ZAMBIAN OPEN UNIVE.RS.

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MOOOLE OS 7 /tlld's2.

THE R()l.E OF NGOs IN

DEVELOPMENT

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 MODULE DS 7

-
THE ROLE OF NGOs 'IN
DEVELOPMENT

TM Mambwe
8A (UNZA) MA (East Angiiaj
First Edition 2005
©ZAOU
ISBN

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Introduction 1

Unit One: Objectives 2

Topic 1: What are NGOs? 2

Definition of NGOs and their Beneficiaries 3

Topic 2: A brief History of NGOs 6

Topic 3: The Composition and Nature of NGOs 11

Topic 4: The Role of Ideology in NGOs 14

Unit Two The Nature and Characteristics of NGOs 18

Topic 1: NGOs and the Issue of Autonomy 19

Topic 2: Protection of Non-Governmental Sector in

International Law 23

Topic 3: Strengths and Weaknesses of NGOs 28

Strengths 30
)
Weaknesses 42

Topic 4: Relationship Between NGOs and Governments 57

Topic 5: . NGOs Impact in the South 66

•
Bibliography 93

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INTRODUCTION

': _,.·:!{'_,i:' .. ~--"1 ~

This course introduces you to the subject matter of Non~Governmental
Organizatfo'n'i{(NG'Os). The course seeks to analyse the emergence. of NGOS and
their role in the development of third world countries. The cour~ also anplys.~s
the advantages and shortcomings of NGOs and shows hpw they are increasing ·in
importance and in the financial muscle in the battle by the poor to achieve
democracy and justice.

OBJf;l;TIVES

At the end of the course you should be able to:

i) Demonstrate a dear understanding of NGOs particularly their origins,

objectives and functions.
. ' ' . .

ii) Understand how NGQs are related to the development of the Third
World .
•\ ) •\."I

iii) Identjfy
,.
the
:
?trengths and .weaknesses of NGOs.
'

iv) Contrast the structure and functions of NGOs with those of

governments.

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UNIT ONE

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','We!con~e t6th'ii.unit which is about the definition on Non~Governmental
' Organisations {NG0s). ' i ·

OBJEtTlVES
At the end of this unit, you should be abfo to:-·
(a) Defihe vJhat~n NGO is
(b) Understand the general purpose and aims of NGOs

Topic 1: What are NGOs?

It is not possible to give a dear and universal definition of NGOs. This is partly
due to the fact that definitions vary from one country to another depending on
the circumstances of each particular country. As a matter of fact such definitions
are usually guided by the legislation of a particular state. However, what is
crucial in the definition of NGOs is clarity about the general purposes and aims of
NGOs. This ls necessary to enable a state determine what rights, duties, powers
and immunities apply to an organization. Such clarity is also necessary for the
protection of the public from the ·activities of organizations that may abuse
power. For the purpose of this course we can define a Non-Governmental
e

Organisation to be:

A private voluntary grouping of individuals or associations not operated for

profit or for other commercial purposes but which have organized
themselves natlona!ly or internationally for the benefit of the public at large
and for the promotion of social welfare, development, charity or research in
the areas inclusive of, but not restricted to, health, rellef, agriculture,
education, Industry and the supply of amenitles and services (Ya·nsah
1995:16).

Given this definition it is important tu state the fact that regulations ln

most states (if not all} explicitly prohibit a'1 NGO from becoming a branch
- -.....,1.,..

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 of,. or affiliated to, or connected with any organization or group of a
'political' nature.

Furthermore, a number of deductions or elements can be drawn from the

definition that is advanced. These are:
• NGOs are private and voluntary, they are riot owned by
governments or states.
• , They are not designed to be profit-making entities since they are
supposed to operate on a charitable basis.
• They can be locally or foreign owned.
• Their work should be biased towards the benefit of the public at
large; and
• They operate in a number of fiel_ds at various levels.

DEFINITIONS Of NGOs AND THEIR BENEFICIARIES

Clarity about the genera! purposes and aims of NGOs is necessary to enabl~ a
state to determine what rights, duties, powers and immunities apply to · a:n
organization. Such clarity is also necessary for the protection of the pubiic from
the activities of organizations that may abuse power. For example, the English
Charitable Uses Act 1601, enacted to prevent abuses prevalent at the time
contained a preamble setting out a list of issues which were considered to fall
within the ambit of charity.

Relief of aged, ·impotent and poor people .. Mciintenance of sick and

~
maimed soldiers and mariners, schools of learning, free schools and
scholars in universities, repair of bridges, ports havens, causeways,
education and preferment -of
\;
orphans,. The relief, stock or maintenance of
houses for correction marrl~es of poor maids. Supportation, aid and ht'..J
of young tradesmen, handicraftsmen and persons decayed relief- or

~,,
•,,
 redemption of prisoners or captives: and aid or ease of any poor
inhabitants concerning payment of fifteens, setting out of soldiers and
other taxes (Pettit 1993:227; Goodman 1976:8).

Today, in UK, an NGO may organize itself as a charity provided it can satisfy the
Charity, Commissioners that its purposes fall entirely under one or more of four
headings namely: the relief of poverty, the advancement of education, the
promotion of religion, and other purposes beneficial to the community in a way
recognized as charitable' (Phillips 1994: Pettit 1993).

•
Ironically, despite the long existence of charity law in the UK, the concept of
what constitutes charity has never been statutorily defined. Activities which are
construed as political by the Charity Commissioners can cause an organization to
lose its charitable status. For example, Oxfam was challenged by the
Commissioners for its campaigning against apartheid in South Africa.· Oxfam
argued that apartheid was a cause of poverty. Jhe Commissioners argued that
anti-apartheid campaigning vJas piairily political and to protect its charitable
status. Oxfam was forced to withdraw its campaigning literature on this topic
(Adiin-Yaansah and Harrell-Bond 1995:4.9) .

Despite Oxfam's experience, the concept of what constitutes political remains

open (Goodman 1976;Pettit 1993; Phillips 1994). Where an organization can
·. show that its political activity is directly ancillary to or otherwise in furtherance of
its charitable purposes, that degree of political activity is allowed (ibid).

The objects clause' is the foundation stone of a charity which can ·do nothing
lawfully which does not fall entirely within its limits. However, not all NGOs are
charities in terms of this definition. Those which do not qualify as charities may
nevertheless register, for example, as limited liability companies ,mder fr.::
Companies Act 1985. The main advantc:iges of registering as a charity rnther
-..._.,,._

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 . . ,. . . ; ,,. . . . ,,. : ,.:.·;, ·.;·,c: . .·
than as a limited company are the tax benefits which accrue to charities as well
as to those who' make donations to charitable organizations' (G6od~an 197_6;
Pettit 1993: 224-5; PhlHips ·1994:84-94).

To be registered· as a charity, the Charity Commissioners will look not only at an

,· ·'
'
organization's objectives in relation ·to the 'objective clause' but.. also at the .

answers' td a series of questions aimed at eliciting the organization's ptaris.

• . : . • ., I

Sometimes there can be difficulties with registration because the Commissioners

. , :1 •

are not satisfied with the wording of the organization's draft constitution which

.
has to accompany the application,
.
because they.
. - .
are not convi~ced that the
purposes of the organization are actually 'charity' (Adiin-Yaansah and Harrell-
Bond 1995).

The analysis which follows shows how the countries examined in this study _have
all sought to address similar problems.

CondUsion
The objective of this section has been to examine the definition of NGOs and
their beneficiaries. The study found that although there are variations in the'
definition of non-governmental organizations nevertheless, the terminology of_
the various legislations examined in the study reflect that of the: Elizabethan,
statute discussed earlier. At the same time, however, the variation in definitions
reflect the fact that these countries are addressing themselves to fundamentar
social problems in societies that are vastly different from those faced by Britain
.. ~ .

during the Elizabethan era (Goodman 1976:2; Ball and Dunn 1984:54-55).

By defining NGOs and humanitarian organizations in such broad terms, the

legis,iation (unlike that of the UK), appears to put organizations with charftable
purposes on the same footing as those that have no such purposes. Thus, k"
example, fiscal and other tax benefits which, under UK law have been deniEd to

5
 some voluntary organizatiof.is due to the rules regulating the status and acti~ities
of char.ities seem open to. all NGOs' Which. fulfill the registration requirem~nts.
While this approach may be justified ~n grounds of the need ·for unif~rm
treatment in the legislation, nevertheless, it appears that the definitions have not
taken into sufficient account · the realities of NGO constituencies, size or
objectives. For example; ,'foreign NGOs are , often much larger in size or
constituencies; they· may '·be charities, trusts, foundations, incorporated or
unincorporated organizations or friendly societies. The choice of the' for~ the
organization takes often : reflects the advantages and disadvantages .or lhe
difficulties involved in constituting itself as one rather than the other. Given
. these differences· and in particular, the differential treatment which some aspects
of the legislation accords to NGOs, the definition could give rise to confusion and
problems. For example, it s2ems inappropriate to apply the present definition to
. local self-help groups or mutual benefit societies with the implication that they
should be 'non-commercial' and 'non-profit' making. Such societies have, as one
of their central objec.tives1 'self~sufflciency and therefore, often need to generate
resources, which by definition require that they operate at least some of their

ACTIVITY: Questions for discussion

1. Describe the main features of an NGO.
2. Discuss the variations in the definitions of NGOs in developing
cuntries.
3; What are the strengths and weaknesses of NGOs?

activities on a profit-making basis. (Milofsky 1988; Sanyal 1994:52.)

Topic 2: A brief History of NGOs

The history of contemporary NGOs car be traced to the period following the Fin.:·.
World War. According to Clark (1991) the first northern NGO::i to enter the stage
-""",;..

·!~·.
 did so just after World War 1 - such as the Catholic based CARITAS and Save
the Children Fund. They however gained strength towards the· end 1.tif and
immediately after the Second World War. Hence Oxfam started in 1942, Catholic
· . Relief Services in 1943 and the American Co~operative Agency for Relief
Everywhere (CARE) in 1945. Initially these NGOs were engaged in relief workf
primarily in war-torn Europe. During this time, NGOs were concerned with the
plight of numerous refugees who were displaced by the war. At the same time
they had to care for the sick and injured. As such their work was concentrated in
refugee camps and hospitals. They gradually shifted their attention to the third
world and also broadened it to include welfare activities - a natural extensioh 'of
relief (Clark 1991).

At a later stage during the 1950s and 1960s the number of northern NGOs
multiplied and their focus shifted progressively from relief into development
activities. Why was this development necessary? The simple reason is that relief
work is normally applied to temporarily take care of an existing problem. This
being the case this kind of approach does not offer long-term solutions to the
problem. By its nature, relief attacks only the symptoms of poverty. It was
therefore realized that to attack deprivation itself necessitated helping the poor
increase their capacity to meet their own needs with the resources they control.
After all, development is about 'enabling people to achieve their aspirations' It
is a process of change that enables people to take charge of their own destinies
and realize · their full potential. It requires building up in the people the
confidence, skills, assets and freedoms necessary to achieve this goal. This is
where development differs with relief. The shift of location from the refugee
,,. camps, feeding centers and hospitals to the villages and slums where they set
about establishing their projects opened the northern NGO's eyes to the full
reality of poverty. In the first locations the symptoms of poverty are apparent, in
the second its root causes.

7
 ,,'-At1i1wf WP-.

ACTIVITY: Questions for discussion

· 1. Why did NGOs move from relief to development? Illustrate your answer by
· making a distinction between relief and development. Give examples of
the tvvo approaches, i.e. relief and developments.
2. Identify some of the elements of NGOs and show how these can influence
the operations of any given NGO.

An important observation to be made at this point in time is that at the start 9f

thei.r dev£1opmental work NGOs tended to locate their activities within the
paradigm of 'modernization school of thought'. As such their approach was to
try and help the poor communities to become more llke northern or European
societies by adopting northern ideas and ideals. At the same time th~re ,was
I

emphasis on the utilization of modern technology and expertise. However, what

they did not realize is that there were indigenous structures (such as village
committees) that were already ln existence; .For this reason they had to set up
their owh projects using their own staff. The imposition of foreign development
mode·1s, ideas and programmes did not however, yield positive results.
Consequently many of these NGOs came to seriously question the contribution of
their · development model. This prompted them to adopt a new approach of
providing a service to the popular grassroots organizations and. self-help
mov~ments. This work was characterized by its smalt-scale, its local (or at least
national} leadership, and its support for economic and political indepenpence; .pf
the poor. 1

By 1961, for example, Oxfam, had made a policy decision to move away from
financing missionary organizations c;nd other northern impl,3nts and to switch

1
Landim, Leilah, 'NGOs in Latin America; in World D(;, ;elc,pment (Supplement), vo1. 15 •Deve!opment
Alternatives: the challenge for NGOs' (Oxford, Pergam0"1, 1987) ,._...:..,

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•."'••"'•••"'•""""""''""""""""',.,,.,__,__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
• _ , , - .. · ~ t.V .,n.11.11.1v1 L 111u1yc::1,1uus errorts. Many of the organizations it funded have

go~e on to become significant NGOs. Many of these grew rapidly to become

national level institutions that served as intermepiate organizations, chanAeling
the assistance from northern NGO to the grassroots level.

New political concepts emerging from Third World intellectuals, such as the
Theology of Liberation, also greatly influenced NGO thinking during this period.
Development
.
theory,
.
once dominated by northern practitioners, was becoming
an indigenous process, led by the people themselves (Brodhead, et al. 1988).

Although the number of NGOs was multiplying it has been noted that in the early
days !Jere was a homogeneity among NGOs. They more or less pursued a
common agenda. But by the1960s there had been a considerable fanning out.
Some remained with their traditional activities, other progressed to new activities
and a11alysis at different rates. Up ti!l the 1960s the NGO community was almost
exclusively a northern preserve, thereafter it has become increasingly a shared
ground, albeit initially shared with southern NGOs created by thek northern
counterparts or \partners' (Clark 1991).

· In the 1970s the spectrum broadened. Many NGOs engaged in self-help activities
came to realize that there was a limit to how far self-help activities could go,
governed by the vested interests of the political and economic elite.
Development was mcreasingly viewed as a process of liberating the poor, both
from their physical oppressors and from their own resignation to poverty. As
such new approaches were called. Brazilian NGOs, for instance {particularly
inspired by the - ideas of Paolo Freire) pioneered the approach of
\conscientization' - a combination of political education, social organization and
grassroots development - designed not just to improve living standards, but to
help the poor perceive their exploitation and to realize the opportuDities the~'
have for overcoming such exploitation through mass organizat:;on.
......~:

9
Conscientization, it was claimed, would also liberate the oppressors!. As it were,
NGOs in other countries developed similar approached to 'empowering' the poor,
for example through adult and functional literacy programmes in the Indian sub-
continent.

Throughout much of the Third World, NGOs concentrated on fostering structures

to help the poor in their struggle against injustice. Social development, therefore,
became of age. The resulting grassroots organizations were rapidly shifting/'
often informally constituted, and sometimes unrecognized by their governments.

The gradual realization throughout the 1970s that poverty is political in nature
also gave birth to advocacy as a new activity. It was clear that some of the
vested interest groups which bear down on the poor· are western based
(governments and companies). This dimension gave birth to advocacy groups. It
is pointless to tackle this in the south alone. The battleground had to be the west
itself. NGOs began programmes of development education, public campaigning
and parliamentary lobbying in pursuit of political changes. Again a conflict of
interests became apparent. NGOs which were dependent on government funding
or a conservative donor base were shy of this advocacy role. How could they be
seen to be knocking the establishment of which they were a party? Some, at
least in the United Kingdom, judged that they would be proscribed from
advocacy activities by charity law.

The 1980s saw an important leap forward in advocacy work on two counts. First,
some of the northern NGOs. with overseas programmes began to lose their
inhibitions and started to speak out, being goaded to do so by their. staff and
their overseas partners. Though their advocacy work may be more timid than
that of the specialist lobbying organizations they did achieve a great deal
because of their credibility with the public and with governments. Seox;dly, ar;:I
most importantly, a number of parallel advocacy groups have emerged in the

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 Third World. This being the case, north-south networks of advocacy groups have
increased the authenticity, analytical strength and power of NGO advocacy by
several orders of magnitude. The first such network to make its mark was the
International Baby Food Action Network. This was set up in 1979 by several
NGOs it rapidly grew to about 150 NGOs from all parts of the world, and led the
successful campaign for international governmental agreement on a Code of
Marketing for baby foods (Clark 1991).

The emergence of advocacy groups in the north also implied that more of similar
groups emerged in the south. Southern NGOs were basically funded by their
northern partners. However, northern NGOs tended to take a back-seat role.
This was partly due to the fact that they wanted to maintain their public image
and legal status. The other reason was that they did not have sufficient staff
with strong advocacy skills.

ACTMTY: Questions for discussion

1. Discuss the evolution of northern NGOs and show how these facilitated
the formation of NGOs in the south.
2. Why do you think NGOs should not be political in nature and orientation?

Topic 3: The composition and Nature of NGOs

Before we venture into. the discussion of the composition and nature of NGOs we
would like to mention the fact that the following section addresses two sub-
topics1 i.e. the composition and nature of NGOs in developed countries; and
NGOs in the third World Countries.

