Blanquerna–Ramon Llull University, School of Communications and International Relations,

Degree in International Relations.

IO. Core Class - Onno Seroo

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.
Core Class.
nyam

Monday, 9th January, 2023

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Outline

● When talking about international organizations it is important to know its structure (in order
to understand the decision making process, and how it works), its mandate, its members
(states, CSO,…)

● International organizations are not the only players → regional organizations, civil society
organizations…

The UN Human Rights Committee is the body of independent experts that monitors implementation
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by its States parties. It continues to strive
to ensure all the civil and political rights guaranteed by the Covenant can be enjoyed in full and
without discrimination, by all people.

Block 1: International Organizations and Analysis

Lesson 1: Setting stage

1.1 A FIRST APPROACH TO IO

What is an international organization?

An organization with an international membership, scope (they tackle different issues, related to
culture, language, economy, health, …) or presence. Including companies, NGOs, …

Who are members of IO?

State and non-state actors, depending on the type of organization, it is the type of member who
determines the type of organization.

What purpose do IO have?

The purpose serves to connect the different members, in order to discuss different issues, bridging
gaps, with the purpose of encouraging peace and security, economic development, etc…

What is their role in current day governance?

In recent decades their role in world politics and the scope of their activities has greatly increased.
- The functions and the role of these organizations have been changing since the needs of the
world change along with the situation and the current events that affect the world.

They are in an extraordinary period of transition and there is renewed academic interest towards IOs.

Types of International Organization

1. Intergovernmental Organizations (IGO)

2. International NGO
3. Multinational Companies (MNC)
4. International Regimes

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1.1.1. Intergovernmental Organizations

- IGOs are formal institutions comprised primarily of sovereign states (referred to as member
states), or of other intergovernmental organization (i.e. UN, EU, NATO, IMF, G8)

- They can be multi or general-purpose organizations, taking up any international issue, such
as the UN. The they have a very wide set of purposes

- They can also have a narrow mandate focusing on a specific economic, political, social or
military issue. i.e. ILO, WHO

- Spillover → cooperation in one issue area may affect another issue area.
- i.e. EU → after WWII, it started off as a specific Economic Community Charcoal and
Steel and that affected different countries since by the means of collaboration allowed
them to bring together those countries that were in war during WWII. This made
them think that maybe they could also collaborate in other feels → end up creating
the EU

- Membership can be open to all actors (UN), or limited by some objective criteria (i.e. EU,
NATO conditionality)
- Limitations can be on the regional criteria or on other kinds of criteria like for
example in the case of the EU → not everyone can be a member since there are
different criterias that a country has to have (Copenhagen criteria, 1992 → shaped
through the ‘liberal democracy’ perspective).

1.1.2. International NGOs

(1) CHARACTERISTICS.

- Essentially non-profit, private organizations that engage in a variety of international

activities (i.e. Amnesty International, Greenpeace, International Committee for Red Cross,
Doctors without Borders, …)

- Types of NGOs (alternative names): independent sector, volunteer sector, civil society,
grassroots organizations, transnational social movement organizations, private voluntary
organizations, self-help organizations and non-state actors.

- Financing – Mostly membership dues charitable contributions and private sourcing.

- they can have public funding, but mostly they should not have a specific/dominant
source of finance if they want to keep their independence,

NGO vs. Social Movement → NGOs have a kind of a legal identity (board, funding charter,
secretariat…), while social movements do not bother so much in having a legal representation.

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(2) NGOs ROLE IN THE WORLD POLITICS.

- Information gathering with people on the ground, interaction with other NGOs, IGOs, and
MNCs.

- Participate in international politics by:

- defining goals,
- providing information, and
- giving expert advice.

- Carrying out and monitoring policies of states and IGOs.

- Pressure governments and IGOs through direct and indirect lobbying. Private interactions
involving various transactions to bring together groups and individuals. (lobby).

- NGOs are instrumental in setting international norms and executing international policy.
i.e. after WWII NGOs were promoting human rights in order to avoid a similar situation
already lived.

- There are so many different NGOs tackling different issues such as climate change, poverty.

1.1.3. Multinational Companies.

Characteristics

- Profit firms that have subsidiaries in one or more countries and engage in transnational
production activities involving movement of goods and services across national boundaries
(i.e.: Wal-Mart, McDonalds, GeneralMotors..)

- Some large multilateral corporations, given their large economic influence as well as their
extensive financial resources, can have a powerful influence in local economies as well as
the world economy and play an important role in international relations and
globalization.

- In addition to efforts by multinational corporations to affect governments, there is much

government action intended to affect corporate behavior. The threat of nationalization
(forcing a company to sell its local assets to the government or to other local nationals) or
changes in local business laws and regulations can limit a multinational’s power.

Subcategories

- MNCs involved in Agriculture and extractive industries, including gas and oil
explorations. I.e. British Petroleum (BP), Statoil (Norwegian), Exxon (US), Amoco (US)
- MNCs involved in the provision of financial services, such as multinational banks, brokers
and insurance companies.
- MNCs as industrial corporations involved in manufacture of goods (Motorola, Sony, …)
- Pharmaceuticals (covid), Tech companies

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MNC CHALLENGES FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE. WHO RULES THE WORLD?

Currently, some multinational companies are bigger than some economies in the world, and this
questions who is really ruling the world.

In the last years, Big Tech companies have increased a lot, and there has been an issue in the
European Commission, since they were criticizing Google for the abuse of market dominance.
Leading to Google tax in European countries. In Sept. 14, 2022, the European court sentenced Google
to pay €4.1 billion fine.

Inside an international organization, such as the EU, you have different organs (EP, ECJ, EC), it tries
to achieve a BoP between the different organs inside the international organization. This phenomenon
has been exemplified with the Google issue.

Global Supply Chains their economic, social, cultural and environmental impact.
- The supply chains have been globalized
- Collateral damages of globalization are the taxes and the taxes evasion → tax evasion is a
problem since this taxes are used to cover public expenditure

SUMMARY OF 1.1 - 1.3

IGO INGO (NGO) MULTINATIONAL

Constituency citizens citizens (voluntary) shareholders

Representation whole society part of society part of society

Objective/Goal to represent a common Common goal profit driven

good of their citizens

These can show us that there are different reasons to join an international organization.

1.1.4. International Regimes.

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- Regimes: “principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actor
expectations converge in a given area of international relations”. This definition is
intentionally broad and covers human interaction ranging from formal organizations (i.e.
OPEC) to informal groups. i.e: climate change.

- ‘Informal principles, rules, norms, and decision-making procedures that are codified in
charters, treaties and international law (i.e. International Protocols, Conventions, systems,
etc.)

- International actors, when formally organized, many of them can be considered IGO often
formed in response to a need to coordinate behavior among countries around issues (such
as security, trade…).
- I.e. In its absence, telecommunications between countries would have to be governed
by numerous bilateral agreements, which would become impossibly complex to
administer worldwide. A regime such as ITU serves simultaneously as a forum, a
multilateral treaty, and a governing body to standardize telecommunications across
countries efficiently.
- The IMF, Biological Weapons Convention, and the Kyoto Protocol are other examples
of international regimes.

- In a regime we can find a conglomeration of different actors that are involved in the
problem → i.e Climate change. The collaboration of these different actors and organizations
is what constitutes the regimes.

Stephen Krasner: “regimes are sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and
decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of
international relations”.
- Principles (theoretical statements: “cooperation is good”)
- Norms (standards of behavior: rights and obligations)
- Rules (technical prescription and proscription)
- DMP (practices to implement collective action)

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Why are regimes useful? → in these regimes there is a certain transparency and allows mapping actors
in a specific area, reducing uncertainty and insecurity through mutual expectations, less transaction
costs; producing information and providing a frame or reference.

- The issue of refugees is interlinked

with other issues that need to be
tackled and took into consideration
when tackling the former issue.
- The instruments that every regime
provides aims to solve and help the
refugee regime.

1.2 INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

From a sociological perspective INSTITUTIONS are one the collective forms of basic structure of
social organization as established by law or by human tradition (Maurice Duverger, french sociologist:
perspective):

International Institutions are ‘persistent and connected set of (formal and informal rules) that
prescribe behavioral roles patterns, constrain activity and shape expectations’ (Keohane)

2 subsets of International Institutions → that organize our society and human behavior:

1. Regimes: (Krasner) “principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which
actor expectations converge in a given area of international relations”.
- collaboration of the existent network of institutions, members, actors,
intergovernmental organizations, ngos… that together form a regime with the aim to
solve, tackle an specific problem.

2. International organizations (Pevehouse, 2004): “three or more states as members, hold a

plenary meeting at least every ten years, have a permanent secretariat, and a correspondence
address”.

Difference between formal and informal: is basically something that is formalized by an institution
and informal is all the set of rules, norms, principles that are in the regime and that together form a
network.

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*International Regimes and International Organizations support and complement each other
mutually.

Two basic relationships between international regimes and international organizations:

1. one IGO = participates in multiple regimes → i.e: EU, UN
2. one regime = involves multiple IGOs → i.e: int. dev. coop., NPT regime.
One IGO can participate in one or more regimes.

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Lesson 2: History and Classification

2.1. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION

No IOs were possible before the creation of a relatively stable system of sovereign states.
(Crucial turning point, Peace of Westphalia, 1648).

- IR as extension of the state-centric system (sovereignty, equality, ILP)

- IO are response to security threat (Rittberger) and trigger subsequent demand for enhanced
coordination/cooperation

XIX provided fertile ground for IOs

First embryonic IOs created in the 19th century, after the Napoleonic wars in Europe. The Central
Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine, founded in 1815.

- Growing interdependencies between states, as a result of technological improvements and

industrialization. Need to coordinate action in the socioeconomic area.

- Approx: 1860-70 UPU/ITU

- Need for cooperation over the issues of peace and conflict

- In 1815 certain organizations were put in place to ensure certain kind of collaboration

- The westphalian model was the base for it: which has to do with sovereignty, equality → all
states are the same in terms of right in front of the law

- The notion of "state sovereignty" as the fundamental structural idea of that system.

- The system of mutual recognition is what founded the international system

- Basically IO are created to respond to specific problems, or threats…

Alternative names for proto IO:

- International Public Union
- International Office
- Commission

The Concert of Europe (1815-1914) - The balance of power that existed in Europe from the fall of
Napoleon to the outbreak of WWI. This was a result of a custom, following the era of Napoleon and
the French Revolution, adopted by the old great powers of Europe. Moreover, after the Napoleonic
wars there was the need to tackle the issue of interdependence and other specific issues, thus its use
and creation.

The Concert would meet from time to time in an International Conference, or Congress, in order to
plan a solution by mutual agreement (concert), whenever some problem arose that threatened peace
between European nations. A mechanism to enforce the decisions of the Congress of Vienna.

The Congress of Vienna (1815) - A forum for international collaboration on European security and
commerce. A multipurpose IGO avant la lettre created by the European great powers to reestablish
order and stability on the continent after the Napoleonic Wars.

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Apart from that, there was also the creation of some international organizations such as the Central
Commission for the navigation of the Rhine (CCNR)

CCNR
- Creation: 1815

- Function: encourage European prosperity by guaranteeing a high level of security for

navigation of the Rhine and surroundings

- The Central Commission has five member-states: Germany, Belgium, France, the
Netherlands, and Switzerland. The number of members has varied throughout the
Commission’s history. In previous times, the various German States were directly represented.
After the First World War, the Federal State took the place of the Lander.

- Shortly after the First World War, the Treaty of Versailles made provision for the membership
of the allied powers - Belgium, Italy and the United Kingdom, plus Switzerland. Italy and the
United Kingdom renounced participation in 1935 and 1993 respectively.

- The United States was a member of the Central Commission after the Second World War as
an occupation power and resigned its membership in 1961.

- Still existing? renewed interest?/relevance? → there is a huge need for tackling contemporary
issues through these organizations, since the different issues and needs that the world
population faces have changed through time. Nonetheless, these organizations still today are
updated to contemporary challenges, in order to be useful and relevant.

The same issue happens with the League of Nations → 20th century, a boom after WW1 and
WW2.
- Increasing challenges of global concern: war, economic crisis, HHRR violations, inequality,
environment

- Growing perception that IOs can contribute to international cooperation.

- US leadership in founding the UN System.

- WWII ended with the creation of the UN and the League of Nation in order to respond to
certain kinds of problems.

IO responds to the increased global interaction as movements of information, money, physical objects,
people or other tangible or intangible items across state boundaries, and the crisis this triggers in terms
of governance of international relations.
- Increase of globalization is what has increased interdependence and interaction in the
international arena. These IO have to face new challenges that are not anymore national but
transnational.

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Keohane/Nye- (2010, p.336 ): 4 major types of global interaction:

1. “communication, the movement of

information, including the transmission of
beliefs, ideas, and doctrines;

2. transportation, the movement of physical

objects, including war materiel and personal property as well as merchandise;

3. finance, the movement of money and instruments of credit;

4. travel, the movement of persons”

Rittberger: IO as response to global challenges

Not only were IO a reaction on war and power politics based problems, but also to other crisis
derived from global interactions, such as inter alia :

- Economic and Financial crisis

- Human Rights Violations

- Environmental problems

- Development Asymmetries

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According to the data (2010) provided by the Yearbook of IO, there are 266 IGOs and 8689 INGOs.
- According to Karl Holsti, from the IGOs already existing in the early 1990s, 94% were
created post-1940. Mainly because that challenges and threats that the world was facing
economically, politically, social… and in the other side because the increasing trend of
globalization

- Two simultaneous trends after the end of Cold War:

- number of IGOs stagnating
- end of Cold War
- end of US leadership

- Increasing no of INGOs
- Increased globalization
- Increased participation

- Data is always very difficult to obtain, but the most precise data about IO is the Yearbook of
international organizations.

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2.2. ACADEMIC DEFINITIONS OF IO

International Organizations can be defined as:

(Michel Virally, 1977): an association of States, established by agreement among its members and
possessing a permanent system or set of organs, whose task is to pursue objectives of common interest
by means of cooperation among its members.
- He does not define how many states which leaves it to free interpretation

Michael Wallace and David J. Singer (IGO in the Global System, 1815-1964: A Quantitative
Description - 1970) distinguished intergovernmental organizations by three criteria:

(1) The organization must consist of at list two qualified members of the IS and should have been
created by a formal instrument of agreement between the governments of nation states So
bilateral IO are included.

(2) The organization must hold more or less regular plenary sessions at intervals not greater than
once decade.

(3) The organization should have a permanent secretariat with a permanent headquarters
arrangement and which performs ongoing tasks

- He is being much more specific than the former definition

Some definitions:
Bennet (1977) listed their common characteristics as being:
- a permanent organization to carry on a continuing set of functions
- voluntary membership of eligible parties
- a basic instrument stating goals, structure and methods of operation
- a broadly representative consultative organ
- a permanent secretariat to carry on continuous administration, research and information
functions.

