 and 1965 (Athens, Ohio: Ohio
University Center for International Studies, 1983), pp. 116-119.
72
Gavi,KDnJerreVO!utionin Indonesien, p. 35. Another report states that fifteen members
of the Muslim youth group Ansor died in clashes in Kediri. See Topping, 'Slaughter of Reds
gives Indonesia a grim legacy', p. 16.
35
Witroduction
·s·occupied by the Kurawa, who are allegedly morally wrong and destined
:!J'lose, salah dan kalah, in the drawn-out struggle with their Pandawa
cousins. As good Javanese, so the argument goes, the communists merely
submitted to the fate marked out for them. since the beginning oftime. 73
Although the PKI certainly used wayangmetaphor to understand its place
in the.world far more than one would expect of a Marxist party74, any ·
argnment along these lines needs to take account of the far more subtle
notions of good and bad, and left and right, in the wayang, whose message
stresses duty in the face of moral ambiguity, rather than clear-cut moral
polarities." In the absence of detailed accounts of the killings we are
never likely to find out.
Tue problem of PKI passivity is complicated by its relationship to the
question of guilt. .Some observers have argued that passivity implied
acknowledgment of guilt, and have suggested that meekness in the face
ofdestruction was the party's admission that it had erred. The party, of
ceµrse, was neatly pinned in a no-win situation by this kind of argument:
if'it .did not fight, it acknowledged its guilt, if it did fight, then its guilt
.was proven. Passivity is so frequently reported in stories of the Indonesian
massacres that it probably was indeed the typical response of victims, but
th~ most plausible explanation is that the victims were paralysed by that
combination of uncertainty and vague hope which makes acquiescence
right until the very last mome!)t always seem wiser than resistance.
Questions of guilt, in fact, were much more of an issue for the killers.
Wholesale killing required justification, hence the eagerness with which
people accepted stories of death lists, holes dug by PKI members for the
bodies of their intended victims and the whole panoply of PKI demonic
activities, in which simple tools such as rubber tapping implements could
become cunningly disguised eye-gougers. Hence, too, the emphasis on
documentary proof of involvement in the coup in the army's 'Crushing
the G30S/PKI in Central Java'. Part of the motive for the killings, however,
Legge, Sukarno, pp. 398-399 and Resink, 'From the Old Mahabharata- to the New
Ramayana-Order', p. _220.
" See Ruth T. McVey, 'Thewayangcontroversy in Indonesian communism', in Mark
Hobart and Robert H. Taylor, eds, Context, meaning and power in Southeast Asia (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1986), pp. 21-51. As McVey points out,
moreover, the PKI Politburo identified itself overtly with the Pandawa, not the Kurawa.
1S
Anderson, Myrholog; and the tolerance of the Javanese, pp. 4-27.
 38 Robert Cribb /ntro:duction 37

1I was also to create guilt. Although Indonesian politics under Guided

I ',I Democracy had been polarized between the PKI and its opponents, political
I
. . .r
,, I'
uncertainty and the discontinuities between rhetoric and reality had Ieu'
many people to equivocate, to avoid doing anything to cut their links
II I'11,.'!,I'
1··1' '·: irrevocably with either side. This was good political sense: Indonesian
I 'I' ' politics is unforgiving; those who choose the wrong side are seldom
permitted to return, and each major showdown in Indonesian politics .
'''ill I
11.'
I 1
the Madiun Affair, Dutch-sponsored federalism, the PRRI-Permesta revolt.
I I'
11
had seen capable and patriotic individuals, great and small, excluded from
'· ·.I ' the nation's political life. In 1965, the army was determined to force another
such parting of the ways, not only to remove its rivals but to force
commitment on the uncommitted. Although confident within days that
1I ,i ![,i' the Gestapu coup i!Self had been crushed, General Suharto and those
close to him remained deeply uncertain about which people in the armed
, 1·';•·.
I
forces and bureaucracy could be relied upon. Encouraging as wi~e as
possible participation iri the massacres was a way of creating complicity,
I ',
a way of committing fence-sitters to the victory of the anti-communist
forces. The ·more hands which were bloodied by the suppression of
communism, the more hands which could be depended upon to stand firm
against any future PKI resurgence and depended upon not to tum and
point in accusation against those who sponsored the massacres. The killing
which took place within families seems to have had the deliberate futention
of placing blood-guilt on those otherwise most likely to seek revenge." How to gouge an eye: a demonstration by a captured n:iember of the Pemuda Rakyat

As Michael van Langenberg points out, too, the extent of the killings
soon became an element in the army's case for a drastic restructuring of
the Indonesian political order. Suharto and those close to him realized
very soon after the coup that an opportunity had arisen not simply to
eliminate the PKI and to seize power butto restructure Indonesian politics
so that a political order such as Guided Democracy need never emerge
again. The exact nature of the army's new order was not determined until
later - indeed it is still being adjusted - but a compelling case for a clear
and definitive break with the past was required. The killings served this
army purpose by placfug clearly on the historical record just what a disaster
it was for Indonesia to dabble in liberal democracy and leftist politics.
Constructing a memory to uphold a New Order, thus, was an important
army motive.

"' Sutton, 'Indonesia's night of terror', p. 27; Moser, 'Where the rivers ran crimson
from butchery', p. 28.
38 Robert Cribb
Consequences of the massacres
What is the place of the massacres in contemporary Indonesian politics?
Did the efficacy of the killings, for instance, help to establish violence.
both remembered and continuing - as an effective tool of policy under
the New Order? Although a literature on structural violence in Indonesia·
does exist, and is summed up by such titles as Ten Years' Military Terror'
and Indonesia: Law, Propaganda and Terror, much political analysis of'
modern Indonesia downplays the structural role of violence, arguing that
the ~ajority of brutal incidents are gratuitous and politically unnecessary.
In thIS respect, however, the so-called petros killings (from penembakan
misterius, mysterious shootings) of 1983 and after may have exercised a
profound academic influence. These killings were, initially at least, a
~esponse to sh~rply rising criminality in the cities of Java. They began,
m Yogyakarta m early 1983 and spread from there to most regions of the!
archipelago. The victinIS, on the whole, were known criminals or former
criminals whose names appeared on an official black list and who were
hunted down by murder squads clearly composed of military personnel."
~e campaign l~ter extended to the carefully staged shooting of escaped
pnsoners. Estimates of the number of victims in this campaign vary
substantially, but it seems likely that several thousand were killed.
Systematic terror of this kind seemed at first to be a new phenomenon
in Indonesian history, but as scholars have probed the origins and style
of the petrus killings more closely, some have come to link them with
other cases of state violence, including the Gestapu killings. 78 Much of
the work in this direction, however, is still in preparation or has only just
been published, and we cannot yet say just how it will influence the study
of Indonesia in general.
Another reason, of course, why we study. mass killings is for their
psychological effect on the survivors. There is little doubt that most Jews
feel themselves to be in some way or other survivors of the Holocaust,
71
_For detailed accounts of these killings, see Justus·M. van der Kroef, ,• 11Petrus":
patterns of prophylactic murder iI.I lndonesia',Asian Survey 25, 7 (1985), 745-59; William
J. O'Malley, 'Behind the mysterious killings'; and David Bourchier, 'Law, cdme and state
a~thority in Indonesia', in Arief Budiman, ed., State and civil society in JndOnesia (Clayton,
Vic.: Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies Monograph Series, 1990).
78
See, for instance, Justus M. van der Kroef. 'Indonesia: prophylactic murder and
the legacy of Gestapo', SolidariJy, 5 no 99 (1984), pp. 16-22
39
tntrciduction
·ust as probably a majority of Cambodians feel themselves to be survivors
~f;Pol Pot and that this sense of survival has enormous effect on politics
·n·both Israel and Cambodia. Biting uncertainty as the killings went on,
:he Joss of family members, often without sure knowledge of their fate
or.burial place, and the sight of violence and of corpses79 must all have
had a psychological effect on those involved, who will have included small
children now grown to adulthood. Webb cites the storyofa child suffering
years of vivid nightmares after seeing his father hacked to death by
neighbours80; both Kenneth Orr and Maskun Iskandar hint at similar
cases of trauma. Just how this trauma, however, may have influenced
Indonesian society is not clear. Commentators at the time predicted that
aceumulated blood debts would see a further explosion of mass violence";
this has not happened. And although the killings soon produced the crop
cif short stories translated by Harry Aveling as Gestapu, only in recent
y~ars, as Keith Fo~lcher explains,. have the killings re-entered Indonesian
Jiierature as a topic for explorat1on.82
Perhaps much of the trauma which the events of 1965-66 inflicted on
.indonesian society was channelled into the wave of religious conversion
which followed them. In the six years intmediately after the killings, an
estimated 2.8 million people converted to Christianity (both Protestantism
'19 For mention of the public display of corpses and severed heads, see King, 'The
great purge in Indonesia', pp. 25, 891 and Turner, 'Indonesian killings may exceed 300 1000',
p.12.
80 Webb, Palms and the cross, p. 155.
81 Sutton, 'Indonesia's. night of terror', p. 27; Moser, 'Where the rivers ran crimson
from butchery', pp.26,81; Topping, 'Slaughter of Reds', p.1; Contenay, 'Another bloodbath?',
p.357.
Mention of the killings in literature by non-Indonesians is sparse, but see Ian Stewart,
DetulJine in Jakmta (New Yorlc Paul HamlyD, 1981) and a poem by AD. Oegg called 'Indonesia
October 1965 ·February 1966', published inApi Pemuda Indanesia (Tirana) 8 no. 1 (1975),
p. 30. Something of the tone of the latter can be gleaned from the following stanza:
The Communists, caught by surprise,
were seized and bound and hacked to death
and to have been the friend of one
guaranteed you your last breath.
 40 Robert Cribo
and Catholicism83), predominantly in Java,. Timar and North Sumatra.~
Significant numbers on Java convened to Hinduism during the same
period." The reasons for these conversions are complex. Since 1966,
the New Order government has insisted that all Indonesians must believe
in God and adhere to a religion, so that they cannot subscribeto atheism
which is seen as linked to communism. Some conversions, therefore, were
undoubtedly proforma registrations. Since the Christian churches before
1965, moreover, were an object of suspicion because of the Western
connections, their conversion figures may also have included something
I I of a pre-coup backlog of unannounced conversion.
The scale of conversion, however, suggests that the political trauma
of 1965 shook many people loose from their previously held values and
world views, making them receptive to new messages and new spirituaJ,
solutions. Christianity was especially well-placed to benefit from this shakingj
loose because, unlike Islam, it had remained relatively aloof from the'
political confrontation before 1965 and from the killings themselves,,
although as Kenneth Orr and the Gadjah Mada team report Christians
were involved in the killings in some regions. Far more than Islam, too,
the Christian churches carried out energetic pastoral work amongst prisoners,
their families and remnants of the Left in general. As Bu Yeti's
reminiscences reveal, this work, disregarding the official ostracism of the
Left, won Christianity much respect amongst groups who would previously
have had little time for it.86 In the case of Hinduism, the appeal of a
return to Java's pre-Islamic beliefs as part of a search for stability was
probably important; Hinduism also attracted those politically committed
to resisting the expansion of Muslim political influence.
83
Following Dutch usage, Indonesian resetves the term Kristen (Dutch Christelijk)
for Protestantism and has no generally accepted term for Christianity as a whole, hence the
need for specifying both main branches of Christianity.
8
" AveryT. Willis, Jr,Indonesian revival: wlo/ two million came to Christ (South ~asadena,
Cal.: William Carey Library, 1977). See also Frank L. Cooley, Indonesia: church and society
(New York: Friendship Press, 1968), pp. 6~7, 90.
85
M.L. Lyon, 'The Hindu revival in Java: politics and religious identity', in JJ. Fox,
ed., Indonesia: the making ofa culture (Canberra: Australian National University, 1980), pp.
205-220.
86 See Willis, Indonesian revival, and Webb, 'The sickJe and the cross',
41
il1f!PducUon
,, ,,.To.judge the effects of survival on _rnd~nesia, howe~e~, we need also
· make sense of the figures. To begtn with, many millions of people,
to, t,half or more of the population which was anti-communist87, were
tha er at any risk of being killed in 1%5-66, at least not by those who were
:ng alleged communists. Just as a majority of the population in Western
countries treated AIDS with equanimity when the disease appeared only
·attack homosexuals and intravenous drug-users, the large number of
~donesians who were never threatened by the 1965-66 killings, and their
descendants, may ~e psychologi'.2lly u~affected by them no':". Th~ ~Kl
!aimed three million members, its affiliate the BTI around eight llllll10n,
c ther mass organizations perhaps another twelve million.88 Did all these
~illions feel themselves to have been survivors when the wave of killings
had finally abated? The answer is probably that they did not. First, of
c0urse, a figure of twenty-three million produced by adding these
memberships is almost cenainly an over-estimate. A great many party
members were also members of affiliated organizations, and a figure of
twenty-three million must include a good deal of double counting.
Indonesian political. parties, moreover, have always counted generously
when assessing their own membership and the PK! never had any reason
to downplay its public support. This is perhaps even more true of the
BTI, whose dispersed rural constituency must have been harder to marshal.
Although anyone with links to the left was at some risk, this risk was by
no means evenly spread. Party leaders and senior cadres, together with
leftist government officials and military officers, were at far greater risk
than, say, peasants who happened to be members of the BTI.
KOPKAMTIB's own estimate - which is hardly likely to be conservative -
was that there were around 300,000 PK! cadres in 1965, together with
well under two million pany members with a significant degree of training
and involvement in pany affairs.89 These people were the prime target
of the killers and although thousands of others outside this category cenainly
perished as well, those who were not in the main target group must have
felt themselves, correctly, less at risk.
81
I suggest this figure on the debatable basis that the PKI might have obtained close
to a majority of the vote had free elections been held in Indonesia in 1964/65. Certainly,
PKI support was never more than 50% nationwide.
88
The women's organization Gerwani alone claimed nine million members in 1961.
89 Polomka, Indonesia since Sukarno, p. 161.
42 Robert Cribb
This fact that those conscious of being survivors of the massacres in
Indonesia were a relatively small proportion of society as a whole, in i::ontrast
with Cambodia or the Jews of Central Europe, means that the role o1
survivors and their families in shaping Indonesian consciousness is likely
to be far smaller than in Cambodia or Israel Perhaps even more importan~
however, is the fate of those survivors. People in huge numbers were
detained but not killed after the Gestapu affair. Just how many these
were is as uncertain as the number of deaths. In the 1970s, official figure.r
for the total number ever detained ranged from 600,000 to 750,000";
Amnesty International put the figure at 'about one million'." More
recently, the Indonesian government has suggested that 1.5 to 1.7 million
former prisoners are 'at large' in society, but it is hard to know whether
this is part of an attempt to keep the issue of a 'communist threat' alive.~
Whatever the total, only a small number remain in jail, but many hundred$
of thousands of people spent months or years behind barbed wire because
of their alleged involvement in the 30 September Movement. Amongst.
these were a good number of pathetic victims, detained by accident or
out of malice although they had absolutely no connection with the PKL
A large majority of those held, however, were 'guilty' in the New Order's•
flexible sense of the term, that is they were recognizable members of the
broad left before 1965, the category that was in danger of being killed
all over Indonesia in 1965-66. The conditions that these prisoners were
90
Justus M. van der Kroef, 'Indonesia's political prisoners', Pacific Affairs, 49 no_
4 (1976-77), pp. 625-647; Hamish McDonald,Suharw~ Indonesia (Blackburn, Vic.: Fontana,·;
1980), p. 216.
91
Indonesia:anAmnes.tylntemationalreport(London:Amnestylntecnational, 1911),
pp. 23, 41-44. A significant but unknown number died while in detention, either formally
executed or from deliberate maltreatment or neglect or from natural causes.
92
Government figures vary considerably. In 1981, officials gave a figure of 1,580,020
former prisoners, of whom 42,084 were said to be disqualified from voting in the coming
election. This figure was repeated in. 1985, with some suggestion ~hat it might rise to 1.7
million. In 1990, the news magazine Tempo referred to 1.43-million former,prisoners, while
the Dutch journal Indonesii, Feiten en Meningen cited the army commander Try Sutrisno ·~
as saying that the total number was 1.8 million. See 'Korting hak pilih', Tempo 12December ;
1981, p. 14; 'Pendataan ulang bekas tahanan G30S/PKI selesai akhir 1985', Kompas 8 June
1985, p. 1; 'Pemilih baru Pemilu', Tempo 17 February 1990, p. 24; 'Geen stemrecht voor ,
ex-tapols', Indonesii, Feiten en Meningen 15 no. 3 (April 1990), p. 20..
/ntroducUon 43
Id under have been well documented" as have the various social
~~ bilities imposed on former prisoners after their return to society."
~sa
0
such people, the burdens of imprisonment and discrimination probably
jj ~ a much more important part of their consciousness than the relatively
bo ·ef risk of being killed in the massacres of 1965-66. Bu Yeti's story,
t ~nslated in this volume, supports this conclusion, her chief bitterness
;eing against those who made her life hard drudgery after the coup.95
Something different must apply to those who escaped death and detention
by going underground. For such people, changing their names and
appearance, calling clandestinely on circles of friends, often spending long
eriods as gelandangan (wandering, homeless people), risk more than
;uffering must have been the dominant feature of their lives after 1965.
we catch a glimpse of life on the run in Ibu Marni's 'I am a leaf in the
storm' and in Umar Kayam's short story 'Bawuk'96, but no more than
8 glimpse. We need many more such stories before we know what the
fate of Ibu Marni and of so many other victims means for modern Indonesia.
9J See, for instance, McDonald, Suhtuto~ Indonesia, pp. 216-231; May, The Indn=ian
tragedy, pp. 27-40; Indonesia: an Amnesty International report and the British campaigning
magazine Tapol.
94 These include restrictions on the kind of job they may bold, disqualification in
some cases from voting in general elCctions, limits on freedom to travel and having th.e letters
'ET' (des tahanan, ex-prisoner) marked on their identity cards.
9S For another prisoner's personal account, see Pandu Nusa, 'The path of suffering:
the report of a political prisoner on his journey through various prison camps in Indonesia',
liulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 19 no. 1 (1987), pp. 15-23.
'I am a leaf in the storm', translated by Anton Lucas, Indone.sia 41(April1989),
pp. 49-60; Umar Kayam, 'Bawuk', in Frederick and McGlynn, Reflection on rebellion, pp.
'~ 106·129.
. ) •'

Chapter 2
GESTAPU AND STATE POWER IN INDONESIA

Michael van Langenberg

The usual historical image of the establishment of Indonesia's 'New

order' (Orde Baru) and Suharto's rise to political power is one of gradual,
'slow but sure'1 progress. But, in fact, the political process which actually
replaced the 'Old' order of Guided Democracy with the 'New' had been
carried out effectively within six months of the outbreak of the so-called
Gestapu affair of 30 September/1 October 1965. The basic power structure
of the New Order state was put in place between 1 October 1965 and
mid,March 1966. This was possible principally because the violence of
mass killings in late 1965 permitted the speedy elimination of political
opponents and the restoration of order upon which future hegemony could
be built.

The Gestapu affair erupted on the night of 30 September 1965 with

the abduction and murder of six senior members of the military high
command and an adjutant to the Defence Minister. This was ostensibly
part of an attempted transfer of state power to a Revolutionary Council
(Dewan Revolusi), appointed by a '30 September Movement' (Gerakan
30 September).2 In fewer than twenty-four hours, however, the attempted
seizure of power had been crushed by military forces led by the commander
of the Army's Strategic Command (KOSTRAD), Major-General Suharto.

Harold Crouch, The anny and politics in lndcnesia (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press 1978), p. 347.

2
See 'Statement of the September 30th Movement', Indonesia 1 (April 1966), .
pp. 133-135.
 46 Michael van Langen be~ ,- ~G'SStaPU and State Power 47

The Suharto-led military command did not merely crush the attempt~ ji\\a'massacre of PKI supporters. On 17 October Suharto, in an instruction
'coup', but also set about seizing political power.3 The defeated Moveme Ji!\'li.ll army personnel, declared the PKI_t_o:,b~ '.lr~itorous' and announced
was dubbed with the acronym Gestapu (for Gerakan September Tiga Puiu~ '!W.if 1 October, the day on which the 30 September Movement had been
Movement of September 30), a term allegedly coined by the director
01 ' ?$Shed, would henceforth be celebrated as Sacred Pancasila Memorial
the arm~ forces newsp_aper ~gkat~n Ber~endjata, Brigadier-Generai ffi'y
(Hari Peringatan Pancasila Sakti).'.
Sugandhi, presumably with the mtentmn of mvesting it with the aura I
evil associated wi_th the term 'Gestapo'.' On 2 October 1965, the arm;;i ;;;,Within days of the failure of the 30 September Movement, the
Supreme Operatmnal Command (Komando Operasi Tertinggi KOTJf -.:\:inunanders of the army's strategic reserve, KOSTRAD, and of the
established an Action Front to Crush the Gestapu (KAP (Koma~do Aks' -~a\'acommando unit RPKAD, together with their allies embarked on a
Pengganyangan]-Gestapu), an alliance of militant young anti-communis: 'd~h"Qerate campaign to promote a climate of fear and retribution. A crucial
leaders in Jakarta. In the meantime, the corpses of the seven murder~· fi~[nent was a propaganda campaign, especially during October and
o~~rs were recovered from a well in the Lubang Buaya (Crocodile Hole)! :N'il~.ember, aimed at creating popular fear and loathing of the PKI and
di:stnct at the Halim Perdanakusumah Air Force base outside Jakarta' i~ supporters.• Photographs of the grisly exhumation of the bodies of
~1ve days after the recovery of the bodies, KAP-Gestapu held a mass rait die.seven slain officers were displayed prominently in most of the print
m Jaka~a which cl~maxed with an attack on the headquarters of lhj .ro,;;dia. These were accompanied by lurid accounts of the murdered officers
Indonesran Commumst Party (PKI). The building was ransacked and burne<i i{if~g been sexually assaulted and mutilated by members of the PKI
In th~ next few days, an Operational Command for the Restoration of ~omen's movement, Gerwani. 7
The murder of General Nasution's infant
Secunty and Order (Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan ~ii~ghter, fatally wounded in the course of the attempt to abduct Nasution
~ete~tiban, KOPKAMTIB) was formed under Suharto's command to :filfuself on 30 September, was publicized to its maximum tragic extent.
1dent1fy, arrest and investigate all those responsible for and involved in flle state funerals of the seven slain officers and of Nasution's young
the 30 September Movement. KOPKAMTIB's powers were undefined daughter were held with pomp and ceremony, and wide media exposure.
?t~e~ than to '~estore ord~r and s~curity', and effectively unlimited by an; Tue populace was urged to have little mercy on the perpetrators of the
Jund1cal restramt. Almost immediately afterwards, in the province of Aceh, .O~tapu affair who were principally identified as being the PKI. They
troops from the regional military command joined militant Islamic youth -~re publicly vilified as 'traitors' (pengkhianat), 'devils' (setan ),
c)lild-murderers and sexually dissolute women. Published reports and
rumours spread widely that the nation had only just escaped a massive
p.urge of anti-communists, planned by thePKI, in the wake of the Gestapu.
3
For details of the events below, see ibitl:, chapter 5. There is now a substantial :From the popular media, from military commanders and from
bodyof li~eratui: ~ining the events of ~estapu and its aftermath, as well as hypothesizing -~n.ti-communist political leaders, the crushing of the 'Gestapu/PKI'
about which pol~tical forc:es were responsible. I have identified 232 sources dealing with
the Gestapu affair. See Michael van Langenberg (romp.),Bibliography ofIndonesian politics
and the economy since 1965 (Sydney: Univer.;ity of Sydney, Research Institute for Asia and
the Pacific, 1988). Surveys of some of the writing about Gestapo are given in: Harold Crouch,
'Another look at the Indonesian "coup"', Indonesia 15 (April 1973), pp. 1-20; Jusius van der See'Surat-KeputusanNomor:Kep-977J9/1966Menteri/PanglimaAngkatanDarat'
Kroef, 'Interpretations of the 1965 Indonesian coup: a review of the literature',PacificA!fairs .i-~ Hakekat Pembangunan
Monwnen Pancasila Sakti (Jakarta: Departemen Pendidi.kan dan
43 no 4 (1971), pp. 557-577, and 'Origin of the 1965 coup in Indonesia: probabilities and Jcebudayaan, DirektoratJenderal Kebudayaan, Panitia Harl Peringatan Kesaktian Pancasila
alternatives', Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 3 no 2 (1972), pp. 277-298; ·Donald E. Tahun 1982, 1982), pp. 12-13.
Weatherbee, 'Interpretations of 11Gestapu 11 the1965 Indonesian coup', WorldAffairs 132 no
4 (1970), pp. 308-316; and W.F. Wertheim, 'Whose plot? - new light on ,the 1965 events', 6 Julie Southwood and Patrick Flanagan, Indonesia: law, propaganda and len'Or (London:
Journal of Contemporary Asia 9 no 2 (1979), pp. 197-215. · · · Zed Press, 1983), pp. 66-71.

lnd~nesian citation of dates normally follows the day/montWyear format, rather

4 7 Official autopsy repons on the bodies of the murdered generals do not appear
than th_e Amencan month/day/year. Since the 1970s, however, the term Gestapu has largely to support the propaganda campaign alleging that they bad been mutilated. See Benedict
been dISplaced by G30S. Anderson, 'How did the ge~erals die?', Indonesia 43 (April 1987), pp. 109-134.

, ,s~al units and others from the regional military command promoted
· ~~-hysterical anti-Communist pogrom'9, thousands of vigilante groups,
One of the generals' bodies, shortly after exhumation. After three days in the well atlubang
Buaya, the bodies had begun to decay, and the resulting disfiguration gave rise to wild
rumours that the generals had been tortured before death.
49
: .ged on with the urgency of 'kill or be killed'.8 The 'kill or be killed'
phere was heightened soon after Gestapu by the appearance in virtually
egions where mass killings later occurred, of alleged death lists,
rted to have been drawn up by the PKI in preparation for a post-coup
·nation of anti-communists.
the second half of October 1%5, groups of anti-communist youth
• ntral and East Java, mostly belonging to Islamic and Christian
·· ruzations, began mass killings of alleged PKI sympathisers.
ultaneously, RPKAD units began moving through Central Java, with
·. ctions from Jakarta to restore order and crush the remnants of the
.· ptember Movement. The Movement as such no longer had organized
but its remnants were identified as being members and alleged
'
~pathisers of the PKI. In Java the RPKAD armed and trained
fn!il:gimmunist youth groups for the specific purpose of crushing the PK!.
Similar activity was under way in northern Sumatra, where KOSTRAD
.,,,
tifd.rsupported the mass killing of PKI sympathisers by local anti-communist
f
);!>pth.
\:Jnder army supervision, and with army participation, large-scale
m~sacres took place in Central and East Java, Bali and northern Sumatra.
©~~ interests, religious fervour, communal hatreds, deep ideological
~erences were all mobilized in the anti-communist violence. In a
sii~ported by local military units and frequently directed by military
li!imanders, spread through the regions, killing or arresting alleged PKI
/;gpathisers. 10 Tens of thousands were placed under military detention.
C.PKI, which in early 1%5 had claimed some three million party members
~" See the coverage in any of the Jakarta daily media during October and November
~~.·Also, John Hughes, The end of Sulcamo (London: Angus & Robertson, 1968) ..Among
th~i.riimediate post-coup publications in Indonesia which illustrate this prevailingatmosphere
ar:e: Dhannawan Tjondronegoro, Ledakan fitnah subversi G-30-S (Jakarta: Matoa, 1965)i
alJCI Susilomurti and S. Etjip, Teror subuh: falaa1alaa penghianatan G30S/PKI (Jakarta: Jajasan
Dharma Sedjahtera, 1966).
9
Justus M. van der Kroef, 'Indonesia: -the Battle of the ttQld" and the "New Order111 ,
Australian Outlook 21 (April 1967), p. 19.
10
Crouch,Anny and politics, pp. 142-155 and Hughes, End of Sukarno, pp. 119-196.
50 57

with another fifteen million in affiliated organizations, was destroyed~ ·: thS 11 Tue main institutional instrument for the exercise of state
a political force. . :rrnon · . .
, '··, wer on behalf of the new regime, the KOPKAMTIB, was m place. The
!1'0nsolidation of power now demanded a restoration of order. The military
::gh command moved .t? bring t?e mass vi?lence to ~ end, restraining
, '"gilante. actions by militant anti-commurust groups. KOPKAMTIB,
;VI
88
an intelligence and security command network extending from Subarto,
, ,coromander, down to local military commanders at village level, was
·:iJjzed for this purpose. All military commanders within the national
territorial military command structure were made responsible for carrying
out the KOPKAMTIB tasks of intelligence and internal security. In
particular, KOPKAMTIB was made responsible for purging the civil service
ofpersons alleged to have been involved in the 30 September Movement."
Suharto, the KOPKAMTIB commander, was promoted to Minister/Army
6;inmander. On 6 December, a presidential decision expanded
---~--.:..... .. 'k6PKAMTIB activities to 'restore the authority of the Government by
li\ieans of physical-military and mental operations'. 14 The Army general
istaffwas made the staff command for KOPKAMTIB, with power to co-opt
i$5Sistance from the navy, air force and police. Special operations by
IK©PKAMTIB could, in addition, draw on the resources of all government
{departments, as required. Finally, all military units in the country, from
ithe inter-regional and provincial commands down to village level, were
imade operational units of KOPKAMTIB.
*·
iF, 11 Published estimates on the total number of persons murdered in the massacres
J~i;ige from eighty thousand to one million. There would be a wide consensus today among
.scholars of the period that a quarter of a million is a consexvative estimate of the number
~~f~ctims. It was most likely considerably more.
,ff'

12 Regular killings continued, however, in some areas, notably Bali, throughout

December. While in Central Java and Bali during Januacy 19661 I knew of summacy executions
of 'PKI' detainees still being carried out by squads of vigilante youth and soldiers.

. 13 See 'lnstruksi Presiden R.I. No.22/KOTl/1965 Tgl.15Nopember1965 Ttg. Dasar2

Cartoon from the Muslim newspaper Duta Masyarakat of 19 October 1965, showin{i th11·
PK/ and its affiliated organizations lapping up th~ blood of the murdered generals. ·
By early December, the bloodbath, having claimed at least a quarter
of a million victims, began to lose the 'momentum' of the previous two
Kebijaksanaan Penertiban/Pembe"rsihan Personil Sipil dari Kompartimen2, Departemen2
clan Badan2 lainnya dlm Aparatur Pemerintah' - signed by Suharto, as Operational Commander
for Restoration of Security and Order, on behalf of President Sukarno; text in Himpunan
ketentuan komando operasi pemulihan keamanan clan ketertiban tenlang screening personil
dari tahun 1965s/d1985 (Jakarta: Departemen Pekerjaan Umum, 1985), pp. 1-6.
u 'Keputusan Presiden/Panglima Tertinggi Angkatan Bersendjata Republik
lndonesia/Panglima Besar Komando Operasi Tertinggi No. 179/KOTl/1965'; text in
KOPKAMTIB,Himpunansura1-sura1keputusanlperintahjangberhubungandenganKopkamtib
1965s/d1969 (Jakarta: Sekretariat Kopkamtib, n.d.), pp. 86-89.
52 Michael van Langenbe.
(g
Between December 1965 and March 1966 the state's management
violence shifted from military-promoted killings at the local level to m~o
more centrally-directed arrests and detention of Old Order remnants, carri:
out through the KOPKAMTIB apparatus. At the same time, the transre
of state power was completed. In March 1966, President Sukarno ~
compelled to sign the now famous Instruction of 11 March (Surat Perinta
Sebelas Maret) or Supersemar, empowering Suharto, newly appointel!
as Minister/Army Commander, to:
Take all measures considered necessary to ensure peace
and order and stability of the Revolution... in the interests
of the Nation and State of the Republic oflndonesia ....1'
This acknowledge_<! t~~ effective oontrol of state power was in the hand!
of Suh~rto and his military command. The next day, Suharto issued a
decre~ m th": name of the President declaring the PKI illegal, and ordering
the d1ssolut1on of the party and all its affiliated organizations. 16
Within a week of Supersemar, on Suharto's orders, fifteen ministers
were removed from Sukarno's presidential Cabinet. T\velve of the
including two of the four deputy prime ministers, were placed under arrest
by ~OP~. In the next few weeks further purges took place. More
cabmet m1msters were removed. PKI and Sukarnoist sympathisers in the
state bureaucracy were purged. Over three hundred Air Force officers
were arrested. Purges were extended rapidly to the other armed services
and the police. In June 1966 the new military command convened a session
of the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Perrnusyawaratan
Ra~at Sementara, MPRS), purged of its PKI members and their supporters
This New Order MPRS endorsed the legality of the Supersemar17 and
15
'Surat Perintah 11 Maret' (clause III/I), Orde Bam (Jakarta: Biro Informasi dan
Data, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1985), p. 1.
16
• 'Keputusan Presiden/Panglima Tertinggi Angkatan Bersendjata ·. Republik
!ndones1a/Mandatari~ MPRS/Pemimpin Besar Revolusi No.1/3/1966 (12 March 1966)'; text
m KOPKAMTIB, Hunpunan surat-surat, pp. 102-3. For an Indonesian ,~retrospective' to
commemorate the 20th anniversary of the events of 11 March 1966, see Tempo 15 March
1986, pp. 12-20. For a detailed account of the events surrounding Supersemar see Crouch
Anny and politics, chapter 7. ' '
17 Kele!apan MPRS No. IX/MPRS/1966.
53
>iically curtailed Sukarno's powers as president, including rescinding
ppaintment as president-for-life. 18
\'e power of the New Order state was consolidated and expanded
the next five years. By the middle of 1966, state power was effectively
,. tb,e hands of a new military-dominated oligarchy, headed by General
" ~i;to. Nine months later, by the end of March 1967, virtually the entire
5fai~apparatus
-!;.
(civilian an~ mi~itary), purged of 'Old Ordc::r' eleme~ts,
under the control of thJS ohgarchy. Suharto was appomted Actmg
·. i[e_;ident by the MPRS. Several senior members of the former regime
~;e put on trial for treason, and convicted. These included Dr Subandrio
(!fust Deputy Prime Minister), Jusuf Muda Dalam (minister for central
6!~king), and Omar Dhani (air force commander). Drastic changes in
;;nomic policy were under way. 19 The army swiftly completed the
;dOi{ulation and issue of a long-standing doctrine asserting its permanent
i6\e.in Indonesian social-political life."' The command structure of the
J;med forces was re-organized, centralized, and brought under Suharto's
. 'a~tbority. Construction was begun of a new state-controlled, 'non-party',
ii<!Uiical organization. The nucleus for this was the army-sponsored Joint
Secretariat of Functional Groups (Sekber Golkar) which had been set
;pin 1964, as an anti-communist popular front, to coordinate anti-PK!
organizations within the National Front (Front Nasional).21 In 1969,
the implementation of the first Five Year Development Plan (Rencana
pembangunan Lima Tahun, Repelita), saw a major program of state-directed
economic reconstruction under way. Within a further three years, following
acsuccessfully managed general election, state power was considerably more
eentralized and more functionally effective over the civil society at large
than at any time since 1942.
Before Gestapu, a dominating feature in the history both of Indonesian
nationalism and of the Indonesian national polity had been the defining
18 See Crouch1 Anny and politics, pp. 197-202 and Strategi. dasar era pembangunan
25 tohun (Bandung: C.V. Sumadjaja, 1973), pp. 22-24. '
19 For details of the events between June 1966 and March 1967, see Crouch,Anny
~d Politics, chapter 8.
20 See 'Garis-garis besar kebidjaksanaandan rentjana pelaksanaan stabilisasi politik:
hasilseminar AD ke-II Ag. 1966 Ban.dung', 1966; and Crouch,Anny and politics, pp. 344-5.
21 Crouch, Army and politics, pp. 266.
54
of Indonesian national identity. The building of state power was intrinsica
absorbed within, and took second place to, struggles to construc111
nationalist polity. After tbe declaration of Indonesian.independence·
1945, the major forces competing for control of the national state we
primarily concerned with establishing a nationalist legitimacy to gove!Iil
The struggles were for tbe control of, ratber !ban tbe building of, state powe1
Since Gestapu, it is the growth and centralization of state power that
dominated the national polity. BeforeGestapu the building of state powe
was intrinsically absorbed witbin struggles to construct a nationalist policy,
Since Gestapu these priorities have been reversed. From this perspectiv~
the image of continuity of state power through the twentieth century, from
Dutch colonial state to present New Order'2, needs to be qualified. There
has undoubtedly been continuity in state apparatus from the colonialstat
to the present - such as institutions of civil administration or organizei!
religion. But this does not mean the same thing as continuity of stat
power. On tbe contrary, tbe conditions of state power have varied drasticaJI
during this century. Throughout tbe twenty-tbree years from tbe tennination
of Dutch colonial rule by the Japanese in 1942 until the collapse of Guideo
Democracy in 1965, the power of the state was considerably diminisheo
if compared both with the preceding forty years of Dutch colonial rule
and the subsequent era of the New Order since Gestapu.
Neither has the consolidation of state power in the post-Gestapu ei:a
been simply a continuity between pre-World War II 'colonial' and
contemporary 'post-colonial' state systems: broken briefly by a 'devian'
period of immediate post-independence upheaval. Rather, the New Ordei
is a distinctive product of the dialectic between national identity and state
power that has dominated a half-century of Indonesian nationalist politici.
That dialectic, important in the nationalist discourse of the 1920s and
1930s23, became even more prominent after the Japanese occupation of
tbe Indies in 1942. Since then, tbe emergence of tbe military as an
important institutional base for Indonesian nationalism has seen even more~
overt assertions of authoritarian models contributed to the debates abou~
the ideal Indonesian nation-state.
22 For one such continuity argument, see Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, 'Old statef:
new society: Indonesia's New Order in comparative historical perspective' Journal ofAsian
Studies 42 no 3 (May 1983), pp. 477-496.
23
See David Reeve, Gol.karofIndonesia: analtemative to theparty~stem (Singapore:~
Oxford Univer>ity Press, 1985).
55
;/.
~.political disorder~ d_eveloped witbin the Indonesian polity between
llliS>and 1965_, cont~ad1c~10~s between tbe needs ~f state power and the
selirch for national 1dent1ty mcreased. The establIShment of the system
· ,@'iiided Democracy in 1959 was itselfan attempt on tbe part of Sukarno
1seme otber national leaders to resolve just such contradictions. Guided
"'0Cracy sought resolution tbrough compromise, even consensus, directed
··,authoritarian state. However, tbe two generations of conflict within
nesian nationalism had made compromise, let alone consensus,
ingly unlikely. The political divisions of the nationalist discourse
fullled to prevail over tbe consolidation of state power. Neither
;.rno'sefforts since 1960 towards a National Front nor thePKI's theory
~'cf"I\VO Aspects in the State Power of tbe Republic of Indonesia', enunciated
~{964, achieved anytbing towards solving these structural weaknesses
l!flihe state system, before the Gestapu affair ended it all. 24
,-«.:~<~:-
: %il:The political debates and conflicts within tbe Guided Democracy political
. ~tern had spread widely during tbe early 1960s into the villages and small
'}o:Wiis of Indonesia. Ideological and communal hatreds reached high
· ~til&iionaI levels. Simultaneously, a powerful 'alliance' of political forces
. !ltdnsisting of military officers, bureaucrats, intelligentsia, entrepreneurs,
· ~Iiticians and community leaders - emerged, anxious to see an end to
political upheaval. Most were intensely anti-communist." They wanted
a'more regulated civil society, orderly and, importantly, one oriented towards
.• ~nomic development. In tbe conditions prevailing by mid-1965 this could
·. KpJbe achieved without some final resolution of political conflicts. There
~~.110 longer any room for political compromise, such as had occurred
ff'~µently since 1945. Resolution would have to mean a clear victory for
it,.. .
the vtctors, and overwhelmmg defeat for the losers. Just that occurred
~iween October 1965 and March 1966. The result has been the
."1 ..-·
For discussions about these aspects of the state during Guided Democracy, see
1 Rex Mortimer, Indonesian communiJm wukT Sukarno: ideoiog; and poUJics, 1959-1965 (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1974); Joel Rocamora, Nationalism in search of ideology: the
IniJcn<sian Nalionalist Party, 1946-1965 (Quezon aiy: Philippine Center for Advanced Studies,
;,~
University of the Philippines, 1975), pp. 281.fI; Basuki Gunawan, KudetQ: stlU1ISf7UP in Djakarta:
deachtergrond van de 30 September-bewegingin Indonesiif (Meppel: JA Boom en Z.OOn, 1968);
and. Crouch, Anny and politics, pp. 43-96. ·
2J
On the rapid emergence of an 'anti-Communist coalition' in the months following
the Gestapo affair, see Susan Purdy, 'Legitimation of power and authority in a pluralistic
state: Pancasila and civil religion in Indonesia' (Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1984),
1 pp. 198-201.
;
56 Michael van Langenb
construction of a powerful state system that has engendered manifo]
changes in the structural patterns of civil society.26 · .' tfiich the massacres overall may have been a 'project', 'systematic', or
The mass violence that had occurred in the wake of the failure oft
30 September Movement was crucial to the consolidation and expansio
of state power under the New Order regime. It served three impor . n
purposes. First was the elimination of the leadership of the PKI and tH
destruction of its mass cadre structure. Second, it issued an unequivoca
warning to those who might consider a challenge to new ruling elite.
it created a dramatic historical break, a break since made part of tii
hegemonic ideology of the state system with the official celebration 0
1 October as Hari Peringatan Pancasila Sakti. 27 The sheer scale of tti
killings particularly was important in facilitating state hegemony. SouthwOQi!
and Flanagan, in their study of political violence in New Order Indonesi
contend that:
The Indonesian massacre was essentially a project of
systematically indiscriminate killing. A projectconnotes
aims, means and responsibility. It was systematic in that
the military leadership clearly defined the set of victims:
the PKI and its sympathizers. It was indiscriminate in
that within the category of victims specified, all members
were to be killed, regardless of age, sex, guilt, or any other
criteria. 28
It is perhaps rather too sweeping to suggest that all the killings wer
all-encompassing of a particular category of victims. Many informant!
say that it was not uncommon for women and children to be spared. Als9
there were regional variations. In Java and Bali, some of the most intense
violence took place within families. In Balak northern Sumatra, in som
cases intra-clan (marga) relationships worked to save persons from violen
in others inter-clan rivalries intensified the violence. The precise exten!
26
For recent analyses of this relationship between state pclYJCf and changes in ln.donesiaii
civil society, see: R. William Liddle, 'Soeharto's Indonesia: personal rule c;i.nd political~
institutions', Pacific Affairs 58 no 1 (1985), pp. 68-90; and Richard Robison, Indonesia:~~
rise ofcapital (Sydney: Allen & Unwin Australia and Asian Studies Associa,tion of Australia,-~
1986).
27
I am grateful to Robert Cribb for emphasizing these three points to me.
28
Southwood and Flanagan, Indonesia, pp. 73.
57
(:dminate' is debatable. But there is little doubt that for many of
C:who initiated and/or participated in the massacres it was one or more
o i)l:~e.
...';l--
... ·respective of what percentage of the massacres may have been
~nianeous', as distinct from being deliberately directed by state authorities,
et<ijal scale of the social trauma of the killings made ~e main instruments
.0 ~·.u$ hegemony - KOPKAMTIB, fear of Commumsm, the acceptance
o~derandstability (ketertiban andstabilitas) in the interests of economic
~e~~lo.pment (pembangunan) - much more easily utilized by the state.
ut:.crudely, the deaths of a mere 1000 would not have provided
•QFKAMTIB and Supersemar with the legitimacy in the restoration of
oro~f.!hat the deaths of over 100,000 did. The massacres endorsed the
iiliJiWy as a powerful and ruthless instrument of state power. They endorsed
c:OD!ll1unism as an instrument of chaos and disorder.
.· ·~tins is not to say that there is some kind of direct correlation to be
mi'd~· between the actual number of those killed (even if we knew what
t;ii.was) and the degree of structural change in the political transition
c·:rmm Old to New Order. The relationship is more one of scale than degree.
'•!:foot of the deaths were the result of actions by vigilante groups, encouraged
·'fnd'. .directed by local military commanders. Those at the centre of the
Ji';;!~ system who initiated the conditions of post-coup violence (the
·,:i'QS'IRAD/RPKAD group and their allies) did not consciously
JP,re-determine the number eventually killed. But they did initiate and
•. rn,&iurage the fervour of the anti-communist violence that motivated and
;• •1fcilitated most of the killings.29 They were concerned to ensure a thorough
~ieal purge of their political opponents and they set out deliberately
lf>achieve this. There is, thus, not necessarily any contradiction between
fff~ spontaneity of much of the killings at the local level and the state
lUrection of the violence from the centre. On the contrary, thereis a clear
#,.'usal relationship between political initiatives leading to mass violence,
t.aken by those in control of the instruments of violence in the state
apparatus, and the killings that ensued.
29
For example, the activities of the ·RPKAD units in Java and Bali led by Sarwo
;J!dhie and the KOSTRAD units led by Kemal Idris in Sumatra. See Hughes, End ofSukarno,
and Crouch, Army and politics.
 58 Michael van Langenberg
The massacres occurred because of the convergence of deep communaJ
hatreds, on the one hand, and state direction of violence, on the othei.
The state utilized and directed the spontaneity of those.hatreds. Tuer
were, thus, discrepancies in both the scale and patterus of the post-Gestapu
violence between different local regions. In many cases these reflected
differing intensities of local social and political conflicts. In some areas
local military and civilian leaders were more willing to contain intemecin;
violence than in others. In some other areas local leaders sought (0
deliberately promote such violence.30 But, regional variations
notwithstanding, the killings occurred widely across the nation. In late
1965 there was no efficient, centralized government to issue a cohereri
policy of genocide or mass extermination of political enemies. But, there
were widespread local anti-communist hatreds, which were easily linkea
with other local political conflicts and just as easily mobilized into mass
violence through state intervention. ' state upon the military for the maintenance of internal order, and enabled
The legitimacy of the New Order has been built on its role as the restorer
of order. The scale of the killings has served to consolidate in the public
mind an image of the Old Order as a period.of chaos and disorder. The
I .,-!
New Order has used the historical memory of the killings in the
I :.i,. I•,,
'.1· •1,·1·
.
establishment of its own legitimacy. The killings themselves are not given:
j I ;1! , any prominence in the official histories of the New Order. They are certainly
I Iii,, !
not justified solely as retribution by the New Order against the Old. Where
.,1:.1' 1.·i ' retribution is suggested, it is usually presented as being that of the
!
spontaneous actions by the 'People' against 'communist' treachery. TuiS,;
1
:11:1,' places ultimate responsibility for the mass violence at the feet of the PK!j
I.' 'I
ii; and its political allies: making that violence a consequence of the chaosj
.l1II ' '
I :•I I
of the Old Order, not the beginning of the New. In the years since 1966;'
it is the memory of past disorder, and not the details of the mass killings
~i
themselves, which the official discourse of the New Order regime has
' emphasized. If the engineered climate of fear and retribution in the
immediate aftermath of Gestapu was important to the seizure of state
I power itself, the historical memory of disorder has been crucial in the
subsequent consolidation of that power.
30
The picture gathered from informants in North Sumatra during 1969no indicates
just such local differences within that province.
:<~."tapu and state Power
•.. 59
G.,,'.,
'·''. Events that legitimize also constitute an enabling31 process by which
·:~ er is acquired and exercised. As an enabling process, therefore, the
, f;berate management of violence was crucial to the consolidation of
'' ~te power in the hands of the new post-Gestapu regime. The apparent
li\~Jilpt at s~~zure of power on 30 Septemb.e~ 1965 and the ~urders of
&e $even nuhtary officers endorsed the leg1t1macy of a physical assault
sfithe PKI and its allies. It endorsed the resulting massacres as popular
ttiribution. And it endorsed the primacy of the military as maintainer
bf social order. This became part of the enabling process through which
i/itiroassacres were promoted by the state and implemented by a combination
dhtate direction and communal fervour. Thus the scale of the mass
\iiolence meted out against PKI members and supporters endorsed the
.pgrty and its allies as 'traitors', also making them responsible for the violence
'ilielf." Finally, the violence, in tum, endorsed the dependence of the
·ilie consolidation of military-bureaucratic state power. 33
· Establishing a contrast with the disorder of the past is, therefore, a
ctiicial need. In the dominant ideology and political iconography of the
New Order, the mass killings are a consequence of the Old Order, a signifier
6hn especially distasteful past. The heroes of the New Order are the
seven officers who fell victim to that disorder (killed by the 30 September
Moveroent) and those who brought that disorder to an end. The term
G~tapu has been coined by the victors to emphasize the demonic forces
'iffthe Old Order, from which the nation has been rescued. The chief
satanic enemy is identified as 'Gestapu/PKI' or 'G-30-S/PKI'. Formulations
about Pancasila, Undang-undang Dasar '45 (the 1945 State Constitution),
iind Dwifungsi ABRI (the civil-military 'dual function' of the armed forces)
JI 'Enabling' = authorize/empower/legalize something otherwise unlawful.
' 32
See, for example, such an ~lanation for the post-Gestapo violence in Hakekat
Pailbangunan.MonwnenPancasila Silkti, p. 9. Also the statemCnts in 1976 and 1979 by the
thenKOPKAMTIB deputycommander,AdmiralSudomo, cited in Southwood and Flanagan,
Indonesia, pp. 72 & 80 (n.21).
33 The enabling function of the massacres is particularly important given the emphasis
that the New Order state has placed upon order and constitutionality as a basis for its legitimacy.
See Southwood and Flanaganlndonesia, and MiChaelvan l..angenberg1 'Analysing Indonesia's
New Orner state: a keywords approach', Review oflndmtesion andMakrpionA!fain; 20 (Summer
1986), pp. 1-47. I am grateful to Charles Coppel for drawing my attention to the particular
relevance in this case of the notion of an 'enabling process'.
60
are used to stress constitutional order, political stability and cultura
cohesion as products of the New Order state. Implicit, is that these ·
protect the nation from political chaos such as that of1960-65.
Since 1966, the term Gestapu has come to signify chaos and disordei
In contrast, Supersemar signifies social order and stability. The two 'ico ·
of the New Order state, the Monumen Pancasila Sakti (Sacred Pancas·
Monument), erected on the site of the 'Crocodile Hole' well in which tti
bodies of the seven murdered officers were found in October 1965, and
the Supersemar document itself, emphasize this. In the discourse of bot
nationalism is subordinated to assertions of state power. Whilst nationalistk
sentiment has certainly not disappeared from public political rhetoric sin
October 1965, it has been subordinated to the interests of the state. During
the pre-Gestapu Guided Democracy years, it was nationalism that had
been the driving force in a popular rhetoric of revolution and
anti-imperialism. Since Gestapu, nationalism has been made part of a
hegemony of order and stability, and put to the service of a corporat~
managerial state.34 - ,
The exercise of state power in New Order Indonesia has not displayed
the sadistic brutality of many of the Latin American and African regimes.
Yet, the deliberate control and manipulation of violence has been a
consistent feature. State power, in the first decade after 1965 came to
rest principally upon the effective management of violence, particularij
through KOPKAMTIB, and the hegemony accruing from the post-Gestap¥
killings and subsequent restoration of order. Officially sanctioned violence
against a defined category of citizens in late 1965 and early 1966 set th~
conditions for a substantial consolidation of state power. By the end ol
its second decade, the New Order state had built up a substantial apparatusj
of social control reaching deep into the daily lives of its citizenry. Persons1
and groups defined by the state system as 'communists', Islamic 'extremists','
or 'criminals' have all been subject to the select use of violence (summary
execution or imprisonment) by the state. The most dramatic recent example
was the so-called 'mysterious killings' (penembakan misterius, or petrus),
a campaign of state-sanctioned murders of 'criminals'. The killings were
widely publicized, thereby demonstrating state power in the enforcement
of civil order through the selective, extra-judicial, use of force against a
34
See Hakekat Pembangunan Monumen Pancasila Sakti; and Monumen Pancasila
Sokti (Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, Direktorat Jenderal Kebudayaan,
Panitia Hari Peringatan Kesaktian Pancasila, 1982).
61
(fined social group." In the context of the history of the New Order,
a,~'aus was a consistent expression of the state's use of violence in the
,!fli(erests of its own hegemony.
~> · 1be Gestapu affair initiated the greatest outbreak of violence in modem
· Indonesian history. The many thousands who resorted to violence in 1965
. • d the few who utilized it to build a strong state system were all responding
~some sense to circumstances arising from the intense internecine conflicts
:at had beset Indonesian nationalism for over half a century. Prominent
inthOseconflicts were struggles between 'marxism' and 'anti-communism',
tied in with, and mostly detemtined by, primordial factors of cultural identity
and religious belief. This long struggle was called upon to motivate and
·ustify the violent seizure of state power in 1%5/66. Both God
}rwian!Allah/Dewa) and cultural traditions (ethnic identity, traditional
'13iues, etc.) were invoked to combat communism as 'atheistic' and 'foreign'.
';. By 1965, after more than half a century of an Indonesian nationalist
movement characterized by intense ideological and physical conflicts, millions
of.Indonesians were committed anti-communists, ready to wreak violence
upon their political enemies should the opportunity arise. In the event,
the Gestapu affair provided that opportunity. Throughout much of
small-town and village .Indonesia in 1965 long-standing communal conflicts
and rival visions about the nation-state together provided a volatile political
mixture. To this extent, in so far as the 'government' in October/November
J.965 may have been a bystander to the killings, the killings themselves
were also part of a power struggle for control of government itself. In
the history of Indonesian nationalism the mass violence of Gestapu,
therefore, marks a significant stage in the relations between state and civil
society. The massacres have, thereby, also provided both community
experiences and a national historical memory which have enabled and
legitimized the subsequent growth of state power.
The Gestapu affair and its consequences is significant well beyond the
history of modem Indonesian alone. It could be argued that apart from
Indonesia, only in the Soviet Union, China and Spain in this century has
mass violence on a huge scale within the national polity also been utilized
to build a state system vastly more powerful than before; and, in
oonsequence, so markedly change the civil society within a generation.
3J
On the petrus phenomenon, see Justus van der Kroef, '"Petrus": patterns of
prophylactic murder in Indonesia', Asian Survey 25 no 7 (July 1985), pp. 745·759.
 Chapter 3

. 'tOCAL AND NATIONAL INFLUENCES

·•· IN THE VIOLENCE OF 1965
iJI,' Kenneth R. Young

If [!I :, 1 1 1
111 I !', j;

Ii
l l!
:1 ',' ·1·j'1

'. I'' :11

!Ne still know remarkably little about tbe social upheaval within
1 'i .i·.: 'ni:sia in 1965. Among tbe many causal elements tbat shaped tbe course
1 •):'1Ii,; I,
!

eVeilts in tbat year, we know least about tbe underlying social tensions
I I I:·,', I 0
lii~h, in parts of Indonesia, were released with such perplexing intensity
I
1

i''tl hlnhlbited communal violence. Given tbe passage of time and the
!
I I 'I 1.1 '.
cons'.!>lidation of tbe New Order, prospects are poor for improving our
1,:, I' , 0$>Jedge of the sociological dynamics of violence at the grass roots.
II 1ii"'II1 'I: hlindependent research on these problems witbin Indonesia is positively
,'I I '! isCQ.nraged.
' ' :1

We would be tberefore left to rely upon established accounts of tbe

1:·.l ,1 · ·lince, but for tbe fact tbat one encounters many people, Indonesians
ni!!foteign scholars, who have experience of tbose times. It is not likely
lliitltheir separate stories will be published, and many do not want tbeir
teiial made public in an attributed form. From years of listening to
uG!f..~tories, and from information gleaned as a by-product of my own
I
' I
' I ,I,: earch in East and Central Java, I have a number of observations to
1' :''I
~C',·about the ways in which local and national influences combined
I

''• I I ,:1 , release the mass killings of 1965.