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NGOs do not comprise a tight community but a broad spectrum - too broad,
perhaps to leave the term with much meaning. It embraces multi-million dollar
food aid managers and trade unions of peasants and street hawkers, lawyers
advocating the environmental cause and illiterate barefoot midwives.

According to Clark (1991) NGOs, reflecting largely their historical evolution, can
be divided into six schools as follows.

1. R~f and Welfare agencies (RWA), such as Catholic Relief Services,

various missionary societies, and so on. These agencies normally
specialize in giving relief services especially in emergency cases.

2. Technical Innovation Organizations (TIO). These are NGOs which operate

their own projects to pioneer new or improved approaches to problems,
and which tend to remain specialized in their chosen field. Examples
include the British Intermediate Technology Development Group, the
International Aga Khan Foundation, and the Grameen Bank · of
Bangladesh.

3. Public Service Cont:ractors (PSC). NGOs which are mostly funded by

northern governments and which work closely with southern governments
and official agencies. These NGOs are contracted to implement
components of official programmes because it is felt that their size and
flexibility would help them perform the tasks more effectively than
government departments. Examples include CARE, Africare, etc.

4. Popular Development Agencies (PDA). Northern NGOs and their southern

intermediary counterparts which concentrate on self~help, social
development1 and grassroots democracy. Examples include th~ sevt:n
independent Oxfam's (in different fundraising countries), Bangladesh

1 ')
 .Rural fttclvancement Cc,n1mlttee, a of local NGOs found in

.:},,

pressea
attempt a often
support from no at
peasants' the
Associations, credit groups,
~.,. women's groups in many countries.

6. Advocacy Group and Networks (AGN). Organizations which have no field

projects but which exist primarily for education and lobbying. Examples
include the Freedom from Debt Coalition in the Philippines, the Third
World Network based in Penang, environmental pressure groups in north
and south, and Health Action International (campaigning for reforms
the marketing of pharmaceuticals). Such networks have come to take root
in recent days in Zambia. Among them could be identified groups such as
Jubilee 2000 (Coalition for Debt Cancellation), Afronetr Fodep, Voter
Apathy Project, Citizens' Forum, etc.

While this categorization exits the way it does, mention should be made of the
fact that this is not intended as a value judgment. An NGO in any form or school
can be good or bad. However, all of them have an important role to play and all
can make a contributi9n to ji..lst development. Whether the NGO does its job well
is determined largely by its success in integrating all the DEPENDS2 elements into
its work. What is imprntant to note though is the fact that a \/good NGO" should
have a clear 'mission statemenr should be able to guide ail its activities

'The DE"PE::\1DS approach vviH be a point of discussion i'l our discussion of ·De, ~inpment'.

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from its fieldwork to its fundraising techniques to its advocacy roles, The mission
statement should describe the NGO's development philosophy (along the
DEPENDS line)1 define own potential contribution to process, set

case
mission statement ,,
;+.

NGOs
roots trae this is correct. A study a
number countries instance reveals ear'iy southern
NGOs typically arose out of the independence struggles. However, what is also
true is that northern NGOs have given Impetus to the formation of southern
NGOs, as we know them today. As a matter of course most of them depend on
northern NGOs for funding and other logistical support.

ACTIVITY: Questions for discussion

1. Discuss the various schools of NGOs as identified by Clark.
20 How do these schools compare with some of the NGOs that are found in
Zambia?
3. Do you think that Zambian NGOs can exist without the support of
northern NGOs? Give reasons for your answer.
4. What is the importance of a mission statement in an NGO?

L_

Topic 4: The Role of Ideology in NGOs

Before we venture discussion of the above topic, it is important first of a!I to
reflect on the concept of \ideology'. loosely defined an ldeology can be said to be
a set of consistent and !ogica!ly connected ideas and ideals put togef1er for tr-;2
purpose of guiding, directing, and executing a programrne of action foi thP
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 benefit of a particular society. An ideology can operate to conform to the three
id2ological traditions of the social sciences, Le. Conservative (rightist), Libera!
( centralist), or Radical (Marx\st) (leftist). This is to say that we can have three
main types of ideo1omr. f\n ldeotogy c.J.n 1Je conservative~ it can be Eberai; or it
can be radical. An example of an ideology that can be given is that of the
'·Zambian Human!sm' which was propounded by the Kaunda government to
direct Zambia's way of deveiopmenr - this was a variant of a '-radical ideoiogt.

.. . . • 1,...0 . .-, . b - . ..,., , . ...

it 1s true hlJ s can m,·,uenced ,y these 1uernor;i1es, it iS
equally true to acknowledge the fact that there are certain times when NGOs;
l'.·<"
agd indeed their programmes can cross the ldeo!ogical boundary, There is a
suggestion by Clark (1991) for instance, that Popular Development Agencies- and
Advocacy Groups have something of 2 left-wing image in northern societies
where they may be based. It is probably true Ulat the majority of their staff and
often of their most active supporters has left or liberal views (Ciark 1991 :43). But
it would at the same time be faHacious to suggest that the issues they deal with
are leftist or radical. Otherwise most of the issues they tackle can be labeled as
'progressive'.

Grassroots movements and Popular Development Agencies in the Third world are

mostly pursuing struggles that lie outside the divided territory of northern
politics. Pressures to allow more democracy within development planning, to
chailenge the second-class status afforded to women, to resist the unsustainable
'mining' of thE: environment on which poor people depend, and to encourage
!and reform in the south has also been supported by advocacy groups - are
radical causes but not necessarily left-wing. Some can even be said to be free-
m2.rket oriented.

Having said we should also realize the fact that for the radk:~f NGO::,,
development is about taking sides. fr,r t11ern they uelieve that s0me

15
achievements are possible by improving services and economic activities for the

the same most on

can
access to a
democratic as is

and controversiaL

A issue 1 however, is that NGOs- see

the non-rad~ca!s as a conslderable compete capture
governr?rent funds and distort development work.

The radicals are tryinq to change the images by which the Third World is
conventionally portrayed in the north. They are trying to inject images of dignity
rather than despair 1 self-help rather than begging, active struggle rather than
hopelessness, a~id ingenuity rather than ignorance. These they see as very
honest images than the classic charity portrait of the Third World -· the
amorphous sprawling concentration camp of pot-bellied children and sunken -
eyed, starving mothers. The progressive portrait is more complex, however, and
not so effective at triggering immediate response - like writing cheques. Other
NGOs, including some of the resource-abundant evangelical charities such as
World Vision, suffer nothing of this inhibition. They go straight for the artery
connecting heart and wallet. No image is too harrowing for them; no technique
too tacky. This coupled with the rapid rise of mass media evangelicals,
particularly in the USA, leads to a very steep grov,;th curve for these agencies
(Clark 1991: 44).

16
 UJ
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 UNIT TWO
NATURE AND

a nev; organizatiGn
one plays a roie of a society. You !earn that its existence has

growth of its rn!e necessited to

NGOs are different in ideoiogy, nature and character. They all represent

different types of idco!ogle-s, pollcies and programmes. Some of them are smali

in size, others ore large. They ar·e fund2d in different ways_

Some of them are financed from state coffers, v1/hi!e others are funded from

voluntary contributions by those caf1 afford to give away their money. You

will learn about NGOs which are from tne North ( or normaHy caHed the
Devdopeci Wodd) and from t 11e South (normally called the Developing
Countries).

The view which we have abouc NGOs is heavilv influenced by the rnass media.
In general NGOs are seen as the answer to problems of promoting sustainable
de·,1elcpment. They are portrayed as a more efficient model of service delivery
to the poor and as a possible route through which government in the deveroping
world can reduce poverty, disease, human suffering, etc.

In most developing societies, the large Northern_ NGO is trs::ated with suspicion.

It is seen as a threat to national s:.~CJrity. Some of the large NGOs participate

the politica\ of socieLieS i11 the developing coun-z:.nes 1 10v exa.·1p1er tr,,y
participate in various electora! proc:::sses.

't {'
:. ...~
The NGOs are used as a means for the distribution of Thls ls especially so in
are portrayed as rnore
are in as r;1ore m
service delivery the third governments

OBJECTIVES
the end of able to:-

(a) To describe, discuss and explain the role of NGOs in society

(b) To disting1.,;ish the difference in the nature of NGOs in terms of their
policies, programmes and source of finance,
(c) To explain the extent to which an NGO or NGOs can contribute to the
solution of problems, such as reduction of poverty, disease, human
suffering etc.
(d) To understand and explain the problems which force states to regulate
NGOs.
(e) To explain how accountable NGOs are to the societies in which they
operate.

Topic 1: NGOs and the Issue of Autonomy

NGOs vary in size, objectives, ideologies, specialization, and economic power.
They relate in varying degrees of opposition to, or cooperation with their
governments (Bennett 1995; Garcia-Izquirdo and Walkup 1994). No single
regulatory blue print tan be appropriate for NGO regulation in all countries (ICNL
1994 ). Regulations to govern the activities of NGOs wm therefore reflect the
particular socio-economic, political and other conditions of the country in
ouestion . Whatever shape such regul:tlo:is eventuat!y take, the aim should be
enabie the development of the NGO sector rather than obstruct lt. At the

l9
same time, governments have 3 duiy to pec,;_,\c as a v,1ho:e from
unscrupulous practices. legislation tu these require,
among otne, thlnos th2t in ;:1'

and intended to ;t through and we!!

defined.

Studies that have been conducted a nurnber African countries (Yansah

1995) have indicated that tt1ose countries the governments appear accept
that NGOs (both local and foreign) makes an important contribution to socio-
~

economic development. Although c:t the sarne time, their laws reflect some of
the problems they have encountered and are seeking to overcome through
, tegislation. It has been observed, for instance that in some countries
governments are partly motivated to introduce a new regulatory framework
because they see an excessive number of foreign organizations, some with no
dear objective (Yansah 1995:6),

Ideally, the services which NGOs provide, which governments have been unable
(or have neglected) to provide, would be carried out in a highly professional
manner. Too often this is far from the reality. In many cases there has not been
a method to register them (either fo:eign or local NGOs). Often, governments
are not even aware of the existence of some foreign NGOs! operating on their
territories or, indeed, the precise nature of their activities, or when they do know
of their presence, whether they are actuaHy carrying out their declared
objectives. Foreign NGOs, o~en without approval, involve themselves in activities
which, on the face of it, wot1ld appear to be the sole province of a government;
for example, road building; water supply, school construction 1 training of
teachers or health workers outside the national educational structures and with
different curricu!a. NGOs operations, 2specia!!y in emerge;,..1cv situation, atso tend
to be uncoordinated, competitive and to ciuplicate work (V~mtira ani Harrel!·
Bond 1992; Morss 1984; Kathlna 1994; B2rn1ett 1995). Cor::-/.:m has also b::en

20

'-,
expressed about transparency of NGOs and accountability to
receiving governments,

ar-e open sources

governrnents aH
information i
..t Hansah (l instance in
UK, application charitable registration, an
is to account annuaify
Companies rt"'''""'''"' as are subject to
cha:~ies legislation and the Companies Act of 1985 (Phillips 1994; Warburton
1993; Gower 1992). The idea that NGOs operating outside tr.eir countries should
be subject to similar regulations concerning their finances has met with stiff
resistance (Yaansah 1995:7).

Governments also comp!ain that NGOs are often unwilling to conform to their
poiicies or development plans. In theory 1 NGOs should be responsive to the
needs of the community and work within the framework of existing state
institutions and developme:1t policies (Smith 1990; Morss 1984). However, many
NGOs do not even observe iocai employment legislation 1 to say nothing about
fitting their activities into government plans. Many governments fear the
perceived potential of NGOs - especially those dedicated to human rights issues
- for de-establishing the existing system of governance (Neff 1991).

With the possible exception of the new Rt\randan governments, whose legislation
appears to be explicitly targeting foreign NGOs, the organizations most affected
by the introduction of regulatory frameworks appear to be the" !oca! NGOs. In all
the countries examined by Yaansah (1995), foreign NGOs appear to enjoy
significant finanda! advantaoes
_, ove, r,ational oraanizaticns. ~

21
Many foreign NGOs are required by to partnerships

ff1 of "as
;n

one
I .
NGO 1._LlS!i1Q European established
Humanitarian Office (ECHO). to establish itself allowing

charity taws the the legislation of countries examined

not actively set out to promote the NGO sector; neither do they actively set out
to hinder it (Houston 1994). The laws have nevertheless, tended to be somewhat
ambiguous in their purpose. One hypothesis, arising from this study, ls that the
increasing dependence of such governments on large numbers of foreign NGOs,
and the activities these foreigr NGOs undertake or fund through local
organizations, are the major factors which have prompted governments to
respond by introducing regulatory frameworks. For many governments, NGOs
represent the Jong arm of external political interests intervening in their domestic
affairs.

---,
I
, ACTIVITY: Questions for discussion
:L Why is it necessary for host governments to introduce legislative
i frameworks for NGOs operating in their countries? Do you think that it is !
i i
I
necessary to legislate the operations of NGOs? Give reasons for your
I
I
answer. In your answer try to draw some examples from the Zambian
l experience.
II 2. Identify and discuss some of the factors that make governments

I'I suspicious of some of the activities of NGOs operating in their countries. ,

Suggest some solutions that can brlng about mutual respect and trust \

I___ between host go_~~~r~=ents anc'. NGOs.

22
 Topic 2: Protection of the Non··Governmental Sector in Internati'onai

thek
new laws are
as an intrusion hinders the capadty and
Kenyan NGO Coordination met
NGO sector. The Croatian draft on
on Dom general and

As the analysis in the preceding sections show, all the foreign non-governmental
organizations operating in the countries examined in this study come from
countries where legislation to regu!ate activities of, for example, charities (as
many FNGOs usually are), and other associated voluntary sectors have been in
existence for many years. In Britain, for exampie 1 as we noted earlier, legislation
'i:o regulate the voluntary sector ranges from laws dea!ing with charities of, for
example the Charities Acts 1992 and 1993), the Companies Act 1985, the
Friendly Societies Act 1974, to laws regulating the activities of the trustees,
Thus, ln Britain., the question is not so much whether the activities of the
voluntary sector should be regulated (as they usually are,) but rather, which of
the numerous regu,atory frameworks most appropriately achieves the desired
results?

Organizations constituted as charities would primarily be governed by charities'

legislation, and subject to the control of the Charity Commissioners 1 while those
'"
registered as companies, trusts or friendly societies 1 would be governed by the
laws appropriate to their objectives and .constitutions. Why then do NGOs,
particularly foreign ones% resist regu!;::tion of their activities by host governments
almost every single one of the countries examined in this st,.,1dy?

23
The argument for non-interference by government in the NGO sector is often put
terms the need space 1992), Freedom of the
sector is regarded as it
(0 be state or ariven to oe
proposed 1 interest groups 1 resrn.1rccs to be mobilized (Kjaerurn 1993).

The argrnr,ent space :s way or asserting tne of freedom

association, is recognized international (~~eff 1.991)- The
freedom assodation is rooted as on the rights persons
under 'the Universal Declaration of Human Right~- (adopted by the UN Genera!
Assen:bly in 1948), Articie 20 (1) of th(' Human Rights Deciaration states that
everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.

In General, the resolutim1s of the '.JN General Assernbiy are not binding on
member states 1 but it is now i0creasingiy acc".':pted that the principles set out in
the Universal Declaration of Human rights can be invoked in defense of a case
against a state or by international trib1..,nals, such as the one sitting in Ethiopia
since 1994. This Declaration of the Cenera! Assembly, provides an authoritative
gu;de to the inter·pretaticn of the provis;ons of the UN Charter (Brownlie
1990:570-1; Lillich 1989; Humprey 1989).

The more general provision of Article 2.0 of the UN Declaration is given more
specific content by Article 22. (1). of tr.e International Covenant on Civil and
Po!ltica! Rights, 1996 which is relevant to this discussion. It provides that
everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the
right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests1 Similarly,
Article 8 of the International Cove on Economic, Sodai and Cultural Rights,
1996, guarantees the right of ever 10·1e tc form trade and join the trade
union of his choice.

--~
')!
 Freedom Asscdatlon of the Right to Organize Convention,.
on 9

au.:rvmes traoe urnor;s. Non-governrnental organizations are also

on at-e
frequently execute 1 publicize, or contribute to the
decisions (Meron 1989, Weissbrodt 1989), Artide Charter provides

consu1tation non-governmental organizations which are concerned

ma~rs within its competence. The arrangements made by the Council for such
consultation are set out in its Resolution 1296 (XLIV) of 23 March 1968 which
provides for certain principles to be applied ln the establishment of consultative
reiations. Matters referred to in this Resolution include those.

With respect to international, economic; sociai, cultural, educational,

health, scientific, technological and related matters and to questions of
human rights. (UN Centre for Human Rights 1994:31).

The UN Charter and the Conventions referred to here are ones to which many
· countries including those examined in this study, are parties.