Pier Gerbet (1977) The idea of an international organization is the outcome of an attempt to bring
order into international relations by establishing lasting bonds across frontiers between
governments or social groups wishing to defend their common interests, within the context of
permanent bodies, distinct from national institutions, having their own individual characteristics,
capable of expressing their own will and whose role it is to perform certain functions of international
importance.

DEFINITION (Archer): an international organization is a formal continuous structure that is

established by agreement between members (governmental and/or non-governmental) from two
or more sovereign states with the aim of pursuing the common interest of the membership.
- The interest of this organization is to promote a common interest
- and it has to come from at least 2 sovereign states
- There needs to be a written form (where the values, criteria, entry requirements, mandate,
different organs must be written down).

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The Yearbook of International Organizations excludes those established with the purpose of making a
profit for the members.
This rules out international business corporations, cartels and transnational or multinational
enterprises.

Case Study. Referendums taking place in Ukrainian regions.

Many IO are not legitimizing these referendums arguing that it should be a democratic process of (territorial)
sovereignty, while Russia is using force and coercion. Moreover, there are many refugees that are not being
taken into account

Impact on IO: Zelenski talking at the Security Council (UN), UNHCR, OSCE (Organization Security and
Cooperation Europe), and many countries of the EU have positioned themselves against these referendums
(Poland).

2.3. CLASSIFICATION OF IO (Ritter/Archer)

State-centric view.

2.3.1 By Ritter: IO = IGO

We can try to classify the different international organizations according to certain criteria. According
to Ritter the outstanding features are:
- Scope
- Function
- Centralization

Type of IO according to Scope

There can be many issues to tackle or just a few issue areas. They can be either task specific or
general purpose. Task specific: It is created specifically to solve one or very few problems whereas
general purpose: it wants to create a sense of community.
Task Specific General Purpose

Scope Few Issue Areas (problem-driven) Many Issue Areas (community driven)

Examples - IAEA - AU (african)

- IMF - EU
- WB - UN
- WTO

Type of IO according to Function/ role

Programme Organization Operational Organization

Function Setting norms and rules Implementing norms and rules

Examples - ILO - IAEA

- UN - IMF
- WTO - WB

Type of IO according to Centralization /(type of authority, regarding the type of decision-making)

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Decentralized Organization Centralized Organization

Authority Consensus decision-making and Majority voting and implementation by

implementation by states international organization

Examples - NAFTA - EU
- NATO - IMF
- OPEC - WB

2.3.2 By Archer
According to Archer the outstanding features of an IO are:
- IO = IGO, TGO, NGO
- the outstanding features are:
- membership
- aims
- structure

1. Membership
An international organization should draw its membership from two or more sovereign states,
although membership need not be limited to states or official state representatives such as
government ministers.

- The first distinction between two building blocks: those which are intergovernmental and
those whose membership is non-governmental
- A further category → with mixed membership

The traditional notion of international organizations being established between governments is based
on the sovereign state view of international relations → the state is the center of the international
system. This contains three important elements: that, with few exceptions, only sovereign states are
the subjects of international law; that sovereign states are equal in their standing in international law;
that sovereign states are institutionally self-contained and international law

- Normally as a general rule (for archer) the member states are full fledged sovereign states →
to have any standing in international law

The state-centric model of international relations would allow interactions between the government of
one state and the domestic society of another state, but would insist that international politics is about
relations between the governments of two or more states and not between the members of those states’
societies (Figure 2.1).

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Keohane/Nye (1971): transnational action covers movement of (in)tangible items across state
borders when at least one agent is not a government or an IO. Transnational interactions between
members that are not exclusively states

Through that definition three sorts of Transnational Organizations (TNO) are defined:
(1) Genuine INGO (IOC: WCC, Salvation Army International) is an organization with only
non-governmental members. Such organizations bring together the representatives of
like-minded groups from more than two countries

(2) Hybrid INGO (mixed → some governmental and some non-governmental membership)
(a) established by governmental treaty: ex, ILO: considered as IGO
(b) non-governmental treaty: International Council of Scientific Unions (int. Scientific
unions, academies, national research councils, governments).
(3) Transgovernmental organization (TGO) (‘not controlled by central foreing policy organs of
government. (IULA, UCLG, ORU-FOGAR, IPU, Interpol, …)
- In a state there is the government but also there are other parts that belong to the state
administration → so de association created by public organization but that are not
controlled by the government

Membership (b): (The “Catchment Area”)

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- Extent: “regionalism” versus “universalism”

- Geographically contiguous (Benelux) or broad membership

- But… How can we define a region? and how can we put limits to the extent of an IO? (and
how do we define the aspirations of an IO?)
- i.e. NATO, OAU, OAS, OECD…

Bruce Russett (1967) defining regionalism is not to territory and physical region there are different
factors that affect the Criteria for regionalism:
1. regions of social and cultural homogeneity;
2. regions sharing similar attitudes or external behavior;
3. regions of political interdependence;
4. regions of economic interdependence;
5. regions of geographic proximity.
There are so many regional organizations and → “Some regional organizations are more regional
than other regional organizations”

Table 2.1. Degrees of homogeneity among five IGOs.

Better to refer to organizations of limited/restricted membership as opposed to IOs with

extensive/open membership

2. Aim
The organization is established with the aim of pursuing the common interests of the members.
Although, it may end up not undertaking this task or favoring the interest of one member over that of
another, but it should not have the express aim of the pursuit of the interests of only one member,
regardless of the desires of others.
In order to be legitimate, an organization should be representative and effective/efficient.
An organization that is effective but not representative does not have legitimacy, and the other way
around.

the aims can distinguished between:

- specific vs comprehensive
- orientation of activities (cooperation, conflict management, confrontation)

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- Virally (1977) notes both the distinction between general and specialized organizations and
that between political and technical ones.

- Nye uses a threefold division:

- military security,
- political organizations, and
- economic organizations.
- Pentland goes on to use the distinction between “high” and “low” politics:
- high politics concerns ‘diplomatic and military problems relating directly to the
security and sovereignty of states’
- low politics refers to ‘the great volume of daily business concerning economics,
social, cultural and technical issues.

Do these distinctions work in the context of the present day IO scenario? Are they still valid
nowadays?
- The assertion that economic issues have now become high politics cannot be rejected, because
the preponderance of economic considerations in the internationalized world markets cannot
be discounted in the conduct of foreign policy in general.
- Take for instance UNESCO (UN Scientific and CUltural Organization) → their archeological
findings are becoming highly politicized.

- 1973: OPEC crisis

- 2008: Financial Crisis
- 2015: Ebola
- 2020: Covid
- ….. Climate crisis

Increased interdependence between different dimensions: merging hard and soft politics.

A. Aims: General - Specific

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B. Aims: Orientation of Activities

1. IO encouraging cooperative relations: increase existing cooperation or transform indifference
into cooperation
2. IO decrease the level of tension between member: conflict management or prevention
(from conflict to less conflict/indifference/cooperation
3. IO aims at confrontation between members with differing opinions between members and
non-members.

3. Structure
A) The organization should have its own formal structure of a continuous nature established
by an agreement such as a treaty or constituent document.
- How this founding document defines the EU is different from the NATO

B) The nature of the formal structure may vary from organization to organization, but it
should be separated from the continued control of one member.

↓
It is the autonomous structure that differentiates a number of international organizations from
a series of conferences or congresses.

A) Structure implies agreement/foundational treaty:

Legal Personality (LP) If you are an IO you need to have legal personality (which are the actors with
legal personality in international public law?
- but how do IO’s acquire legal personality?
- By foundational treaties signed by States. This legal personality is
delegated by the States members (Trust in IO)
- An organization established by treaty or other must be governed by international law
standards and must possess legal personality. Entities without legal personality cannot be held
accountable for their acts.
- Legal Personality makes IO exist for International Law, it gives rights and duties. (non-state
actors, they have different status)
- In IO there has to be a legal personality → because if not they cannot operate in the
international law
- ie: if you sign the treaty the only way that an io can apply the law and making
sure that the treaty is respected is by having this legal personality

Legal Consequences
1. Treaty-making power
2. Obligations & Rights
3. Recognition by the member states
4. External & Internal representations

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5. Regular diplomatic relations

6. Legal proceedings → related to legal personality

Practical Consequences
To have legal capacity is needed for the IO to conduct its functions.
1. Contract Staff: if an IO cannot have its own staff will lose its capacity to function
2. Acquire or dispose properties
3. Working for an IO gives the person legal coverage.

Reuter (1958) poses three questions about IGOs and their structures (3 balances):

1. What provision is made in the institutional organs to balance the interests of one member
against those of another or one group of members against another group of members? How,
then, is institutional power distributed?

2. How is the balance between the power and influence of the member states and that of the
organization’s institutions reflected in its structure?

3. and very important, what is the balance between governmental and nongovernmental
representation?

There are organs which are exclusively governmental, others that are non-governmental and others
that are a mix. For instance, in the UN there are 6 main organs:
→ The General Assembly which represents states, so it is governmental;
→ Security Council, also governmental;
→ ECOSOC (Economic and Social Council), also governmental;
→ The Secretariat: does not represent states, it represents civil population →
non-governmental.
→ The International Court of Justice, non-governmental
→ The Trusteeship Council

There are kinds of mechanisms that counterbalance. State representation is not mandatory or present
in every body of the UN charter. For instance, the UN Permanent Forum of Indigenous Issues is
non-governmental, because 50% of its composition are representatives of governments, and yet the
other 50% are representatives of non-indigenous peoples. UNHRC: They are representatives of states
who are elected regularly, so it is a governmental representation.

Structure-based IO Classification (Archer) indicates

- whether IO are more/less egalitarian;
- their degree of dependency from members;
- balance between governmental and non-governmental participation

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In the EU, for instance, the European Commission (executive branch) represents the whole set of the
community's interests (EU citizens); the Council of the European Union (legislative branch)
represents the governments/states of each member state; and the European Parliament (legislative
branch together with the Council) represents the governments and individuals of the member states.

- The organization should have its own formal structure of a continuous nature established by
an agreement such as a treaty or constituent document.
- The nature of the formal structure may vary from organization to organization, but it should
be separate from the continued control of one member.
- It is the autonomous structure that differentiates a number of IOs from other series of
conferences or congresses.

NATO – Irene Martinez

After WWII and Bretton Woods, 17 forces allied themselves in order to unite forces.

It has two areas of work:

- political/civilian → which takes the decisions
- military → once the decisions are taken, they have to be decided as well from the military command.
Decisions have to be approved from both areas.

art. 5 stands for the fact that if one NATO country is attacked, all of them must react. It is the one that really
shapes the organization and it has only been applied once in 2001.

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2.3.3 Institutional structure

These international organizations need to be legitimate, and legitimacy is composed by the

interrelation of output and input → if an organization has a lot of output (is very effective) but little
input: can be considered that is not very legitimate and vice versa.

Intergovernmental Organs

1. Plenary organs → maximum body where the IGO is controlled by the states. Maximum policy
maker. Based on the principle of member states sovereignty
- All states have their own representatives within → They act according their governments’
instructions
- the plenary organs are frequently at the center of international organizations decision-making
- The plenary can create an executive council

2. Executive Council
- Their main task is to supervise the permanent secretariat of the organization and to take on
the implementation of policy programmes decided by the plenary organ
- Limited number of member states’ representatives elected by the plenary organ
- Sometimes the principle of fair regional representation.
- Balance on distribution of competences between plenary organ and executive council.
- Most regional IGO do not have this kind of council (plenary + supporting committees)

Power distribution
- How is power divided between deliberative, plenary organs on which all members are
represented and executive-governing organs which do not always have representatives of all
members?
- Practice of leading IGOs provide “permanent representation” in executive- governing
organs of states playing a leading role: UN Security Council, those given to the large

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capital subscribers of IMF, IDA, IFC..., ILO Governing Council. Those who give the
money in the IMF, are also the ones that are the most present in the governing board.
- Executive-governing organ on which all members are represented equally. OAU’s
Council of Ministers

- How do we do this? By voting. Voting mechanisms:

- Allow parts of a state separate representation E.g. The Soviet Union was faced with a
lot of UN member states living in a situation of ideological minorization. A way to
compensate for this, they got extra political representation, the two soviet republics
got 2 separate representations (Belarus and Ukraine).
- Weight the votes in accordance with the economic strengths of the members (IMF,
IBRD, IDA, IFC) or in accordance with population (EU).
- Majority rules with the right of veto (UN Security Council, permanent members)

- Voting Mechanisms
a. Unanimity (why the League of Nations failed) → if one member is against, you have
de facto a VETO situation. This is something that undermines the efficiency of this
organization.
- Veto mechanism → has been agreed and decided in a precise context (1945)

b. Majority
- SMV (50% + 1) → Council of Europe.
- QMV (⅔ votes or other systems- including veto - where states are granted a different
number of votes (WB, Council of ministers of the EU)
-
*The utility of the double majority voting system is that if there was a single majority system the
bigger countries would do what they won or a coalition of countries could gain a majority as well.
Otherwise, there is a certain obligation that countries look for coalitions with both big countries and
small countries. → it allows for the effective participation of minorities.

c. Consensus (formally there is no voting: Council OECD, most UN organs). It requires

no voting.

EU decision making in the Council of Ministers of the EU:

Until November 2014 it required 260/352 votes (74%) + Majority MS.
Since then, QMV means 55% of MS vote in favor (in practice: 15 out of 27 MS) + the proposal is
supported by member states representing at least 65% of the total EU population: This
consequently means that this process requires an obligation to reach agreements.

We distinguish between decision-making authority whether if it is intergovernmental or supranational:

- Intergovernmental: all governments at the same level, everything is executed by a specific
organization. Sovereignty and autonomy.
- Supranational (hierarchical coordination via centralized organs more efficiency > consensus
not required), pooled sovereignty.

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Non-Intergovernmental Organs

I. Administrative staff (Secretariat, bureau, commission): not representatives of MS governments

(independence). Provision of technical services, but also getting some independent (and indirect)
influence on IGO policy making. (Case-study UN Secretariat)
- In principal they do not represent governments, however in practice may not be respected
- In principal is technical: Secretariat prepares the paper for the plenary and the council to
discuss

II. Courts of Justice: decide on disputes between MS, MS and IGO’s organs and organs themselves.
In some IGO these bodies function as supranational courts in which independent judges exercise
compulsory jurisdiction not only over IGO organs (administrative authority) but also over MS (eg.
WTO, EU)

III. Parliamentary Assembly: most IGO don’t have these kinds of assemblies. They play simply a
consultative role (not legislative). Voice of MS population in IGO

IV. Representation of social interest: organs representing civil society groups or regional & local
administrative bodies (with an observer or a consultative status). 3 forms that NGO can act inside
IGO: (1) through an institutionalized procedure (ECOSOC); (2) through their own representative
organs (Economic and Social Committees of the EU); (3) through formal participation in
decision-making processes with right to vote (exceptional.....ILO)

Evolution of IGO structural model : 4 models

(Marcel Merle, Sociologie des Relations Internationales, 1982)

1. Basic/simple model: International technical unions of XIXth century (UPU, ITU); I adopt decisions
and an administrative committee manages the secretariat. This includes international technical unions
of the XIXth century, for instance, NATO.