I I' :I
, I ,I
***
1:
1, !As in other large complex countries such as India and tbe Soviet Union,
' '
i;iunent efforts to achieve national integration in Indonesia have to
l >With differences which arise from the strength of complex political;
';!·
64
cultural and economic influences whose main focus is limited to particu1a1
regions. In such countries, regional developments are not just a
embellishment of patterns determined at the centre - they are part of the
substance of that determination. The question is not whether centratt
national considerations prevail, but to what extent they do, and to what
extent these partly separate regional influences are being integrated ove1
time into a more unified polity.
In Indonesia's case, I believe that a comparison of the local dynamics
of conflict in 1965 will reveal a rather limited degree of national integration
at that time. That leads me to question the extent to which we can
generalize about the sociological dynamics of violence in 1965. The
understandings we have at the moment are heavily dependent on material
from East Java and especially from the Kediri region, and these cases are
not, in my view, especially useful as a guide to social patterns elsewher
My own research in Java was predominantly concerned with the Kediri
area. Therefore in the comparative survey of the interaction of local and
national influences that follows, I will give most attention to the case•]
know best and most directly. I want to convey my sense of how mucli
developments there depended on factors which were distinctively local.
Important local influences that were at work during those times were eithe1
unusually concentrated in Kediri or were special to this area and perhaps
a few other parts of East Java. Because of this, they are unsuitable as
a basis for generalizations about the dynamics of violence on Java mor"
generally, and certainly for Indonesia as a whole.
Though we are still too much in the dark about these matters in man~
regions, there is enough material from other parts of Java and the rest
of the country to show that Kediri was not 'typical' in a sense that would
lend it to being the source ofa more comprehensive model of the violen
of 1965. The comparison of cases I review , from my own research area:
of Kediri, from other parts of Java, and from regions beyond Java - also
show that local influences still exerted considerable weight in 1965. Pl.
further source of interest in comparing these cases arises from what they
suggest about the course of longer term trends toward national integration.,
***
l Sukarno: ideology and politics 1959-1965 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974);
1 W.F. Wertheim, 'From aliran to class struggle in the countryside of Java', Pacific Vu:wpoint
Much of the scholarly analysis of these explosive times is rightly give~·.
to the cloudy and complex manoeuvring at the centre of national politics~
Once the fatal moves were made in the centre, however, an eruption of·
65
::'Jenee destroyed the PKI and ended the lives of innumerable obscure,
· \Jr victims· Any attempt to understand the tensions in society that
· such a tragedy possible impels us to come to grips with a variety
~'!Ota! social and political dynamics. The accounts we do have of local
.~15 in these turbulent times are predominantly concerned with Java,
.>'""' ·any East Java. These analyses invoke anthropological studies which
ti!ls1
r a variety of socio-economic a~d cultur~l cat~gories. Some familiar
" loJi'cepis, such as class or patron-client relat10nships, are used, and these
, ~Ji{ suggest the w~rkings ~f patterns of conflict close to those in other
: prellominantly agranan soc1et1es. Howe~er, a!most all a~thors ':'nclude
-. tli'at these approaches need some modification (there IS considerable
'. ~greement about how much) to take account of the special socio-cultural
·:, ~iacteristics of Indonesia. For example there is widespread agreement
>i~ui the need to take account of the religious differences between Muslim
'. ~!lilnunities in some parts of Java - the mutual alienation between those
•· (cifi_~n referred to as 'santri ') who seek to conduct their lives strictly in
: ~nicirmitywith what they take to be orthodox Islamic precepts and those
' ('1aY.anists', often referred to by the santri as 'abangan') who blend Islam
•. wiiji pre-Islamic beliefs and practices.' I will argue that here in many
··. fetpects these cultural categories, however combined, have limited
t;:h,.~
'..i'·l-
-:·:·1 Cf. Clifford Geertz, The religi.on of Java (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
{~). Another important and widely used socio-cultural categocy of this nature is 'aliran'.
~jsan indigenous concept (the word literally means 'stream') employed by Clifford Geertz
f()\idCntify the major social cleavages which cut across class lines in Java. He explains the
Workings of 'aliran' in such classic studies as The social history of an Indonesian town
(~mbridge 1 Mass.: MIT Press, 1965) and in some of his earlier works. Another closely
rcJ8~ed concept, this time t'aken from the Netherlands, is the idea of 'cultural pillarization',
Qr;Va:zwling. Its utility for characterising Indonesian social divisions at this time is explored
iriRuth T. McVey, 'Nationalism, Islam and Marxism: the management of ideological conflict
inlndonesia',introductiontoSukamo,Nationalism,IslamandMarxism(lthaca,N.Y.,Cornell
Modern Indonesia Project, 1970). McVey's essay is an excellent discussion of Indonesian
sOCiSty and of the ideas used by sc~olars to understand it. Understandably the literature
On this subject is very extensive. McVey's essay is a good place to start, but a glance through
Margo Lyon, Bases of conflict in rural Java (Berkeley: University of California Center for
South and Southeast &ia Studies, 1970)i Rex Mortimer, 'Class, social cleavage and Indonesian
communism', Indonesia 8 (1969), pp. 1-20; Rex Mortimer, Indonesian commwiism wuJer
10 (1969), pp. 1-17; Robert R. Jay, Religi.on dnd politics in rural central Java (New Haven:
Ya:Ie University, Southeast Asia Studies Cultural ReportSeries1 1963) and Koentjaraningrat,
laWmese culture (Singapore: OUP/ISEAS, 1985), will reveal many of the key terms in use1
as well as the range of the literature.
 66
geographic and social scope, and will not serve as the basis of an ·
"
;'I Indonesia, or even all-Java pattern.
The point is rather that, by 1965 at least, the working out of natio
conflicts was still very variable from region to region. These regio
'11
patterns were not wholly separate; autonomous processes, but neither·
they easily assimilable in analysis into a uniform national pattern. TJia
I believe, is an aspect of the study of Indonesia which we should be pi
to acknowledge, since it recognizes a fascinating but relatively neglect
dimension of the study of the longer-term development of politics, socie
and economy in Indonesia.
The upheaval of 1965 can be viewed as marking a critical stage in t
internal integration of the modem Indonesian state, and, less certain!~
of the Indonesian nation. The nationalist cause began to realize its ici
after 1945, building from the dispersed, disparate and very loosely connectlil
regional dynamics which clearly manifested themselves during the struggi
for independence.' The degree of national integration in 1965 was mu.
more advanced tha_n that of1945. Now,after the passage of almost twency,.
five more years, the many-stranded connections between the national cen
and the regions are more numerous than they ever were. The mechanis
of control, of 'steering', by the centre are much more precise and reliab!
than they were. Local communities are not always encouraged to do mo
than act in conformity with directives from above, but when they do asse
themselves they are much more likely now to see themselves as actin
in the national context. This is all relative, since, even to-day, there a
many parts of Indonesia where local functionaries of the state still ten
to go their own way. In such places, officials and representatives of larg
private interests have constantly to balance the demands and perceptions
of the centre with local realities, resistances and perceptions which do
not match at all well the views of the centre. ·
In 1965, the capacities of the protagonists at the centre to steer their
adherents throughout the nation stood somewhere between the presen
2 Cf. Benedict Anderson, 'Old state, new society: lndonesia'sNew_Orderin histori
perspective', Joumol ofAsian Studies, 42 (1983), pp. 477-496; and Benedi!" Anderron, l111i1 ·
communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism (London: Verso, 1983).
3 Audrey R. Kahin, ed., Regional dynamics ofthe Indonesian Revolution: unity frdm
diversity (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985).
67
iion and the sharplyregionalized dynamics of the national revolution.
fudependence struggle, the centre served largely as a common focus
: nation and inspiration for '...a series of largely autonomous regional
.Juiions in pursuit of a common formal goal - an independent Indonesia -
lfoS~ contemplated content and character varied in accordance with both
!!ill rrailltions and changing social dynamics of each region.'' The nationalist
b01ism at the centre was a blunt, imprecise instrument, but powerful
i'.e!l~elybecauseofits imp~ec~ion- it could be inte_rpreted wit~out muc~
Ciff!illulty 10 match the aspirations of a range of different reg10nal ant1-
0010;Ja1 struggles.' In 1965 the army was in a position to restrain popular
:viQ)~ni:e, as it did in West Java, but once it chose to licence civilian vigilantes
. its drive against the communists, it set in motion dynamics of conflict
:w!Ullh were deeply embedded in regional political processes, and which
·. expressed through local class and cultural configurations. Similarly,
e &illective ideological unity of the killers (as far as we are able to know
iti, lli'eir perceptions of their victims, and their rationale for such extreme
aotiolis, were also variable.
liJiere are difficulties which follow once we accept the importance of
g\onallyspecificvariables for analyzing the violence and politics of1965.
·e least desirable outcome is the mere production of a series of local
studies. To avoid this, there are spatial, conceptual and historical issues
:w {eh must be addressed. The spatial ones, as Heather Sutherland points
o)lt:in her perceptive review of the volume on the national revolution
&fited by Audrey Kahin, are those of drawing the boundaries between
HiS!iJict regional clusters of political, cultural and socio-economic relations.6
Ibid., p. 282.
These struggles were undoubtedly nationalist, and therefore also supra-local, in
·_ -:cfrjeniation. The interest in this issue then, in 1965, and today is in exploring how and to
~_ij3t extent such localized struggles combined to make up the complete Indonesian national
.. pattern.
Creating such a 'map' would be an extremely ambitious task. Something like this
- ~:b:een attempted for Javanese culture - see Koentjaraningrat, Javanese culture and Ron
~~l_ey, 'Mapping cultural regions of Java;, in Ron Hatley and J. Schiller, eds, Other Javas:
_--~from the kraton (Clayton, Vic.: Monash University, 1983). In her review of Kahin's
_, Rqjooal dynamics ofthe Indonesian revo/ulion (Heather Sutherland, The Indonesian revolution:
,·--'.~~ew', Indonesia 42 (1986)1 p. 118)1 Sutherland remarks:
 68
69

The historical problem is the choice of.temporal perspective. Events sue
as the civil catastrophe of 1965 or the. national Revolution, are, as
Sutherland observes 'abnormal', and consequently it is desirable to vie\;;
them in a longer time-frame, so that 'both the continuities and th
aberrations become visible'. 7 The conceptual problems are no less
challenging. They require specification not only of 'the region'8, but also
of the elements of the internal dynamic of the region, and how, and to
what extent, these elements are linked into broader national antt
international processes. One needs also to choose categories appropriat
to the task of investigating how these inter-regional and centre-regional
relations are changing over time.
My concern in this paper is much more modest. I simply want to
establish that the major case (East Java) that has frequently been taken
as the exemplar of the violence of 1965 cannot adequately elucidate the
dynamics of communal conflict for Indonesia generally: that this case was
too much influenced by significant local factors to allow this; and that
a brief survey of these events from a selection of other places will sho\ii
that they developed elsewhere in accordance with local political, socio".
economic and cultural factors unrelated to the East Java case.
'·
The Violence in Kediri
It is not surprising that the violence in Kediri was much worse tharij
in many other parts of Java. The kabupaten 9 was simultaneously a;,
I'
i I ·'I
Selection of units of analysis could ... [have concentrated] ...on regions as defined
11,' ' by their patterns of interaction and behaviour rather than following the convenient
1: ' .
' ·ngllold of the Muslim Nahdatul Ulama (NU) and of the communist
str,~fy {PKI). From the time of their formation, but especially during the
.R~ these parties and their supporters had confronted each other, their
i:Thsh~ escalating in bitterness during the communist-led land reform actions
'{itff,si sepihak) and the subsequent Muslim landlord backlash in 1963-6410•
:;such considerations, conforming largely to wider trends and national
· , pi}litiCS, may appear to provide reason enough to understand the extent
' "f!he bloodshed in this part of East Java. However, we are not dealing
~rn,political violen~. on any ordin~1?' scale~~ intensity. here. (Read the
"efiections and remm1Scences of P1pll Roch11at11 to gam a sense of the
' .kremity of the violence of villager against villager.) Once one becomes
. a:efjuainted in greater detail with what occurred, and comes to know the
': J'!iiople of the region, such clinical and routine explanations cease to be
;: il\iisfying. Civilians killed civilians with little apparent concern for their
€lfmmon humanity. They killed villagers who, in most places, did not
i!lfJsically ~esist capt.ure, ~laughterin!l them .meth?dically as t~~y might
Slaughter livestock sick with some virulent mfect10n. In Kedm people
~ere not murdered in a momentary frenzied outburst of mob violence.
Tue calculated intensity of the killings needs to be understood, and political
~tagonisms, deep as they were, do not wholly explain the degree and extent
~(the massacre. Sharp political antagonisms existed in other regions without
fteveloping to such a bitter pitch.
· ' After a very brief survey of the national influences which bore upon
K:ediri equally with many other places, I will outline the salient local
influences which are necessary to understanding why events developed
iii this way in Kediri. Regional history provides some of the most important
oonsiderations. I am not able to speculate about the psychology of violence,
but can point to special features of regional history. These historical
outcomes are identifiable in terms of social organization and patterns of

''
1' , '

:1;1 lj,j
'

residency borders. The very attempt to map out politically relevant boundaries communal conflict which took particular forms of political and cultural
would be fascinating, leading to an examination of local cultural identities and expression. Attention to these additional details does improve somewhat
social relationships.
I I ',li1l:j
1

7
Sutherl~nd, 'The Indonesian Revolution', p. 116. 10
Rex Mortimer, The Indonesian Communist Party and land reform (Clayton, Vic.:
! I ·. 'JI. J 8
Cf. Otto van den Muijzenberg, Pieter Streefland and Willem Wolters, Focus on
Monash University PapersonSoutheastAsia, 1972); Mortimer,lndonesiancommunismunder
I, ,I :111.' Sukarno, chapter 7; J. Walkin, '1he Ma;Jem-Communist confrontation in East Java, 1964-1965',
I':." the region in Asia (Rotterdam: Study Group on Tropical Asia - Kota, 1982). Orbis 12 (1969), pp, 822-847; Lyon, Bases of conflict in tuTal Java.
'''
9
On this and other administrative and military terms, see the explanation on p. 11
Pipit Rochijat, 'Am I PK.I or non-PK.I?', Indonesia 40 (1985), pp. 37-52
ix.
70
on explanations which confine themselves to national influences. Latei
after looking at Kediri, I will briefly survey the conflict. in a number (i'
other parts of Indonesia to show that delving into the sociology ofviolen ·
e~sewhere would lead to the identification and emphasis of significant!):
different, but equally regionally specific, variables.
General Considerations (National Forces)
After independence, a number of the protagonists of Jakarta-basC!I
politics struggles, not always successfully, to integrate regional powe1
structures into a unified national polity. Even where organizational
ideological and bureaucratic integration was weak, the regions were ofte;
strongly influenced by political actions at the centre, such as the moves
towards greater centralization of the armed forces command structure
or economic policy-making which led to runaway inflation or depleted
foreign reserves. The following brief summary reviews national developmen~
in general terms to show that these alone had created a situation of greai
civil tension by 1965.12 . sometimes confronted the army directly, as in North Sumatra, though the
Since the 1930s, the whole country had been through successive decades l
of great upheaval - depression, war, national revolution - followed by furtheil
economic difficulty in the 1950s and 60s. During Guided Democracy in j
particular, economic decline accelerated. Inflation reached very serious ,
proportions and conditions worsened for the impoverished masses. The ·
great expectations stimulated by the achievement of independence and
kept alive by party agitation were seldom fulfilled and, as the colonial era.
receded, a search for foreign and domestic scapegoats to explain the lack
of general betterment. Party rivalries sharpened in an era of mass
mobilization, great campaigns and extreme populist rhetoric. Traditional
12
The specific details of these developments are complex but well documented in
a considerable volume of writing - see McVey, 'Nationalism, Islam and Marxism'; Mortimer,
'Class,socialcleavageandlndonesiancommunism';Mortimer,JndonesianCommutiismunder
Sukarno; Herbert Feith's three works, The decline of constitutional democracy'in Indonesia
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962), 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy' in Ruth
T. McVey (ed.) Indon..ia (New Haven: Human Relations Area Ftles Press, 1963), and 'President
Sukarno, the army and the communists: the triangle changes shape' Asian Suivey 4 (1964),
pp. 969-980; Wertheim, 'From aliran to class struggle', Harold Crouch, The anny and politics
in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978); Geertz, The social history of an
Indonesian town; and Jay, Religion and politics.
71
~al eontrols were weakened as the mass of Indonesians, inexperienced
ill 0pen party competition, asserted their interests through a time of intense
J'i>f{o/ competition (1950-1957) prior to Guided Democracy (1958-1965).
· ~· In rur~l areas, ~~e do~inant ~nomi". classes as well as bureaucratic
and tradiUonal political elites faced mcreasmgly bold challenges by workers
~cl peasants. Open c~ass ~nflict was complicated by cross-cutting cultural
and communal 1dent1ficat1ons, and the patronage structure of political
p3rties. Neve~eless, these po~en~ rivalri~ tended to be channelled through
political part~es'. whose orgamzat1onal !mks ran through an amazing array
of.civil associat10ns.
Y In the 1960s, during the Guided Democracy period, the PKI in particular
~massed a vast constituency, and was opposed principally by the army,
)Vhile the President tried to balance political rivalries in a volatile
foVironment. The central contest for power became an increasingly
<f!'iangular' 13 - a tense and unstable situation focused around three nodes
Bfpower: the President, the army and the PKI. In the regions, the PKI
army was not always the PKI's most committed opponent; in Central Java,
for example, the Diponegoro Division contained many elements sympathetic
to the PKI. In Bali, the party's main rival was the PNI, while in East Java
it was the Muslim parties and affiliated organizations.
In 1963 the PKI initiated a policy of class-based mobilization (aksi
sepihak: the 'unilateral actions' campaign) over issues of land reform, share-
cropping rights, and bureaucratic obstruction. The party also promoted
the claims of peasants squatting on army-controlled nationalized estates.
The tactics, scale of action, degree of reliance on confrontation by force
within this general policy varied considerably from region to region. The
campaigns were most developed in East and Central Java, but Bali, North
Sumatra and West Java also were sites of large-scale actions. 14 The main
campaigns were in 1964. By late 1964, however, landowners had mobilized
resistance through the PNI and NU, rolling back the PKI campaign. To
lJ
Herbert Feith, 'President Sukarno, the army and the communis~ the triangle changes
shape' Asian Swvey 4 (1964), pp. 969·980.
14
Rex Mortimer, 'Class, social cleavage and Indonesian communism', Indonesia.8
(1969), p. 18.
 72
its surprise, the PKI found itself on the defensive in this test of strengt
by early 1965, particularly in strongly santri areas, such as East Java.u
All of these strains were intensified by political developments in 196s.
There was heightened anxiety, conflict, tension and great uncertainty'
public life in the months before the Untung coup. There was, therefor'
an explosive situation throughout the most populous regions oflndonesi
'I However, the impact of all these developments, and the form and degr
I of violence of their resolution once the crisis came was not at all unifor
! The full story requires further specification of historical, institutional antt
cultural factor5, which show marked regional differences. The dynamr
and the outcomes of the violence before and during 1965 were rather dive ·
The Importance of Kediri's Social History
The social polarization within Kediri between supp01:_ters of the Muslilii
parties (NU and to some extent Masyumi) and the communists was no
an antagonism which began with party competition after independen ·
This conflict had a strong class basis, but it was also an expression - antt
a heightening - of inter-communal tensions which had a longer history,
The most important of the social cleavages within the rural village complex
was that between the pious Muslim santri communities and those of tli
abanganJavanesewhosereligious observances blended Islam with vestig
of Hindu and animistic belief-systems. 16 The unresolved tensions betwee.
these groups derived from Kediri's experience, in the early part of th'
century, of being a frontier area opened up by the sugar industry. :
There had been ancient kingdoms in this part of East Java, but w.fr
famine and disease in the eighteenth century had virtually depopulat
it, apart from a small area around the main town, also called Kediri, on
the Brantas river. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
the region was opened up by Dutch corporate plantation interests, especialij
the sugar industry, and the region 'filled up' with a stream of migran~
attracted by the highly commercialized economy. Ahigh proportion (oven
40%) of villagers acquired no land and came to work as wag~ labourers!
15 Mortimer, Indonesian communism wuler Sukarno, chapter 7.
16
Geertz, Religion of Java.
···ar'and Local Influences 73
·~·ese and other reasons, there were from the outset rather visible
~w
(differences among the new sett1ers.
·:fu~othersignificant consequence o!rapid ~gration to the sugar-a~d­
. ,5 · wah lands that were opened up m Kedm was the haphazard, side
'®. ~ settlement of groups from two distinct subcultural areas of Java.
igrants came mainly from two areas of origin - south-central Java
. Bagelen and the negarigung around Yogyakarta and Surakarta), and
iii i;/sisirwetan, or north coast, of the island. 17 They settled in contiguous
. ~unities in a complex chequer-board pattern. Residential groups,
OOeighbourhoods which were ofte~ no larger than part ~fa .vi!lag~, drew
pP-n the cultures they brought with them to assert their dtstmct1veness
0
gamst the other immigrant groups settled next to them. Whether their
~ltural and religious differences sprang from a simple re-affirmation of
l!eliefs and values prevailing in their region of origin, or whether they were
rodre-actively reconstituted in an effort to resist assimilation with other
i~grant groups in the new settlements of East Java is not certain; in
either.case, an abundant repertoire of symbolic and cultural practices was
avlftlable to distinguish the separate communities. Those from the north
00 ~stasserted their identity through their closer adherence to Islam. They
established distinctively santri communities which then clearly fixed the
oo~traSt between them and the next-door communities of Central Javanese
~igrants who, for their part, diligently 'preserved' their abangan way
ofj)ife.
·· These communities never worked out a settled modus vivendi in the
~l\uient years that followed. 18 These later decades brought the depression,
th:~;catastrophic collapse of the sugar industry, war, revolution, and then
-~nally the era of open party competition.
-k-.:
::,some of Clifford Geertz's analyses of aliran rivalries in the 1950s 19
:l'_h:L_
,;:i
-, f#,~ 1 C(. Koentjaraningrat, Javanese culture, pp. 21-24, 196-198; C. Poensen, •Jets over
:..;Javaanschenaamgevingeneigennamen',MededeelingenvanwegehetNederlandscheZendeling
.;Gmaotschap 14 (1870), p. 312.
16
See Jay, Religion and politics.
. Clifford Geertz, 'The Javanese village', in G. William Skinner, ed., Loea~ ethnic
an.tlnationalloyalties in village Indonesia (New Haven: Yale University, Cultural report series,
..'"titheast Asia, 1959); Clifford Geertz, The social history ofan Indonesian town (Cambridge,
 74
suggest that the political parties of the parliamentary period, backed ·
their numerous affiliated mass organizations, gave a sharpness and clarilji
to social tensions which were previously rather unformed. However, tti
lines of inter-communal tension were already firmly drawn well befo
independence. The Madiun affair of 1948 triggered off violent clash·
between the communities. Although the abangq.n were identified Wit
the PKI, they were feared among ordinary santri villagers not because 0
communist ideology or political strategy, but because of their black magi
and irreligious abangan practices. This remained the most significant pa
of the idiom of de-humanization used by their civilian enemies when they,
were attacked in 1%5. · :witldand and the terms of share-cropping agreements. The prescribed
The party system of the period of parliamentary democracy in the 19sQi
both expressed these divisions and intensified them. Rival communal grou
were socialized through party-affiliated associations which reinforced thei
separate identities, heightened class tensions, and stressed the 'othernesg
of competing groups. Competition ran through many aspects of ordinary.
everyday life, so that rivalries were energized not just by disputes ove1
land or economic advantage, but recreational events such as football matchesi
The sharply polarized situation was clear enough in the elections of tb.
1950s. In 1955, the PKI vote, at 33%, was about 50% greater than th
party's all-Java and East Java averages. By the 1957 DPRD elections, it
had grown to about 40% of votes cast. The NU vote on the other hand
was also strong, just over 20% in 1955 and about 23% in 1957, about equal
to its all-Java average, though it was about one third less than the East
Java average. Although the NU vote was lower than in other parts oi
East Java, the Muslim parties' constituency was large and comparable in'.
I 1
size to the PKI's - the combined NU and Masyumi votes were 36% iii
1955 and 34% in 1957. 20
:1.·1·k
i.
I
Kediri, therefore, was a region whose historical development had left ,
Ii ·I'
it with closely settled communities markedly polarized along cultural- .
· 1J11 religious and class lines.
1 1
! 1 '•'
i ! I
! 23
' to my attention. See also the vivid description of the Jengkol aksi in Pipit Rochijat 'Am
I,. Mass.: MIT Press, 1965).
20
The PNI vote was 23% in 1955 and 20% in 1957. The 1971 results were PNI 7%;
Parmusi 4%; NU 32%; and Golkar 56%.
75
,· ·•e confrontation over land reform was as sharp in Kediri as anywhere
the country. In some regions the land reform campaigns were pursued
~oroilitantly, and the open class character of the PKI agitation was
laiiVely subdued compared with East Java, but the tensions generated
~~ti\ral areas at the time were part of a national trend. There were
JDufnerous campaigns against santri landholders, often involving complex
~~utes over terms of a pawning agreement or land redistribution order.21
, eebjectives on the PKI side were primarily class objectives, concerned
.!l~l doctrines and class categorizations had been memorized religiously
;@rt'etally so - Jay notes how their rote recitation resembled the pengajian
o!koranic texts by their opponents22). Their efforts to redistribute land
.$re not restricted to Muslim landholdings. Perhaps the best known of
;{lr~--bksi in Kediri was the Jengkol incident of 1961. The aim, on this
.~sion, of the communist peasants' union, the BTI, was to occupy and
~iStribute long-lease riceland still attached to one of the remaining sugar
. fi\'!lis in Kediri, run by the military. The occupation was made by as many
,·Itt!iree thousand peasants. They made a determined attempt to hold
ji\'e land and there were twenty-four casualties before the army ejected
lifem.. While Jengkol was the largest incident, I was told of others involving
. [~tgenumbers of peasants confronting the army in Plosoklaten, Plemahan,
" &gancar and Puncu in these years.23 Furthermore, the old Dutch upland
!;·
~·~iI See typical examples from Banyuwangi in Pusat Penelitian dan Studi Pedesaan
din Kawasan,Laporan tentangsrudi mengenai koesahan ped=an pada tahun 196().an, khususnya
itntangkasus di Klaten, Banyuwangi dan Bali (prepared by PPSPK. Universitas Gadjah Mada
J,!p.der the direction of Professor Sartono Kartodirdjo) (Jakarta: Yayasan Pancasila Sakti,
~~82), chapter 5 (translated in this volume).
22 Rohen Jay, Javanese villag= social relaticns in rural Mddjokwo (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 1969).
The Jengkol incident is described in the Surabaya newspaper Duta Masjarakat
(November 1961 ). I am obliged to Mr Andrew Gunawan for drawing this and other details
I PKI or non-PK.I?', p. 39, as well as other incidents in Kediri, ibid., p. 40. Pipit adds details
such as an episode in theJengkol clash in which PK.I members were said to have buried alive
a· bulldozer driver and a policeman prior to military intervention. I was told a similar story,
but have chosen to keep the present account to the most essential details.
 76 Ken You
estates had been occupied by poor villagers from Kediri and neighbouri)jg
residencies, and the squatters backed by the PKI had fairly successrun
resisted attempts to move them.
As elsewhere, the political parties and their associated mass movemen
'· 1i
.1,'
)~ (unions, women, youth etc.) gave organizational structure to the civil COnfli
but the fear and hostility that was channelled through the political parti
was an ambiguous mixture of class and communal antagonisms, tli
i
intensification of deep seated antagonisms expressed in cultural-religio111
terms, which predated the formation of parties. The protagonists hatt
i
struck out at each other in the 1940s, after which the lines of battle ha
become sharply delineated by years of mutually hostile acts - mostly pei
! but numerous and constant - during the 1950s. The demonology whic
flourished on both sides then found violent and frightening confirmati~
during theaksi sepihak and the backlash that followed. What is important
for the present argument is that, while the political and class antagonisms
gave form to the actions, the extremity of the feelings on both sides wer
also, as Svein Aass24 noted from his fieldwork in Kediri, the result o!
'the emergence of long-standing conflicts which had only a marginal
relationship with the problem of agrarian reform itself. These additional
tensions give the dynamics of violence in Kediri a regionally specific
character unsuited to easy generalization to other parts of the countfY..
Rumours of plots and hit lists flourished on both sides. The P :
organizations may have seen their objectives primarily in class terms, bu
they remembered the aftermath of Madiun, when victorious governmerit
troops and Muslim irregulars had systematically executed PKI followers
and they too were not averse (in spite of party admonitions to the contrary)
to type-casting their opponents as religious fanatics, especially as the poor
abangan peasants saw their claims under land reform legislation blocked
Ii' by local committees staffed by an unholy alliance of Muslim landlords
Ii
I Ii' and PNI bureaucrats. Their campaigns of occupation ofland ('dropping')j
i!i
and confrontation of recalcitrant bureaucrats ('retooling') were mostlf1
thwarted by the military or by Muslim youth groups. .;
24
Svein Aass, 'Terre et travail dans un village aJava', (doctoral thesis, Paris, Ecole ',
des Hautes :Etudes, n.d.), p. 217, cited in Ben White, "'Agricultural Involution11 and its critics:
twenty years after', Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 15 no 2 (1983), p. 29.
77
'~nee.the aksi sepihak commenced, however; Muslim landlords in Kediri
a'~~ir worst fears confirmed by land seizures by groups of hundreds
8
.. · ts armed with sharpened bamboo spears and other crude weapons.
OJ!C1;eaders spoke often of what they had experienced in 1948 as the
. es·.pf battle ebbed and flowed - when the PKI had control they had
~ticedsantri villages and Islamic religious schools. Santri village leaders
~wly had little difficulty persuading their communities that the aksi were
01;ni'erelyunjust attempts to seize land, but that they were aimed against
n ~·v~lues and the very existence of santri communities. As in 1948, the
J!inia'ry characteristics of the communists in the eyes of Muslim villagers
~ tlieir hostility to Islam, their predilection for violence and their abangan
tillcli: magic. 25 Leaflets were circulated in 1965 (in Kediri and beyond)
r~mfiiding believers that 'thousands of Muslims were murdered by the
odi&•side' in the Madiun incident in 1948.26
• ··!fhe Muslim construction of the situation in Kediri was strongly
r~ij\forced when the PKI attacked a school operated by the student
otganization Pemuda Islam Indonesia (PII, Indonesian Islamic Youth)
at!:Kanigoro in Keras kecamatan in the south of Kediri in January 1965.
!Jl!i"e>PII was a former affiliate of the Muslim Masyumi party, which had
· banned by the national government in 1960. The PKI group found
II students and handed them over to police as subversives. The Muslim
nt of the incident stressed allegations that PKI cadres entered the
:Mosque with dirty feet, manhandled the school's kyai and trampled on
· iJlelKoran. 27 This incident, and another involving clashes between Muslims
'· anci"communists at the Lodoyo pesantren in 1964, served both to fuel
. piipular rumours among the santri about the misdeeds of 'the atheists',
.· and to stiffen the resolve of the kyai in their opposition to the PKl.28
it~I,
1);;:It is clear that the material for the conflagration had been built up
to·a highly inflammable stage. Once the sparks were drawn in from the
2S Walkin, 'The Moslem-Communist oonfrontation', p. 828f; David Charles Afiderson,
'The military aspects of the Madiun Affair', Indonesia 21 (1976), pp. 1-63.
26
Wal kin, 'The Moslem-Communist confrontation', p. 832.
27
Ibid., pp. 829-830.
,j.f 'Report from East Java' [Translation of a report by an intelligence officer to hjs
~uperiors in November 1965], Indonesia 41 (1986)1 p. 141.
78
fires of national politics, they would ignite this volatile East Javanese mixtu
and burn here with great intensity.
The Reaction to the Untung Coup
For a few weeks after the Untung coup, one of the influences of natio
politics in Kediri was to create uncertainty which held back anti-communij
forces. They were unclear at first about what was happening at the cent
and doubted the 'reliability' of some local elements in the armed for~
and bureaucracy. During the first week or so,.Major General BasuJ1i
Rachmat, commanderoftheEastJava military region (KODAM), seemeo
unwilling to risk provoking large-scale clashes, in spite of informal
encouragement from military circles inJakarta to move to crush the PKl
The commander of the infantry brigade based in Kediri was strongly anti.
PKI, but not all of his officers were equally trusted by anti-communist
leaders. The territorial commander of the Madiun-Kediri resort'°, Willy,
Soedjono, argued against the caution of his immediate superiors and
advocated immediate firm action against the PKI. He himself, howevet
was regarded with some suspicion, and was eventually arrested in 1967:"
Among villagers in Kediri there was fear and uncertainty during th'
period. Many stayed in their houses, and in some sub-districts they we'
advised to do so by local officials. On the other hand, those organizations
which had been active against the PKI were prepared, indeed were eagei
for action. They only needed clear evidence of the PKI's vulnerabiliti:
and assurances from the military to move against their enemy. Tuer
appears to have been private consultation among anti-communist leaders,
some of whom had contacts within the military and bureaucracy. I hav
no evidence of similar moves among communist organizations, though
presumably they must have conferred about what was happening.
29 Ibid., p. 151.
30
The East Java military region had its own infantry brigades, one o(which was based
in Kediri. The main forces of the army however were organized in a territorial hierarchy
of KODAM-KOREM-KODIM-KORAMIL (see pp. ix-x).
31
Harold Crouch, The army and politics in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1978), pp. 151-152, 233.
79
,.'Jlhe anti-communist organizations had institutionalized networks
iJ&6ughout Kediri, and could mobilize paramilitary youth groups, ofwhich
: far the most formidable was the NU youth group Ansor. It seems
!iY"''kely that they would have attacked the PKI in the villages alone, so
tihe declaration of intent by the armed forces was critical to triggering
· e killings.
youth organizations were in action early in October in other parts
t Java. Their actions sometimes responded to, sometimes ran ahead
. events in Jakarta. In the capital, the NU leadership had been quick
_10'·c;ooperate with the armed forces and other anti-PK! groups. This
~~iition set up, on 2 October, an action front ('KAP-Gestapu') to crush
~e•PKI. On the 5th, the national NU leadership called publicly for the
1)8lining of the PKI and on the same day sent instructions encouraging
· · eh committees to give active support for this campaign. Starting about
·tober there was a spate of anti-communist (and anti-Chinese) rallies
t Java, which led to attacks on PKI buildings. 32 In Jakarta on the
'a mob formed mainly from Muslim youth organizations set the PKI's
.· ..'dquarters on fire.
·Ii;!•::
i$.\ In Kediri the anti-communist coalition was not mobilized quite this
~Fly. However, as the days passed in undiminished tension, the news
· tf·Widespread unchecked violence against the communists buttressed the
¥1-salve and the confidence of the local anti-PK! groups. Their leaders
·Had by this time satisfied themselves that they had sufficient backing from
· Within locally stationed army groups. They had heard, too, of the swift
;a'ctions of the RPKAD against the communists in the core regions of PKI
support in Central Java. The army appeared to be rapidly gaining control
there, though this was only because it had augmented its strength by inviting
anti-communist vigilantes to participate. Clashes with the PKI in
Banyuwangi33 further stiffened the resolve of NU leaders in East Java.
Ansor leaders from a number of regencies in East Java met and agreed
ta hold coordinated rallies in a number of towns in the southern Brantas
Valley (Kediri, Blitar, Trenggalekand others) on 13 October. They agreed
that the demonstrations would conclude with physical attacks on local
Ibid., p. 14lf.
jJ
Ibid., p. 264.
 80 81

PK.I headquarters and personnel. So it was that the 'Vigilance Rally 0

Godly People' came to be held in the city of Kediri on 13 October.

This demonstration marks the beginning ofwidespr~d mass violen~

in Kediri. The rally itself was violent enough, eleven PK.I m!lmbers beiJ)g
beaten and hacked to death as they vainly defended local PK.I headquanel'SI
Once this was done, the systematic killing of people identified as p ,
I
members or sympathizers commenced throughout the kabupaten. 11l
,,I Ansor demonstration of the 13th was a demonstration of strength. TJi
crowd was huge. The passions of the demonstrators were first fired qP.
by rousing speeches, then they marched off noisily to PK.I headquarte ·
their progress resisted by a much smaller crowd of PK.I youths. 'I1l
encounter was one of chaotic fighting, but did not long hold up the attac
on the PK.I buildings. Before they were destroyed, the offices wer
ransacked. The Muslims claimed that they found documents showing tha
the communists had already prepared lists of their enemies, presumabl
for subsequent execution.
!
The viciousness of the fighting that day showed that there would nq
be no quarter given in the coming assault on all who were believed to
'!...
1 I! '.·.11
be associated with the communist party. The taste of mortal combat against
' a surprisingly ill-prepared enemy was an experience which galvanized many,
of the youthful Muslim participants, committing them to an absolut'll
religiously-sanctioned crusade of extermination of their enemies. Many,
who were there today speak proudly of their deeds. Others who now hav ·:lift!'
troubled feelings about what was done, nevertheless felt swept along by
:,-Bb·dies of victims on the banks of the River Brantas in East Java
the collective spirit at the time. A minority were appalled and soughi
i 1
.,,, 1
1
quietly to escape from the insistent peer pressure of their Ansor comrades.~
' ~ I: I
I' I
11'::· •.'' The sanguinary violence of 13 October in Kediri city soon receded in
I
1.j' significance by comparison with the scale (and, at times, gruesomeness)
1 of the numerous murders in the villages of this overwhelmingly rural
,,

I I
,'i l
....~
kabupaten. Great numbers, many thousands", of ordinary villagers died.
The victims were said to be ·'communists'. Who knows what this label
-~ really signified among the tightly clustered settlements of Kediri? No doubt
·;
there were many villagers who found common cause in the complex (but
34 The two infonnants cited by Harold Crouch (Anny and politics, p. 147, and 'The·~ • ' immediate and tangible) local struggles of the preceding fifteen years.
Indonesian army in politics: 1960-1971' (Ph.D. thesis, Monash University, 1975), pp. 264, :'.
281) belong to polar opposites in terms of their responses to deliberate kill iiig. One expresses
pride in his actions, the other left Kediri in horror of what was being done - private·)
communication Dr Harold Crouch (for whose heJp I am most thankful). See also Pipit Rochija4 .~ I know of no accurate estimates for Kediri as a whole, but for East Java more
'Am I PKI or non-PKI?', p. 43f, and John Hughes, The end of Sukarno (London: Angus &.~j generally see the Report from East Java, Crouch, Anny and politics, and Hughes, The end
Robertson, 1968), p. 160. ' of Sukanio.
 82
Their loyalties and hatreds were invariably set, too, by the accident ofbeiJi
born into a particular household and neighbourhood, of being raised;j
a certain cultural tradition, of being oppressed by recognizable peoni
whose faces were seen every other day. For such ordinary villagers, boun
'
to the PKI primarily by communal loyalties and immediate class experien
!: the ideological antagonisms and political machinations of the capital we
surely more than geographically remote, however much they were shroud
in danger should their political standard bearer be cast down. With gr~
suddenness their cause was lost, and they were to die not only for W!ii
they had done and believed in, but simply because they could be labell!ll
'PKI.' To have the wrong friends, to wear such a label was enough,to
warrant summary execution. This awful situation moved the former Kedin
vigilante Pipit to his distressed appeal to have done with judging peoP.J
by labels (hence his title: 'Am I PKI or non-PKI?'.36 _ 0~ \]ie inevitable anti-communist attack. Mostly this did them no good.
The identification of people who were said to be activists or sympathize
of the PKI was mostly done at desa and kecamatan level. The victi
'l
Ii were identified by NU (or occasionally PNI or Christian) anti-communisij
from within the village or sub-district. There was apparently some kin~
i
of general overview of these attacks by anti-communist authorities, including
I '
the NU leaders, in the city. Raids did not proceed unless they we
I,., approved and organized by the mainly NU civilian leaders, and clearell
with the military."
I, 'I, "'', ,
I,
,~ I It was a method of operation which allowed the deployment of youthful
Ansor killers (with a sprinkling of PNI and Christian youths) from raid
•.. I: to raid to bolster numbers. 38 In a few cases, such as the predominant!J
I
communist villages in the upland plantation area, army support was brought
in as well. The mobile executioners were, however, frequently merelj
supplementary forces for mainly Muslim youths recruited from the sami
kecamatan as the victims. The size of the raiding party depended on th(
i:•I' prospective magnitude of the slaughter. The raiding force could b~J
hundreds, and not infrequently the numbers were as high as one or two;l
36
See especially p. 52.
37
This pattern was followed, though with significant variations, in other parts ofJavi
as well; see Hughes, The end of Sukarno, chapter 13.
38
Pipit Rochijat, 'Am I PKI or non-PK!?'; 'Report from East Java'.
83
d. The large-scale involvement of 'neighbourhood' anti-communists
lips one reason why in Kediri, unlike some other parts of East Java,
-- PKI leaders escaped. 39 This was a clear consequence of the pattern
~ttlement in Kediri during the period of rapid economic expansion
0
d;
1anial times, a pattern that left a patchwork of small, culturally
wregeneous groups living alongside each other. Prominent PKI activists
~·easily identified by locals. The efficacy of the purge of PKI cadres
afiirther indication of how much the violence in Kediri was not that
, sifanger against relatively anonymous enemy, but most frequently that
:~ 6rganized murder carried out by neighbour against neighbour.
J,1re victims were mostly trapped in a hopeless situation. Some sought
m;est.er refuge in the city (or even in mosques) in preference to waiting
, <ise in jail or other holding areas were often 'pawned' to vigilante groups,
o! uansported to a place of execution by the military, who handed them
over to the civilian execution squads. The patterns of violence were not
entil'i:ly uniform, but they were for the most part the result of planned
att.fcks. Stories of peoples' desperate attempts to escape are not hard
to·find. In Pare ('Modjokuto' of the Harvard-MIT study) the local Ansor
Jeatlers and the lurah tried to protect some of their peasants who were
m~te 'taggers-on' of the communist party...
... by giving them badges as members of Ansor or NU. They
were gathered together, and coincidentally, there happened
to be an operation by the military and Ansor going on. Seeing
many people gathered together, the soldiers and Ansor asked
the lurah who all these people were. The lurah, nervous and
particked, responded that they were PKI. Before he had finished
speaking, every one of the approximately 300 people was
,,,. killed.... This shocked the people, and within Ansor itself
mutual mistrust arose.40
'Report from East Java', p. 145.
Ibid., p. 145.
 84
At times, the killings hovered uneasily between orderly ruthlessn
and pointless chaotic massacres. There are nevertheless. no grounds fo
describing them as.unpremeditated or spontaneous. No one disputes t!Ui
there were people killed who were in no sense 'communist', and one too
II rarely encounters much doubt that those who were PKI deserved wha
I
I was done to them. The central political interest of the army was satisfiett
if the network of PKI cadres and activists were liquidated, but there is
at least one instance in Kediri where the inhabitants of a whole villag
reputed to be solidly PKI, was attacked indiscriminately by religiol!!
vigilantes, leading to heavy loss of life by people of all ages.
In Wates, one of the southern sub-districts, the PKI gathered in sufficient
numbers (about ten thousand) to attempt to march to 'safety' in Madiuij.
This was one case where the military was obliged to combine with Anson
forces to be sure of overwhelming the communists. ThePKI group refused
to surrender and lost 1200 of their number before they were subdued."
Depressing stories of individual tragedies are numerous even in published
sources." Kediri had these in abundance. Not least of these, perhaps,·
is Pipit's story of his encounter with crowds of starving five to ten yea,
old orphans at Kertosono. These bewildered homeless children had bee11
reduced to begging like dogs for scraps of food at the railway station.-0
It serves no purpose here to dwell on the many atrocities of that dreadful
one and a half months, except to observe again that systematic civil violence.
of such intensity deserves the most searching of explanations. Party political,
rivalry alone certainly seems to me to be insufficient cause for the suspension,
!
11
I-: of all other consideration of shared humanity among neighbours.
After December the army re-asserted its prerogative in the exercise 1
of violence, and the worst of the killings in Kediri were over. The great i
intensity, the special pitch of internecine hatreds, that. characterized the
41 Ibid., p. 148.
42
See ibid.; Hal'l)' Aveling (ed.), Gestapu: Indonesian short stories on the abonive
communist coup of 30th September 1965 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii ~outheast Asian
Studies Program, 1974); Pipit Rochijat, 'Am I PK.I or non-PK!?', and Foulcher in this volume.
43 · Fortunately this does not appear to have been a lasting phenomenon. By most
accounts I know of from Kediri, such young orphans were adopted and brought up by other
families.
85
. -ce inKediri depended on the conjunction of national developments
~1~~ting elements of inter-communal hostility which must be understood
. ci<;al tenns. The social history of Kediri - as a region of closely settled
~ ~lirants, a region whose social antagonisms were shaped in the boom
il!! ''of the corporate sugar industry and the decades of upheaval that
~bVii:d its sudden col~ap~e - r~veals m~ny ~pon_ant factors which ~~ve
~vn1inter-group conflict m thts area tts d1Stinct1vely uncom~romismg
~cter in the 1960s. Elsewhere (in the kabupaten ofKebumen m Central
f'for example), the termination in 1%5 of the PKI's influence was
a~ritplished with nov:here near this level of viole~ce or ea~er participation
o~thecivilian populatton. We can no":' turn to bnefly constd~r the p~ttern
o~Yiblence in other parts of Indonesia. In some cases, as m Bali: mter-
.tnl\tunal conflict reached, or even surpassed, the level of destructiveness
oooserved in Kediri. However, it can be quickly seen that in these cases,
~o)t; the most destructive energy behind the violence flowed largely from
meal influences.
1··~·
··'~''
:Regional Variation: Java and Beyond
•'iltl
•· #c;Tn the final analysis, the violence in Indonesia in 1965 would not have
, 'athieved the catastrophic proportions it did without the deliberate decision
· df..the army leaders to licence civil violence. They did so in order to amplify
· theforce the army could exercise in the aftermath of the Untung coup.
eertainly, there are instances - such as Pasuruan (East Java) or Aceh
(Sumatra) - where the PKI's local enemies did not wait until they were
s'ure of army support. For the most part, however, had the army chosen
fo'discourage civilian involvement, its prime political objective - the
eilmination of the PKI as an effective force in society and politics - might
fiave been achieved with relatively few casualties. The number of deaths
iii'Kediri would certainly have been much smaller. The clearest support
forthis proposition is probably the case of West Java. Here the regional
military commander firmly opposed the use of civilian auxiliaries and the
numbers of deaths were much less than in the other two Javanese provinces.
There were, it is true, places like the coastal town of Cirebon on the border
with Central Java, where many people died - '... the anti-communists [reports
Hughes) set up a guillotine that.worked steadily throughout the day, day
alter day' 44 - but civilian violence very significantly curtailed. Clearly,
Hughes, The end of Sukarno, p. 157.
 86
: I the commanders of the army had considerable power to contain and eve
!
prevent violence.
At the time, however, the leaders of the armed forces in Jakarta h
1 •
other calculations to make. In their judgement, early and effective acti~
against the communists required the mobilization of civilian auxiliarl
They were most uncertain of their rapacity to act in Central Java whe
the regional commander was very unsure of the loyalty of at least fi
battalions whose commanders h.ad expressed support for the30 Septem
movement. Elite troops were still needed in Jakarta, and logistics a
political considerations complicated calculations about troop movemen
the Sundanese troops of the Siliwangi division, for inst~nce, were reliati
anti-communist, but would only have antagonized the public in the Javan
cultural capitals in Central Java." Even after the occupation of Surakir
'the RPKAD commander, Col. Sarwo Edhie, ... still felt beleaguered'.
Unlike East Java, where civilian groups were eager to act against tH
communists early in October, the Central Javanese vigilantes needed 1
certain amount of coaxing from the military. On the other hand, bot
provincial army units and civil groups in East Java held back from Jar
scale action until the army, spearheaded by the RPKAD, had secured i
position in Central Java. The army elite, therefore, viewed strategic positio
early in October 1965, as being in need of strengthening by the use,
I Muslim and other paramilitary forces. One important reservation th
" i
had in making this choice was that they were reluctant to create a grass-roo
political vacuum which could be filled by organized Islam."
11 The violence that convulsed Indonesian society in that year w
therefore, more than the climax of years of internal struggle within
Indonesian society. It was a political choice deliberately taken by tli
military commanders who controlled perhaps the only instrument of Suit
policy that could be relied upon - the army itself. The army remairidl
a coherent force while the civilian side of the State lost all the limiteil
effectiveness it had once had. As Anderson observes ' ... the efficacy b
I 1
the civilian side of the State apparatus disintegrated as corruption a.~d
1 I
I ·:·oefj_Oi:ible in ecological terms and wh.ich were relatively homogeneous internally in terms of
j! Crouch, Anny and politics in Jndon'esia, p. 265, pp. 268-269. ,
46
Ibid.' p. 268.
47 Ibid.. p. 272.
87
'nteeism proliferated and communication, transportation and revenue
uei:tion broke down .... The one apparatus capable of sustaining itself
Cl!L,tlle·army ... partly because it controlled the bulk of the country's real,
epposed to paper, assets.' The willingness of the high command to
IS ' ·out the right to exercise violence under these circumstances, however
~rarily, indeed shows the gravity of the crisis. Max Weber regarded
State as being defined most essentially by its institutionalized monopoly
~exercise oflegitimate violence within a given territory. In this sense
one si'ate was crucial, but the most pressing strategic consideration behind
l!e ~ecision was the perceived (and actual) fragility of the State in the
. iii ~nd political crisis of 1965.48 Licensed civil violence was a lever
p,ull~d at the centre of national politics, but it was a very crude political
·:ifanism. The consequences of selectively releasing legal restraint on
~violent settlement of civil antagonisms varied greatly from place to
Iac;e,· the variations being shaped essentially by local influences.
j,have already drawn attention to the way in which the patterns of
'dlen:ce varied between the provinces of Java", and to the fact that the
00filucts were most severe in East Java. Even East Java itself showed no
stt~ng uniformity in the dynamics of civil conflict; there were parts of
e. province which exhibited important differences from the patterns
~~iiussed for Kediri. .
;:in Pasuruan, for example, the pattern of settlement, and the consequent
tiiS(6ry of intra-regional rivalry produced a very different cultural and
~fjtical geography from that I have described for Kediri. In Pasuruan,
no\ihnlike the Grobogan kabupaten in Central Java'°, culture, religion
Anderson, 'Old state, new society', p. 486.
CC. Crouch, Anny and politics, chapter 4; and Mortimer, Indonesian communism
.iiilikr
.
~: ~-
Sukarno.
-~ In Grobogan, support for political parties tended to be clustered in whole districts
·:paitf ·support. Rivalries were therefore distributed between districts (defined ecologically
ifa.lherthan administratively) rather than in the intricate patterns that pitched villager against
;\:i!lager in Kediri. The lines of political division in Grobogan were drawn between the rice
~.ltivatingvillages of the western plains and the tegion of poor, dry, rain-fed, corn-cultivating
~Uager in the east. The strength of the PK.I in Grobogan was concentrated in the east (this
~·also the home of a small number of Saminists), and in the teak forest enclave in the
n'or:th.
 88
and politics were broadly divided by ecological boundaries. 1'!i1l
predominated in the populous lowlands where Madurese emigration ha
been very significant, whereas the PNI and the PKI were more importan
in the Javanese midslope region and the Hindu uplands." .,
In the lowlands of Pasuruan, the killing of the small number of
activists followed soon after the news of the coup and its aftermath
Jakarta. In Pasuruan (unlike Kediri), Ansor did not wait on outsid
encouragement to act. On the other hand, the complex lines of COnfli.
in lowland Pasuruan were (unlike Kediri) not so clearly NU against p ,
but more that of Muslim anti-Javanist against the non-santri minoriti!l!
living there. Some of the first to be killed here by Ansor vigilantes wer
''ii
PNI members who had been prominent in Hindu-Buddhist religio.
organizations with a reputation for anti-Muslim agitation. 52 Howeve~
Hefner warns against the simple reduction of the violence there in 196$
along simple Muslim-Javanist (santri-abangan) lines. He observes in a
forthcoming study that 'whatever its very real religious dimensions, tl(
conflict was not in any organizational sense exclusively or even primarijy,
about religion.' Hefner's studies" explore a complex local history ol
conflict in Pasuruan which has many similar ingredients to Kediri. In spite
of this, it is a history which led to the entrenchment of dynamics of conllkt
which could not be readily anticipated from a knowledge of comparable
developments in Kediri.
Hefner's carefully developed ethnographic analysis of Pasuruan show
I :··1
with great cogency the strength of the distinctive local configuration ol
ii!
cultural-religious, class and political divisions in that part of East Java.
I ',i I l'oonflict.
'' i
51
Hefner, in chapter 7 of his forthcoming book, Economy and morality in Mountain
Java: an ethnographic history, says that Pasuruan had the strongest NU organization in a.U
of Java. The same chapter also documents how Pasuru~n presents a case, even sharper than~
i in Grobogan (see note 50), where ecological boundaries mark off profound differences in
cultural, religious and political orientation. My characterization of the situation in Pasuruaii;
'I relies entirely on Hefner's superb analysis. See also Robert W. Hefner, 'lslamizing Java?_
religion and politics in rural East JaVa', Journal of Asian Studies 46 no. 3 (August 1987k_;.
pp. 533~554, and Robert W. Hefner, Hindu Javanese: Tengger tradilion and IslOf!? (Princeton;~~
l Princeton University Press, 1985).
! I;
I~ 52 Hefner, 'lslamizing Java?'.
53
Hefner, Hindu lavanesej Hefner, 'lslamizing Java?'; and Hefner, Economy and
morality in Mountain lava. ' .: J9 the translation of Sukarno's Nationalism, Islam, and Marxism.
89
'·ummarize his anthropological findings too briefly here would be to
. :aversimplification. Some further points of contrast with Kediri can
~ guicltlY noted, however, by simply following the broad lines of political
Gtieli in 1965.
Pm ,~Jand Muslim vigilantes supported by the army invaded the highlands
.fi@ng after the Pasuruan plains had been purged of the small number
~~{~pununists. In t~e mi~lo~e villages and those of the 1:rlghlands, the
R~~\vas comprehensively hqmdated, but the task was earned out by the
. w'iiers ratherthan by neighbours. Indeed, the PKI's strongest opponents
~ tfi'e upland areas feared the invasion almost as much as the communists
~arand tended not. to cooperate voluntarily wi~h- the invade~s: Here we
Jiil~a pattern of acu~n between local cultural-religmus an~ palittcal blocks,
ruike the intricate mter-communal patchwork of Kedm. At the level
~f(tlielocal elites, alliances that worked inKediri were simply not possible
in J!asuruan. In Kediri, as among the national elite", PNI leaders were
aiiept at playing off NU and PKI rivalries to their own advantage. In the
uP,lands of Pasuruan, the Javanist PNI elite could not cont_emplate calling
lo~ assistance from members of the same class stratum m the lowlands
auring the aksi sepihak because of the strength of the inter-communal
G!&vages. In both Kediri and Pasuruan, the State was a major channel
1
0{ influences from the national centre, but the intentions of the centre
.were refracted in different ways in both localities. Similarly, stimuli of
cdnflict emanating from the centre set off strong reactions locally in Kediri
art& Pasuruan, but the interaction of these national influences with local
~hural, socio-economic and political forces led to locally distinct patterns
·
·*'~
While it would be rewarding to compare these two East Javanese
~lrnpaten at length, there is not scope to do so here. What matters for
' .Nesent purposes is to indicate that the circumstances of this time allowed
l)O!:ally-grounded dynamic:S of conflict full range for their expression. As
i"C;pnsequence, the blending of conflicts of national scope with these much
'iftore locally restricted patterns of socio-cultural, class and communal
dlvision produced a far from uniform series of actions, shepherded with
'""rying degrees of success by the army. (At the same time the armed forces
; '.
were themselves still ·engaged in an internal struggle to purge themselves
':r...
Ji'!Jf!. A pattern of poliUcal manoeuvre subtly ob.$erved by Ruth McVey in her 'Introduction'
90
of partisan political connections.") First among the circumstances t
produced such diverse conflicts· was a legacy of the past, the still ratH
limited degree of national integration, be it unity imposed on I .
communities through the State apparatus (the trend within the New Ord
or unity developing organically within civil society. Locally based politica
cultural and economic relationships still retained a high degree of salien
in public affairs in the regions. Given the crisis in central authoriiy ·
1965, and the army's encouragement of local anti-communist groups·:
addition to the rather lintited penetration of State and even party'' con'
at the local level, it is hardly surprising that the patterns of conflict shomtt
be so strongly influenced by local considerations.
Kediri and_ Pasuruan are not far ~tant from each other, either spatialJi
or culturally, m East Java. They still may be close enough to invite som
kind of explanatory synthesis which might possibly work for a significant
part ofJava. But if there is barely sufficient underlying similarity between
the local studies of the dynamics of conflict on Java to undertake sucH
an analytical synthesis, would that help us identify a national pattel"fy?
An extremely brief review of Bali and a few other places will illustrate
that this is really not feasible.
55
East Java had been a battleground of internal anny resistance to centralized authority
since the time of the struggle for independence. D.C. Anderson observes ('Military aspectS·
of the Madiun affair', p. 53):
The struggle between the hinterland Javanese units, determined to preserve a mass pop~ :;
army, and a high command no less determined to bring the field units under greate~ ~
central control, was a principal theme of the revolution which pre-dated Madiun and
continued well into the post-independence period .... Within this military struggle over-
power and ideology, East Java occupied a key position as an entrenched and highly articulate
source of opposition to the centralizing policies of the high command and its political
allies. · ,
Central direction was only established in the 1960s (ibid., see also pp. 35-36 a~d Anderson,
'Old state, ne<N society\ pp. 484-486).
Crouch, 'Indonesian army in politics', p. 153, notes that in the year prior to 1965,
the PNiand the NU both found themselves bound by 'the need to pursue one policy in Jakarta
and another in the regions.'
91
,·: ·eJdllings on Bali57 did not start in earnest until relatively late -
fu-_st week of December 1965. Here too the floodgates of violence
el'll~opened following action by the military, in this case army reprisals
!li~·killing of a soldier in a clash with communist youths in Jembrana
' ~ il{e west of the island). Once initiated by regional ar.my units, however,
0
: killing of communists was taken over on a large scale by civilians -
ureru, pted in a frenzy of savagery worse than Java's'. 58
·'i-
wJ.e massacres here were perhaps comparable only with the rapid
olesale elimination of the PKI in Muslim Aceh. However, there has
noiiieen, to my knowledge, any serious study of the dynamics of communal
·o1~nce on Bali comparable with the attempts to identify the roots of
®Mict in parts of Java. Nor for that matter has there been such a study
wri.A.ceh or for many populous non-Javanese regions such as West Sumatra.
·e little we do know does not suggest any simple equation with Javanese
·iJn Hindu Bali tensions between Muslims and Javanists (santri-abangan
clea~ages) are simply not relevant. Class conflict between poor peasants
and iandlords in earlier years had some relevance, since the PKI had
:;&i;cessfully -recruited poor villagers because of its serious agitation to
J;plement land reform. However, it was also well known throughout Bali
'iJlat pro-PKI landlords were protected by the party. Furthermore, the
'gqvernor, Suteja, was a PKisympathizer. Sutejahad very close connexions
·»With the leader of the party on Bali, Gde Puger. Puger had prospered
. i0.1turn through this association, and the party had an unusual degree of
uit1uence within the State apparatus, especially in Suteja's home district
of,Jembrana. Communist party practice, therefore, was hardly a model
ofscrupulous class confrontation.
;,:
The PKI's major rival was not NU, as in East Java, but the PNI. The
anger of PNI administrators, landlords and traditional rulers had been
roused by the boldness of the PKI's agitation in the 1960s, including
oommunist attacks on the religiously structured banjar system which
" The sources for the description of events on Bali, apart from private conversations,
are Hughes, The end of Sukarno, chapter 15; ·Crouch, Anny and politics, chapter 5; and
Keresohan pedesaon, chapter 6.
" Hughes, The end of Sukarno, p. 175.
 92
controlled many important aspects of communal ritual and ceremon·
life, including irrigation. · !~,restore order. In a press interview, the RPKAD commander Sarwo
Anger against the PKI was undoubtedly stimulated, as elsewhere
Indonesia, by confrontations over land and tenancy which commu ·
organizations pursued vigorously on Bali during the aksi sepihak campai
As elsewhere, landlords associated with the PKI were not seriously har
There is some evidence59 that, on Bali, deviation by the PKI, and by·i
peasants' union the BTI, from strictly class based action went further th
this. On Bali, '... the BTI attacked not only [non-PKI] landlords, it attack
small peasants as well'. 60 The organized BTI attacks (usually in grou
of hundreds) frequently came after adverse decisions by land reform coun
(dominated by PNI bureaucrats?) against them. Many of the documentai
attacks were against fairly small landholders.61 . of YiCtimS close to the number killed (perhaps one hundred thousand)
Whatever the grounds for anti-communist hostility were, they we
clearly widespread and deep. Following the army action in Decem~i
the PNI mobilized its paramilitary groups (known as Tamins). The T ·
systematic programme of village-to-village killing using lists of par
members (or following denunciation by local 'informers') conformed 10
a pattern rather similar to the actions of Ansor groups in Kediri. Howevei
on Bali uninhibited mob violence was at least as significant as the mor
methodical activities of the Tamin groups. There were cases where who!
villages (including children) are said to have participated in a frenzi<;11
hunt for communists, or in attacks on pro-PKI settlements. People I ha
spoken to suggest that political party identification was by no means alwa)!
I 1',: the first consideration in the selection ofvictims (t.hough there is no doubt
that the PKI itself was indeed thoroughly purged). While the PK! was
'
I bloodily uprooted from Balinese soil, it was also clear that 'old grudg ·
debts and feuds were being settled'62 and that non-communist Javan~
1'
and Chinese merchants were coming under attack.
J 6J
: I
:. i
:I 59
' Keresahan pedesaan, chapter 5.
Ibid. t p. 93.
61
Ibid.' p. 93f.
62 Hughes, The End of Sukarno, p. 180.
93
·. e RPKAD was ordered in, not to supervise the purge of the PKI,
tiUI .: remarked: 'in Centra!Java the people had to be aroused to oppose
file u whereas in Bali the spirit of the people was overflowing so that
0 esJ:f to control them'." What we lack is a thorough study which might
'":'more light on why 'the spirit of the people' overfl°"'.ed so voluminously
•:.and on who (in sociological terms) the protagomsts were. A model
er~,. cted from East Java has little direct application. An elucidation
~~.,!bat happened on Bali wo~ld have to ide~tify th~ cnicial local influences
' 1\nese not Javanese) which merged wtth natmnal developments to
~r~uce this complex (and at times almost chaotic) pattern of violence.
fu
the province of North Sumatra, where some accounts put the number
· Bali", we find again that the army encouraged local youth groups
on
· the capital city (Medan) to murder th' elf commumst· ·nva.
1T s. he youth
:uads here were Muslim, Catholic and 'Pemuda Panca Sila', this last group
in~llding a fair proportion more interest~ in looting th~n in pu~s~ing
itl®logically defined aims." The class, soc10-cultural, et~mc and rehgmu.s
Rrpfne of North Sumatra is very different from that ~f either Java ':Bah,
notwithstanding the large numbers of Javanese migrants there. The
region stands out, not on!~ f?r its ~ociological com~lexity, but because
ilie:struggles over economic issues tn the decades pnor to 1965 created
a.·situation of conflict which does not resemble the parts of East Java I
.!lave discussed.
;l
. <:East Sumatra is a region of massive estates (tobacco, rubber, oil palm
eJc.), established originally by Dutch and other foreign <;<>rpo.ratio;11s. The
.\IDutch estates fell into army hands after they were natmnahzed m 1957,
Crouch, Anny and politics in Indonesia, p. 154.
· ·64 Ann Laura Stoler, Capilalism and confronuuion in Swnatra's p/anJaJion belt 1870-1979
{New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), p. 163.
Crouch, Anny and politics, p. 153.
~ "'§6. Cf._Michael van Langenberg, 'C~ 3nd ethnic conflict in Indonesia's decolonization
Rmcess: a study of East Sumatra' ,Indonesia 33 (1982), pp.1-30; and Michael van Langenberg,
~t Sumatra: accommodating an Indonesian nation within a Sumatran residency', in Kahin,
:.J!.<gionol dynamics, pp. 113-143.
 94
so that in t~is region the PKI, through labour organizations such.·
S~UPR:l , confronted the army directly. The army therefore confronte(I
radical un~ons for about eight years in its role as employer. T!!
confrontation was not confined to industrial relations since the milita
largely took o~er the exer~ise of ~overnment in the region following t~
1957 declaration of martrnl law. The army organized and promot
a rival'. and _'~eliable' ~rade union, SOKSI. The crisis of 1%5 triggertjj
off swift nu~1tary act10n on the estates to eliminate the communisG
comprehens1vely'9, the army's purge being substantially backed up !iii
members of SOKSI.70 Javanese killed Javanese here (as did Batak a~a
Malay), but considerations such as santri-abangan cleavages, which we
scrucial
. in Kediri, had little to do with the patterns of violence in i•·•
umatran estate areas. Identifying who killed whom, and why, in NortH
Sumatra, accounting for the interaction of national and local polities
receivesinsufficientilluminationfrommodelsofcommunalconflictdra~
from East Java. The dynamics of conflict in this Sumatr~n region in 1965
have to be understood substantially in their own terms.
Many parts of Indonesia were even less responsive to central influences
than the cases we have looked at so far. Even beyond the populous centres
of PKI strength, there were other parts of the country which experienced
serious violence in 1965 and 1966. In these remoter regions there was
little similarity between local political processes and those we have looked
67
Sarekat Buruh Perkebunan Republik Indonesia, Union of Indonesian Plantation.
1
Workers.
I I 68
Stoler, Capitalism ahd confrontation, p. 143.
I i~nd issues as far back as the early 1950s.72 After the 1955 elections
69
Stoler, Capitalism and confrontation, pp. 142-143, 162f; Crouch,Anny andpolitics1
p. 87.
'
7
~ • Cro~ch, Anny and politi~'. p· _153. SOKS I was the Sentral_ Organisasi Karyawan
11.:
,, Sosialis Indonesta, the Central Orgaruzat1on of Indonesian Socialist 'Workers'. SOKSI's selection
I ~'
of the termkaryawanwas deliberate: buruh (labour) in lrid-onesian inlplies workers as distinct
I
from - and often in opposition to - the management; karyawan, literally 'functiOnary', refers
I ffite sickle and the cross: Christians and communists in'Bali, Flores, Sumba and Timar, 1965-67',
' °I! to all employees of a large operation, including management, and implies no distinct interests
I! on the part of labour; cf. Jacques Leclerc, 'An ideological problem of Indonesi8n trade unionism
in the sixties: "karyawan" versus "buruh,,,, Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs 6. no.
~ (1972~, pp. 76-9lj Jacques Leclerc, 'Vocabulairesocial et r~pression politique: un exemple
1ndones1en' 1 Ann_a~: .Economies, Sociit~ Civilisations 2 (March-April 1973), pp. 407-428i
and Stoler, Capllalrsm and confrontation, p. 159.
95
iin•Java. To underscore this point I will look briefly at Nusatenggara,
1
a ~ )1'oor islands of Indonesia's southeast?~ · , .. ',
J.he integration of these areas into the nation· today is much more
aa ,'ti~ than was the case .in the 1950s and 1960s. Even so, in places
li!le'$umba, Flores and East Timar, peoples' social orientation in rural
arc!lis.still remains primarily governed by their membership of one or other
·m~ \housands of small, scattered lineage-organized groups. There are
0
nuil!erous regional languages, and the socio-cultural and political identities
0~ J!OOple here was formed much more around these local 'traditional'
griJ~pings than by reference to the national community. In this part of
!lfe'country Indonesian national identity is strongest among the elites in
ffi:e:,few small towns.
· ,, Tue State is much more influential today than it was in the 1950s and
!J..!IQi)s, and so is nationalist ideology. Trained civil servants have gradually
roii,~ed in to replace therajas (the inheritors of the petty local 'kingdoms'),
~o remained very influential in the first two decades after independence.
;fui\hose years influences from the centre were strongly mediated by the
'•futhority of these local traditional elites, and particularly by the authority
fnd..institutional infrastructure of the Christian churches, both Catholic
S~· .
a:nd Protestant. Even m 1970, the churches owned seventy per cent of
. fe"educational establishments in West Timar, and were the major providers
qffsuch social services as health, electricity and agricultural advice.
'51(
'"" This is not to say that these areas were cut off from national influences.
l,t,merely points to the fact that these influences were mediated through
\9.f!ll social structures in rather distinctive ways. There were a number
~J.iJlstances of small local leftist-inspired uprisings and 'agitation' over
,H. 71. As noted before, my inforillation has been gleaned from a number of informants
whom I prefer not to name. Iam however particularly thankful for pertinent material supplied
!(?.'me by two graduate students - Paul Sutherland and Patricia Thatcher. I would like to
!hank them, and acknowledge their as yet unpublished work. See also R.AF. Paul Webb,
ftrpnal of Southeast Asian Srudies 17 no.1 (March 1986), pp. 94-112.
"I":'
, 72 Report on the Lesser Sundos, iru!oru:sio. Mernori penjerohan Gubemur Nu.ra Tenggaro:
1952-1957 (Singaraja: US Government translation, 1957)i A Hakim, Dari pulau bunga ke
pulau dewa (Jakarta: P.T. Pembangunan, 1961).
 96
the PKI gained .many ?1embers in rural areas. The PKI here was a par,
of reform, but 1t was m no sense revolutionary or subversive. Many·
its members were Christian, and its cadres tended to be local Protesia:o
0 li(i5-66. We know something about parts of Java - though I am struck
teachers and clergy. The political 'choices' made in Nusatenggara in th
years revolved around local issues, but they were no less fateful for thll
When the army swept through this region - in some cases months aft
the killings had died down on Java - the retribution meted out to thee
gave little recognition to the ingenuousness of the 'communism' •.o
clanspeople. I was told, for example, of the pathetic bewilderment of
. I:, remote tri??l group rounded up because their names had been placed 0 a
I a PKI pet1t10n by a member of the local elite.
1:..'
··.1'
It is unne~sary to elaborate on such cases. It is surely very obvio!is
that the blendmg of local and national influences in many parts of th
'Outer Islands' often had a most tenuous relationship to developmen
on ~ava. S~ch places clearly do not fit a 'national' model of the dynami
Of Violence m 1965 beyond the specification of the major national influen
(and even these were frequently mediated in locally distinctive ways). :·
is all a matter of degree. These are cases at the end of a spectrum. The
variation is not merely a matter of geography or remoteness from tti
national centre; it depends on the different historical experiences of different
elements of the Indonesian population and the variable speeds at whicH
they have been, and still are being, integrated into the nation.
The integration of political dynamics at the grass roots with developmen~
at the national centre was most advanced on Java, even though, as we
have seen, influences in both directions were mediated by groups whos
interests were still defined to an important degree within the idiom and
experience of older local conflicts. Across the narrow straits of Bali local·
i~fluences meshed with national developments in ways that were markedly,
' d1.fferent from Java. In North Sumatra, we find another pattern again,:,
I:: with the ar?1y w~ll entrenched in the control of the region's plantations,.'ji
;Ii
! I~
Here, cons1derat10n of the pre-coup period reveals a history of complex~
I class conflict between the military elite and the (largely Javanese) plantation 1
i·1.··! work-force - conflict further complicated by distinctive local configurations '1
of class, ethnic and religious loyalties. The more one looks beyond East '
.11'
Java, the more the East Javanese and especially the Kediri case is put in -~
I'
"
'' '.~'!'.' comparative perspective, the clearer it becomes that Kediri is merely one '
:1 local variant, and not a case that is readily generalizable to Indonesia more
broadly.
97
,,).\ie knOW little enough about the dynamics of conflict within Indonesia
1
!i)l Ji:e paucity of published information relative to what can be heard in
oonvprsation with Indonesians and foreign scholars with experience from
ose tll11es - and next to nothing about the rest of the country. This
r(gJ:!i.ttable lack of knowledge can only worsen as time passes unless more
~pie with direct experience act to record what they know. I have reviewed
rnx, reasons for believing that, once we move from the gross fact of the
a~aration of war on the communists by the military, (supported by a
Jlii:stiiy arranged but eager civilian coalition) to the consequences in the
~ and villages of Indonesia, we will find no single formulation, excepting
e:xcessively abstract or formalistic ones with very limited social and cultural
sW:cificity, that will adequately identify the dynamics of the remarkably
oloodY civil conflict which followed.
:ihave argued that the patterns of conflict, and the blending of national
mth local influences probably had to produce very variable results from
r~gion to region because of the weakness of what might loosely be called
·national integration'. The unity of Indonesia has always been primarily
~ured, both in colonial and post-independence times, by the military-
:b_uieaucratic apparatus of the State.73 The inculcation of a single overriding
:i'd~,ittity with the national community among all the peoples of the vast
if.r,itory. of ,the Repu~lic of Indonesia (th~ creation _of a~ 'imagined
· ;ctJI)llllUillty' 1fyou will - m Anderson's words) 1s even today a widely shared
~piration rather than a fully realised actuality. In 1965 this kind of
>M!~logical unity was weaker than it is today. Popular nationalism and
•: r~ti-colonialism was of course, as the returning Dutch discovered after
~ugust 1945, a most potent force. Nevertheless, the real political reckoning
0fjust what that hope-filled dedication to the nation entailed had to be
made once the unifying threat of Dutch return was removed.
The newly independent -government inherited a difficult situation.
Colonial policy had encouraged - indeed policies of indirect rule depended
on -the growth and elaboration oflocal particularisms. The colonial state
· :mis extremely wary of institutions or social movements that could command
mass constituencies. On the other hand, it positively depended on the
73 Anderson, 'Old state, new society'; Anderson, Imagined conununides.
 98 99