Kenya, Uganda and Rwc::nda are also parties to the African Charter on Human
Rights and Peoples Rights, 1981. Provision for the participation by African
foreign and international NGOs in the ·work of the African Commission on Human
and Peoples' Rights can be found in the Charter ond rules of Procedure1988.
For example, Article 45( 1) (a) of this Charter gives the Commission the mandate
to encourage national and local institutions concerned \Nith human and peoples'
rights, while Article 45(1) (c) mandates it to cooperate with other African and
intemationa\ institutions concerned w,th the promotion i:-o·otection of human
and peoples' rights (Gutto 1991; Shlvji 1989).

25

,.:r:s:?:<••/
Both the African Charter and international iaw1 however, place certain !imitations
on the enjoyment of these Charter no ,generaf

dausel rt does claw back·' provisions (Harris

1 . 1 .L
'
i, .l..

states that:

exercise of sha!i subject necessary

provided law particular those enacted the interest

security, the safety, ethics and rights and freedoms

On the other hand, Article 29(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
permlts derogation from Article 20 (1) freedom of peaceful association) where
tt-iis \s justified by law.

Sorely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the
rights and freedoms of others and meeting the just requirements of
morality, public order and the genercl welfare in a democratic society.

There are also limitations on the rights to be enjoyed under Articles 8 of the
International Covenant on Economic., Social and Cultural Rights 1 1966 and Article
22 cf the Civil and Politlca! Covenant. Derogation under Article 8 must be shown
to be justified by law or pubHc order or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others. The rights of the state to derogate from Article 22 are more
tightly controlled. The limitations 011 state power are: found in Artide 22 (2).
They are:

Those \Nhich are permitted by law and which are necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of nar:ioncil s,:<unty or public safety; public order ( order
public), the protection of public health or morals or the protec':ion of th::: rights cf

others.

26

··>
,,"';
 is
Li ,c: sty, H.::> dl iaws seeKmg to rescna tnese freedoms

seeking can demonstrate that they do the

democratic functioning of the society (Neff 1991:7).

degree regulate
therefore depend in part on the degree of problems which governments
perceives to be created by allowing the sector to manage its own affairs without
undue interference. As we have seen, the UN Declaration of Human Rightst the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, a!l require state intervention to be reasonably justifiable. Thus, when an
association moves from advocacy and lobbing pursuit of its objectives; to
activities which are designed to undermine state Institutions or policies, any
government is likely to intervene (Benn arid Peters 1969).

ACTIVITY: Questions for discussion

1. There is a problem which is related to the control of foreign NGOs in
I
Africa. Discuss the sources of the problem in relation to the objectives,
policies and programmes of NGOs in an African Country, use Kenya or
Zambia as your example.
2. Foreign NGOs are registered and regulated in their countries of origin.
They resist regu!atlon in Africa, why?
3. Can Zambia exercise its autonomy over an NGO 1 such as Oxfam? Why
not?
--------------------------=-~-'""" Hf~ liOI . c ~ : . " " ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.,.

27

<f}'·".
Topic 3: Strengths and Weaknesses of NGOs
In we some vveaknesses that

characterize NGOs. begin the perceptions of the m,:;n.,•::,

governments . -:,c;
ca~ by

According to Clark (1991) the media love NGOs. The world's public - at !east
those any coff,passion the struggling poor - love NGOs.
Increasingly official aid agencies and many governments are
courting them, Is the glowing image realistic? Can NGOs deliver all that is
expe~d from them?

The northern media - with its zest for drama, for simple stories and for clear
heroes and villains - find NGOs as a 'good copy', True the whiffs of
misdemeanour or inefficiency are also eagerly pounced upon, exaggerated;
turned into genera:izatinr:s and politicaHy dressed up for the scandal-loving
western public. But the bias ls overwhelmingly pro-NGOs, After aii it is
governments that we, the public, love to hate; non-governmental organizations
cannot be suspect. It is large bureaucracies we mistrust; small, voluntary
organizations are our friends. It ls the profit-motive that we find vulgar; altruism
is noble.

The media project northem NGOs as virtuous Davids fighting the Goliaths of
famine, hostile climate, government in~quity, slavery and oppression. They
provide success stories ,n an arena - the Third World - which is mostly gloomy.
They perform modern day miracles by turning modest donations into hope for
the hungry millions. Their staff make such great sacrifices and confront personal
risk daily in selfless service of the poor. Their projects allow crops to grow
abundantly where previously there w2.s desert. Their relief ar(ves on time where
governmental emerger.cy suppHes remain tied up by red ta;c\ or suc.-:uur oni/
the well off. NGO people ta!k in an ev2ryday language 1 .- Jt the indiges<:J!e

28
gobbledegook of govemrnent 'experts'. In short, their business is magic. That is
the media view and the one the pubiic wants to hear.

1t seems; then, rather churlish to ask '"'....,-,.,....,." are

VeP/ quesdon cynicism but it is well placed for three reasons.

First, there is surprisrng!y little objective reporting of NGO projects. Northern

NGOs' own writings genera!ly concentrate on the success stories and, being
aimed largely at their supporc\ng publics, serve a propaganda purpose. The
N<iOs tend to commission few objective evaluations, as we shall discuss below,
and so many not even know much about their successes or failures. Their
intermittent eva.luations are rarely published and are usually kept confidentia! 1
even inside the NGO. When academics evaluate NGO work they generally seek
advice of a northern NGO on \good projects; to look at 'Good' here means that
they contain interesting !essons about successful small-scale or part;cipatory
initiatives, about f!exibiHty, about the bypassing of governmental structures or
about how an official aid programme might be strengthened. The studies would
also usually need permission from the prcject agency; hence the weaker projects
tend to avoid scrutiny.

Until recently there has been little pressure on donor NGOs for more disciplined
evaluations. Most contributors tmve an implicit faith in the 'NGO approach' which
they do not want rocked, After aH, one does not scrutinize magic too closely,
otherwise it loses its charm. This era may be passing, however, as NGOs are
emerging as signific::ant players on the development stage and as an increasing
share of their funding derives from official sources, NGOs will more and more be
chaHenged to say why they are confident about the approaches they adopt·
Accountability is the other side of the publicly contributed coii --

29
Secondly, there is at present a dramatic mushrooming of NGOs1 particularly in
the and credentiais deserve to be questioned. Those set up by
essenb2Hv
official aid agencies are
1:on-governmentaJ is say that all the above are necessarily bad
agencies). Neither are northern-- based agenc1es 1 financed overwhelmingly by
home governments operatirig projects in conjunction southern
governments. Furthermore, agencies vvhose primary is or
political.
. '
or to poor1 are not 'tn.:e NGOs'.

These quasi-NGOs take up a great deal of time of the more estab!lshed NGOs.
The latter are called upon to give advice, and they are drawn into endless
debates about the legitimacy of these newer organizations; It is ln the interests
of NGOs to be ahead of the game in defining what are 2cceptab!e or legitimate
NGO activities.

Thirdly, NGOs must constantly be questioning where their real strengths and
weaknesses lie in order to find ways of improving their performance and to
remain confident about the approach they are pursuing. This is particularly
important in an age when official aid agencies are offering sums of money for
collaboration with NGOs on projects defined by the former.

Strengths that Hamper

Serving the poor

While governments and official aid agencies juggle with a wide range of
objectlves and target groups, an NGO generally has the advantage of being able
to concentrate on just a few activities relating to the needs of the poor. Its
physical base, therefore, is usually c0s2 to concentrations of poverty and it i::,
likely to be trusted by the poor (thouqh fre tnotivation and funding srnYces may
--- ~

3G
remain puzzlino to them) whereas thev on!ur know of offlcia! aid through their
,· _,, ., ;I

governments, of whom they are probably suspicious. NGOs often work in

areas perhaps no government official \s seen one year to
u1,:::, c2}se. Tnere are few NGOsp for example, m
Centra! ,;',;,"
v, Sumatra, India NGOs are mon:
co:Kentrated the sourhern states than in the poorer Hindi beiL likewise in
Kenya NGOs are more adive around Nairobi than in the famine-prone areas
rv,n, d;:i,te:rl
r"'·-r---'\...::,...,,..,,. ,_
n::zc;tr-,.-::ii\c;tc:
r'',_,....,:J'...., ....... « .......,i~-""---"

Even for NGOs it is not easy to reach the very poorest and some, unfortunately
make littie effort. It is easier to work with people who start with some assets,
some confidence and some skills of farming, crafts, numeracy and literacy. It is
relatively easy for the NGO to help increase the productivity of those assets and
the application of those skills. For example the provision of credit1 irrigation or
market outlets to small farmers is easier than the provision of land, farming skms
and confidence to the landless" Meaningful development (as opposed to welfare)
with the disabled and destitute is even more taxing.

Some res2archers into NGO work conclude that the NGO rhetoric of working with
the "poorest of the poor'' is overstated, that NGOs may be successful at reaching
poor people but have yet to demonstrate that they substantially benefit the
poorest. Judith Tendler, for example, undertook a major study on US NGOs,
based on 75 project evaluations. She concluded that beneficiaries were often in
the middle and upper ranges of the Income distribution and suggests that NGOs
have in fact moved away from a poverty focus over the years in their gradual
transition from relief and welfare schemes (which are carefully targeted) to
development focusing on those who have some assets or marketable skills.

Some would argue that NGOs should not oe over-anxious ':bout rea-:ning tlk·
very poorest. Though the trickle down theory is much discre <ted- the ric;1 b·-_:ng

3i
ver\1 SK}fft.H dt aP•r12X{;l(J \Vt::attn crt:~CHJCP- G':f:re tS to

t+;,,::: cen(,

,n
it ~tl

\Na 2

sdieme to encourage the use of ox-traction farms an area where such

~

technology was previously almost non- existent "Ond" breeds the oxen, trains
the animals and the farmers in ploughing competition which proved to be verv
popular. The spectators - farrners of all classes - enjoyed the day out and also
saw how easily new land cou!d be prepared for planting. After this many of the
poorest farmers ;ndud\ng ,Norrit~n oxen., and as a resu\t were able
double the area land is 1n plentiful supp!y this has
clearly been a very positive development buc it is unlikely that the very poorest
would have taken the piunge without having witnessed the positive experience of
their stronger neighbours.

More generally, research Institute has demonstrated that a large proportion of

vvea!th generated by development schemes remains in the project area. The
families who benefit tend to spend their increased income within the vH!age, so
strengthening local craft industries anj trade. Employment on the !and
1
increases. Local '·'beer' shcps open. Barbers potters and perhaps tailors set up
business, and other trades start to arrive. Unfortunately the same does not yet
ap~eai- to be the case in rnost African countries. New wealth tends to be spent
on consumer goods imported f; om often abroad and so the
rurai poorest benefit little by fort.mes of thos~ :.:,dghtly ;JELter off.
infrastructure is not sufficient\' estahlished to cater the ,::2man(:
stemming from economic growth.

.).L
 ~)E: :,~

rn ()02

sustainable development is securing effective citlzen's participation cledslon

~

making;;. This sentence sums up the central tenet of progressive NGOs.

Hovvever appealing the project, it is tike!y to come to iltt!e unless it is well
understood and desired by its intended beneficiaries. An NGO credit scheme, for
example, is likely to attract plenty of members, but unless the mechanisms for
raising capita!, allocation charging interest and recovering debts are
'J :1derstooc1 is to be durable.

A pmject, to be sustainable, rnust address pwbit::rns and aspirations identified by

the poor and must have a management and decision making structure in which
they have confidence. Th/s does not relegate the outsider" NGOs to an easy,
passive role. They must ensure that the discussions and conclusions reflect the
views of the poorest and less confident members of the community (particularly
the women), rather than those of tl~e traditionat community leaders. This entails
fostering a new cadre of leadership from among the poor \Nhich is likely to be
jealous resisted by the traditional leaders.

For exampfe the pe<1sant ie:iders of Samata a high!y effective and localized
pea{;ants rnoverrient In Pabna Bang!adesr, :c;·;e been beaten
-,,, ➔ ;y,, ,.,_
and have prisonr:d ·•\..l\.l •:_j

charge of rape, murder or lodged by the !ancllrn-ds,

': )
f\lGOs must to rrake sure are
C)nes rnust
.
'rho

rp,,

,:)tilt(

to can cannot be
up a

balance ls a fine one, support: which lend

for wedding and funeral celebrations though these may be the primary
reasons for borrowing from traditional moneylenders. NGO workers also have to
be mindful of where the real cornmitment and enthusiasm of potential new
community leaders Hes.

One pair of NGO v1orke(s a poor of a Copperbelt town in

Zambia painstakingly ;ecorded the concerns and vvishes of the poor. A !ist of
some 15 possible project targets was drawn up and then carefu!iy prioritized,
following a further series of meetings with the compound's residents. The whole
process took two years. Top of the list was water supplies, job creation, health
care and education, Bottom of the list was sports and recreation, In spite of this, .
the very first project undE:(lak:ing was the leveling of a piece of ground for a
footbail pitch and the provision of football kits. The NGO reaiized the expediency
of responding to a priority of a small group of lively, determined youths who
\Nere dearly emerging as community leaders. The compound now boasts its own
football team'. which plays a9a:nst others in the Copperbe!t league. This has no
doubt strengthened community spirit and he!ped combat the drabnes·s of life for
the urban poor and it has also increased the people's confidence the NGO,
. '
which has since gone on to orov,oe valuable help
identified as prior-ities.
 imoortant is

see co sodaHy

neutral course of is rn noth[rg. intervent\on a!te:rs povver balances.

NC:Js' business is, inescapably, pol!tlcaL It is about taking sides; siding vvlth the
poor against those who 1:::omprise the barriers to just development.

"Participation" a NGO term should be seen as tNo way lnvo!vement

execution, but also of the
fu:1d1i1g or intennedlary NGO in the poor's struggle for equity, human rights and
democracy.

How representative is such "partidpation" The term has been much devalued by
schemes such as Hararnbe in Kenya ;n which people are coerced by local
authorities to make a "voluntary" contribution to some community undertaking.
The poor may have litt:e desire for tile undertaking, for example the construction
of a new village ha!! but are expected to give some cash or their fabour in the
spirit of "participation". NGOs a!rnost a!! dalm to involve the poor in all aspects
of their projects, but this i--;1ay be overstated. One study by Tendler, of 75 US
NGO projects suggests that there is a confusion of tenns betvveen "participation"
and ·'decentralized, domlnated b\! NGO staff and local such as village
headmen. that the elite have a vested interest outcome of the i1rojects
a paterna!istic: 1 cemraHzed, approaci1 might be preferable to an e!ite-\ect
decentralized style. ract one of Tendier's most strikirr; findings was that

'1,-;
 p1Jorcst vvere

vvh

USAID, but it NGOs to look dose\y

c,peratlons

ai,

An advantage of the dose proximity many NGOs, particularly indigenous one,

1
have to the poor is "local knowledge' an understanding of the true nature of
poverty and of how macro trends or iocai!y planned large-scale initiatives are
!ikely to impact on the poor. They are also well placed to act as facilitators to
expose relevant decision makers to those best placed to articulate the concern of
the poor, to act m a ser:se as democracy. This ls a relatively
new and exciting task fo; most NGOs but unfortunately few engage in it
subse0dently as yet. It is 1ike\y that this \Nill become a more mainstream activity
in the future, demanding new partnerships between Southern grassroots
organizations and Northern advocacy NGOs.
 ,,, c:,~ r-~"',::..:i-\l rP/t; r ,:::::,; ~~r~ fn
Ji

'!t
i
2, ar~: l
iI
f
it
)
3. LS ?:C:
U,;
t"Yin
, , , ''--- I1

~
Civic Educaton Associatlon 1 e.tc. HovJ effective is the t
•-

0
__ -~artictpation of th~-~~~~ef~ci~rie:~~~~~~~_:~on making? __ __j
Innovation
NGOs are [ess subject to the straitjacket of development orthodoxy than are
official agencies and governments. Tr1eir staff norrna!ly have greater
experiment! adapt and attempt nevv approacnes. This ls partly
because the numbers involved in decision making are srna!ler, because !ocai
officials will probab!y not be as minutely involved, because scrutiny from outside
is slight, the consequences of failure are rnuch less, and because the ethos of
"vo!unteerism" encourages the individual to develop his or her ideas. This same
factor could be cited as a problem namely ''amateurism;(. It fosters idiosyncrasy,
lack of continuity and poor learning abilities. It should also be said that many
NGOs are far from innovative, but prefer to apply well-tested approaches to nevJ
constituencies.

A number of NGO innovations have crept into the official ~evelopment menu.
For exampie the pioneering work of the Ka:rn District Dair-; Co-operatives in the
1960s (Gujarat State 1 India) p!i::Ked a particular emph::::sis on women and
the landless, has growri into India-eJide Operation r=iood or White Revoiution
programmes, The provision credit to t!1 e very poor thf: Grameen Bank of

:n

, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _@!' ill! \' '

 pro. vides a for ctedit scf1ertr2s
even and demonsn-ated more

3(2 ---
'~ rn·'s
ftnencat1c1n y

'_:;.

1n sucn cases a or roie

a nevv idea, access
greater power and budgets to take notice, and then encouraging the vvldespread
adoption by others of the idea.