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2. Model used in universal IGOs: UN, WB, WMO, and specialized institutions → Plenary organ that
represents itself in an executive council which is supported administratively by the secretary

3. Model used in Western IGOs: Council of Europe, OSCE → Plenary organ without an executive
council and with an administrative power which is a Parliamentary Assembly.

4. IGO complex Model: EU, UN → one of the most complex ones . Most complex and sophisticated
model, institutional design → balance as much as possible the different interests of member states.
Member states represented by governments who are plenary organs which delegate representatives in
an executive council. They can also be represented by the parliamentary assembly which is an organ
for representative interests. This looks very much like the structure of the EU.

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Balance between member states and institutions

- Tensions between the organ representing individual members and the embodying of the
collective needs.
- UE Council of Ministers and European Commission (Turkey)
- Eu Commission, EU Council and Eu Court of Justice (Morocco)
- Extent to which the international functionaries or officials are controlled by the member
states. Idea of International Secretariat (League of Nations): civil servants with a loyalty to
the organization rather than to their original home country.
- European Commission? (a body made up of international civil servants with
important executive powers)
- Independence of UN Secretariat

POLEXIT, name given to a hypothetical Polish withdrawal from the European Union. Poland as a
member and its court of justice facing the EU court of justice and the Council of Ministers and the
European Council on the other hand. Two main issues; the fact that the constitutional court tried to
invalidate, to disassociate itself from the foundational treaty of the EU, article 1 and article 19. The
issue of recovery funds, in which the commission and the council of ministers do not want to pay this
because of the rule of law in Poland. It allows it to represent the interests of its states but also to avoid
free-riding, meaning that countries take independent decisions.

Other examples:
EU and the Western Sahara → UN (said that the occupation was illegal according to
international law
→ EU interested in the waters → agreement with morocco but
according to the international law is not from morocco

Summarizing
IOs have become more and more complex and there has been important institutional innovation since
the original organizations appeared. (When they had an administrative bureau with a meeting of the
member countries every few years)

- Further on with the League of Nations: Secretariat, a Plenary, and a Council (with selected
members).
- Juridical institutions: dealing with administrative disagreements between members. (UN’s
Intal Court of Justice, European Court of Justice...).
- A further institutional innovation has been that of parliamentary organs (with directly elected
or indirectly members)

UN a really complex network: Security Council, General Assembly, Economic and Social Council,
Secretariat, International Court of Justice… commissions, committees, specialized agencies and
programmes.

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The most complex structures are in the bodies of the UN and the EU. The purpose of this bodies is
to ensure an adequate input and adequate output

The decisions have to be in accordance with international law if not, it won’t be really efficient

ECOSOC → intergovernmental → countries’ representatives reunite to discuss issues

international court of justice → non intergovernmental → no political elected and do not represent any
state

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Lesson 3: Theories and IOs

G20 Summit Bali → summit for the most industrialized countries in the world. In their
meeting, there are also international organizations collaborating. The country that holds the
presidency, also holds the secretariat.
- the members are states

Every theory represents a different view of the world → theories are like colored eye lenses

All these theories have a different view of the states and its role, as well as each theory has an specific
view of what an IO is and its basis is

ONTOLOGY-EPISTEMOLOGY-METHODOLOGY

In social sciences (including IR), all theories are dependent

upon particular assumptions about:

1. Ontology: what do we study? How do each of us

view the world? According to Colin Hay (2013), a
set of assumptions made about the nature, essence,
and characteristics of an object of analytical
inquiry
2. Epistemology (how do we produce and acquire
knowledge?
Positivist epistemology (“scientific”) vs
Post-positivism (“interpretative”) – OS (“Operative
System”)
3. Methodology (what methods do we use to gather
data and evidence?)
– “Software” (tools)

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Different IRT approach IO from their own set of assumptions about how the international
system works, and the role of IO within their respective positions.

Based on how they view the world, international organizations serve a specific role in international
affairs. So, for example, for a theory that advocates power and security, international organizations
may be seen as functioning a particular way given this behavioral characteristic, whereas someone
else who views the international relations theory as something different, could also in turn have a
different perception on international organizations.

Thus, it depends on who/which tradition you interrogate, to know what role international
organizations serve, as well as their level of effectiveness in the international political system.

Within the multitude of IRT, some specific theories address specifically IOs:

- Realism → HST rational choice

- Liberalism → functionalism, international regimes, public goods
- Social constructivism Marxism → Dependency/WST

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3.1 REALISM

REALIST SCHOOL

- Struggle for power between state’s own interests

- International politics is about maximization of power, wealth or security
- Principal authority in the absence of overarching authority: sovereign nation-state
- Anarchy and feeling of insecurity, mutual fear and distrust
- Intergovernmental cooperation as a way of avoiding war

Realist view on IOs

- IOs as instruments of intergovernmental cooperation in a zero-sum game → instrument of the

state
- IOs instrumentalized by powerful states: tool in the hand of states to maximize power and
extend influence
- Does not rule out IO, but question their utility (mostly “waste of time”)
- IO importance is exaggerated
- IO incapable of promoting stability

3.1.1 Classical Realism

- Pessimistic view about “Human nature” the mistrust of ”the other” Hobbes
- “Tragic” view of International politics as perennial struggle for survival and power to escape
anarchy.
- IR evolve around fear and suffering (// Tragedy)
- IR are state-centered
- Thucydides (History of Peloponnesian War concerning Athens-Sparta struggle for hegemony
in the Mediterranean) as retaken by Morgenthau
- Unlike neo-realists, he appreciated norms and values in the creation of international peace and
security; community can contribute to avert war in the international system but the best way
to be safe from uncertainty caused by anarchy, classical realism aspires to maximization of
power
- principal driving force, . Man’s deeply ingrained
- they do not want to have nothing to do with IO

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3.1.2. Structural Realism / Neo-realism

A) Kenneth Waltz

- introduction of scientific rigor:

- goes beyond human nature; views the unique nature of international politics ( contrary to
classic realists who see no difference between domestic and international sphere)
- IO is a tool to maximize its power

- Main Tenets:

1. International Politics = struggle for power/wealth or security. This sphere is dominated by big
powers
2. anarchic structure of the International system as the main determinant of state behavior
3. Centrality of great powers: importance of (bi-multi-) polarity for international peace
4. IS’ anarchic structure produces uncertainty, which leads to survival imperative (struggle for
survival is not human nature bound but induced by the structure
5. IS configuration makes that states can never trust others intentions
6. Sovereignless environment penalizes all states that fail to protect their vital national interests
or pursue national interests beyond capabilities
7. States, conceptualized as unitary-rational actors, engage in means-end calculations
8. States are sensitive about any erosion of relative capabilities → It’s not just about the
maximization of power, wealth, security but about interest maximization vis a vis other states

B) J. Grieco-Relative gains problem in International Cooperation

- States are not only worried about interest maximization as such, but about interest-
maximization relative to the gains and losses of other states
- States are not atomistic but positional actors
- States’ main concern is not pursuit of power but maintenance of relative power in the
International System
- International Cooperation: tricky proposition because the spectre of relative gains
- States are reluctant to join IOs if other states are going to gain more by doing so
- States may even renounce international cooperation gains if that prevents other states
from improving their position in the international system

C) J.Mearsheimer - The false promise of international institutions

- IOs are the reflection of power distribution in the international system.

- IO are epiphenomenal: they have no independent effect on international outcomes → If and
when IO matter they do so because states use them instrumentally for their own gain
- IO are nothing more than arenas for acting out power relations between contending states :
they have no independent power themselves
- States are less concerned with being cheated in international cooperation than with ending up
worse off vis-a- vis other states regardless of absolute gains
- That’s why IO will only matter at most in the margins of international politics

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- IO as such has no independent outcome since is the outcome is the discussion

between states
- IO are instruments no power to themselves

3.1.3 Hegemonic Stability Theory (Ch. Kinderberger, R. Gilpin)

- Powerful states tend to seek dominance over all or parts of any international system, fostering
some degree of hierarchy within the overall systemic anarchy (hegemony creates order and
stability).
- In order for a nation-state to be a hegemon, there are some attributes it must have
(1) political strength and military force to forge new laws and organizations;
(2) a large and growing economy;
(3) will to lead as well as the capability to enforce the rules of the system;
(4) must commit to the system – needs to be perceived as mutually beneficial for other
great powers.
- HST explains how cooperation can emerge among major powers and how international order
(rules, norms, values, institutions) emerge and is sustained: the order is stable as long as the
authority within it is sustained by the distribution of power (i.e. Liberal economic system
after the WWII lead by US, Germany, France in the EU)
- IOs need an hegemon to provide stability (are all hegemons the same?)

- Is not only about being an hegemon, but what are the qualities that this hegemon
brings to the international system

3.1.4 Rational Choice Theory

- States have objective and material conditions → the decisions that take the state have to be
useful and rational
- States action is a function of utility, which explains its engagement in any multilateral activity
→ they participate in IOs since is useful for them
- States do not rely solely on their power
- states use the international system to advance their national interests (only if it is useful):
realists view IOs as amplifiers of states’ choices and instruments. Therefore, they are
considered to be very utilitarian.

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3.2 LIBERALISM

International politics is about more than maximization of power, wealth, security → individuals, as
well as states, are able to cooperate even if the international system is anarchic.

3.2.1 Classical Liberalism (idealists) (Major influence in the practice of multilateralism in the
aftermath of WW 1 and WW2)

- Optimistic view about human beings: international cooperation and law are not only
necessary but good → human beings are good by nature an benign
- Interdependence is key: no anarchy. Democratic values overcome aggression and war. How?
By multilateral action and reform
- Grotius (17th century). International society, international law, universal standard of morality.
Individuals and States are ultimately sociable: states feel obligation to create and respect rules
of IS (this stems from man’s condition as rational and social creature); Natural law theory
provides a standard of behavior against which to measure state behavior.
- Kant (18th century). Despite an anarchic environment, a perpetual peace is possible.
Conditions: republican constitution, universal hospitality
- Major influence in the practice of multilateralism in the aftermath of WW1 and WW2

- Rule based society is one of the main guarantees for peace and security

3.2.2. Idealist / Classic Liberal School

- Distribution of power in the IS / structure of the system is less determinative of

international outcomes: human nature is benign and domestic politics matter.
- Societies, not states, are the central actors
- International cooperation benefits all participants: Internationalism is a force for good
- Transnational interactions and idea of a sort of universal community based on norms and
values, which are not only the rules of the game but constitute actor’s interests (and
sometimes even identities)

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- Even if anarchy would characterize the international system (realism), within a framework of
institutions and rules, cooperation is possible.
- Norms and values are not only the rules of the game but constitute actor’s interests (and
sometimes even identities

Idealist View on IO

- IO with a dual role

- reflecting the values and norms on which they were founded
- influencing the values and norms
- IOs change state behavior and also their fundamental interests

From Idealism via Pluralism to Neoliberal Institutionalism (pluralism)

- Modernisation in the IS increased economic interdependence between states

- Welfare not security is main goal of states (contrary to realism)
- Keohane Indicate the conditions under which the state-centric paradigm is inadequate to
explain international outcomes → pluralistic understanding of key processes (e.g.)
globalization
- Draws attention to new actors besides states: substate actors, in
particular transnational actors : MNC, IO and NGO.

INSTITUTIONALIST SCHOOL (1980s)

- International co-operation between states is possible, but is difficult to achieve → thus a good
mediator to allow this cooperation are international organizations, since they can provide a
common context to facilitate cooperation.
- Complex interdependence leads to IOs as facilitators of cooperation among states.
- Just as neo-realists, also institutionalists believe that States are unitary and utility-maximizing
actors → it is always about increasing the role of the states,
- But at the same time, contrary to realists, IOs have more influence over the interests and
behavior of states → they provide values, rules…
- However, contrary to Neorealism (which saw the anarchy impeded international cooperation)
institutionalist consider that anarchy-rooted uncertainty is overcome by continuous
interaction among states; this provides motivation for States to create IO, which, in turn
- Moderate state behavior
- Provide a framework for interaction
- Establish mechanisms to reduce cheating → obligation to report over an issue that
you have ratified → this means that you are internationally accountable, moreover
this report is public (ngos, civil society… can have their input), which provokes that
states can not avoid their responsibilities
- Facilitate transparency of state actions
- Rules, cooperation is possible

Institutionalist Views on IOs

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- IOs have regulatory and constitutive aspects.

- IO are focal points for coordination that can make state commitments more credible by
specifying expectations and establishing a reputation for compliance.
- IO are fundamental institutional pillars of democracy and market capitalism
- IOs are particularly useful for solving two types of problems:
- Technical, non-political issues where states are not the best units for problem
resolution (functionalism).
- The collective goods issues (Garett Hardin - The tragedy of the Commons).

(I) Specific Theories: Game theory (Robert Keohane)

- States engaged in international bargaining worry about their reputations provided that
they will have repeated interactions with states
- Interdependency in IS demands reiterated bargaining → tit for tat strategies, linking
issues across different sets of negotiation, shaming/punishing defection from agreements
bilateral/multilateral
- IO as providers for critical information and reassurance, thereby discouraging state
defection/cheating
- Principal agent theory: dynamic relations between principals (states) and agents (IO):
determine the autonomy and interdependence between IO and their principals: to what extent
are principals able to monitor and steer the behavior of their agents once they have
delegated authority to IO.

(II) Specific Theories: (Neo)Functionalism (David Mitrany)

- States and individuals have basic or functional needs

- Economic and social international cooperation as prerequisites for peace and security, in
this context, the special agencies of the UN are explained (exp. WB, UNICEF, etc.)
- Web of activities that would bring to more interconnectedness and thus, interdependence
- Most plausible explanation of many IO
- Need to establish independent and powerful IGOs to address current political issues.

- Big case: European integration (spill-over) (neo-functionalism)

- Ernst Haas, (Jean Monnet, Robert Schumann)
- Begins with limited, pragmatic cooperation on narrow, neopolitical issues that leads to
broader and higher levels of cooperation later on.

Sometimes IO use this bureaucratic approach to get into some areas → i.e China

(III) Specific Theories: International Regimes Theory

Although a neo-realist, Krasner’s regime theory owes more to liberalism than to realism

- Krasner; “regimes are sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and
decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of
international relations.” → draws attention to less institutionalized international arrangements
that perform similar functions.
- Principles (beliefs of fact, coherent bodies of theoretical statements about how a
system works: i.e. cooperation for multilateralism; “cooperation is good.”)

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- Norms (defined in standards of behavior: rights and obligations, i.e. reciprocity, social
standards).
- Rules (specific technical prescription and proscription for action)
- DMP (practices for making and implementing collective action)

(IV) Specific Theories: Peace Theory

Democratic Peace Theory, based on Kant’s perpetual Peace: Kantian influence on international
peace and security:

- Democracy: democracies are reluctant to wage war against each other

- International trade: creates incentives for economically interdependent states to avert war

Pevehouse and Russett: particular types of IO, densely democratic organizations, generate
peaceful relations among their members (less in heterogeneous organizations)

(1) IOs help states to sustain credible commitments → monitoring commitments reduces
credibility gap when states negotiate. I.e. trade agreements; enhance credibility of
international agreements in case of a transfer of government turnover.
(2) Sufficiently democratic IO contribute to dispute settlement via mediation and conflict
resolution (EU, OAS, NATO) and are credible third parties.
(3) IOs contribute to socialization: spread norms and contribute to identity formation → trust
building among members and discouragement of the use of force.