authority of minor local authority figures. The fragmentation was n fit these circumsta?~ it is scarcely surp~ing 1!1at a crisis in central
just political, but cultural, linguistic and even in certain respects econollli i]i'ority should prec1p~tate patt~rns of a~10n which ow~ as '?uch_ to
Eventually nationalism, Islam and Communism, each in their differen au iinfluences as they did to conflicts of national scope. The identificauon
ways, displayed a capacity to articulate the aspirations of the coloni · JioW these influences combined will require that greater attention be
(especially the small numbers with access to education) in idioms Whfo 0 • to various regionally based sources of tension. The lack of uniformity
transcended many of these boundaries. Nevertheless, after independen . , Indonesia is illuminating, not because it asserts a false (and ultimately
a poorly resourced State faced a formidable task in trying to forge ~istic) primacy of ever increasing restrictions of social and geographic
workable participatory polity from the diverse territories of the formei ~pe, but because, in the longer view of the development of Indonesian
Netherlands Indies. · . 'iety and politics, it is some gauge of the gradual movement towards
a tfiore inclusive national polity in Indonesia.
The State itself proved to be a weak and, with the exception of tli
gathering strength of the army, a failing complex of institutions. In spite
of this, there was undoubtedly a widespread popular will to hold the coun
together. Much of the striving to achieve the promise of the struggle.1 '~
'' independence therefore fell to political parties, and to centrally-inspireu
I,
mass campaigns. The mass campaigns of Guided Democracy reached'.a
broad spectrum of Indonesian society because of Sukarno's charismati
I leadership, and his skill at mobilising support across party divisions.
Nevertheless, his populist symbolism was given varying local and partisan
interpretation, and the energy of the campaigns deepened divisions as muc\i
as they superseded them.'4 The political parties seemed to act to breaK
down local particularisms, but they were engaged in an energetic scrambi
to thwart each other and to create their own mass base through ~
" comprehensive array of civil associations which touched not only politics
but every aspect of organized public life. This mass base had to be created.
very quickly and by whatever means were at hand -inevitably this involved
compromises through which older structures of local privilege and influen~
could be preserved. The PKI in particular made many such compromises·
across class boundaries. 75 Therefore party competition at the local level.
was an uneasy combination of recently articulated conflicts given imprecise 1
meaning by broad national symbols blended with older sources of intra- '
regional tensions and their existing symbolic complexes.
'
I
I

74
Cf. Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy' and Clifford Geertz, 'Ideology as a
cultural system' in Clifford Geertz, The interpretation of cultures (New York: Basic Books,
1975).

75
Mortimer, 'Class, social cleavage and Indonesian communism'; Wertheim, 'From
aliran to class struggle'.
 Chapter 4
MAKING HISTORY:
RECENT INDONESIAN LITERATURE
AND THE EVENTS OF 1965

Keith Foulcher

' '\.' Throughout most of the 1970s, creative literature in Indonesian was
· fifuost totally silent on the meaning of the events of 1965 and their
· tfiermath in the lives of individuals, communities and the nation. 1 During
· tji~ period, remembered history seemed to have no place in the national
ij{erature, as prominent writers turned inward to highly subjective
~!orations of personal experience or outward to issues of international
interest as subjects for creative expression. Realism and social observation
Jii general tended to be replaced, among those writers who drew recognition,
11Y experimentation with forms that gave expression to inner, psychic reality
and religious experience. In 1979, however, history began to resurface,
~ot initially in the mainstream or 'art' literature but in the burgeoning

This essay is a revised and updated version of a review article which appeared
uilder the title 'Historical Past and Political Present in Recent Indonesian Novels', Asian
Studies Association of Australia Review, ·11 no. 1 (July 1987), pp. 87-99.

In the period immediately following the massacres, a number of short stories by

witilesses or participants in the killings recorded the horror of the experience, often pleading
frir understanding or seeking to expunge the guilt of their author/narrators. These stories
were discussed by Satyagraha Hoerip in an article published in the journal Budaja Djaja in
1972, and republished as 'Pemberontakan Gestapu/PKI dalam Cerpen-cerpen Indonesia',
in Pamusuk Eneste, ed., Cerpen Indonesia Mutakhir (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1983), pp. 55-75.
'The stories were translated into English by Hany Aveling in the collection Gestapu: Indonerian
slfort stories on the abonive communist coup of 30th September 1965 (Honolulu: University
of Hawaii, Southeast Asian Studies Working Paper no. 6, 1975).
 102
entertainment literature genre usually known as sastra pop or 'po
literature'. · ,
The huge growth"': popular li~erature in the ~970s was ~ne of the~­
products of the expans10n of the literate urban middle class m early 'N'
'j'
Order' Indonesia. It was a tradition of writing that was both free of tti
aesthetic concerns of the 'art' literature tradition, and unencumbered !Si
the trauma of the literary politics of the pre-65 ,period. Within the 'an
I •I tradition, major writers and critics of the 1970s carried strong persona
and collective memories of that time, when they felt themselves to be t]j
embattled centre of resistance against the increasing tendency towar
the politicization of art and literature by the left. The 'popular' writers
of the 1970s, on the other hand, were mostly of a younger generation
who had been children in 1%5, and so were less directly affected by the•
events which 'art' literature appeared thankful to be able to forget or igno~
They were also the youth of the 1970s, and they shared the general outlook!
of the youth culture of that time, entlrralled by the glamorous possibilitf
of 'modernization', and yet also aware of the social issues and problems
which surrounded it. Some of them saw popular literature as a means
of communicating to other young Indonesians issues they felt to be 'o!
serious social concern. ,,
One of these writers was Ashadi Siregar, a lecturer at Gadjah Mada
University who had been involved in student activism in the early 1970!
and had turned to popular literature as an alternative to journalism afte1
the banning of the Yogyakarta student newspaper Sendi in 1971.2 In 1979,
: i
Ashadi published a novel entitled Jentera Lepas (Detached Wheel) (Jakarta:
Cypress, 1979), clearly in the popular literature vein, but like his previous
,i novels having a set of definite 'messages' for its anticipated youth audience,,
' ftl;er younger writers not associated with the left, and not directly belonging
The novel concerns the fortunes of a family associated with the PKI after
the events of 1965; its warning of the social implications of a generation:
of dispossessed young Indonesians growing up under the New Order was
the first of a number of similar evocations of this theme in the literature
of the early 1980s. Indeed, before 1979 was out, Yudhistira Ardi Noegraha,
another and perhaps more accomplished young writer who was also on\
the fringe of serious and popular expression, moved away from the satirical-~
2
See David T. Hill, 'Alienation and Opposition to Authoritarianism in the Nove1S ~
of Ashadi Siregar', Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs 13 no. 1 (June 1979), pp: .i
25-43.
103
!:. ur and iconoclasm of his Arjuna Mencari Cinta (Arjuna in Search
0 9
1 ~e) series, in favour ofan imaginative portrait-of the trauma of 19~5
?rif_encoba Tidak Menyerah (Try n~t to surrender)_ (Jakar~: Gramed~a,
9J11!j' 'IbiS novel, ostensibly for children and told m the vmce of a child
' , -'";or (like Yudhistira himself eleven years old in_ 1~5), details the
'1rie of a relatively prosperous and respected family ~ a kabupaten
a ci in west Java after October 1%5. It covers the penod from some
ihS before October 1%5 until late in 1966. During this time the
~~tor's father is imprisoned; released and finally a~~ucted, no~ to be
-a of again. The respected Jakarta poet and cnt1c, Sapard1 Joko
,iAfono,inareviewofthenovel,emphas1"zed its
Hear · ' meo
1 dramat1c. ' narra t"1ve
j'e' and suggested it had more value as a social document than a work
~rliterature.' Yet it is precisely this co~cious mixing of 'literature'_~n~
.- document' which makes the novel nnportant, regardless of the cnt1cs
\iation. Mencoba Tidak Menyerah tacitly rejects the literary conventions
ofiIBe 1970s and contributes to the new development, the use of remembered
~fory as a subject of creative narrative.
,,By 1980, a concern with history and s_ocial obs~rvati~n ~~general began
to11?e transferred into the area of 'art' literature 1tsel_f, 1m~1~lly as a_ r~ult
oi-the reappearance of left-wing writers gaoled for therr political affiliations
cier the 1965 coup. 1980 was the year of the publication of Pramoedya
~anta Toer's Bumi Manusia (This Earth of Mankind), the first in his
sefies of specifically historical novels, dealing with the awakening of
•!idonesian' political and cultural consciousness at the beginning of the
twentieth century. Other literature written at the time recorded the
~rience of political imprisonment, even though for obvious reasons
Jtwas slow to make its way into print.' As this was occurring, however,
:ftr'the 'popular' tradition, were beginning to take up themes which
~·
f,;} See Savitri-Scherer, 'Yudhistira Ardi -Noegraha: Social Attitudes in the· Works
'Ma-Popular Writer', Indonesia 31(April1981), pp, 31-52.
.1 Sapardi Joko Damono, 'Dokumen Melodramatik', Tempo 2 Feb. 1980.
~
-J 5
In published literature it is only the poetry of H.R. Bandaharo,DosaApa? (Jakarta:
i
, )nkultra, 1981) and Pu tu Oka Sukanta,SelatBali (Jakarta: Inkultra, 1982) and TembangJalak
, ;!IP/i (Kuala Lumpur. Wira Kaiya, 1986) which has spoken directly of the experience of political ,
',!j ·,)imprisonment and its aftermath.
 104 105

reintroduced the events of 1965 and their legacy into the mainstream lite novel asks us whether 'all our actions which appear to be good are
tradition. .iiJally based on something vile which is always in control of all we do'.
ca'!Je. But the blood which flows in Nyali's other-worldly kingdom,
In 1980, there appeared the novel KU bah (Mosque Cupola} by Ahrnan ~~trated by the unidentifiable enemy and its pursuers, the social
Tohari, followed in 1982 by the first of his Ronggeng Dukuh Paruk (TI! ilSndltions under a developmentalist-minded military ruler who is the victor
Dancing Girl from Dukuh Paruk) trilogy, published in book form afte ~.a' coup whose origins are unclear, and the regime's (and the novel's)
111
being serialized in the national daily Kompas. KUbah, published in Jakana ·, · on the 'enemy within' the social fabric all point towards recent history
by Pustaka Jaya, is a story of change in the lives of a rural communiey 5
Wing a part of the 1980s collective consciousness, expressing itself in
set against the national history of independent Indonesia and told in tif ffijf~r~nt strands of the national literary tradition.7
formal narrative style that had been largely repudiated by writers accorde(!
prominence in the 1970s. Its main theme is the problem of alienation ft is difficult to know where among these 'strands' to placeAjip Rosidi
'I. and reintegration, the attempt by both individuals and community !o 1111 (!,his important historical novel of the 1950s and 60s,Anak Tanahair,
re-establish lives disrupted and ravaged by political polarization and polititjij ec'erCah Kisah (Child of the Homeland, a Story), published by Gramedia
imprisonment. It tells the story of Karman, who is enticed by promises in.!rakarta in 1985. Born in 1938, Ajip Rosidi himself occupies an important
of personal wealth into affiliation with the left before 1965, and suffe p,lace in the pre-1965 history of Indonesian literature. Along with the
imprisonment and the disintegration of his family as a result. Returning l'llijng Rendra, he was. perhap~ the most significant of the group of young
to his village after his release, he is fearful of the community's respollj waters who emerged m the m1d-1950s, the first non-European educated,
to him, but gradually he is reassured of their acceptance. The novel end! 0 Jk-Dutch speaking generation of modern Indonesian writers. Both in
with a symbolic act of reintegration, Karman's making of a new cupol eir creative work and in the exchange of ideas, this group stressed regional
(kubah) for the village mosque. Similarly, an element of the Ronggeng i~entities and regional cultural roots as a basis for development in the
Dukuh Paruk trilogy is the tragic fate of a poverty-stricken and traditional na.lional literary tradition. At a time when Indonesian literature was still
i. community with no sense of life beyond its own immediate surrounds whicli HOniinated by the internationalist orientations of the '45 Generation', Ajip,
' is nevertheless drawn into the national political arena by the manipulation Rendra and those like them sign3.lled a new stage in modem literary history.
of political propagandists for the left. In 1966, the community is destroyed It. 'was Ajip who coined the term 'Angkatan Terbaru' ('The Newest
and its hamlet razed, after it had been tricked into seeing a neighbouring (!leheration') as a collective designation of these writers, and entered into
Islamic community as its enemy.6 .>'igorous polemic on its behalf in the early 1960s. His relations with the
)ltlllrary and critical centre at this time were ambiguous, as he remained
It is possible also to suggest that by the early 1980s the awareness ol ~blicly uncommitted and unassociated with the centre's defence of its
remembered history may have been making itself felt in the anti-realis\ 3J&gemonic position throughout the period of left-wing challenge in the
literature of the Jakarta centre. The nightmarish world of Putu Wijaya:1. •fears just before 1965. Following the events of 1965/66, Ajip moved onto
remarkable novelNyali (Bile) (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1983) bears no direct · ~ritre stage, not so much as a creative writer, but as a critic anci cultural
relation to history or observable reality at all. It is a story of inhumanl ·. fil.ministrator. Throughout the 1970s he was president-director of Pustaka
violence and cruelty, and political betrayal and deceit, set in a world which;; • ~ya, the most important publisher of serious literary work during the
uses elements ofan Indonesian environment only in the way that twentieth '.:i ' ~fiod, and from 1973 until the end of the decade he was both head of
century America is recognizable in Western popular culture's vision of·\ ~. 'li\e Indonesian Publisher's Association (IKAPI) and New Order Indonesia's
the technological future. In a publisher's preface to the novel, the ·:
government printer Balai Pustaka suggests that the author wishes to show
"'·.
'.llJ

that cruelty in human beings is unconquerable. In the publisher's words, 'fl

;i~.
1
In his paper to the 1987 Monash Univc!rsity 'Trauma of 1965' Seminar, Ben Anderson
:' ..~ntrasted the imprisoning cycles of violence and revenge inNyali with Pipit Rochijat's 'Am
' ~~~~or non-PK.I?', Indonesia 40 (Octoberl985), pp. 37-56, in which a mechanism for escape
6 Ahmad Tohari, Lintang Kemukus Dini Harl (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1985). Jr.Om the cycle is suggested.
106 Keith Fou/c 107

most prestigious arts body, the Jakarta Arts Council (DKJ). In 198Liti er.eality of child prostitution, represented by a young girl who had been
took an appointment as visiting professor at the Osaka Foreign Languag nhaned in the West Java regional insurrection.
O~r~
University in Japan, where he has remained ever since. The 300 pa 1'-
novelAnak Tanahair.was written in Japan, initially under a.grant fro a:iiis rebellion, the so-called Darul Islam movement, figures significantly
the Japan Foundation.. !he ending of this part of the novel. On a holiday visit to his home
YiJ!age, Ardi visits a school friend some distance away, and during the visit
Both the literary conventions on which it is based and aspects of tti !ii.l~friend's father and mother are both killed in a graphic description of
way in which it treats its subject matter make Anak Tanahair arguan} ii! ~!tack on the village by Darul Islam rebels. This event is important
not a work of the literary centre, as represented by Putu Wijaya's Nya. ill >AJ:di's development, for it confirms forever his distrust of religion as
It is a realist historical novel, in part a historical documentary, fulLo a secial and political force .. Back in Jakarta, Part 1 finishes around the
autobiographical elements and peopled by actual historical figures, eith · 2e of the 1955 elections, with the main preoccupation of Ardi and his
under their own names or thinly disguised behind pseudonyms. It is AjiP. ra~nds being the rival claims of Indonesian communists and socialists,
personal record of what it meant to be a creative artist in Indonesiaijn uiiqugh their political parties the PKI and PSI.
the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s, when questions of personal an[
national identity went hand in hand, and when political pressures ultimat~~ . iii Part II, the story's narrator becomes Ardi himself. We first see him
impinged on all areas of personal creative and intellectual life. It<' att~.riding the opening of an exhibition of paintings by his friend Hasan,
structured in three parts, with a single chronological progression maintaineil eniaged in a discussion of how appropriate the concerns of European
by three different narrators. aFtiSts, expressing themselves as alienation and loneliness, might be in
rn~Indonesian arts. He becomes attracted to Herrnin, a girl from an upper
In Part 1, the voice of the omniscient narrator tells the story of Ardi class background who is interested in art and discussion of ideas. Ardi
a young Sundanese .boy who is coming from his isolated village, first tll is ~ut of his depth and ill at ease in her social environment, but the
Bandung, on his way to live with his uncle in Jakarta, some time in the relationship deepens and, on her initiative, becomes Ardi's first sexual
early 1950s. His father has died in the revolution, and his mother is pooi inv9lvement. With his new-found unorthodox relationship Ardi keeps
and unable to cover the expense of his upbringing. He is a simple villag ~g further apart from social convention. He finishes school and begins
boy, at first ill at ease in the urban environment and shocked by the povel)J, W(yve as a painter, with a job as illustrator for a new arts magazine enabling
of his surroundings. In Jakarta, he attends a Taman Dewasa school, a~d him to rent a tiny kampung house for himself. He is friends with other
soon finds himself drawn into a lively intellectual and artistic environmenQ ¥.iJung artists, both those sympathetic and those hostile to the left, and
As this occurs, Ardi finds in himself the ability to debate and questio9, al:qlpts with excitement the opportunity offered to him by his leftist friends
and comes to feel himself in revolt against convention. In discussion he to ,\neet the painter Hendra Gunawan. Reporting the meeting, and .the
is able to question religious dogma, for example, to the point where h ~erest Hendra had shown in him, to his anti-communist friends, he is
even surprises himself. As he is drawn more and more into the life d) :.~9~ked at their reaction, and rejects their advice that he should have
the school community and its artistic activities, the noveJ begins to dra~I '.'l\l),t)ting more to do with such people. 'It is the anti-communists who insist
more and more on names and events familiar to an educated Indonesia~~ ·.t\l~.t art should be free of politics', Ardi tells himself. 'Isn't it.they who
audience. There.is a lively debate, for example, on the issue of 'appropriat~'i . ~e!now setting up political barriers to friendship and interaction between
content in a work of art, occasioned by Ardi's sense of admiration for thH ', /artists?}
Vi't·
audacity of Affandi and one of his artist friends in painting each otherc!
nude. Ardi himself shows a talent for painting, and feels himself in the·; " Jiii.i Following this development, Ardi becomes more self-reflective about
process of becoming an artist. As this occurs, he is also evolving a sociaL :i· art, and the vocation of an artist in modern Indonesia. On an assignment
and political conscience. We see him· taken by artist friends to visit · \Wf his magazine he comes to re-think his attitude to traditional art, learning
prostitutes in the red-light district of Senen, where Ardi's attempt to : "~understand that its bases and social function are different but just as
overoome his inexperience and unease finally breaks down in the face of . 'i'@lid as his own art. Meanwhile he continues to pursue the relationship
108 Keith Fou/c
with Hermin and dreams of a future with her. There are all kinds of er
tensions between them, however, which surface and cause a rift betwee
them after a visit, Hermin's first, to his kampung house. Her family,
come to learn, is associated with the PSI, and she believes, contrary,.10
Ardi's experience, that independence has done away with class divisio\]J
that all are equal and free in a democratic Indonesia. An old frieMo
Hermin and her family appears on the scene and exacerbates the tensio
between Hermin and Ardi. He i.s Asep, known also to Ardi but dislik(!(I
by him as Asep is the son of a former official in Ardi's home region Wlio
is now a governor in Kalimantan. Ardi ponders with resentment the ra.
that Asep's father, who before the revolution worked for the Dutch,:
now a governor, while his own father, who fought for independence.·
dead and his mother impoverished. In a state of anxiety and depression
over his relationship with Hermin, Ardi is visited by some leftist frien'
who are seeking his support for the Konsepsi Presiden, Sukarno's call
for the creation of a 'genuinely Indonesian' political sy~tem in 1957. ':
In reply to their appeal for support, Ardi at first responds that heiS
an artist, not a politician, but the ensuing discussion eventually persuades
him that artists should take a stand on questions of political importan
Indeed, this in no way conflicts with Ardi's beliefs as we have seen them
develop. He signs the document of support for the Konsepsi, althougH
he does not join the delegation to the palace out of shame at the stat
of his clothes, and his name is published in the leftist press along wifH
other artists who declared their support. This is a crucial point in Ardi's
story, because from this point on, circumstances turn against him. Hermin
rejects him, saying she had always loved Asep (indeed, he was her forme1
lover) and that her father has now forbidden their relationship becaus
Ardi is now known to have become a communist. His anti-communiSt
artist friends all desert him, and withdraw their offer of sponsorship !01
an exhibition of his work. He loses his source of income, as the magazine
which employs him folds, and other magazines which previously accepted·
his sketches for publication now will not deal with him. Ardi remaiiiS·
faithful to his convictions, debating issues of artistic freedom and defending
the rights of artists to political involvement, even as he is horrified at the.
polarization he sees taking place around him. Finally, deserted by former
friends and without any means of support, he becomes ill. In this condition
he is visited by leftist friends belonging to LEKRA, the left-wing cultural ,
organization. They offer him a job, and sponsorship of an exhibition. '
Ardi is at first wary, but decides in full conscience and awareness that he
109
~l:cept this further step towards 'involvement'. Part II ends with Ardi
. i'on his feet and holding an exhibition. Hasan, one of his few former
. ndS whO attends the exhibition warns him to be careful. 'Your work
ti~'talent and promise', he says, 'but if you are not careful you will
Ma ,uJ> serving interests outside of art'.
~t, this point, the end of Part II, Anak Tanahair has shown itself to
:{i:emarkable novel in a number of ways. Its 'documentary' nature makes
. 81guably a limited 'in group' novel, only to be appreciated fully by the
~tlc and intellectual community whose concerns it records, or by outsiders
S!llfidently familiar with that world to recognize the reference to works
0~ literature and other arts, and to identify the figures shielded behind
udonyms. At the same time, however, this characteristic is also a
strength, indicative ofa growing self-referencing Indonesian tradition, making
0 ci>ncessions to the needs of outsiders and without a self-conscious need
rorf.universal' relevance. More importantly, it is the first time that an
anti-OJmmunist artist (for while his relationship with the hegemonic centre
o!the 1960s was ambiguous, Ajip had no sympathy or alignment with the
eft'wing cultural forces of the time) has written of the challenge posed
!if)the left in a way that avoids caricature and trivializing. Ardi's progression
to)>iards becoming a member of LEKRA is sustained and credible, even
!YJ!ipathetic. Ajip allows Ardi a well-drawn moral and intellectual basis
0 Jlis development, as well as making room for the more familiar personal
ffl)stration and disappointment at his failure to gain recognition and
satisfaction as an individual and an artist. We see, moreover, how the
cjr&mstances which Ardi faced were at a certain point beyond his control
881a:n individual. Acting initially on the basis of personal conviction, the
n.eed to express a social conscience without wishing to become aligned
wiih·any particular group, he is propelled into a situation where his personal
'and artistic survival is only assured by coming to terms with the broader
.:!soclal and political conditions in which he finds himself. All this represents
~way of viewing recent Indonesian history which as a published statement
!~ide Indonesia is perhaps unique, and as creative work is certainly itself
· ~tory-making. It is not a story of 'innocent victims' ofa national tragedy,
-~t a detailed attempt to illustrate the circumstances which might have
-'.''"'
 110
led an individual artist to make a left-wing political commitment in 19,
Indonesia,• , ~~food and be of value to the present. The issue remained alive right
Ajip's reconstruction of history is all the more remarkabl.e whenji
seen in the light of his involvement in recent events which indicate Ji
raw are the scars of the period of history with which Anak Tanahait.,
concerned. Tirroughout much of 1987, the national literary journal Hons
was the forum for an at times fiery series of claim and counter-claim o.
the question of the legitimate view of pre-1965 literary politics. Ajip Ros·
himself initiated the exchange by responding to a claim made in a 'roma
biografi' of the critic H.B. Jassin by Darsjaf Rahman that Ajip and a gro"uP.
of young West Java writers, somehow in league with LEKRA, had sougji
to sabotage the anti-communist 'All-Indonesia Writers' Conference' (KKJi
o~March 19?'1.' Ajip wrot? a long article in reply to the claim,.detailliig
his recollection of the penod between 1963 and 1965, and reiecting
false and defamatory the claims made in the Darsjaf Rahman bool(l
His article points to the tendency of those associated with tii
anti-communist cultural circles of the early 1960s to suspect the political
motivations of those artists like Ajip who resisted formal affiliation Willi
both the left and the right wing of the cultural political struggle of tH
period.
II
Darsjaf Ral!man's reply to Ajip's article, while it dealt mostly with poinu
of detail, maintained the general tone of the need for constant vigilan
and action as the only means of defeating the left-wing threat. It was
published in two successive issues of Horison, concluding in April 19S1
The same April issue, however, contained an editorial essay by Ari.e!
Budiman, entitled 'Do we have the courage to look at our past historyi•
buying into the issµe Ajip had raised, and arguing that the events of th
8 ! ifha11:ge of views o~ the hist~rical record, so too ~ considerable effort
One is led to wonder how well Ajip's reconstruction of this period will sit with
the recently announced Presidential instruction on the neCd for an authoritative history t)I:
Zaman Baro lndonesiaMemang Perlu DitulisK.embali',Kompas 5May1987, and theeditoriaL..:
fn the same issue, 'Tentang Penulisan Sejarah Periode 1950·1965'.
the period between 1950 and 1965 for use in Indonesian educational institutions. See 'Sejarafi
/
9
DarsjafRahman,Antaralmaginasi danHukum: SebuahRomll!lBiografiH.B. Jassbl
(Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1986),
IO
Ajip Rosidi, 'Manifes Kebudayaan dan KKPI', Horison 21 no.I (Jan. 1987), pp.,
10-16 and no. 2 (Feb, 1987), pp. 43-49.
111
, ,·eeded disinterested historical reconstruction if they were to be
.ugh into the latter half of 1987. In the May issue of Horison there
~ect a vociferous reply to Arief Budiman by Wiratmo Soekito, an
8
eUectual most closely aligned with the anti-communist actions of the
~ ejecting Ariefs call out of hand, and reaffinning the reply he had
0 a similar call by Satyagraha Hoerip in 1982: 'Go to hell with
.,
ill' r;ekra!' (English original).
Jii:August of the same year, Ajip concluded his recollections of the
~surrounding the KKPI of 1964, in reply to DarsjafRahman's reporting
th-ilm. 11 Interestingly, the editors of Horison not only devoted
0
CQ iqerable space in the magazine to Ajip's two-part article, but in the
in ertists of the history of the period, devoted further space in the August
itien to the re-publication of a series of articles Ajip wrote at the time
0 lli~ 1964 conference for publication in the Bandung newspaper Pikiran
~at. In these articles Ajip had written at length and with passion over
e Clifference of opinion between the Bandung delegation and the organizers
o! !l(e conference, outlining and justifying the Bandung attempt to broaden
!ht:'.scope and in a sense depoliticize the nature of the conference. The
J!j(ljctung position had been viewed with suspicion throughout the KKPI,
antl'fu Ajip's view it remained so in the 198(1<; with the publication of Darsjaf
Rifunan's book. The fact that the editors of Horison devoted such space
. !his exchange, re-publishing Ajip's 1964 articles as an historical document
- a move without precedent in the journal's recent history - reinforces
e/sense of acute topicality which surrounds the surfacing in the 1980s
o! the events of the mid-1960s.
The mood of the mid-1980s was not only one ofreappraisal, however,
•as the events and printed sources so far reviewed may tend to suggest.
·.if at the same time as individual cultural figures were engaging in an
·.~·bemg made officially to remforce the orthodoxVIew of the 1965 coup.
~1984 the government had sponsored the production and distribution
· 1a
-~:;
marathon 'historical documentary'-style feature film entitled
~natan G30S/PKI (The Treason of the PKI 30 September Movement).
Jl
Ajip Rosidi, 'Masa Lalu Sebagai Sejarah' (Bagian II·Habis),Horiron 22no. 8 (Aug.
. ,1987), pp. 263-267,
 113

!irten by Ari1in C. Noer, and numbering among.its actors such prominent

res as Umar Kayam, the film told with re!eritless detail the official
, Jon of the coup attempt, which led to the murder of six generals and
e small daughter of General Nasution, before the future of the nation
a'5sured by General Suharto's counter coup ofl October. While much
~film is taken up with shadowy recreations of clandestine meetings
rween the PKI and the coup plotters, it actually makes its bid for the
, pathy of its audience not so much through appeals to the national
0 erest as through repetitive affirmation of the sanctity of the family and
0 c!\ildren, which is violated by the inhuman and un-Indonesian actions
0 l!ie PKI and its supporters. The detailed portrayal of each of the
iffijered generals as a loving husband and father, the focus on the suffering
.~ families, and especially on the death of the five year old Ade Irma
asution represents the film's attempt to turn popular values to political
adwntage. The importance which was assigned to the film, especially as
a esson for those too young to have experienced directly the events of
. ..imay be gauged from its widespread showings to captive mass audiences
@~students, civil servants and military personnel in the latter part of 1984.
0!ies of popular reaction to the film are varied, ranging from its successful
oonf(rmation of popular prejudice, through boredom and distaste, to
titinilitary responses among some audiences of university students. 12
,iJ. 1986, one year after the publication of Ajip's Anak Tanahair,
gkhianatan GJOS/PKI entered Indonesian literature, in the form of
n0vel' adapted from the film, written by Arswendo Atmowiloto from
·fin C. Noer's film scenario. 13 Written in documentary style and liberally
ustrated with stills from the film, the book is more properly viewed as
11lar history rather than creative fiction, and is likely to be much more
res1dcted in its circulation than was the film itself. Nevertheless, its
a p,~arance as a novel written by a popular and successful writer illustrates,
as tl~es the film, the need felt by the state apparatus to make its presence
ntl Its version of history felt within the sphere of creative discourse..

Frontispiece from Arswendo Atmowiloto's Pengkhianatan G30S/PKJ. The PKI, in the form . See the report in Indonesia Reports 20 (February 1987), quoted in Krishna Sen,
of a worker and peasant brandishing a hammer and sickle, stand behind the soldiers ffi'!lniing 'history' under the New Order', in Krishna Sen, ed., Histories and stories: cinema
firing on the awakened general ~~ ~,'!Vew· Order Indonesia (Clayton, Vic.: Monash University, 1988), pp. 49-59.

" Arswendo Atmowiloto,Pengkhianatan G30SJPKI (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1986).

114
Placed within this overall context of the battle to define the r~
past, Ajip's Anak Tanahair assumes an added degree of interest. 1ill
narrator's sympathetic treatment of its protagonist and his progressio
to the position of LEKRA artist may appear to be an outspoken reappnf
of a still very contentious past. Yet this is in fact not completely the ·
for the novel is compromised significantly by the climate in WhicH .
appeared. It goes some way towards reappraisal, but it ultimately subllli~
to a reinforcement of orthodoxy. This only becomes apparent oncet
novel's third and final section is taken into account.
115
i.thiS section, the last fifty-odd pages of the novel, Ardi himself recedes
IQ the background, and the narrator becomes Ardi's painter friend Hasan,
1ro5ewords closed Part II. It is Hasan who tells the final chapterof Ardi's
.!Y;Jn a series of journal entri~ dated ~tween 1962 and 1965, and written
ii! ii)eform of letters to a fict10nal friend. As becomes clear, Hasan is
jiJiJs person.a, and the sent~ments expressed by Hasan are those of Ajip
. ·e!f.14 His letters descnbe the harmful effects of the politicization
the arts, the terrorizing of artists by the left, and the corruption and
6
· orality of the national level politics of the period. Hasan's own response
· a:deepening of his religious convictions and a thorough-going study
0
!Slam and the nature of Islamic art. In the middle of his letters comes
e.eiing with Ardi, who looks well, but to Hasan is clearly tired in body
soul, deprived of help by his anti-communist friends when he was most
lll n~ of them. In the reported conversation Ardi speaks in formal and
ciffi~ tenns, trying to convince Hasan that he should join the organization
j~mic artists, LESBUMI, and accept that the conditions of national
e ake individual identity an impossible luxury. Hasan insists on
m~ining unaligned, and comes closest to speaking for his own creator
en we see him rejecting involvement with the anti-communist Manifes
e1i6dayaan of 1963, an issue also fought out between Ajip and Darsjaf
. l!man in the Horison exchange. 15 In Hasan's last meeting with Ardi,
eptember 1965, Ardi has just returned from an overseas trip. Hasan
KS.• him out, to ask his help in assisting those artists who are being
rsecuted for their Manifes Kebudayaan connections. Ardi is shocked
n horrified by what he hears, and confesses to Hasan that he wants to
ve,LEKRA. He has learned that artists involved in politics can't be
tp create art. Hasan says quietly, 'Now you understand', but he warns
Hi:'to be careful, saying that once a member of an organisation like
Thus, while aspects of Ajip's own biography are felt in Ardi's experience in Parts
an~ II, it is Hasan who represents the stance taken by Ajip during the period of extreme
_lbgical tension before 1965. -
,. The Manifes Kebudayaan has in fact been the subject of considerable and often
~ionate discussion in recent years, as individuals both centrally and periphera1ly involved
m_ 01e events of 1964/65 have sought to 'set the record straight'. For a detailed personal
act;,ount by a signatory to the original document, see Goenawan Mohamad The 'Cultural
~~Ji;ifesto' affair: literature and politics in Indonesia in the 1960s, a signatory's.view (Clayton,
;.:-'\~:Monash Uni~ersity ~ntre of Southeast_Asian_ Studies, v:orking Pap~r no. 45, 1988) .
.~ enlarged version of this paper was published 10 Indonesian as Pensuwa 'Manikebu. ':
'!ftsuSasteraan Indonesia dan politik di tahun 1960-an (Jakarta: Tempo, 1988).
 116
LEKRA it will be difficult for Ardi to free himself again. To himse
he expresses the hope that Ardi still has some talent left for his art.:
Hasan's final letter, dated December 1965, we are led to presume t6a
Ardi has been killed in the aftermath of the· coup. Hasan deplores tH
killing going on around him, and expresses the conviction that it will no
solve Indonesia's problems. Communism, he says, will only be destro~
by a just and free Pancasila society. 'God has saved Indonesia for the presen
and only He will save us in the future.'
From Arifin C. Noer's Pengkhianatan G30SJPKJ (the torture of the captured general~
The function of this final section of the novel is clearly to undercu
and reverse the ideological directions established in its earlier sections.
'
.1
The author himself intrudes, so as to define and justify the role he playel!
in the events which form 'the backdrop to the narrative, and Ardi is forcdl
to surrender the pen just when we, the reader, have come to know a.na
understand him. Tue novel falters, and remains unconvincing, partly as
117
te5ult of technical failure, and partly .be~us,e of overt ideological
1
artipulation of the narrative. Technically the intrusion immediately
~ents the author with a problem which is not satisfactorily resolved.
Ghange in narrator of this kind demands a significant shift in narrative
;ioirb along with that change, and Anak Tanahair does not achieve that
· ition. In Part III ofAnak Tanahair, the narrator is Hasan/Ajip, but
e w"oice' is the same voice established in the previous 150 pages as
10 ~ging to Ardi. Therefore, when we do glimpse Ardi in Part III, he
ks as a character in what we had come to see as 'his' story, and the
. ~:of the novel becomes blurred and confused. (There is indeed no
ih voice between the omniscient third person narrator in Part I and
i's.first person account in Part II, but its absence is not as damaging
. 1 ~narrative as it is between Parts II and III, because there is no change
e~pective in the transition from the third person narrator to Ardi
elf). If Ardi had been allowed by the author to finish his story, the
·0,ti.s sense of a flawed narrative might have been mitigated. Indeed,
nl'it inconsistent that the character we know Ardito be should become
tl.isillusioned and remorseful figure Hasan sees for the last time in
tember 1965. The internal logic of the narrative, however, demands
t Ardi be allowed to reveal this process himself, and not to have the
n faken from him at the crucial point in the development of his story.
ut il\jip as author wants his own say, and so the reader must accept the
en~ing
,, of the novel's main character.
! t Ajip as author undertook this difficult technical problem, intruding
oi~tantly into the narrative, is an indication of how strong are the present
~ideological imperatives governing the novel's production. Ajip'smajor
u~pose in the final section ofAnak Tanahairis to establish the legitimacy
o ilje stance of non-involvement which he took in the Manifes Kebudayaan
l!l:Fiod, and to indicate his ultimate rejection of any hint of sympathy with
iliqse artists who aligned with the left. As he does so, this part of the
navrl becomes subject to all the cliches which Parts I and II have so carefully
aVGided. Whereas, for example, Ardi discovered in Part II that the provision
ofqasic physical needs of food and shelter inevitably impinged on an artist's
creativity, Hasan in Part III finds peace and satisfaction in his art, avoiding
an)\.compromise with political pressures but without any visible means
o "velihood and support. Where Ardi's views of Indonesian destiny are
test6d in rigorous intellectual debate. throughout Parts I and II, Hasan
is a_Ilowed an unchallenged vision of the Pancasila society and God as the
res:uer from communism. The fact that these ideas do not emerge from
118
the narrative, but are reproduced in unmediated form indicates the exten
to which· Ajip Rosidi is mindful of the climate in which his novel
published. The present, in the form of Part III, subverts the histori.
consciousness which underlies Parts I and II.
From Arifin C. Noer's Pengkhianatan G30SJPKI (Detail from the recovery of the bodies
of the murdered generals)
Anak Tanahair is an important book, for it is a major contributio.n
to the tendency of 1980s Indonesian literature to begin recording aria
reflecting the experience of its readers as participants in processes ofsocial
and historical change. The·past is being re-examined, as Arief Budiman
urged in hisHorison editorial. But although there is in thatn~-examination
a sense of understanding and sympathy, present-day ideological imperati~
demand that the sympathy be for innocent victims, individuals, families
or communities wrongly implicated in the events of October 1965 m
politicaity manipulated into a position· of responsibility for those even~.
119
, a arge extent these tales of innocent victims in fact reinforce the guilt
~rn;eextra-literary actors, the PKI and those who knowingly and willingly
0
. :·pated in its ruthless pursuit of power. Clearly then, Wiratmo Soekito
:ght, in his angry retort to Arief Budiman that the past is also a part
.!
0
me political present. As an art work, Anak Tanahair is an example
0
! 0 w uneasily the exigencies of the political present and the need to
16
: mine the past co-exist in contemporary Indonesian literature.
Since the publication of the novels discussed in this ~ay, there has been-further
Cience to the events of 1965 in at least two published Indonesian short stories. Those
_. re of are Anggia Putra's 'Penjual Bakso' (Harison, July 1987) and Nb. Dini's 'Petilan
pan' (Kompas, 24 Jan. 1988). Both confirm the conclusion drawn from the novels
the remembered past is being both incorporated and compromised. Both are
ISCVClopments of the 'innocent victim of PKI crimes' theme. 'Penjual Bakso' points to the
residue of the violence unleashed in 1965 and before, and 'Petilan Kehidupan' looks back
-~e experience of the wives of political prisoners after 1965. Both narrators are of the
19.SOS, however. The past cannot be dismissed, but they themselves have adapted to new
~{~ a new and changed society.
120

~~
~ "o
a wz
0
<
~
fe "~§
" <
~
Chapter S
~
~

a
~ RURAL VIOLENCE IN KLATEN AND
·"' BANYUWANGl1
•
~
~
0 < •
!?.~
.... t§ •
< ~

• "'• .]
0

~. Centre for Village Studies

~. • ~.. ~ Gadjah Mada University
Translated by Antony Cominos

J
· ·Some of the heaviest killing in 1965-66 took place in the Central Javanese
' ion of Kia ten, lying on the lower slopes of Mount Merapi between Solo
and Yogyakarta. This study was prepared by a research team from Gadjah
Nl:ada University and examines especially the relationship between the
< Ii.ling tensions in the countryside and the campaign of direct action (aksi
>

•
<
.... .. p(hak) by the PKI and its peasant affiliate the BTI (Barisan Tani
Iildonesia, Indonesia Peasants' Front) to carry out the land reform laws
a

••
< ."'
~
qf1959-60. Implementation of these laws had run aground and a shoal
E
• 'Jfbureaucratic delay and resistance encouraged by rural landholders .
·:'1r~
"' ...l<
~ '!'' The study traces the origins of the aksi sepihak in Klaten from February
E-<
z i: • and March 1964, when the BTI organized public meetings to demand land
u ~
"' 0 "for the peasants and the crushing of what were described as the 'seven
~ . village devils'. Aksi sepihak then began to take place in various

·····......... \......./···········
I From Pusat Penelitian dan Study Pedesaan & Kawasan Universitas Gadjah Mada,
!fporan tentang studi mengenai keresahan pedesaan pada tahwi 1960-an (Jakarta: Yayasan
. f~casila Sakti, 1982), pp. 42-74. The text shmys evidence of hasty compilation, perhaps by
. a- committee; sections announced at the beginning of chapters are missing and the order
«·,of paragraphs is confused. To make the material more readily accessible to the reader, the
,.:iext has been has been both edited and in some cases substantially rearranged. Except where
--_(~oted, footnotes are from the original text.
 122 123

·'of the K!aten kabupaten.2 The research team recorded a total of

. ti such actions in the Klaten region in 1964, clustered in the periods
!UarY-July and October-December. Perhaps the most interesting feature
~iii~ incidents described is that they had to do with land which had only
0
. · tly been alienated from its former peasant owners. While the seizure
iiand was accompanied by an assertion of the rights ofvillagers in general
0
iak~ in the harvest, the actions were most clearly aimed at rescuing
~ously landholding peasants from the slide into landlessness.3

fr~rhaps
most important, the study sheds light on the level of violence
it! wral Java after the coup and before the mass killings began. In the
~)!ijrting of the time, regional branches of the PKI were accused not only

0
r,Jliunching Gestapu-like local operations to remove conservative military
of!iters (see the introduction to 'Crushing the G30S/PKiin Centra!Java'),
5u~were alleged to have launched more general actions against their political
I DRJlPnents in the countryside. Arthur Oommen reported a extensive killings
in \he K!aten-Boyolali area of Central Java in which two hundred and
fil!YPNI and NU leaders were murdered and some fifteen thousand people
Dell.' Such reports, whether true, partly true or wholly false, helped to
i:@te the atmosphere of 'kill-or-be-killed', which many writers have pointed
o9J Jay behind some of the ferocity of the massacres.
) Tue Gadjah Mada study unfortunately does not follow the course of
e<1ents in Jlobo, Kraguman and Mlese beyond the aksi sepihak into the
·~riod of the massacres. We do not discover what became ofHarjosuwito,
•.Jikosukamo and Lulut Sunamo. Instead the focus shifts to other parts
·b'f the Klaten region, describing PKI activities before and after the coup,
··as recalled by their opponents, and re-creating the sense of fear and
\l}lC:Crtainty which pervaded the non-communist communities of the region.
:pie study ends with the remark, 'tension subsided and calm was restored.'
t · J1or the non-communists this was so, but it points to the fact that the large

For an explanation of this.and other administrative and militaiy terms, see note

3 The slide into landlessness is also described in Umar Kayam's short story, 'Sri
' ! Sumarah', translated by John H. McGiynn, in William H. Frederick and John H. McGlynn,
eds, Reflections on rebellion: stories from the Indonesian upheavals of1948and1965 (Athens,
Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1983), pp. 130-168.

p.150.
' Arthur C. Dammen, 'The attempted coup in Indonesia', China Quarterly 25 (1966),
124 Centre for Village Stua 125

scale killings began only after the non-communist forces were assure<( PRAMBANAN
. 0
victory. .
.'i Sepibak
t,
lf:he following passages are accounts of several 11ksi sepihak protests
oiMiiiZed by t~e B!l in the Kl~t~n region. We begin wi_th an acco~nt
ol a protest which aim~ at re~ammg contro_I over land which_ had ~arher
~n; rented out. Hariosuwito was a latlz kenceng' who hved m the
enuaban of Jlobo, in Wonosari kecamatan. In 1957 he rented out one
tdk [about 0.45 hectare] of his rice field to Dulkamdi for a period of
w;'years. The rental contract was ratified by the local village head. Before
e..eiid of the agreed five year period, the term was extended for a further
five'years. This extension was not ratified by the lurah. After the first
reeyears of this extension, Harjosuwito requested the return of his land.
Jilu)Jcamdi refused, and Harjosuwito reported the case to the village head
wlio, in turn, conveyed it to the kecamatan Land Reform Committee, which
aJided in Dulkamdi's favour. .
~ . .