More controversial innovations, such as the use of law courts to demand justice
from unwilling governments or officials, are spreading rapidly but by their nature
are hkely to be restricted to the more rad1ca! end of the NGO spectrum. In India,
fnr example, environmental and tribal rights groups successfully used the courts
to hait the construction of a dam in Silent Vai!ey, Kera!a. And the Seif Employed
Women's Association of Ahmedabad used the Supreme Court to force the local
authorities to allow poor women hawkers to set up their sta!!s in the municipal
rnar!<et place.

In some sectors NGO innovations have been more successful than in others.
These include development projects for women, work with pastoralists, credit
schemes for the poor, primary health care, soi! and water conservation, income
generation programmes, functional iiteracy1 relief programmes, and work with
tribal and ethnic gruups. They have a!so proved effective as early warning agents
during the onset of drought, in describing problems associated with resettlement
schen\es and in pointing out conflicts of interest between national development
objectives and the weH being of indigenous people,

~,

?,8
 ----------~=-,,,,,_,,,~,,,.r=,=~m"-''''''~""'?W-~''A='""""'" ,.,,,,~ , . """""""'"''"''""""7""'•','\o/',;"""'·'"""""'·""'""""=,1"1~..Jt:Cii<\'i'&"'.'l!'~;~,~~Jf'/'%-;}'it,If'Jlt'.l','Uc"t'/,~

A common characteristic ls on a dose

and is t)enefit

However small projects benefit few peopfe. How can the precision of small scale
be retained while multiplying the outreach? One approach is to subdivided the
project into large numbers of relatively autonomous units. The Grameen Bank of
Bangladesh has been especially successful at this, retaining celis of just five
people vvho receiv2 crr:dit and decide vvhich of their members should get the first
loans. The cells are Hnked viBa1..ge,' district rea1onal
.., structures but the
basic grassroots decision-making Linit has stayed the same as the scheme has
expanded to 230,000 members.

A frequently stated disadvantage of small-scale actlvlties is the disproportionate

administrative costs when NGO si:::aff handle iarge numbers of small projects. But
it would be wrong to see grassroots NGO workers simpiy as administrators.
They also give advice and help to build confidence among poor communities.

One field worker employed by Oxfam in the mid 1980 to assist smaH groups in
the tribal belt of Gujarat, India, had a very !ow productivity if measured soie!y in
terms of funds disbursed" For exarnp!e he made severa1 visits to one village

where the tribal forest gatherers (adivasis) wanted he!o with marketing to
overcome their exploitation bv the local midd!ernan. The merchant Daid
govarnment-stipulated price for the leaves, nuts, fruit, spices and so on,
collected in the forests, but he used vveighted sca!es 1 res:.=:rving one set for

.,... .......
;t-t

J&Jt'.~A,:::W~t<,,;· ,, ./
 r-c in

0\"',(

:"~:)\... . . u\,\:

u 1e vJ(Jrk.er ovf:~r a

rea
~:JV

\.\Jf:'.(2 or
Oxfam g:3ve a grant for the scales a full :/f:25 and immediately the merchant had
to stop cheating. The tribals' rea! income man to operate the scales.

At one level the degree of staff time canrot be justified for such a small grant
but it had a powerful galvanlzing effect on the community. The group went on
to organize mvn successful scheme and acquired government
irrigation.

Commitment: of Staff
NGO staff are generally higrdy committed to their work because of widely shared
values and a belief in the soda! change rnission inllerent in their work. Th2y are
often prepared, therefor£\ to wo1 k long hours for !ow pay. The commitment is
often to the work rath2r than to ttie organization itself, particu!ady in the case of
Northern NGO programme staff.

As David Brown has observed, unlike a company V.Jhich produces things from raw
materials within the boundaries of the organization (in the ''core"), social change
organizations are involved !.ransforrnations outside, is 1 the core is at the
periphery. NGO staff c\osesi: to transformation are involved
nal consl:ituenues anc often relatively unintere:s. in the NGO itse:f
anc its oraaniz3i:ional effectiveness. unless it starts to irno2dc
__ , ) < own work.

40
 are

a11

ccJr'.10:: can c
r [0

to
co#eJgues at the pedphery -- col!e:agues who they are usual!y ab!e to choose for
themselves. It may be that experience and ldeas generated locally are more
vah1abk~ in determining a ioca!ly appropriate development strategy but thls
feature of NGOs tends to obstruct the evolution of a coherent approach to new
priorities - such as looking at the gender issues -- and to obstruct institutional
learning through the widespread of ideas proven to work in one part of

Committed staff also tend to h-:ive strong Ideas of their own which they are keen
to express. While it seems natura! for a northern NGO to adopt at home the
same principles of popular participation that it advocates overseasr this can lead
to extremely cumbersome and inappropriate decision-making. "Participation"
within a smaH group of people whose background and knowledge is roughly
similar and whose accountability is just to themselves is very different from
participation in a large organization employing diverse specializations and
cornp!ex and varied accountabiiities.

Naturally an organization of principled and committed vvorkers v'iH! function best

if staff feel respected and to. Where aH strong views push in the
same direction the sailing is , but when, as is there are tensions the<1
decision making cam suffer. Lengthy staff debates :~ad to consensus

41

' -'MW:ffVJ
 In cartlcioants ar-e ,...........
_\_)

own plans.
tS

extrerne

. '~
1,r•

Pmars of Weakness
\Nhen practice fails to !ive to the rhetoric, the state;J strengths start to
resemble v1eaknesses. In the ;,vords of Sheldon .Annis 3, a prominent American
arn!yst of NGO performance,

rn the face nf · smali scai,2" can rnere!y mean "inslgniflcant",

ca:1 ntt:.:z!n \ povve.-iess or "dlsconnected
1 0 1 1
'
1 can
mean "under Rnanced'' or "pcor quality", and "i1novative" can mean simply
·ten,porary" or "unsustainable".

An NGO may describe in its literature the goal of helping the poorest of the poor,
but in practice puts !ittle effort into targeting or sampling t.o ascertain whether
the benefits of its work are really the "poorest" or merely the "poor". It is as if to
state noble objectives is sufficient.

Nowhere is the gap bet\Neen rhetoric and practice starker than in the field of
women and development. NGOs \111i!l describe at length the importance of this
subject, however one (probabiy typical) analysis of NGOs practical work with

JAnnis, Sheldon. 'Can Smail<,cak: Devdop~ 1itn, be Lai gesca!e Policy?··, in: ~Viv!rl Development
tSupplcmem), vol. 15, ·Devdopmei1t Alternatives: The Challenge for NGOs' ((hi'crd; Pergarw1:, l 967)
-..
:\ ')
....,. ;
\.?<.JfH"'0r-:,;n
'· '"·, ,,
/Vt trlnhYl?n )4
\ __ ,.__.......... •... _ ~ : - ~ " ... t>~
;nrtirAhc~c
~t,1.......,-...... ...... 1-,__._.. r4r•J-,·,oc·+;..-
uv~~~--..Jl'\..,o....._,
1

not productive They concentrate on teaching sewing cooking

seerr!S most

an
ro!e for
\ , ,,--, -..-.,..,.. r ,,;
1,/IJ\,._;(: :Ci;

to 0

pots. In another Asian example, a trainlng programme for village women

concentrated on strengthening "traditional women's activities" such as health
care, child nutrition, family !aw, and sewing, but comp1etely failed to address
their active roie in agriculture, in spite of many reminders from the women
participants that this was their tru1y traditional activity. That NGOs often fail to
live to their fine rhetoric can be ascribed to thee following weaknesses.

The legitimacy Problem -

In many countries it is easy to set up an NGO. Someone who can write
convincingly in a major western langucge, and who knows the current donor
fashions stands a good chance of attracting funds. Even the most careful donor
frequently makes mistakes, and not all donors are careful.

While some funders wi!l support a project for many years, and thereby avoid
risk, others will o(l!y f:Jnd for a certain number of years. The latter see
themselves as 'talent spotters', finding new people with new ideas and backing
them. They encourage experimentation and dynamism. But they also !end a

,; Yudelman, Sal!y, ·Integration of\Vmnen intc, DevelopI~.ent Projects' b Same as above.

43

9111111111111111111llllllllllllllllllllllllllillllll!i!l!lll!!l!lll!a9,~f)B:,;m·v·•"'
faddish, temporary nature to the NGO sector, and can !ead to a 'supply-led
development' in which resources chase new ideas.

i,1creasing of NGO as we have seeny from

sources 1 and an increasing proportion of [s being channeled directly to the
southern NGO, by-passing the northern NGO. Some southern NGO workers
welcome this trend. They prefer to cortlnue relating to and trusted northern
NGO colleagues and let these be intermediaries for official agendes' funds 1
r21th2r than become exposed to the whims and pressures of those agencies
~

directly.

Very frequently, however, the official funding goes not to established NGOs but
to new organizations conforming to models defined by, and oriented to, priorities
chosen by the donors. This may be the case with the present expansion of
official funding for NGOs in Ghana under tile Programme of Action to Mitigate
the Socia! Costs of Adjustment. In such situations there is a danger of the public
sector corralling the voluntary sector, whether or not the services provided are
welcomed by the poor. This could not only deflect NGOs from their chosen
functions but it could bring the whole sector into disrepute.

Increasingly, official agencies are contracting NGOs to implement components of

their projects, rather than work with government departments. Southern
governments are understandably, becoming increasingly resentful about this.
They see the erosion of their sovereignty; the increasing execution of state
functions by staff who are -answerable not to tem but to foreign governments;
the diversion of some of their most skilled labour from government to 'non-
govemment' service; and the gradual take-over by foreign influence, culture and
values. The British government and public would react likevvise ifff say, there
were lavish Japanese funding for family planning services, with Japanese staff in
all key posts and oriented to a peculiarly Japanese approach to contraception,
-
..... ·......~

44
 NGO commuility a given often puts more energy into criticism of
staff

emphasis on criticism goes beyond healthy can foster isolationism

among NGOs -- exacerbated, no by the\r to compete for attention
resources.

leadership Problems
Gotd leadership is critical to the success of an NGO but NGO staff often resent
and impede strong leadership, David Brown - President of the Boston based
Institute for Development Research, identifies a leadershlp dilemma inherent in
the structure of NGOs, characterized by two distinct types of NGO leaders.

(a) Charismatic people of deep commitment and vision who lead

inspiration 1 and by their persorral qualities but who maintain an ill-defined
structure and tend to be somewhat dictatorial in decision making. These
are typically NGO founders.

(b) Leaders committed to participation, who share influence and functions

with other staff and who like decision making to be a collegial process,
within a tight management structure.

One writer by the name of Judith Tendier has demonstrated that a common
factor in many successful southern NGOs is charismatic leadership. However,
overwhelming demands are placed on the guru-like leaders, particularly during
periods of rapid grrnNth. The organizations revolve around them, tend to
stagnate rapidly when the leaders are away for more than ::i short period; are
prone to decay and die when leader moves on, be replicated; and are

45

iJEdF:!!"Y?:17{?':•,
likely to be fixed in their approach sometimes dogmatica\ly so, being only as
flexible and open to new ideas as their leader a!!ow,

The DNO styles of - charismatic or co!legia! - advantages

and disadvantages.

Though leadership is critical to the success NGOs usually attention is

to the development of leadership "'"''r'"'"'',,_, or to rnanagement training. once
:n post, leadership skills are rareiy fostered efficiently because most NGOs are
poor at delegation.

Leadership in northern NGOs tends to be of the collegial type, often due in part
to the staff's ideo!oglca! disdain for 'management' from the staff. An autocratic
style simply wouldn't work; the staff require participation, Decision-making
typically becomes rather cornrnittee bound and suffers as a result

When an otganization is being drowned by good ideas, when the paramount

problem is insufficient time and resources to take each deserving idea to fruition,
then the natural braking power committees can be a useful counter balance. This
however is rarely the problem, Usually the brake is more powerful than the
engine and this tends to stifle creativity. To handle creativity matters by
committee is like commissioning a committee to produce a work of art. It might
be appropriate for a committee to choose which painting to buy but never to
paint the picture.

This tendency to 'management by committee' is perhaps related to the 'structural

amateurism' of most northern NGOs. While comoanv
' . directors receive too
. oav,
. . it ;

is customary ( obligatory by law in the case of British charities) for voluntary

organizations to be answerable to bo3rds of trustee~ who receive no -,
46
remuneration whatsoever. is 9000 at one !eve! -- it volunt::iry
it ·experience
v~ u i<: K_,

NGO -
best brains on spedfic topics. Hov11e\1er this does not neces;adly
mean r0 ,-rJn

SC:'e nor
the programme staff, and mdeed atternpts tc so be seen 2s an
unwelcome intrusion, r.ow can such a body be exp(:':cted to make str2tegic
decisions as do a compari'/s board of directors? Yet its mC:n1bers may well be
much more personally accountal}le for the body's dz::clslons tran in the business
world. Under British charity lavv, trustees are persona\ly !!able for tnappro~riate
use of funds whereas co,npanv directors are a crime is
invc/ved.

Achieving the right balance between strong IEad2rship v-rhich ensures z.he
resolute pursuit of strong ide:as, and openness of style which ensures al! staff
feeHn9 properly valued, is the g"eatest management chdlenge for 1\/GOsr
pa1ticularly as they grew in size. It is a problem that f2-.N have cracked.

Staff Problems
The more non-governmsnta! UK: NGO the greater the probk:m of staffing. An
organization which works cfoseiy with government structures - both northern
and southern will prc;bably na;ntain a staff reward and even organizational
structure s:milar to that of the pubHc sector and indeed it is ccmmon for tr.ere to
be rc-".gu!ar exchange of slaff, particularly in southern NGOs. The staff tend to
'know their place\ see a dec3r ca,0.er structure in front of :hern 1 and be
Jsoiated from debates in otre1 secUons of th2 organization. i ~ey are also !ike\y
to be paid on a par with public scccor 'Nurkers. in the case :}f southern NCOs1

47

i&4¥filbln~?:':f:~?D:~;,","
pa1tlculai'ly in Africa, it is likely that pay be very much greater than
government workers - a subject considerable resentment governments,

the more 'non-governmental' organizatlons problems car; arise,

depending on the style of !eadersh p, Under charismatic 12adershlp staff often
have a weak position. There is a tendency to recruit staff who will follow orders
and be avJe of the !eacicr. AH ne\:\/ Ideas con1e the stng~e source
ieaders, who is given little stlmulati:;n or creative ideas by colleagues, In such
situatiQQs the NGO does not get full value from its staff1 neither is it likely to
present much of a career structure.

In collegial northern NGOs problems often arise from the ambiguous relationship
between staff and authority, Staff are recruited who are strongly committed,
However since 'the cause' may not be deady defined by the organization,
personal motivation may lead staff off different, poorly co-ordinated and
sometimes opposing directions., there will be numerous self-determined
objectives rather than an overall sense of mission. Staff may obstruct efforts of
the management to exert authority and will argue, with justification, that the
participatory environment and idEological satisfaction compensate for the
meager sala1y.

Northern NGOs are also ambivalent about decentralization. Investing authority in

programme staff encourages innovation and locally determined interventions but
it can lead to a loss of corporate identity, cliquishness and sometimes stagnation
in individual countries or regions. Programme staff may ldent(fy more with
counterparts in other northern and rnuthern NGOs working in that country than
with cclieagues in their own organization. This leads to a vveak identification with
the organization and a disregard for ce:itra!iy conceived reqt:,=:sts or instructions.
There is also a danger of a nepotistic pattern emerging which funding
decisions are made more on the basis of friendship and pe::;r pressure (making
~--

48
grants because it would look bad not to) than on the identifiable wishes of the

expatriate and local staff, where these

coexist m one . The NGO may be pursuing the laudable goal of shifting to
indigencus staff but the interim the quandary arises of vvhether or not to pay
at sarne rate, and if so, ·whether this should be at \ocai or
expatriate rate. The resolution might have three components to field staff's
salary; a spending component enough to support a reasonab!e !ifest:vie; a saving
componentiaid in the staff's national currency and calculated on the basis of
how much the average professional of comparable status might be expected to
save per annum, and a dislocation component to compensate for working away
from one's home country. The first component should be equal for expatriate
and ioca! staff, but the others wil! be different.

ACTIVITY: Questions for discussion

l. One of the innovations of NGOs is the practice letting the organization

of functions to remain small scale, e.g. Gramean Bakle of Bangladesh

operates a credit scheme hasi2d or. a "cell" of five members. How
effective is such an idea in the poverty reduction strategy of Zambia?
2. What functionai differences are there between small scale and large
scale NGOs in Zambia?
3. What are the strengths ::md weaknesses of NGOs in Zambia when
judged against a background of r·hetoric, legitimacy, leadership
prob!ems 1 staff and accountability?