(V) Specific Theories: Public (Collective) Goods Theories

- Emerged in UNDP in the 2000-2010 to express and frame the challenges directly faced by the
international community.
- In economics, public or collective goods are contrasted with private goods. By contrast,
public (collective) goods are non excludable –shared by everybody whether they helped pay
for the good or not– and nonrival –in that one person’s “enjoyment” of the good does not
affect another’s
- GPG management interwoven action and interdependent activity: mutual trust
developed and built via IOs (Kyoto protocol, ISO, WTO, high navigation of the seas,
commissions on the navigation of rivers…)
- Successful term that has permeated much of the international policy discourse.
- Tangible and intangible; peace, environment, financial stability, internet, free-trade, etc.
- Need interwoven action and interdependent activity

- Here is an example where the UN can become and agent → since one of the main goals of IO
is to protect this public good

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3.3 SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM

Follows the tradition of idealist school. Normative approach: social actors act in response to social
values and norms, Norm orientations (vs) interest orientation.

- Social constructivism: shared values and norms

- Role of social groups which lobby for specific norms (not state-centric)
- Role of epistemic communities important in the formation of cognitive agreement.
- The creation of IO depends on whether there is a consensus over values and norms
- Importance of the cognitive agreement (basic perception of the problem among participating
societies) → they create knowledge and concepts → then they express this knowledge trying
to orient international policies of states
- IOs used by NGOs and transnational movements.
- Influence of NGOs in lobbying states (internal forces)
- Bureaucracies of IO are/can become promoters of values and norms (agency)

- IR, and within that IO, are in and of themselves not necessarily pessimistic, nor are they
innately positive and cooperative in their nature and towards issues such as power and
security.
- Rather, relationships and institutions are viewed a certain way depending on the actors.
(Wendt: “Anarchy is what states make of it”)
- “actors behave toward the world around them in ways that are shaped by the ideas that they
hold about the world; these ideas are generated by past interactions” (Hurd, 2014).
- Therefore, while the past helps to (in)form how actors interact, this is not permanent like
a realist or liberalist may believe;
- interactions, as well as negative or positive perceptions, are not infinite, but can be altered
(Hurd, 2014): Tackling poverty by WB, international humanitarian IO, UNICEF, enlargement
of EU

Summary
- Reason d’être of IO → protect values
- It is a non state centric approach
- create knowledge that influences the international arena

3.4 CONSTRUCTIVISM

IO as norm-entrepreneurs

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3.5 MARXISM

- Marxism looks at the role of economic power as it relates to international affairs.

- International system resulting from an uneven economic development. Motor of history:
power, process of production and class relations.
- The contemporary economic system itself, capitalism today, is viewed by some as another
form of exploitation and control, as they are seen by some “to promote capitalism”
- IOs are viewed as merely tools used by more economically powerful states to impose
their control and influence over less economically strong states. Thus, those who are
economically dependent on other states/IOs are often the ones who suffer in the
international system
- Not state centric: not the state, but classes inside states.
- IOs are dominated by a group of powerful states that drive the agenda and have higher
gains
- WB, IMF, OCDE, WTO, perpetuate this international system, and are viewed to “promote
capitalist-liberalist policies” (Pease, 2012), often at the expense of what is best for the
citizens of the state.
- The current international system –in the context of human rights and development– cannot
and will not improve as long as there are conditions (which often are manifested in liberal
marked economic policies) that are set by international organizations such as the World Bank
and International Monetary Fund.
- IOs and MNCs based in developed countries help to foster inequality and dependency.

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*****GOVERNANCE OF THE UN SYSTEM

- The “UN System” encompasses a large group of IOs, many of which are not in any way
within the administrative hierarchy of the UN headquarters. According to Article 7 of the
Charter, the central organization – the actual IO called “the United Nations”- encompassessix
principal organs relevant to the decision-making processes (these organs are directly
mandated by the Charter). Some of these organs, particularly the GA and ECOSOC have in
turn created subsidiary agencies. There are also a number of autonomous agencies that are
part of the UN system but these are not administratively subsidiary to the central organs of the
UN.

- Difference between subsidiary agencies and autonomous agencies:

First ones, they can be thought of as a major IOs in their own right, but have in common that
they have been created by, and are in principle overseen by, and can be disbanded by their
superior organization. They are answerable to the central organs of the UN. They usually
draw at least a portion of their budgets from UN funds as well. UNCTAD, UNHCR, UNICEF.

- Autonomous agencies have more tenuous administrative links, interact with and send reports
to ECOSOC but are not answerable to it, and do not draw their funding from general UN
funds

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Lesson 4: Functions, roles and agency

Why do states frequently use IOs as vehicles of cooperation?

They can be used by states as:

a. Instruments of foreign policy of a state
b. Possibility to have a venue, to discuss and to coordinate policies
c. Agents or actors in international affairs in their own rights, so not only as an instrument of
maximization of foreign power, but becoming an actor itself.

Do IOs do what states want?

Is there authority apart from that coming from states?

Is there any independent agency in IO?

4.1 IO AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM (Ritterberg)

The international organization reacts to the challenges that the international environment poses.

IO as a political system converts inputs into outputs: input – conversion – output. Based on the
developments in the international environment, political actors formulate demands and provide
support to IO (input). IO converts these inputs into decisions and activities (output) directed towards
the international environment.

1. The process through which IO convert inputs into outputs matters: what happens inside
the IO matters: acting through IO has different outcomes as when acting via IO

2. The design of IO – rules, scope, membership, etc – affects the outcome

- It is important to know the members that the IO has:

- small number members no majority voting

- big number of members (UN) → countries feel much more insecure about
delegating their power to an organization and want to be in control of their
vote → difficult to achieve a common agreement. i.e: COP27 → problem:
COP27 is consensus building → no final decisions if there is no consensus

- disadvantage of consensus process is that is not ambitious → since it

has to take into account all opinions

- advantage more legitimacy since everybody is onboard

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*Intergovernmental → composed only of states. The bodies that can control things within
international organizations are the Intergovernmental Conferences, Plenary Meeting, Executive
Council and the Delegated Decision-Making Secretariat.

Example 1:

The IO that the countries decide to tackle the issues depend on the outcome they want to get.
Non-developed countries prefer to tackle the United Nations as a way to tackle the new independent
economic order, since their interests and their voting power is higher than in the world bank (UN= 1
country, 1 vote), where western countries prefer to tackle this issue since they have more influence.

Exemple 2:

Western Sahara → the main interest where to assert the issue is if the decisions are binding or not
binding
- european court of justice has a verdict that is legally binding upon states
- UN → is not legally binding, are recommendations

The interest groups poses a demand (input) → the european court of justice, addresses these demands
→ produces decisions, policy programs, operational activities (output)

- policy program → norms, rules…

- operational activities → humanitarian groups…

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4.2. WHY STATES COOPERATE: THEORIES OF COOPERATION

Most IR theories on IO are of state behavior

According to these prevalent theories, states create IOs to solve problems of incomplete information,
transaction costs, etc. these theories tend to focus attention on why states create IOs to fulfill certain
functions

Different theories offer different perspectives on IOa agency, roles and levels of autonomy.

Why states should cooperate:

National interest → challenges + complexity → you participate in and IO for your own benefit and
it has to be an IO and not bilateral since challenges are complex and involve lot of countries

Reduce uncertainty
(realist try to reduce to role of IO as much as possible/ rational theory use it for your benefit)

To make a common understanding of certain things → make specific agreement in certain common
provisions to avoid major problems

A realist and institutionalist Theories of cooperation

from this perspective the IOs java no agency of their own they are functional of the states → states
create this organizations → states are the ones that have the agency

Arthur Stein: cooperation dilemma → there are situations in which all the actors have an incentive
to elude independent decision making (unilateralism): there are situations in which individualistic
self-interested calculation leads them to prefer joint decision making because independent
self-interested behavior can result in undesirable (suboptimal) outcomes. In those cases, states
abandon independent decision making in favor of joint decision making for rational
self-interested calculation.

The IOs is what provides the framework to monitor the common interest.

In favoring self-interest, states may face cooperation dilemmas: To deal with these dilemmas
to favor self-interest, states must respectively collaborate (in dilemmas of common interest)
with one another or coordinate their behavior in the case of dilemmas of common aversion.
Common Interest → collaboration: is more formalized, requires mechanisms both to
monitor potential cheating and to ensure compliance with the regime. Public goods constitute
a major class of collaboration dilemmas of common interest.
Common aversion → coordination: is self-enforcing, can be reached through the
use of conventions. States have a common interest in avoiding a particular outcome.

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A. Dilemmas of common interests (require collaboration)

- Public goods constitute a major class of collaboration dilemmas of common interest.

- When states can benefit from a good (clean environment, collective security), whether or not
they contribute to its provision, the classic free rider problem arises.
- In the absence of centralized provision (IO), the outcome is likely to be sub-optimal. In
such cases, states may benefit by delegating to an IO that they empower and finance to
provide the public good (WHO International Health)

- Focusing on global common goods → you need a structure in order to avoid free rider
states → this structure will ensure that all states are on board. also you need
monitoring structure in order to see if states are complying with agreement

- Alternatively, states may elect to contribute individually to public goods, but create agents
(IO) to collect and reveal information about their efforts.
- CoE: Human Rights practices;
- IAEA: monitors MS non-prol. policies
- OCDE: monitors macro-economic policies
This more formalized requires mechanisms both to monitor potential cheating and to
insure compliance with

B. Dilemmas of common aversion (require coordination)

- States have a common interest in avoiding a particular outcome
- The actors do not have divergent interests
- Common aversion problems require coordination: is self-enforcing, can be reached
through the use of conventions
- Examples:
- Traffic convention
- Air traffic convention → it compulsory to speak english in order to avoid
communication problems

Degrees of cooperation. Following Keohane (After Hegemony 1984):

Cooperation is defined as mutual policy adjustment: “cooperation occurs when actors adjust their
behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy
coordination”

He differentiated 3 types/degrees of collaboration:

- Unilateralism. In unilateral actions, there is no adjustment of policy: IOs are not the
implementing agency for any policy. Lack of cooperation

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Ex. US war on Afghanistan: US pursued its own preferences and implemented its policy
choices without its traditional allies.

- International cooperation. First form of cooperation. The parties adjust policy but
implementation is through strictly national laws or regulations. States themselves are the ones
responsible to implement the policy rather than delegate authority to a third party.
Ex. lowering tariffs under the GATT, arms reduction under START, bilateral foreign aid
contracts…

- Delegation to IOs. Second form of cooperation. States (Principals) agree on a common

policy and then delegate the implementation of that policy to an IO
Ex: WHO → and policies and recommendation related to Covid ).

4. 3. WHAT IS DELEGATION AND WHY DO STATES DELEGATE TO IO?

PRINCIPAL-AGENT ANALYSIS

IOs as AGENTS of States (PRINCIPALS).

States design IOs with some autonomy to carry out their assigned tasks.

IOs may act autonomously within a “zone of discretion”

- Delegation: a conditional grant of authority from a principal to an agent that empowers the
latter to act on behalf of the former.

- Principal: actors that both grant and have the power to revoke authority

- Agent: receive conditional grants of authority from principal

- Autonomy: the range of independent action that is available to an agent that can be
used to benefit or undermine the principal

- Discretion: the grant of authority specifies the goal but not the specific actions.

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Member states delegate a specific grant of their authority to the IO, the agent.
But they do so just for a specific goal or area, specified in the constitution of the IO.
And at any time it can revoke this authority → i.e: Brexit

Principal Agent analysis (Hawkins, 2006) explores the question of IO autonomy. IOs are agents of
states (principals): BUT states purposefully design IOs with some autonomy since otherwise IOs
would not be able to carry out their assigned tasks. In these analyses, IOs may act autonomously
within a “zone of discretion”

Can IOs act autonomously from states: if so, how?

- State-centric theoretical approaches provide no reason to expect autonomous IO behavior →

IOs are mechanisms or structures through which others (usually states) act. States often
provide the money for these organizations, usually dominate their top decision-making
bodies, and determine who becomes the chief executive.
- Alternatively, IOs are better understood as bureaucracies that, like those within states, can be
more or less controlled by their political masters. They treat IOs as actors in their own right,
that implement policy decisions and pursue their own interests strategically.
- PA theory inserts agency into institutional theory.

WHY STATES DELEGATE? (Archer)

WHY DO STATES ACT VIA/DELEGATE TO IOs? (Abott & Snidal)

Rational states will use or create a formal IO when the value of its functions –facilitation the
negotiation and implementation of agreements, resolving disputes, managing conflicts, carrying out
operation activities like technical assistance, elaborating norms, shaping International discourse,
etc.- outweighs the costs, notably the resulting limits on unilateral action

The role of IOs is best understood through a synthesis of rationalist and constructivist approaches.

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States consciously use IOs both to reduce transaction costs in the narrow sense and, more broadly, to
create information, ideas, norms, and expectations; to carry out and encourage specific activities; to
legitimate or delegitimate particular ideas and practices; and to enhance their capacities and power.

These functions constitute IOs as agents, which, in turn, influence the interests, intersubjective
understandings, and environment of states. Potentially, these roles give IOs an influence well beyond
their material power.

- the fact that IO can benefit and state is not enough reason to explain why states delegate
power to IO
- constructivist approach → creating social values/meaning

(Abott & Snidal): IO’s allow for:

A. Centralisation → through a stable organizational structure. This increases the efficiency of

collective activities and enhance the Organisation ability to affect the understandings, environment
and interests of states

This allows states to:

A.1: IO support Direct State Interaction

- IO as stable negotiating form

- Quick response
- Reinforce accepted norms
- Provide neutral, depoliticised specialized
forums for state interaction
- Partisan forum for political coalitions
- Information provision makes interaction more trustworthy

A.2: IO manage as operational activities

- Influence state capabilities, understandings and interests

- Pooling activities, assets, risks
- Interstate joint production
- Norm elaboration and cooperation

B. Independence → the ability to act with a degree of autonomy within defined spheres. Capacity to
operate as a neutral actor, which increases efficiency and legitimacy of individual and collective
actions

- Independent IO promotes intergovernmental cooperation in a more proactive way. IO staff

influences agendas and maintains issues alive
- Importance of independence in the implementation
- Laundering: unacceptable state to state cooperation can be laundered via IO
- i.e: Cuba will not accept money directly from the US, unless this money is channeled
through a IO
- Failure: UN secretariat is not neutral, keeps national identity

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- Neutrality adds impartiality to independence, this enables IO as:

- mediation among states (peace keeping) neutral information providers (monitoring
conventions)
- legal dispute resolution mechanism (ECJ, ICJ)

An IO can be independent since it has a stable structure

4.4. IO AUTHORITY AND AUTONOMY.

(Barnett & Finnemore- Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics, 2004)

State-centric theoretical approaches provide no reason to expect autonomous IO behavior →

International Organizations are mechanisms or structures through which others (usually states) act.
- States
- often provide the money for these organizations;
- usually dominate their top decision-making bodies;
- and determine who becomes the chief executive.