.'>After failing to achieve his objectives by means of negotiation,

Jil~rjosuwito took action. On 19 February 1965 he began to work the land
wiihout Dulkamdi's permission, assisted by perhaps five hundred people,
wlio came from the kelurahan of Sukoharjo, Lumbungkerep, Kingkang
add Granting in Wonosari and from Mojorejo and Carikan in Juwiring.
©ne third of them were women from Jlobo kelurahan. One of them brought
twii buffaloes to plough and harrow the soil, and with the help of these
S°ple Harjosuwito was able to plant the field with rice seedlings.
·i111 Similar action aimed at regaining control over rented land was organized
;j\iithe kelurahan ofKraguman in Jogonalan kecamatan. In 1962 a farmer
iWith a small plot ofland named Joyosukarno pawned his land to a certain
·Suharto for Rp. 50,000. An oral agreement between the two set the contract
·cv· ·
. ~\ 't.en years, although the written contract made by the lurah had stated
ii'as seven. The camat of Jogonalan refused to ratify the new contract,
1':;!
· But the lurah nevertheless regarded it as valid. After two years, Joyosukarno
ijgi:ided to redeem his land, according to the 1960 land reform law which
siated that redemption was possible before the agreed time limit .
. ioyosukarno was represented at the negotiations by Suradi, Suharjo,
Mitropawiro and Hardomintoyo, well-known BTI figures in Jogonalan,

A small farmer owning a house and some agricultural land. Ed.

 126
since the BTI wanted to help him fight his case. Suharto, however, re
to hand the land over.
Once negotiations had failed, the BTI decided to take action. On.,.
March 1964 the BTI organized an aksi sepihak on Joyosukarno's be~
,J According to Joyosutarman, a police officer in the Gondangwinangy
I district, at around 2.00 p.m. on 25 March, about two hundred men [
.i women began to work the disputed land. Dozens of women harvest
the rice manually while behind them the men hoed and ploughed the Ian
The harvested rice was then taken to Joyosukarno's house.' · . GrWingly tense and members of the PNI began to worry that a physical
In other regions, direct action was used to regain control of land Whi .
I
I
had earlier been sold. In the kelurahan of Mlese in Gantiwarno kecama
for instance, another wage labourer, Surosentono, had sold two bloc
.1. ,. of.sawah [rice field) to Sudarmono in 1940. Surosentono was then gi~e
1'
the right to work half of o,ne of those blocks, while Sudarmono work
the remainder.7 In 1960, Surosentono asked if he could buy back iH
land. Sudarmono refused, and the case was taken before the Kia ten coti .
which decided in favour of Sudarmono. Nevertheless Surosentono retaineil
,, the right to work his half block on a morte/u share-cropping basis. ,
:1'
11.:1
In May 1964, Surosentono decided to work Sudarmono's section· ol
the block after Sudarmono's crop had been harvested. Surosentono w
assisted in this work by members of the BTI. As the BTI members w~nt
to work, the commander of the PUTERPRA (Perwira Urusan Territorial
dan Pertahanan Rakyat, Teiritorial and aviJ. Defence Officer) in Gantiwamo
stood at the edge of the village, not far from the activity, and said: 'Terusrio
lehmu do nggarap sawah. Mengko yen wong PNI rene tak bedile' (Continu~
working the land. If the PNI come, I'll shoot them.) With BTI help,
Surosentono was able to work the land successfully. · entled, the Cucukan kelurahan administration auctioned the lease again
Several days after this aksi sepihak, Sudarmono and several well kno~
figures from the Gantiwamo PNI met to discuss how to counter the B'IT•
actions. Twenty days after Surosentono's aksi sepihak, Sudarmono decideil
to work his section of the block, with the help of eight members of tli~
6
In former times, it was customary that all members of a village could take pan -
in the harvest and would receive a share of crop in exchange for their Work. Ed.
7 Complex: tenancy-ownership relationships such as this were not uncommon in rural
Java. See Clifford Geertz,Agricultural Involudon: the proceSs ofecologi.cal change in Jndane.siO :
(Berkeley: University of California Pr~, 1963). Ed.
127
, . others PNI members waited nearby. The BTI apparently found out
;1"as happening and approached the eight PNI people who were hoeing
aaiiJnono's land. Two of the eight were forcibly taken to Sumbiyono's
eiill Miese; where they were questioned on a v~riety of matters, before
. gfalJowed to return to the rice field.
,· ue this was happening, BTI and PNI memb.ers gathered near the
~Id being worked by Sudarmono. Numbers grew and two tight groups
.f!!!ed. Both showed their feelingsofanimosity. The atmosphere became
ooii'iontation might develop. One of them reported what was happening
. ui:e Gondangwinangun District Police and soon afterwards. four armed
ui:e officers arrived on the scene. The police explained to both groups
t!they could not permit any action which might promote physical conflict
~n Indonesian citizens. The police spoke at length and tried to soothe
ilie tension. They then instructed the people to leave the area.
i.further example of aksi sepihak, this time aiming to regain control
0~ land which had earlier been auctioned, was an incident which took
p,laC!i in the kelurahan of Cucukan in Prambanan kecamatan. The village
~etary of Cucukan provided the following account of the incident. The
iliSRu'ted land had previously been a 2000m2 reservoir belonging to the
· _ge administration and it was the policy of the kelurahan to rent it
out.anew every year. In 1962 a peasant from Cucukan with a small
lindholding of his own named Lulut Sunarno obtained the right to work
e;:land. At the end of his first year, however, Lulut had still not paid
liiS- .rent to the kelurahan, and he continued to work the land into the
fOllpwing year even though the rental period had ended. As in previous
r: he refused to pay his rent. Because the rental period had formally
in.~·963 and it was bought by a peasant named Sugito from the kampung
oflSaren in Cucukan, who was a memberof the PNI. Lulut's right to work
tfft:field had by now been formally rescinded by the administration, but
h~ stayed put. Seeing Lulut's attitude, Sugito was afraid to exercise his
o;.vn rights over the land. The Prambanan administration, however, advised
~ ~'gito to work the land immediately, and guaranteed to protect him while
)\e did so.
By May 1964 the peasants of Cucukan had finished harvesting their
dee fields. Lulut had also finished and began planting a new crop. Three
\j'eeks after Lulut had finished planting, Sugito decided to work the land
~ltich he had rented. Early one morning fa May, at around 6.00 a.m'.,
r.--.
 128
Sugito began to work the land, with the help of several members of
Pemuda Marhaenis8 including Suharno, Saryono, Muhadi and Suman
The Prambanan administration also sent along the commander o{ 1
Prambanan Police Sector, Inspector Mulyono, and two aides, Yahlllin•a
Projo. Suhardi from the pagar praja [village defence corps] represen
the kecamatanadministration. No-one came from the Prambanan mi!i
command. The youth from· the Pemuda Marhaenis helped Silgjm
enthusiastically. Four cattle were produced in order to plough and ha .
the field and the field was guarded by police officers, the pagar praja; a
several members of the Pemuda Marhaenis. ·
When the work was half finished a group of Pemuda Rakyat,' includin
Suwarto, Suroyo, Dono and Anto, arrived on the scene, and tried torcu
the reins of the harrow which was being operated by Suharno. Sumant
knew Suwarto well and politely attempted to stop him. Suwarto did incl1!i!j
stop, but more and more members of Pemuda Rakyat and the Pemu
Marhaenis began to arrive at the field. The situation became chaotic a!iij
neither the police nor the pagar praja officials could control it. Not long
afterwards the sound of a drum could be heard from the village of Je ·
! I
to the south-west. More and more drums began to beat, the sound spread~
from village to village. Members of the BTI began to arrive from all fou
points of the compass, carrying objects which could be used as weapo
such as hoes, sickles and hammers. · say. Disperse and go home.' The BTI members then left Gupala. When
The new arrivals from the BTI and Pemuda Rakyat gathered togethe~
around the field, in their thousands. They came from areas including\]!
kelurahan of Taji and from Prambanan, Manisrenggo, Jogonalan ana
Gantiwarno. The situation in the rice field became even .more chaor
as BTI members continued to try and obstruct the work. More and mq
Pemuda Rakyat went into the field. The four cows which were pulling
the plough .and harrow were pulled indiscriminately over the furro ·
One of the BTI members said 'Are you tired of eating rice [i.e. are you
tired ofliving]? Why have you taken someone else'ssawah?' In the midit
of the panic Suhardi fired his pistol once into the air. This was followe11
by two shots from Yamin. Suhardi then screamed to the BTI member!;
'Alright, we had better go and discuss all this in the kelurahan office.~.
8 Marhaenist Youth, a youth wing of the PNI. Ed.
9 People's Youth, a yo.uth wing of the PKI, Ed.
129
·e BTI agreed with Suhardi's proposal and they walked towards the
• hall, throwing insults at the kecamatln officials and PNI members
ey went. One of the BT! me~b~rs pretended to try ~n~ chop off
J!ead of a PNI member with his sickle. So that negotiations could
'~lace more easily, Suhardi asked the BTI members to select a
~~ntative. A number of people called out: 'Suroyo! Suroyo ... !' and
.yp walked to the front of the group to negotiate with the officials.
· b;ihe negotiations were taking place in the Gupala village hall, BTI
bets surrounded the village. The negotiations proceeded for four
urs'.without achieving a result. Although the village was surrounded,
roie ro'ember of the PNI succeeded in escaping, and went to the kecamatan
ci to request support from Klaten.
0
~t- 2.30 p.m. the head of the BTI's Klaten branch, Supriyo, arrived
1 !Jiei)iall where the negotiations were taking place. So that the discussions
1Qiild proceed smoothly the negotiators were changed, Supriyo replacing
toYo as BTI representative, while Suhardi replaced Mulyono. When
e sei:ond phase of the negotiations were about to begin, Kismo, head
ih~ Prambanan kecamatan office, announced that help from Klaten
en its way in the form of a convoy of trucks carrying a Mobile Brigade
·~·On hearing Kismo's announcement, Supriyo stood up, walked towards
e:ll,TI people gathered in the yard, and said to them: 'You must do as
e Mobile Brigade Unit arrived in the village the atmosphere was calm,
ui0ugh nothing has ever happened. The late arrival of the unit was
ue to the fact that it had to stop in Pandangsimping to help someone
tio'had been run over by one of the trucks. There is one very interesting
· g about the aksi sepihak which took place in Manisrenggo: both the
~tll:ipants in the protests and the landlords who were the targets of the
mion were members of the STI (Serikat Tani Islam Indonesia, Indonesian
u'slim Peasants' Association).
•
 130
The Seven Village Devils Campaign and PKI Preparatio
for Rebellion10 , ··vehicles and other necessary equipment for the party. Some time
Several months prior to September 1%5 there was a meeting of p
branches in Klaten, organized by the Klaten branch and attended '
representatives from twenty-three other branches. One of the resolur
cam~bth y e meetmg · was to urge all classes within society to elimina
m °' ene occasion, several people had been kidnapped and were about to
what the PKI called the 'Seven Village Devils'. These were: 1) land!or
2) usurers; 3) people who bought padi at very low prices before it W.!i
harvested (penebas); 4) middlemen (tengkulak); 5) rural bandits; 6) · .
traders; and 7) bureaucratic capitalists. ··
Utilizing the Confrontation with Malaysia as a front, the PKI provi~~
military training for all members of the Pemuda Rakyat. The folloWin
forces received his training: 1) a crack force (kekuatan inti) offive platoo g
to be based in the city - one platoon was trained from each of the fi
districts; 2) a platoon from the Pemuda Rakyat to be bas.ed in every villa
(desa/kelurahan); 3) a platoon of Pemuda Rakyat for every hamie
(kampung!perdukuhan); 4) and a special platoon consisting ofeleven men·
Minggir, Ratmo, Darmo, Mujio, Harjo, Partono, Pasikw1, Kuwaji, Tentr{ ·
Suwandi and Pariman. This special platoon was led by Sumarto. Its brfef
was to commit murders and kidnappings. The members of tltis platoon
ha.d to disp1'.1y the highest degree of loyalty to the party in carrying 0 ~ 1
thIS bloodth1rstywork, even to the extent of murdering their own relative\
One particular task of this special platoon was to kill Village Devils whose
names appeared ori specially prepared lists. Before this task was carrieii
out each l.ist had to be ratified by the Seetor Committees: Military trainiiig
was provided by BUIBRPRA (Bintara Urusan Territorial Pertahanah
Rakyat, Territorial and Civil Defenee Officer) at the kecamatan level.
Several months prior to September 1%5 military training under the auspiteic
of preparations for crushing Malaysia was carried out in Prambanan~ .
Members of Pemuda Rakyat took part in these exercises which included j
the assembling and disassembling of weapons.
Another part of the total PKI strategy was training to take power and
control of the economy. At the village level the PKI proposed that all
village heads aligned with the party should direct money collected from
taxes and other charges to it rather than to the government. Traders
' JO
' The facts upon which this section is based are drawn from inteIViews carried out
in the Prambanan region during June and July 1975.
131
a'me wealthy were requested to provide monetary contributions for
lhe end of September, all PKI sympathizers were requested to provide
one kilogram of rice. In the PKI view, anyone in Prambanan who
·at support the movement belonged to one of the seven categories
. l\lil!age Devils. There was a plan to kill a number of these people.
iWJed when they were saved by the PNI. One of those involved in such
0 i~cident was Colonel Katamso, the Commandant of KOREM 072.
:The PKI constantly endeavoured to infiltrate or influence government
il!,ltltutions and organizations. In Prambanan, the communists managed
suci.cessfully to influence the Buterpra. Several officials of the kecamatan
ii!llipolice officers also came under PKI influence. At least 50% of teachers
)iil~i already joined the PGRI non vak sentral. 11 Most wealthy people
antl,ordinary villagers either became members or at least declared sympathy
for1the PKI. Good examples of the extent of PKI influence are the desa
Slijran and Joho. In Bajran only twenty-five people declared themselves
10 be members of the PNI. The rest of the village was aligned with the
R)a. In Joho there were only eight PNI members.
iThe PKI's war committees in each village made extensive preparations,
inclµding the provision of holes in which they could bury their victinls.
, ere were five areas in Prambanan prepared for this purpose. Post 1
w/s located in Purwodadi (Bugisan) and Post 2 in Klentengan
@>ompyongan). Strong fences were built around communist villages.
, ey also built false entrance roads in order to confuse and disorientate
outsiders, and dug holes or placed obstacles such as tree trunks on the
rdads into these villages. Obstacles such as these could be found on the
.~Y to Brajan, Randusari and Kemudho villages.
;~; Klentengan was also the headquarters of the Prambanan PKI. The
:jg'cation of these posts was selected upon the basis of the PKI's military
i · ~C:tics. Purwodadi lies between two rivers and is in the midst of an open
Held (bulak). For this reason it is an extremely difficult area to attack.
~hackers would have to cross both open and very difficult terrain. Unless
"
· 'sllrrounded closely, the communists could easily escape by river. Klentengan
II
The breakaway left-wing branch of the Persatuan Guru Republik Indonesia (Teachers
Association of the Republic of Indonesia) which was not part of the PNI - affiliated GSBI
trade union federation (vak sentral). See also Kenneth Orr's chapter in this volume. Ed.
 132
is located in the midst of a number of closely knit hamlets, and it is n
easy for outsiders to distinguish.it from the rest. A number of guard Pbso
were erected in a layered formation in the surrounding area, making .
11
difficult for attackers to reach Klentengan undetected. It was easy to esca
from this cluster of hamlets as was proven during the military operatic
which were carried out at the beginning of November 1%5. · eir
The mobilization of PKI forces just prior to 30 September 1965
felt throughout the whole community. Apart from.the special platoo
and the platoons drawn from Pemuda Rakyat, the PKI also made all otne
inhabitants of the villages do guard duty and work in the interests of tl!
party. The PKI leadership planned to use non-communist forces to furth
the party's interests. Because these forces were a minority they had eithe
to submit to the PKI's wishes or risk being killed. Orders and instructiom
were often accompanied by threats. Every outsider who entered a p ,
area had first to pass through a security screen and be interrogated':!11
the PKI members. All inhabitants of the villages were obliged to participa
in the guarding of their village, on the grounds thai-HMI (Himpunan
Mahasiswa Islam, Muslim Students Association) was ready to seize powe~
in the region. The PKI leadership also utilized informal leadership ties
to extend their influence. The area around Klentengan and Watuleler,
to the north of Prambanan, was known as a centre of criminal activi)l'..
Two well known criminals were Karsopendek and Arjoslamet. They were
known as petut (gangsters) and were feared by all. The PKI used them
to kill several non-communists in Prambanan.
Anti-communist Counter-measures
One of the main tasks of both communist and non-communist youiH
was to maintain security in their respective villages. In areas in which
communists were a minority, their every move was closely watched by the
non-communists. Village administrations controlled by the PNI ma4e
it clear to PKI members that if they did not follow the orders or instructiori.I
given to them then their safety could not be guaranteed. But despite sucli.
I
warnings, communists usually preferred to leave their own village and joilic
their comrades in other villages.
I
I
133
lit.order to counter the increase in communist activity, the Nationalist,12
il.luPt and Christian groups organized their youth into fighting forces.
Nationalists, who were supported by the PNI, formed a special unit
Ol'lii as the Pasukan Banteng Serba Gnna (lit. All-Purpose Wild Bull
nil]f' Platoons of as many as thirty people were stationed in each village.
enthusiasm for fighting the enemy was heightened by Kyai Mawardi
m Boyolali, who was brought in to lecture them. This form of training
undertaken by all members of the Pemuda Marhaenis. The Islamic
utJ{in KJaten were organized into a force known as the Barisan Serba
~urfa (All-Purpose Brigade). There were also Christian youth who called
etn5elves the Barisan Pengawal Yesus (Guards of Jesus Brigade). Their
llin"aim was to protect churches from communist attacks.
j
· 'e defensive organizations established by the non-communist political
~tips had three main aims: 1) to help the government when necessary;
. to'help the rural people in defending the safety of their village and
l to: provide rural youth with military training.
The military training was
P.!l.Jiideci by the RPKAD para-commando units based in Kandangmenjangan
ana Kartasura and the Battalion 05 Depot in Wedi.
'e armed clashes in Prambanan
""
"on the morning of 23 October 1965 a strange· thing happened in
P.nfmbanan. This was market day at the Prambanan market, and as usual
i!ie'small traders were going about their business in the market complex
antl along the side of the Yogyakarta-Solo road. They were amazed to
liiitl large tree trunks and gravestones placed deliberately in the middle
o(ihe road. Traders and. other people on their way to market were
oti.Sttucted by a group of youth who told them to return home, without
gjYmg any reason. Groups of young people stood in several places along
tli,emain road. In Kongklangan they gathered togethernearthe Borongan
:·ver bridge. A number of them wore green uniforms. Most wore the
Rej\1uda Rakyat uniform -- black with a picture of a scorpion across the
'" Since the 1950s, the term nasionalis has tended to shrink in scope from denoting
~eral commitment to Indonesian nationalism to implying no more than membership of
9.~iassociation with the Nationalist Party, PNI. The banteng or wild bull, mentioned below,
~ the PNI party symbol. Ed.
134
back. They were armed withparang (broad-bladed knives), linggis (crow
and keris (short swords or daggers). . e~ilp
During the night the sound of wooden drums could be heard cl
by all inhabitants of Prambanan. The sound caused alarm. among
population but for certain members of the community it meant that so
form of action had to be taken quickly. The non-communists were ove ·
by fear and doubt. Communication was difficult as their homes
dispersed, though it was also difficult for communist activists to mai~
contact with their leaders. ' ng'people and pagar praja who were on guard duty. While the youth
Several ~llagei: located rel~tively close to the m.ain road became targ
of communist action. These included Randusan, Joho, Bajran, Pere
and Geneng. The village secretary (carik) of Bajran was the only no
communist in his kampung. All his neighbours were PKI members)
became extremely frightened and decided to take refuge in the keluri
office, since the lurah of Bajran was also a member of the PNI and~
be relied upon to help. On his way to the lurah's house, he came act
a tree trunk laid across the road. A group of young people were wait"
along the main road in a state of constant alert and they watched ·
suspiciously as he passed. On the other side of the bridge he could:
bits of wood scattered all over the road. This wood was clearly from.
door of Amat Darum's house in Klongkangan. It had been destroyed
a group of youth because Darum's son, Huri, was a member of the Peniu
Marhaenis. The carik then decided to head instead for the Prambana
kecamatan office, where he met several well known PNI figures, as ·
as large numbers of sympathizers and village officials who had taken retil
there because they were afraid of the terrorist activities of the PK!. ,
lurah of Barukan in Manisrenggo kecamatan was also present. ·
communist coup in Manisrenggo had not yet taken place (see below],tiu
the .Prambanan camat had convinced him that he was one of the m
important people in Manisrenggo and that his life would be in dangg
if he returned.
With the help of lurah of Barukan, the camat of Prambanan fonhi!!
a Command Team (Tim Komando) ofnori-communist party leaders, un
his direct control. No members of the police force or BU1ERPRA we
invited, as both these forces has fallen under the influence of the Pm.
The Team was aided by communications, supply and logistics departme~u
and by a secretariat. The carik of Bajran was entrusted with logistii!il
matters. · u1niunded the kecamatan from all sides. In the west they had reached
135
older to counter !?Nery possible l?Nentuality, young people were ordered
positions in strategic locations. The.group of youth who were
· .neid at the front gate were accompanied by several pagar praja dressed
· fins similar to those worn by the police. Several of the youth were
,~th weapons from the kecamatan armoury, while the rest carried
~-~t around 10.00 o'clock that night a unit from battalion F at Klaten
)iad gone on patrol to Manisrenggo arrived to the north of Prambanan
f..station and turned westwards towards the Prambanan kecamatan.
lights of the army vehicles shone very brightly in the direction of the
·1ea11mth their weapons, the pagar praja stood by the side of the road
"Iii tfieir hands behind their backs. The Battalion F troops suddenly
~ down from their trucks and began shooting wildly in the air for
ut· thirty minutes while screaming to the youth to surrender. The
osphere became extremely tense. The camat fled in fear, leaving the
Ji,.0f Barukan, who was asleep at the tinle, and several youth leaders.
e ·~oung people retreated into the kecamatan grounds and sought
.t£tfon behind the masonry wall. After being woken from his sleep,
lurah of Barukal). approached the soldiers who were still shooting.
e. did so the military commander screamed out at him: 'Hold it,
, enµer! If you don't surrender you will be shot!' Continuing to walk
ard, the lurah explained that these were non-communist youth. They
e:Marhaenist and Ansor youth who, together with members of the
.n:·eommunist kecamatan administration, were maintaining security in
lll"ll8.· The military patrol, which was led by Second Lieutenant Ngadimin,
ij"thought at first that they were part of a communist force who had
. -UP,ied the kecamatari. From a distanee the pagar praja had looked
e pplice who had been disarmed. It had seemed as though their hands
ij been tied.behind their backs while armed youth were standing guard
r•lthem. After the misunderstanding had been resolved the military
tto.l returned to Klaten.
'.
Not long afterwards more shots were heard. The patrol encountered
a einuda Rakyat group which was about to carry out some form of terrorist
acti~ty. After failing to halt the patrol, the band disappeared into the
111pungs, firing into the air.
,. e shots fired by the Battalion F unit proved to be of considerable
tielp:to the Prambanan Command Team. It was discover later that just
fo'.e to the battalion's arrival in Prambanan; Pemuda Rakyat units had
136
the desa of Karang, while in the north a unit was stationed in 'll0
kampung. In the east a unit was based in Borongan kampung and ui 1\!1
south they were positioned along the railway line. They were pla .!
to launch a major attack on the Prambanan kecamatan, but when the
continued for thirty minutes the communists were frightened· out oftn .
respective positions. The misunderstanding between the battalion·
the Prambanan youth was indeed very fortunate for the peoplea
Prambanan. When interviewed for this project, the lurah ofBarukansa
that he would probably have been killed by the Pemuda Rakyat if it
not been for the incident with the Battalion F. At 1.00 a.m. a sp .:
envoy from the Commandant of Battalion F visited Prambanan to apolo ·
for the misunderstanding. The lurah of Barukan was then able to sl
peacefully before joining the camat of Manisrenggo in Jambon then
day. ,
The Kidnapping and Release of Suwito and DarmosenjoY.
The vandalizing of Amat Darum's house in Klongklangan on 23 Octo~
part of an attempt to kidnap Huri, Amat Darum's son, was only one of
a series of terrorist actions carried out by the communists. On the sam
morning, several people, including at least three PNI members, we
kidn~pped: ~arjono, a primary school teacher from Borongan (Tiogo
Suwito, a resident of the desa Randusari, and Darmosenjoyo, a residen
of Bajran. S~veral people were kidnapped while carrying out their da\!j
work. Suwito, for example, was kidnapped while digging a we .
Darmosenjoyo was kidnapped while simply having a conversation. Althmi8J!
those people who were kidnapped were certain to be killed, the PW
established courts complete with judges and prosecutors. The chief
magistrate (haldm tinggi) was Suwarto, one of the general leaders of tli
PKI. Darmosenjoyo was accused of being an accessory of the PNI a~a
of being affiliated with the USA He was also charged with being a foll~1
of Katamso. He was pronounced guilty but was provided with an
opportunity to appeal. His appeal was rejected, however, and he was
sentenced to death. The punishment was to be carried out two days later.
The victims of kidnappings were usually taken to PKI headquarteri:
Suwito was taken to the Randusari headquarters whileDarmosenjoyowa!
taken to Klentengan. The house useq for the Klentengan headquarte~
was owned by Warnotemu, a farmer sympathetic to the PKI. The housE
137
!liph Darmosenjoyo was confined belonged to a small trader (bakul)
~\political ideology is still unknown.
,/ii Suwito and Darmosenjoyo were fed during the periods of their
l!!!iifill~ment.Suwito .received better quality food than Darmosenjoyo,
0 :was given only cassava and corn. The peasant who lived in the house
exiremely poor and knew nothing about politics, except that he had
jG\ure of Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX on one of his walls. It was
ar~nt that he felt more sympathy for the prisoner than he did for the
, 'and
·,
he treated him well.
, flier prisoners were treated cruelly by the PKI although they received
gathy from the owners of the houses. Suwito witnessed one case in
!iich an official named Kisno of the Prambanan kecamatan was beaten
·iii.an iron bar several times on the body and head and was then thrown
mto'the comer of the room, his hands were still bound. A PKI member
i!l!I!led Sarindi then turned up and slashed Kisno's mouth with his parang.
n afterwards a person called Warnotelu came and cleaned Kisno's
.qnds, bandaging them with strips of material. While all this was
Rpening Suwito and his wife and children were lying face downwards
on !he floor with their hands tied behind their backs. PKI policy on killing
us prisoners was that the more serious the accusation against them the
or,e· quickly they were put to death. Kisno was killed only a few hours
ifte_r being kidnapped. Suwito discovered this fact after overhearing a
oon'.l!ersation between PKI members. On the other hand Suwito himself
i;not to be put to death until 6.00 a.m. on Sunday.
;pieRandusari base possessed adequate supplies of food- several bales
o!liftl and halfa bale of refined sugar. Sitting on several fireplaces were
eifthen cooking pots filled with vegetables and jackfruit, tempe [soy bean
iiife], and boiled cassava. In Klentengan the provision of food for the
P,~Gners was the responsibility of the owners of the houses. In Post 2
a!~entengan the prisoners' accommodation was divided into two classes
aca,>rding to the seriousness of their crimes. Class one was reserved fo;
P,Fis;oners whose crime was oonsidered to be so serious that they could
no~,possibly be forgiven. Class two was for prisoners whose crime was
no,t1so great and for whom there was still the possibility of a pardon.
I!laanosenjoyo was categorized as a class one prisoner.
·,As the wave of terror intensified,. members and sympathizers of the
R)ITT and other non-communists fled to safer regions. Most of them headed
for Yogyakarta or the headquarters of the Command Team in Prambanan,
 138
taking with them food and their valuables. The people who came to
refugee centres were screened_ in order to ensure that they were genufu
non-communist. If they did not possess written proof. of their POiiti.
affiliation, they were required to produce at least one person who C(j
guarantee that they were not communist. Those people acceptej!
guarantors were usually Village heads or political leaders who lived in
same village as the person in question. The Command Team was respon81
for the increasing numbers of refugees and it had to provide food for t~e
In order to overcome this problem logistical sub-teams were fonne(I ·
each village, with the responsibility for providing food for the refug
On 24 October a military unit from Klaten arrived in Pramba
There were many refugees who wanted to launch a counter attack on t
PKI with the support of this unit to free their friends who had
kidnapped. The leaders of the Command Team agreed to their requ
and it was decided that a clean up operation would be mounted agai
Randusari at midday.·
Taking into account both the location and the difficulty of moun ·
a full-scale attack on Randusari, the army officers decided on a tactf
encirclement. After seeing that they had been surrounded by non-comm . ·
forces, many communists began to flee. The officers called out to th~
'Don't run! we won't shoot!' Hearing this a number of communists be
to slow down and even to stop, although they were still doubtful. •'
friendliness of the troops who accompanied the youth eventually co ·
them of the sincerity of this appeal. Those who did not flee were orde
into trucks in groups of ten. One hundred and twenty-five communls
were captured in the operation. Suwito, howev~r, was not fou.nd amo~
them. A communist named Trismado was quest10ned concernmg Suwito
whereabouts.
Just before the operation, it turned out, Suwito asked to be take~
the river so that he could wash and defecate. As he went down to.,
river with just one guard, he could see several o:ommunists ~eluding J.
.' discussing something on a big rock in the middle of the nver. While,
I
was washing, Suwito saw Joyudo and his followers run towards the no·.
I'' The communist youth who had been guarding him also fled, and Suwito
was making his own way back to Randusari when he met a.soldier, wh?m
he told immediately that he was a member of the PNI. After conducu?g
a house-to-house search in Randusari, the military unit returned to.'U
Prambanan base.
139
~acquaintance of Darmosenjoyo named Kamto was held with him
iJie.'same house. ' He still re.membered clearly one night whe~ Kamto
(e' him: 'Tomorrow mornmg I'll be freed. I've agreed to give them
- money and food'. The next day Kamto was allowed to leave.
roe'osenjoyo wondered whether his kidnappers might be willing to give
liiS freedom in exchange for a ransom.
·i · days before his deat11 sentence was to be carried out, Darmosenjoyo
ii!dneither eat nor sleep. He was informed that several people had
IO ily been put to death: Harjono and his younge~ brother ~aiba~ ~om
rongan, both nephews of Ir Sabar; and themodm [a Muslllll religious
aeh of Bajran. His appetite completely disappeared ~fter being told
rfre too would be put to death. For two days a few sips of tea were
i!fat he could take in. On the day Kamto was freed, Darmosenjoyo
a'communist named Wongsoalip shot dead and another communist
otfu the leg. A group of Pemuda Marhaenis had attempted to exhume
dirpses of Harjono and Kisno which had been buried by the communists
1Jl ui~ graveyard at Dengok. They were supported by the Prambanan police
0,possessed some firearms. In the ensuing struggle with the communists,
e police fired several shots. It was one of these shots which killed
oq_gsoalip.
barmosenjoyo could do nothing but think about his death the next
llif.•. His hands remained clenched behind his back. There were about
n>~outh assigned to guard him and they changed every hour. It was not
)ble for him to get to know them individually. When he heard the
uggJe taking place in the Dengok graveyard which ended in the shooting
o s~eral communists, he realized that the hole which would be used for
· •.grave was located very near to his place of confinement.
'that night he could not sleep. He could just hear the far-away sounds
oi/he youth waiting in their base - in Gitosugih's house - and their tarian
•.'m bunga [dance of the fragrant flowers]. Several of the youth guarding
Ji) /jnosenjoyo told him that they had just been watching the dance.
el)lbers of the Pemuda Rakyat and Gerwani joined in the dance as one
. of their series of ritual ceremonies celebrating death and their terrorist
acti'Vities. 13 At 7:00 the next morning Darmosenjoyo was to die.
ortunately for him, at dawn on 3 November 1965, a Battalion F force
Rumour reported a similar dance at Halim Airforce base before the murder of
e~generals
on 30 September/1 October. See p. 47. Ed.
 140 141

launched a clean-up operation of communists from Manisrengg ·. MANISRENGG014

north to the main Jogya-Solo road in the south During this 0
:
PCl)I
an exhausted and greatly weakened Darrnosenioyo was freed fr.
kidnappers.
°"
· g tension
o,in
@n· the evening of 22 October the echo of drums could be heard
Jlere. For the inhabitants of Manisrenggo this sound signified danger.
'luiah of Barukan was woken by the noise at 3.00 a.rn. Along with
~1her villagers, he ventured outside the village to find out what was
·. iJlgic!n~ The beating of drun:is norrna_ll~ ~eant that~ robbery or looting
i3J{en place. After checking the vicm1ty of the village, however, and
· ering that the sound was corning from the west, beyond the village
eiS, he returned home. Next day he attended a meeting at the office
! iiie>Manisrenggo kecarnatan, along with other village heads, officials
o~ihe.kecarnatan, and leaders of non-communist political organizations.
e•nlajor topic of discussion was. the possibility of issuing a joint statement
up,p,lifting Sukarno and condemning the Dewan Revolusi. All village
~in the Manisrenggo kecarnatan attended, with the exception of the
urah ofTanjungsari, who was a member of the PK.I, and they all signed
e·staternent. Several village heads and kecarnatan officials then left the
office, while eight PNI village heads and leaders of other political parties
maJned.
This was not a normal day in Manisrenggo. The ntain road which passed
·dugh the karnpungs was deserted and only a few people were visible.
.eey few roadside stalls were open. Youth began to gather in front of
eoffice of the Pernuda Rakyat, opposite theManisrenggo police station.
1 _elurah ofBarukan spoke to some of them and they chatted for a while

a1!fiut the atmosphere in the town. There was no hint of trouble.

f.!
, The c;arnat of Manisrenggo also felt uneasy that morning. As soon
I as,1the lurah of Barukan arrived at his office, the carnal asked him to go
11· tQ,Klaten and request military support. The carnat was not the only person
:1.0 feel afraid. All the officials and political party leaders felt the same
!'ffe,y. News had spread that the PK.I masses had undertaken terrorist
I
•rruvities including the murder of a clerk in Logode who had been a member
-i "cdf the PNI. Acts of cruelty had also been carried out against religious
.
I" I

It"""-------
·:_,\;

:.' ._~, 14 The facts upon which this section is based are drawn from interviews carried out
ih the office of the Manisrenggo kecamatan in February and March 1975. [The events are
also reported briefly in 'Jakarta reports Java rebel gains',New York Times 1November1965,
pp.!, 6].
142
figures in various areas. The lurah of Barukan agreed to go to ~
on the condition that he was accompanied by a policeman arme(l
an automatic weapon; the carnal agreed. The lurah and the police
left Manisrenggo for Klaten at 10.00 that morning, taking a Java
motorbike, registration number AD 13251. On the journey to K!aten:i
passed the· house of the communist lurah of Tanjungsari, who had
attended the meeting that morning. In his house were several p :
school teachers who were members of the PGRI non vak sentra/, seye
school principals, and members of Pemuda Rakyat. Further on, a
two kilometres before Prambanan, they met a member of the BTI wli
the lurah knew. When the lurah asked what was going on, he answe
that a number of young people with knives and sickles had gathered
the side of the road earlier that day but that they had already left..,
Before continuing on the journey to Klaten, the lurah stoppea
Prambanan to discuss the situation with the carnal. He then weni
Yogyakarta to check on his son who was a student there. His policees\;o,
remained in Prambanan. On the return journey from Yogyakan~
Prambanan he met a policeman on his way to Yogyakarta. The police
advised him not to go to Prambanan, as the situation there was very t~
but the lurah paid no attention and continued on his journey, arri ·
safely in Klaten at 2.00 p.m. He immediately called on Patih Setyo
the Kasubdit Kedesaan (Head of the Military Subdirectorate for Villa
Affairs) for Kiaten kabupaten and told him of the situation in Manisren
and of the camat's request for military aid. The patih, however, refuli!l
to send military aid, although he was a relative of the Manisrenggo cairiau
The lurah then turned to the commander of Battalion F Dharma-Pu·
of the KOSTRAD. In the battalion headquarters, the lurah met sq
of his friends, including the leaders of the Wedi PNI who were busy talkiii
to the wedana of Pedan. They had come here for the same reason - to
request military support, and competed with each other for help. Beca
no trouble had yet taken place in Manisrenggo, however, the Barukin
lurah's request for support was again turned down.
143
~Kl coup in Manisrenggo
". e all this was happening, the other village heads and kecamatan
·ais·m Manisrenggo remained in the kecamatan office discussing the
~ijf!ity of future trouble. They were still afraid. At around 3.00 p.m:
e 6f them began to leave the office, but several stayed on, including
JI! ; aitosemoto, the head of the kecamatan office, whose tum it was
staY on watch. He was extremely frightened. He was already a few
dver fifty, his physical condition was not that good, and he did not
long to go before his retirement. Sitting beside him was one of the
rJiS•who lived in Kranggan. This clerk had come to the office with the
0·.of Kranggan, who was affiliated with the PKI, but remained in the
ce after the Kranggan lurah had left.
·er most of those who had attended the meeting had left the office,
e lurahs of the Tanjungsari and Tijayan arrived. Both these men were
mb'ers of the PPDI (Persatuan Pamong Desa Indonesia, Indonesian
· lion of Village Officials), an organization which received protection
m'the PKI, and they wanted to talk to the carnal immediately. The
pie of Manisrenggo were sympathetic to the aims of the PKI but most
tlielurah and village officials were members of the PNI. Yet this did
0 aifect the relationship between the officials and their people. Both
rali informed the carnal that the situation in Indonesia had reached a
te:of crisis and that a certain force was now threatening the Indonesian
.pie. The communists in Manisrenggo, they said, were prepared to
&!!t the HMI forces and the two lurah were now trying to find weapons.
1'V8S for this reason that they had come to see the camat ofManisrenggo.
e·q.mat informed them that members of the public were not permitted
. ~.rry firearms, which did not please the two lurah. Not long afterwards
undreds of militant communists arrived outside the kecamatan office.
ey filled the extensive office grounds, many of them carrying sharp
weapons including bamboo spears, swords, keris, and iron bars.
. Beith Iurah attempted to calm the situation as the large gro.up of
oorrlmunists began to make trouble, but they surrounded the carnal and
ell' suddenly grabbed him, tied him up and threw him into the river on
Uie western side of the kecamatan office. The clerk, who had seen that
t~ublewas brewing when the two village heads arrived, escaped by leaping
over a fence behind the house. The communists were then able to seize
!tie weapons which were stored in the office - a sten gun, a Lee Enfield,
144 Centre for Village St
a .95 rifle, and a pistol. They also found a limited quantity of amnutnir
1
for each weapon. . liJitbon; five general kitchens were set up and housewives and young
Retreat to Yogyakarta
Immediately after these events, the camat of Manisrenggo ordered
Iurah affiliated with the PNI to take refuge across the border in
Yogyakarta region. 15 The administration of the Manisrenggo kecama
would also shift there temporarily. The distance from Manisrenggo
Jambon in Yogyakarta was only two kilometres. The office of
Manisrenggo kecamatan could be housed temporarily in the headquan
of non-communist forces from Klaten and Yogyakarta. , 0 g}iakarta-Solo road. Further to the north, for example in Kemalang
Before the evacuation could take place the communists locked t
Manisrenggo camat's wife and children in a room behind the kecamala
office. A number of communist youth surrounded the camat's office antt
house and took complete control of the office. A little while later, whe
a group of young communists headed for a house on the other side
the street, the camat took advantage of this opportunity to escape throu~
the back door, creeping down the bank of the river on the western si
of the house in order not to be seen. He then ran south along the ed
of the river. After reaching the village of Keditan he left the river a
headed towards Jambon. With the help of members of the Sinduma~
community, he managed to contact non-communist village heads from
Manisrenggo and established a temporary kecamatan office.
Thousands of non-communist youth were then mobilized in the NgempliX
kecamatan in Yogyakarta and in other kecamatan including NgaglikanH
Pakem. This mobilization of youth was initiated in order to counter Iti
communists who were centred in the Klaten region. In Yogyakarta tH
majority of the population was aligned with the PNI or NU. By the thfid
week of October 1965, Jambon had become the main centre of defence
for non-communist forces to the west of Kia ten, as well as the headquanei\
of the Manisrenggo's non-communist administration. There were about
five hundred refugees from the Klaten region, there and, as in Prambanan;
preparing food for them was an immediate problem. It was decided tM)
the provision of food would be the responsibility of the Sindumartanf
15
The camat evidently survived his immersion in the river, though the text is not:
altogether clear on this point. Ed.
145
ii(ahan. By 24 October several thousand young people had gathered
,p,le.were responsible for preparing the food. At least 700 to 800
,~ams of rice had to be found.
, .,e non-C:ommunist youth in Jambon were in a state of constant alert.
·;typosts were erected along the Yogyakarta-Solo border, with ten
iwenty-five people stationed at each of them. They adopted this strategy
' use they knew that the communist youth were also active along the
fj!er. Jambon was a strategic location in the Yogyakarta-Solo region.
e' rommunists in Manisrenggo for their part organized an extensive
'eillance system. The front line of defence was located along the
aYManisrenggo, the defence posts became increasingly concentrated.
iheadquarters of the Manisrenggo communists was located in the house
iJie Jurah of Kebonalas. Several smaller posts also became sub-command
Ires.
Qn Sunday night the atmosphere in Manisrenggo was very calm. The
~ts through the villages and kampongs were deserted. Usually people
uld gather at cross-roads or at certain places within the kampungs to
6Jilit until dinner time, but on this occasion they were happier to be at
oine with their families. They all knew that something terrible might
appen, and a feeling of distrust pervaded the community. Was it possible
at their friendly and good-natured neighbour was actually a political
op,p,9nent? Would one of their relatives cause trouble for them? In such
a lime of uncertainty, men and youths preferred to gather at the security
, ts while the women, children and elderly remained in their homes.
· · 'ty posts were also established in the kampungs where the communists
ere a minority. Several dozen armed youth were stationed at strategic
·'ints. When the mosque called Muslims for the Isya prayer only a few
oltl:people ventured onto the streets. Most people preferred to pray in
eir own houses, afraid to leave their homes in case they met trouble.
· .The youth stationed along the border area had to fight against their
ttes,i,re for sleep. At around midnight news came through of a planned
attack on non-communist posts in Jambon. The non-communist forces
in.Jambon were under the direct leadership of the camat of Manisrenggo,
aided by the lurahs of Barukan and Sindumartani and by Slamet Wahadi,
'!l'ell-known figure in the Jamboil community. The distance between
the non-communist gnardposts of the Yogyakarta district and the communist
J!iists in Manisrenggo was only about 200 metres. Tension began to increase
146 147

on both sides. At the same time news spread among the communisu ~ ;1ong with his bicycle, which he happened to have with him at the
an attack to be carried out that night by the Jambon youth. In the•
of the night, both sides attempted to estimate the strength of 1
opposition by shining lamps in the direction of their enemy. The Yo , ~ non-communists in Manisrenggo were not as strong as the
youth were instructed to adopt positions which would be difficult to atta . 'unist forces, the non-communist minority was thus a target of
and their drowsiness disappeared as the tension mounted. Both side8~ : ~ion, especially as the surrounding kecamatan - Kernalang, Prambanan
to predict what would happen. The night became deathly still. on1y, , r gnongko - were also PKI bases. The communists did not consider
crickets could be heard. They sounded sbmething like a drum roll inten no_n-communists in Manisrenggo a force to be reckoned with, since
to boost the enthusiasm of the two sides about· to wage war. , RNI was only influential among village officials, the elite and rich
atmosphere remained calm as both sides awaited the break of dawn. Vl,il . ts. Among other social groups communist influence was dominant.
the cocks crowed they rested in their respective security posts.
. · In Jambon the non-communist defences were organized in such
The next day, Monday, the Jambon market opened for the small y' as to counter a possible communist attack. Some consideration
of Manisrenggo, Ngemplak and surrounding areas. In view of the ten8io ijSo given to attacking the communist headquarters in Manisrenggo
which still existed, Slamet Wahadi suggested that the market not be ape aregaining control of the area. But this plan was never implemented.
The Jambon command considered the idea and ordered the marke'i · .threatened by the communists finally received military support at
close, instructing people to return to their homes. Nevertheless a ~eginning of November. Manisrenggo itself received a platoon from
people continued on their way, thinking that going to market was a fair t!l(lion F. Gradually the tension subsided and calm was restored. The
routine matter and that this day would be no different from any oiH a:t of Manisrenggo was able to return to his house on 2 November,
They also felt that this would be a good opportunity to stock up on i .. fited by an armed forces unit from KOREM 072.
in case conditions in the region continued to decline. As the national
youth of Jambon checked the small traders on their way to the mailfC
they noticed a communist youth from Manisrenggo in the crowd. Wiie
questioned by the leader of the Nationalist youth there, the commuilis
said that he was bringing a message for the camat of Manisrenggo. '1J:i
stated that the communist leadership in Manisrenggo wanted to avo·
bloodshed and physical confrontation and were now seeking to negotia
After receiving this message the camat responded with a possible t'
and place for the meeting.
It was agreed that the meeting would take place in theJambon ma~K
at 3.00 p.m. The communists were represented by the lurah of Kebonalii
who was accompanied by several members of the BTI and PKI. 'lili
Nationalists were represented by the camat of Manisrenggo, Iurahs{o!
Barukan and Sindumartani and Slamet Wahadi. The negotiations proceilil
smoothly, but unfortunately the communists followed them with seveiiJ
acts of violence. On the night after the negotiations, the house of !H
Iurah of Barukan was burnt down. On 27 October, a fight broke o~
between a group of communists and Mangun Tumpo, a member of tti
Taskombang PNI, and ended with his death. The communists buried hii
148 149