.._._,,

49

'"' 4 &Sli®i~f\D-t;,P;·,
Project Design
Although some NGO projects are are
-Rrnrlho::,r! i:=Hi,-,t+ ....., ..,-s ,.'i
authors AC: _,,_, ,._ . . .~-;; ..._,._...._,.,.,,._i/ l ll UH\.,.,:;

have the commonest

11' Projects olten don't really benefit the poor; they focus on those easiest to
reach. In particular too little is nc,an,c OJ' vvomen _
® Decision-making tends to be dominated !oca! elites, there is often
real grassroots participation, especially of women in the planning and
design of projects.
• There are often not innovative, but extend a tried and tested service.
• They are of limited replicability, being locally specific in task and
approach, and being dependent on rare, charismatic leadership.
,.. Projects and often unsuccessful when they seek to introduce approaches
and values from a foreign environment (although some of the greatest
NGO successes also stem from such cross-fertilization). For example
attempts at developing conscientization and community animation
programmes in Africa along Latin American lines have largely been
disappointing.
• Projects tend to be disconnected, isolated and conceived in the absence of
a broad planning strategy. In particular an FAO study describes the
frequent failure of apparently innovative NGO projects when they are
conceived and developed outside of the context of any overall state
stracegy. It is common to find a plethora of projects in a country or region
which neither learn from each other nor attempt to co-ordinate their
efforts. Furthermore they are likely to have a total lack of relationship with
the state.
"' Often, little attention fs paid tc mak[ng pmjects sustainable/ either
economically or environmentally. They often collapse once funding ceases.

50
 e Project staff often have limited technical capacity and therefore technical
matters, such as maintenance equipment, are oilen neglected.

learning Disabilities
The subtleness NGO prograP.lmes indicates need
careful !earning through the experience both of the NGO and of others. reality
however ts th~s learning NGOs.

Isolation and rivalry ob:;truct the process of !earning from others. A resistance to
mon:toring and evaluation hampers learning from experience. And an
idiosyncratic programme approach coupled with high staff turnover leads to a
short-term institutional memory,

The documentation of experience is often irregular, subjective, and geared more

to fundraising than to institutional learning. What is viewed as important is field,
riot centralized, knowledge since it is the programme staff that tend to make the
operational decisions, not the headquarters staff. To do this they need
eyewitness assessments as to whether the project seems to be on the right
track, and the opinions of community leaders. Such things are difficult to
quantify and tabulate. This dynamic knovvledge is stored not in the papers with
charts and tables that are favoured by stereotypical H.Q. bur2aucrats but in the
programme staff's own memciry. The trouble is that this memory leaves when
the person does.

Since senior rogramme staff are free, and are often encouraged, to experiment
and pursue their own priorities, country programmes may transform
unrecognizably as staff change, This factor may be reducing r.ow as networks of
strong southern NGOs are increasingly defining the NGO development agenda
and as northern NGOs become more seasoned.

51
Progressive funders like to see their re\ciUor.ship vvith project leaders as one of
partnershi;-17,. is term is rnore
i~ttf.'.)'l'" -;}Y('.) ~'\.lf"."!il '),\ /,.)!"'",,,._, ,......,~-, /_-. ~i'v"C: •·
!c Ht::
,~,,,·.~-•.....,. "--' •'j ,·v'-•• ,_..,"""-"' ._ V,t\..., _,

to the are to
inequality insisting on independent monitoring evaluation.
app22Jr untrustirig, as already the southern partners are prone to complain about
the bureaucratic demanded
funders encourage partners self-evaluation the design
thei~projects but will not press for independent morntoring.

If there is iittle attention paid to serious analysis of project experience then there
is even less attention spared for impact studies or broader research. Few funding
NGOs will have any knowledge of projects where funding stopped five or ten
years ago. They probably will not even knovv whether tile proJect surviv2s, nor
whether there have been any lasting .benefits and lf so to vvhom. Such impact
studies are made all the more difficult as a result of weak monitoring and
evaluai::ion. The latter rareiy study nearby communlties not affected by the
project to provide a control or baseline data. Hence it is impossible, five or ten
years later, to do any accurate comparative research to detect lastlng benefits.

The paucity of research is not altogether the fault of NGO staff. The project work
of progressive NGOs often does not lend itself easily to monitoring. There are no
ready indices for 'popular participation', r,o convenient barometer to chart the
'raising of consciousness', and no comparative tables listing the degrees of
'empowerment'.

Official aid agencies, by ::ontrast1 produce volumes reports on monitoring and

research findings. The pressures \Vithin these agencies 2fre qu,ce different Those
who award their funds (governments, parliaments, and ultirnately the taxpayers)
do not have the same ready trust that characterizes the supporters of NCOs.

52
They are more to have a cynical suspicion that very little of the funds do
good whatsoever, Hence sober evaluation of NGO performance,
however ~~~.,~r• the some new

agencies have a mixed reputation place, tvlon\mring is show

U1at, at least sorne of the funds go achieving at !east some of the stated
ob3ectives. Offidai agencies also finance a s;mai! number very large
ptoJects, hence the instirution of a serious study of the project neither swaiiows
a disproportionate share of the project's resources nor dvJarfs project, As a
resuit,information on the state of the art in development projects, then, must be
drawn mainly from the research and evaluation outputs of !arger donors and
academic institutions rather than from !\JGOs, who may well 1 of course, be
practicing a different art

It is a weakness of the NGO sector that, in the words of Biswajit Sen, the
'survival of NGOs has become de-linked from their performance'. He argues that
the close relationship between articuiate NGO leaders and funding agencies and
the resource rich environment in whic.h NGOs work leads to an 'absence of
pressures for performance for the NGOs [which makes] self-evaluation of their
own work a non-priority area'.

A way forward which avoids many of the problems might be for the main
progressive northern NGOs to combine forces to fund six or eight southern based
research institutes. These institutes would be commissioned to conduct the
necessary evaluations and research. They could either be purpose-built or
existing bod;es expanded accordingly. Through they would not be able to
quantify the unquantifiable they would be well placed to make comparative
judgments on factors such as the degree of popular participation. They would
naturally have a geographical emphasis but also a sectoral sp::ciaiism. Hence the
Indian-based institute, for example, might specialize in stndying social action
groups and so be best placed to evaluate a Kenyan NGO whic;i such a focus.

51

fJ.l.'C<
 ,~

\. s.::·::~ rfV)re r:~ean

,ac:..::

t,J

iS

and large the things, It does not chai!enge the f:ffectiveness

projects supported but whether the funds go to where they are supposed to go.
The preoccupation with detecting the diversion of funds to the wrong purpose
inherently assumes that the lntended one ;s the rightpurpose.

effectiveness this 'trial by bankers-order' is rneasured not in terms

changes the well being of the poor, sfze of population helped, or by the
durability of the benefits, but in terms of the proportion of funds spent on
administration. The money can be thrown away but as long as not too many
people are employed to do so the NGO will not attract complaint.

The NGO may be accused of paying saiaries that are too high (particularly to the
Director) and of having too many staff, but there is little e,Jident public worry
about the danger of havlng incompetent, inexperienced or untrained staff in
charge off NGOs. In fact many NGOs handle mi!llc,ns of pounds annually, have
scores if not hundreds of staff, and shou!d be run at !east as professionally as a
comparably sized company, hospital or school.

NGO salaries should be imver than average 1 but when they fa1t too low then
orofess;or.a!ism slides. The reduced sa!a:y shoJ!d reflect the ': ;ycho!ogical pay1 ·
the opportunity staff havr' making a meaningful social con::··:bution person?!ly.
 greater ffJr are

tJn

{v-,..._
LU

kr•n1,yledn::::/
: ,,{-.....-1'<- t ~......._, -:-0,
r_v Ask
..,_,i {

auest1ons.
' The"] havi:': be acco:_mcble to their aovernment not ..,iust for the
'--'

increasing proportion ft_;nds tha: dedve from this source but aiso to comply
with the provision of accountancy iav-1s! charitv !a,N, not- for-profit regulations or
the equivalent. This accountabi'?ty is quite rigorous regarding the publicly-

contribute btit to prot,_"'cting the donor not the recipient

rnedia and /he 9er1era! pub!ic tends to on

the wrong things, as described above fvlutual '--•ccoLmtabil!ty between northern
and southern NGOs is unrealistic ,~iven the unequ'"'~l relationsr,. 1p in which the
northern organization chooses its southern partners in {:~e firs . And finally
accountability to tire NGO's own staff, who are certainly' m:.ei~ 1 be the sh3rpest

and most persistent criUcs, is incestuous. A.fter a!I it'.' is the ,::;ufcnnance of

the staff and the: appropriateness of their judgment for the NG[: must be

accountable.

Northern NGOs wou\d µ-cbably ben2m from more rigorous, constructiv,;: scrutiny
and perhaps they should this -:;y ma~ing rnore strenuous efforts to describe
to academics, develooment SIY::ciaH:sts and the gererai public exactly 'Nhat it is
that they do and UC i: 7 \fv'ay lo;:,,!
,C:..,t,_,.;
r'~·''· c~:,

about the quidir:o :Jrincio!es

,. J ' ~
t.o a diffusion of these :cleas to off1c1a1

agencies, southern ar-:,:i to the acadernic \,vodd,

-,
 '
r-~..... ··: ....... ;: ,,..,., ....., .,..., --. ""' .~./,---. ,,-, .·~ ...,~; <'-":)~ ;,-,:::\

-. ,~ -~.~\ •' '

·~\._.>'._'..)~-;

t() to C;[ tc)

(10Vv

the~udget which has been allocatet1 to

Agair, Yaansah (l 995) argues that from the point of view of the !aw 1
accountability is concerned with making NGOs ansvverab!e to host governments
and to the beneficiaries of tneir activities. He further notes that the concept,
accountability has no singte are at least three different
senses in which the wor-d 1 when discussing
NGO activities in the context of regulatory frameworks. The first is that NGOs
should be responsive to the interests of the community where they provide
services. Secondly, this would also mean that their activities should not seek to
underrn:ne the institutional structures of the host country and should reflect the
actual needs, as they are perceived by the recipient community. Finally, as has
been discussed, f\GOs must be flnancia!ly transparent, r:ot only with their
donors, but a\so with ':.r.e gov en iment of the country in which they work.
However objectionable such a requirement might appear to the NGO community,
is it entirely unreasonable for a gcvemment to ask for information on sources,
amounts and purposes of funds vvhk::h 2.re brought it1to a country?

Why a govemme;it be conccmed origin of funds"; What if

funds are cornlng from states are (rving to lne ; riem by supporbng
terrorism-✓ Governments also need to know how rnuch 111oney ;s in the system 1n
d,01;kc
,_., • .__,-._ ::l(\n,rinri::ire
"-"';-- .. f.~.,1;,..,,-'·' .... 1.-
r;"J(ir)i:-•l-:;~n1
, , ••.,,, • • .._ ... ..,,.., j
ooHriP<:
i-·· , • ._,,, __ ....., (V::i;:,nc:~h
\ ,s..,.,.·._;;,.,..,.._.,_, 1 QQc;, c:;~_.;4\
-..-.,, _;._..
__ ,.._,., - .;.

56
 ,·(::

·~
_). ff
ac ~untabte
1 are reasons 2re

Topic
NGOs are often chticai of governments and of foreign dose
contacts. These sentiments .are often reciprocated. As has been described,
however 1 NGOs cornprise a broad spectrum and such a generatization is
dange'.'"DUS.

Friendly coexistence between an Nc;o and a government occurs when the NGO
req1..iires of the government little mor-e than freed om to get on 1.,vith its
chosen task, does not seek to influence vvider ar2as of deve!opment p!arning
cp-;:j v~here its task 1s actuai!y r1ampered by government ~Ktions. ,A.
government 1s happy such a relationship it feels neither threatened

nor chaHenged, f'<GO s its ovm

objections. of the Public ,,,chnica! Innovation
. Goverr:rnent however,

S?
 oc\.~e~>:-.:, sorn(~

~,..::i. \ :~c\>veve~r ;_s,

! t<:)

ar: '-'

('\,-
•,_.It

;) /'\{~~

to NGO choose to keep

gcvemm2nt's vvay, or oppose the state outright. The government 1s uneasy
such \/GOs. On other hand they may well reco~1nize
of their projects indeed we:come the Foreign exchange they bring),
on the other see as trouble

NGOs are also governments as rt of problem --

controlled by the elite, biased towards 'First \i\Jorid solutions 11 corrupt and anti-
empowerrnent. rhis applies v1it1ether th2 regime is avrnNed!y right- or ieft-wing.
The former is characterized as exposing the poor to the injustices of intemationa!
cap:r:alism and to sacdficing their interests In the pursuit of economic growth. But
the state Capitalism of the Latter is sirnilar!y rejected as a political, (ather than an
economic, monopolization of power, expertise and technology to serve the
interests oF a few.

While not changing tneir analysis, many of these NGOs are beginning to change
their strategy for relating to state. This is not a symptom of vveakness - of
but of : tne discove,·v of
' . analysis, self-a~vareness
.

persuasiveness. Sharpened oolltlcal :::ir:a!ysis enab!es \::he :'iGOs see ho\,\1

various policies the state deliberately or inadvertent!y conf! 1ct with or faci!itatf::
ovvn deve\ooment objectives.

)½
 "'.~~~~';

;ing NGO

,
1ncrc~asea. persuasiveness
- ena b'J1es NGO to cowey i,-;essages from its political
and self-awareness a broade;· audience. The NGO !earns position
debates
. It ai~,o explores
swccessf u 1 p,oject approaches into offida! deveiopmem
partlcuiar it may seek to project lts posltive experience of
popufar partrclpaUon into efforts to democratize the institutions and development
processes of state itse 1L As these strengths extend the horizons of NGOs'
vision and they explore ways using their influence on a national scaie they
have three choices. They can oppose the state, cornpiement it, or reform it - but
tney cannot ignore it

Opposing the state would rnean using whatever channels are availabte to
frustrate any government pian which is negative for the poor. Thi$ rnay mean
oHpnizing protests, usln(J courts to challenge official declslons, joining forces
eiot!tica! ·!a;- rnove:ments suc 11 as trade unions to
o: \i'i~desptead use media and

Ut1(Jfficial con1murdcaticn1 chan.t1eis

_) \)
 v-/0:- :<:
.) Sl.rCt~ E~3

r;

? ' fe ~ ' ...., e:r 't

f•.n

so <no1e

R~orming the state would mean more deliberate with government

departments with a view to helping those departments improve the services they
provide. The NGO would position [tse!f not so much 2s a co-producer but as a
co-director of these services 1 not taking responsibility for actual service delivery,
but helping to strengthen the existing systems. Typically the NGO would provide
appropriate training, heip process, demonstrate how
services can be strengthened .~ estab!isr-ilng iocal committees -
and introduce problem-solving techniques. It would also vigorously challenge the
state to implement policies that are posibve for the poor.

These approaches are very different in style but all can be effective, as a
growing bank of experience testifies. Even 'bad' governments have 'good'
departments with which NGOs can vvork. For example in Ethiopia it is difficult to
work with the mainstream Ministry of Agriculture 1 but the Peasant Association
departrnent1 and the Village Water Supply department both co-operate well with
NGOs. f'\!most no government ls so bad that it resolutely refuses to help the
poor. The government of Pinochet in Chile had an atrocious h·uman rights record
but it was quite progressi 11e in response to NGOs on the baby foods issue,
i:1troduc1ng rei;1ulations aggressive markc:dng pi (·;,:tices and giving
considerable resources to promoting a return to breast feedin9.

60
 i,~\},.C

<:Z

sectors - each share

~

being influenced other.

Gow.:rmnents dearly have a tremendous capacity to do harm and to hamper self-

help efforts (as indeed does the business sector) but they are part of the reality
ignore. Often the do is spite
a ~ , (Jr a

Strategic NGOs might attack the lacks but at same time articulate a dear,
tvorkebie a!ternative.

The degree to which NGOs choose to and are able to influence governments
depends greatly on the social political context of the particu!ar country. Rajesh
Tandon helpfully describes three categories of regimes which afford very
different environments for NGOs.