In that perspective, IOs are better understood as bureaucracies that, like those within states, can be
more or less controlled by their political masters.

rational-legal authority that IOs embody gives them power indepen- dent of the states that created
them and channels that power in particular directions. Bureaucracies, by definition, make rules, but in
doing so they also create social knowledge. They define shared international tasks (like
"development"), create and define new categories of actors (like "refugee"), create new interests for
actors (like "promoting human rights"), and transfer models of political organization around the world
(like markets and democracy.)

To understand how IOs can become autonomous sites of authority we turn to Weber and his classic
study of bureaucratization. Bureaucracies provide a framework for social interaction that can respond
to the increasingly technical demands of modern life in a stable, predictable, and nonviolent way; they
exemplify rationality and are technically superior to previous forms of rule because they bring
precision, knowledge, and continuity to increasingly complex social tasks. They are political creatures
that can be autonomous from their creators, because of both the normative appeal of
rational-legal authority and their control over technical expertise and information.

- Authority: Their authority is "rational" in that it deploys socially recognized relevant

knowledge to create rules that determine how goals will be pursued. The very fact that they
embody rationality is what makes bureaucracies powerful and makes people willing to
submit to this kind of authority. As they have specialized technical knowledge, training,
and experience that is not immediately available to other actors, this also gives
bureaucracies power over politicians (and other actors); which invites and at times
requires bureaucracies to shape policy, not just implement it.
- Autonomy: The legitimacy of rational-legal authority suggests that IOs may have an
authority independent of the policies and interests of states that create them. IOs have

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become autonomous because of their embodiment of technical rationality and control over
information.
E.g.: The UN's peacekeepers derive part of their authority from the claim that they are
independent, objective, neutral actors who simply implement Security Council resolutions.
UN officials routinely use this language to describe their role and are explicit that they
understand this to be the basis of their influence. As a consequence, UN officials spend
considerable time and energy attempting to maintain the image that they are not the
instrument of any great power and must be seen as representatives of "the international
community" as embodied in the rules and resolutions of the UN.

Principal-Agent Analysis theories treat IOs as actors in their own right, that implement policy
decisions and pursue their own interests strategically; PA theory insert agency into institutional theory.

“If autonomy exists only when IOs are able to coerce powerful states, forcing them to act contrary to
their expressed interests, then we would have to agree with the statistic that there are few instances of
IO autonomy.

But! This criterion excludes a wide variety of IO activity that might be independent of states but not
actively opposed by the powerful.

If, by contrast, we understand autonomy to exist when IOs are able to act in ways not dictated by
states, we capture the range of activity not well explained by statist arguments”.

- If from a realist perspective you say that IO are exclusively the extension of what states want
it makes no sense talking about the autonomy of IO
- From the Constructivist point of view there are many more aspects in the table since IO can
be instruments, but also allows to be arenas, or can be actors of their own

What does this mean?

- IOs can be policy leaders, or may actually shape the policy preferences of states by changing
what states want.
- IOs might act independently from, but insistently with, states interests;
- they also might operate in areas to which states are indifferent;
- they might fail to carry out state interests;
- oppose state interests;
- or change state interests → as they have this autonomy the can change state interest, i.e:
femenist and gender issues

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Is there real autonomy?: Constructivism

Authority: the ability of one actor to use institutional and discursive resources to induce deference
from others.

Constructivist approach (Barnett & Finnemore)

- IOs as autonomous actors with power and authority

- IOs as bureaucracies, a social form of authority.
- IOs can have authority both: because of the mission and the means.

Sources of power:

- Material coercion
- Information (persuasion)
- They use their authority to orient action and create social reality: power to regulate and to
create social wold (knowledge)

4.5. IO ROLES (Archer)

From functional perspective and taking into account the different theoretical perspectives on the
International System (IS), Archer distinguishes three main roles for IO: Instrument, Arena, Actor

If the IS is seen as a necessary and continuing result of power politics, IO will have a limited aspect→
only able to ameliorate unwanted consequences of relations between sovereign states.

If IS is interpreted as an international society - (Bull, 2002) “exists when a group of states, conscious
of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive
themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one
another, and share in the working of common institutions” → role of IO will be seen as part of the
institutions that support such an order.

If IS is developing very much in the way that political systems within states have, then IO
can be seen in the role of potential instruments of world government.

Archer distinguishes three main roles for IO: (1) Instrument, (2) Arena, and (3) Actor.

1. Instrument of State Diplomacy

Most usual image: IO as instrument being used by its members for particular ends. In particular with
IGO, where the sovereign MS with power limit independent action by IO

McCormick study shows with empirical findings that IGOs are used by nations primarily as selective
instruments for gaining foreign policy objectives → This view relegates IGOs to the role of
convenient tools for use by their member states.

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e.i: The UN in its first eight years of existence is often characterized as being an instrument of
US diplomacy. But an organization cannot continue to be the instrument of policy of one
dominant member when the membership is as varied as that of the UN.
Some experts note that Third World countries started to use the UN as an instrument for
implementing their foreign policies, made more necessary by their not having a traditional
network of diplomacy at their disposal.
Are states also influenced by the means of the civil servants coming from the own country?

The way of decision-taking in many IO can also demonstrate their use for the pursuance of national
policies:

The constitutions of most IO do not allow for decisions to be taken that may bind members
that have voted against them. In the case of UN General Assembly resolutions only have the
strengths of recommendations. SC resolutions can be passed by a majority of nine out of
fifteen members and can be mandatory but are subject to veto by any one of the permanent
members. The unanimity principle is the best assurance for a member that its interest will not
be jeopardized by the decisions of the organization.

OECD: those voting for decisions are bound by them whilst those abstaining or against are
not.

From this point of view, in any political process, participants have to calculate the extent to which
they are in a zero-sum game:

If they believe that gains made by any other member are going to be to their detriment, then
they will insist on tight constitutional control of the IO, exercising their right of veto over any
move that does not benefit them.

If they believe that cooperation can produce new benefits which would otherwise remain
unexploited and that all, or most, members can take advantage of these, then it is logical to
allow the institutions of the organization some scope for action.

- only take part when they are sure they are gaining something or can control the constitution
of the IO
- unanimity power → states has a guarantee that the is responding to its own foreing policy

2. Arenas of International politics more seen as frameworks

IO as arenas / or forums within which actions take place. In this case, the IO provides meeting places
for members to come together to discuss, argue, co-operate or disagree. IO have provided their
members with more open and public forum than that provided by bilateral diplomacy.

- Ex. 1970s: UN ( + agencies) used by Third World countries to air their views on NIEO →
Call for a fresh set of economic priorities.
- By 1964 UNCTAD was created as a forum at which they could articulate their trade and
economic demands outside the predefined discussion of the Bretton Woods organizations:

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- The South preferred the UN GA, and to some extend UNCTAD, because of its
“universality, its egalitarian/majoritarian decision-making rules and practices, and its
political character;
- The North, the developed economies, preferred a more pluralistic system of forums
with regard for the specialized institutions such as IMF, IBRD and GATT.

The system of blocs, formalized in UNCTAD, -- G77, Nordic Countries, Western Countries -- and
seen in the Seventh Special Session, together with the use of consensus, meant that on this occasion
the UNGA could offer and effective forum for a wide range of states to discuss the process of revising
the world economic order.

3. Actors in international politics. Also in a position to change the basic pattern of

International politics
- The constructivist approach is when you have different actors

Role as an independent actor → those representing the institution can make their own decisions, act
contrary to the wishes of some members and affect the actions of other members. Many well-known
INGOs display a strong corporate identity, showing the organization to be stronger than the sum of its
membership, and many also act effectively on the world stage.
Ex. the International Committee of the Red Cross, Amnesty International...

Estimating the degree of independent actor capacity of IGOs in the international system presents a
further problem. As these organizations are established by intergovernmental agreement, can they be
anything more than instruments of or forums for those member states?

ICJ and its structure prevents any interference in its work by the signatories to its articles;
judges appointed by the members of the UN are not delegates of their state of origin. Their
decisions are taken independently, not after instructions from their home, and each case is
judged by the standards of international law, not by an amalgam of national laws.

Moreover, once the IO created and once it has started to build up a bureaucracy, a modus operandi and
a role not totally dependent on the acceptance of its every act by all its membership →, then it
becomes politically more difficult for a member state effectively to stop that IGO’s activities. The UN
offers the greatest possibility here.

Ex. UN PKO demonstrates the ability of an IO to perform on the world stage with a certain
degree of independence and with an effectiveness not always matched by state actors. The
UN’s peacekeeping role is not mentioned in the Charter by which the original member states
established the organization, nor has it been the subject of any amendmen1t9to that charter.

Once you create a IO, and its working its very complicate (almost impossible) to dissolve an IO

To what extent can the UN in the form of the Secretariat be said to have displayed the capacity of
being an independent actor in this peacekeeping activities?

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There are three touchstones by which this capacity can be gauged (in the case of UN Peacekeeping as
well as in the case of other institutions)

- the existence of control of the institution by the UN membership;

- the ability of the institution to take its own decisions;
- and the likely outcome had UN peacekeeping facilities not been available.

Pre-conditions for roles

If IO constitutions create strong institutions, insulated from government interference → likely

independent actor (ECSC); If Members have constitutional safeguards preventing the growth of strong
institutions → likely forum or tool (EFTA)

If IO has membership dominated by 1 powerful member → susceptibility to be used as hegemonic

instrument (SU vs. Warsaw Pact); If IO members have about the same weight →more egalitarian
→act as meeting place for equals

Extent of membership conditions ability to accept certain roles.

1. Limited membership IO → can play any of the three roles

2. Near universal membership IO → difficulty to remain an instrument of a small group of
members or to be an active independent actor (UN) Ex.
a. Wide membership overruled US, USSR, Global South domination
b. Increase in the 1950-1960 enabled central institutions to take on a more active,
independent role
c. Once new members organized in their groups → idea of independent Secretariat with
too much discretion became acceptable to newcomers and old-timers
- By their nature, the universal institutions will become forums within which a range of views
will be expressed

The different roles are NOT mutually exclusive, but can alternate within an organization, or even
within the very same institutions of the organization throughout the years, which can combine various
roles: Ex.

- Different phases of Peacekeeping

- Development of economic and development policy (WB: “what is poverty”)
- Role of State control on IO (UNSG nomination; Boutros Boutros Ghali)

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4.6. IO: FUNCTIONS

The idea of a political system is to have, in reply to demands, governance and decision-making
procedures with outputs and outcomes:

1. Regulatory Programmes: directed at behavior of social actors to avoid undesirable

interactions or achieve desirable interactions (Outcomes):
- Charter prohibition on use of force,
- NPT....

2. Distributive programmes: directed to social actor’s behavior to change the distribution of

goods and services
- Transfer of resources to developing countries (UNDP, WB, structural cohesion funds
- Costs shared by all MS, benefits reaped by LDC or Less Developed
- Areas in Member States
- influence distributions of good and services at the global level

4.6.1 FUNCTIONS OF IO (Archer):

1. Articulation and aggregation: forums of discussion and negotiation that previously serve to
articulate interests and aggregate opinions (UNCTAD within the framework of the UN is based in
one framework and one vote vs BW, whose framework is giving majority voting to western states) -
some countries prefer one forum or the other, because both power coalitions have very specific
forums.

2. Providers of Norms (non)enforceable: rule making, rule application, rule adjudication

- Monitoring (IAEA)
- Adjudication (ICJ, ECJ)
- Sanctions: if the norms are not maintained, the IO can:
- (Moral) exclusion: exclude states, organizations… for instance the Apartheid regime
in Africa, which was considered to be against the international law and which led to
the moral exclusion of S.A. to participate in UN bodies.
- Suspension of certain rights: the whole discussion on the new Taliban regime,
- Economic, diplomatic sanctions embargo case of Iraq oil embargos, current new
military junta in Sudan.
- Military actions

3. Providers of operations: direct implementation of policy programmes on the basis of

informational, financial and personal resources to provide support for activities desired by MS
(Banking operations WB, UN specialized agencies (related to food supplies), UN peacekeeping,
INGO)

4. Providers of information and knowledge: collecting and publishing information, independently

gathering information, forum for information exchange (PISA survey OECD, UNEP information

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gathering on ozone layer (Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer). IOs provide
information, work with it and use it as a forum of foreign exchange.

4.7. IO PERFORMANCE

IOs are essential but controversial. In a more and more interdependent world, IOs are in charge of
managing what former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan famously called “problems without
passports, which states cannot easily address on their own”.

Big discussions around the real contribution of IOs to sort out this global challenges. Are they doing
their job well? Why do some IOs perform better than others? How do IO perform

The question of performance has taken an additional importance in light of widespread criticism that
IOs are undemocratic and therefore lack legitimacy. The argument is that international institutions
lack transparency in their decision making and are not subject to accountability mechanisms.

Which are the main sources of legitimacy for the IOs:

- input legitimacy: based on representativeness

- output legitimacy: legitimacy based on results

The relation between on another is that the work has to be translated in activities that the IO do in
order to satisfy the demands (input)

1. Input legitimacy

Based on representativeness → io have to be constantly updated in order to ensure good

representativeness of the institution. For instance, the European Parliamentary elections and the voter
turnout. This leads to the question that if in many countries there is less than 50%, what is the
legitimacy of this type of bodies?

- EP elections: Voter turnout

- Process for electing President EC
- Composition EC

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2. Output legitimacy (Results)

- Legitimacy based on results (efficiency). The performance of IOs (how they perform their
functions) has to do with legitimacy.

Buchanan & Keohane (2006): IO receives support based primarily on the extent to which it can
“effectively perform the functions invoked to justify its existence”.

IOs performance is the path to legitimacy.

How to measure performance?

- Barnett & Finnemore. Need to verify good performance of bureaucracies

- Hawkins. Control mechanisms that can guarantee the exercise of delegation and the correct
application of the contract agreed by the principal and the agent.
- Literature on regime effectiveness: whether the regime “solves the problem that motivated its
establishment”.

Starting point to define performance: an organization’s ability to achieve agreed-upon

objectives:
- General long-term objectives (outcomes) more specific medium-term objectives.

According to the specific nature of the IOs, their membership and governance, performance reflects
the behavior of two sets of actors:
(1) the member states
(2) the staff

Causal influences on good or bad performance may come from

- within the IO
- from external sources.