BANYUWANGI
DEN .HIGHLANDS
~ctivity before the coup

tl'j'jmpetition between the two major forces in Banyuwangi, the PKI

tlie Nahdatul Ulama, for the support of the mass of the population
ill!flY began long before 1965. The PKI assassinated NU leaders in
·pahit during th~ Dut~h. ~eriod, o_n ~he grounds that these haji were
Gil-spies; terronst act1VIlles by cnmmal groups were also organized
ePKI against wealthy non-communists; and PKI members sabotaged
ns. of production owned by non-communists. In the 1960s, however,
sources of disagreement between the PKI and non-PKI groups were:
infplementation of the land refonn law, the movement of PK.I members
,,
0 official positions, and mass mobilization.
Gambiran , ,Karangasem
,Srono , "e PK.I's influence over the peasantry in Banyuwangi was fairly strong.
Cluring,
Kalipahit
Cemelu~ • • Muncar -
re was, for instance, an active aksi sepihak movement in the kabupaten,
TapanreJO
·qh'worked from district to district with the result at the height of the
,vement that aksi sepihak took place there almost everyday. According
R. Setail a report published in Suara Indonesia of 5 January 1965, aksi sepihak
Bangorejo'
.J<place in nine villages in the Genteng district and at least 6,720 people
itii:ipated. Other districts in which there is evidence of an active
Pasanggaran. ment include Srono, Cluring, Kabat, Gambiran and Glagah. In several
!ages this action degenerated into arson and the destruction of people's
ous_es, the looting of crops and other activities which promoted disorder.
e~KI incited members of the BTI to make aksi sepihak claims on land
.ntiolled by rich non-communist farmers. On several occasions wealthy
ji tlC:mated land to a pesantren (Islamic school) or mosque but retained
oonqol of it.
D Land over 1500m

lt~~I Swamp Further conflict in Banyuwangi between the PKI and the NU was evident
t)ie fishing industry. Port labourers who were organized by the PKI
10
kilometres
n!lj:e Indonesian Fishermen's Union (Barisan Nelayan Indonesia, BNI)
liOiaged nets and boats belonging to non-communists. The port labourers
dboycotted fishing by non-communists. Fishermen, of course, are very
Bnnyuwnngi eaVily dependent on service facilities such as labour for transporting tlie
~fiom boats to the harbour and on salt for preserving the fish. Because
oiihe PK.I's influence over the port labourers, non-communist fishermen
tl.extreme difficulty in finding labourers willing to carry the fish from
he~ boats. Chinese boats, on the other hand, experienced no difficulty
tia_tsoever. Indigenous fishermen, who were usually non-communist, also
 150
found it difficult to get salt, whereas 1he Chinese had no trouble ai
On several occasions, tensions over these issues led to fighis and 1
life. The port labourers who had been attracted to the NU were or~- .
in 1he Indonesian Muslim Fishertnen's Association (Serikat NeJa
Muslimin Indonesia, SNMI). The total membership of 1he SNMJ, h
was far less 1han that of the BNI. Indigenous boat owners and caP. .
on the o1her hand were more often attracted to 1he NU (more often-
Chinese captains) because the boycotlS by BNI port labourers often
to substantial financial losses on 1he part of indigenous captain$
fishermen.
The major spheres of communist influence in Banyuwangi were
kecamatan of Glagah, Singajuruh, Kabat, Rogojampi, Genteng, Pasan~
,: Cluring, Purwoharjo and Glenmore. The NU was strongest in 1
Wongsorejo, Giri and Ciuring kecamatan, while the followers of the'p.
' primarily civil servants and village officials, were spread through varjo
sub-districts and unlike the other political parties were not concentri
in any particular areas. The influence of the NU was· also rather stro
in Muncar, but Muncar was also a coastal region and the PKI's inlluen
among the port labourers was almost total. In the early 1960s B~
Prayitno, a well-known figure in the Banyuwangi PKI, made many visi
to Muncar, apparently to bolster PKI influence there.
The selection of the bupati of Banyuwangi at the beginning of 1
was also a majorissue.16 The three political parties operating in the re.@.on
- PKI, PNI and NU - attempted to win 1he office for their own candidat~
The PKI's candidate was Suwarno Kanapi SH, an official with the pulili
prosecutor (kantor kejaksaan) who had a Chinese wife. The PNI's candi~
was Lieutenant-Colonel Joko Supaat Slamet, the head of the Banyuwa.nm
KODIM. In northern Banyuwangi, 1he NU was led by Haji Ali Marisui
and supported the candidature of Kana pi while in southern Banyuwarigj
Haji Abdul Latif was NU leader, with Supaat Slamet the NU candidat
The PKI was evidently successful in manipulating the selection in favou1
of Kanapi. Certain facilities were promised to Ali Mansur provided tl!at
Kanapi became the next bupati. It is said that certain funds for tlie
construction of the Banyuwangi mosque were embezzled by Ali Mansurls
faction. With 1he support of the PKI and Mansur's faction Kanapi w~
16 Bupati were appointed by the central government except during a brief perilia_'
from 1957 to 1959. Under Guided Democracy, however, political parties strongly Jobbie(·
the authorities over the appointment of new bupati. Ed.
151
n as bupati of Banyuwangi. The PNI and Abdul Latifs faction of
filsed to recognise this victory and protested to the Panca Tunggal
yilwangi kabupaten.
' mobilization by 1he PKI, meanwhile, was taking place in all sectors
, .·e~, for example, in agricul~e, in 1he fishing and transport ~dustries
,n ·plantations. In 1he plantation sector 1he PKI attempted to influence
.ne _from day labourers to the directors. A report to 1he screening
.atles in Banyuwangi in September 1966 by an investigatory team
e State Plantation Corporation estate Aneka-Tanaman no 1317 gives
eJnsight into PKI activities before 1he coup. The team reported that
@FJ>Oration had disciplines t>75 workers, forty of whom were employed
8 monthly basis, 1he remaining 835 being day labourers. The investigatory
fiad classified them under three headings: ·
.niployees who had been either members of the Party or organizers
0~,ihe PKI's mass organizations were dishonourably discharged;
!h~e were forced to leave 1he plantation;
Efnployees who had aided the PKI during the years and months
leading up to the coup; these were forced to leave the plantation;
and
)llployees who had been ordinary members of the PKI's mass
organizations; these were simply re-educated.
., era! of those who were dismissed and forced from the plantations
H.l!een active organizers and recruiters for SOBS!. They had also been
ubordinate, cooperating with coffee thieves and refusing to work for
e ,plantation company although they lived on the plantation. Also
ismlssed and forced from the area were junior plantation officials who
att- allowed BTI secret meetings in 1heir homes, instigators of demands
l\inJand belonging to the company, propagandislS, coffee 1hieves and
agitators for wage increases.
rn ilS efforlS to control 1he productive sector, the PKI also attempted
9btain senior management positions in the Corporation. During the
9Q!)s, the upper management (Staf Direksi) of state plantations in East
~ Plantations underthe jurisdiction ofAneka-Tanaman no 13were: Pabrik, Besa ran,
~~r Bopang, Sumber Jambe 2, Sumber Wringin, Sumber Gandeng, Paal 4, Paa! 61 and
DarUngan.
 152
Java included members of mass organizations and political parties lli,
the PKI never managed to obtain any plantation directorships,'li~
the fact that KOPKAMTIB documents show that in thirty-two oflhe':
three sugar plantations in East Java SOBSI was successful in ga} .
very strong sphere of intluence among the labourers. It was usuany
SOBS I that the PKI fought for the interests of the company workei:s
example, for a reduction in the prices of goods, higher wages and 0 ,
improvements in social welfare. Its representatives in upper managem
positions espoused its policies whenever decisions were to be takeru
Tension rises
The activities of the BTI in the weeks and months leading up to Oci
1965hadmade the relationship between communists andnon-commu ·
increasingly tense. Physical confrontations in the form of fights and.m
violence between Ansor and the Pemuda Marhaenis on the one han'd a
the Pemuda Rakyat on the other took place almost every day during 1
period. The PKI employed the mass of its followers to strengthen its,
defences but, unavoidably, Ansor and Pemuda Marhaenis membe~\w
lived in areas of communist influence were also forced to do guard'au
by the Pemuda Rakyat. The PKI usually used non-communists in the ffiln
line of its defences. We know that the PKI organized the forces guati!·
its strongholds in a layered formation, the more skilled and ideologka
sounder units being placed closer to the centre. In Kalipahit, for examR
Ansor youth were placed in the front line, with Pemuda Marhaenis be, ·
them and communist youth in the rear. As in Central Java, lhe P. •
i:1 leadership used tactics of intimidation and pressure against non-conunu
'
!! where they were in a minority, often physically threatening them, so Uii
they had no other option but to submit to PKI orders.
In Tapanrejo region, for instance, a PKI stronghold, the BTI, Pemu
Rakyat and Gerwani based in Kalipahit desa included several mern
of the Ansor. As events unfolded in October 1%5 and Kalipahit becim
the PKI's headquarters one measure taken by the party was to m<ibi '.
the masses for defensive duties. Several metres behind the non-PKI you
forced into the front line were a few members of the Pemuda Rakyat, po5ilil
to ensure that the Ansor youth did not attempt to flee. On one occasfon
'
i two youth guarding the communist defences were captured in an Anso
i, raid into Tapanrejo. They were taken to Ansor headquarters where th,
were viciously beaten. Then, one of the Ansor activists approached !H
11
153
,jSeners and, drawing his 'samurai' sword, decapitated the first of
· ~ners. The remaining prisoner begged for mercy, explaining to
~utors tormentors he and his companion were actually members
, F. The Ansor leadership in Muncar ordered one of the group to
nJs story. After checking with the Ansor organizers in Tapanrejo
: e clear that the prisoner was indeed telling the truth.
er news broke of the Council of Generals and the Dewan Revolusi,
ea~ers of the PNI, NU, and PKI · Jafar Ma'ruf, Ali Mansur and Sigit -
'et to diScuss the situation. Sigit claimed that the Council of Generals
· :y exiSted, but Jafar and Ali Mansur denied the exiStence of either
@iuncil of Generals or the Revolutionary Council. A heated debate
loped between Sigit on the one hand and Jafar and Ali on the other.
enipers rose, Jafar Ma'ruf tried to calm things down and brought the
ting to a close, urging the others not to Jet the disagreement end in
ell~· The debate between Sigit and Ali, however, continued unabated
IJtey came close to fisticuffs in the doorway of the police station where
mu.ting had been organized.
.·;communist activities
Ml,liile the PKI masses were carrying out their terrorist activities against
j>!lrs ofnon-communist political organizations/community organizations,
non-communist youth who were organized within the Pemuda Marhaenis
(he Ansor youth joined to create a united front. To prepare themselves
a'G!i>mmunist attack, both Ansor and Pemuda Marhaenis youth actively
· ed in the skills of self defence. During the first week of October 1965,
ggiiations took place between the leaders of Ansor and the Marhaenist
up,s in order to decide on a strategy to counter the PKI's terrorist
iviJies. They decided, amongst other things, that they needed a single
minandant to plan the non-communist response to PKI activities, and
·~greed to appoint Mursid. He was approached by two leading figures
ni:JheAnsor and Marhaenist groups and was asked to lead both groups
inst the communists. Thus, the clean up of communists in Banyuwangi
el'!the events of September 1965 was undertaken by youth from Ansor
a>the Pemuda Marhaenis under the leadership of Mursid. Part of this
fan cleanup involved operations in Kalipahit and Bangorejo.
J?uring a period in which the power of the authorities was weakened,
geai.er possibilities existed for the mass of the people to take individual
Gtion, especially those who had a score to settle with local Muslims~
154
Conscious of the potentialfor serious trouble, Jafar Ma'ruf and the lea
of the other non-PKI political parties established the BKKs (ll~
Koordinasi Komando Siaga, Coordinating Body lbr the Vigilance Co
The BKKS was established with the intention of monitoring and contra ·
the activities of the non-PKI people against their opponents, the 'll
One day after the formation of BKKS the PKI organized a s
demonstration displaying red banners. Then, on Friday 15 October Ill
action broke out in the town of Banyuwangi. Mobs marched on the ])j
shop, whose owner was accused of suppporting the 30 September move~
and on the house of Muhdar, a leading PKI figure. The shop was destr
and foodstuffs were brought out into the streets and burnt. Mutrila
house, which was situated right next to the square, was also destroyed w·
his cars and household utensils were dragged out into his garden and bum
On Saturday 16 October 1965 a mass meeting was held in the t
square. Thousands of people crowded into the square to hear their leade
speak. The main speakers at the meeting were Colonel Supaat Slall\e
Haji Abdul Latif of NU and Jafar Ma'ruf of the PNI. -suwarno Kana
chose not to speak. In general, the speakers told the public that the
was no Council of Generals and that the Dewan Revolusi was a pup
of the PKI. This meeting seems to have provided the catalyst for ·II!
outbreak of non-PKI mass action throughout all sub-districts of Banyuwangy
Incidents at Cemetuk and Karangasem
During the third week of October 1965 the activities of Ansor affil
the Pemuda Marhaenis become more intense. One movement aga·
supporters of the 30 September Movement by non-communist youth whiCli
took place before the general butchering of communists is known as tti
Karangasem incident. On 18 October 1965 Mursid led a group ofyoutti
in an operation to mop up remnants of the 30 September Movementlin
Kalipahit. A convoy of four trucks, one jeep and a car was used on thii
operation. All along its journey the convoy was greeted with enthusias,m
by the mass of the people, and many people, especially the younger ones
joined the convoy. Because of so many new members, the progress..o
the vehicles was slow. On reaching the Karangasem crossroads, the fin
group of youth decided, without informing Mursid, to take the Cemetil~
road, rather than that to Kalipahit. When interviewed for this researt)i
project, Mursid explained that the first group had decided to go to Cemetulf
because several people waiting at the crossroads informed them that PID
155
.J!re in Cemetuk were ready to attack Muncar. As the first group was
. ggiven this information a child from Cemetuk village was heard to
·iel•the Arabic formula 'Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar' ('God is great,
is great'). Without seeking the advice of the convoy's leaders this
,up.advanced towards Cemetuk.
: out one kilometer from Cemetuk the jeep in which the first group
·travelling was struck by a falling tamarind tree. 18 The youth
epiately alighted from their vehicle and continued their journey to
m~tuk on foot. Not long afterwards the vehicles which were following
re''also hit by falling trees so that none of the vehicles could move.
· Yiere caged in a specific area just outside Cemetuk village. Immediately
ID: noticed that the village looked different. It had long been known
1Cemetuk was a PKI base. For months beforehand the only banners
!lad seen in this village were those of ihe BTI, Pemuda Rakyat, Gerwani
nil the PKI. What they saw now in October 1965 was most encouraging.
:wi before their very eyes were Ansor banners in strategic places
.\!ghout the village. In the background they could hear chants of 'Allahu
.ijar'.
Unable to restrain their curiosity, the young people moved forward
111Qrjl quickly. Suddenly they were showered with rocks and other projectiles
anti/were attacked by a group of young people without shirts. Mursid
ana· several of his men could see the first group being ambushed by the
ittless attackers and he ordered the youth who were still within his range
re)Ilove their shirts, enter the village and destroy everything. The situation
· the village became totally chaotic. The Ansor youth who were still
png their shirts received no mercy from the communists. They were
· oo. But the shirtless Ansor youth set fire to several houses and destroyed
e J>elongings of communist members. The communists in turn set fire
the abandoned vehicles, though several members of Mursid's group
ucceeded in escaping from Cemetuk by car. Their reports of the activities
King place in Cemetuk were given credence by the bloodstains in the
ea(.
We know that Cemetuk village was a PKI base. For this reason we
can.say that 99% of its population were either members or sympathizers
o~ the PKI, and it is clear .that Cemetuk was indeed used by the PKI as
a iletensive stronghold. There was a concentration of PKI forces in the
Many roads in East Java are lined with tamarind trees. Ed.
156
village and for this reason the youth group from Muncar, though la~
was unable to match the strength of the PKI forces. Many injured mem
of the non-communist group escaped to areas which they thought \\le
safe. Those unable to escape were killed by frenzied PKI supponers ,6
those who succeeded in breaking through the PKI net were not purs~~
Exhausted but fearing for their lives, they ran and kept on running, headk
for an area where they hoped there would be no PKI. Soon they Caing
across a group of girls wearing the Fatayet NU uniform - long green 8 ·,
white blouse and white veil. The girls welcomed the exhausted young me
with the hand of friendship. Although they did not know the young me!
personally, the warmth and softness shown by these girls seemed to\
a natural outcome of friendship between members of the same organizatiom
The tired young men were not at all suspicious. They were invited to,si
down in a place that had already been prepared and were served WitH a
range of delicious snacks. Soon after eating this food, however, some 0
the men began to faint, others became violently ill and some began·,10
convulse. Only one young man had not eaten the food seryed by the gir, .
He had been concerned by what had happened earlier; in Cemetuk, tlj
communist base, he had seen the flags and banners of Ansor and the N
displayed as a deception, and the girls dressed in Fatayat uniforms witH
friendly smiles serving previously prepared food aroused his suspiciom
When he saw that his friends had been poisoned he ran off to the poll'
post in Yoso Mulya to report the incident.19 ,
Meanwhile, a patrol from the Genteng KODIM received reports ol
a clash in Karangasem. On their way to Karangasem they noticed crow&
of people along the road. Many of them were shirtless and were canyiitg
weapons, including swords, sickles and bamboo stakes. People could liC
seen standing on guard in front of their houses, in a PKI stronghold area
known as Alas Malang. The non-communists'° had begun by setting fire:
to houses in the area., Apparently the clean-up operation by non-Pi<l,',
forces against the remnants of the 30 September Movement was bell(g ,
carried out in several parts of Banyuwangi kabupaten at the same time:
19 This story is also told, in rather o~ terms, in 'Report from East Java', .IndontJia
41 (1986), p.138. It is reminiscent of an incident during the national revolution, when troops
of the West Java Siliwangi Division were poisoned at a dinner offered by_Muslim members
of the fundamentalist Darul Islam movement. Ed.
20
Apparently the remainder of the expedition which had set out from Mu near under
the command of Mursid. Ed.
157
e k.ODIM patrol succeeded in restraining the non-communist forces
0
ewere running wild against the PKI, telling them to leave the area
liat the physical confrontation could be stopped.
'On arriving in Karangasem, however, the KODIM patrol found twenty-
it bQdies sprawled over the roads and in people's gardens. The vehicles
fiich were used to transport the youth from Muncar had been gutted.
\"estigations were begun immediately by the responsible authorities -
e'police, KODIM and the regional government. These investigations
uncovered three wells in which the bodies of a further twenty-four youth
ttQtil Muncar had been buried in groups of four, nine and eleven. The
oliYiously careful planning behind the Karangasem ambush was the work
0 ~~1ocal resident, a retired soldier named Bulus, who had been won over
, tile PKI. The executioners were all big shot criminals recruited by the
mas toughs: Mangun Lekar, Mangun Kuat, Ngadimin, Teket Meleng,
oy,o Dikun, Kadimin, Lurah Senopo and Bambang Benjo.
'l'\pparently the communists used magic formulae or supernatural powers
10 ioughen the mental outlook of their followers. In Karangasem, the
5 jifrtiess youth in the village all wore yellow coconut plant leaves (janur
Jiining) and salam leaves around their necks. Even the non-communist
i:guth used charms and amulets. Long before October 1965 these youth
,re being trained both mentally and physically by kyai (venerated scholars
ntl teachers of Islam) who were often brought in specifically from far
away places.
,,such were the events which took place in Karangasem preceding the
liilli:ng of thousands of PKI members and sympathizers by non-communists.
1 'ese events were not only the beginning of a tidal wave of mass action
tiut they were also the beginning of a wave of revenge against the PKI
and its mass organizations.
 Chapter 6
USIDNG THE G30S/PKI IN CENTRAL JAVA
•',;

Dinas Sejarah TNI Angkatan Darat

translated by Robert Cribb

Ilfost Western accounts of the 1965 coup stress that it was centred
00 cr~karta. In Jakarta, afterall, were the main keys to power - the leading
Jilical figures, both victints and victors, the centres of administration
ana,communication, and the symbolic significance of the capital. 1 Outside
e qipital, a group associated with the 30 September Movement launched
a soiiiewhat similar coup in Central Java, in which the army's divisional
ooillffiander, Brigadier-General Suryosumpeno was deposed by the division's
intelligence chief, Colonel Suherrnan, who appointed Lieutenant-Colonel
sqrnn Sastrodibroto in his place. Similar coup attempts took place at
IOw~r levels of the military hierarchy and two middle-ranking officers were
·a0apped and killed.2 In official Indonesian accounts of the coup, action
!?] the 30 September Movement is described as far more widespread,
covering virtually every province, though most of these offer no more than
a f$> vague sentences of description.' The account translated here is

John Hughes, kulonRsian upheaval (New York: McKay, 1967), pp. 3-87, is especially
~ in evoking significance of Jakarta in these times.

See Harold Crouch, Theannyandpoliticsinlndonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University

1:1"'· 1978), pp. 100-101.
See, for example, 40 hori kegagalan "G-30-S; 1 Oktober-10 Norember 1965 ((Jakarta]:
~ Pertahanan-Keamanan, Lembaga Sedjarah, 1966). The accounts refer to operations
-·~testroy the PKI, rather than to actions by the party. The only other significant coup-like
action by the left at this time was the seizure by VIOrk.ers of a number of state owned enterprises
m.East Java. See Basuk.i Gunawan, Kudetd: staatsgreep in Djakarta, tJe·achtergronden van
11(30 September-beweging in Indonesiii (Meppel: Boero, 1968), p. 183.
 160
from an official publication, Pemberontakan G30S/PKI dan penumpas ·
(The revolt of the G30S/PKI and its suppression] (Jakarta: Dinas Seja.
TNI Angkatan Darat, 1982).4 Although vague in some respects, repeu .
in style and at times self-contradictory in its details, it is a useful statern~
of the official view of the killings as it was a decade and a half afte~
event. Like the account of Gadjah Mada's Centre for Village Stuij'
this report stops short of a detailed description of the killings, but it ·
noteworthy for the care with which it sets out the alleged guilt of p, ,
members and associates far from Jakarta. Not only does the army dis
'incriminating documents' but it obtains active confessions of complim
from PKI members and presents the coup of 30 September as no rno
than the first stage in a PKI plan to seize power by armed struggle.
case for the mass killings which followed is thus laid. · c.
The coup of 1 October 1965 in Jakarta spread rapidly to the territo.
·•
ofKODAM VII/Diponegoro'. Based on captured documents and reli~ti ·
reports, it can be said that Central Java was a refuge for the PK! a:nu a
base for its attempts to move into phase two of its programme. Fort
reason, revolutionary activities were more widespread in Central Java·.
in other regions. This was logical, because the results of the 1955 electio
and other data showed that Central Java had the largest number ofp ,
members of any province.
On 1 October 1%5 at 1.30 p.m., ex-Colonel Suherman announcedlH
formation of a Dewan Revolusi (Revolutionary Council) in Central Java
with himself as chairperson. Using units he could rely upon, the adventurei;
seized the offices of KODAM VII as his headquarters, and used its faciliti
to communicate his actions to all territorial and mobile units in
KO DAM. TheDiponegoro Panglima, Brigadier-General Suryosumpeno
was in Magelang at the time and held a briefing with the garrison ana
4 English language terms in the original text are italicized. Some passages have beeD
slightly rearranged and a short section dealing with the Icx:3tion of anti-commu~ist t~<.
bas been omitted. The events described here are dealt with at greater length m Maqoto
:i Trissaputra, 'Dengan Jon Kav-lWll Mageland Pak Soerjo menggagalkan "Dewan Revolusi"~ja·:
G 30 S/PKI di Djawa Tengah', Vidya Yudha 2 no 5 (Dec. 1968), pp. 113,129.
'I
s Indonesia was divided at this time inio regional military commands (KomandO'.'
Daerah Militer, KODAM), generally named after historical figures prominent in resist~,~
the imposition of Dutch rule. For this an other administrative and military terms, see ~·
note on p. ix. ·'·
161
1
co!lllllanders there to organize a plan for crushing the 30 September
.Jllent. The plan was as follows:
a. To restore the line of command from the
KODAM to all units;
b. To consolidate the order of battle of KO DAM
VII by means of
(i) physical consolidation
(ii) psychological and
ideological consolidation
(iii) consolidation of
personnel
To restore security and order throughout the
territory of KODAM VII.
.i
', 0carry out the first plan, on 2 October 1965 at 5.00 a.m., the Panglima
··.If led an operation from MageJang with a single cavalry unit to liberate
- g. Within five hours, Semarang was in their hands and the Panglima
:once more in control of KODAM VII. Ex-Colonel Suherman, with
followers from two companies of Battalion K under Major Kaderi,
:from the city. Two other companies who were alerted by the Panglima
~Jllbled in the barracks of Battalion 454 at Srondol, along with two
companies from Irifantry Battalion D.
in the Yogyakarta area, G30S/PKI adventurists led by a number of
onous officers with the help of PKI leaders and sympathizers were
tiltfat first to seize Radio Republik Indonesia. They influenced a number
o~oiher officers and kidnapped several officers whom they could not seduce.
, ePanglima and leaders from other regions, however, were quickly able
0 counter these actions, and within a few days some of the officers who
ii joined the revolt came to their senses. After the putsch [in Semarangl
bad. been crushed, the leaders of the revolt supported the Pemuda Rakyat
cainpaign of sticking up posters and disturbing the people with a campaign
o~forror and murder. The Pancasila forces resisted these actions, and
an~mber
,'<'-
of mass demonstrations opposing the G30S/PKI were organized
Pemuda Rakyat, People's Youth, was the main youth affiliate of the PKI.
162 D/nas Sejarah TNI Angkatan, .'
by the HMI, Pemuda Pancasilfils and Ansor youth.' There were a e RPKAD sent a full battalion under command of Major Santoso,
outbreaks of terror and disruption in Solo, Klaten and Boyolali.
To deal with the situation, the Panglima worked out a plan to c~
the remnants of the G30S/PKI adventurists in Central Java, making
of the units under his command. The RPKAD, headed by Colonel sall\\'O
Eclhie, was also given orders to help restore security and order in the re00Ji1
Colonel Sarwo Edhie, commander of the RPKAD paracommando unit
' TheHimpunan Mabasi.Wla Islam (Islamic Students' Association) was fonnally alliliated
with the bannedMasyumi partyj thePemuda Panc:asilais (Pancasila-ist Youth) was associated '
with the PNI and the Ansor was the youth wing of the Nahdatul Uiama.
163
'Gil reached Semarang on 17 October 1%5. After entering the city,
i;attalion made a show offorce, marching through the city streets to
e clieers of the people. Semarang was already under the control of
, , Ji)AM VII and it was clear that things were calm there. The Panglima
aMajor Santoso met and discussed a plan of action. That night they
····· ed eight hundred people strongly suspected of involvement in
~JPKI, well as capturing incriminating documents and a number of
pt>ns. The G30S/PKI group continued their activities in the form of
1ers supporting the treason of the movement. As they saw the RPKAD
maYe firmly to crush the G30S/PKI remnants the Pancasila group began
tk1ize their opportunity to oppose the enemy themselves. Clashes
.fplace, and a war of posters broke out across the city. The atmosphere
·•· e tense. To avoid a further breakdown, the RPKAD units and the
regional government organized arrests of G30S/PKI followers, many of
ti~.m then fled from the city.
nn 21 October 1965, three RPKAD companies together with three
units from the KODAM departed left for Magelang, leaving Semarang
in the hands of other troops. The RPKAD arrival in Magelang was greeted
!Viili cheers from the people and after the RPKAD had made a show of
rtffi;e around the city the people organized a demonstration in which PKI
8J1tl BAPERKl8 buildings and members' houses were destroyed. After
arresting and securing G30S/PKI members in Magelang, the units proceeded
to J:!oyolali According to information received, the local military command
in )loyolali was surrounded by thousands of Pemuda Rakyat and PKI
mdmbers armed with knives and sharpened bamboo spears (bambu runcing).
, ~units called in at Yogyakarta on the way to attend the funerals of
Brigadier-General Katamso and Colonel Sugiyono, who died after being
oriured by the rebels on 2 October.
One RPKAD company pressed on to Boyolali with cavalry support
a~d launched arrest and clean-up operations against the PKI and Pemuda
Rakyat members who were causing the trouble there. The rebels' attempt
to Surround and seize the Boyolali district military command was thwarted
and the troublemakers fled into the forests. Boyolali was well known as
~
Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indc:inesia, Deliberative Association
fOr Indonesian Citizenship, a largely Chinese Indonesian organization, founded in 1954 and
c:Onsidered close to the PK.I. It encouraged resident Chinese to accept Indonesian citizenship;
ti*argued against cultural assimilation.
164
an area where a great many PKI members carried out their terrorisi
disruptive activities. . .;es<in Central Java, including the bupatis of Boyolali and Karanganyar
On 22 October, another RPKAD unit was sent to Solo after inforina
was received that trade union members at Balapan railway ·Station
gone on strike.on 21 October. The unit, under the direct COllllllij!
Colonel Sarwo Edhie, went straight to the station. After canying oui
necessary security measures, they told the workers forcefully to go
to work as normal. The unit then made a show offorce around the~
greeted by cheering crowds. Destruction of buildings b.elonging to
PKI and its affiliates also took place here, and the people demanded.
the PKI and its mass organizations be abolished. After arresting;!
G30S/PKI leaders, the unit continued by driving G30S/PKI terrorist$
into the outskirts of the city and then hunting them down up lit
mountains where many of them had fled. " ~ated to believe that the TNI was a NEKOLIM10 army which
Another RPKAD unit moved to Wonosobo on 23 October. 'The'r.
had been damaged and blocked by G30S/PKI gangs, but the unit was·ati
to push through, capturing 115 G30S/PKI elements along the way, ~lo
with a number of weapons and documents proving the involvement
the PKI in the coup. Meanwhile in Kia ten, a local training camp had
surrounded at 3.00 a.m. by thousands of G30S/PKI followers who ho
to seize weapons. The attack, however, was beaten off and 135 leade
and members were arrested.
On 26 October Colonel Sarwo Edhie held a meeting of the SuraKli
Joint Security Staff in the Surakarta district military command staff offi
along with local civil and military officials, to plan an intensification.a
the campaign. Forces in Solo were reinforced by three battalions from
the 4th Infantry Brigade of the Diponegoro Division. These operatio
were based on the following principle:
The G30S/PKI should be given no opportunity to
concentrate/consolidate. It should be pushed back
systematically by all means, includingp.sywar", distnoution
of pamphlets and the spreading of infonnation to achieve
the goal of slowing down (G30S/PKI activities].
9 Psychological warfare.
165
umber of government officials had been involved in G30S/PKI
ecmayor of Surakarta, Utomo Ramelan. On 27 October 1%5, the
, @r appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Sumanta as mayor of Sura~rta,
J);ieutenant-Colonel Saebani and police commander Drs Kariono
e :e bupatis respectively of Boyolali and Karanganyar. To intensify
suppression of the G30S/PKI, the Panglima on 9 November. 1965
,irited Colonel Y asir Hadibroto, commander of the 4th Infantry Bngade,
embantu Kuasa Perang (Assistant Martial Law Administrator) for
urakarta area.
1 'tregion covering Surakarta, Kiaten, Boyolali, Karanganyar and Sragen
llie area most heavily influenced by G30S/PKI,and most members there
involved in the party's adventurism. Even little children were
to:be opposed. Kia ten was in fact a kind of PKI pilot project fortheir
· "ties elsewhere. After the coup, many PKI leaders from Jakarta, Cirebon
other regions fled there. The party also formed armed units there
Jiegan a campaign of destruction and murder. Colonel Y asir Hadibroto
Hhis troops, however, succeeded in capturing D.N. Aidit in the desa
embleng near Solo. Aidit was hiding .in the back of a wardrobe in
house of A Karim. The house had been constructed to conceal a
·mien chamber behind this wardrobe. Aidit was then interrogated and
He his confession in the presence of witnesses. His confession included
e s,iatement:
I alone bear the major responsibility for the G30S affair,
which failed and which was supported by other PKI
members and by the PKI's mass organizations. As is
already known, I worked out a plan to assemble the
communist forces in Central Java....
erthe interrogation, and after Aidit had signed his confession, Colonel
asir Hadibroto took him out of the city by jeep. They turned off the
mafu road at Boyolali and came to a dry well in the middle of a banana
gi0ve. There Aidit was shot dead. His body was thrown into the well
nd covered with banana tree trunks.
~·
Neocolonialist-imperialist.
166 167

On 15 November, the RPKAD arrested eighteen military perso ult of its positive actions to restore security and order and because
from KODIM 0708 Purworejo, three officers and fifteen NCOs, all sus · . , e cooperation between government and people in carrying out these
of involvement in G30S/PKI. This brought the number of detaine_es . W'ter undertaking their duties, the RPKAD turned over responsibility
Purworejo jail to 1017. InMagelangtherewere 1250detainees,consis. rne region's security and on 25 December 1965 returned to Jakarta,
of thirty-four military personnel, fifty-two Gerwani members and~[ rto take up new duties.
communists. On 25 November, the regional military commander an(!
head of the security staff assembled seven PKI members of the YogyakJi
DPR-GR11 to discuss the dissolution of the PKI, and at 8.00 a.m..
day Radio Repubill: Indonesia in Yogyakarta announced that theJP, ,
and its mass organizations had been dissolved by the PKI leadershipi"
To intensify the campaign to track down and destroy remnants ot
G30S/PKI, especially ex-Colonel Suherman and his colleagues, a Koma·
Operasi Merapi (Mount Merapi Operational Command) was formed. 0
1 December under the command of Colonel Sarwo Edhie. In orde~ to
defeat the PKI tactic of arousing the mass of its followers in a campal
of terror and disruption, the government itself mobilized the mass of,tH
people. The RPKAD gave military training, including instruction in~t
use of weapons and techniques for securing villages, as part of a gene
programme of cooperation between the army and the people to crush'tti
remnants of the G30S/PKI. In this way, the Pancasila forces regained tfiei
spirit and their confidence in the ability of the armed forces to restb
security and order. ,
On 9 December 1965: the RPKAD launched a joint operation ~tH
a platoon from Battalion E and with civilians who had already had training
against rebel hideouts on Mount Merbabu which were led by ex-Lieutenan .
Colonel Usman, ex-Colonel Maryono, ex-Colonel Suherman, ex-Majo1
Samadi and several other G30S/PKI leaders. These leaders were stio
and the remnants of their followers were steadily pushed back by the arm\lll
forces operations. Suherman, Maryono and Sukirno, too, were capture<!
on 14 December, and with the arrest and execution of the former heai!
of the Dewan Revolusi for Central Java, the influence and strengt!iih
the G30S/PKI in Central Java began to wane. PKI followers throughoµt
the region began to surrender and disperse.
Thus, in a short time, the influence of the G30S/PKI leadership anl!
mass was broken. The people regained confidence in the government as

11 Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat-Gotong Royong, Gotong Royong People's Representatri:e

Council, the popular assembly for the Yogyakarta Special Administrative Region.
 Chapter 7
ADDITIONAL DATA
ON COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY
CRUELTY IN INDONESIA,
ESPECIALLY IN EAST JAVA

Anonymous

itor's introduction
, e following document is a rare Indonesian report on the killings in East
a~a in 1965-66. The origin of the document itself is obscure. It deals
ivii!i the period from December 1%5 to January 1966 but was apparently
corltpiled in the 1970s. There is no clue to the identity of the author -
~obvious reasons - but there is no evidence that he or she was a witness
10 a,,ny of the killings. The document, which came into the hands of the
BFitish campaigning organization Tapol in the mid 1970s, may in fact have
li'WP compiled from information collected amongst Indonesian exiles in
urope; the document is a collection of specific reports on a number of
ttis\inct incidents rather than a narrative of one person's experience. Part
o ihe report was published in Tapol's Bulletin', but the sharpness of the
intliVidual accounts makes the report worth reproducing here in full. 2
•et.ailed accounts of individual killings are themselves uncommon, and
acCciunts by Indonesians are even more so, for the reasons outlined in
efatroductory chapter. Although parts of this report make particularly
unpleasant reading, the document opens a rare window to the massacres.

'Massacres in East Java', Tapol Bulletin 15 (April 1976), p. 3.

, I am grateful to Carmel Budiardjo for supplying me with a copy of the original

ifocument and for her permission to include it in this collection. The text here draws partly
a$o on a translation prepared for Tapol.
170
1. Lawang, Kabupaten Malang
Members and sympathizers of the PKI who were to be murdered
their hands tied. Then an Ansor gang, accompanied and protecttj!
an army unit, ZIPUR V (Zeni Tempur, Combat Engineers), took iJie
to the killing places, the village of Sentong and the Botanic Gardens ( •.
Raya) in Purwodadi.3 Holes had already been prepared in these pJa
The victims were taken one by one up to the holes; nooses were put am
their necks and then tightened until the victims collapsed. Then they Vie
beaten with iron rods and other hard implements. After the victims)
died, their heads were cut off. Dozens of people were killed Iike 4
Sentong and about a thousand in the Botanic Gardens. Banana trees we
planted over the graves.
·surrounding districts were killed by methods similar to those described
mArtillery), working closely with Ansor. The bodies were buried. in
, <lr three months, the victims were brought in on trucks belonging to
The killing of PKI detainees
3
Not the Purwodadi mentioned elsewhere in this book, but a town.north of Mal8
in East Java. The place name Putwodadi, which means 'perfectly made', is found in .m
parts of Java.
171
. Jigosari, Kabupaten Malang
¥oung boy, member of the !PI [Ikatan Pelajar Indonesia, Union of
eriis of Indonesia] and son of Pak Tjokrodihardjo, who was a member
e Jocal PKI committee (CSS) in Singosari Kecamatan, was arrested
·or. He was then tied to a jeep and dragged behind it until he was
ill )3oth his parents committed suicide.
@rip' Kalsum, a woman who was lurah of the village of Dengkol in
sari, was a member of the PKI. Before being killed, she was ordered
·e all her clothes off. Her body and her honour (kehonnatannya)
then subjected to fire. She was then tied up, taken to the village
nlong in Lawang, where a noose was put around her neck and she
Hacked to death.
bst of the murders in the Singosari region were done by beheading
>'ittunS. The bodies were then buried in gardens and plants such as
aila trees were planted over the graves.
pang, Kabupaten Malang
·.. ut two thousand people from Tumpang and Poncokusumo Kecamatan
e: •. These killings were carried out by ARMED I (Anilleri Medan,
C!l$ in the village of Kunci.
1· e killings in Jeinber were carried out by ARMED III; in most cases
'ctims were shot. The killing places were the rubber plantations of
miwiri and Glantangan and the Nglangan coconut plantation. For
Rerkebunan.' They were buried in holes, each with about ten to fifteen
One of the thousands killed was a mother called Ny. Sudiono.
The handwritten original is not clear.
PN Perkebunan, state-owned plantation corporation.
172
Before she was killed, she asked for permission to kiss her Child l!ui
refused. · · e·'l'illage of Gumul.
In the village of Pontang, the killing was carried out by the villag~ a .
and retired soldiers. · . rn{PPDI [Persatuan Pamong Desa Indonesia, Union of Indonesian
5. Nglegok, Kabupaten Blitar
a) Japik, a leading figure in the local branch of Gerwani and a me~
of the PGRI Non Vaksentral was killed along with her husband Dju'
also a member of the PGRI Non Vaksentral. They has been marrie<i·o
thirty-five days. She was raped many times and her body was then iii
open from her breasts to her vulva. This was done by an Ansor '
b) Nursamsu, also a member of the PGRI Non Vaksentral
dismembered and the pieces of his body were hung in the homes 0
friends. , 10 ihe river.
c) Sutjipto, a former lurah of Nglegok and member of the PK!, ·
castrated and then killed. This was also done by an Ansor gang.
6. Garum, Kabupaten Blitar
Ny. Djajus, a woman who was lurah of the village of Tawangsari. in
Garum and a member of Gerwani, was pregnant to the time of the c0up,
Her body was cut open before she was killed. Pak Djajus, her husbapa
was sliced in the face with a dagger until he died.
7. Kecamatan Gurah, Kabupaten Kediri
a) Saekun, head of the Information Service in Gurah, was visiting l)i§
brother, H. Ridwan, in the village of Tremas Babadan (Patianngrowb;
in Kertosono when he was murdered by his own nephew and a gang ~t;
Ansoryouths. They beat him until he fell unconscious and then butchere11! ;
him.
b) Kasman, a teacher in the village of Ngasem, north of the town of
Kediri, and a member of the PGRI Non Vaksentral, was captured byan
Ansor gang. They paraded him along the street, beating him as they went
When he finally collapsed, they cut his head off, stuck it on a bamboo ,
-~ 1 .oata on East Java 173
(flambu runcing) and placed it on a guard post at an intersection
.
. pjmyita, village head of Kaliamba, and a member of the Kediri branch
ge, Officials); Samino, an official of the Standards Office of Kabupaten
ini; Ny. Samina, head of the primary school in Kampung Dalam and
ber of the PGRI Non Vaksentral; Kusnan, deputy chief of the Office
SQciaJ Affairs in Kabupaten Kediri and a member of the Serikat Sekerja
· (Union of Social Affairs Department Employees); and Nono Ariatun,
amaster of the primary school in Kampung Dalam II and a member
e'. PGRI Non Vaksentral - were all inhabitants of the village of
· ·m.ba. All five were captured by an Ansor gang. They were beaten
ui they were crippled, then taken to the banks of the Brantas river, to
e w,est of the market at the village of Kaliamba and to the south of the
t mosque at Kediri. There they were butchered and their bodies thrown
ecamatan Pare, Kabupaten Kediri
Suranto, headmaster of the Sekolah Menengah (High School) in Pare
na ime of the leaders of the Pare branch of Partiitdo and a member of
e.J:)PRD Kabupaten Kediri, lived in the village of Pulorejo, Pare. On
8 @dtober 1965 at about 5.00 p.m. he went by bicycle to meet his wife,
nin~ months pregnant, who had been at an arisan. 6 On the way home,
ey:were stopped and taken prisoner by an Ansor gang. They were beaten
ntil they fell unconscious and were then killed. The man's head was cut
ofltimd his wife's stomach was cut open, the baby taken out and cut to
p,jeces. The two bodies were thrown down a ravine to the east of the market
in Rare. For a week afterwards, their five children who were all small
.tfie oldest was eleven) had no-one to help them because the neighbours
re warned by Ansor members that anyone helping them would be at
risk.
l
6· An arisan is perhaps best described as a rotating credit and social club. Members
rthe arisan gather regularly for copversation ·and snacks; at each meeting, the members
l!f a fixed amount into a kitty, which is then allocated by lot or by prior agreement to one
00 the members. Each member is eligible for the kitty only once and the arisan breaks up
on:ce all its members have received a payment.
174
9. Kecamatan Keras, Kabupaten Kediri
Danum, head of the market in Keras and a member of the trade li!U
SEBDA, was arrested by an Ansor gang. Along with other prisoners
was taken down to a ferry crossing at the Brantas River near the
of Ploso, being beaten all the way. At the river bank, they were '-a
and their bodieS thrown into the river.
10. Kabupaten Banyuwangi
Mass killings began in Banyuwangi on 20 November 1965 aM n
on until 25 December 1965. There was another outbreak from Ho
October 1966 and the final (?) 7 killings took place from May to Octd
1968. The murders were carried out as follows:
a. Shooting by the firing squads of KODIM 08325;
b. Mass round-ups by Ansor and Pemuda Demokrat' wearing black ieei
shirts and led by members of the Raiders.• After their detention.-tli
victims were beaten to death. 1
·'
c. Kidnappings at night by members of Ansor and the Pemuda Demokrau
Victims were strangled with nooses around their necks. The bodii:s
were then placed in a sitting position under trees along the main roall!
In some cases the victims were beheaded, the body being left ili'IH
middle of the road and the head taken elsewhere. The killings .too
place along the roads and on river banks, and bodies were buried;
mass graves.
d. Some victims who had been arrested by the authorities were 'loaned
out' (dibon ), and dropped off one by one along the roads, where tou~
(algojo) were waiting to dispatch them.
7 Question mark in original.
8
Apparently another name for, or perhaps a similar organization affiliated to, the-"
PNI's Pemuda Marhaen.
9 The elite commando unit of the East Java Brawijaya Division of the army, simifil-.
in style and orientation to the RPKAD.
175
:one place, a large hole was prepared, big enough for twenty to twenty-
ve bQdies. The victims were killed one by one with their hands tied
hind their backs.
vUi sing tip-trucks from a paper factory in Banyuwangi, bound victims
~ere dumped down ravines, soaked in petrol and burnt to death. This
teOk place at Curahtangis, a ravine about twenty-five metres deep
i;:eiween Banyuwangi and Situbondo. The .people killed here were from
obth Banyuwangi and Situbondo.
fu:many cases, women were killed by being stabbed through the vagina
.vfth Jong knives until their stomachs were pierced. Their heads and
breasts were then cut off and hung on display in guard huts along the
road.
Male victims had their penises cut off and these too were hung up on
gµard posts. The heads of Pemuda Rakyat members were cut off and
placed on bamboo stakes along the roadside or hung from trees.
•-;
·mie organizers of the killings in Banyuwangi were Colonel Sumadi,
00n0nander of KOREM 083, Lieutenant-Colonel Djoko Supaat Slamet,
oonin)ander of KODIM 08325, Dja'far Maruf (Jafar Ma'ruf], chairman
0 tl!e Banyuwangi branch of the PNI, Haji Abdul Latif, chairman of the
yuwangi branch of the Nahdatul Ulama, and Captain Sairnin Suprapto,
eailofSection I ofKODIM 085325, with the assistance of2ndLieutenant
'jumangat, toughs from the two parties and members of the armed forces
illocated this work. At kecamatan level, the murders were carried out
ORAMIL commanders and staff, as well as party members..
!pie murders were normally carried out in quiet places - public
cen}.eteries, secluded river banks and particularly coffee and rubber
p,lan,tations. Among the places widely known as locations of mass killings
are'•.
a. 1Curahtangis, mentioned above, where people were thrown into a ravine
.and burnt;
6. '·.Merawan, on the border between Banyuwangi and Jember, where people
who had been tied up were thrown from trucks into a gully and shot
. from above. The victims here were from both Banyuwangi and Jember;
,•:f
176

c. Tampuh, a village in a secluded plantation, where members of the l' .

a
PKI committee were shot after ceremony attended by all mempe
of the Banyuwangi National Front. The killings were led by Colcln
Djoko Supaat Slamet of the Banyuwangi KODIM, with the assista:n e1 ·chapter-8
of a firing squad. ·

d. Curahjati, a teak forest in Beculuk kecamatan. A large hole was du
for victims who had been taken from Banyuwangi prison and ft~~
Kalibaru detention camp.
e. The villages of Bulusan and Ketapang on the coast. The people kill~
here were mainly former detainees in the Banyuwangi KO RAMIL an
police stations. Big holes were dug at the edge of the beach fonij
victims.
f. The Chinese cemetery, in the village of Giri, Giri kecamatan.
was where members of the Banyuwangi KODIM and KO
generally executed people they had arrested or kidnapped.
Places of detention included the various KODIM headquarters; the
number of prisoners in these places is difficult to calculate, because ther
was much coming and going. There was also a camp at Kalibaru Wit
around 7670 detainees. Prisoners were also held in police stations in tlie
towns and at kecamatan level; again the number held is difficult to know
because of the constant through traffic. KO RAMIL headquarters in ea.ati
kecamatan also held prisoners. And finally, the Lowokwaru prison tin
Malang held 150 people from Banyuwangi in Block I; only four have been
released.
By 25 December 1%5, when the Fact Finding Team consisting
Brig.Gen. Dr Sumarno, Oei Tju Tat10 and police chief Sukamto, the nwn~F
ofvictims had reached 25,000. On 1 October 1966 another 150 were kill~:
and more were killed in May 1968, though the number is not known. t'
That is all for the moment. I am still collecting data!
.. SCHOOLING AND VILLAGE POLITICS
IN CENTRAL JAVA
IN THE TIME OF.TURBULENCE
Kenneth Orr
:There is a whole range of complex procedures which the government
0 li\donesia requires of intending researchers before it gives them
dnission to operate, especially in the villages. It is very unlikely that
an ·foreigner would be granted permission to invelitigate as sensitive a
p,lc as the coup of 30 September 1965 or its aftermath. It has been no
Fi of my intention during my several visits to Indonesia for authorized
eltl work on village education· to pursue unrelated matters. However,
in iile course of being asked about the history of the founding and funding
ol shoo ls in two villages, my informants have as the subject demanded
ed of events of the latter part of 1965. The material that follows is
e~fore heavily oriented towards schools and schooling.
ol i\great deal of the substance of this paper was gleaned by my energetic
an"ci enthusiastic graduate assistanis. In this case, it might be nci good
sei:vice to quote their names. Should any of them read this paper, they
will hereby be assured that I remain conscious ofa debt of gratitude owed
toHhem. At points in the paper where 'we' is used, reference is to the
re&_earch team, 'I' is to the writer alone.

10
Sumarno was minister for Internal Affairs, Oei Tju Tat was minister of state. .
178
MARGO SARI
Thekabupaten1 of Kia ten lies between the two stronibolds ofJavan
court culture, Yogyakarta and Surakarta. It has for many centuries~
a heavily cultivated rice bowl, providing income for the development
0
a high culture of polished sensitivity centred on life around the pala
One consequence was that, in the colonial period, there was rather m
Dutch enterprise in the area than in many others in Central Java: i .
included schools. Another consequence has been serious over-population
and the early development of a landless labouring class. Not surprisin
the area provided a fertile recruiting ground for the Partai Komu .
Indonesia, which by 1965 had built up a strong base through much of tti
kabupaten. 2
Along one of the kabupaten boundaries, running up the slopes of Mo!U!
Merapi, is the village of Margosari.3 Though some of the villages in tti
district further up the mountain side are less well-watered and
productive, Margosari itself shows several signs of relative prospefi...
strong concrete irrigation channels carrying water to well-constructed con
points and beyond them to the paddy-fields; and solid homes, many ol
them of permanent materials set on rais.ed stone platforms above :a
possibility of snap flooding. Indeed, one of its boundaries is the sm
street of shops which forms the district centre. So, many of the inhabitan
of Margosari behave in some situations as townspeople, a stage more
sophisticated than their counterparts in other villages further out. '"·
is partly a consequence of the easy access to Klaten, now a large antt
prosperous market town, and to the proud city of Yogyakarta: it ta~
only fifteen minutes on the pillion seat of a motor cycle taxi to be on iHe
main road and a frequent bus service to each of these centres. And.~.
is partly a consequence of the educational level of a sizeable number of,.
Margosari people. 'l'
For this and other administrative terms, see the note on p. ii.
2 It was one of a number of kabupaten in Central Java which returned a vote of
more than 50 per cent for the PK.I in the 1957 elections,which were the last to be held before
the banning of the communist patty. See Donald Hindley, The Communist Party ofJndoneia :
1951-1963 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1%4), p. 226.
3 Names of places and persons from thekecamatan level downward are pseudon~
179
@ne of the reasons for this latter is the fact that a small missionary
aol was founded there as early as 1925, and remained vigorously active
. iaken over by the Japanese occupation authorities. Many of the
eration which received its primary education in that school in the latter
~.of colonial rule later converted, and became the core of a body of
.ung parents who worked in the early years of independence for the
.ration of that school to Christian ownership. They were not successful
mat time and the building was used to house the first national SD4
ore village. When by 1953 it was apparent that the building was not
mg to be returned, the group set up a formal association and opened
@lj!istian SD which has remained a lively school in its own right.
, e 1950s saw SDs set up by local initiative in every village in the
tilct: a room would be borrowed or hired and someone with a little
re than a minimal standard of educational achievement engaged as a
6her. The appetite for such an institution developed faster than the
i ~urces of the government, so the semblance of provision readily
.utstripped the substance. An afternoon course of tuition in Indonesian,
arithmetic and elementary pedagogics was offered at the Margosari SD,
a:;it seems a certificate issued at its conclusion. The condition of
· espread illiteracy of the majority of the adult population did not prevent
em for distinguishing between qualifications earned and qualifications
p,urchased. A mild ~cepticism spread abr.oad through t~e co~ee stalls,
lliSlinguishing 'genume teachers' from 'chicken teachers . As time went
on.,however, the supply of graduates from teacher training schools increased.
ihe number of schools increased, and the size of those already established
Y/}Vf. these young people formed a growing proportion of the teaching
.'f. They had four or six years of post-primary education and were
erefore in most cases the most educated persons in the villages where
ti~worked.
·~
Tue fact that the village was at the centre of the district also made
1 thefocus of efforts to provide for secondary education. The principal
'4 The system of national schools at the time proVided for a six-year primacy school,
;; n as a Sekolah Dasar (basic school) to be regarded as the norm for all children. ~ose
lio:auained asufficientacademicstandardand could pay the fees might proceed to a Sekolah
€ilengahPertama(firstmiddleschool)whichProvidedanacademiccurriculumforafurther
tiTue years. Both of these institutions became known universally by their initials (SD and
t;t:P) and are referred to accordingly in this chapter. There was a variety of alternative
JU~ior secondary schools for technical and vocational training.
180
of the government SD had once attended a secondary school run b '
Taman Siswa Association, and maintained links of loyalty and Y.
mindedness with this movement through a junior high schoolit COnd. :
in Dororejo, an adjoining district. The founder of Taman Siswa, KiB~~·
Dewantara, had been one of the key ideologues of moves for an indig :·1
·
curncu d"
1um unng the final twenty years of colonial rule, and he wasi
eno
of the formulators of plans for a national system of education in the ·~
years of the revolution. Most of his life was spent in Yogyakarta ~
it was from there that many of his closest disciples originated. o~'.a 0.
two of the wealthier people in Margosari had links with the movenie
and they supported the SD principal in his concern to provide Son
opportunity for local children to continue beyond primary school •. m
to .do i~ under the auspices of the move?1ent ~hie~ had in its h~ya
ep1~omized the struggle to re-assert a national 1dent1ty for Indonesia" !ll
So 1t was agreed that the principal would administer a single class of chilili'aii
under the aegis of the Sekolah Taman Dewasa in Dororejo. (Tam ans··
translates as 'garden of pupils'; Taman Dewasa, 'garden of maturity';
the term adopted for secondary schools.) That was in 1955. The ventu
seems never to have prospered. Most of the teachers commuted rio
Dororejo, and were erratic in attendance. The pupils in their turn:ai
not receive that pastoral care and individual stimulation which was 'on
of the hallmarks of the Taman Siswa tradition, so that they were: no
purposeful enough in study to achieve satisfactorily at the examinatio
conducted by government for private school pupils. And, most fat~fii
for the future of the school, the increasing politicization of the villa
population produced rifts running right through the area between' :
particular) PNI and PKI supporters. Many of the teachers involved in
the Taman Dewasa school at Dororejo aligned themselves, overtly 01
covertly, with the communist cause. Neither the Dororejo school nor1itS
Margosari affiliate survived the upheavals of the latter part of 1965:
The Taman Siswa contribution to the extension of educational facilities
in Margosari seems rather to have been as a stimulus to others. Between
1960 and 1970 no Jess than five secondary schools were initiated Jn
Margosari or its immediate environs, several of them with a consciO:us
concern to provide.a counter to the growing influence of the PKI on the
younger generation. The first in 1960 was a proposal by a Catholic pries~
in Kiaten that an SMP Ounior high school) be adumbrated by setting ,up,
a single continuation class for those who had successfully completed priniaJl:
school. Some forty children were gathered together in borrowed premises
181
many words spoken about the value of the venture. But supporting
.-seem to have been Jacking and the enrolled pupils melted away within
~1months. The following year, a dozen pupils were gathered together
!If~ home of one of the devout Muslims in what was announced as a
· Je school but was hoped by its initiators would become a Muslim
,school. Like the Catholic venture, this one avoided many of the
ropJex demands of registration with government as a private foundation
announcing itself to be a kelas jauh (a distant class) ofan existing SMP
maten.
[\was evident that there was a market for secondary school places.
embers of the PNI in particular, and others with no strong ideological
nuniunent, saw the need for a national SMP in Margosari, serving the
o.(e district without distinction of persons or creeds. The district officer,
jowo, was more than casually supportive of the notion, and he provided
se!JSitive awareness of what needed to be done both to ensure that any
"tiatives did not fall foul of party strife and that they were eventually
Ren over by the Department of Education. First, he formed a grand
.mmittee (panitia besar), including among the membership the Jurahs
all the villages in the district, under himself as chairman. Once this
mmittee had sufficiently expressed the direction of its commitment, it
~ointed a working committee of eight to take action. These members
re persons with a proven capacity for executive endeavour, and were
re.fully chosen to represent the three major political forces of the district:
e !'NI, the PKI and the Muslim parties. In the words of one observer,
was ~ golongan_ Nasalwm ~ffort'; that is, it followed carefully the political
ancmgact which the president had declared normative for the Republic
that time.
il'his group set itself to fulfil the four conditions necessary if the venture
in time to be taken into the national system. The first of these was
nd: Sanjowo obtained permission from· the Lands Department to take
~a segment of ~e site of a Dutch sugar factory which had been destroyed
u1lng the revolut10n. To raise funds for the second, a building of at least
ree classrooms, the Jurahs agreed to levy landowners in their villages.
~,:re~aining two conditions, an enrolment of pupils and a minimum
appo~nted teachers, were met before the building was erected by beginning
Imes m the government SD in afternoon hours. Payment of teachers
Ul?ffees levied was pathetically norninal; but all Jived in hope of moving
·n towards qualifying for full government subsidy.
182
Those who worked on the staff of the school in that period sir
1
experience of being in the place from day to day was less smooul~
its progress might have seemed to those whose primary concern:
buildings. Each of the major political streams had set up studentmovem
in the district' complete with theme songs and banners and slog~
to~en items of distinguishing clothing. Rallies and marches took p
This occurred off the school property, of course; but the atmosphe-
partisan loyalty it engendered overflowed into classroom jibes a
playground brawls. Official celebrations conducted according to srl)! .
convention drew very different attendances, according to whether U!e
significance was religious or national or revolutionary. Arrangemenu
these were often a source of contention among staff. They were at 0
however in a conviction that the school was inlportant for the future .
the district, whoever eventually won the struggle for power. ' siage or another taken in for checking. This included ninety per cent
Early in October news filtered through that the struggle had reaciH
flashpoint. No group had any clear perceptions of what action to ta
One night a small band of PKI zealots broke into the district office;a
stole some small arms. Fearful for their immediate safety, several not
Muslim leaders left Margosari and took refuge with friends in the villa
of Plumbon, which was strongly santri. School attendance dropped sha"P.
and several principals decided to close until the atmosphere clear
Rumour told of the killing here of a noted PNI figure and there of aJR ,
leader. On 10 October' a detachment of troops arrived and too~
residence. After due consultation with Sanjowo in the district office, t6
sought out some of the most noted PNI and Muslim citizens to participat
5 The Pelajar Islam Indonesia (Muslim Students of Indonesia) was associated~
the Masyumi, the Gerakan Siswa Nasional Indonesia (National Student Movement of Ind~
with the PNI, and lkatan Pelajar Indonesia (Union of Students of Indonesia) with the:RIG
group.
6 We arrived at this tentative suggestion as to when the programme of poli\iCil
elimination began on the basis of comparing and weighing the dating given by ourinfomian
Others have suggested slightly later dates. · Rex: Mortimer says that Colonel Sarwo Ed ·
commander of the army's para coinmando force (RPKAD), was ordered to Central J~
to clean up the province on 17 October, see his Indonesian communism under Sukarno: ·
and politics, 1959-1965 (Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 389-90. LesliePaloliCI!
says that commando troops subdued mutinous military elements of the Diponegoro divisi®
at Solo on 22 October, and thereafter began the elimination of the PKI. See his Commwiisa
in Indonesia (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1973), pp. 247-48.
183
p.rogram for cleansing the district of the influence of communism.
yuki, one of the members of staff of the SMP, was invited to join
. use of his longstanding association with Muhammadiyah. He became
mJ>er of the small team charged with screening those taken into custody
uspicion. A group of empty shops near the camat's office were taken
f0r use as a makeshift prison. It was guarded by members of the
1uan Pejuang Agama dan Nasional (PPAN), a youth group formed
er·santri sponsorship to struggle against communism. 7 Those prisoners
. atrived wearing watches or other items of value soon had them taken
all suffered a deal of abuse from the less temperate of the young men
l!ius suddenly found themselves in a position of unwonted power.
e' of the detainees were very quickly cleared and allowed to depart
t 0\hers took their place. Damsyuki said that a total of 300 were at
ill~ teachers in the district.
, e investigating committee began with records and membership lists
»mcated from the homes of PKI leaders, and also took verbal evidence
p,Olitical and social activism. The case of the teachers illustrates
ething of the haziness of the lines which they had to draw. The teachers
·on in Indonesia (Persatuan Guru Republik Indonesia, PGRI) had split
iyears before, mainly, it seemed to teachers in this part of the country,
i ihe question of the proper function of a union. The official continuing
Fegarded support of the government in the building of the nation
i~ primary ·concern: it therefore held the loyalty of the staunch PNI
Jllbers as well as many of the older and more cautious. The breakaway
o ,ement (the PGRI non vak sentral~ said that the object of a union
ouid be the welfare of its members rather than the support of their
ployer: while teachers were hungry, one of its current slogans declared,
·~<JUld not teach. This stance drew teachers with a variety of political
. alties: its more militant policies ensured that a sizeable proportion
The only occasion on which one of our informants specified the origin of the PPAN,
ascribed to Partai Masyumi. In the eyes of Margosari viIIagers, all santri activists at
t tipiewereidentified with the Masyumi, though the party had been proscribed by Sukarno
96.0 for its alleged involvement in the regional uprisings in Sumatra and Sulawesi. Most
ili~ activists continued their association by membership of Muhammadiyah. I have been
bl.e .to find an external reference to the PPAN which would clarify this point.
The vak~entral, or trade union federation, in this case was the PNI-affiliated GSBI..
184
of the leadership were PKI members; Consequently, in the aftermath 0
the coup, all members of the PGRI non vak sentral were called in.~
screening. Damsyuki, as a teacher himself, was much involved in so~
through this large group of his professional peers. Many were quic'ilg
able to establish their credentials as members of other political parliJ
or leaders of Christian youth groups or well-known supporters of soln
other religious congregation. On the other hand the names of some w~r
readily identified as office holders in PKI branches, positions for wb.fo
their superior education had readily qualified them. Others with an espetjj!
interest in wayang or game/an had been associated with LEKRA, and,118
such were under suspicion by association. It would have been a difficn1t
task for a competent lawyer. Damsyuki and his colleagues were
inexperienced amateurs, and there were no directives from the government
as to the criteria that should be applied. As the days went by, and tlie
makeshift prison was filled, news began to get through of widesprea11
slaughter in other parts of the residency, some of it clearly beyond th'e
control of even such a makeshift ·body of investigator-prosecutor-judga
as themselves. Better a few semi-judicial errors than uncontrolled mayhefu!
' •i$ included seven lurahs, eighty SD teachers and sundry pamong. 10
So, on about 20 October, the first group of those condemned were
taken by the soldiers to a nearby field to be killed. A sizeable numb~;
of villagers went along to watch.9 One of those, a ten year-old, found
the whole event a colourful change from filling in time without school;
Sometimes the stabs would hit the stomach, sometimes the
head. I liked the ones to the head most, because sometimes
the skull split and then blood and brains would spill out.
Others would be hung from a tree. Some of them would
not die immediately, and would cry out for another stab.
Sometimes their throats were cut: one time I saw this I
shuddered as there was so much blood all at once. It all
happened in the middle of the day, so lots of people were
9 The manner of execution and the identity of the executioners is less than clear
from our material. Had it been our intention at the time to research the killings we could
easily have followed this to a point of greater clarity. On most matters we.have regarded
Damsyuki as the most reliable informant: he was a relatively educated man with a modelln
background (his senior secondary school was an Ahmadiyah foundation, he himself belonged
to Partai Masyumi), and in interview he showed a consistent sobriety of utterance, avoiding
decoration or undue elaboration. But he made no reference to being actually present al
the place of killings, which others did.
185
there to see it. All the killings were done by soldiers with
red berets.
' that last point our sources are not consistent. Some say that the
@n
ung men of the PPAN were also involved. In view of the general
oi!Wliness of the process, I wonder if this does not represent wishful
· king on the part of those who would like to be able to tell of having
Jiyed a more dramatic part in the stirring ·events of the period. One
, !o/ told by several concerned a young blade who did his utmost to be
5
at the death, borrowing uniforms from the military personnel whenever
h'e eould. His delight in the whole process (even, it was said, to the point
0 !irinking the blood of his victims) became the stuff of local legend, so
at when he returned to the district in 1980 everyone recognized him.
'then he was suffering from large body ulcers which ate into his flesh
antl caused him to die in agony. It was clear, the locals said, that his cruelty
~cbeen remembered in heaven, and he had been given his just deserts.
;)
By the time the killing was over, some 120 to 130 had been killed.
@fins colleagues at the SMP, Damsyuki recalls, two including the principal
ere killed, one sentenced to imprisonment, one deprived of civil rights
and one suspended from teaching. For several weeks, the schools remained
closed. When they opened it was hard to resume regular classes. Not
a single SD in the district had a full complement of six teachers. Several
!0,und themselves operating with two or three. One such told of having
tolshare the entire six primary classes with just one surviving colleague.
1 ey devised a programme of rotation. One class was sent outside to
P.lay sport, one to do some written work without supervision. The four
remaining classes were put in adjoining rooms. Each teacher operated
through a door in a dividing wall, keeping two classes busy under his
alternating stimulus and supervision. Classes I and II were sent home
early. Even so, work programmes were delayed and confused. The crisis
~ms to have been widespread _enough to demand a response from Jakarta.
,,·e government declared a six-month extension of the school year.
.eantime the Kursus Pendidikan Guru (Teacher Training Courses) of
lfe 1950s were revived, offering three months of afternoon classes to SMP
graduates to train them rapidly as teachers. The results were of indifferent
A term used to cover all village officials from the lurah down.
186 187

quality, but the products were snapped up by harassed headmasters: a ousehold electrical appliances. The several children of the family were
put in charge of classes. Many are there to this day. \
1'at school against all odds; and, when two of the boys performed well
The Margosari SMP survived the shaking better than most, an°d
K4P, they were sent away to Yogyakarta to attend senior technical school.
~iholic priest in the district arranged for them to be granted residence
the opening of the school year in 1966 was ready to promote its first inta aries in a church hostel in the city. These boys used to come home
into Class III and admit its third into Class I. Furniture from the'.n ~kends and spend all their time helping in the repair shop. A keen
defunct SMP Taman Dewasa was added to its own stock. It was n
\of mutual loyalty kept that family together. Others doubtless fared
fully functioning school, and its supporters could present its case tQ t well, though their stories will never be told. One SMP teacher told
Department of Education with some assurance, despite the insecuril)i 0
taking a civics class in 1981, and dealing with the events of 1965. As
the times. Sanjowo put in a word to his superiors, and their assessmen
spoke, his glance was caught by the face of a serious-minded student
of the political atmosphere may well have added weight to the case. , ,
!lie back row. She was sitting utterly still, her face an emotional blank;
district had purged itself of a very sizeable communist movement, ,~n
t ber eyes had filled with tears.
done it with a minimum of casual slaughter. The New Order governmen
had committed itself to the practice of considerable restraint in e>.penditu
for all that, it was still clear that the district deserved a mark of approvall
So it was that on 1 July 1966 the school was officially proclaimed to\
a national school, and its property handed over to the Departmenvo1
Education. The staff were given equivalence of status on generous te~
which allowed those without any tertiary qualifications a set period ol
time and adjusted timetables to attend upgrading courses.