1. Military and other dictatorships (such as China 1 Philippines under President

1'"1arcos, Chile under Genera! Pinochet, Bangladesh unqer President
Ershad): in such countrles 1 especialiy those which had had !iberai or
de:nocrat[c NGOs are ilkely side vvltr-1 the poHticai
opposftion oc -- parbes and trade ur:ic:1s are ban:-ied - to
be the opposition. This the political space' characterized much of
NGO sector Latin /\merica until the outbreak c: der,1ocracy. Ofren

6i
 t~'1e~

an
dS l

a !S

Law Adrninlstrators of Bangladesh (then) lntroduced the most progressive

l2gisiation on pharmaceut1c2!s of all Th!rd World nations. In response to effective
campaigning by Bangladesh and northern NGOs, the government legislated to
res:rain pharmaceutical marketing to a narrow range of priority preparations,
based on the World Health Orqanization 1s Essential Drug Ust. The government
appointed ZafruHah Cl1ovvdhury, the director of the leading r:ational NGO worklng
on the issue, to the comrnittee set up to review the entire drug situation of the
country. The drug companies (many of which are transnational corporations)
vvere furious and sought to discredit the legislation by impugning the motives
and information of the NGOs, but the government - which received considerable
international acclaim for its tough stance, stood firm. Activists in the campaign
have pointed out that, paradoxically 1 such a victory might not have been as easy
in a poor but liberal democracy. The manufacturers would have many
opportunities to head off or bv pass such legisiation, both through buying-off
politicians and civil se,vants 1 and through bombarding officials and health
vvorkers with 'relevant inforrnation' to confuse the decision-making process.
President Ershad wante·d the blli to ,;Jo through and was ab!e to put his foot
down"

2.. Other single party states, usuaHy Marxist oriented such as Kampuchea,
Cuba, Burma, and many other countries: typicr1!!y the government or the
ri, ;-~ , (l:,SU1<0eJ
rarq,; .""',. . _ . T)'
C' i, ,.Jr. l r-, ~rl
\·c..l,Q~dl,., 1
'
·~
·----()p
2'\...·-S '?,,,,.,[\
d0
r·q:::.c -~
,t,_s_.C:
 so
::,,; ,y-i

(Jr n.crt- e)nste.nce

''·- :.J.··':/ \•C

on or as case of the Zimbabwe

government's to stamp out repression in Matabe!e!and. Gender and
environmental issues may aiso be neglected. NGOs can play an important
ro!e in such situations, espedaHy where the party leadership becomes
divorced from the grassroots. The NGO can be supportive of the pro-poor
a criticaL If it is seen as becoming too critica!
;t is to cut by the govemrnent, but if it is quiescent it simp!y
becomes absorbed by the Parly.

3. Libera! democracies: here the situation is most complex. NGOs may play
mixed roles -- c.o!!ab0rating governments on specific programmes 1
challenging in other areas, Governments may appear to be pro-poorr use
populist slogans 1 :md sometimes take progressive action, but are usually
more attentive to the vested interest groups on \''i'hose support they
depend. W!1ere the signa!s are mixed in this way the state may not be
monolithic. The Indian government, for example 1 gives more attention to
industrialization and modernization than to poverty eradication, yet
specfic governrnent departments, such as the National Wastelands
D,::veiooment Boardr a progresslve reputation.

,,
 ,:1nS\J\tf;;: ~

<.:ac: use

3 \Jse ~

~ . ' !
nat1ona1 sca.e.
In which category of regimes is the sector strongest Explain
your answer.

~c
y
Lt
.i.
.J an NGO sympathy a
or

Uke the business sector, NGOs find it easier to survive 1n Hbera1 democracies and
may even be offered he!p and considerable endorsement by the state. India's
seventh 5--year plan, for example, explicitly recognizes the role of voluntary
organizations and earmarks 1.5 billion rupees for direct funding. Ove(
endorsement can bring as many problems as ostracism. 3 NGOs in India are wary
that their independence_. and perhaps eventualiy their right to receive funds from

abroad, might be in jeopardy.

Many !iDeral governments are co-opting NGO ieaders on to varlous official bodies
or commissions. This also is a double-edged swmd. On the one hand i[ gives an
.ti,t:-h r,....,-......, , ;?,., .,..-... .ri u ;,...• ,.,._ . . . . t--. ......,,-
lrr:;:;ortant IT\ for NGO opErdons. Or~ vt, ~ei... i ~Cf iO tl Ced t
¥"">
uUn lnc :'.::)! !C:H p /"\ i.__,_,...,
cGsc

of NGO criticism and occupy of rnuch best NG{) talent.

Ube;·al democracies tend to respond NGO criticlsm in thn22": ways: they harass

f,21. :1~u1de~ . · t\(:(Js ~:t St: ,·h \:::~:·\ - ii~ H·',>!'!d s,·1.:L !5,
... t....... ;,.,J ,"-.., /\ ''
\ ' , '- , ~,
 as

;0 rs ~5·

Other ~tors influence tne possibHltles and nature of NGO-government

intei-action. Indigei :ous NGOs tend to be more numerous and strong where the
government is efficiently structured and confident A government which feels
secure is more likely to be willing to experiment vvith the new operational
methods suggested by NGOs. Conversely poor 1 repressive regimes will be most
likely the oppmtunit:es for NGOs, Even the most reactionary
the north and south) are coming to see NGOs as effic[ent
deUverers of services and conduits fer popular participation.

Political and economic ractors influence the government-NGO relationship, but so

do cultural factors. Countries which are western in outlook, in particu\ar those
with strong tertiary educational systems, are likely to have ,;trong NGO sectors.
Hence Kenya and Bangladesh have mDre diverse NGO bases (Zambia could also
be lnduded).

To summarise, the rational for attempting to influence state policies and services
1s dear. This avenue provides possibilities both to improve the efficiency and
equity of government services! and to democratize state functions. Ignoring such
opportunit:es may render disconnected and its ,2xperience wasted.
NGOs are: for this rcasun beginning to magnify their in1patt by stepping
into the polltica! and governmental arena.
This 'scaling-up' can be achieved by setting out to challenge state functions
through popular rnobillzation, by moulding the NGO operations to fill the gaps
and inject ideas of equity into the government structures, or by working in
collaboration with state authorities to reform and improve the government
sei'\lices provided. These approaches are very different in nature.

Risks are inevitably posed for the NGO. Their profile will become higher. Potential
conflicts with governments become greater. And they may find it difficult to
remain in such intimate contact with their popular base. What is more, tension
between NGOs may grow if they move at different paces or along different
paths .

.-------------- ------ -- ~
I ACTIVITY: Questions for discussion
I :
i 1. Of late northern governments have opted to channel their developmental

I resources (funds) th:-ough NGOs rather than through host governments. ,

! Do you think that NGOs are more likely to bring about development than
governments? Give reasons for your answer.
I
I
l 2. What kind of relationship exists between the Zambian government and
l___ NGOs? How can you account for this relationship?

Topic 5: NGOs Impact in the South

Scaling-up
An NGO typically starts a programme in a particular country to respond to a
specific need. This may be rural credit, adult literacy, and empowerment of the
landless, economic programmes for women or any of a hundred other options, or
it could be ;:m integrated programme with a range of diverse Dbjectives.

66
 s 3 ('; nnor
2S 3 cnean
con1e mean ne1.N
or crushing bureaucracy.

! ne success is can \;ve a

be content to continue with the same

perpetuity when it is setf-evident that its contribution is not more than a drop
the ocean-' hmvever exce!lent a drop it may be, Th2 ans-..\•er might have four
components.

l. an NGO can act to the

problem of poverty; how it can mobiHze the human 1 financial and other
resources to make that a sustainable intervention; and how it can create
an appropriate structure for managing that intervention, for ensuring
participation and accourttabi!ity to the people.

2. Popular concerns. What the poor perceive their problems to be, their
weaknesses in being able to resolve these problems, and their aspirations.
How these weaknesses might be overcome and the aspirations achieved
through wel!-constrncted grassroots action,

l. Local policy .::,1"" 1ri1~r,r,,"',

,._ l'V,i V/,,. ... ""'nf'
t'-,_/fi.. µ,Cl''
~ ·~ii rhe ,,...,,.,..,gram"")es
Li r--"~u L Ile ~~ n,'"' 1icie•::
p.,,11~ l .._, a·'"'a' 11a1.uc
~~ v~..;,

pursued, or indeed not pursued, by local and national government

authorities exacerbate the problems of poverty. \1\/hat windows of
opportunity exist for generati.ng changes in policies that would improv2
the situation.

Y'\ I
"f
 4. International policy envilonment. How external factors, particularly those
generated by policies and actions of northern governments and the.
international institutions they control, exacerbate the problem of poverty.
What windows of opportunity exist for generating changes in policies that
would improve the situation.

The first three pathways are what can be termed 'scaling-up'. Scaling-up

-
therefore1 falls into three types of activity:

l. Project replication. Using experience of success and failures both to

increase the outreach of the NGO's own programme and to help others
establish similar programmes.

2. Building grassroots movements. Increasing support for grassroots

organizations who are campaigning for social change. Using the NGO's
iocal knowledge and local contacts to help foster widespread networks
articulating popular concerns and striving for changes in systems which
oppress the poor.

3. Influencing policy reforrn. Influencing change in the local policies and

practices of governments and official aid agencies, so as to create an
environment more favourable to the poor and to grassroots development.
Using experience of the conflict between the NGO's objectives and
government action of the local or national level to lever for appropriate
changes in policies, institutions and laws which would reduce the conflict.

68
The three activities are not rnutualry exclusive, nor are the dividing lines dear.
The peculiar scaling-up apprnach adopted must fit vvith the culture of the NGO in
,,,..,,, •i~.("'·Hr-..:.-·, J\
\.-fU,_..J•... tU! t~ f-\ heaiUH.:are organization which is cri(icai of
government services is to be placed to mobilize mass demands for
reforms, but it is likely to be taken seriously if it offers to help retrain
government health workers so they can deliver a service more appropriate to the
poor.

The'. scajj/lg-up route must also be appropriate to the country [n question.

Project replication is most logical where the following conditions tend to apply:

I,; NGO resources are plentiful;

" Institutions and governrnent are ~weak but relatively benig:1, or the
government is autocratic and there is no realistic prospect for influencing
policy;

• There is little evident popular perception of exploitation by local elites, or

the poor are fearful of voicing their discontent;

• There is strong community leadership by members of the traditional elite

(e.g. tribal chiefs).

In such situations, and good examples are Ethiopia and Zambia, it is unlikely that
the rJfficial bodies could be persuaded to provide the services desired or to
facilitate the NGO's task of providing these services. There b little alternative to
scaling-up the NGO's operations (this could include encouraging official aid
agencies to adopt a similar pragmatic approach and ev~n h,2 diffusion of NGO

i;q
ideas to specific government departments). rt ls also un!ikelv that attempts to
rnobl!ize grassroots action vvil! be effective in the short run, vvhich is not to say
that conscientization activities should not be devised.

Building grassroots movements is apt where the following conditions apply:

• Poverty is greatly exacerbated by traditional social factors ( e.g. landlords,

moneylenders);

• Poverty is greatly exacerbated by institutional factors (e.g. corrupt

bureaucracies, repressive legislation)~

·lf> There is a strong perception of exploitation and injustice among the

leaders of the poor;

• There are potential allies of grassroots organizations (e.g. trade unions,

opposition political parties);

• There is at least limited scope for free assembly of poor people outside of
official structures.

In such situations, it is unlikely that desired reforms will result from rational
persuasion alone; expression of mass unrest and publidty embarrassing to the
authoritie:S are also required, Traditional NGO project activitie? have q limited
roie being in themselves a 'bad-aid' response to a deeper set of problems,

Influencing policy reform is signaled ·where the follpwing ( ondltions apply:

70
 ill Effective and participatory development is possible but hampered by
; ri.r~;t-, it-;,,.....,<-:> ·:--f -... ~
H iO:l,H.t.•.h.. ~VI tU1 Vt practices.

• The authorities respect the contribution of NGOs;

" The authorities are strong and have some liberal traditions or the
authorities are weak, haphazard and pliant;

• The poor welcome efforts to seek reforms;

• The NGOs have or can acquire the competence needed· for policy
dialogue.

Where such conditions apply, for example India, the NGO is likely to achieve
much more by influencing reforms than by its operational programmes. A tactic
of dialogue and persuasion rather than confrontation is most likely to secure the
desired reform.

The three approaches require of the NGO different skills and cultures which may
not easily ccexist within the same organization. However, there are a number of
necessary skills, and disciplines which are common to all the scaling-up
strategies. They can be summarized as the 'Five Ls'.

listening - to allies but also to our critics, to understand their position; -

learning - improving our research/evaluation capacity relating both to our

programmes and to the 'macro' context;

linking - building netwfwks and broad coalitions for effectin(J change;

71
-
t•
1

i
:(
'.i
~
leadership - in particu!ar fostering leadership from among the poor;

Lobbying - to influence those with access too much greater clout and
resources.

New Opportunities for NGOs

The new era of single issue campaign and of popular movements affords NGOs a
,IJla,

new role. They need no longer remain the 'carers' of societies, they can become
the 'changers'. Their legitimacy depends on their popular base, and on their
potential through influence with governments or sheer might to become agents
of social change. As conduits for local democracy they have the potential to
strengthen civil society, and to force institutions to be more accountable and
more responsive to the needs of ordinary people. In this \•vay they can
strengthen the development process and improve the efficiency of governments,
as pioneerir_q NGOs are demonstrating.

Northern NGOs can assist their Southern partners by mounting campaigns in

thelr home countries to persuade the offic.ial aid agencies to change their policies
so as to support the grassroots cause. Such advocacy is beginning to have real
effect, as is recognized by Joseph Wheeler, Chairperson of the OECD's
Development Assistance Committee, in his foreword to a recent OECD book on
NGOs.

The voluntary sector has frequently articulated new policy in~ights reflecting
changes which have been taking place in our societies. Ask an aid administrator
why he or she has increased the emphasis on environmental concerns, or
women in development, or population. Ask where the pressure comes from for
more emphasis on reaching the poor, or on health and education. The answer is

.,,
7 "-
thJt thc:;c me the concerns uf our populalions expressed Lhrough our politicai
processes and usually polnted up by what we ca.11 our NGOs.

A similar recognition of the advocacy role of NGOs mode by officials of the World
Bank. For example Michael Cernea writes

Internatio~l NGOs like Oxfam (UK), survival International and others have
repeatedly signaled to the Bank cases when resettlement under Bank-financed
projects does not proceed satisfactorily ... ; such signals have at many times
triggered additional Bank efforts and have led to improvements 1n the standards
and conditions of resettlement... Discussions between NGOs and the World
Bank on policy issues regardingr in partic.uiar, poverty issues and environment,
have contributed to the evolution Df Wortd Bank policies in the context of
structural adjustments programmes ... 5

r. ,:_e; lie.a, tVJH;naeJ, i\'lrUS ll/1/1 LOU;/ Ur,cf:'/opr:,e:u (Washington D.C.: World Bank. l 988)

73
•-ff•--------·-----------,
ACTIVITY: Questions for discussion
1. Many liberal governments are co-opting NGO leaders on to various
official bodies or commissions. Criticize or espouse the morality of this
move.
2. An increase in he n:Jmber of NGOs is indicative of a country's effective
and efficient governmental administration. Is this above statement
true or false? Explain your answer.
3. Channeling developmental funds through NGOs by Northern
governments rather than through host governments only weakens
collaboration between government and NGOs. Do you subscribe to
this assertion?
4. What is meant by 'scaling up' and what are the three types of activity
into which it is defined?
5. Influencing reforms rather than operating programmes is the best form
of scaling up activities. What is your opinion? Justify it.
6. Discuss ways in which Northern NGOs can help their Southern pa1tners
to put pressure on the G-8 nation's cancel Africa's debt and fight for
fair trade.

'- n-------
T he Bank's Senior Vice President for Operations, Moeen Qureshi, also gave
recognition of the influencing role of NGOs in his speech to the Washington
Chapter of the Society for International Development.

In just the last few years, NGO influence on Bank policies has grown. Some
NGOs joined with UNICZEF and other international agencies in expressing concern
that IMF and Bank supported adjustment programmes in the early 1980s did not
adequately attend to poverty concerns. Environmental NGOs have helped us
become more keenly aware of natural resource and resettlement issues. I am
grateful to them for that, even though their criticism has sorn 12times beef~ harsh.

74
~ - ~ - - - · -... , ~ ....,. , -~,- ...:,,..,,,_,..__..___.,+. .. .,:.,. ...-'"~". .,....::,.,...... ·--.-'" ---~~.-~~·,,.-~::............,. .........;......, - , , . ~ , - -.. ~~._,...--- ~--•"""'"':·•~~i---,..

Some NGOs can give policy makers important insights about the effects
adjustment policies have on poor people and suggest alternatives.

More significant that the increase in offidal funding is the enhanced credibility
NGOs command from official aid agencies.

New Dangers
An NGO may find it flattering to have its views and collaboration sought by the
mainstream development agencies such as the World Bank. and bilateral aid
agencies, but within new coliaboration lurk dangers as wei! as opportunities.
NGOs are usually asked to help improve the design or working of particular
components of existing projects rather than to design the projects themselves,
let alone to help recast the objectives of the official aid agencies. NGOs are
expected to lend their much praised qualities of efficiency, flexibility, enthusiasm,
and low cost, but not tr-c:ir distinctive analysis of what should be done or how.
There is a danger, in accepting such invitations, that the NGOs' own, legitimate
agendas becomes swept away.

This is not to argue that NGOs should resist opportunities to work with
governments and official aid agencies. But NGOs should approach these
invitations as potential negotiating opportunities to forward their vision of
development.
1•

The critical question is wheU1f;r the overall project in hand is in the interests of
the poor. The NGO might well see that it can do a good job making· a project
component more efficient, perhaps rnore socially responsive, but it must guard
against strengthening a system which works against the poor. Much will depend
on who controls the system so devised. If the NGO is able to use its influence to
give greater power to the poor in deteTmining how the syster ,·, operatesf then its
involvement is likely to be positive.