MEASUREMENT

Difficulties of measurement

1. Defining IO performance is messy and political

- multiple conflicting goals, pulled in different directions by stakeholder

2. IO have lofty mandates without specific criteria to judge performance.

- WB: world free of poverty

3. Complexity of ever-expanding tasks and the number of constituencies they have to

please. Performance will depend on the analyser.
- I.e. IMF policies analyzed by banker or by NGO

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4. Internal or external evaluation

- Trade off between institutional learning process vs independence & credibility
- internal evaluation → take into account some specificities but is less critical
- external evaluation → much more credible and independent

Possibilities of measurement

Outcomes → may be inappropriate when IO are constraint by factors outside control (OHCHR cannot
be responsible if hr abuses continue)

i.e. MDG measurement (2015) → measurement of different goals

Micro-level. Here we focus on the specific tasks and narrow functions the organization is intended to
perform and assess whether these are successfully carried out. It may reveal interesting cases where
IOs properly fulfill their various tasks and functions but have little impact on the fundamental
problem behind their creation.

Intermediate outcomes. We might measure the number of states and localities that have implemented
environmental programs required by federal legislation.

IO performance

At the bottom of the pyramid are the many specific tasks, projects, and programs performed by an IO.
Achievement of these functions should lead to better performance at the next level, where a smaller
number of intermediate outputs and political goals are achieved.

Ex. if the WTO secretariat produces credible Trade Policy Reviews this should promote compliance
with trade rules. UN HR review mechanism

Finally, if administrative and political tasks are performed well, this should produce outcomes that
solve underlying problems and enhance welfare.

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Sources of performance: What are the determinants of good/bad performance

1. Bad performance can be the result of IOs struggle to cope with incoherent mandates,
irreconcilable political demands of member states. Poor outcomes may not be the fault of
IO staff but the result of problems emanating from member states “principal problems”
- I.e. Some of the IMF’s weak performance can be attributed to pressure by its
powerful shareholders to make loans without strictly enforcing the policy
conditionality attached to them. (Vreeland)

2. Applications of realist principal-agent theory to IOs typically assumes that if IOs are not
achieving the desired policy outcomes delegated by state principals it is because the agents
are pursuing self-interested behavior that deviates from expectations.

3. The importance of bureaucratic culture → Looks within IOs to find the factors for good-bad
performance.
- I.e. aspects of the UN’s internal culture that generated a “collective mentality” of
denial that genocide was occurring in Ruanda, viewing the conflict as merely a civil
war, fit more comfortably with standard procedures based on impartiality and consent
(Barnett). You have to be aware of the institutional context in which you have to
operate.

4. Leadership. Sometimes IOs may perform poorly because their missions do not reflect a clear
consensus among states of what normative principles should be pursued or what underlying
problem needs to be solved.
- I.e. Human Rights: tensions between women rights and gender and collective-identity
rights, or collective rights and positive rights.

5. Even when IOs may be well designed, have a clear mandate, strong support from its MS,
possess an efficient set of procedures for carrying out its work, but still fail if it is working in
a situation where there is instability, weak capacity, corruption, or a lack of consent
from relevant parties.

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TWO GOOD PRACTICES OF PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT

(1) Quality of official development assistance (quoda)

Measures donors’ performance on 31 indicators of aid quality to which donors have made
commitments. The indicators are grouped into four dimensions associated with effective aid:
maximizing efficiency, fostering institutions, reducing the burden on partner countries, and
transparency and learning.

- The 2014 Edition: donors are overall becoming more transparent and better at fostering
partner country institutions. But little progress at maximizing efficiency or reducing the
burden on partner countries.
- The WB’s concessional lending arm, the International Development Association
(IDA), performs very well in QuODA, ranking in the top 10 of 31 donors on all four
dimensions.
- USA: in bottom half of all donors on 3 of 4 dimensions of aid quality; last on
reducing the burden on partner countries.
- UK: in top 3 on three of four dimensions of aid quality; cores particularly well on
transparency & learning.

- The results of the 2018 QuODA edition were combined into a single measure of aid quality
representing an average across the (standardized) scores in the 24 indicators. This enabled
comparisons of relative performance of multilateral agencies to bilateral donors (operating
through their bilateral channels only in this case
- Overall, multilateral development funds (Global Fund, GAVIA etc) ranked highest,
taking four of the top five spots, and the UN agencies all fall in the bottom half.
Considering just the bilateral aid of countries, New Zealand, Denmark, and
Ireland rank in the top three countries while Greece, Germany, and Spain are at the
bottom of bilateral aid quality scores. Notably, since the scores in individual
indicators are “normalized” using the performance of the other aid agencies included
in the analysis, a given country's ranking depends not just on its own behavior and
absolute progress, but on its performance relative to those of all others.

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(2) MOPAN – Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (2002)

Network of donor countries which share a common interest in assessing the effectiveness of the
major multilateral organizations they fund. MOPAN responds to the increasing demands to
better understand how public funds are used by the organizations and how funds contribute to
strengthening the effectiveness of multilateral organizations.

Every year MOPAN assesses the performance of a number of multilateral organizations at the
institutional level and in several developing countries, based on a mix of qualitative and quantitative
data on the organizations’ effectiveness.

In 2020, 20 Network members are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Republic of Korea,
Sweden, Switzerland, UAE, UK, USA.

The survey is built around 4 strategic dimensions of organizational effectiveness:

1. Strategic management.
2. Operational management
3. Relationship management
4. Knowledge management

In addition, the development results achieved by multilateral organizations are assessed.

- Organizations are assessed against a set of key performance indicators (KPIs), which are in
turn composed of micro-indicators.
- Data is collected through a survey (tailored to the operations of the different types of
multilateral organizations), consultations and a document review process.
- Data are collected from several sources:
1. MOPAN member officials at HQ level, including missions, delegations and
representations, and at country level in the selected survey countries
2. MOPAN member officials at country level (in the selected survey countries)
3. Multilateral organizations’ direct partners at country level, including governmental
representatives, private sector, non-governmental and other civil society organizations
etc.

These three groups are asked to complete the survey. Findings from the survey are complemented
with:

1. A review of documents published by multilateral organizations, comprising publicly

available documents and publications—including strategies and plans, human
resource documents, reports and system descriptions
2. Interviews with staff of the multilateral organization (primarily at headquarters), who
are consulted on the topics of the assessment.

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What is the added value of being a MOPAN member?

The incentives and added value of being a Network member include the opportunities to:

1. Take part in a community of practice and share experiences with other countries that
contribute multilateral aid.
2. Strengthen the relationship with multilateral organizations by leading assessments.
3. Improve internal knowledge about the organizations by engaging in the assessment
process.
4. Influence the future direction of MOPAN, including which multilateral organizations and
what topics to assess and how.
5. Implement policy commitments on aid and effectiveness to reduce burden and duplication
through joint assessments.

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Block 2: UN and Multilateralism

Lesson 5: UN, Origins and Evolution

I. THE ORIGINS OF THE UN

1. From Alliance policy to Collective Security System

Qualitative leap: Previous format of the Concert of Europe, with Great Powers before the WWI,
trying to avoid conflict by mutual agreement:

Ruggie: LoN: Transition from Alliance Policies to Collective Security system as a form of
multilateralism

Proposal to create a situation of anarchy to overcome, via collective action/cooperation: “Cooperation

occurs when actors adjust their behavior through a process of policy coordination (Keohane). Via IO:
LoN

Different approaches to Multilateralism → Nominal and Substantive:

- Keohane: the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of 3 or more states

- Ruggie in the other side says that “ An institutional form which coordinates relations among
three or more states, on the basis of generalized principles of conduct (....) which specify
appropriate conduct for a class of actions → Sort of institution, structure which states try to
coordinate themselves according to the universalized principles: logic of appropriateness).

Collective Security System as a substantive/principled Multilateralism (Ruggie)

Goal/Aim: provide a public good: indivisible, non excludable and non-rivalrous good:

- Good to be provided by LoN: Peace. Peace is indivisible: War against one state is war against
another state: War against all.
- Community of states has to respond to aggression, first by diplomatic means, economic
sanctions and finally collective use of force. Community response deters the agresor

from Concert of Europe to collective security system: Concert of Europe: balance of power
between alliances of power

- Ally: If state A aids state B, if B is attacked by C

- CS: If state A aids state B, if B is attacked by C, but A also needs to come to aid C if C is
attacked by B. In this case, A is not more allied with B than with C, nor is B more allied to A
than to C, nor is C more allied to B than to A.
- This system can be extended to more states. Community response deters the agresor

- In the collective security system there are no alliances, everyone is on board → everybody is
allied to everybody
- security is collective organized and the attacker is punished by the others

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The US rejected LoN because it preferred alliance model (based on fixed interest) over collective
security system (unforeseeable)

History of Multilateralism: According to G. John Ikenberry (“The Future of Liberal Order”,

Japanese Journal of Political Science, Vol.16 Issue 3 September 2015), we can trace the origins of
evolution of Multilateralism:

- Modernity (late XVII-early XIX century): ideas of ‘world politics’ and ‘global order’;
Enlightenment thinking. (Peace of Westphalia

- Concert of Europe (1815): first organized multilateral system of global governance

(multilateral security order)

- Second industrial revolution (late XIX century – before WWI): variety of multilateral
institutions and agreements in various areas (trade, finance, shipping, communications)

- League of Nations (first half XX century): part of a larger vision of postwar order that
Woodrow Wilson advanced

- Post-WWII (‘golden age’ of liberal multilateralism): open world economy; new international
institutions; wider-American led security setting; political project. MODERNITY (“Single
Space”) → Ideology Concert of Europe → Power 2nd Industrial Rev. (International Regimes)
→ Technical League of Nations (14 Wilson Points) → Ideology + Power + Technical Post
WWII → Multipolar System. With the elements to check and force states to act.

MODERNITY (“Single Space”) → Ideology Concert of Europe → Power

2nd Industrial Rev. (International Regimes) → Technical

League of Nations (14 Wilson Points) → Ideology + Power + Technical

Post WWII → Multipolar System. With the elements to check and force states to act.

2. The League of Nations (LoN)

Versailles Peace Conference, President Wilson chaired a special Commission on the League of
Nations.

Result of the horrors of 1st WW: anarchical International system in which the security dilemma was
not solved.

A system of collective security was set up. continuation of the Concert of Europe but including the
smaller states as well as the major powers. Previous format of the Concert of Europe, with Great
Powers before the WWI , trying to avoid conflict by mutual agreement. The Hague Conferences.

Ruggie: From Alliance Policy to Collective Security Policy

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a) Public Good: indivisible, non excludable and non-rivalrous

b) from Ally to collective security: all are allies of all

This already indicates the first idea → is not only about to guarantee peace as an absence of war, but
to work on issues in order to really achieve peace.

Structure of the League of Nations

Wilson’s idealist belief: in democratic governments people would prevent governments going to war.
However:
- Japan expanded in Asia (Manchuria, 1931)
- Italy in Abyssinia (1935)
- Germany developed in the 1930s.

Failure of US Senate to approve US LoN membership ( Alliance policy)

Late joining of the USSR

Japan’s and Germany’s withdrawal

...In the end the system was not allowed to prevent the 2ndWW

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Strengths

- Many countries supported it in early days (4- they wanted peace)

- First international – global / general organization
- Collective security system
- Idealism

Some early successes:

- Settled some land disputes in 1920’s

- Helped refugees
- Dealt with spread of disease
- Fought for better conditions for people
- Social issues, such as the improvement of living and working conditions worldwide (through
ILO)
- Health issues – targeted the treatment of specific diseases (e.g. leprosy)
- Set up commissions that improved living conditions in poorer countries

Mixed balance in Conflict management and resolution

Success
- Aaland Islands (1921)
- Albania (1923)
- Greek-Bulgarian Border Dispute (1925)

Partial Success
- Upper Silesia (1921)
- Memel (1923)

Failure
- The Ruhr (1923)
- Corfu (1923)
- Vilna (1923)

Weaknesses of the LoN

1. Attitudes to the League

- Peace treaties seen unpopular, so treaty creating the League unpopular
- Paris and London differences
- USA not a member : why should others take it seriously? • Seen as a liberal, winners club

2. Membership
- 42 countries (1919) → 60 in the 1930s (also not fully independent countries could be
members, art. 1.2)
- Defeated countries from WW1 could not join immediately (e.g. Germany joined in 1926)
- Russia was left out – communist revolution in 1917

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- USA never joined – American Congress refused to the sign the Peace Treaties – Wilson voted
out of office
- The League was regarded as a ‘winners only club’
- Neither Britain nor France gave the League their full support
- LoN Governance: The smaller states could have their say in the assembly and through being
non-permanent members on the council, However, as most decisions in the council had to be
unanimous, the powers could easily veto any proposals made by the smaller League members.
This meant that the concerns of small countries could easily be ignored if they were
inconvenient to the leading members.

3. Mandate system
- No legal right to govern under the control of the League
- Took over most of Germany’s former colonies
- Countries holding colonies in mandate had to help the colonies move to self- government as
soon as possible
- Not enforcement: by late 1930s many countries turned against the League

4. Difficulties in Resolving Disputes • Sanctions as usual form of punishment

- Useless: hurting trade with other countries; removed as quickly as imposed
- No force of its own (expected members to contribute troops)

5. Unable to manage disarmament

- Britain: The need to defend the Empire and to stop trouble in parts of the Empire seeking
Independence;
- France: Defense from Germany;
- China: Civil War in progress and the need to defend against Japanese advances;
- Japan: Power of the Army and need to defense against European land-grabbing in the
Asia-Pacific;
- Switzerland: Army was small and only big enough to defend their neutrality
- Poland: Need to defend their new country, espec1ia2lly from Germany and Russia

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3. Interbellum: towards the founding of the UN

The UN was founded based on the Lessons learned of LoN and on the basis of a victorious war
coalition.

Leadership of the US President Franklin D.Roosevelt. He believed the greatest threat lay in the
enemy states of WW2

- Atlantic Charter (1941; US-UK ) “United Nations”: alliance fighting the Axis (1942).
Stipulates the importance of freedom of navigation, and promotes the open trade system
which takes on board the 1929 Crisis in Europe. It is taken into account social and economic
protection in order to avoid outbreaks
- Cooperation of the “Four Policemen” initially US and Britain, later on USSR & China. Later
adding France.

Conference of Foreign Ministers in Moscow

(1943), the 4 powers stated: “that they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest
practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign
equality of all peace-long states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the
maintenance of international peace and security”

- reference to the principle of westphalia

1942 Representatives of 26 countries fighting the Rome- Berlin-Tokyo Axis, decide to affirm their
support by Signing the Declaration by the United Nations.

Dumbarton Oaks Conference (1944), also Washington Conversations on International Peace

and Security Organization → there, the negotiation continued.

- International Conference that follows up parra 4 of Moscow Declaration. Experts met to

produce the first draft of IO for maintenance of peace & security

- Conversations were held in two phases, as Soviets were unwilling to meet directly with the
Chinese. Phase I: SU, UK, USA ; phase II: Republic of China, USA, UK

- Delegates agreed on a tentative set of proposals (Proposals for the Establishment of a General
International Organization)

- Few controversial points were left open:

- USSR Republics membership
- UNSC voting.