In time, the New Order government devised its version of the evenis
of 1965, and these have been used in the classrooms of all the schoo
in the district. The Department of Education and Culture issued a bulletin
announcing the status of all teachers who had been judged to be involve(!
with the PKI. They were not subsequently allowed to resume teaching
until 1977, and then only in non-government schools. (In practice tlle
application of this directive seems to have depended on the sponsoring
foundation: a number of such teachers were re-engaged before that date~.
I
The effects of this pedagogic short-changing on that generation of schoof 1
children cannot be documented. Other more obvious consequences can!
Families which had lost a bread winner often found themselves straitenC!l
to the point where even decent clothing for school attendance was beyonf ·
their means, and the children dropped out. Supporting mothers who ha~ :
relatives in other districts were sometimes able to move to an environment .
without agonising associations and attempt a fresh start. Others lacke<J
such alternative resources and stayed put. One such family lived next door .
to the home in which the research team was billeted. Both mother and .
father had been teachers, and were deprived of civil rights, father after •
serving a period in detention. In time they developed skill in the repair .
188
KALIMANGKO
The kecamatan ofDemangan is a dry district some w,;enty kilo ..'
from Purwodadi, away to the east of Semarang. One of the northern~~
of Java, th~ Kun tan~, forms one boundary of the district and in a seaso
and unreliable fashion serves as a source of water. But the wate ,,
which the villagers relyforagriculturalirrigationandhousehold user?
from .a l~rge canal "'.hic? runs.in a southerly direction the full len~ .
the d1Stnct. Alongside it, straight and flat, runs the only access roa'd
most of ~he villages, an assemblage of stone which at sometime iii
past r~ce1v~ an. asphalt surface but has long since relapsed into blll!!
and pits wh~c? 1ar .even the best-sprung vehicle. Not surprisingly;,i
attempt to VISI~~liman~o onl~~n mark~t days can village peoplecql!ll
on the probab11Ity of a smgle mmlbus plymg irregularly along this ro tt
There are a number of bicycles, and during the dry weather they wei!~ 8
manageable track for themselves through and alongside the irregular patcH
of stone and metal. A fortunate few own motor-cycles. The rest wa
That means, for those who wish to reach the village of Kalimangko fio
the nearest main road, a trek of some twelve kilometres. ·
These minimal communications bespeak poverty. A brief glance a
farming practice in Kalimangko explains part of the reason for it. Tu
fields which are in close proximity to the canal are allocated water fon
one crop of padi per year. The rest have to make do with the rainfl!U
so corn and tapioca are sown in October, at the beginning of the north~in
monsoon. Some of these fields are inundated during the wet season whe
the Kuntang River bursts over its banks and spreads itself far and wide.
Sometimes the flooding comes at an appropriate stage of growth, and is
gone quickly enough to leave the crop with an enhanced topsoil, so theie
is a good harvest. At others, the vast volume of water moves too quick!Y,,
remo~ng topsoil and uprooting the young plants in its turbulent pat~t~
The village people most affected by this calamity may well have been u~''
all the previous night, moving their children and belongings out of theit,: _
homes onto the higher reaches of the nearest roadway. The few who ar~ '
wealthy in Kalimangko have their homes built on raised platforms; and:_.
most of their land is sawah (wet paddy), to which intermittent flooding '
is a minor benefit.
The village then is bounded on one side by the Serang and straddles ·
both the road and the canal; but ninety percent of its territory is between
the river and the canal. There are three hamlets, each one running along
189
· ·or village street from the main road towards the river. ·The most
, ~rly, Kaliparas, which is the one at which the visitor first arrives,
~n the centre of village government for forty years, and includes,
:ll as the lurah's home and the village hall and offices, two of
· angko's three schools and a number of warungs. A kilometre further
uili•>is Kalitelor, which has the largest population and is the site of the
~ SD Jnpres and the neglected mosque. The remaining hamlet
·gandul, is much further south, and plays little part in village affairs.
Jk around one or two of these settlements serves to reinforce the
ression of poverty: a high proportion of houses have only rattan walls,
any of them consist of only one small living room and a tiny kitchen.
, e combination of isolation and poverty makes it easy to understand
~ill the mid-1950s there was still no school in Kalimangko: the few
· [es who much wanted their children to be literate sent them to
·gj\bouring villages. Indeed, there was so little pressure for, education
1when the vigorous village secretary, Sulibuh, a member of the PKI,
ugg<_lSted in 1956 to the Department of Basic Education that it should
iiiJtla school in Kalimangko it pleaded a shortage of funds and directed
~ources elsewhere. Despite lack of interest in the project on the part
t11e lurah, Sulibuh went on canvassing the need of the local children
tli~truck a sympathetic listener in a Christian pastor of his acquaintance
, Purwodadi. The result was the appointment of Kristiardjo, a trained
: , ary school teacher, to take charge of twenty-five children gathered
the living room of Sulibuh's house.
By the mid-1960s, the polarization of Indonesian politics was being
Greasingly felt in Kalimangko. Budiyapto, the lurah, was a member of
e PNI. Though Sulibuh was his son-in-law, and had indeed gained his
Iirge office by virtue of that relationship, he was increasingly building
p, an alternative power centre within the village, and winning support
nh both because of his energy and personal charisma and because of
C:attraction of the PKI's policies of economic betterment for the poor.
the wealthiest landowner in the village, Budiyapto had no counter to
off~r to this latter score. It was therefore all the more desirable that Sulibuh
~o,uld no longer be, able to take credit for being the only leader in the
!age to show a concern for the education of village children. Budiyapto
anil his friends discussed the issue, and put together the most convincing
case they could to the Department. 'To help them put the case with
maximum persuasiveness, they. involved in the negotiation Rusiman, a
C!tcher from elsewhere in the district, who was very active in the PNI.'
190
The Christian school (the deputation pointed out) now had a full sixc
and there were still a large number of unschooled children in the Villa
Many parents, they also claimed with much less plausibility, were UJ(
about sending their children to a school where everyone received ChriS .
religious instruction. Besides (in a whisper to selected government Otliee .
that school had been initiated by a PKI leader, and it was time that trs
village had alternatives. Initial approaches were received with great cou.
but no assurances of action. When the matter was pressed, one depanmen
officer seems to have suggested that, however reprehensible Suiibu
motives may have been, his initiative was worthy of emulation. If the vilJa
leadership founded a school, and demonstrated both the general need;fil!d
its own commitment, the government might when more funds becgin
available be more easily persuaded of Kalimangko's claim over thli_t 0
others. This was not the kind of response that Budiyapto had hoped Jo
where was this village in its poverty to get resources to pay)fOn
accommodation and teacher's salary, except from the pockets of the lutaH
and one or two of his immediate relatives? So the matter might in quiete
times have been allowed to rest. But as the year 1965 had arrived an
the pitch of political contention become more strident, it was clear tiia
the people of the village needed something more tangible than newi o!
another unsuccessful deputation to government if they were to belf
that the PNI deserved their support. The Christian school, having quicRJii
outgrown the resources of Sulibuh's house, had tried meeting for a whil
in the village hall and then moved on to some nearby houses. What tllen
was to prevent a Class I of the proposed national school from meeti~g
in the village hall? So Rusiman, heavily involved in the cause, was offert'j!
some minor inducements from village funds to travel across from his oWI!
village after school there closed at 12.30, and teach through the afternoon
hours in Kalimangko. It was an erratic and educationally minimal servi!\C'
but, graced with the title SD Persiapan (primary school in preparation~·
it served its purpose as a sign to the people of the village of the lurah'!.'°.:
benevolent concern for the education of their children and to t!t'.~. :,
government of the village's aspirations for a subsidy from the nation's coffe~. .
Meantime, the PKI continued to be active, conducting its campaiW,i ·
for support by both symbolic and substantive action. Its members talked
of the coming revolution, when they would take over every office in the
land, from presidency of the Republic to lurahship of Kalimangko. They
went around under cover of darkness and painted hammer and sickle signs
on the doors of the homes of some of the leaders of the PNI faction:
191
promoted Javanese puppetry performances laced with leftist innuendoes
l)egan recruitment for a gamelan orchestra under the sponsorship
Nor were they willing to acknowledge defeat on the educational
nfii Recognising that kindergarten classes were becoming increasingly
·on in other places, Sulibuh organized one in his home, known as
' Kanak-KanakMelati. One report says that the children were actively
11 atheism. 'Now, boys and girls,' the teacher was reported to say,
gnt
ra~, to God for a pencil... Have you got the pencil you asked for? ...
en ask the teacher for a pencil... There you see, there is no God. Only
ill!!an beings can give you things.' Whether this was so or not, the
ahrgarten could be clearly identified as a communist initiative. There
.none of the ambiguity which attached to the Christian SD, which had
J1'.founded by Sulibuh but established itself over the subsequent years
an unambiguously Christian institution responsible to its supporting
.undation in Purwodadi. And through all this activity, PKI adherents
nt on talking of the redistribution of land which would follow communist
G!)IY·
bn the first day or two of October of that year news began to circulate
,ugh the village that the revolution had in fact begun in Jakarta. Reports
re confused, and in that atmosphere of tense expectancy and fear they
multiplied in rapid confusion. Within two or three days it was clear,
er, that, whatever had happened in Jakarta, the PKI was not in power.
jnembers turned to Sulibuh for advice on what they should do, and
riinot much consoled to find that he knew as little as they. Two weeks
on fo later, he was asked to attend a meeting in the district office in
~awangan. That evening a messenger returned his bicycle and his books:
e:village secretary himself was never seen again in Kalimangko. Two
iliY,S later a platoon of soldiers arrived. They arrested several of the known
ea.tlers of the local PKI branch, and announced that a youth group for
e'defence oflndonesia's basic ideology, the Pancasila, was to be founded.
~rkus Yahmo, deputy principal of the Christian SD, volunteered, as did
utarmet, another of the lurah's sons-in-law.
,Sutarmet originated somewhere in the Kia ten region. A oombination
o~ poor health and poverty had driven his father to move north looking
ffiv; employment, and after sundry vicissitudes he and his wife and son had
!tied in Kalimangko. Sutarmet was. bright enough to recognize early
ID life that for some people poverty at the beginning of life did not keep
lfiem for ever at the bottom of the heap. He walked five kilometres to
e nearest primary school, and when he left it began buying and selling
192 193

on a tiny scale. With his savings, and some help from his newly a .· ed to by the investigating autbority, Sutarmet confirmed his innocence.
~te~mot~er who was an expe~ienced trader, he went off to Purwo~ . , mpense, Sutarmet received a very substantial sum. Just how much
1umor high school. By the tune he had completed he was twenty ifilj!Se8 to say; but he does own to an additional clause which he inserted
ofage, and increasingly aware of the rewards of enterprise. He got : ,..ltich has been fulfilled to this day. He asked the bekel to inform
a job as a clerk in the Semarang office of the Department of Eduea ofall important matters discussed at meetings of village officers. It
and a few months later managed to transfer to the Purwodadi ,0 Be surmised that his was not the only case in which such a promise
Meant~me,_ he courted and married one of Budiyapto's daughters, made, and kept. ·
l',
formallon m October 1965 of the Barisan Garuda Pancasila, to eff~
iS hard to assess just how much Markus Yahmo was involved in this
thorough destruction of communism in the villages of Penawangan .·~ 1.
his entrepreneurial inclinations precisely. After a brief period of t~/ .
oittion. In discussing the period, he talked about the extent to which
milers of the Barisan and others indulged in blackmail, and it seems
by members of a military unit in Purwodadi, the young men were.&!
· elY that in his own state of financial stringency he refused all. the
the right to wear a yellow shirt and a red beret, and to go and roo
,rtunities that were pressed upon him. He is however a very different
all traces of the allegedly alien doctrine. Such a patriotic duty: ou
n frOm Sutarmet, with high standards of professional zeal and a clear
sufficient reason for non-attendance at the office, while nevertheless dra ·
: ;tian committnent within the Reformed tradition of the Gereja Kristen
his salary.
onesia. It seems very possible that, while he stayed.out of Sutarmet's
There were only six members of the Baris an in Kalimangko. The 0 p,Jiisticated manipulations, he allowed himself to be persuaded that they
ones with any initiative and independence of judgement were Sutil'll! . best unreported, for the alternative to this cover-up would surely
and Markus Yahmo. The military had already taken into custody'. · ·~n widespread slaughter of the kind being conducted in other places.
of the known leaders of the local PKI branch. The Baris an were thus) it:was, the only deaths were those of Sulibuh (shot, according to reports,
to operate on a confused and demoralized rank and file. Sutarmet's~ : barawa) and two of the other party leaders who were apprehended
first investigation convinced him that his hunches were correct The !lie military unit during its first visit to the village. Our informants
whom he interviewed had indeed been a paid-up member of the p !Ce no mention of whether those two were shot there in the village or
he was now however willing not only to deny all connection but to man~ en away.
his tiny plot of land in order to recompense anyone who would sup'
Even so, there was a sizeable power vacuum in some segments of the
him in his denial. The situation was perfectly tailored to Sutarmet's talen
Ia:ge polity. Budiyapto, the lurah, moved with his customary acumen
Exuding high purposefulness and earnest goodwill, he set out to diYi
the wicked from the misled, and managed over the next two month§ m
asingle-mindedness to fill them. His eldest daughter was Sulibuh's
marshall nearly all of Kalimangko's erstwhile communists into the !al
·aow, and she was left in peace but not in poverty to reconstruct her
rsonal life. 12 The second daughter was married to a man who had been
corral. His reputation spread, and one day he received a call from't
en the very minor job of being a messenger: he was moved into the
bekel11 of Kalitelor. When Sutarmet checked the documents to wlli
cant secretaryship. And so on, until there were only two positions in
he had access, he had no doubt at all about the man's PKI membersHip,
llage government not occupied by members of his family: the bekel of
over several years. A man holding a public office like this would be certain
e,tlistant hamlet of Kaligandul, who by regulation had to be a resident
to lose it, and the income attached to it, possibly his freedom and may
!hat neighbourhood, and the imam of the mosque, who it was recognized
his life. So Sutarmet, as an officer-of the PNI, wrote out a member5liip,
o,uld be known for at least a minimal piety. Since then, Budiyapto's
certificate in that party in the name of the bekel, and backdated it. Tiius
n,:and son-in-law have ruled the village as a family fiefdom, maintaining
armed, the man was able to claim that he had been framed, and, wilen

u;· Even sixteen

. years Iater she was speaking
· of Sulibuh in very positive terms: hi~
11 The lurah's administrative deputy in that hamlet. rgy, his social idealism, his concern to serve.
194

and extending their own wealth. National elections see a flurry ofsuif
for Golkar. ;

For the rest of the time, in happy harmony with New Order poU!:i
economic considerations have taken over from political ones, excep'r Chapter 9
only for an election for a new lurah which had at the resident's directi
to take place in 1980. The family coffers were then opened to ensure i: THE PURWODADI KILLINGS
the district officer disqualified the only plausible non-family candiilata Two accounts
the headmaster of the Christian SD, who was deemed to have failed'tH
literacy test taken by all candidates at the district office, and to bu~
many votes as possible for the most favoured candidate: the only on Maskun Iskandar & Jopie Lasut
ofBudiyapto's sons who did not already have either govermnent employni Translated and introduced
or a post in the village. Of course an edict removing parties from iH by Robert Cribb
villages does not necessarily eliminate political debate within them. 1
Kalirnangko however, the New Order govermnent has no cause for concelll!
Struggles for power now occur only within the closed circle of a famjly,
whose members squabble in private over their share of the spoils: oi 'Readers of the Indonesian press in 1965 and 1966 found little reference
commoners are perforce totally preoccupied with an exhausting strud! ere to the killing. Reports on the alleged activities of PKI members
to feed themselves. " antl about army operation to suppress them appeared regularly in
papers, but the mass killings themselves were touched on only indirectly,
· at all. Soe Hok Gie's 1967 attempt to address the issue of the killings
never published. Only in February and March 1969 did this silence
5reak, when reports of renewed extensive killing in the Purwodadi area
of Central Java occupied the front pages of the Jakarta press for about
ree weeks. The difficulties which journalists faced in investigating and
reporting this story, however, help to explain why the earlier, more extensive,
.assacres were so meagrely covered.

· On 26 February 1969, the newspaper Harian KAMI carrier a page one

tieadline 'Pembunuhan gelombang dalam 3 bulan di Purwodadi' ('A wave
ofkillings over 3 months in Purwodadi'), together with a report of an
interview with Haji J.C. Princen of the Human Rights Defence Foundation
ff:.embaga Pembela Hak-hak Asazi Manusia) in Jakarta. Princen, just
5*ck from a week in Central Java with two Dutch journalists, reported
!hat two to three thousand people had been killed in the Purwodadi area
sihce November 1%8 by army units of the Central Java Diponegoro Division.
· e victims, he said, has been struck on the back of the neck with iron
b.ars before being buried in nearby teak forests. At least one was still alive
when he was buried. Many more people were in detention in jails in the
region, Princen said, where they were being tortured with electric shocks.
 197

elecal ntilitarydistrict (KOD IM) commander Lieutenant-Colonel Tejo

t'.§!. ,·no bad earlier told a public meeting in Purwodadi that the people·
c
•c I!'
·\would 'do better to clean yourselves up than to let me do it'.
·c •
~
rf1 di, in consequence, was in a state of terror, and some people had
• .s · "tted suicide, rather than risk torture and death at the hands of the
:> "'~
~- . ·iai:y.
Reports of a PKI resurgence themselves nothing new. The conservative
·c
•~
.,,.•
·~
• .• ~were in no doubt in 1%5 that the PKI and its mass organizations
~ ""-•
• iild.fight and each incident in which party members or associates fought
co
"• y,;and vigilante units in the immediate aftermath of the coup was seen
a'battle in the civil war. Even after the army was clearly in power, reports
&ea! 'terrorist' activities by the PKI continued to appear in the press.1
p,llrts of this kind came from many parts of the archipelago. In West
· tan, there was a prolonged guerrilla struggle between the Indonesian
il!!!Y and troops of the Pasukan Gerilya Rakyat Sarawak, which had been
1JI1ed originally with Indonesian assistance to promote the confrontation
Malaysia. The most substantial of the reports from Java were of the
15 rablishment of PKI guerrilla bases on the slopes of Mounts Merapi and
efbabu in Central Java in late 1966 and in the South Blitar area in East
ava in 1968. Accounts of the Blitar bases described them as full scale
Bl!eirilla headquarters, complete with a People's Liberation Army (Tentara
embebasan Rakyat), underground bunkers and a network of cells
.0ughout the countryside. The PKI's South Blitar operation had been
, . bed in the army's Operation Trisula in mid-1968, but the public was
well-primed to expect a further recrudecence of communist activity, and
neW8 of the Purwodadi operations was initially thought unremarkable.
·The report of extensive massacres in Purwodadi, however, led other
akarta newspapers to pick up the story. Indonesia Raya (28 February
969) described Purwodadi as a miserably poor limestone area, no good
for agriculture, where people could survive only by stealing wood from
·estate teak forests. In 1966, the newspaper recalled, local people had
Jiacked to pieces a member of the forest police. This was perhaps a cause
of the present crackdown, the newspaper speculated. Indeed, alongside
iHe question of land reform, forest policy had been a major issue of political

For a summary of publicly reported PKI activity after the coup's suppression, see
[ilstus M. van der Kroef, Indonesia since Sukarno (Singapore: Donald Moore, 1971 ) 1 pp.
1,1-124.
 ,
198 Maskun lskandar & Jo pie;·
contention in the poorer areas of Central Java since Dutch times.2
Santin movement of late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
claimed the right of pea5ants to collect wood in Dutch teak forests•-,
during the fifties and sixties the PKI and its affiliates had argued for,
redistribution of forest land to peasants, a programme which later enabl
the party's enemies to add promoting erosion to the list of its aU~g
crimes.' . • that the Dutch had cast themselves in the erstwhile German role
Confronted by journalists with reports of the killings, the arttt
commander General Maraden Panggabean promised and investigation.'
Governments ranks, however, quickly began to close. The Diponegoro
commander Major-General Surono categorically denied the killings.ana
tortures and was joined by the Central Java governor, Major-Genefu
Munadi. Operations had taken place in the area, they conceded, wbi .
was well known as a PKI stronghold, and had successfully uncovered a
number of so-called ruba (ruang bawah tanah, underground shelters) fu
of weapons. Having failed in their attempts to set up a guerrilla base.in
South Blitar, the officers suggested, the PKI had chosen Purwodadi as
the starting point for another 'come back'. Army operations to crush :.
activity had been successful, but the army had shown no cruelty, thC)l
reassured the journalists; in fact, the soldiers had been especially careNJ!
of the lives of their enemies in order to be able to interrogate them later~
. . . Jj;y
Surono and Munad1 also turned the heat on Pnncen, saymg that iw;,-
had never visited the villages where he claimed the massacres had take!);·
place but had obtained his information entirely from a Catholic pri~,lt-'
in the town of Purwodadi. He had, moreover, they alleged, gone
Purwodadi clandestinely, after telling the military authorities in Semarang :·
he was on his way to Yogyakarta. Nor, said Surono, was there any such
person as Lt-Col. Tejo Sarwono; rather there were separate Lt-Cols. Tejo.
2
See Nancy Lee Peluso, 'Rich forests, poor people, and development: forest access
control and resistance in Java' (Ph.D. the.sis, Cornell University, 1988).
3 Harry J. Benda and Lance Castles, 'The Samin movement',Bijdragen tot de Taal·,
Land- en Volkenkunde 125 no. 2 (1%9), 219-224.
, JPRS, Translations on South and East Asia no. 135 (14 Nov. 1966), p. 5.
s Indonesian lltrja [IR], 3 March 1%9.
• IR, 3,4 March 1969; Harian KAMI [HK], 3 March 1969.
199
~,
SafWOnO in the region. Munadi went on to accuse Princen of attempting
1!<Jtage the Indonesian Republic and of being a member of the Dutch
jjjp1unist party. 7 This sidetracked the debate for a time into Princen's
ece<1ents, which proved to be impeccable. Jailed by the Nazis for his
e in the Dutch wartime resistance, he had joined Dutch military forces
empting to suppress the Indonesian revolution, only to discover, in his
_,_
l f<)'reign oppressors. In 1948 he deserted to the Republic but was jailed
p,Ia units in Kudus, coincidentally no far from Purwodadi, as soon as
appeared across the border. Released by anti-communist Siliwangi
· ·'ion troops after the Madiun affair, he joined the Siliwangi in its march
. ;into Dutch-occupied West Java and was awarded the Guerrilla Star
, intang Gerilya) for his role in the final stages of the struggle against
eDutch. In 1955 he was elected to parliament as representative of the
·wangi-based party IPKI, and in 1960 was one of the founders of the
tifcommunist Liga Demokrasi (Democratic League). He had been jailed
Sukarno from 1962 to 1966 for his opposition to the rise of the left.8
· unadi, on the other hand, said Princen, had only started fighting the
• ·after it had been crippled. Perhaps he had always disagreed with
rommunist activitities, 'but none of us sitting in those cells heard his voice'.9
On 7 March, Surono invited Jakarta journalists to visit Purwodadi to
:things for themselves, and this invitation was taken up by the Indonesia
journalist Maskun Iskandar, whose report is translated here. Surono's
offer, it turned out, was for journalists to be escorted through the region
w: ·1ocal military authorities. Iskandar's account described the difficulty
o~·reaching any conclusion under such circumstances. Other journalists
at empted to go without military sponsorship, and the report of Jopie Lasut
ol~inar Harapan on his brief visit is also translated here. Harian KAMI
p,ublished a sarcastic story suggesting that a tourist guide to Purwodadi
:md soon be published for the many journalists who had suddenly become
mterested in the previously neglected region. The paper advised journalists
'iravel alone, and to dress as simply as possible, preferably in an old
saritng andpic_i (black Muslim cap). No arrangements for accommodation
IR, 4, 6 March, 1969.
8
For Princen's own memoirs, see 'Pelarian KNIL Berbintang Gerilya', Tempo 7
!Uly 1990, pp. 51-65.
IR, 4, 6, March 1969.
200
or for return journey were necessary, however, said Harian KAMI: 8.
the army was happy to provide free overnight lodgings and to arra~ge
rapid transport back to Semarang.1° ' tablishment of its leftist element, had been relatively inactive. The paper
Despite military restriction, hints about the nature of the killin11f5 s
as the days passed. What these hints suggested, however, was rathei'mo
than simple army massacres of suspected PKI supporters. Amongstlll
arrested, according to early reports, wer~ a number of 'religious teaqlien•
These turned out, in later reports, to mclude between seven Callie .
teachers who had been arrested in the pastoran at Purwodadi 0·
December 1968 as well as a number of Protestant teachers. One of tl!
called Llmaran, had died in detention, from a faJJ in the bathroom accq· · ·
to the military, from severe beating according to a medical report lea
to Harian KAMI. 11 This incident was said to have led the Diponego
Division to train 'one hundred' interrogators who would use psychologi .
rather than physical techniques to extract information. The Cati{o
dintension of the affair was reinforced by a report that a Hansip (ci ·
defence) officer called Marni, who had allegedly given informatio~·
Princen, was arrested early on the morning of 5 March, before going 0
Mass. Military announcements now began to stress that Islamic and
Protestant religious leaders had been arrested too, and that PKI strate&ll
was to infiltrate religious organizations. The intpression remained, hOWCl!:li
that Catholics had some special involvement in the affair. The milita!¥,
spokesman who issued these reassurances was a Lt-Col. Tejo Suwamo
who, though his name had appeared at first as Tejo Sarwono, thus turn.ea
out to be one person after all. 12 .<
In mid-March, Harian KAMI published three further reports from,tJi
region, none of them explicitly related to the army killings. It told f\iit:
the story of an Islamic religious teacher who had attended, more or l~,
by mistake, a clandestine meeting of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PI'!]),;
which had also been fairly strong in the region. At this meeting peop)f:
had spoken out in favour of Sukarno. When, however, the teacher reportfJ!
this to the local authorities, be was hintself jailed, tortured and accus,<;,4
of planning to slaughter Protestants and Catholics in the region. Second,
10 HK, 13 March 1969.
11 HK, 5 March 1969; JR., 6 March 1969.
12 IR, 4 March 1969.
201
'iifi!JnKAMI commented that the official screening team for civil servants
ihe region (Team Penertiban Personil), intended to purge the official
rved sourly that not a single KAMI member had been appointed to
e J(abupaten assembly. And it concluded with the story of a former
rober of the PKl-affiliated organizations BTI and LEKRA who had
n released from detention and was promptly elected lurah of the village
,emon. Challenged over his past, he triumphantly produced a PNI
mbership card. 13 At about the same tinte, Indonesian Raya published
suggestion from someone with a 'senior security role' in Jakarta that
eI'urwodadi army units had themselves been infiltrated by the PKI and
· using the killings as an opportunity to dispose of enemies. Sinar
arfipan reported that the Central Java commander had personally ordered
check on the local KODIM which had put fourteen military personnel
jail in Ambarawa, apparently on suspicion ofleftist sympathies.'' Lt.Col.
WSuwarno was himself tr~nsferr~ to Sal~tiga, elsewhere i~ Central
av;t', on 30 April, though this was said officially to have nothing to do
"t ' the affair.
:How much truth there was in any of the reports is intpossible to say,
utthey clouded the affair with three complications, all of which tended
subdue enthusiasm for further details. First, the reports reminded
Honesians that the political polanzation between left and right was not
ebnly cleavage in Indonesian society, and that religious differences had
e'potential to be a powerful source of communal conflict. After the
iifrontational politics of Guided Democracy, large sections of Indonesian
~etywere ready for social divisions to be papered over, camouflage and
rued under the aegis of an ostensibly tolerant Pancasila. It was easier
anifmore comforting to attribute the extraordinary violence of 1965-69
the extraordinary tensions engendered by the PKI than to acknowledge
at its roots mightlie elsewhere in society as well. Second, the suggestion
at the PKI itself might have been behind the killings revived fear of
tteviJish cunning on the part of the communists, adding to their catalogue
ofcrimes and reinforcing the belief that any measures necessary to suppress
them were justified. A vague report that the commander of a military
HK, 14, 15, 17 March 1969.
IR, 14 March 1969; Sinor Harapan, 14 March 1969.
202
sub-district (KORAMIL) in the area had been shot by a p ;
(gerombolan PKI) on 13 March strengthened this feeling." .
And third, the reports raised the suggestion, already aired bys:'
Gie, that some of those who had avoided irrevocable COmmitmentt~.
side before Gestapu deliberately promoted the killings afire the · !lt
a way of showing their loyalty to the New Order. Few lndonesia:u
Guided Democracy had been able to avoid, even if they wanted i/
form of compromise or accommodation with left. Munadi's silence''. Ill
acquiescence in a flow of events which seemed unstoppable, was 't
more common than Princen's outspoken opposition. Even Suharr
Sudharmono, current president and vice-president of the Republit
been accused, in different contexts, of close contact with sections 0
left in this period. 16 This consciousness of having dallied with the
crippled whatever inclination many Indonesians may have had to oP,
the killi~gs, fo_r _oppo~ition could too easily be construed as sympath~ ,
the PKI s political alillS. Few had the anti-communist 'credentialS'
Princen, and even those credentials did not save him from virulent perao
attack. If there was any lesson drawn from the Purwodadi case it was•t
the lid was best kept firmly on the earlier, greater killings. 1.
The Purwodadi affair ended, as far as the Jakarta press was conee~
with a flurry of government assurances and warnings. On 14 March ·
foreign minister Adam Malik warned against 'magnifying' the issue; it~
only, he said, distract the country from the forthcoming five y,ea
development plan (REPELITA) and could damage Indonesia's internatioDi!
relations. President Suharto was planning a state visit to Europe in Ma)
and the affair could provide, Malik said, a pretext for anti-Indone8·
demonstrations. Then on 17 March the information minister Air vice;
Marshal Budiarjo returned from an unannounced visit to Purwodadf1to
tell the president, the cabinet and reporters that nothing untoward iiaa
happened and that the area was calm. ...,
15 IR, 15 March 1969.
16
W.F. Wertheim, 'Whose plot? New light on the 1965 events', Jownal ofCon/mlp<JrOl'1
Asia 9 no. 2 (1979).
203
PURWODADI: AREA OF DEATH17
Maskun Iskandar
~'Mir, my clothes, my bag were all dusty. It was a bad road from
adi to Kuwu. In a few places the asphalt could still be seen, but
.rest the road was paved only with brittle stones which crushed easily.
river stones are like gold in this area,"' said the military man who
iiti;d us in the jeep. We proceeded slowly, seldom meeting another
·rue. I had been told that the only public transport available was an
ain which ran the 62 kilometres fom Semarang to Purwodadi. So
'1(as one piece of Princen's information confirmed: communications
~iffic~lt. But was the rest true? Had there been mass killings? Were
it.ions m the Kuwu area tense? Now that I was on my way to the area,
a'to find answers to these riddles.
fuce leaving Jakarta for Semarang, my mind had been churning with
ughts and questions. I had to be alert to the possibility that someone
orches~rating a split here between the armed forces and the people.
·. possible, too, that government bodies had been infiltrated or that
.P.le were spreading false information for their own ends, whatever those
· t be. There was also the possibility of interference from outside to
te tension between religious groups.
r;:arrived in Semarang on Monday 3 March 1969. On the same day,
Id Major Suhimo, head of the Diponegoro Division's information section,
tthe division's official denials had not satisfied me and that I wanted
s,ee things for myself. On the following day, together with a colleague
inKompas, I received a letter of permit fom the Assistant I of KO DAM
'" I also had a long discussion with Major Suhirno about the rule of
w.; freedom of the press, human rights and so on. He warned me against
king information from individuals not competent to supply it. This
·pded members of the community and officials not from the local military
~7 Originally published as 'Laporan dari daerah maut Purwodadi', in Indonesia Raya
IOUl, 12, 13, ~4, 15 and 17 March 1969. A somewhat stilted English language translation
ID~~aRevtew 7 no. 3 (17May1969), pp. 9-13, was also used in the preparation of this
.-lation. English language expressions from the·original text are underlined.
18
The collection of river stones for the paving of roads was one of the traditional
ill:iligations laid on the rural population in Java.
204 205

command (KODIM). This was, he emphasized, a matter of securil}l and all the lights were turned off. I.cannot say which, if any, of these
order. lies are true: there is simply no firm evidence to confirm or deny them.
The morning of our arrival in Purwodadi, Wednesday 5 March!-
there had been a military search operation at Purwodadi railway statio
Captain Sarwono told me that these operations were launched frequen
at the station, because it was a kind of open door into the region. I!
an easy place to pick up new faces, especially suspect ones. The co · .
of KO DIM 1717, Lieutenant-Colonel Tejo Suwarno told us that they,
arrested a PKI member the previous night in Toroh. His name was Ki£
alias Prawirosudarno. When I was in Semarang, I had read that a ii ·
Yudha journalist in East Java had been arrested on suspicion o!O:e
connections, and we heard on the train that two journa~ts from SO!
had been arrested. So Princen's information that detentmns were·i ·
going on was also true. This of course was the reason. we had asked ra
a letter of authorization in Semarang. We were afraid to be mista'.!Ce
for being PKI, which happens commonly these days.

Before we left Purwodadi for the Kuwu area, which had been identi(i
in press reports as the centre of the killing, the KODIM commander ga
us a briefing. PKI membership in Purwodadi was estimated at 200,00!
out of a population of 700,000 in eighteen kecamatan. Two hundrc;ti o!
the 285 lurah were PKI, he told us. Out of this number, only abciu1
thousand had been 'finished off, and those were only the leaders. 'ffwe
arrested everyone who was PKI,' the commander told us, 'we would no
know what to do with them. We do not have space to detain them~
we could not simply release them because the rest of the population wo,
not have them back.' The commander of KODAM VII plans to transmi We heard more stories. Major-General Surono and Governor Munadi
them. may have denied them, but people kept talking. In my diary, I noted, 'This
ituation should be settled by a proper explanation, true and objective,
According to reports I had read in the Centra!Java press, some offici,
ffiim the relevant authorities. No exceptions, no ifs and buts.' This would
had admitted that torture of prisoners had taken place, though only du
wer my questions. As it was, so much depended on the honesty and
operations. The same was true of killings. Unfo~tunately, however, " ' bility of my informants, official and otherwise. Of course I already
were not allowed to interview any prisoners on this matter. And was the
tl plenty of pieces of information, but I also had a lot of question marks
torture done to an inhuman degree? How can I weigh up the evidence ·· after them. ·
of different stories we were told? Someone told us that the body ofLimaran
had been dug up after being buried for two days and a night. His left ·
.on the afternoon of 5 March I visited four of the fourteen prison camps
hand was smashed, his cheeks had black spots on them, traces of torture.
in· urwodadi kabupaten. I saw 987 prisoners and it would be dishonest
But the official story was that he died from a fall in the bathroom. Someo~
!1 were to say that they were either fat or the reverse. The camps
else told us that soldiers had brought the body to hospital for a post mortem, ·
einselves, I was told, included former store houses which the military
but that all the staff had to stay at their posts. No-one was allowed to ·
.~ borrowed from local people. So there were no terrifying iron bars,.
206
but they were secure enough. Let us take Camps I and II in KuV(U
examples. Local people call them kamp maut, camps of death. It.·18
clear to me, however, just what they mean by this. ls there some conn ,~o
with those reports about Kuwu being in the grip of fear? I don't I.Iii.
Stories passing from mouth to mouth tend to get bigger. ThiS
why my editor had sent me to get first hand accounts. Had killings tii11
place without due legal process? Was it true that each desa had to sil
seventy-five victinls a night? Was it true, as we heard, that the vicP.·
were tied up in groups of five before being shot, struck with iron:'.!iilii
or slaughtered without mercy? I had no success in checking these d~taili
and I got tired of hearing the same words 'I don't know', and 'Perha
My readers, I know, want positive confirmation, not inferences from la~
of information. I remembered the instructions of my editor before I lefi·
'When you are doing this job', he said, 'remember that all we are interestea
in is the truth. Truth may be bitter, but we are not aiming to discr it
anyone or damage anyone, we have no hidden agenda, as people are incuDeo
to allege these days.'
·,
The sun stung my skin in Kuwu. The heat was more oppressive ulan
in Jakarta. My trousers and shoes were full of white dust. My KomP@
colleague pressed insistently for permission to interview local people, l\ut
the words 'Go ahead' never managed to get out of our escort's molitli.
We both know there were orders from above, policy and instruction.· It
is hard to go against all of that. It took us a long, long time to get
permission. I was reminded of that old political term dagang sapi, cow;
trading [i.e. horse-trading]. Finally the verdict came down: 'Permitted~'
but you must have an escort and the interview cannot be lengthy'. "':'.
'I'd like to be shown to the mosque', I said, 'The information from
Bapak is sufficient already.' They escorted us to the mosque in a mosJ
friendly manner. When we got there, I left my camera and notebook wit!\
my escort, who waited outside. After I had prayed, I approached a man
in the mosque, introduced myself and, using Javanese, explained whal'i
was there for. 'There is a military man outside, pak:, he warned me
nervously. 'I know', I said, 'I brought him here intentionally. He won't
eat us.' Our conversation was brief. I realized the overwhelming importance
of time under these circumstances. My principle had to be: get as much
information as possible in as short as possible a time. I had a spare piece
of paper and a pen ready just in case, but I put them away. Before I sat
down on the verandah of the mosque to talk to two other local people,
207
ill '·ed my military escort to act as interpreter, because my Javanese is
1 ~eryflue~t. He seemed pleased to do so, and our talks covered general
·gious topics. The locals were friendly but initially rather stiff. I would
say that this was because someone from the army was sitting next to
yerhaps, it was just because my Indonesian seemed rather strange to
m.
We took a rest in one of the local houses. I had not lived in a kampung
! ~ears, and now I felt that old feeling of ease which is absent in the
·es. Simplicity is the civilization of the village. Honesty and friendliness.
e·wooden table was laden with food and drink. There were coconuts
"!!Mheir delicious, refreshing milk, especially welcome after our tiring
·p,, My hands shook as I filled my glass with the coconut milk, and I
illed some ~n my trousers. There were oranges, coffee and snacks, bread
., ·but I did not try it. My stomach could not take any more; I
embered my own village which had also once been in the grip of terrible
· turbances. Suddenly I longed to enjoy the full moon, to play hide-and-
lt with my playmates.
· "ttle children surrounded the jeep, but they did not dare come close,
not'lilte the children at army barracks. They seemed to wonder why so
ny outsiders were visiting their village lately. I approached one of them
anil·asked in low Javanese, 'Do you have a sister?' He was silent. 'Where
~ur mother?', I asked again. He remained silent, making circles in
eisand with his big toe. 'Is your father here?', I asked at random. The
·. d raised his eyes. They were brinlming over. Then he ran away into
)narrow streets of the kampung. I deeply regretted asking those 'useless'
uestions.
·.When I had got off the train in Semarang, fresh from Jakarta, I had
ught almost all the newspapers I could find which mentioned the
urwodadi affair. What had excited me was that invitation [from Surono]
.'check for yourselves'. I was impressed. Here was an honest and
:nourable official, not afraid to speak openly because he had nothing
hide. Lieut~nant~Colonel Tejo Suwamo had also told me, 'I am always
oii.en and straightforward.' My confidence had increased. If we had not
liCen in front of the commandant, I would have grasped the hand of my
mpas colleague and said, 'We're going to make it.' Like some senior
official at a banquet, I could have raised a toast, 'To our common prosperity.
208
We uphold the Message of the People's Conscience.' 19 We pr .'
'Renewal of the people, by_ the people, for the people.'20 I felt re~mo
Pak Tejo accompanied us when we visited the prison camps and uncl
left Purwodadi. We had lunch at the best restaurant in the kabu .
But when my Kompas colleague went to wash his hands, the milita~~te
who was escorting us whispered something to one of his colleagu lllli
did not suspect anything and I do not know what happened, but
nothing happened. Our room to move suddenly became limited. '
mi'
As -I travelled, I tried to go over what I had heard. I knowt·
government faces a dilemma when it comes to communism. Sometu\i
the relationship between communists and communism is like that betw~~
a snail and its shell. The snail can abandon the shell if it wants to. :©n
the other hand, sometimes it is like the relationship between a fire~~
its heat. Without heat, there is no fire. Although we know that there
are groups A, B and C,21 it must be hard to draw a firm line betw~
them. If they are released, there are problems, too, because the communilii
may reject them, or they may revolt again. To detain them means facipg
the cost of providing food for them; they are human beings after all!
Finishing them off or killing them is no solution either, for these are nbt
just inanimate objects or numbers to be dealt with summarily, and killilig
them will just entrench feelings of revenge in the following generations.
,, .
Kill! But kill the idea, not the people. Not that I think this will''~ ,
an easy task. Without wanting to make things more difficult, I do wonde~ '·
whether our present apparatus is capable of doing this and of convinciii~::
people to discard communism. As far as I am concerned, communiitif ·
is clearly bad and as long as people believe in something else I don'tmind'-
what it is. But what about these people? I was very tired and sleepy but
19
Amanat Had Nuroni Rakyat, Mes.sage of the People's Consciousness, the slogan
which appears on the masthead of K.ompas.
20
Suara Pembaruon dari Rakyat oleh Rakyat untuk Rakyat, the Voice of Renewai
of the People, by the People, for the People, the slogan on the masthead of Indonesia Raya~
21 Those detained on suspicion of involvement in the coup were divided into three
categories (golongan), ~Band C. Category A prisoners, generally_major figures, were those
accused of direct participation in the coup and were generally brought to trial. B categocy
prisoners, generally lesser figures within the PKI and affiliated organiz.ations1 were detained
without trial, often for more than ten years. C category prisoners, about 550,000 in total,
were detained only briefly.
209
,uld not sleep at all. Those rough roads kept jolting my mind. But
ought, once I have a rest at the hotel things will be clearer, and I was
confident that I would have complete answers to take back to Jakarta.
B,ack in my hotel, I attempted to sort my confused notes. The very
es I had written down of numbers killed seemed to be shaking. The
'es of villagers where the killings had taken place seemed to cry out.
,haps· the light in the room was too dim. The other guests in the hotel
re all asleep; I had come back rather late. It was 8.00 p.m. when we
•}'urwodadi for Semarang accompanied by our military escort.
Inoted once again what I had heard from an official source who wanted
remain anonymous. Three hundred prisoners, he said, had been killed
1i)e desa Simo. Two hundred and fifty in Cerewek, two hundred in
· ari, one hundred in Kuwu, two hundred in Tanjungsari. Was this
e? 'Did this really happen?', I had asked him. 'It's no secret any more',
tpld me. 'All the locals know about it. No honest man will deny it.
e,:graves of the victims are witness to it.' I asked the same questions
a,11 those who gave me information, people who wanted to crush the
'.but did not want it done in this way. What they said was, 'This kind
fitliingwill not solve anything, not for the people who do it, not for those
is done to.' When the army took me through those areas which were
'il to be tense, I tried to find proof. Was it true that there was a grave
:· d Cerewek railway station which had recently been planted with banana
? Was there a grave in the rice fields at Banjarsari? Someone told
e',there were graves along the river in Tanjungsari, but our escort did
not let us see any of these things. I got tired of writing down the names
of1villages where there were supposed to have been executions and burials.
Pakis, so my official source said, there were one hundred victims, in
Grbbogan fifty. Outside this area my source did not have specific
ififormation, but he named villages: Toroh, Kedungglundung, Sambongbangi,
elogo, Mbogo, Banjardowo, Plosorejo, Monggot, Gundik and so on.
®uld any·of this be proven?
, Like Princen, I began to suspect that not everyone who was arrested
s communist. I heard that eighteen members of the Muhammadiyah
µbeen arrested, as well as sixteen Catholics and Protestants, and some
.m the Nahdatul Ulama and other organizations. Officials told me that
ese detainees were suspected of being PKI infiltrators into the religious
organizations. ·
210
Almost the whole night long, I sorted at my notes on the Purw
~· I made a simpl~ map, marking important places, places with repii,
killings, reported bunal places, areas where there was a majority of WO
I was told that in Cerewek, Gabus and Sulur 70% of the populatio ~
widows. Some people even said that in Banjardowo it was hard tol)lll!
a single adult male. Where could they have gone to? It was very late' ij
water in the bathroom was dripping constantly. Some of my notes :en
hard to find. 'It would be terrible to lose them', I thought, 'iifter 'tlire
took so much effort to compile.' I thought of all the time I had s~ ·
asking here and there, officials only of course, and only from the KOD~
and KODIM. I had even managed to talk directly to people who too
active part in crushing the PKI. . .. ·,
I had a lot of Information about the operations in Purwodadi, {( t
from when they began, but that would take too much space. Let us s•
with 5 April 1968, just under a year ago. The police in PurwodadiHaa
just arrested Sugeng, a former PKI member who conducted raids iii'.tHe
area. Under interrogation, he told the police that the PKI was putiing
together an underground organization called the P~ple's Liberation ~
[Tentara Pembebasan Rakyat, TPR], led by Suratin, who was still at!argei
Level I of the TPR (equivalent to the PKI's old Comite Daerah Bisai
regional committees) was based first in Semarang, at JI. Dr Cipto ~
and 298. Government forces then took over these buildings and be&@n
breaking up PKI operations with increasing success. The PKI kept'uP,
its operations, but it was shadowed ever more closely and had to cha:ike
its operatives frequently. 'When did the large-scale arrests begin?' I ask~
one of those involved. '27 June 1968', he answered.
Hearing that date reminded me that responsibility for operations hi@';;
been transferred to KODIM 0717 Purwodadi. If I am not mistaken, ilf(
headquarters had then been in Grobogan, about four kilometres from)
Purwodadi, while the investigating team had been first at Kradenan and
then at Kuwu, about five kilometres away. I stopped writing, and tried
to remember what I had noted down about Corporal S and Sergeant 8'
From what I had been told, both men were much feared in Kuwu. Perhaps
there was some connection with the story I heard from Kuwu residen~
in Semarang that the sergeant was known as Agent 007. Ian Fleming'l
James Bond. Licensed to kill. I was surprised people could be so loost
in their use of terminology. James Bond was on the side of Good, but
was this man? People told me that he used to summon the authoritiei
to a ritual meal before he went out on his operations. One time he got
211
'!
D,k and shouted am Agent 007. I have killed hundreds of people.'
,i!lunately an official who happened to be sitting next to him.was able
. stop his mouth and prevent him from saying any more.
~gain I rummaged through my notes on the arrests. There was an
!(i~ial who told me that the arrests had gone on for a month from 27
mi When the prisoners had been collected, they took seventy-five away
iaCh night, in ~o lots. Later this became less and they only took away
nty-five pnsoners every Saturday night.
Someone walked past my room. I quickly hid the papers under the
ttress and switched off the light Then everythiiig fell quiet again, except
F the constant short cough of the nightwatchman. It reminded me of
jncident before I had met the KODIM commander in Purwodadi the
@ous night, but I might come back to that. I still had not finished
anscribing my notes on the arrests and killings.
,i'..ccording to the earliest information from Princen, two to three
ousand people had been killed. This seemed very high, out of a total
~wation of eight thousand in Purwodadi kabupaten. 22 So I began to
rount. Seventy-five people at night for, say, two months, how much would
at be? Now, there are 285 desa in Purwodadi. There cannot have been
· · · gin all of them, so let us assume just ten, and that the killings took
~ce once a week, not every night. This would make 8 (weeks) x 10 (desa)
5 people= 6000 people. Impossible! What if I make it just one.desa?
~t is still hundreds, still mass killings. I folded up my notes. I would
tjlrD them in due course to the authorities in the form of questions.
e had actually had plenty of information before we met the KODIM
C?i_nmander in Purwodadi and before we went on our escorted inspectio~
11, but there were question marks all over this information. What I
·d wanted was to be able to remove those question marks. So. much
·r. my hopes. I had not despaired at first. In Semarang I read that the
limy commander had sent an investigatory team to Purwodadi and that
i:htcen had .quietly asked members of parliament to use their right to
~ve freely m order to undertake a. proper investigation, in a way that
neither of us had been able to, with our pockets full of question marks.
.ad also b~en coD:fident that the government would be open, that they
.uld allow iournalists from Jakarta and the provinces to conduct a proper
Eight thousand is of course far too low. Earlier Iskaitda:r gives the kabupaten
P.?Pulation· as 700,000.
212 Maskun lskandar & Jople.' -. 213

investigation because there was nothing to hide, no mass killings rdrom the arrests in 1965. In Godong there are nine prisoners; in
inhuman tortures, no disregard for due legal process. I believed tha; no i!enan two camps, the first with fifty-five, the second with sixty-seven .
all had good intentions and honest aims. I still remember law facul . in Sulur, seventy-two in Grobogan. The total number of prisoners,
students carrying a big poster at a carnival, reading, 'Goddess of Jusu uding beggars, lunatics and women is 9f!>I in fourteen camps. In Wirosari
open the hearts of our rulers', 'When weapons speak, law is silent',''a'nu er.e are seventy-nine prisoners, in Ngaringan sixty-four, in Tawangharjo
other similar slogans.23 I would not like to have to see those pos\e · ' -six, in Pulokulon forty-seven, in Grubug five, in Tewoganu thirty-three,
.
agam.·
n Jl!edungjati one. In January there were four cases of illness, in February
, Some people said these were all recent arrivals, others called them
Under other circumstances, I would not have believed the story'il~ -overs' (sisa). It was not altogether clear to me what the term sisa
Hama [civil defence officer] from one of the villages around PurwOd~!c!i! · 't, so I did not pay much attention to it.
who told me that he and his colleagues had rehearsed uniform ans~n
to visitors from Jakarta when they passed through. I was told this' on I put all my notes and the materials I had not yet transcribed back
Tuesday evening, 4 March, while we were still on our way to PurwOdadiJ rity bag and closed it with a large question mark I hope that an
The hama told us to be careful if we had not yet reported to the KODOO , ligation team dedicated to upholding the law will open it.
office. I could not understand this. After all, we had a letter from KODPlNlJ
My Kompas colleague and I were confident that both we and the lociil
authorities had nothing but good intentions, so we did not suspect anythitjg
when we heard about the military raid on Purwodadi station that morniti~
It did not occur to us that they ntight have heard we were coming and
that it ntight be us they wanted to arrest. This kind of raid was common~·
they told us, and it. did not seem strange that they asked us when we h~··,
arrived. Any good host would have done that. .. •I:·.
I saw no beggars in Purwodadi. They say the kabupaten was once !Ji~.:;
of them, but there was now no sign of them. I asked my escort. Th~,
had been pulled in during the searches, he said; there were forty-thr~··
in the camps now. Were they PKI people hiding as beggars, I wondered[ :
or just ordinary non-communist beggars. Another thing drew my attentiorl, .. :
There were said to be five mad people in the camp, and none had ~ri;
sent to a mental hospital. Even one mad person is a lot for a smal!
kabupaten, but five? Perhaps Purwodadi is an exception. It was not clear
whether these people were mad when they went into the camp or whether
they became mad there. I do not know.
There are fourteen women among the prisoners, perhaps Gerwani,
perhaps not. I did not get a chance to ask them. But let me give. details
of prison camps as I know them. There are fourteen camps in Purwodadi.
In the town itself, there are 411 prisoners, in Toroh fifty-one, in Gundik
forty. Ah yes, and before I forget, the total includes 127 prisoners left

E A reference to demonstrations before the establishment of the New Order.