1- 75

~~. ~
I
j

Such issues are the source of considerable tension within the NGO community,
Fe; exarnp!e some grassroots NGOs working with people who are to be displaced
by the construction of tt1e Narmada Dam in India have agreed to help the
authorities implement an effective resettlement programme. They have been
hotly criticized by other NGOs who are opposing the construction of the dam
itself because of the environmental damage it may cause and the particular style
of development it reflects. There ls no simple soiution. Developing countries
•
might need hydroelectric power and large-scale irrigation potential and perhaps
!arge dams are a valid way of achieving these in certain circumstances. In the
case in point so much money has already been invested in construction that it is
unlikely that the dam will be stopped. If this is the case then it is clearly better
that there is a proper resettiement scheme. But other NGOs still believe that it is
possible to ha!t construction altogether. _In their view popular opposition is
defused by some of the NGOs joining with the project authorities in planning
resettlement.

NGOs with a genuine grassroots constituency are often understandably reluctant

to involve themselves in official aid projects.

This can reflect a laudable faithfulness to their mission statements, but it can
also be short sighted.

Sma!f-scale projects, islands of relative prosperity, by themselves will not

eliminate poverty. Changes in po!icies 1 attitudes! institutions a~d customs are
required, and properly constructed governmental schE::nes may have more
prospect of achieving these changes than NGO projects. , ,.ficia! aid agencies
who are sincere in wanting to pursue such changes 1.tvill ne(,:d to work with
popular structures if they are to have access to the local knowledge they need.
They should not be spurned by the very NGOs who urged thc11 to take this new,

76
people-oriented approach and who can act as the channel for this local
knowledge. Indeed the NGOs should encourage the search for opportunities to
convey lessons fron1 the grcissroots to the official developrnent planners. It must
also be remembered that the more r2!uctant grassroots NGOs are to involve
themselves in official aid projects, the faster will be the evolution of less
scrupulous NGOs oriented to official funding; opportunities. Funding will
gradually shi~ from the former to the latter and the former may be increasingly
marginalized.

-
Grassroots NGOs should, with considerab!e urgency, draw up a code of conduct
for mutual collaboration and persuade official aid agencies to accept it. Elements
of such a code should require the agency to:

10 Inform the host country government of the agency's wish to explore

involving NGOs as project collaborators. -Make it clear that this coutd be a
condition of funding.

2. Use experienced Northern and National l'JGOs to advise on appropriate

indigenous NGOs who would be potential partners. An important criteria
in the selection would be the track record the Southern or Northern NGO
has of involvement with poor communities.

3. Invite potential collaborators to participate in the project preparation

missions, so that they have an opportunity to influence the overall shapes
of the project ( and not just of those components which the NGO is. invited
to implement).

4. When collaboratioP is agreed, rlelegate authority to the NGO to evolve

policy and project design so that the NGO is not seen just as a

'77
 subcontractor but is enabled to introduce changes in the project in
response to changing iocai needs.

5. Recognize that the NGO remains accountable first and foremost to its own
constituency, rather than to the agency, that its contribution to the project
is in keeping with the NGO's own style of participation and grassroots
oernocracy.

b. Make available to the NGO ai! project information relevant to its social or
environmental impact or to the project components for which the NGO is
responsible.

7. Recognize that the NGO would require the freedom to make available to
local populations such project information that has a direct bearing on
their lives. Allow the NGO to establish channels for direct consultation
with poor communities who are affected by the project and encourage
other project staff to take part in these consultations when invited to do
so by the NGO.

The negotiation of such a compact between NGOs and official aid agencies is of
vital importance if the formers wishes to retain its identity and the latter wishes
to bring in the real advantages of the NGO sector and is not just out to cut costs.
The urgency of this task is heightened by the rapidly increasingly numbers of "
government inspired NGOs " or "government-oriented NGOs" (the GINGOs and
.
GONGOs). In many developing countries government ministers or civil servants
are establishing their own organizations without popular bases, and calling them
NGOs because they know of the likelihood of receiving funds from Northern
governments. In Mali, for example, it is reported that a plethora of so-called
NGOs has been set up by state ernpioyees who have been la 1d off by as a result
of structural adjustment programmes .

78
 ~ a111r .z • ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

ACTIVI1Y: Questions for cUscuss,on

1. Discuss the new dangers NGOs may face vvhen collaborating with
mainstrearn development 11gencies?

2. Give reasons as to why NGOs with a grassroots agenda are often

reluctant to involve themselves in official aid projects"?

Creating space for "influencing"

NGOs rarely give top priority to developing the skills of scaling-up.
The preoccupation with "doing" leaves insufficient space fo.r "influencing". In
most cases the management structure and reporting requirements re-affirm the
p;-oject emphasis deflect staff from attending to the wider role of the
organization. In part because of the need to satisfy their donors, NGOs will
require detailed reports on project performance indicating how much money has
been spent, providing statistics and comparing actual progress with stated
objectives. But few require reports on how co:1temporary events outside the
project, such as government policy shifts, economic recession, or environmental
degradation affect the project objectives or performance, or how they impact on
the poor as the poor themselves see it.

The project is scrutinized but not the context in which it is located. This is

4• symptomatic of the disease of "projectitis". The sufferer views the Third World
as being an archipelago, the islands are the NGO projects and there is little in
between worthy of note. In fact the sufferer probably also takes little notice of
islands beionging to different clusters, the projects supported by other NGOs.

The opportunity to work with government agencies sometimes helps NGOs

collaborate among themselves. Preparations for he social investment fund in
Guatemala, for example, called for NGOs to help develop criteria for government

•
79
'
l
funding of NGOs and, in the process, to share experience among themselves
about what types of project are working. This led to co-ordination in the
development of NGO strategic plans in the socia! sectors.

The deep-rooted confidence in their chosen project approach is an inevitable

aspect of the courage of conviction necessary for successful innovation. But it is
a bl~sing as well as a curse. The principal strength of NGOs lie in their capacity
to experiment, to try out new approaches on a modest scale which may in time
become well-accepted development techniques or afford useful lesson for others.
This requires staff who are original thinkers, prepared to take risks, but confident
in their own judgment. But these very same qualities make it very difficult for
such staff to collaborate with others whose views are fractionally different from
their own.

... one of the most serious barriers to expanding the development

roles of NGOs may be the difficulties they face in working with one
another. Jealousies among them are often intense, and efforts at
collaboration all too often break down into internecine warfare that
paralyses efforts to work together towards the achieving of shares
purposes. Ironically, it at times seems easier for NGOs to work
with governments than with other NGOs.

These tendencies towards isolation may be reinforced by the messages received

from the NGOs headquarters or from funding agencies. These messages tend to
encourage idiosyncrasy by creating a folkwhero mythology about field staff and
project leaders.

Northern NGOs are looking for "good copy". The "Robin Hood" or "David fighting
Goliath 11 images are ideal ones to convey to their supporters. And policies of
decentralization give free reign for experimentation anrl for c:-1;:mging Pstrlhlic;hprl

80
programmes. To question decentralization in most NGOs is almost sacrilegious.
Like kindness, it is seen as a self-evident virtue. But to decentralize without limit
is to atomize.

An NGO has a responsibility to set operational norms based on experience

garnered from across its operation and from throughout it history. NGOs which
neglect the tasks of sca!ing-up are wasting their taf(;nt . and experience.
Conver~ly those organizations which have evolved beyond a narrow project
focus have frequently demonstrated the immense contribution they can make
towards reshaping development and towards amplifying the voice of the poor.

The three following chapters give an account of the three very different
approaches to scaling-up, The intention is not to present an exhaustive
handbook on the theory and practice of the art. It is an attempt to distil some
lessons out of a very rich base of experience generated by a range of
organizations who have all had some success in moving, along varied paths, to a
wider, "influencing" role. 1

ACTIVITY: Questions for discussion

1. What do you understand by the term "projectitis"?

2. Outline some of the benefits NGOs derive from collaborating with one
another?

Project Replication
Almost everyone is keen to see successful NGO projects replicated. The poor
communities who benefit, NGO staff and broads, the funding partners, official aid
agencies and Southern governments all welcome the extension of tried and
tested approaches. The likely exceptions are local government officials who fear

81
being supplanted, and sometimes as in the case of Bangladesh opposition
political parties, some of which see Northern NGOs as agents of imperialism.

With such rare breadth of support it may sound perverse to suggest that
replication may not be the best approach. But it is important to remember that
what works like a charm in one specific situation may be lack-lustre in others.
The key to the successful project is almost invariably found at the helm.

Sadly such leaders are few and far between, and no formula exists for replicating
them. They can be drawn fro other sectors, from government service, academia,
business and elsewhere but this may be at the expense of depleting those
sectors which are also important for the healthy development of the country.

One study of NGOs in Kenya and Niger conducted ln 1979 concluded that
reproducing carbon copies of successful NGO projects is not a realistic option,
not a defensible use of scarce human and material resources, and it is unlikely to
produce a comparable impact in most of the new settings where it is attempted.
This is probably an over-pessimistic conclusion, but it provides an important
caution.

Whether or not a strategy of replication is appropriate depends on the following

questions. Is there an adequate reservoir of the human required? Will the
approach work as well elsewhere? Can a " loss of flair" in the original project be
guarded against? Would it be better to multiply the number of like projects, by
helping others to develop the NGO's approach rather than incre~se the size of
the "parent project"? In particular can official aid agencies and government
departments be persuaded to develop some of the approaches? Can the
increased impact required be achieved better through other scaling-up
approaches?

82
;I
·1
. i.

N practice, of course rather than a conscious decision to scale-up the project

grows originally, with success being the motive force. News of this success
inspires others to try a simHar approach. Replication happeiis rather more than
it ls planned.

Experience of successes and failures provides a number of pointers which can

help to make replication more successful.

ACTIVITY: Questions for discussion

1. "The key to a successful project is almcst invariably at the helm."
Discuss this statement.
2. When is pr-eject rE:plication most logical?
=~illll.i:'n-....m. w:: lltllCII rtami=ll:.:.JlU.4\l&'l'JX rr ~

Recruitment, Training and apprenticeship

One of the main blocks to successful project growth and replication is finding the
right people, and giving them the right training. Rarely however, is sufficient
attention paid to such tasks.

Where NGOs have developed an active recruitment and training strategy it has
more than paid off. A good example is provided by BRAC of Bangladeshi which
started in 1972 during the country's struggle for independence from Pakistan. It
is :iow of the largest NGOs in tne Third World, employing over 2000 staff under
the charismatic leadership of Fazle Abed. It operates projects in primary health
care, education, credit, adult literacy and other fields and is widely respected as
being a highly effective organization. For example its credit schemes have a
· repayment record of over 95 percent.

:~: '!'

. 83
.."'
i

1.,,
Abed realized in its early days that BRAC was a steep growth curve and that it
I

would rapidly come to need skiiied and dedicated local leaders and middle
managers. Rather than depend on the orthodox job markr< and employ, when
i:he time came, staff with proven track records in management (but who would in
all likelihood be new to the voluntary ethos), Abed took the imaginative decision
to "home-grow,, his own management cadre of highest caliber. He actively
sought out the most promising Bangladeshi graduates and offered them a "moral
contlilid:". The recruits were expected to do a period of fieldwork, during which
time they would learn about rural realities and about BRAC's way of working. By
this time the organization would have grown and in all probability they would be
promoted into the new management posts which would be needed. As a result
of this forward-looking strategy BRAC now has a widely respected management
base. It is true that the middle and junior lever BRAC has a very high staff
turnover, but this has had a positive sp\n~off. A large proportion of the most
effective NGOs in Bangladeshi have been set up by people who once worked for
BRAC.

Another Bangladeshi organization, Proshika, has helped strengthen the country's

NGO sector by running a special training center which provides excellent courses
for both staff and group activists. This is offered as a service to all NGOs in the
country. The training covers all aspects of NGO vyork, from mobilization
techniques and legal rights to agriculture and functional literacy.

An important factor which grassroots NGOs must be sensitive to is that when

they help develop leaders from among the poor, they are exposing those leaders
to considerable personal risk. Even an activity which on the surface appears
quite neutral is likely to be viewed by local elites as an erosion of their power
base and they are likely to retaliate. Part of the training giv~~n should be about
the nature of the threats that can be expected and how to respond to them.

84
 ACrIVITY: Questions for discussion

1. Explain why in project replication little attention is given to recruiting

the right people?

2. Give examples to support the notion that active recruitment and

training is beneficial to NGOs.

~lanagement Capacity
The etho~f most NGOs is idealistic, bottom-up, democratic, flexible, responsive
and anti-elite. This can easily manifest itself as anti-management. Staff tend to
be demotivated by, and resentful ofr hierarchy and bureaucracy within their own
organization. However without strong management the organization is likely to
drift and under-achieve. NGO project staff are likely to be highly motivated in
early years by a charismatic leade1·. As the prnject grows the leader may or may
not seek to recruit 2 micidle-management cadre. If they do so it may be
resented by those staff who now perceive themselves to be one-removed from
the leadership; factionalism may evolve centred around the middle-managers. If
they do not, then overwhelming demands are placed on the leader by the
project's growth, the leadership becomes autocratic and reluctant to take on new
ideas. Either course confronts difficulties as is described by David Brown. The
first course faces risks of ideological disintegration, the latter of ideological
conformity.

There is no easy path, but it ls clear that the organization which fails _to evolve
management capacity as it grows is not sustainable. Too much depends on one
person and a crisis is inevitable when, for whatever reason, he or she is no
longer around. The difficulties of installing a management structure can be
reduced by a very clear statement of the organization's mission, with authority
devolved as much as possible so that a wide range of people share management

85
responsibi11ty for achiev:ng that rnission, Brown suggests six prionties for
building up capacity:

(a) Rer1ew the organizc1tior/::. visions and vaiues, Though potent1a11y

explosi'✓e it is iniportant to arrive at common ground through
'ideolog,ca! negotiations'.

(b) Formulate strategic concepts whict1 posit.ion the or~12nization with

respect to external constituencies and provide a framework for
assessing new Qpportunities.

( c) Build consensus CY1 the orqanization's plans, incluc1ing the

agr
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(d) Empower the ;e.adership. leaders musts have authority to rnake

decisions, btit t~:e.y must 2lso delegate
- ac;thorlt-,-. so that their time
is free for strategic is'.sues.

(e) Match the org .~nizar.lon to the agreerJ tasks and values.

(f) Emphasiz2 leam:ng frorn doing! especially fro:·n mistakes. A good

deai of re-Jnvcnting the whe1::I' can be avoide~ 1 by having written
manuals deschbing pitxedw·es for dei":;ling with routine tasks.

Some NGOs, such as the Aqa Kh2n Foundati 1)n (AKF), are realizing that they
have much to learn from tbc business sector. Management training in financial
matters, organizational stru.~tures, tearn bLJilding, interpersonal skills, personnel
rnanz.gement, negotiation., objective setting and strategic plan ,ing all have
relevance to the Nc;o 1,;odn,
1

zt
 AKF believe that the government from each other. By workin{l more closely
together and. overcoming the deep-rooted suspicions each holds of the other
they can all contribute towards creating an "enabling envlronrnent" in which
public policy, entrepreneurship and social innovation all work together towards
eradication of poverty.,:. , · ,. · ·

Through careful application of management techniques, AKF has achieved a

good reputation in its operation of very large--scale projects. In Northern
Pakistan, for example, AKF ·has recently expanded its Rural Support Programme
(AKSP) from three districts to four. The cost of this expansion was $2.8 million.
The Brrtish Overseas Development Adrninistration was impresseij by the local
institution building demonstrated by the project and so took the unprecedented
step of agreeing to fund the undertaking not out of its normal budget for NGOs
but out of its bilateral aid programme.

Such a progression is only possible where the government is sympathetic to both

donor and local NGO. The World Bank's evaluation department has done two
evaluations of AKSP its first studies of non-Bank projects. aoth were positive
about the very successful participatory approach to rural development, but the
second asked questions about the programme's sustainability.

,,

ACTIVITY: Question for discussion

1. Why is it essential for any NGO to have strong management capacity? ·

; st

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Decentralization
There is an inevitable conflict between the principles of strong leadership and
decentra!ization when it comes to the setting of objectives. On the one hand,,
these should, through popular participation, respond to the priorities the poor
themselves set, but on the other hand the benefit of experience and·
experimentation elsewhere should not be wasted. The balance indicated is to
have clearly defined operational norms (such as the procedures and structures

-
for rural credit schemes), but to facilitate local decision-making within this
framework on all other matters such as the allocation of credit and the choice of
other activities the group wishes to undertake.

One NGO which enjoys international acclaim for such an approach is the
Grameen Bank of Bangladesh. This NGO was set up in 1976 with support from
the Central Bank. It is quite rigid in its approach, starting with the formation of
rural groups of five people who are all committed to making regular savings.
They decide for themselves which two members get loans at the outset. No-one -
else in the group can get a loan until the first tvvo start making their weekly
repayments. This ensures peer-pressure not to default and consequently"
repayment records are extremely high (97 percent compared with 27 percent for
private banks). Six groups comprises a Centre which meets weekly to discuss
wider affairs of the village, typically tree planting, latrine digging, and fighting
the dowry system. Some 50 to 60 groups comprises a Branch which decides on
the allocation of revolving loans between the Centres.