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In Yalta, February 1945. Controversial points (from Dumbarton Oaks) were negotiated and
approved:

- Inclusion of Soviet republics → Bielrussia and Ukraine. URSS fears of being isolated.
- Voting procedure in the SC, including SU Veto.
- US initiative to anchor human rights in the Charter

Potsdam Conference (August 1945): Truman → it was decided how to administer Germany,
establishment of the postwar order, peace treaty issues, and countering the effects of the war.

Yalta/Potsdam: 2 visions: 2 leaders that are going to be Realists (Churchill and Stalin), which do not
trust each other and have a realpolitik approach. Stalin wanted the Red Army to remain where they
were. On the other hand, the idealist (Roosevelt, Truman) saw the possibility of alliance with
Germany → they so the solution in the IO in order to achieve peace

COMPARING the League of Nations & the United Nations

LoN UN

Structure Assembly General Assembly

Permanent Council Security Council

Secretariat Secretariat

ICJ ICJ

– Trusteeship Council (main difference)

– Ecosoc.

Voting Unanimity Vote Assembly Majority Voting General (Consensus)

De facto veto for all Council members Only Veto for SC P-5 (majority
(unanimity) decision, except for veto use)

Membership Sovereign States Sovereign States

Non-Sovereign States

“Any fully self-governing State,

Dominion or Colony not named in the
Annex may become a Member of the
League if its admission is agreed to by
two-thirds of the Assembly, provided
that it shall give effective guarantees
of its sincere intention to observe its
international obligations, and shall
accept such regulations as may be
prescribed by the League in regard to
its military, naval and air forces and

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armaments.” (1.2)

Withdrawal clause No Withdrawal Clause

Any Member of the League may, after

two years' notice of its intention so to
do, withdraw from the League,
provided that all its international
obligations and all its obligations
under this Covenant shall have been
fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal
(1.3)

II. THE UN SYSTEM

1. Founding of UN: UN Conference on International Organizations 1945

The creation of the UN response to a treaty which has to be ratified by the majority of the states

San Francisco Founding Conference of UN (25 April to 26 June 1945).

- The 4 powers invited the 45 states that had opposed Germany and Japan in the war. Finally
the Charter was signed on 26 June 1945 by the representatives of the 50 countries.
- Poland, which was not represented at the Conference, signed it later and became one of the
original 51 Member States.
- UN Charter = international treaty, therefore, as a treaty, it needed to be ratified by the
signatory states. UN Charter (Art. 110 on entry into force criteria: Charter comes into force

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when the Governments of China, France, UK, SU, USA and a majority of the other signatory
states had ratified it and deposited notification to this effect with the State Department of the
United States).
- On October 24, 1945, this condition was fulfilled, the UN Charter entered into force, and the
United Nations came into existence.

UN Governance

- In 1945 only there were the 6 main bodies mentioned in the UN Charter.
- All the others are a response to the need of the IO to adapt itself to the complex realty and
new challenges in order to response to the needs → in order to increase output legitimacy

Avoid the “mistakes” of the League of Nations:

- The confusion of responsibility for peace and security between Council and AG (the Council
Big 3+ China and France would have prime responsibility)
- Restrictions of all members having a veto
- A legalistic approach to international peace and security

The Charter provides a set of tools: Pacific Settlement of Disputes (Chapter VI); Action with
respect to threats to the peace, branches of the peace and acts of aggression (Chapter VII); Regional
arrangements (Chapter VIII).

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Start up: GA with six main committees

- + first UN Secretary-General: Trygve Lie Norwegian foreign minister (not coming from one
of the 5 Permanent members → to avoid any kind of noise of power balance) +
- special agreements with ILO → they were brought into the broader framework of the UN +
- creation of FAO, UNICEF → crisis of food security after the WWII +
- the UN Human Rights Commissions developed (1946)→ +
- the General Declaration on Human Rights +
- UN Headquarters were built on New York’s East River

2. Goals: Purposes & Principles

What is understood as peace? There was no agreement on what peace means. Is peace the absence of
war?

- What they agreed on was that the bases of peace need to be rooted in social, economic, and
health… well being among people → positive peace is the kind of peace that was needed

UN Charter Logic

Peace and security is very related to justice on one side and development on the other.

The role of the individual in non western societies is much more diluted that in western countries →
affects the human rights

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UN goals and principles:

Right of self determination belongs to people and not to states

Charter “constitution of world community”: http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/

Preamble: “we the peoples of the UN” // “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” //
“reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights” // “promote social progress and better standards of life in
larger freedom”

Article 1. FOUR Goals:

- primary goal: the maintenance of International peace and security
- “Peace”: negative vs positive peace. A broad definition of peace

Article 2. Principles:
- Sovereign equality
- Duty to settle Ital disputes by peaceful means
- Prohibition on the threat or use of force (negative right)
- Exclusion of any right of the Organisation to interfere in domestic matters, except cases of
measures under Chapter VII (negative right)

Different possible interpretations

Positive or negative peace?

Broad and expanding mandate → UN security council resolutions related social, economic, or health
issues with the maintenance of peace and security

- Ex: UNSC R 2177 (2014) on Ebola; Resolution 2532 (2020) , (Covid, Climate Change)

Tensions between humanitarian problems and self-determination of peoples (vs) the principle of
sovereignty and the prohibition of intervention on domestic issues.

Birth defect: internal contradiction

- On the one hand, aspiration to subject states to a universal regime for securing peace
- On the other, great powers are still unwilling to accept the rules of that regime for themselves.

Renewed attention to the preamble: “We the peoples” (Link between interpretations and
performance!)

To understand UN and structure, we should have history and evolution present

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III. ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE UNo

1. First period: Cold War (1945-54)

The system of collective security was effectively blocked in the SC. The US and USSR used their
veto to protect their allies. → and use veto rights in order to block the admission of new members,

First major conflict: debate over the admission of new members → Only a small group of states was
admitted (Afghanistan, Iceland, Sweden, Thailand, Yemen and Pakistan, and Burma). Israel (admitted
in 1949) was the last state allowed for a period of six years. Only after 1955 was the blockade
overcome.

Collective security mechanism used for the first time in 1950, invasion of South Korea by North
Korea. Resolution 82 → It was not possible because the Soviet Union was not present at the meeting
of the SC.

Uniting for Peace Resolution

2. Second period: Emergence of Third World (1955-74)

Soviet Union cooperation strategy after death of Stalin: in UN organizations (ILO, UNESCO),
accession of new members (by the beginning of ‘60 members had climbed to 118)

Independence of colonies: changing balances of majorities in the GA + affairs of these new states
began to gain room + establishment of subsidiary organs focusing on dev. Issues: World Food
Programme, UNCTAD, UNIDO…
- Bandung Conference. Starting point of the so-called “third World” (which joined the
- First World” and the “Second World”.
- First “Development Decade” initiated in 1961.

Beginning of blue-helmet missions. → Suez Crisis (1956). French and British vetoes in SC.
- First Emergency Special Session of the GA based on the Uniting for Peace Resolution.
- Demands of an immediate cease-fire.
- Hammarskjold proposed the creation of a peacekeeping force to monitor cease-fire.

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3. Third period: North-South Conflict (1975-84)

“Third World” approaching the 2/3 majority in the GA.

- Questions of a fair world economic order.
- Balancing of interests between industrialized and developing countries.
- North-South conflict overshadowed the East-West conflict.
- Dominance of the Group of 77 in the GA and several of UN’s funds, programmes and
specialized agencies.
- Some Western States withdraw from agencies such as ILO, UNESCO

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979) showed the limits of the collective security system. →
SC gridlocked. Special emergency session of the GA condemning the aggression was powerless.

NATO decision to catch up on nuclear armaments. → Worsening of East- West relations. Little
room for maneuver in the UN.

4. Fourth period: Renaissance, Crisis, Reform (1985-)

USSR falling apart and Yugoslavia falling apart too

End of Cold War, removed the blockages in SC.
- 5 permanent members had used their veto 279 times between 45-90. Since 1990
have rarely used it.
- 1990 liberation of Kuwait conducted on the bases of the SC

UN became involved in internal conflicts (Somalia, Bosnia, East- Timor, Kosovo). New wars
(Kaldor, 1999).
- Peacekeeping missions rose with the newly-emerging forms of conflict following the end of
the Cold War

1990: Decade of World Conferences on different global issues.

BAD TIMES:
- “the death of the UN” R.Perle. Bush Administration.
- Kosovo conflict in 1999: marginalization of the UN through NATO
- 11 September 2001 and 2003 war in Iraq: Minilateralism, coalition of the Willing

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THE EVOLUTION OF MULTILATERALISM

Social and economic dimension of peace is broader → further development also becomes important
and in the 2000s you see the transformation of the relation of human security and human development
→ Security is object of development and it is subjected to the individual

IV. MEMBERSHIP

Charter was signed in June 1945 by 51 founding members. Currently, 193 states are UN members.
Since its foundation 142 further states have become members:
- Increase of states following decolonization
- New international order since the end of 1980, beginning of 1990.

UN Charter: “Membership is open to all

peace-loving States which accept the obligations
contained in the UN Charter and, in the judgment of
the Organisation, are able to carry out these
obligations”

Only sovereign states may become members. (UN

admission is the most visible symbol of state-hood)

State admissions: formal decision of the G.A. based

on a recommendation of the S.C.

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Admission procedure:

1. Application to the SG
2. Consideration by SC. Recommendation for admission must receive the affirmative votes of 9
of the 15 members, provided that none of its five PM have voted against the application.
3. Consideration by the GA. 2/3 majority vote is necessary

Examples:

Which has been the last state to become a member of the UN? South Sudan
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/07/14/south.sudan.un/

Palestina as a non-member state:

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/29/united-nations-vote-palestine-state

Example of Montenegro’s admission procedure (2006)

And what about Catalonia, Scotland, Georgia, …? They will have to first settle their issues with their
former countries in order to be able to enter the UN (if not, veto).

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Lesson 6: UN, Origins and Evolution

6.1 UN FINANCING AND BUDGET: Total UN regular Budget for 2021: $ 3.073.830.500

Each country’s contribution to the UN regular budget is based on a formula that, in theory, represents
a country’s “capacity to pay.”

The formula starts by using a country’s share of global gross national income (GNI). Then,
adjustments are applied, taking account of where a country is relative to average global income per
head and indebtedness. A minimum floor is applied and a ceiling for Least Developed countries and
the largest contributor (i.e. the U.S.).

Specialized institutions do not go in the regular budget, since they have a specific/independent budget
and governance. The budget for peacekeeping operations also goes a part of the general budget.

The US has been the biggest funder of the UN, and in the recent years China has been increased its
contribution since their economy has been increasing and they are more accountable.

It’s interesting to see how the G20 represents more or less

the 84% of the contributions, while the other countries are
accountable for the remaining 16%

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6.2 UN GOVERNANCE: CHARTER BODIES

There are 6 charter bodies → Security council, the secretariat, the general assembly, the ECOSOC, the
trusteeship council and the international court of justice. They are Charter Bodies since they appear in
the charter of the United Nations. → Reminder of the complexity of challenges and dependency
currently

The group of the OECD is represented in the General Assembly.

One of the functions that the UN takes on is the participation of new members → G77 (Global South)
and Western powers (represented by the OCDE)

Funds and programs created to address the different issues faced. Specialized organizations are
supervised by the ECOSOC.

The main differences between special agencies and programmes are the following: specialized
agencies have an institutional structure of their own, their own executive board and own secretariat,
and their own budget nondependent of the UN’s; while the programmes are much more reduced and
depend, for finance, on the GA.

In the subsidiary organs, there are also main committees. These are where issues are discussed

HRC: overseen by the GA.

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6.2.1 General Assembly: intergovernmental

(FROM article 9 to 22) makes recommendations to states on international issues within its
competence (including international peace and security - however they cannot take any decision on
something that the UNSC is working on at the moment). Takes decisions related to budget, elections.
It has also initiated actions—political, economic, humanitarian, social and legal—which have affected
the lives of millions of people throughout the world.

The main policy-making organ of the Organization.

● Comprising all Member States, it provides a unique forum for multilateral discussion of the
full spectrum of international issues covered by the Charter of the United Nations.
● Each of the 193 Member States of the United Nations has an equal vote.
● The UNGA also makes key decisions for the UN, including:
○ appointing the Secretary-General on the recommendation of the Security Council
○ electing the non-permanent members of the Security Council
○ approving the UN budget
● In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the UNGA has been carrying out its work since
2020 via novel means to guarantee business continuity and mitigate the spread of the disease.
Specific examples include the use of virtual platforms to conduct meetings and the adoption
of e-voting through procedure for decision-making when an in-person meeting is not possible.
● The pandemic is not the only issue the world faces. Racism, intolerance, inequality, climate
change, poverty, hunger, armed conflict, and other ills remain global challenges. These
challenges call for global action, and the General Assembly is a critical opportunity for all to
come together and chart a course for the future

Its mission includes:

● Consider and approve the United Nations budget and establish the financial assessments of
Member States;
● Elect the non-permanent members of the Security Council and the members of other
United Nations councils and organs and, on the recommendation of the Security Council,
appoint the Secretary-General;
● Consider and make recommendations on the general principles of cooperation for
maintaining international peace and security, including disarmament;
● Discuss any question relating to international peace and security and, except where a dispute
or situation is currently being discussed by the Security Council, make recommendations
on it;
● Discuss, with the same exception, and make recommendations on any questions within the
scope of the Charter or affecting the powers and functions of any organ of the United Nations;
● Initiate studies and make recommendations to promote international political cooperation,
the development and codification of international law, the realization of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, and international collaboration in the economic, social, humanitarian,
cultural, educational and health fields;
● Make recommendations for the peaceful settlement of any situation that might impair
friendly relations among countries;

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● Consider reports from the Security Council and other United Nations organs.

UN GA Organization

The Assembly meets in regular sessions from September to December each year, and thereafter as
required. It discusses specific issues through dedicated agenda items or sub-items, which lead to the
adoption of resolutions (non-binding).

Sitting arrangements in the General Assembly Hall change for each session. During the 77th Session
(2022-2023), Belize will occupy the first seat in the Hall, including in the Main Committees (followed
by all the other countries, in English alphabetical order).

High level Segment and regular sessions → the regular

UN GA Main Committees

● First Committee (Disarmament & International Security)

● Second Committee (Economic & Financial)
● Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian & Cultural)
● Fourth Committee (Special Political & Decolonization)
● Fifth Committee (Administrative & Budgetary)
● Sixth Committee (Legal)

In these committees this resolutions are discussed and approved, and once there are approved they
pass to the general assembly where they will be adopted as recommendations

UN GA 77 SESSION:

● Agenda: https://www.un.org/en/ga/77/agenda/
● UN WebTV: http://webtv.un.org/meetings-events/general-assembly/
● Csaba Körösi (Hungary) , President 77th Session UNGA

The president of the general assembly has the capacity to channel the debates

The general assembly also has the role to create subsidiary bodies

Decision-making: search for consensus

● Each of the 193 Member States in the Assembly has one vote.
● Votes taken on designated important issues— such as recommendations on peace and security,
the election of Security Council and Economic and Social Council members, and budgetary
questions—require a two-thirds majority of Member States, but other questions are decided
by a simple majority.
● In recent years, an effort has been made to achieve consensus on issues, rather than deciding
by a formal vote, thus strengthening support for the Assembly’s decisions. The President,
after having consulted and reached agreement with delegations, can propose that a resolution
be adopted without a vote.