214
REPORT FROM PURWODADI.2'
Jopie Lasut
We left Wiros~ sta!ion a~ 4 a.m. in an old local train headin fo:
gh ~
Kradenan. People m .Wrrosan had told us of many widows there Wose
us an
hbdsh ad been killed and F. from Pedoman said that this was rui'
we should be looking for; an Australian journalist, Frank Palmos w ~l
. [ , told
Ang.ka tan B ersendgata an armed forces newspaper) that large numbe~
of widows and orphans would be one of the signs of a massacre, ifith "'
occurred. ad
The train crawled on like something out of a spaghetti Western {
occurred to us to begin by asking the women who happened to be the t
'the same carriage
m . 'h us. There was a young woman near U8' and re·
wit
lurn
e d out sh . >11
e was mdeed a widow, but only by divorce, not because her
husband had been killed. We were disappointed. But as we chatted with
her, my companion'~ eyes suddenly began to glint: 'He's onto something,'
I thou_ght. I asked him what he had found. He smiled and said, 'Her father
was killed because he was accused of PKI activities.' Perhaps, I thought
she would be able to lead us to other widows and help us draw the curtai~
from these 'mass killings' in Purwodadi.
After her father was arrested, she said, she had seen him once at the
KOR~~1IlP post in Kuwu, commanded at that time by Lieutenant Sutopo.
Surpnsmgly, herfather had said that he was being interrogated by'another
PKI prisoner'. After that visit, she and her family had heard nothing more
of her father and according to civil defence troops stationed in the Kuwu
KORAMIL, he had been killed somewhere along with other prisoners.
None of this was proof, though, that this woman's mother was a widow.
Perhaps, I thought, her father had just been 'lent' to another military unit
for interrogation or some other purpose.
Her story reminded me of something told me by an officer who had
been in the Operation Kikis (Rub Out) in Semarang. He said that he
had been forbidden to give out information but that he felt that he should
24 Originally published in Sinar Harapan, 14, 17, 18, zO, 21Maich1969.
language expressions in the original have been italicized.
25 For an explanation of this and other military and administrative terms, seep. x.
'purwodadi affair 215
Ill! so to help safeguard the policies of President Suharto and the authorities
m)akarta. The stories he had read in the Semarang edition of Duta
asjarakat, he said, were 100% true. When I asked him whether these
·ilf. stories were the same as those reported by Princen, he would not answer.
think that the fault lay with the investigation team in Kuwu, which knew
fiQthing about interrogation techniques or about the PKI or about Marxism',
e finally conceded. By way of example, he said that the head of the
jJ!terrogation team, Lieutenant Sutopo, who was also commander of the
· •JiWU KORAMIL, did not know the difference between DETGA
[Detasemen Gerilya, guerrilla detachments of the PKI) and TPR (Tentara
Rembebasan Rakyat) He also mixed up PKI and PNI people, so that both
groups were arrested. 'He even recruited a few PKI detainees as "assistant
jnvestigators"', so the officer in Seniarang told me.
· So it was not surprising that many of those taken to Kuwu were from
what the communists call the 'middle group', thatis Catholics, Protestants,
.uslims and nationalists. My informant in Semarang had heard all this
rtom a prisoner from Purwodadi who had been 'lent' to the military
irivestigators in Semarang. 'When news of this reached Panglima Surono
al)d his assistant Colonel Suprapto, they moved quickly and sent in staff
rtpm the Banteng Raiders26 at KODIM level and replaced Sutopo as
jCORAMIL commander. The new commander is the only sergeant-major
at that level.' It was this new team which had been able to break up a
PKI ring within the Purwodadi KODIM, putting fourteen military personnel
liehind bars in Ambarawa.
• We arrived in Kradenan at about 4.30 a.m. F. leapt from the train
like an EI Fatah guerrilla a few hundred metres from the station. He was
lucky not to sprain his ankle. Since it was still dark, we were able to avoid
!he watchful eyes of the guards and spies who were at the station and we
ilnmediately went to the house of one of the local people.
. .
• People there told us about the mass arrests and about places where
the prisoners had been killed. Those who had been arrested and had not
~een heard of for months had been killed, it was rumoured. Most of them
!Vere Muslim. When we said we did not believe this, they urged us to
.meet the local ustadz (Muslim teacher). He lives in the mosque, they told
.Jis. But we did not want to delay in one place for too long. We were
English
• 26 A crack armed forces unit under the direct command of the army General Sta~f
.·m Jakarta and not normally administered through the regional military commands,
216 Maskun lskandar & Jopie
getting used to the fact that people here were 'security-minded'. W!ie
people we talked to heard we were from the press, they became agitat"eu
Everyone we talked to would look nervously left and right as we spok~.. ·
So we promised we would come back tomorrow. 'Tell Haji Rohman
we do want to meet him,' we told them. · !their innocence or guilt, surely the local Protestant representatives had
The stories we heard in Kradenan and Wirosari were hair-raising. ~!1;;,
was not because of the mass killings (most people knew about these fro~ ·
newspaperssuchasKompas,DutaMasjarakatanclAndika). Whatterrifili!f 5
people were the arrests and the tortures. 'They took one person and clil
his throat with a knife, in front of everyone,' said an old man. 'Wheret{: .
I asked. 'In c.erewek,pak.' Had he seen it himself? The old man hesitated:
'No,' head said. But then he added, with a voice trembling and full at
emotion, 'It was my only child. I heard about it from other people. ·1
hate the way things are here.'
We did not want to ask anything more, but then it occurred to mt;
what if this man is a communist? So I asked him, 'Bapak, what party wer'6
you in?' He replied that he was just an ordinary labourer and had noi
taken part in politics, but the callous treatment of his child was more than
he could bear. F. from Pedoman said, 'I am a good Muslim. As soon
as I get back to Jakarta, I am going to get in touch with the party leade~
there.' In Jakarta they talk about community leadership, democracy,
humanity, rule oflaw and so forth, but it is clear that they just don't know
what their followers are going through in kabupaten Grobogan-PurwodadL
People here know men such as Haji Rohman, Father Wignyo Sumarto
and other religious leaders from their own kabupaten, kecamatan or village,
but have never seen the faces of party men like Harry Tjan, Liem Bian
Koen, Liem Bian Kie and Worotikan.27 In fact the Catholic community
has never even seen the head of the C-entral Java branch of the Partai
Katolik. This must have applied just as much to people such as Mari'i
Muhamad, Binsar Sianpar, Victor Matondang and Sabam Sirait, the
secretary-general of PARK.INDO (Partai Kristen Indonesia, the Protestant
political party), who gave me a letter addressed to his dear colleagues in
the party's Purwodadi branch. Our movements, however, were rather
restricted and I was not able to meet them. In Wirosari, on the other
hand, the Protestant congregation, which numbers about five hundred,
27 Conseivative Catholic leaders associated with the Center for Strategic and
International Studies think-tank in Jakarta.
La1 217
able to tell me about Drs Ngayi Iman Marsudi, head of the Christian
. nomic High School (SMEA) in Wirosari who was detained along with
··ght other Protestant leaders without the local Parkindo so much as
u;;;; :eathing a word of en~uiry about their fate. Aside from the ~uestion
~ a\ity to ask where they were and to ensure that they were being treated
according to the law.
, According to information I received, Limaran, one of the sixteen
p,rotestant and Catholic teachers detained, was tortured to death. Of the
een remaining in detention, only one was still refusing to sign a confession
acimowledging that he was a PKI member ordered to infiltrate the Christian
community. (When I asked at the Purwodadi KODIM, they denied any
@hristian teachers had been arrested; this, however, was not what the
, iponegoro Divisional information section had told me.) '1he Protestants
in; Purwodadi are afraid to talk; their ministers are hoping we will do
semething', Father Noto explained. He said that the Catholic community
ail contacted the Purwodadi KODIM in December for permission to
i:dnduct a Christmas service in the jail. This had been refused. The
@il.tholics then made a request through Father Projo for a guarantee that
·e fifteen Christian detainees would be treated in a humane fashion.
, · was also refused.
. In fact, although Father Projo's actions had the blessing of the Cardinal,
he army came next to arrest him. He told them, 'I'll come with you only
rn'you have an official order authorizing my detention. Otherwise you'll
have to take my dead body.' (I confirmed this later with Father Projo's
aeputy as head of priests in the region, Father Endra at Ungaran.)
This was the kind of story we heard in Wirosari. It was a relief to meet
amongst these terrified people a few men such as Father Projo, Father
Wignyo Sumarto, Haji Rohman and the KAPPI members who told us
:When they heard that Mami [one of Princen's informants] had been arrested:
'We are willing to point out the location of the graves to an investigating
t'eam and we are prepared to accept the consequences. Marni was the ·
qnly Hanra28 in Purwodadi who was willing to reveal where the graves
were. But now he has been kidnapped.' I later asked a KODIM officer,
Lieutenant YusufTohiran, who knows the Purwodadi area well, what had
28 Perta/Janon Rakyat, people's defence, i.e. civil guard.
218
become of Marni. 'We heard he was missing,' I was told, 'We are actuaiJ:
looking for him ourselves and we have not been able to find him.'. · ~
•••
'Well, this is certainly a Marhaenist stronghold,' said F. when we·'
PNI symbols plastered along the walls of houses in Cerewek. There ·
houses with posters from GSNI, GWNI, LKN and other Marhae·
organizations", but these generally seemed to have been abandoned ·l!Y•
their occupants. As in Wirosari, these people ~ad been rou~ded up, alo.~ .
with other Marhaenist leaders. The people m Cerewek did not want to
talk. I wondered whether the chickens running wild in the abando;eti
gardens of those Marhaenist houses would be more willing to talk, if o~li
they could. .,j;
As I contemplated this state of affairs, I became nauseous. In Semara\\l .:
the Marhaenist leaders were busy gathering funds to pay off the Weddii\'g:,.
of the child of some party bigshot. I read about this in the Central J~~'i'.
edition of Su/uh Marhaen just as I was leaving Semar~ng for 'Yiros~.
Hadisubeno30 had proudly proclaimed that no Marhaemsts were mvolv~
in the Purwodadi killings. But here in Cerewek notices were tacked u~
to the houses of Marhaenists saying 'Under supervision ar1
PEPERKUPER31'. ·
One other thing was striking about Cerewek (which incidentally~ ·
attacked that night by the PKI). There was a single sign in front of lhi .
mosque with the party symbol of the Nahdatul ~ama, the only one vi~ · ·
saw: And whereas the PNI signs were freshly pamted, that of the NlJ
•·'
29 Marhaenism was the official philosophy of the Partai Nasional Indonesia ~~
encompassed general concern for the poorer sections of societywi~out. any stri7t ~lculation
of class identity. The philosophy was based on Sukarno's o~i:vatlon in_ colon1al U~es that
the majority of impoverished Indonesians were not proletanan ID the stnct sense, smce they
owned some of the means of production, perhaps a small plot of land or a few tools.
GSNI (Gerakan Siswa Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National School Pupils' Movem_ent),
GWNI (Gerakan Wanita Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Wome~'s Mov~m~t)
and LKN (Lembaga Kebudayaan Nasional, National Cultural lnstitute)were social orgaruzatiODs
affiliated with the PNI.
30 Hadisubeno Sosrowerdoyo, PNI mayor of Semarang under Guided Democracy
and an old colleague of President Suharto.
31 Pembantu Pelaksana Penguasa Perang, Assistant Martial Law Administrator.
219
,grubby, as if the mosque had been abandoned for months. We walked
riabout half an hour until we met a dokar [horse-drawn carriage]. The
· r was willing to take us to Banjardowo, a few kilometres away, through
ifat1ooked like particularly fertile rice fields. Banjardowo was the village
ppased to have a majority of widows, but from a distance it looked normal
soon became distracted, however, by a 'tail' we had picked up when we
artered the dokar, a couple of people on bicycles. Funnily enough, when
·stopped, they did too. 'If they are not PKI', I said to F., who had begun
iook a little agitated, they must be informers from the OPSUS32 James
nd in Purwodadi.'
When we entered the village, we began to look for people to interview,
ut, the first row of ten houses we passed was silent and empty. I was
· ded of the abandoned towns I had seen in Sulawesi during the regional
rebellion there. Our driver stared in surprise at the empty buildings. F.
as ed him in Javanese where the people had gone, and he replied 'Probably
en away, pak.' He stopped talking and quickly got the dokar ready
. leave. F., however, did not want to leave without getting full information.
te.pping the driver, he got down and approached a group of children who
Had appeared behind a clump of trees. F. asked them whether there was
anyone else about, and they pointed to a house where five women were
"ding. F. asked if he could buy something to eat, but they told him they
ilid not sell food. 'Look at them,' said F., 'they are not afraid of us: they
.te us.' Perhaps because I was wearing green trousers and a green jacket,
thought. Then an old man suddenly appeared from the sawah. Thirty-
ee men, he said, had been taken away. The story was that they had
lieen killed near Simo. I nudged F. to continue, and he offered one of
ewomen a RplOO note (with a portrait of Sukarno), asking her to boil
·1er and make some coffee for us. On the wall of the room was a national
ooat of arms and a portrait of President Suharto. But I noticed that oui
ii' was watching us from a distance and I felt like the French journalist
egis Debray interviewing Che Guevara. When I noticed one of our 'tails'
leaving stealthily like a guerrilla, I decided that it was time we too left
U(e village.
. F. wanted to stay, but I pointed out that the Kuwu KORAMIL must
mow of our arrival now and that it would be better for us to go directly
OPSUS, operasi khusus, or special operations, was the name of an intelligence
nit under the control of General Ali Murtopo known for its 'dirty tricks'. The term was
ext_ended to any activist, as opposed to intelligence-gathering, intelligence operation.
220 Maskun ·lskandar & Jo pie
to them and ask whether thirty-three people had indeed been arrest~
and whether they were really communists. As we left, F. tried to give som
money to the village children, but they would not take it, quite a contra$~
with city kids. I asked F. to tell me what he had learnt from the wome'~
and children, but 'Bajingan .. .' [gangsters] was all he would say, , !:
As far as I am concerned, it is at least as criminal to permit evii-b~;<
remaining silent as it is to commit a crime actively. Silence keeps
army leaders in Jakarta ignorant of the tense situation in Purwodadi a!fclf
lets the situation there be exploited by enemies of the Suharto governmen~
Such people use the Catholic fathers and the Central Java army officer$'
indirectly, as became clear from the first interrogation of Pono, leadet
of the Biro Khusus 33, who acknowledged that he had 'followers' in NiJl
PNI, Parkindo, Partai Katolik and even the Muharnmadiyah. He conresse;f , ·
that officers in KO DAM Diponegoro had supplied the PKI in Purwodadf c
with 125 grenades and fifteen rifles. I also recalled an interview witli'o\'
Catholic party leader in Semarang, J. Wangsasoputro, who said
communications between his party and the army had broken down entirelf
because of the actions of 'some lndo" priest in Purwodadi with no politicai
sense.' For us non-communists, it is a question of to be or not to be, hi!
said. If the PKI recovers, we will be killed, he told me. Presumably thiS
view is shared by most party leaders in Central Java, especially those iJi
the legislative bodies and other government institutions.
As we headed back to Kradenan from Banjardowo, we met a man on
his way to Cerewek. We put a few questions to him and he told us that
there had been killings in Cerewek some months ago, but only a few.
He could show us, he said, two graves, each containing about twenty
skeletons of political prisoners. According to him, these people had been
helped into the next world by 'yang berwajib'35• A little while later the
graves had been planted over with bananas by Hanra from 'Garuda'
(presumably he meant Hansip/Hanra from the Garuda Pancasila unit"
3J The Biro Khusus, or Special Bureau, of the PKI was allegedly the organization
within the party which masterminded the coup attempt of 30 September.
I.e. Eurasian.
35 Literally 'those with the duty', that is, the authorities.
36 On this unit, see Kenneth Orr, pp. 179-194.
LJ 221
· '!(uwu KO RAMIL). He told us that he did not think that this was done
td conceal the graves, because the people of Cerewek had all been told
abaut the killings to discourage them from following in the footsteps of
!lie deceased, who had actively assisted the PKI. But he added that no-one
_;;,,}'.
outside Cerewek would be able to point out where the killing had taken
p,lace.
u;i ·, · On hearing this, we decided not to go and check on the graves without
a camera. We had decided that we should contact the authorities in Jakarta
10,get greater freedom of action to check the reports. We decided this
,f various reasons. First, if it were true, as I had heard from a security
oJlicer in Semarang, that the Kuwu KORAMIL was working in cooperation
!Vith the PKI, then we were in trouble. 'They'll take us away too,' said
i1Second, there were those Hanra trailing us on their bikes. They had
nqt approached us yet, just followed us. 'If we approach the site of the
gi-aves, they are bound to do something,' said F., half-whispering. 'But
thaf · have to check our information,' I replied. In Central Java, you always
"ave to check information many times. People like exaggerating things.
t is possible that what the man from Cerewek told us was influenced
tiy, the "bush telegraph".' He had not been there himself, that was certain.
r showed signs of thought. 'And if the grav~ are there, perhaps they
'ave been "manufactured" by the PKI or filled with the bodies of dogs
ot something,' he remarked. On the other hand, if there were really human
corpses in the graves, then surely dogs would have smelt them and dug
up the remains (assuming that the graves were shallow). People in Cerewek
~ad not reported anything along these lines. If, on the other hand, the
graves were deep, then digging them must have been a major operation, .
either for the people or for the Hansip or for the army. And how were
ilie victims killed? No-one reported hearing shots. Was it possible that
Jlieutenant Sutopo, head of the KO RAMIL, had deliberately staged a fake
mass execution to discredit the government in the eyes of the international
ciimmunity, which is of course opposed to that kind of fascist behaviour?
We would only be able to get answers to these questions, I thought, if
we were able to interview people in Cerewek fully, without being shadowed
qr watched.
:, Even so, we would have to be scientific about it. You can't just put
l)venty corpses in a pit and forget about them. Gas accumulates in the
! S!bmachs of corpses and with twenty corpses this would raise the soil over
!he grave by about a metre. The people who had given us information
tljd not know about this. To avoid this inflation of corpses, it would have.
222 Maskun ·lskandar & Jopie ~
been necessary to hack the victims into little pieces as well, as had happen~
in India. So from a scientific point of view, we could not immediate!
accept the stories we had heard from people. I deliberately did not rea~
Princen's report when my editor sent me to Purwodadi, because I wanted
to be as objective as possible in making my report. And I couldtell afteJ~
just a few days in Central Java just how effective rumours were';.iif'.
psychological warfare. Some people in Jakarta say 'Where there's smok6:~·
there's fire,' but that is the kind of attitude that led people who had hear1L
about the 'Gilchrist letter' to believe that there was indeed a 'Council;d'r
Generals"'. By using psychological warfare, the PKI could ride on t~
backs of priests and ministers who are naturally sensitive to issues of hum$
rights. '•'·
I recalled an officer I had met in Semarang who had put forward tri~ '·
' "'
following hypothesis: 'PKI members who were aware of this "weakn~~ {
of ·Christian leaders when it comes to human rights issues gave orde~ c;
via their cells for the priests to be told fabricated stories about atrocitie$'r t .
They even managed to produce a soldier who had "taken pan• in tb.~.' -
executions but who was actually a PKI agent Of course the religious leade~
would believe the story ai:td report it to Semarang. Patty officials tb.eji.
take it up with the army and point out that the killings damage the standilig
of the New Order, but of course the story is fake and the army pays no
attention. The patty leaders then get in touch with their allies in the
religious parties in Western Europe. The European parties organize for
Western journalists to visit and they talk Princen into coming along.' The
operation had been a success, my informant said, thanks to a priest who
had since confessed that he was a PKI infiltrator. The priest involved,
however, had later been released as part of a 'gentleman's agreement'
between the Cardinal and the Diponegoro commander.
'Impossible', was the reaciion of a priest when I asked his opinio~.
'We are not allowed to talk to political parties,' he said. 'Perhaps it was
a Protestant minister. They are allowed to join parties,' he added. Of
course this bit of counter-psychological warfare put out by the officer in
Semarang was not relevant, but that does not mean we should simply accept
37 The coup of 30 September was ostensibly staged to forestall a coup against Sukam?
by a group of conservative generals, alleged to have formed a Dewan Jendral, or Council
of Generals. Part of the evidence for the existence of such a group was a letter from the
British ambas.<ador Sir Andrew Gilchris~ publicii.ed by Sukarno in May 1965, in which Gilclui&t
described the political actions of 'our local army friends'.
purwodadi affair 223
jiDilar gross ·exaggerations from the other side. In this connection the
marks of a Muslim leader we spoke to were particularly interesting.
'this fuss about Princen and where he got his information from only
O!!Scures the search for truth, he said. Princen's intentions were good,
ufhe did not check his sources. What needs to be done, if the government
· sound, is simply for firm action to be taken against those who have
~ed the instructions of the commander of KOPKAMTIB. This is
jiat is needed to restore the good name of the army.
,Tremembered that a numberof religious leaders in Semarang had told
m~that they had full documentation of the affair, including photographs
f1the mass graves. They assured me that the materials were in safe-keeping
.
'th a Catholic priest in another city. I got in touch with the priest
ooncerned late that night and promised him that Sinar Harapan would
lie the risk of publishing the materials in full for the sake of Truth and
'lice based on Love. But then he told me with great disappointment
at he did not have the materials himself. He was sure, however, that
,meone else had them. I left and on the following day went to the town
e'had told me of. Here too, however, the story was: 'It's another priest
wJio has the material'. I was irritated at being shuffled around like this,
ut I thought, 'I cannot let this possible rumour-mongering by the PKI
gQ'unchecked .... '
.. The problem now was not whether the mass killings had really taken
lace but how the issue was to be resolved as a matter of social concern;
·~t was what my editor told me when I came back from Purwodadi. It
is totally acceptable for an editor to push his journalists around, but quite
ijifferent matter when outsiders try to do it. An important person came
. -,me and suggested gently that I should not write a report which might
!Wnage the army. I thanked him for his concern and promised that I would
e account of it. He then added some remarks which rather changed
e tone of the visit. The army, he said, was 'beginning to doubt the good
mtentions' of the Protestant community. 'What is it you really want?'
H~' asked. I was stunned, and when I made no reply he went on. 'The
arltiy is not going to get involved, but you should bear in mind that
· ildisubeno has said on behalf of the Marhaenists that nothing happened
in Purwodadi. You may have to deal with them. And remember that
iliS the PNI that has the power in Central Java now. If they decide to
ke you on, what are you going to do about it?'
I replied that I had no wish to disc~s these things with him. I said_
at we had nothing but moral strength behind us. As far as the 'Marhaenist
224
danger' was concerned, I offered the opinion of a primary school teatii
in Wirosari: 'The Marhaenists here have lost heart; they are afraid ofila§Ji
other after all the arrests.' But I am sure you can find other grou~ .
Central Java, I said, who want to prove by attacking us that they haven
bee~ infiltrated by the PKI. This remark concluded our short bri;rfflt
sess10n. · QailY difficult.' We had heard so many complaints from the local people
More difficult for me is the question: will the government adopt !lie
Westmoreland anti-communist strategy being used in South Vietnam,lei
search and destroy; or will they follow the McNamara-World Bank paJI!
using economic development to destroy the roots of communism by fighting
poverty in the villages? The hard liners want to destroy the PKI With;an
iron fist; the soft liners have more confidence in economic developmeil!
as promoted by the contemporary 'military technocrats'. Up until no··
the hard line had not been particularly apparent in Indonesia; on the ou;:e;
hand there had been no signs of a social explosion as portrayed by t)fe
Australian journalist Frank Palmos inAngkatan Bersendjata. An impoi::@lt
lesson from the Purwodadi affair, however, was not 10·1et the PK! i;i.';:
it establish a 'second Hunan', which has long been its goal. In Huna'~.
in 1928 the Chinese Communist Party succeeded in forming its first peasan(ci ·
army after the Kuomintang in 1927 had carried out mass executions 0{,'
communist cadres during which many peasants became the victim ofKMT .
excesses. We should not let Purwodadi create another Ho Lung, an antt
communist general who suddenly changed sides and joined the communists
because he could not stand to see his own family butchered. If somethiJ\i
like the Purwodadi affair had taken place ten years ago in North Sulaweii,
it would have helped the PRRI-Permesta rebels. We see the same thing.
happening now in Biafra. If similar things happen in Indonesia in the
future, the Purwodadi affair will certainly influence the general trend and
not in favour of the government.
The government in Jakarta needs to make these choices. At the momen~
the situation in Purwodadi remains unchanged. Arrests are still taking
place, and the Information Minister has even stated: 'Killings will continue
as long·as the military operations take place.' My thoughts fly to Purwodadi
I remember what my colleague fromPedoman whispered into my ef1rwhen
we finally met the representatives of the Kuwu KORAMIL: 'When we
get back to Jakarta, I am going to write an article about our trip here,
with the title "Captured at last...." A sergeant had just politely but firmly
ordered us into a jeep which he said would take us to face the Purwodadi
KODIM commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Tejo Suwamo. In the jeep I
225
· pered back to F., 'If we can escape from the KORAMIL, you'll be
le 10 write your article. If not....' Still fresh in our minds was the advice
Jiad received from Major Dwipayana, press officer in the presidential
·te in Jakarta. He had reminded us always to be careful with lower
jfks. 'With officers you can always talk. With ordinary soldiers it is
li!')µt the operations of the Kuwu KORAMIL commander and his
uWJrdinates that I was keen to meet him face to face. We wanted to know
nether Lieutenant Sutopo really was a sadist, as people had reported.
topo's reputation had already spread far beyond the boundaries of
odadi kabupaten.
We arrived in Kuwu and the jeep pulled up in front of the KORAMIL
iiquarters. I remembered a question which one of the people in Wirosari
aa ,asked me the previous night when they heard that we were journalists
.m Jakarta. 'Aren't you afraid of being killed?' F. had answered. 'No,'
''said, 'We are not afraid. We have not come to look for crimes but
look for the truth.' That night, after hearing this answer, in a room
m!arded by young men, they explained to us how to get to places where
might find the 'truth'.
·,'This must be him,' I thought, as an officer approached us, in gleaming
tull dress uniform. Our guards got out of the jeep and disappeared. Only
e driver, of Chinese descent, remained behind the steering wheel. We
sat in the back. The officer came to the door of the jeep and began
Heliberately to look at us angrily, his hands on his hips. Meanwhile, other
officers in a variety of other, new uniforms began to collect on the veranda
ot the KORAMIL office. They watched their champion watch us.
ortunately, someone called him away. He was only a rather trigger-happy
: imra, it turned out. He was not Lieutenant Sutopo, our driver explained.
topo had been replaced by an NCO from the Raiders, a sergeant-major
l{adi Sutrisno.
· Eventually, after a brief interrogation by the sergeant-major, we were
ordered to get ready to go back to Purwodadi. I was able to imagine the
~ling<; of a non-communist detainee confronted with these Hanra, civilians
Hbing their version of dwifungsi38 within the KORAMIL. It is so much
~ Dwifungsi, dual function, is the doctrine which justifies.the participation of the
ffidonesian armed forces in civil goveminent and civilians affairs. The Hanra, as a kind Of .
civilian militia, are a kind of dwifungsi in reverse.
226
safer to deal with real armed forci:s personnel, such as the KO
commander in this instance. In ·correct fashion, he asked us for 0 -~
occupations, addresses and reasons for being in the area, and tl!Y!.
apologised, saying that he was just carrying out his duties. 39 F. said tll~ ·
same: 'We are just carrying out the orders of tens of thousands of reade~
of Sinar Harapan and Pedoman who what to know the truth.' And afte:
showing him as a kind of passport the newspaper article in which th~
Diponegoro commander had invited journalists to see Purwodadi for-
themselves, he invited us to get in touch directly with the KODIM
commander in Purwodadi.
. .
To be continued
•••
Lasut's report was not continued. Sinar Harapan on 22 March 1969
instead contained the following brief statement:
·'
The govermnent has concluded that Princen's information
concerning 'mass killings in Purwodadi' is connected with " aftermath of the coup attempt of30 September 1965, but life after survival
PKI remnants who wish to discredit the government.
And if there were killings, then they were a result of
military actions taken under martial law.
39 The journalist Brian May, who visited the Puiwodadi area to check the stories
of mass killing, reported a similar impression of Tejo Suwamo. See The Indonesian tragedy
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 206-209.
Chapter 10
SURVIVAL: BU YETI'S STORY
Translated by Anton Lucas
troduction.
;_ Those who survived the massacres of 1%5-69 have never been 'ltllerated'
in. the way that, say, concentration camp victims in Europe were liberated
at the end of World War II. Survival was difficult in the immediate
was also difficult. Whether inside or outside prison, former members and
associates of the PKI saw their families scattered, their health broken,
jheir careers blighted. Wives of male political prisoners bore the heavy
ti.urden of trying to keep their families together, coping with illness and
~king education for their offspring.'
The following account is the story of a woman who survived both the
cjtmps and the depressing struggle for existence which followed release.
It illustrates the dual psychological bnrden carried by survivors: escape
from death, with all the questions of guilt and meaning which that entails
' .and long, scarring years of drudgery. As in the story of Ibu Marni',
survival is possible partly because Indonesian society offers so many niches
~t the very edge of subsistence.
'
: T\vo themes emerge strongly from this account. First is the importance
of children. Not only do Bu Yeti's children anchor her to one plaee, but
For another woman's account of life as the wife of a former political prisoner,
~Ruth Havelaar, 'Quartering: a story of a marriage in Indonesia during the eighties', published
serially in Inside Indonesia no. 17(December1988) to no. 25(December1990).
Ibu Marni, 'I am a leaf in t!:te stonn', translated by Anton Lucas, Indonesia 41·
fApril 1989), pp. 49-60.
228
educating them becomes the key to social rehabilitation.' Bu Yeti.
determined that the alleged sins of the parents should fall as lighU~
possible on the children, and seeing her children settled with a g~
education was her highest priority. .:
:!~
Second, social relations were re-forged by the trauma of the co~·
Fear of implication in the general purge of the Left made Bu Yeti's ranJ·
wary of associating with her; opportunism led them to use her childri
as servants when they were farmed out to relatives while she was in prison'.!
The wedge between her and her family was driven deeper by groWi!f
differences over religion. Bu Yeti never forgave Islam and Muslims fa;
her treattnent immediately after the coup, the taunting reference to he'f'.
miscarriage and the ransacking of her house - not just destruction but
calculated looting - by HMI youth crying 'Allahu akbar, Allahu akbli~·
('God is great').' During the time of trial which followed, the Catholic~
and Protestant churches won her respect by their charitable work in th~· .
prison and by their direct help in her children's education, Both the chari~f­
itself and the defiance of social norms which the churches showed wcin)'
for them numerous converts and sympathizers in the months and yeiji.
following the massacres, despite the participation of Christians in the killingi
in some areas (see Kenneth Orr's chapter in this volume). Bu Yeti's respeci
for the churches deepened the antagonism between her and her familyi
and she remarked, ·
I really hate the Muslims. All my family was Islam. Even
when they helped me, it was not genuine (tidak sepenuh
3 Not that education alone is enough. Current official regulations in Indonesia require
holders of many 'sensitive' positions, such as school teachers and workers in export industries,
not only to be free of all personal involvement in leftist organizations, but to come from
a 'clean environment' (bersih lingkungan), that is, not to have close family members who were
involved with the Left. The 'cleanliness' of the social background of members of the public
is checked by the periodic re-registration of former political prisoners, as part of which
registrants must list their family members. Ruth Havelaar describes bow her husband filled
this section of the form with the names of deceased relatives as a means of protecting the
living. See Inside Imkmesia 19 (July 1989), p. 30.
4 Ruth Havelaar describes the victimization of her husband's younger brother after
he helped his elder brother following the coup; Inside Indonesia 19 (July 1989), p. 31.
5 In background discussions before this interview, Bu Yeti stated that the Muslim
youth were goaded (dipanas-panaskan) by the military into making the attack.
229
hati). I was called an unbeliever (kaftr). My father was
Islam, he kept the fast and daily prayers. He didn't like
me being close to the church. We often fought.
J{elp for victims and survivors of the massacres by individual Muslims
by Muslim communities and charitable organizations is not mentioned
' u Yeti. 6 Although Muslims did help, they seem to have done less
0tten and less openly than Christians, possibly because the ideological
larization between Islam and the Left had reached such a pitch in 1965
a,thelp for presumed communists would have appeared tantamount to
!Qfrimunist sympathies. The Christian churches, on the other hand, as
· or players in national politics and with long-established charitable
·.'lions, could afford, and had greater desire, to work amongst the losers.
;Tue following text is taken as far as possible verbamn from notes made
utjng a single interview with Bu Yeti, who wishes to remain anonymous.
My husband left for China on 21 September [1965] with the group
!ell by Chaerul Saleh, and I heard about the Coup [of30 September] from
e radio. Friends didn't come to visit any more in the kampung, so I
!liiln't understand what was going on, what the problem was. I wasn't feeling
.11 at the time, because I was three months pregnant. I only. began to
unperstand after 1 October, when there was a curfew introduCecI.
, On 15 October I started to have a miscarriage. I couldn't find a doctor
o(midwife to come to the house, so I had to go to the hospital. The RT
'ukun Tetangga, Neighbourhood Association head] lent us a car, and
someone had to walk in front of it with a torch, so that the car wouldn't
lie stopped because of the curfew. My daughter, who was in first year
· [Sekolah Menengah Atas, Senior Secondary School], came with me
o)he Central General Hospital, but she stay with me long. As soon as
I had been given a curette, she went home with the RT. · ·
· I was only two days in the hospital. There was chaos (hirnkpirnk) outside
and I was scared. My father and my older children were looking after
ihe younger ones at home. I said that I was feeling OK and I forced the
ttoctor to let me go home.
i ~' ~ Ruth Havelaar remarks on the protection which the organized religions gave to
· li~1rfollowers, but sees thiS as often consolidating oppression; Inside Indonesia 19 (July 1989), .
po.
230
I went home by myself from the hospital in a becak. I saw gramu.
0
the walls beside our house. 'Gestapu keguguran' [Gestapu h":8 miscafrieQ.]
was scrawled on the. walls of my house. I was ~ery sad; this was sue!( a
terrible insult (hina betul). And no-one at all m my kampung dared to
·greet me. · · ~.,
On 19 October [1965] at 12 midday a crowd of adults and child~I·,
began stoning my house. I ran out the back, straight for the RT's ho~\
I had to leave my father behind. The crowd destroyed everything. ..:M'y;<
younger daughter ran away. Because it was a school holiday, the bp,~'
were sleeping. They were all kicked. I found the RT, and he said, 'Y.o~
stay here, don't go anywhere else.' Then he went to the military and asked· .
them to come and stop whatwas going on. After the military came, tli1
crowd left and I was allowed to go home. I heard from my children uU;f ·
the crowd,put our belongings in a big sack, including documents relating
to the ownership of the house. It was lucky that there was no Gerwarli'
branch in the RT, though I had opened a TKK [Taman Kanak-kanak,
kindergartenJ Gerwani there. I was also deputy RT. .,;;
The next day [20 October] my cousin arrived and asked me to move
to his house in Slipi [in West Jakarta]; I was still bleeding [from· niy
miscarriage. I moved to my cousin's place with my youngest child, agcil
three years, but I was still fearful. My child was very scared; he would
cry if he had to leave the house or if he saw a person dressed in military
uniform. We took him back to his grandfather in Kuningan, but he~
more upset there.
I stayed in Slipi for a month. During that time the milita~ often came
to the house in Kuningan [in South Jakarta] .. They kept asking 'Has yo~r
father returned [from China]? Where is your mother staying?'. My child
always replied, 'Mother is staying with relatives. She is still recovering'.
7 Gerwani (Gerakan Wanita :rD.donesia, Indonesian Women's Mov~ment) was a le(t
wing women's organization founded in 1954. It campaigned for ~e equal nghts of me_n ~nd
women in marriage and for greater penalties for rape and abduction, as well as establtsbmg
kindergartens and midwifery and literacy courses. It was never~o~ally af~li~ted ~o the_P~,
but was to all intents and purposes the party's women's organJZatton, clalIDmg nine milho_n
members in 1961. After the coup it was the target Of especial hostility, because it was s~n
as having promoted promiscuity and as having encouraged women to neglect their fam1~
duties. For a brief account of Gerwani, see Saskia Wieringa, 'Feminism.aborted: Gerwam
and the coup', Indonesia Reports- Culture and Society Supplement 14 (March 1986), pp.1-4.
231
·In November the police came and asked my child again where I was.
e'll put you in prison', they said, 'If you don't tell us where your mother
.'· My child was scared [and told them]; they bundled him/her into a
ea/and went to the house in Slipi. As it happened, I was at the hospital
~en they came,and my nephew told them that I was not there, that I
ugone out. Meanwhile, I had called in to see my younger sister-in-law.
e police took my nephew from the house in Slipi to my sister-in-law's,
Jiere they picked me up. Then they took us to the police station. I asked
111
em, 'Why did you bring my nephew?'. The police said that he had lied
li.en they asked him where I was. I was put in a cell, my nephew was
·ten. He still has trouble with his back. Only after his mother, who
longed to the NU (Nahdatul Ulama) got a letter from the local RT
~laining that my nephew wasn't a member of the Pemuda Rakyat, was
e,released by the police.
' I was not allowed out of my cell. We slept next to the bathroom, which
Jeaked. The conditions were awful. The rice was awful. You got one
iece of tempe, the spinach (;ayur kangkung) was not cleaned, it still had
~stalks and string with it. I was still recovering from my miscarriage,
and with that kind of food every day, I couldn't eat anything. I became
ll!Jrf thin. Once I became really sick, and I couldn't eat anything unless
hvas really forced to.
' Our cell was close to the place where the police tortured political
p,risoners. We could see the place from our cell. Every time political
rl.soners were interrogated, beaten and intimidated we could see it through
e bars. They were taken out of their cells, told to take off their shirts,
and kicked with spiked boots. Then they were beaten with those belts
' by the military. They fainted from the bleeding wounds, and were
used
iliagged back to their cells. Nearly every male political priSoner experienced
lliis torture. They were not allowed to meet their children who came to
l'i.iit; the children were told to take home the food they brought to the
, '.The police sent the political prisoners in stages to the KODIM.8 Two
ofmy cellmates were members of the Pemuda Rakyat, two were members
of Gerwani and two were there on criminal charges. The wife of one of
~e Pemuda Rakyat saw the police torturing her husband; they beat him,
For an explanation of this and other military and administrative terms, see pp.
232
he collapsed covered in blood, and she fainted screaming. She was quick{
moved to the KODIM. ,~,
I was the third prisoner who was sent to theJatinegara KO DIM. Wh~'
we got to the KODIM, we met many of our friends. Before I arrived tii~
majority were males, but by the time I arrived there were fewer men. 'Ib.e~
were about forty people in a room about 6 metres square. If you slei\t
on the floor, there was not enough room to get comfortable. The toilet
was outside. There was one large bathroom. · any more. Our rations were greatly reduced. We had nothing for breakfast,
While I was at the KODIM, I was allowed to see my children, to receiv~
food, and to go out into the yard. But we were treated with great contempt
(kita dihina sekali). In the mornings they divided us into groups, and We
were told to clean the rooms of the military guards who slept there. Some
were still asleep, some had just taken a bath, and were still in their
underpants.
Maybe the military received the interrogation reports from the police,
because they didn't carry out many interrogations there, though we did
hear that some people were beaten and given electric shocks. No wome~
were given this kind of treatment while I was there. B~fore I arrived I
heard some had been.
I found out that my youngest child had got hepatitis (saldt kuning).
My other children didn't know who to go to for help. I went to see the
KODIM commander and said to him, 'How am I going to look after my
sick child?'. He let me go home for a day and a night, and I was able
to see the RT, and asked neighbours if I could borrow their car. I took
her to the general hospital, with a guarantee [of meeting the hospital's
eiipenses) from my relatives in Slipi. Her older brothers and sisters took
it in turns to be with her at the hospital. I got permission to visit her
. once a week. After the biopsy on her liver [was clear] I was able to visit
her once more. She cried and cried, she wouldn't let me go back to the
KODIM....
. I was three months in the Jatinegara KODIM. By March 1966, there
were no more political detainees in the KODIM. I was one of the last
three to move to Bukitduri prison. When we arrived we are put in the
one cell. There were many old friends, including national leaders [of
Gerwani?] there. 'What are you doing here?' they asked, 'Why are you
so thin?'. 'Yes, I don't know why I am here', I replied.
233
·.On the way to Bukitduri prison we stopped at Salemba prison for a
ea!, and we met the political prisoners there. The prison commander
was still a Sukarno man, a good person. Political prisoners could still
rk outside the jail, any cooked rice left over could be dried.
'·But after several days at Bukitduri prison, the pro-Sukarno military
re all replaced.9 Our new commander was an Acehnese by the name
of,Sani Gondjo. Women prisoners were not allowed to go to Sa!emba
lli!d for lunch we got half a cupful of beras [uncooked rice]. I weighed
9 kilos. Previously I had weighed 41 kilos. While I was in detention
a1·the police station, I went down to 37 kilos.
In Bukitduri we helped each other. Whoever got food from a visit
hilped the others. Rice was also smuggled in from the criminal prisoners.
, ey were close to us but separate, and they pushed food for us through
ibe bars. They got more than enough, they got salted fish, and enough
..egetables. Not like us. We were just left to die (disurnh mati betul) ....10
We once ate rice chaff (dedak) for several days. I was working in the
Jtitchen and we made porridge out of it. Our rice ration was taken by
htllitary corruption. Before Bung Karno was removed from office there
!\'lLS plenty of beras. When we were taken to Salemba (from Jatinegara
·ODIM) there was plenty of good quality rice, and the vegetables were
also nice. When we had to eat thededak in Bukitduri, Mrs Salawati Daud
tlared to go to the prison commander to protest. · Luckily the food was
there as proof. So the deputy commander couldn't help but see what was
going on.
There was a nursing sister who looked after us, if we were sick. We
:would secretly give her money to buy things for us. There were guards
ai the front. of the prison and we had two policewomen guard us each
Presumably this was immediately after the Supersemar order of 11 March 1966,
tiansferring effective power from President Sukarno to General Suh.ci.rto.
10
CC. Seth King's report of a visit to a prison in Tanggerang, near Jakarta: 'They
[the guards] said that they thought there were about 5,000 people inside, most of them
c!:ommunists. The eerie thing was that during the two hours I sat talking with them, I never
heard a sound or saw any movement. Not even a truck coming or going. I got the sickening
feeling that the inmates were slowly being staived to death inside'. Seth S. King, 'The great.
purge in Indonesia' New York Times Magazine 8 May 1966, p. 89.
234
night. Two of them for a hundred of us. we weren't allowed to meer
leader [i.e. of Gerwani]. After a while Tante Aidit11 came to the pr~~u
We had to be in our cells whenever she was allowed out of hers. .· !1!
In the beginning we managed to get anything we wanted from outs'
We read newspapers smuggled in with other things in bundles of cloth
But after the Acehnese [was made prison commander], this stopped·•
they searched the clothing that was sent in. Also in the beginning we w'ef
able to study English in our cells, but then that stopped too. We wei
only allowed to do exercises and play badminton. Then the Muslim wom~il.i'
were allowed to go to hear sermons. We were told that we were sinnersifi:
we were cursed, we were told that the PKI was the infidel, and that socie~') .
wouldn't accept us. Lieutenant-Colonel Pusro, from the Army's spiritual' . ·
affairs department told us, 'Communists are criminals, they kill people'!· ·
Then he got on to the Islamic state. . >!
They were very offensive to us. Some of them only had primary scho;[·
education, and they were teaching intellectuals, members of parliament•
and so on. There was a lot of sexual innuendo too, expressions about
'below the navel' and so on, lewd talk. We couldn't react at all to this.
There was a Christian deputy of [the commander] Sani Gondjo who
used to come to Bukitduri to check up on us, too. He asked us, 'What
do you need?' We were given Christmas presents by members of the church
who came to the prison. We sang carols, but because there was nothing
else to do, we asked the church for help. They sent us needles, cotton
and cloth so we could sew. After that many learnt how to do embroidery.
If the Muslims were giving religious instruction, all Muslim prisoners
had to attend. If the Protestants were doing it, Protestant prisoners had
to attend. The prison commander said that Muslims couldn't attend
Christian religious instruction. The Protestants gave us different religious
instruction from the Muslims. They talked about the suffering of Jesus.
There was no mention about 'sins which can not be forgiven'. They gave
us books, and a Christmas tree in the second year. The Muslim women
asked for veils (kudung), but they didn't get anything. Only at Idul Fitri
[the end of the Muslim fasting month] were Muslim prisoners given meat.
11 The wife of PK.I leader D.N. Aidit. Tante, a Dutch word meaning aunt, was used
as a term of familiar respect.
235
I.often nearly fainted because there was no food; my relatives wouldn't
1inY children come to the prison. But we prisoners helped each other.
sJ\ared a cell with R. She got food parcel each week, and she shared
with me. I slept on a tikar mat, with a small pillow.
Then a couple of prisoners were released. I was number 14 on the
jSt,Of people who were to be released. I felt it would be a long time before
r,y got to me. My children sent word that the military had taken our
eJlle· My father and youngest child were staying in Slipi.
: One day everyone who had been sent to Bukitduri from the KODIM
te called out of their cells, including those from Lampung. We were
iiiVlded into two groups. I rememberthat the wife of Nungcik AR., head
o~\hePKI bloc in the national parliament (DPR), was there; she had been
· ::Bukitduri prison. I had been told that we were going to be released,
tilit I wasn't told the day. I was in the bathroom when they arrived. 'Come
0 ~, Mrs Yeti, you're going,' they told me. They had prepared parcels of
fil9thing for us. So we left our prison clothes with those who were not
!'.l!I released.
: We were taken to Salemba where assembled with the male political
p,risoners, eleven in all, who were also going to be released, They gave
us: a lecture about how generous the government was releasing us and
How we shouldn't make the same mistakes again. So we left Salemba and
went home. But we weren't given any money for transport. Luckily someone
gave me transport money.
I went home to my cousin's house. They were scared to see me free,
tiecause they were the family ofa high level government official. But they
gave me some food and drink and told me to rest. That same night I was
lllken to kampung S., where my oldest child was staying. From there I
s met and taken to where my father was staying. My father was sleeping
cin a camp bed in a room at the back of the house. My youngest child
iyas also asleep on the floor when I arrived. My father was amazed to
see me. 'Did you run away?' he asked me. I showed him my letter of
release.
; My third child was living with my husband's younger sibling. They
were living in poverty. So was my child. They treated him like a servant,
not like one of theirown children. He had to look after younger children,
a.s well as completing his SMP [Sekolah Menengah Pertama, .Junior
Secondary School]. He didn't get any money for transport, so he had to.
236
hitch a ride with a truck to get to and from school every day. Once ol\
the way home he jumped off the truck and hurt his leg. His ~ncle &aver
him a pair of old police boots to wear, but they were too big for hlln~
He didn't dare ask for a pair of shoes. Other family members helped With;
his school expenses. My fifth child, then aged between eight and ten, was·
living with a cousin. He had to get up at 5 a.m., cook rice, make the sambd1,
and look after the young children; he went to school after lunch. Thicii
of our children were with my relatives and three were with my husband't
relatives. My daughter in first year of senior high school, who had also'
been a member of Gerwani, was staying with another relative.
After I had been released, I made contact with all my children. We
couldn't all live together in Slipi. The atmosphere was not free enough·
there. After my third child finished SMP, he was sent to SMA by a family
who was well off, so he could study full time, he didn't have to work.
My fourth child was in Palembang. Luckily my children were all
conscientious (cerdas). Only there was no money for school, every day
they had to go out and look for money. My youngest child was often sick:
For the first few years after I was released, we got powdered milk and
beras from the Protestant ecumenical centre in Salemba. The minister
who had often come to Bukitduri also came to our house. My relatives
were fanatical Muslims (fanatik Islam). When he made a house call, he
usually said some prayers. He didn't say any prayers at this house. 1
couldn't collect my husband's salary. We had no home of our own. Our
furniture that could be removed from our house was all sold by the children
so they could buy food.
I didn't know what would happen to my third child. The minister wanted
to send him to school to the Protestant high school in Salemba. The
director of the school asked for an appointment with me. I said I would
try send him there. He had to get up really early at 5 a.m. and get a bus
which stopped a lot along the route. The school gate was locked at 7 a.m.
After a month my son got hepatitis, and the minister said, 'This is t?o
hard for him, leaving every morning with no breakfast; he can stay ~th
my family'. My son said that was alright, so he stayed three years with
the minister from the GPIB [Gereja Protestant Indonesia Barat]. Then
he went to ITB [Institut Teknologi Bandung, Bandung Institute of
Technology] and did a four year course in electrical engineering. His wife
is an architect.
237
' At first he wanted to study medicine, but the course was a long one
!Uld very expensive. The wife of the minister [who was helping him] came
ftb!Il a big family and had many nephews and nieces. They said to him,
•Ji)on't look for problems with medicine, Do a technical diploma.' But
e wasn't satisfied with that. He went to Bandung, where entrance exams
, re being held. He said to me, 'Look, at least one of your children should
atrsomething worthwhile, something that will get social standing.' I went
to the minister for advice. 'Oh, so that's where he's gone'. I told them
at he wanted to study at ITB. The minister's wife said, 'Your son doesn't
lffiOW what's good for him. Why doesn't he enrol in a course at an academy?
t's only three years.' But the minister said, 'If he passes the entrance
test, I will support him financially to go there. Ifnot, we'll find somewhere
else for him to study.' He passed the entrance test, and the minister's
ivife got together a whole suitcase full of clothes for my son. She said
to me; 'Check 'through this. Is there anything else he needs?'
i When he was in fourth year of electrical engineering, my son had to
tiuild a tall radio aerial. Where was the money going to come from for
!hat? 'I'm embarrassed to tell my (adopted] father', he told me. 'You
~ave to tell him about it', I replied. So he told the minister. · 'I've got
iµoney every year for you', he said. All his expenses were paid for by the
church.
. I didn't go to my son's graduation because I didn't have any clothes
to wear. My oldest child never came back to live with the family again.
She tried to finish SMA, but was not happy where she was living. She
went to live with her father's family, but she only lasted two days with
them. They said she was troublesome (cerewet). So I asked for help again
from the.church. There was a woman in the congregation who didn't have
a.ny children. So my daughter stayed with her for three months. Then
she started at !KIP [Institut Keguruan llmu Pendidikan, Teachers Training
College], with her expenses being paid by the minister. But she needed
a lot of money, money for the college, for transport, for food (you had
to eat lunch on the campus). She was studying German literature. In
ihe end I just couldn't manage to pay for her, I couldn't find the money.
!got her a job for her, in a Protestant foundation. It was a pity she couldn't
continue studying.
My second child was 14years old at the time, in second class ofSMA
We were in very difficult straits financially. He sold newspapers and didn't
pay much attention to his schoolwork. The money he got from selling
newspapers he gave to his older sister for food. It wasn't much. Because
238
of his school he stayed with a brother of his father, where he was
discriminated against a lot; He' went to school run by the Sam RatuJan ,
foundation12, in Menteng [in Central Jakarta], with one of Ibnu Sutow
children." He m~ed ~th all. these upp.er cl~s peop~e (ora~g atas), lllfd ,
wanted to have rnce things like them, mcluding a rnce uniform. Aft,.
finishing SMP he stayed with a minister. But he started to do naug11er
things, like taking the minister's car out for a drive. After he finish~
high school I asked him ,'Where do you want to study?' 'I'll look for work
myself, he said. I got hint a job as a driver. I couldn't see where his
abilities Jay. He worked on a newspaper with a relative and decided to
be a journalist as he was good at writing stories. I told him to take an
English course.
Then I moved from Slipi to Palmerah in Jakarta, so my children could
be near their grandfather. After my father died, my fourth child went to
see his brother in Bandung, but his brother wasn't at home when he arrived.
So he went on to Surabaya. He had made no plans for this trip, he had
no addresses of family there. He ran out of money in Surabaya. He wanted
to get home, but had no money to buy a train ticket, so he rode back to
Jakarta on the roof of a carriage. Near Batang, before Pekalongan, the
train went under a bridge and he was knocked off the carriage roof, near
the Batang river. A farmer found hint and took him to a hospital in
Semarang. His identity card (KTP) was in his pocket. The police sent
word to Jakarta and I went to Semarang. Because I left in a hurry I had
no letter from the minister in Jakarta, and I couldn't get help from the
Protestant minister in Semarang. 'I can only help when someone has died',
he told me. 'He has to die before you will help him!' (Kok meningga/ baru
ditolong), I retorted. So I went to the Catholic church. A nurse helped
me. 'Go home and get help from the minister in Jakarta', she told me.
We got to Jakarta, and my son had to be operated on, or his head injury
would become infected. They had to remove part of his skull. He should
have had another operation a year later. But where could we get Rp.
250,000 from for that?
My father died in 1972 We had been three years in Palmerah. I worked
in the Protestant ecumenical office in Salemba for a Dutch minister, van
Willie, who had been in Irian. My youngest child I took to the house
12 A Christian Manadonese organizatiOn.
I3 Ibnu Su towo (b.1914 ), farmer director general of the state oil company, Pertamina.
239
cif the domine so I could send him to school. After my son finished his
studies in Bandung and got a job straight away, our situation intproved.
: e was sent overseas and paid in dollars. After that he often went overseas,
so we could afford a contract a nice house. 14
I tried to get news from my husband, but there was no answer, until
~981, when he finally sent news via a minister. He had earlier tried to
send word via a relative but it was never passed on to us. My daughter
was given the letter to bring home; she didn't know who it was, as her
rather used a pseudonym. She brought the letter home and gave it to
roe. It was the first time we had heard anything of him for sixteen years.
Afriend in Lampungwho knew my husband later said to me, 'You're
lucky. My wife married again.' 'That means she was thinking of how to
sypport your children', I said. 'No, she only thought of herself, he replied,
!My eldest daughter hanged herself. I didn't think about being married
again. I only thought of the children. I was asked, 'Do you want to go
tp China [to join him]?' The children said, 'We've lost Father, we don't
want to lose you as well.'
The main problem for us was how to support ourselves. Someone
iii the family had to be able to earn money. Only when my son became
an engineer after graduating from ITB Bandung would family come and
wit us. I think that they were afraid they would be tarred with the same
PKI brush. They were also afraid I would ask them for money, but both
aur families did help with the children. They took them in, even if they
t!eated them like servants. The Muslims didn't help at all. 'Communists
tlon't believe in God (Komunis tidak benuhan)' they said. I hated the
Muslims, all my side of the family were Islam. Even when they helped,
it wasn't genuine (sungguhpun mereka membantu, tidak sepenuh hati).
I have wiped out the past now. I have no contact with former friends.
, was asked to be politically active again, but I said no. All I want to think
about is my family.
14
Houses in Jakarta are commonly 'contracted out\ that is, rather than paying a.
inonthly rent, the tenant pays in advance the entire rental due for two or more years.
 Chapter 11
BALI

ditor's introduction.
To step beyond Java and investigate the killings of 1965-69 in Indonesia's
©uter Islands is to take a deeper step into the unknown. The island of
Bali, however, is a slightly different matter, for here the best known accounts
report killings on a scale even greater than Java's. The most influential
report is that of John Hughes, whose chapter 'Frenzy on Bali' outlines
a story repeated by·many later authorities.' Bali was initially tense but
llalm, as people tried to sense where events in Jakarta were leading the
oountry. There was a minor clash between rival parties in Buleleng in
the north in November, but little else took place until early December,
,,;,hen an altercation between PKI villagers and local troops in Jembrana
left one soldier dead. 2 This incident, according to Hughes, sparked off
a wave of killings, across the island. As on Java, the army played an
important role in backing the killings initially, with RPKAD units
Clistributing blacklists of PKI members for liquidation and training gangs
of civilian youths, generally called Tamins, in the basic techniques of killing.
ilbe Balinese, however, exceeded their instructors, turning on PKI members
and those associated with them with a chilling ferocity. Whole villages
,,;,ere destroyed, women and children as well as men, leaving the countryside
pock-marked with the blackened shells of former settlements.' The

John Hughes, Indonesian upheaval (New York: McKay, 1967), pp.173-183. See
:'also Tarzie Vittachi, The fall of Sukarno (London: Mayflower 1967), p. 143.

2
The most detailed description of this event is M Ikramegara 'PKI lantjarkan serangan
"G-30-N" di Bali!! dan gagal',MingguPagi 18 no 42 (16Jan.1966). pp. 25-27. See also Crouch,
;.tnny and politics, p. 152.

3
See the brief account in 'I]okorda Gede Agung Sukawati, Reminiscences of a Balinese
_prince (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, Soutbeast Asia Paper no 14, 1979), p. 79; and Gavi, .
·&nte"evolution in Jndonesien, pp. 40-41.
 243

Hli!inese PKI leader, I Gede Puger, was killed by being cut to pieces. Tales
of over-filled graveyards and rivers clogged with corpses echo similar reports
fiOm Java. The story given perhaps widest coverage in the West was a
G)iilling account of PKI members, calmly accepting their fate, who dressed
m'white funeral robes and walked peacefully with their executioners to
!Jie place of death. 4 The RPKAD commander Sarwo Edhie, whose troops
gived in late December, is said to have remarked, 'In Java we had to
egg the people on to kill' Communists. In Bali we have to restrain them,
make sure they don't go too far."

. Something of a scholarly consensus exists to explain the Balinese killings.