As of July 1990 there were 735 Branches and 770,693 members (90°/o of whom
were women) throughout 17,746 villages. Member's savings totaled US $17.54
million and loans $22.4 million. The most common activities for which loans
were made include paddy huskinq and dairyinq for women, and purchasing rice ·
'.'.

for resale for men. A limitation of the scheme is that servicing the" groups
requires ti level of staff time that a conventional bank might r:.,Jt support.
 ACTIVITY: Questions for discussion

1. What do you understand by the term "decentralization?"

2. Why is it necessary for NGOs to decentralize

Networking

-
Building up strong networks of similar NGOs and projects can help to overcome
any sense of isolation and provide useful for learning skills and exchanging
techniques. This linkage can be vertical (in which local organizations are tied
into regional federations and are required to follow the rules of that federation)
or horizontal (in which the member organizations all operate on the same level
and retain their autonomy). A survey of 150 micro-level case studies conducted
1981 showed that NGOs linked vertically performed better than isolated
organizations, but that those linked horizontally fared even better. The same
survey showed that in general NGOs linked to government did worst of all,
through there were some outstanding successes in this category.

The conclusion that can be drawn is that projects can indeed benefit from
learning from each other, but it is best to avoid the loss of local autonomy.
'Ne~orking allows for a mutual ·learning of each other's techniques but just as
important is the mutual support and motivation afforded.

Some international NGOs are now beginning to fund the exchange of project
readers between different programmes in different counL'ies to encourage a
wider diffusion of NGO experience. Similarly, international workshops on specific
topics which bring together grassroots workers from many different countries are
proving highly effective. For example Oxfam organized an ',l\rid LJnds 'v'Voikshop'
in 1987 which focused on techniques of arresting desertification, arid land

rl
--------------itfff,fo;t}<J;{i'A;",.,,.;,-
L,

agriculture, working with pa~toralists ,and other important NGO innovations from
a wide variety of countries. ,-'i ' •

ACTIVITIY: Questions for discussion

1. Explain why NGOs :inked vertically are saiq to perform better than
those that are isolated?
._______...,_______________.,.__,,..1e.... wr•· a: - • • I

Planning VVithdr;,,w,a/
One of thf= first things and NGO should con~ider when starNng a ne~ project is
how it might end. it.s
'
invp[vemer.t. It is pot realistic t9.
' . ,, ,;
expectto;be leading or
funding the ventyre for ever more and, to be. S1:JStai11a_o:fe, the .~rojectc\ must
become ·self-running and self-financing. Such foresight is·· relatively rare,
unfortunately.

One NGO·· which has managed to become self-supporting is Jamkhed in

Maharashtrp.. State,. I.ndjc1. This record is particularly
, .
hnp..tessive .~ina:e' it, is in the
'· .

health sector,. in which local mobilization of resourcesis

. . Jietoriously{;diff:k:ult,:Ihis
, ... .,,_ '

NGO was.startec;i in 1971 by a husband

.
,,
and wife team. Its.:original focus. W?!S
. .
the ,- ' '' '

mass application of high-tecll curative medicine (partic4l?rlyr catar~at ~pperations

through 'eye-camps') but rapidly switched to - nutrition :atid other (:preventive
' ,, ' ! ; ' . . - '~ . , )

health-care .approaches. The local people welcomed. ~nd:trd.lsted the:services

provided an~ were prepared to contribute a small sum .pf,mon·ey ·eqel, rnonth to
pay for the modest costs of the scheme. The· NGO now.,off~rs· c0mprehensive
rural health c~r~,to. mqre than 175 villages, with a total 'popul~tlon ,of,mqrerthan
200,000, peopl~.,
.
.
:--•"'·r;
·,·
I

90
,-·---------
1 ACTIVITY: Questions for discussion
-· ---·-·------·--· ---

II 1. What are the main advantages of Planning Withdrawai in and NGO?

2. Wt1at do you understand by the term scaling-up? Discuss the three types
of activities into which scaling-up falls. I
I 3. What are the necessary skills and disciplines which are common to all the \

l___ scaling-up_strategies? ________ \

()'")
✓-

f,i.,MhA/'?'
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counrries have accepted this a4vt<:e·, -by rhe World Rank's own
a9mission there is little li,ght at the end of the tunnd. In spit~ of
sever-al years of "structural adjustment" and painful rescheduling of
loans, u no country has significantly improved its debt ratios" . 14 As
a result the social pains and tensions continue to rise, as the growing
number of food riots, mass pmtests against "IMF austerity", and
coup attempts make clear.
Developmer;t is in nisis, and .:be clamour fol' a new approach
is growing, a new approa:ch based on a broader definition of
development.
At its broadest, "development" means quite simply "improving
* the society". Since the society comprises no more than the people
it is made up of, development therefore means "enahling people to
achieve their aspirations". This may appear a rather tauto!Qgkal
argument, but it has three virtues. FtrStly, it indicates the fun<la-
mental necessity to build any development model on a foundation
of democratic processes. How el-s·e can we judge what people's
a1.¢:rations are? Secondly, it reveals the need to make pofitieal
cl\erces""' it goes without saying timt it is impo.;'Sible to satisfy all
. &e,~bidons of all the people all oftbe ri-n,ie. Chcices mim·be made
h:,.- ~ who wieM the power abcmt wh'k.~ groups' aspir~tioos
~-e· to· ~e prfor,i,tized. And thirdly, kspeak~ Qcf "'enabling" ~
n:,~
t..• ,. •..i:
,~v-rw.ng "
- h'm1:tng
. ~1. ..i~•J-1_
mat trti.e ~V1C1ulffll{'J.tt •
ts ..:I
uene "-·
.,,7
• ~..nflt to people, that dev~ment might be co-oodinat-ed
hf·•·~rnments and. 0f.ficial .aid agencies in th&r ,provision
. ~ : i ~ , infrastruame,; services, ai'I& suptmrt, hut ·'ihllt it is
'• .•,.,,.. ,1e peqple rhem~lves-.
·-- 'h •

'f' is oot a ~111 to ·be ~ c t •(},.t me:as,metl

f. It is a ~ , : a f·~ ,:cshu. ··
their ew,i de&unies·••~ .th·
_ up in the ~ij-the ~
- ~ to achieve dris,gea:t

Justde~ment
~Jim d""elopment" is about at:t~ the. -w~-'c!ff $~'·•
cau~ pmtetty. This demands d1,at - ~ , t • · · ·
justi~ be ,_a0u1tt ob~. al<w ···· -
g,ci'iWfh. lt•~\Jst 004¼rl¢• - ~~'
· ..L,~..;_;,.:;:.....~,.:..,j:,,k,.... · · '~•11~
p,t'GVe ""~· .,,...~I.IVl,,,.,..,.;1, ,.pt~~·..-,
2:6

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 DEMOCRAcY AND DEVELOPMENT

and by enabling them to acquire the assets and to improve the

productivity of those assets. lt must combat vulnerability and
isolation. It must ensure the sustainable use of natural resources
and combat exploitation, particularly the oppression of women.
And it must make the institutions of society accountable to the
people.
A developing country has three principal assets. It has its eco~
nomic resources - such as its investments, infrastructure and foreign
exchange reserves, its natur2! resources and its human re~urces.
Unless the country nurtures and uses each one of those assets to
full potential then it will fall behind. Any country, for example,
which is obliged to dt".ain its economic resources in order to service
its debts will inevitably turn to plundering its natural resources and
its human resources.
Just development, therefore, comprises the foilowing ingredients,
some of which are more familiar to orthodox development thinking
than the others:

Development of infrastrnctt-tre
Early offic:al aid strategies concentrated on infrastructUre in the be-
lief that roads, railways; ports, telecommunications, power stations
and similar schemes would open up the country to future trade
and prosperity. Such hopes have rarely born fruit. Infrastructure .
may make development possible but it doesn't make development.
Conversely, development, poverty alleviation and famine relief are ·
severely hampered where infrastructure is weak or unreliable.
In rural areas there is usually a marked correlation between .
vulnerability to hunger and proximity to roads or other commu~· ,
·"nicaticms channels. Just development, therefore, must concelltrate
infrastructural development on the needs of the most vulnerable
...
areas. ·~r ,,
.,·
(
Economic growth i

Though sometimes overlooked by voluntary organizations, ec;;.:l:.

nomic growth is vital for financing the improvements in the quality? . ·.. ·
of life desired by the people~ But it is only one component .of/;:
development, as walls are only one component of a building.: A ;.
house without windows or doors becomes a prison, so too a society · ·
based solely on growth becomes an economic machine.
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 DF.MOCRATJZING DEVELOPMENT

Poverty alleviation
People are the most precious resource of any country. There is
little prospect for any country which allows its people to remain
hungry, side or m~educated. The provision of health care, schooling,
good nutrition and safe water may initially be expensive welfare
measures, but in the long run, by improving the strength of the
workforce, they are a wise use of resources. As Winston Churchill
once said "There is no finer investment for any community than
putting milk into babies".

Equity
While some governments and official .tid agencies have recognized
the importance of poverty alleviation, few pay more than lip service
to the concept of equity. The former, though important in terms of
human capital, is generally seen as the compassionate action of a
civilized regime with funds to spare. The latter implies a shift in the
development model so as to invest in the poorer members of society
through the redistribution of wealth and incomes. The former is a
strategy of investing the surplus resources a nation generates i_nto
human capital. The latter is a strategy of generating surplus in a
different way.
Equity is not charity. It should be pursued because the nation
as a whole runs more efficiently and becomes better off when its
productive assets are broadly distributed. Countries as politically
diverse as China, Japan, Cuba~ South Korea and Finland have
demonstrated this. In particular the land reform programmes of
the Sou.:h East Asian examples have proved to be remarkably
srrong foundations for rapid social and economic improvements.
The success of these countries and the other so called "Tigers" of
the region (though their human rights records may leave much to be
desired) is usually ascribed to their pursuit of "export-led growth"
though it would be more· accurate to describe their strategy as
"equity-led growth".
Gender equity is also of critical importance. In most countries
women comprise at least half the workforce. Any development
strategy which fails to recognize this is guilty or denying this
sector the chance to achieve its full potential. This is not only
bad for women, it is bad for the country. Similar arguments
can be made about tht: need for- equity between nations. It is
desirable from a moral stand point, but it is .£1.ecessary if we
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 DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT

are to achieve an economically healthy and a politically stable

world.

Natural-resource base protection

Just development must attend to future generations and to the
health of the planet, not just to immediate needs. Hence it is es-
sential that the natural-resource base is used wisely and sustainably.
To achieve growth by the depletion of non-renewable resources is
• as artificial as the achievement of short-term government spending
plans by the printing of money. Both are forms of borrowing from
the future. The latte,, as is well know. leads to economic inflation.
The former leads to "environmental inflation". It creates a legacy
of environmental debt, which is a debt that cannot be written off.
Environmentalism and economic growth are not natural enemies.
To replace environm~ntaily unfriendly prodqcts and lifestyles will
be costly and so growth - if it is the right kind - is important. 1n a
production process there are two sources of "value add".:d" -labour
and nature. The right kind <;>f growth is .that which maximizes
the former contribution and ensures that the latter is derived at
a sustainable rate.

Democracy
In any geogi.·aphic region, those countries where people are more
free to speak out, to associate in political parties or trade unions,
where there is a free press, where governments are open and
freely elected, and where institutions of the state are publidy
accountable tend to fare bett~r and to have more contented
populations. The rapid transformations in Eastern Europe, Latin ·
America and elsewhere illuscrate: this. Governance is improved by
strong civil society.
The Soviet Union has distinguished between political democra<.-1'
(Glasnost) and economic democracy (Perestroika). It has been
more energetic in pursuing the forme.r, hut by 1.990 realized the
unsustainabi!ity of political changes without parallel economic
reforms. !n many African countries, conversely, there have been ma-
jor economic reforms, often urged by IMF/World Bank structural
adjustment programmes, but· without political liberalization. The
World Bank has observed that African countries such as Botswana
and Mauritius which are democratic are also more economically
successful.
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 DFMOCRATJZING DEVELOPMENT

Just development calls for an effective pannership of the gov-

ernment and the people, and this is only possible through the
achievement of democracy in its broadest sense.

Social justice
For a sustainable and trusting partnership between governments
and the people to be possible, full human rights must be guaran-
teed. Social justice also demands the eradication of ail forms of
discrimination, whether on grounds of race, creed, tribe or sex.
A country whete social justice is impaired is a counrry divided. Its
human assets will not be used to their full potential. Factionalism
will lead to wasteful tension and fighting. And offended parties will
re~.nt and perhaps seek to undermine the state.
•
The DEPENDS approach
'The ingredien1:s of just development combh1e to make the acronym
DEPENDS: -

Deveiopment of infrastructure
Economic growth
Poverty alleviation
Equity
Natural-resource base protection
Democracy
Social justice.

The DEPENDS approach is as appropriate for governments, for the

World Bank and for other official aid ager.des as it is for NGOs,
and tt is even more important that they adhere to it. Of course
subscribing to a formula of words in itself is useless. Development
agentjes should obja."tively assess whether their actions match up to
those words.
The World Bank has deepened its concern for pove,rty issues
in recent years. Its 1990 World Development Report stresses the·
importance of "labour-enriching growth", increasing investments
in the social sectors and agriculture. 15 It cenainly embraces poverty
alleviation, and more recently the protection of the environment
alongside economic growth among its principal aims. However,
30

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 DE.MOCRA<..'Y AND DEVELOPMENT

although it recognizes the importance of equity, the Bank is hesitant

to discuss income and land distribution, and refuses to put issues of
human rigbcs and. democracJ on its agenda, since these are sten as
the internal affairs of sovereign nations.
It is true that no aid agency can impose these things, but there are
many ways in which they can promote them, even if not altogether
welcomed by the government in question.
A donor can require a certain degree of popular participation and
consultation in the design of projects, and withhold funding if these
are blocked. 'Where governments steadfastly refuse to move in the
direction of just development, aid could be cut off and diverted to
use elsewhere, for exarnpie through the country's NGOs.
It is time to rethink the meaning of sovereignty. As Larry
Diamond argues

True sovereignty resides not with the regime in control of the

state of a country, but with its people, and when the people
dearly indicate their rejection of the ruling regime, democratic
governments and organisations are justified in offering them
assistance rto realise their political aspirations. This is not a
carte blanche for democrades to overthrow regimes they foar
or dislikes but rather an argument for popular legitimacy as the
fount of sovereignty, and for reading unambiguous signals of
the illegitimacy or ddegitimation of an authoritarian regime
as due cause for no longer ac,~ording it tlic full respect and
privileges of sovereignty.
{in Korten t6)

Korten develops this theme to argue that international co-operation

should be predicated on,

the basic human right of the people of any country to organise,

to access information, to undertake development activities of.
their own choosing on their own initiativ~, to express views
on policies, to participate in any international exchange and
to · receive financial and other assistance from foreign and 1·
'i,:
domestic contributors. . •. > -t>
(in Kortent7)(A_'

Sovereignty is inseparable from democracy. There is, of cour~e,.·-~ ·

1
danger in this argument, who determines the democracy "litmus
31

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 DEMOCRATIZING DEVELOPMENT

test"? Wrongly applied it could be a slippery slope towards a new

form of colonialism.
Two currem: trends in international affairs add nuance to the
debate about sovereignty.
First is the dawning realization that we live in an interdependent
world. National boundaries are not hermetic seals. What goes
on in one country can have profound effects on others. Acid
rain, ozone depletion, the spread of AIDS and drugs, increasing
numbers of refugees from war or repression, fall-out from nuclear
accidents, and the ramifica.:,ons of religious funda."nentalism are
all illustrations of tlus. Spaceship Earth has many cabins. The
occupants of each must allow fellow passengers in other cabins
a modicum of privacy, but not a carte blancbe to damage the ·
craft itself. The greatest challenge of any state leader today is to
forge a consensus on the minimum rules of "good planet-keeping"
necessary for the survival of our ailing spaceship. This involves
an environmencal code of conduct but it also involves agreement
on minimum standards of human rights and democracy, and
procedures for eroding the maldistribution of wealth, both between
individuals and nations. Northern governments can expect limited
co-operabon from the South regarding their new-found concern for
tropical rainforests and other environmental issues unless they are
prepared to compromise on the debt• crisis and other economic
injustkes. Leaders of vision wi.ll realize that real progress will
only be made by major concessions all round. The North has
squandered its own environment and consumes perhaps So per
cent of the world's resources. It ii; in nc position to give lessons to
the South about ecology. Concessions desired will only be won if the
North gives ground on the issues the South feels to be most pressing.
Likewise tbe North is likely to scorn talk of wealth maldistribution
between nations from presidents who lord over the most polarized
economies in the world.
Second is the trend in development assistance towards con~ition-
ality. Though structural adjustment has been hotly criticized by
voluntary organizations it is, in at least one respect, a step forward.
Conventional development aid has largely failed the poor, partly
because the projects supported tend to serve the interests of a
minority, but chiefly because they fail to address the political ·
causes of maidevelopment. Structural adjustment lending wades
in where other aid fears -to tread - inducements to make reforms
which the donors believe correct maldevelopment. Unfortunately
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