Jn the first place, although the antagonism between Islam and communism
hich sharpened tensions on Java was clearly absent, a similar antipathy
Had emerged between upholders of Balinese Hinduism and members of
fie local PKI. Communists showed the same disrespect for established
re)igious practice as they did on Java and aroused the same kind of hostile
reaction, though it is a little ironic that in East Java the PKI was associated
w\th Hinduism, while the Muslim vigilantes who broke up Hindu
otganizations in East Java and destroyed·pre-Islamic sacred sites in South
ulawesi would have shared the PKI's iconoclastic attitude to Balinese
: ·nduism. Vickers describes the consternation caused when a ·group of
P.KI supporters attempted to desecrate the funeral ceremony of the Dewa
gung, or paramount traditional ruler of Bali, in Klungkung in 19656•
obilization in the defence of religion was perhaps also combined with
an urge to purify the island in a ritual sense. The Japanese occupation,
!be revolution and years of independence had all been times of trial for
!be whole society. A catastrophic eruption of.Gunung Agung, the island's
~ ·ghest and most sacred mountain in 1963, had been widely seen as the
••
a
<
ciJnsequence of meddling by Sukarno and other secular figures in the timing
·~ and structure of the ritual. Just as elsewhere in Indonesia people cast
]•
E
:;:
-••
a
B about in a secular search for culprits to be blamed for Indonesia's post-
] ~
u
~

"•
il' <
."I
"'
Dll .
'
,
Hughes, Indonesian upheaval, p. 181 .

Hughes, Jn_donesian upheaval, p. 181. These remarks, apparently made during

a.press conference, have been widely reported in varying forms. For an lndones.ian vefsion,
sfu Dharmawan Tjondroneg~ro, Ledakan fitnah subversi G-30-S (Jakarta: Matoa, 1966), p.
f67.

Adrian Vickers, Bali: a paradise created (Ringwood, Vic.: Penguin, 1989), p. 170.
244
independence malaise, so Balinese looked for the cause of spirituat
disharmony so great it could move a mountain. '- ,,
More prosaically, the picturesque countryside of Bali also had its shar~
of class conflict.7 Semi-popular li~era~e has_ made much of ~e supJlOSedi)';
egalitarian system of landholdmg m Bah, but the reality was more
complicated. Dutch reorganization of the administrativ~ structure in th~
early twentieth century followed by the Great Depress10n of the 1930s.
left a growing proportion of Balinese society without rights to land, an.a
in the depressed economic circumstances of the 1930s and 1940s there
was little scope for the development of alternative, off-farm employment.
Especially in the east of the island, land increasingly came into the hands
of the aristocratic and royal families, the Dewa Agung becoming the largest
of the landowners.• When economic growth resumed in the 1950s,
moreover, with the resumption of trade and tourism, it was the aristocratic
families, together with Chinese entrepreneurs, who took the lion's share
of the new opportunities. After the 1960 Agrarian Law was passed, some
official redistribution of land took place, but it was slow, incomplete and
by all accounts inequitably handled. Resentment was exacerbated by an
outbreak of famine in 1964 which highlighted disparities in wealth. From
mid 1964, landless peasants increasingly found an advocate in the PK!
and BTI; there were aksi sepihak of the kind launched on Java. PK! leaders
apparently also encouraged their supporters, as on Java, to move into foresi
areas and clear land for themselves.• These issues are all mentioned in
the first translation below, a brief account of social tensions in Bali in
early 1%5, taken from the same work as the reports on Klaten and
Banyuwangi earlier in this volume.
7 Tue most important source for the political and social history of Bali since 1945
are the as yet unpublished writings of Geoffrey Robinson.
8 Vickers, Bali· a paradise created1 pp. 138-139.
9 Re<Mortimer IhelrukmesianCommunistPartyandlandrefonnl959·1965(CJaytoo,
Vic.: Monash University' Centre of Southeast Asian Studies), pp. 52-53; Hughes, Indonesian
upheaval, pp. 176-177; Vickers, Bali: a paradise created, pp. 169-169; Joel Elisio Rocam~ra,
Nationalism in search of ideology: the Indonesian National Party, 1946-1965 (Quezon City:
Univ. of the Philippines, 1975), pp. 339-340; Willard A Hanna, Bali profile: people even~
circumstances 1001-1976 (New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1976), p. 112;
Ikrarnegara, 'PK.I Iantjarkan serangan', p. 25.
245
· Inter-party competition was strong, too. Although their economic
gosi~on w~s stro~g? the old ruling families were deeply resentful of the
way m which political power had been kept out of their hands after
i!idependence. When Bali re-entered the Republic in 1950, Sukarno had
overruled the preferences of the old elite to choose as Kepala daerah
(regional head) Anak Agung Bagus Suteja, who had fought the Dutch
on Bali during the national revolution (1945-49) and was son of the
nationalistically-inclined raja of Jembrana. During the early 1950s, the
elite channeled its political energies into backing the PNI and the PSI,
and and both parties performed better in Bali than anywhere else in the
oountry. In 1958, when Bali became a province, the elite tried to unseat
uteja, nominating a PNI member, I Nyoman Mantik, for the new post
of governor. Once again, however, Sukarno chose Suteja, overturning
. antik's victory in the provincial assembly. Faced with a provincial
e.itablishment dominated by the PNI (the PSI being banned in 1960), Suteja
attempted to shore up his political base by increasing the representation
of. the PKI and other leftists in legislative and executive bodies on Bali.
, e PKI's following, negligible even in 1955 (around 7.9%), grew steadily,
p,artly on the basis of its support for the dispossessed, partly because it
offered a path to political patronage through Suteja. Thus a number of
lie larger businessmen were public supporters of the party, and the PKI
63der, Puger, was himself a wealthy entrepreneur, though it should be
noted that the PNI was even more active in the distribution of patronage
afkabupaten level, where the ruling families were still in place. At village
eve!, inter-village rivalries were often translated into support for opposing
p,arties, so that whole villages might declare for thePKI, thus condemning
themselves to extirpation after the coup. Villagers, however, were not
tlie only victims: fourteen members of the ruling house of J embrana were
"lied as well as other landlords who were associated with the PKI. 10
: It is interesting that in both accounts translated here we find now-rare
r,eference to Chinese Indonesians as victims, in this case Chinese
businessmen singled out for retribution after aligning themselves with the
PKI. At the time of the killings, much attention focussed on the fate of
Bhinese, and it was even alleged that 'most' of the victims were Chinese. 11
See Ernst Utrecht, 'Het bloedbad op Bali',De GroeneAmsterdammer, 14January
William Glenn, 'Let's be practical [on Taiwan-Indonesia trade]', Far Eastern.Economic·
eview 61 no 32 (8 August 1968), p. 271.
246 . Robert Cribb, Soe Hok Gie et•8.I.
Obseivers speculated on whethl)r they were targeted because of their aJ!e ~l'.
closeness to the PKI (seen as an aspect of the PKI's go_od relations w1\tii
the Chinese Communist Party) or whether Indonesians res.entful of th :
economic wealth of the Chinese simply took a convenient opportun; ':.
for looting and settling scores. Coppel, however, has concluded that anti·
Chinese violence was probably not an important part of the killings 0 ;
1965-69. There was a 'frenzied rampage' against Chinese in Makas~ar,
(Ujung Pandang) in November 1965 and repeated outbreaks over the nen
two years, but the level of violence was not dramatically different from
that of incidents well before and well after the coup. Chinese members
of the party and of affiliated organizations such as the BAPERKI were
of course in especially great peril in 1965-66. But thanks to a government:
regulation of May 1959 banning Chinese from retail trade in rural areas,
Coppel argues, relatively few Chinese were present in the countryside when:
the killings were most fierce on Java. To this he adds the obseivation
that many wealthy Chinese must have already developed protective
relationships with local power-holders, civilian and military, which they.
were able to mobilize when the crisis came. This may point to an
explanation for Bali's anti-Chinese incidents: the relative dominance of
the Left at provincial level in Bali led men such as Tjan Wie, described
by Soe Hok Gie below, to make the wrong choice of political patron.u
As for Indonesia as a whole, there is neither certainty nor consensu8'
on the number of people killed. The London Economist's report on the
basis ofinformation collected by a team of Indonesian graduates suggested
that 100,000 people may have died in the few months from December
1965 to February 1966, and estimates have gone as high as 750,00013,
but figures most commonly cited lie in the 20,000-60,000 range. Even
these figures, however, have been called into question by Mabbett and.
Brackman. 14 This uncertainty arises from the even greater shortage of
1
anecdote and evidence than we have for Java. Although many authors,
12 Charles A. Coppel, Indonesian Chinese in crisis (Kuala Lumpur: OUP, 1983), pp.
58-61.
13 Bridget Mellor, 'Political killings in Indonesia', New Statesman 5 August 1966,
p. 189.
u Hugh Mabbett, The Balinese (Wellington, NZ: Januaiy Books, 1985), pp.191-192
and Arnold C. Brackman, The Commwiist collapse in Indonesia (NeNi York: Norton, 1969),
p.125.
247
mcluding Soe Hok Gie in this volume, report unprecedented ferocity in
!lte Balinese killings, it is difficult to pin accounts to time and place.
. ithout Hughes' account, our image of the Balinese killings would be
a,rather more sober one. Despite Sarwo Edhie's cheerful attribution of
au responsibility to the Balinese, a number of stories make it clear that
it was the arrival of army units with death lists which played a key role
iJ1 prompting the killing in many cases. 15 Webb cites a case in which
a: Catholic village in western Bali refused military orders to kill communists
iii neighbouring Hindu-Balinese village-16 It is probable that the army,
overwhelmingly non-Balinese, was reluctant to carry out a massacres which
!VQUld have pitched ethnic groups in a direct confrontation, and preferred
to see Balinese killing Balinese. Army accounts of spontaneous Balinese
ferocity may therefore merit some scepticism. There is also some evidence
that many killings-which took place especially in the eastern regions close
10 Java - were carried out by Ansor gangs who crossed the Bali Strait from
anyuwangi for this purpose-"
' A second reason for scepticism is the special place of Bali in the Western
imagination as a place of enchantment, an island of smiling, deeply cultured
P.eople in close harmony with their world and with each other. Edward
aid and others have shown how such images, whatever their factual basis,
are often part of an ongoing definition of Western culture and a number
0,f scholars, including Boon and Vickers 18, have traced the evolution of
contradictory ideas of the nature of Bali. The joyfulness of life on Bali
which some authors have described is for others a standing rebuke to the
lifestyles of the West, and there may have been an over-eagerness on the
' lJ See, for example, Don Moser, 'Where the rivers ran crimson from butchery' ,Life
~I (I July 1966), p.
28; and Donald Kirk, 'Bali e<orcises an evil spirit', The Repo11<r 15 December
1966, p. 42.
Webb, 'The sickle and the cross', p. 98.
248 iW'e Mass Killings in Bali 249

part of Western observers to 'discover' that frenzied violence was as much

a part of Balinese culture as rippling music and sleek ·~.culptures. , RURAL VIOLENCE IN BALl19
Centre for Village Studies
Gadjah Mada University
Translated by Robert Cribb

On 3 January 1965, around 300 members of the BTI from Mendoyo

ill kabupaten Jembrana20 organized an action to cut forest in the area
of Pangkangmanggis and Yeh Embang. Two days later, a small number
of state police arrived and were able to stop the action. As is known,
there were 290 hectares of neglected forest in the area.
In the same month, it was also reported that there was an aksi sepihak
·jj,Buleleng to implement the government's land reform regulations. With
the intention of carrying out these regulations, the BTI attacked not only
landlords but also small peasants. One such conflict over land took place
between Pan Tablen, a land owner, and Wayan Wanci, his tenant. The
Toca! assistant camat has already decided that the land should be surrendered
·t~ Pan Tablen, and this decision had been ratified by the bupati of Buleleng.
Wayan Wanci, however, was a member of the BTI and he decided to retain
the land. On 8 January 1865, he summoned 250 other peasants and
destroyed the house of Pan Tablen.
Another incident concerning land occurred between I Made Abian,
.~small peasant, and his son-in-law, I Sukaria, who was a member of the
$TI. In front of kecamatan officials, I Sukaria promised to return the
fand to his father-in-law, but later, with the support of his friends in the
\)TI, refused to do so. With the help of the police, I Sukaria was persuaded

•
'1 19 FromLaporontentangsrwumengenaik=sehanpederaanpadarohunl9(,().an (Jakarta,
.~yayasan Pancasila Sakti, 1982), pp. 93-95. Footnotes in the text suggest that these accounts
'n:db=~~::.eports in the Denpasar newspaper Suara Indonesia, rather than on first hand

20
The scattered incidents mentioned in this account all occurred in the western
:kabupaten of Buleleng, Jembrana and Tabanan, areas where conditions for tenant farmers
Bnd sharecroppers were considerably better than ill the eastern regions of Klungkung (home
of the Dewa Agung), Karangasem, Gianyar and Bangli. The redistribution of land was carried
'.out far more thoroughly in BulelengandJembrana than elsewhere in Bali and these kabupaten
'.Were the site of the earliest and most bitter violence in 1965-66.
250 ~obert Cribb, Soe Hok Gie et al; . The Mass Killings in Bali 251
to hand the land over. On 14 January 1965 at about 3.00 p.m., however . Poh Santen and two from Pakutatan after an incident in which their houses
I Sukaria and 180 BTI members moved onto the land,1.;ut the corn tha~ were pelted with rocks. The nine people were taken to the police station.
was growing on it and as night fell began to work the land..
A third case connected with land occurred between I Nyoman Gedang,
a small farmer, and his tenant Wayan Tiasa, both from Kubutambahan.
According to the Land Reform and Sharecropping Committee, the land
was to be returned to its owner by 1 October 1964. On 15 January 1965
I Nyoman Gedang began to work the land, but three days later, Wayan'
Tiasa and two hundred others pulled out the plants and replaced them
with his own.
Around the middle of January 1965, the atmosphere in Mambang village
was full of tension because of a dispute over the purchase ofland by Nang
Deger, a member of the PNI, from the Puri Aseman. The Landreform
Committee for Selemadeg had decided that from 17 January 1965 the new
owner should have the right to work the land. Bagus Buda!, however,
a BTI member who cultivated the land when it was owned by the Puri
Aseman, refused to accep[t the verdict and continued to work the land.
On 19 January a number of BTI members accompanied Bagus Buda! noisily
to the Selemadeg kecamatan office and protested forcefully against the
decision. There was a long discussion between the representative of the
BTI peasants and officials from the kabupaten and the Landreform
Committee, and eventually it was decided that the land should not be worked
at all for the time being until the kabupaten government had reached a
decision.
On 1 March 1965, at about 11.00 am., there was an incident at Jatiluwih
in Kecamatan Penebel, Kabupaten Tabanan. According to a report to
the local camat by the head of Jatiluwih village, a villager called Nang
Janten, his wife, son and daughter-in-law, were picking coffee in a plantation
he had pawned when about a hundred people led by Nang Renjung of
the BTI had surrounded them, seized and tortured them and then tied
them up. They were told that they would only be released if they joined
the BTI. Fortunately, a numberof police arrived just in time. Neng Janten
and his family were released and sent to hospital to have their serious
injuries treated.
At midnight on 4 March 1965, several members of the Mendoyo branch
of the PNI were attacked by a group armed with parang and other knives.
The attack was led by Nyoman Gedur, with about two PK! members.
Meanwhile, the PNI members were able to capture seven people from
 8obert Cribb, Soe Hok Gie et al.
252
THE MASS KILLING IN B.Abf'
Dewa [Soe Hok Gie]
Translated by Anton Lucas
In describing the events which took place in Bali, this writer is in no
way defending the Gestapu/PKI, or the methods they used against their
opponents. We must oppose, indeed denounce, their uncivilised and cruet
methods of behaviour without using the same methods against them.
Bali does not have the political, economic or military importance to
determine who wins or loses in the struggle for power in our country.
Yet toward the end of 1%5 and around the beginning of 1966 a terrible
catastrophe took place on this beautiful island, a series of mass killings
which have no comparison in modem times, because they took place over
such a short period, and because so many were killed.
Was this a war then? No, the killings were not the result of a war.
In war, no matter how unevenly balanced are the two sides facing each
other, they will always try to attack or at least defend themselves in some
way. [But this is not what happened in Bali.] Killings (penyembelihan
atau pembantaian) would be the most appropriate term to describe what
happened.
In Russia in Stalin's time the term 'mass terror' was very often used
to explain this imbalance. In situations of this kind, groups of people
who were afraid or who had no hope would simply surrender to the
authorities, who could do with them what they wanted. The same thing
happened in Bali, only it was the PKI masses, or those who were accused
of being PKI, who acted like this. There was no resistance in Bali, no
resistance of any importance. Those who admitted they were PKI or who
were accused of being PKI gave themselves up voluntarily to the authorities.
21 This article was written for the Bandung student newspaper Mohasiswa Indonesia.
Due for publication in minggu ll & III (December 1%7), it reached the stage of galley proofs,
but was apparently never actually published. Whether this was for political or other reasons
is not clear. We are grateful to John Maxwell for this information. Italicized words in English
are the author's original. 'The translator and editor would like to thank Geoffrey Robinson
for his help with the preparation of these notes.
. The Mass Killings in Bali 253
When the killings were being carried out, it often happened that people
, who had been arrested wanted to be killed because they knew what their
days wer~ numbered anyway. They preferred to be killed because they
were afraid of torture or other methods of mass murder which are totally
unacceptable to normal human beings who say they believe in God.
The Situation Before the Coup
Before the coup Bali was known as the second capital of Indonesia
a_fter !akarta. Bun_g.Ka~no, when he was in Indonesia, spent almost equal
ume m Tampak Smng and Jakarta. Bali had a unique and sentimental
significance for Sukarno, especially since his mother was Balinese. The
Governor was his special protege, and was always ready to fulfil all Sukarno's
Jdemands (hajat), whatever they might be. Governor Suteja23 was also
, h~ad of Pepelrada, a civil position which was always held by those whose
, faithful loyalty to Sukarno was in no doubt. Other Sukarno followers
. were I Gusti Putu Merta,24 chairman of the DPRGR [the GotongRoyong
· People's Representative Council]; I Gede Puger,25 chairman ofBamunas;
, '.111d Id~ Bagus Ko~pyjanguhead of the Tourism Board. Military positions
. m Bali were also given to Sukarno loyalists. However it was widely known
that governor Suteja did not get on with Pangdam [Regional Military
22 A sacred spring on Bali. The site of one of Sukarno's presidential palaces.
23 In around December 1965, after many oomplaints about Suteja's pre-coup activities
Sukarno _summoned him to Jakarta, where he disappeared. According to some account~
he was killed there by a PNI hit squad sent from Bali for this purpose. See also Utrecht,
.· ·'Het bloedbad op Bali'.
24 I Gusti Putu Merta, a former teacher and cooperating nationalist1 had held a
succes:iion of po!itical posts ~n Bali since 1950 and from 1961 was chairperson of the PNI's
exec~trve committee on the tsland. By June 1966 he had been appointed governor of the
province.
25 I Gede Puger had been a youthful member of the anti-Japanese and anti-Dutch
resistances.on Bali. He was a member of the Pesindo (Indonesian Socialist Youth) during
the revolution and was probably later a member of the PKI, holding a variety of executive
: and legislative posts on the island until the coup. He was killed in 1965/66.
-.
26
The To.urism Board~ a major source of inoome through patronage and oorruption
·~andwas thus an important pohllcal resource on the island. Nothing further is known of.
·fKompyang.
254 Ro~ert Cribb, Soe Hok Gie et al.
Commander] Supardi27 and Sukarno replaced Supardi with Brigadier
General Syafiudin28 who was known for his stinginess. Syafiudin's Wife
was a Gerwani supporter who publicly approved of the principl.es of the
PKI's struggle.
The process of 'Nasakomisation'29 continued in Bali, and every
government agency and board, including those mentioned earlier, was
'Nasakom-ised'. The close cooperation created by Nasakom was very evident
in Bali because Bung Karno made it clear he wanted it that way. When
conflict between groups did occur - and it was not as fierce as the aks;
sepihak in Boyolali for example - Aidit and Ali Sastroamijoyo'° were sent
to Bali to get things back together again. Tio Kandel (PKI)'', Merta
(PNI), Syafiudin (ABRI), kept things under control in Bali. There were
no disturbances, and everything went according to Bung Karno's wishes.
After the Coup
The situation in Bali remained unchanged until a month afterthe coup.
Suteja was still Governor, and even went twice to Jakarta (on 8 and 17
October). In front of Sabur, Sumarno, Subamya, Chaerul Saleh32 and
27 Appointed in 1958, Supardi was a staunch anti-communist and until his removal
in 1963 presented an important barrier to the growth of PK.I power in Bali.
28 .Appointed in 1963 to succeed Supardi, Syafiudin was a Sukamoist and was generally
unwilling to block Suteja as Supardi had done. He was removed from his post in June 1966.
29 Nasakom (nasionalisme, agama [religion], andkomunisme) was the formula employed
by Sukarno to reconcile and unite the major conflicting groups in Indonesian politics.
Nasakomization,however,wasseenbyconservativesasavehicleforintroducingPKiinOuence
into areas of government and society from which it had previously been excluded. Since
agama in this conteu referred principally to Islam, which is barely represented in Bali, it
was the previously dominant PNI which suffered most as a consequence of this programme.
The party was accordingly strongly antagonistic to Suteja.
30 National leaders respectively of the PKI and the PNI.
31 Chairperson of the Bali regional committee (CDB) of the PKI.
32 Brigadier-General Mohammad Sabur was commander of the place guard, the
Cakrabirawa battalion; Major-GeneralSumamoSosroatmojowasgovernorofJakarta: I Gusti
Gde Subamya was chairperson of the national Gotong Royong People's Representative Council
The Mass Killings in Bali
·Syafiudin hiinself, he was asked if he was PKI. He replied that the
.accusation was only slander. Bung Karno convinced Suteja that he should
·.eontinue to hold his position.
255
l
!
The situation in Bali was now becoming tense. People who had
previously been silenced by Bung Karno now began to speak out. News
of the killings in Central and East Java began to spread in Bali. In Jakarta
.Bung Karno still held the highest position of state but Pak Hano was
,beginning to take control. At the beginning of November, still no arrests
had been made. While Puger (PKI) was busy with his guests from
·KIAPMA33, Kompyang and Kandel went to Jakarta several times to assess
ihe situation. Now people began to get impatient and ask why no action
.was
being taken against PKI dignitaries. The people were waiting to see
what the Armed Forces would do to solve the situation. But it seemed
.'that the military leaders in Bali, especially Syafiudin, wanted to see how
• lh\ngs developed, and to see who was going to win the power struggle
,going on in Jakarta, Sukarno or Suharto, the Nasakom or the Pancasila
·.group. Syafiudin, with reptilian cunning, saw which way the wind was
;blowing, and perhaps he realised that history wanted the Pancasila group
. to win. Eventually, sooner or later, the time would come when Bung Kamo
would be pushed aside.
Survival is a very strong motive for action. To succeed, one has to
cover one's tracks and leave no traces. Killing is the easiest and safest
.way to do this, because dead people do not speak. For the Nasakom clique
which was in power in Bali at that time, mass killing was the way to show
ihe outside world, especially Jakarta, that they were strongly anti-PKI and
strongly pro-Pancasila.
Wedagama34, a PNI figure, incited the people to violence by saying
· that God approved of the killing of PKI people, and that the Jaw would
. (DPRGR); Chaerul Saleh was second deputy prime minister.
33
KIAPMA = Konperensi lnternasionalAnti Pangkalan Militer Asing, International
Conference against Foreign Military Bases, held in mid-October 1965, part of Sukarno's
effort to mobilize progressive groups.
34
· DewaMade Wedagamawas3rdchairperson of thePNI-affiliated GMNI (Gerakan
'·Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia, National Students' Movement of Indonesia).
256 R~bert Cribb, Soe Hok Gie et al.
not condemn people for it. Wijana'', another figure close to Bung Karno
told the people that taking property belonging to the PI9 did not break
the law. Thus the leaders who had been the strongest supponers of
Nasakom were now the strongest and most active PKI haters.
Vigilante groups began roaming around dressed in black and armed
with swords, knives, cudgels and even firearms. Houses of people aceused
of being PKI were burnt as pan of the warming up for much crueler actions.
Then the killings began everywhere.
For the next three months, Bali became a nightmare of killing. If there
is anyone amongst my readers who has a Balinese friend, ask him if he
has a friend who became a victim of this bloodbath. He will cenain!y
answer affirmatively, because that was the reality of the situation in Bali.
There is no-one living in Bali now who does not have a neighbour who
was killed and left unburied by the black devils with red berets who roamed
about at that time.
By the most conservative estimate, at least 80,000 people were killed,
including young and old, men and women. The burning of houses an<I
the amount of property either destroyed by fire or lost in robberies cannot
be estimated. Rape of women accused of being members of Gerwani
occurred everywhere, the example being set by local party leaders. The
most monstrous example was Widagda, a PNI leader from Negara, and
a younger brother of Wedastra Suyasa, a leading Balinese PNI figure who
was a member of the DPRGR at the national level. He raped tens of
women who had been accused without basis [ofbeingPKI]. Three of them
brought a case to coun last March and in a decision given in June 1%7
Widagda was sentenced to three years jail in Negara.
Political Aftermath
The consequences of the killings are enormous and will be felt beyond
this generation. Hundreds of thousands of widows are a very serious
problem. But what most interests us is whether these actions have been
35 A leader of the Balinese resistance to the Dutch in the 1940s, Wijana was a major
figure on the left wing of the PNI associated with Ali Sastroamijoyo. His political base was
northern Bali, where he had also bad important business interests in the coffee trade since
revolutionary times. He withdrew from active politics after 1965.
.:.The Mass Killings-in Bali 257
-:effect~ve in liquidating the PKI or not. Certainly not if you look at who
•was killed and who escaped the axe (kapak berantai). Kompyang, Suteja,
Merta who were members of the Dewan Revolusi36 in Bali are still free.
Tuese are only a few examples. The victims of the killings were not these
people, but the masses who were deceived by the promises of the PKI.
"And the sentences given to these victims were far too siivere. Motives
Of jealousy and revenge were extremely strong. Anak Agung Gde Agung,"
,for example, who was head of the government Information Service in Bali
'!"as kidn~pped and killed. The person behind this was his deputy wh~
,wanted hIS JO b. Another example is Lie Lie Tjien, a wealthy businessman
'.in North Bali who financed the PKI in Bali. He saved himself and his
~e~lth by _an ~llian:e with Wijana, an imponant political figure in the
~gmn, ".'~e his busmess competitors, Tjan Wie for example, were victims.
.ijan W1e s coffee - hundr~ds m~ybe thousands of tons - was spread out
?n the roads all around Smgara}a, and Tjan Wie later went crazy. The
IDlportant PKI ~eople from Bali are free and living in Jakarta, probably
,pecaus~ _the.regional government has not done anything, or did not give
,~uthont1es m Jakarta information so they could be arrested.
. , _The kiJ!ings which occurred in Bali were not sportarijfet'8 but something
irhich was just left to go on. If the government or officials had really wanted
~o st?P th~m, then the killings need not have occurred. But government
?fficrnls did absolutely nothing. Jn fact they even initiated the killings
m some areas. We can understand the reason for this from the above
~nalysis. The kill!ngs in Bali were supported and allowed to go on
~ch~c~ed by officrnls who were affiliated with the PKI. By supporting
,!he killmgs they could wash their hands of any involvement with the PKI.
36
;
1
DewanRevolusi(Revolutionacy Councils)were established by the coup organizers
~n Jakarta and other regions immediately after the coup.
37
·- Soe Hok Gie incorrectly has Anak Agung Made Agung here. This Anak Agung
~~~ Agung should not be confused with the politician of the same name who was prime
Qlllnster of the Dutch-sponsored Negara lndonesia·Timur and later Indonesian minister of
Foreign Affairs.
It is not clear what Soe Hok Gie meant by this term.
258 R~bert Cribb, Soe Hok Gie et al.
The new military commander Brigadier-General Sukertiyo is honest
and the fact that he wants to clean up the govemmenl'in Bali is shown
by his efforts at the beginning of this year to get rid of leftist elements
in the officer corps in Bali. However, his efforts to clean up the military
the political parties and the civilian government apparatus have bee~
obstructed. Within ABRI itself there is much opposition of a complex
kind, with the result that many officers with doubtful background are still
in important positions. The new Governor of Bali, Colonel Sukarmen"
is very close to the PNI Asu'° in Bali under the leadership of Wijana.
The PNI Asu group is in this way hoping to get protection from Colonel
Sukarmen if anything should happen.
The civilian government in Bali has also never been purged by its own
leadership in any meaningful way. The PNI in Bali is the only branch
of the party which has not publicly condemned Bung Karno. They still
idolize him especially as the local chairman is a close friend of his.
The New Order forces in Bali are under pressure, and intimidated.
KAMI, KASI, and KAPPI41 cannot do much, especially because there
are no joint actions in partnership with ABRI. This is because these groups
will not cooperate or help each other so there is no united action against
the Left in Bali.
What can be called Orbanisasi (the process of political change to establish
the New Order] has not occurred in Bali. Those who call themselves New
Order the loudest are in fact PNI Asu people who have changed sides.
If the government in Bali is not serious about carrying out the process
of implementing the New Order, Bali will continue to have the same
appearance as before 1965. The people of Bali are hoping for some action
from Panglima Sukertiyo. Up until now he has not found a way or maybe
he will not find a way.... We will see what the results of Pak Harto's visit
to Bali will be.
39
Since Merta was civilian governor of Bali, Sukarmen must have held a senior military
post.
40 Asu, meaning 'dog' in Javanese1 stood in this context for Ali Sastroamijoyo and
Surachman, leaders of the left wing which was dominant in the party at least at the centre.
Although the PNI itself was not banned after 1965, the Asu wing was heavily purged.
41 'Action Fronts', of students, graduates and school pupils respectively, which
spearheaded anti-communist actions in the larger cities.
. The Mass Killings in Bali 259
CRUSHING THE G30S/PKI IN BALI"
Dinas Sejarah TNI Angkatan Darat
In several areas of Indonesia, the G30S/PKI was crushed and destroyed
by the people together with the armed forces, and East Indonesia was no
. exception. There the G30S/PKI was put out of action before it could do
·anything.
: As a precautionary measure to avert the possibility of disruption by
· the G30S/PKI, the Panglima of KO DAM XVI Udayana, Brigadier-General
· Syafiudin organized a purge of the army in particular and of the armed
; !forces in general. Seventy-six armed forces personnel involved in the affair
were arrested after 4 October 1965. What were called 'police operations'
followed on 6 November, and a number of documents were captured
. indicating clearly that the PKI was behind the G30S. While awaiting further
. instructions from above, the Pepelrada" issued an instruction on 3
. November 1965 restricting the activity of the PKI and its affiliated mass
organizations. A curfew from 23.00 to 04.00 hours was also announced
· for the whole island.
The PKI apparently had weapons ready for its rebellion, and so, to
avoid casualties, the Pepelrada ordered those not authorized to carry
. weapons to surrender all firearms and explosives within five days. Anger
welled up amongst the people and they formed mobs to beat up communists
and the Chinese who had helped them. The burning of houses and the
general destruction took place in an orderly fashion. Considering the
conditions, however, the Pepelrada quickly took positive action to avert
further disturbances. The Panglima told the people that if they really wanted
. to help the armed forces to crush the G30S/PKI, they should not act on
·their own initiative and that destruction and unfavourable disturbances
were not permitted.
42
Translated from Pemberontakan G30S/PKI dan penumpasannya (Jakarta: Dinas
, Sejarah TNI Angkatan Darat, 1982). ·
43
: Penguasa Pelak.wlaan Dwikora Daerah, Regional Authority for the Implementation ·
of Dwikora.
260 Ro.bert Cribb, Soe Hok Gie et al.

In its campaign of disruption, the PKI had succeeded in influencing INDEX

a number of army members and they tried to get weapons frOm the divisional
training camp. These treasonous troops included lst lieutenants Teduh Abangan 27, 65, 72-74, 76, 77, 88, 94
and Sutiono, and Sergeant Sarjono; they were assisted by a civil seivant Abdul Latif 150, 154, 175
called Ridas. Under interrogation, the two lieutenants denied their Aceh
involvement, but Ridas confessed openly. Sergeant Sarjono was so killings in 23, 46, 85, 91
frightened that he committed suicide, killing himself with a hand grenade. Adventure, as motive 15
Affandi 106
The mass demonstrations loudly demanded abolition of the PKI. At Africa, comparison with 60, 224
a ceremony commemorating the anniversary of the Youth Pledge" on Agrarian Law, 1960 125, 244
28 October 1965, the Bali Regional Youth Front expressed its determination Agung, Anak Agung Gde 257
in demanding that the government dissolve and ban the PKI and its mass Agung, Gunung 243
organizations. The governor of Bali, AnakAgung Bagus Suteja, who was . Ahmad Khan, Syed 15
suspected of involvement in the G30S/PKI was declared non-active as head Ahmad Tohari 104
of the Front Nasional, which then asked for him to be dismissed as regional ' Aidit, D.N. 165, 234, 254
head. The activities of Anak Agung Bagus Suteja had indeed given rise at Halint airforce base 29
to suspicion. · AIDS, comparison with 41
Airforce 29, 51
The PKI was apparently not willing to accept its defeat, and several
purged 52, 53
of its members who had not been arrested continued their disruptive
Ajip Rosidi 105, 106, 109-111, 113-115, 117, 118
activities. The leadership and cadre of the PKI and its mass organizations
Aksi sepihak v, 21, 23, 69, 71, 72, 75-77, 89, 92, 121, 123,
held meetings to plan killing and destruction. Some, however, apparently
125-129, 149
realized how mistaken their leaders' policies were and they dispersed or
in Bali 244, 249, 250, 254
resigned from their organizations. In Jembrana, the local PKI and its mass
Ali Sastroamijoyo 254, 256, 258
organizations dissolved themselves in the presence of the bupati and swore
Aliran 73
an oath to help the armed forces crush the G30S/PKI until it was totally
Ambarawa 201, 215
destroyed.
Amok (mengamuk) 33, 34
Anak Tanahair 105, 106
Angkatan Terbaru 105
Ansor v, 32, 79, 80, 82-84, 88, 92, 135, 152-154, 162,
170-174
operations in Bali 247
. role in killings 26
Arief Budintan 110, 118, 119 ·
Arjuna Mencari Cinta 103
ARMED v, 171

44 At a nationalist youth congress in 1928, those present took a pledge committing

them to the Indonesian language, the Indonesian flag and the Indonesian nation.
262 Index Index 263

Army 11, 21, 22, 24, 36, 37 Banyumas 26

alleged relationship with United States 6
and KOPKAMTIB 51
as maintainer of order 59
centralized 53
consolidation of power 22, 28, 37
dwifungsi 59
in Bali 27, 241, 247, 253-255, 258, 259
in Central Java 195, 197, 198, 200, 201
'- Banyuwangi 27, 79, 149-157, 174-176, 247
BAPERKI v, 163, 246
Barisan Pendukung Sukamoisme 3
Baris an Pengawal Y esus 133
Bartholomew's Day, Massacre of St 2, 22
! Basuki Rachmat 78
f Bataks 23, 56, 94
Batavia

I~-.
in East Java 78, 150, 160-166 ma8sacre of Chinese, 174, 14
in Timor 11 Batik 9
in West Kalimantan 25 Bersih lingkungan 228
martial law 26, 94 Bharatayuddha 30
political role in New Order 53 Biro Khusus 220
propaganda 25,29,37,46,47, 164 BKKS v, 154
purged 52, 53 Blitar 34, 79
rivalry with PKI 21, 26, 28, 71 killings in 172
role in killings 3, 6, 11, 23, 26, 27 I PKI resistance in 34, 197, 198
territorial structure xv, 51 ! BNI v, 149, 150
Arson 8, 46, 149, 163, 175, 241, 256, 259
Arswendo Atmowiloto 113
Ashadi Siregar 102 .
Australia, comparison with 19
i Bond, James
comparison with 32, 210, 219
Bones, decay of 10
Boyolali 123, 133, 162, 163, 165
Bagelen 73 Boyolali 174
Bali 3, 6, 20, 51, 71, 85, 90-93, 241, 243-247, 249-260 BTI v, 75, 92, 121, 125-129, 149, 151, 152, 201, 244, 249,
. army in 34 250
mutilation of victims 30 membership 41
number of deaths 8, 246, 256 Budiarjo 202
PKI members submit to massacres 20 Budiarjo 31
PKI on 30 Bukitduri 232-235
regional character of killings 27 Buleleng 27, 241, 249
vigilante gangs 32 Bumi Manusia 103
Balinese BUTERPRA vi, 134
victims on Lombok 25 Butterfield, Herbert 14, 19
Balinese woodcarvers, killed 9 Cambodia, comparison with 2, 6, 7, 10, 14, 15, 17, 18, 39,
Bambu runcing v, 77, 163, 173 42
BAMUNAS v, 253 Cannibalism 185
Bangli 249 Cargo cults
Banjardowo 210, 219 and communism 24
Banjarsari 209
Banteng Raiders 174, 215, 225
264 Index .Index 265

Catholicism 24, 95, 198, 222, 228 Cirebon 165

and killings 24, 247 killings in 26, 85
conversion to 40 riots in 26
Caves 10 Civil service
CDB vi and KOPKAMTIB 51
Central Java 3, 26, 27, 34, 71, 86 purged 51-53, 192, 201
army in 34 structure xiv, xv
army in 10 Class 49, 65, 67, 71-76, 82, 88, 89, 91-93, 96, 98, 244
killings in 49 Cold War 5, 28
number of killings 8 Confessions 160
regional variation 26 by D.N. Aidit 165
social tensions 27 Confessions
Cerewek 209,210,216,218,220,221 by D.N. Aidit 39, 40
Chaerul Saleh 229, 254 Coup of 30 September 1965 1, 28, 45, 72, 159
Children .,1 in Central Java 123, 159, 160
affected by violence 39, 84, 173, 186, 187, 207, 214, 219 t"' in East Java 159
as key to rehabilitation ofleftist families 187, 227, 228, in Yogyakarta 161
235-238 Dance of the Fragrant Flowers 29, 139
loss of education 186 Darsjaf Rahman 110, 111, 115
spared during killings 56 Darul Islam movement vi, 26, 107
victims of killings 241 Dayaks 25
China 28,229,230,239 Dengkol 171
comparison with 16, 61, 224 DETGA vi
Chinese 79,92, 149, 150, 163, 245, 246,257, 259 Dewa Agung 249
guerrillas in West Kalimantan 25 as landowner 244
in Bali 244-246, 257, 259 . funeral of 243
massacred in Batavia, 1740 14 Dewan Jenderal vi, 154, 222
victims in Makassar 246 Dewan Revolusi vi, 45, 153, 154, 160, 166, 257
victims in West Kalimantan 25 Dhani, Omar 53
victims on Lombok 25 Diponegoro Division 71, 160, 164, 182, 195, 198, 200, 203,
Christianity 24, 40 217, 220, 226
and land reform 24 Djumangat 175
conversion to 39, 228 DPR-GR vii
Christians Dwifungsi 225
and care for victims 187, 216, 217, 228, 229, 234, Dwipayana 225
236-238 East Java 3, 8, 15, 26, 27, 32, 64, 65, 68, 69, 71, 72, 96
and PKI in Timor 96 army in 78
arrested 200, 217 Hinduism in 243
involved in killings 49, 82, 133, 191, 193, 228 Hinduism in 49, 169-176
East Sumatra
killings in 23, 24
266 Index 267

East Timor 95 GMNI vii, 255

Education 179-182, 185, 186, 189-191, 227-229, 235.-239 Golkar 53, 194
Christian schools 95, 179, 180, 189-191 Gondangwinangun 126
Fact Finding Commission 8, 11, 176 GPIB vii, 236
Families Graves 9, 10, 39, 165, 170, 171, 174-176, 195, 209, 217,
disrupted 227,228,230,232,235, 236, 239 220, 221, 243
killed as groups 11, 56 allegedly dug by PKI 35, 49, 131
killings within 36, 56, 130, 172 Greeks, expelled from Asia Minor, 1922 . 16
women and children spared 56 Grobogan 87, 209, 210, 213
Famine GSBI viii, 183
in Bali 244 GSNI vii, 182, 218
Fear, as motive 15, 47 Guided Democracy 9, 28, 36, 37, 54, 55, 60, 70, 71, 98,
Flores 24, 95 201,202
Forests and social tension 26, 197, 198, 244, 249 and education 9
France, comparison with 2, 22, 32 economic decline 70
Front Nasional vii, 53, 260 journalism during 3
Funerals Guilt 36
anticipated by PKI members on Bali 243 Gurah 172
of Dewa Agung 243 GWNI vii, 218
of murdered generals 47 Hadisubeno 218, 223
Gamelan 184, 191 Halim airforce base
Gangsters events on night of coup 29, 47
and PKI 32, 130, 132, 157 recovery of generals' bodies 46
as victims 38 HANRA viii
Gantiwarno 128 HANSIP viii
Garuda Pancasila 192, 220 Hari Peringatan Pancasila Sakti viii, 47, 56
Garum 172 Hendra Gunawan 107
Gelandangan 43 Heroes of the New Order 59
Genteng 149 Hinduism
Germany, comparison with 2, 7, 11, 14-18, 38, 46, 227 in Bali 27, 91, 243
Gerwani vii, 139, 152, 166, 172, 212, 230-232, 234, 236, in East Java 243
254 in Java 40, 88
alleged activities at Halim airforce base 29, 47 History, as discipline 18, 19
as target of killings 230 HMI viii, 132, 143, 162, 228.
members targeted as victims 256 Holocaust 2, 14, 17, 38
organization and structure 230 Holy war, as motive 15
Gestapu (term) 59 India, comparison with 16, 63, 222
coined 46 Indramayu
Gianyar 249 killings in 26
Gilchrist Letter 222 Inflation 70
Giri 176 INPRES viii
268 Index liidex 269

IPI viii, 171, 182 Karangasem 154, 156, 157, 249

IPKI viii, 199 Karjono 165
Islam 15, 16, 21, 23, 27, 65, 73, 98 KASI ix, 258
ideological basis for killing 15, -16 Katamso 131, 163
Jafar Ma'ruf 175 Kebumen 85
Jails 21, 38, 42, 83, 176, 183, 184, 195, 201, 205, 217, Kediri 27, 64, 68-70, 72, 74-85, 87, 89, 94, 96, 172-174
231-235 Kemal Idris 57
Jakarta 70, 79, 86, 159, 165 in East Sumatra 23
Japanese in World War II, comparison with 2, 6, 16 Keras 77, 174
Japanese occupation of Indonesia 32, 54, 179, 243 Kertosono 172
J as sin, H.B. 110 KIAPMA ix, 255
Jatiluwih 250 Kidnappings 136
Jatinegara 232, 233 Kikis, Operation 214
Java Kindergartens 191, 230
See Central Java, East Java, West Java compared with Klaten 121, 123-147, 162, 164, 165, 178, 180
Bali 243 killings in 26
Javanese Klungkung 243,249
as victims in Bali 92 Komando Operasi Merapi 166
Jember 171, 175 Kompyjang, Ida Bagus 253, 255, 257
Jembrana 27, 91, 241, 245, 249, 260 KOPKAMTIB x, 8, 52, 57, 59, 60, 223
Jengkol 75 estimate of death toll 8, 11, 12, 14, 41
J entera Lepas 102 founded 46
Jews 17, 38, 42 powers 46
Jihad 15, 16 role in New Order 51, 52
Jlobo 123, 125 structure 51
Jogonalan 125, 128 KOSTRAD x, 21, 45, 47, 57
Joko (Djoko) Supaat Slamet 150, 154, 175, 176 in North Sumatra 49, 57
Journalists 3, 4, 8, 102, 195, 197-199, 202, 204, 211, 222, KOTI x, 46
226 Kradenan 210, 213-216, 220
Jusuf Muda Dalam 53 Kraguman 123, 125
Kaderi 161 Kubah 104
Kalimantan Kubutambahan 250
Chinese guerrillas in 25 Kunci 171
killings in 25 Kupang 11
PKI resistance in 34, 197 Kuwu 203, 204, 206, 209, 210, 214, 215, 219, 224, 225
Kalisari 209 Lampung 239
KAMI ix, 201, 258 killings in 24
Kandel, Tio 254, 255 prisoners from 235
KAP-Gestapu ix, 46, 79 Land reform 21, 23, 71, 75, 76, 95, 121, 123, 125, 191, 197
KAPPI ix, 217, 258 in Bali 244, 249, 250
Karanganyar 165 in Nusatenggara 24
270 Index Index 271

Land tenure Marhaenism 218

in Bali 92, 244, 249 \_ Marxism
in Central Java 123, 178 and PK! 35, 55
in Java 72, 75 Masyumi 72, 74, 77, 162, 182-184
Latin America, comparison with 60 Medan 93
Lawang 170, 171 Meekness of victims 20, 34, 35, 69, 253
LEKRA x, 9, 108-111, 114-116, 184, 191, 201 on Bali 243
Lembaga Pembela Hak-hak Asazi Manusia 195 Mencoba Tidak Menyerah 103
LESBUMI 115 Mendoyo 249, 250
Lie Lie Tjien 257 Merapi-Merbabu Complex
Liga Demokrasi 199 PK! resistance in 197
Lists 35, 49, 76, 80, 183, 241, 247 Merta, I Gusti Putu 253, 254, 257
Literature 101-103, 105 Middle classes 102
leftist 19 Mlese 123, 127
LKN x, 218 Monumen Pancasila Sakti xi, 60
Lodoyo 77 MPRS xi, 53
Lombok endorses Supersemar 52
killings in 25 purged 52
Looting 93, 163, 183, 228, 230, 256 Muhammadiyah xi, 183, 209, 220
Lowokwaru 176 Munadi 198, 199, 202, 205
Lubang Buaya 46, 60 Muncar 150, 157
Madiun 84 Murdani, Benny 19
Madiun Affair 36, 74, 76, 77, 199 Murtopo, Ali 219
Madura Mutilation 35, 137, 171-173
perennial violence in 25 castration 172, 175
Madurese 31 decapitation 153, 170-175
in Pasuruan 88 of generals 29, 47, 48
in Surabaya 26 possible reasons for 30
Magelang 160, 161, 163, 166 Nahdatul Ulama xi, 26, 69, 71, 72, 79, 82, 88, 123, 149,
riots in 26 150, 154, 162, 175, 209, 218, 220, 231
Mahabharata 30 in 1955 and 1957 elections 74
Makassarese 31 Nanking, Rape of 6
Makdok movement, Timor 24 NASAKOM xi, 181, 254
Malang 170, 171, 176 Nasution, Abdul Haris 47
Malaysia 25, 130, 197 Nasution, Ade Irma 47, 113
Malik, Adam 202 Nationalism 54, 55, 60, 61, 66, 67, 98
Maluku 25 Navy 51
Mambang 250 Negara 256
Manifes Kebudayaan 115, 117 NEKOLIM xi, 165
Manisrenggo 128, 134, 135, 140-147 Ngasem 172
Mantik, I Nyoman 245 Nglegok 172
272 Index Index 273

Noer, Arifin C. 113 PII xii, 77, 182

North Sumatra 56-58, 71, 93, 94, 96 ·\ PKI xii, 5, 21, 69, 71, 76, 102, 107, 113, 119, 130-132, 136,
killings in 49 163, 189, 190, 192
Nungcik AR. 235 alleged infiltration of army 201
Nusatenggara and 1955 elections 160, 178
killings in 24, 95, 96 and artists 9
Nyali 104-106 and cargo cults 24
Oei Tju Tat 176 and Christianity 96
OPSUS xi, 219 and churches 200
Order and fishermen 149, 151
as basis of New Order 60 and forests 198
as legitimizer for New Order 57, 58 and Hinduism 88, 91, 243
Pakis 209 and labour 94
Pakutatan 251 and peasants 83, 91, 121, 149, 189, 191, 198, 244
Pancasila 59, 116, 117, 191, 201 and police 131, 134
improbable motive for massacres 15 and social tensions 6, 21, 23, 36
Panggabean, Maraden 198 and teachers 9, 131, 180, 184, 190
Pangkangmanggis 249 and women 230
Pare 83, 173 banned 52
PARKINDO xi, 216, 220 dissolves in Central Java 166
Partai Katolik 216, 220 headquarters ransacked 46, 79, 80, 164
Partindo 173 image of demonic behaviour 29, 35, 47, 59, 74, 77
Pasukan Gerilya Rakyat Sarawak 197 in 1955 elections 74, 96
Pasuruan 27, 85, 87-89 in 1957 elections 74
Pali 26 in Bali 91, 241, 243, 245, 250, 257, 259
Patron-client relationships 65, 71 in Central Java 123, 130-132, 160, 178, 181
Pemuda 32 in East Java 149-152
Pemuda Demokrat 174 in East Sumatra 23
Pemuda Marhaen 174 in North Sumatra 25
Pemuda Marhaenis xi, 128, 133, 152-154 in Nusatenggara 24
Pemuda Pancasilais xi, 162 in South Sumatra 25
Pemuda Rakyat xii, 4, 128, 130, 132, 133, 135, 136, 139, leadership and cadres destroyed 56
142, 152, 161, 163, 175, 231 membership 41, 49, 71
Penebel 250 possible underground existence 19
Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI (film) 111, 113 preparations for resistance in central Java 131, 132
PEPELRADA xii, 253, 259 resistance in Boyolali 163
PEPERKUPER xii rivalry with army 28, 71
PESINDO xii, 253 rivalry with Muslims in East Java 71, 72, 77
Petrus killings xii, 10, 38, 60, 61 sympathisers in civil service purged 52
PGRI xii, 172, 183, 184 Ploso 174
PGRI non vak sentral 142, 172, 173, 183, 184
274 Index .Index 275
I,
PNI xii, 71, 76, 88, 89, 123, 126, 127, 129, 131, 132, 162, Realism in literature 101
182, 183, 190, 192, 218, 220 Rendra, W, 105
in Bali 27, 91, 245, 250, 255, 256, 258 REPELITA xiii, 53, 202
in Central Java 131, 133, 134, 142, 181, 189, 200, 201, Revenge, as motive 15, 39, 47, 58, 257
218 Revolution against the Dutch 66, 67, 70, 243, 245
in East Java 82, 150, 154, 175 Rivers, disposal of bodies in 8, 10, 26, 173, 174, 243
Poison 156 Romania, comparison with 33
Police 11, 26, 51, 126-128, 134, 135, 139, 142, 165, 176, Ronggeng Dukuh Paruk 104
231 RPKAD xiii, 21, 26, 47, 57, 79, 86, 93, 163, 166, 167
in Bali 249 casualties 34
infiltrated by PKI 131 in Bali 57, 241, 243, 256
purged 52 in Central Java 49, 133, 162, 163, 166, 167, 182, 185
Poncokusumo 171 in Solo 164
Pono 220 trains vigilantes 166
Pontang 172 Sabur, Mohammad 254
Pos Kota 31 Saebani 165
PPAN xiii, 183, 185 Said, Edward 247
PPDI xiii, 143, 173 Saimin Suprapto 175
Prambanan 125, 127-134, 136-138, 142, 147 Salatiga 201
Pramoedya Ananta Toer 103 riots in 26
Princen, J,C 195, 198-200, 202, 204, 211, 223, 226 Salemba 233, 235
Prisoners, political 42, 49, 52, 166, 176, 183, 195, 205, 208, Samin movement 198
209, 211, 231, 232,233 Sani Gondjo 233, 234
Probolinggo 27 Santoso 163
Protestantism 24, 95, 228 Santri 27, 65, 72-75, 77, 88, 94
conversion to 39 Sapardi Joko Damono 103
PRRI-Permesta revolt 36 Sarawak 25
PSI 107, 108 SARBUPRI 23, 94
in Bali 245 SarwoEdhie 26,57,86,93, 162, 164, 166, 182,243,247
Puger, I Gde 91, 245, 253, 255 Sarwono 204
murdered 30, 243 Sasaks 25
Purwodadi (Bugisan), Central Java 131 Sastra pop 102
Purwodadi, Central Java 4, 6, 27, 188, 191, 192, 195, Satyagraha Hoerip 111
197-226 SEBDA 174
Purwodadi, East Java 170 Selemadeg 250
Purworejo 166 Semarang 161, 163, 203, 209, 215
Pusro 234 Sendi 102
PUTERPRA xiii, 126 Sentong 170, 171
Putu Wijaya 104, 106 Seven village devils 121, 130, 131 ·
Radio Republik Indonesia 161, 166 Sexual abuse 47, 171, 172, 175, 232, 234, 256
Rape 171, 172, 175, 230, 256 Shame 4, 17
 ~· ..,
276 Index liidex 277

Siliwangi Division 26, 86, 199 signs Supersemar 52

Simo 209 Sukertiyo 258
Singosari 171 Sulawesi 25, 219, 224
Situbondo 27, 175 destruction of pre-Islamic sacred sites 243
SNMI xiv, 150 Sumadi 175
SOBS! xiv, 151, 152 Sumanta 165
Soedjono, Willy 78 Sumarno 8, 176, 254
SOKSI 94 Sumatra 8, 23-26, 40, 91 See also Bataks, East Sumatra,
Solo (Surakarta) 9, 73, 86, 121, 162, 164, 165, 178 North Sumatra
riots in 26 Sumba 95
Solor 24 Supardi 254
South Africa, comparison with 19 Supersemar xiv, 52, 57, 60, 233
Soviet Union, comparison with 9, 10, 15, 16, 61, 63, 252 endorsed by MPRS 52
Spain, comparison with 61 Suprapto 215
Sragen 165 Surabaya 8
Starvation of prisoners 233 riots in 26
STI 129 Surachman 258
Strikes 164 Surakarta (Solo) 73, 86, 121, 133, 140, 145, 162, 164, 165,
Subamya, I Gusti Gde 254 178
Subandrio 53 Surono 198, 199, 205, 207, 215
Subang Suryosumpeno 159-163
killings in 26 Suteja, Anak Agung Bagus 30, 91, 245, 253-255, 257, 260
Sudharmono 202 disappearance 253
Sudomo 11, 59 Sutopo 214, 215, 221, 225
Sugandhi 46 Suwarno Kanapi 150, 154
Sugiyono 163 Syafiudin 254, 255, 259
Suharto 5,22,36,37,45,47,53,202,215,233, 255,258 Tabanan 27, 249, 250
and Supersemar 52 Taman Dewasa 180, 186
appointed Acting President 53 Taman Siswa 180
crushes coup attempt 45, 46 Tamins 27, 32, 92, 241
KOPKAMTIB commander 51 Tanggerang 233
Suherman 159-161, 166 Tanjungsari 209
Suhlrno 203 Teachers 9, 131, 136, 142, 173, 179-181, 183, 185, 186,
Suicide 34, 171, 197 189-191
Sukamto 176 Tejo Suwarno 197, 198, 200, 201, 204, 207, 208, 224
Sukarmen 258 Temon 201
Sukarno 8, 19, 28, 71, 98, 108, 200, 218, 233, 243, 245, Terror
253-255 as tactic 32, 33, 139, 161, 166
and Guided Democracy 55 Time magazine 5
powers curtailed 53 Timor 11, 24, 40, 95
presidential cabinet purged 52
I
I
Timor, East, comparison with 16
 lhdex 279
278 Index

Tjan Wie 246, 257 West Java 26, 71

Tohari, Ahmad 104 army restrains violence in 67, 85
Toroh 204, 212 Widagda 256
Torture 163, 170, 185, 197, 200, 204, 216, 231, 232 Wijana 256-258
by PKI 250 Wiratmo Soekito 111, 119
denied 198 Wirosari 216-218, 224, 225
Tourism Women
in Bali 244, 253 and morality 29, 47, 230
TPR xiv and PKI 29
Transmigrants, as victims 24 and political organization 76
Transmigration 204 prisoners 212, 227, 231-235
Trenggalek 79 spared during killings 56, 232
Trials victims of killings 171, 172, 175, 241, 256
of alleged coup plotters 53 widows 256
Trisula, Operation 197 wives of prisoners 227
Tumpang 171 wives of victims 210, 214, 219, 231
Uganda, comparison with 6 Wonosobo 164
United States, alleged role in killings 6 Yasir Hadibroto 165
Usman Sastrodibroto 159 Yeh Embang 249
Utomo Ramelan 165 Yogyakarta 73,121, 133, 144,145, 146,161, 163, 178,180
Vietnam, comparison with 28, 224 Yudhistira Ardi Noegraha 102
Vigilantes 3, 21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 49, 51, 57, 67, 79, 82, 83, ZIPUR xiv, 170
86, 192, 256
encouraged by army 228
in Bali 241
restrained by army 51
trained by army 21
trained by RPKAD 49
Village life
and violence 33
Violence
and New Order 56
men of 31, 32
traditions of 31, 38, 123
Wates 84
Wayang kulit 184, 191
influence on killings 30, 31, 34, 35
Weapons used in killings 15, 17, 170, 171, 174, 175, 195,
206,216, 256
Wedagama, Dewa Made 255
Wedastra Suyasa 256