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● As it the AG Resolutions represent the opinion of the world community, its decisions are
morally binding

The Assembly may also take action in cases of a threat to the peace, breach of peace or act of
aggression, when the Security Council has failed to act owing to the negative vote of a permanent
member. In such instances, according to its “Uniting for peace” resolution of 3 November 1950, the
Assembly may consider the matter immediately and recommend to its Members collective measures
to maintain or restore international peace and security.

UN GA Input Legitimacy

The input legitimacy of the UN GA is related to the representation of the population groups

Issues to input legitimacy: Africa has a total of 54 members and therefore 54 votes while it only
represents 15.8% of the population. Asia and the Pacific represent a total of 58.5% of the population
don’t have as many votes, they have 53.

GA: is set up as a concrete and specific one country one vote. Liechtenstein has as many votes as
China in the general assembly.

In the General assembly there are regional groups, which represent fairly the regional areas

6.2.2. UN Secretariat: non-intergovernmental

It is the main administrative organ of the UN, 43.000 personnel, public servants, “loyalty to the
UN not to their states”. Its main offices can be found in NY but there are also parts of the UN in
other parts of the world
- The secretary General is chosen by the General Assembly (GA) on the recommendation of the
SC. Compromise candidate: approved by both the Council veto powers and by the G77 Since
1946, five-years term of office, with the possibility of one second term. The 9th (and
current) UN Secretary-General is António Guterres: from 2017-2021. Mandate: be the
chief administrative officer of the Organization and bring attention of the SC any
matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and
security. Instructed by the UN Charter to be politically neutral, to maintain an “international
character”.

- It is organized along departmental lines, with each department or office having a distinct area
of action and responsibility. The Secretariat ensures the daily work, services the principal
organs and administers the programs and prepares and executes policies laid down by them.

How the secretariat is organized nowadays is the result of specific decisions in the general assembly
and topics that are in the current agenda

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Activities can be diverse as follows:

● Administration of peacekeeping operations
● Mediation of international disputes
● Examinations of trends and economic and social problems (DESA)
● Preparation of studies on human rights and sustainable development (OHCHR).
● Awareness and information to the media and NGOs about the work of the United Nations
(DPI - NGO)
● Organization of international conferences on topics of common interest, Monitoring the
degree of compliance with the decisions of the organs of the United Nations,

The people that are elected are usually not big powers nor part of the big five. The SG can bring
attention to any issues they consider relevant. e.g. Tigray region, CC. They are supposed to be
politically neutral and maintain an “international character”.

Role: can be seen as an independent actor. Can speak with a strong independent voice. Agenda Setter
and Mediator

SG: has neither the ability to legislate, nor the ability to enforce. The ability to persuade. Role as
independent actor depends on political skills. The Secretary-General is appointed by the General
Assembly, on the recommendation of the Security Council. The Secretary-General's selection is
therefore subject to the veto of any of the five permanent members of the Security Council.

- This process was not quite transparent/”fair” (was pretty biased) so in 2016 the procedure of
selection changed → Selection procedure to elect the 9th UNSG opened in December 2016
with a call for candidates.

Process in the 2016 selection:

- Informal Dialogues and Civil Society Engagement with Candidates for next Secretary-
General [25 Feb 2016]:
- Secretary General Selection– Informal Dialogues by General Assembly [29 Mar 2016]
- Secretary-General Selection – Second round of Informal Dialogues [24 May 2016]
- Consideration of candidacies for the position of next Secretary- General [15 June 2016] by the
Security Council
- Security Council Straw Pollson SG candidates [21 July 2016]
- Appointment of the secretary general – security council recommendation

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- Reelection:June 2021

Where Are The Women? → gender gap

WHAT DOES EVIDENCE SHOW?

- Nordic countries are usually overrepresented, because of:

- Impartiality + they invest a lot in the UN.
- This is very important since there is a whole discussion of China in the role of UN →
there has been a rebalance since members are more demanding to have voice in the
UN
- Depending on the representations there is an influence in the debates and the issue →
the representation help to coin the narrative at can be more empathetic with their issue
(this is what China is trying to do)
- The overrepresentation in issue since is a failure for the input legitimacy since not all
the countries are being equally represented and their need may not be taken into
consideration, and concerning the output legitimacy this overrepresentation may
produce decisions and programs that may not adapt to the need of the minoriti¡y
countries. Not the same need in one or another country.

António Guterres → 9th UN Secretary general JANUARY 2017 – DECEMBER 2021---Continued

6.2.3. ECOSOC (intergovernmental) = Economic and social council:

Its main task is to take responsibility, together with the GA, for those tasks in the economic and social
realm. In accordance, its system of regional representation is weighted towards developing countries.

The Council's 54 member Governments, elected by the GA for 3 years. Seats based on geographical
representation: 14 to African States, 11 to Asian States, 6 to Eastern European States, 10 to Latin
American and Caribbean States, and 13 to Western European and other States.

It coordinates functional Commissions ( Crime Prevention, Narcotics, Population & Development,

Science & Technology for Development, Statistics, Sustainable Development, Social Development,
Status of Women, Forum on Forests)

It is the focal point of contact and coordination with 15 affiliated specialized agencies. (art. 57.2), 10
organic commission and 5 regional commissions and receives reports from 11 UN Programmes and
funds

Makes policy recommendations to the UN system and its member states

- Channels NGO participation

- ECOSOC has appeared to be evolving increasingly into a mere helper-organization for the
G.A. The G.A. has withdrawn further areas of competence from ECOSOC through the
creation of special bodies such as UNDP and the UNCTAD.

Role: Has little agency and is better understood as a forum. The commissions and agencies subsidiary
to it often have more agency.

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It coordinates economic, social and cultural issues. It coordinates different functional commissions
(Crime prevention, narcotics,), also agencies like FAO and others give their reports to ECOSOC. Via
ECOSOC, you can see civil society and NGOs participating. These can only participate until this
level, they cannot participate in proceedings of the ICJ or GA for instance, only in subsidiary bodies
of the ECOSOC. The representation in ECOSOC has been rising, it increased with decolonization and
after 1974 as well. These agencies are in charge of international cooperation for
development. coordinates all specialized organizations that send their input to the ECOSOC.
a. 2 specialized organizations (Ecosoc)

In 1945 there were 18 members, in 1965, 37 members, and in 1974 there were 54.

ARTICLE 71

The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with
non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such
arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national
organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned. Categories of
Consultative Status

Ecosoc Connection with Civil Society – Increasing number of NGOs at the UN : it remains a
Western affair

Management of NGOs → The vast majority of NGOs and

civil society organizations come from the west. The input
that comes from civil society in ECOSOC (and in the work
of the UN) are still corresponding to issues that stem from
western societies.
This is because (1) geographic proximity, the main bodies
of ECOSOC are in the West (NY and Geneva), and (2)
NGOs from the south and the Pacific have to travel to
western countries which are linked with both Visa
procedures and expenditures (need budget to travel).
However, in the last decades, in absolute terms, Africa and Asia have been participating much more
(e.g. Cop26).

Categories of Consultative Status

- General : Global, large membership

and work on many issues
- Special : Regional and general or
specialist and high status
- Roster: Small or highly specialist or
work with UN agencies

​ /47/277 - S/24111. 17 June 1992. An Agenda for Peace. Preventive

A
diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. Report of the
Secretary-General.

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To put into practice an agenda for peace → elaborates much more the need for peace in The UN.
In 2006 they formalized the interactive triangle of Peace, democracy and development → the two
variables are dependent-.

How is International cooperation for development framed?

** specialized organization have their own governance

structure, general assembly, and budget

Subsidiary Agencies: Programmes and Funds (UNGA)

- International Trade Centre (ITC)

- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
- United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
- United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
- United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF)
- United Nations Volunteers (UNV)
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
- Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
- United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT)
- United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)
- United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)
- United Nations World Food Programme (WFP)

Specialized Organizations

- International Labour Organization (ILO)

- International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
- International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
- International Maritime Organization (IMO)
- World Health Organization (WHO)
- International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
- United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)
- Universal Postal Union (UPU)
- World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
- Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
- World Meteorological Organization (WMO)
- World Tourism Organization (UNWTO)
Note: The World Trade Organization (WTO) is not a UN Specialized agency

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SDGs → big issue for the current agenda

6.2.4 ICJ (non-intergovernmental):

Primary judicial organ of the UN, body designed to adjudicate disputes between countries and to
interpret international law. Comprises fifteen independent judges, appointed through a procedure
involving both the Security Council and the General Assembly. Appointed for 9 years.

It is also based in a Western country (La Haye, Netherlands). It intervenes in inter-state disputes: if
two countries have a problem, they bring it to the ICJ. 15 countries appointed by the Security Council
and the GA. Only for states, no non-member states have access, it emphasizes the state nature of the
UN.

How it works:
- Legal disputes between states submitted to it by them(Only states may be parties to disputes
before the ICJ - the ICJ is reinforcing the idea that states are the core actors in international
relations.)
- Advisory opinions: other organs of the UN can request advisory opinions of the ICJ or its 16
specialized agencies. The United Nations General Assembly and Security Council may
request advisory opinions on "any legal question". Other United Nations organs and
specialized agencies which have been authorized to seek advisory opinions can only do so
with respect to "legal questions arising within the scope of their activities".

Important areas it has been covering recently are territorial issues. Border disputes or maritime
disputes are issues where the ICJ intervenes, it comes up with a contextualization and a solution.
Dispute-settlement system. One of the most important recent cases is the advisory opinion of the issue
with Kosovo.

ICJ has not played a very active role in international politics. However, states increasingly submit
disputes to ICJ and demand Advisory Opinion

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6.2.5. Trusteeship Council: Chapter XI-XIII (art.73-91)

In 1945, under Chapter XII of the Charter, the United Nations established the International
Trusteeship System for the supervision of Trust Territories placed under it by individual agreements
with the States administering them. Under Article 77 of the Charter, the Trusteeship System applied
to:

- Territories held under Mandates established by the League of Nations after the First World
War;
- Territories detached from "enemy States" as a result of the Second World War;
- Territories voluntarily placed under the System by States responsible for their
administration.

It was in charge of taking over the mandate territories that were under the LoN. Palestine,
territories under German control, etc. These territories had to be controlled in order to have a SD that
allowed them to establish an economic and political stability. These trustees would accompany these
states through a civilization process. The basic objective of the System was to promote the political,
economic and social advancement of the Territories and their development towards self-government
and self-determination. It also encouraged respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and
recognition of the interdependence of peoples of the world.

It vanished when the last colony was decolonized (Palau), and since then these territories are managed
by the Special Committee on Decolonization (managed by the UNGA). Every year, there is a session
of different cases in the GA, where they talk about PR, Western Sahara, etc. These issues are handled
there via the commission. The list of territories that are still handled by them are Guam, St. Helena,
Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, Turks and Caicos, Western Sahara, New Caledonia, etc.

To date, all Trust Territories have

attained self-government or
independence, either as separate
States or by joining neighboring
independent countries.

Example: New Caledonia: Nouméa Agreements with the French government, and very uniquely
decided that before 2022, a referendum should be held to determine whether NC should be a part of
France, associated with it, independent, or any other form. The unique feature of this is that it is not a
single referendum, but that there would be 3 → if any of them would be in favor of independence, NC

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would become independent. It is monitored by the Decolonization Committee and another UN agency
that checks whether the proceedings are in line with the international framework. There have already
been 2 referendums, both with a NO, and on December 12th, there was the last one with a NO as well,
but only with 43% of participation. It is relevant to consider these issues, for instance for geopolitical
shifts in the Asia-Pacific (advance of China) and everything related to alliances that are being
constructed.

6.2.6. Security Council:

Coordination of the collective security system. Settle conflicts without resorting to violence or force.
Created 1945 reminiscent of the powers of the time. 5 Permanent Members and 6 Non-Permanent
Members. In 1963, the number of NPM was proposed to be increased to 10.
The Security Council is an intergovernmental body. 5 permanent members and 10 non permanent. The
10 non-permanent members have a mandate of 2 years.

15 Members:

- 5 permanent members: China, France, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the
United States,
- 10 non-permanent members elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly (with end of
term year):
- Albania (2023)
- Brazil (2023)
- Gabon (2023)
- Ghana (2023)
- India (2022)
- Ireland (2022)
- Kenya (2022)
- Mexico (2022)
Norway (2022)
- United Arab Emirates (2023)

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Non-Council Member States

More than 50 United Nations Member States have never been Members of the Security Council.
A State which is a Member of the United Nations but not of the Security Council may participate,
without a vote, in its discussions when the Council considers that country's interests are affected. Both
Members and non- members of the United Nations, if they are parties to a dispute being considered by
the Council, may be invited to take part, without a vote, in the Council's discussions; the Council sets
the conditions for participation by a non-member State.

Every month there is a rotating presidency, this month, for instance, it is India. This president
proposes the issues that should be on the table the correspondent month.

The people that can activate the Security Council in order to meet are the president of the UN security
Council; the UN Secretary General, if they consider that there is a specific issue disturbing global
peace and security; and UN members, which have to channel it through the UN Secretary General or
the President of the SC. If there is an issue that affects MS directly, who participates in the debate are
the UNSC Permanent Members and Non-PM, and the country that is coated in the issue (Tigray:
representative of Ethiopia, any other states that are considered are affected. But these states cannot
vote provided that they are NPM).

There are some states that are much more represented than others in the SC. The NPM are chosen by
the GA on the basis of regional importance.

Functions and powers of the security council:

The functions and powers of the Security Council are covered in Articles 24-26 of the Charter of the
United Nations:
- Article 24 – Responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security
- Article 25 – Agreement to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council
- Article 26 – Regulation of armaments

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Security Council procedures

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Important issues: Chapters VI, VII, VIII

Chapter VI: peaceful and pacific settlement of disputes, it provides assistance at the request of the
parties. This investigation does not normally involve military means (until an accord is arranged). It
is state-focused, it is mandatory to have the consent of the parties. Council has authority to
investigate. The conditions to a chapter VI operation are consent of the parties; a cease-fire needs to
be effective; a comprehensive agreement should be signed; parties assist the deployment of force;
parties sign a SOFA (status of forces).

Chapter VII: it is the decision to use enforcement of power, in breaches of peace and acts of
regression (in ongoing conflicts), no longer within the framework of consent. Lessons learned of
where it went wrong with the LoN (veto power and unanimity). The range of situations which the
Council determined as giving rise to threats to the peace includes country-specific situations such as
inter- or intra- State conflicts or internal conflicts with a regional or sub-regional dimension.
Furthermore, the Council identifies potential or generic threats as threats to international peace and
security, such as terrorist acts, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or the proliferation
and illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons.

“The Decision to Use Enforcement Power”

Conflict is ongoing; High risk that conflict may start again; Parties are not in agreement, and there is
a risky internal situation which includes violations of human rights, weapons, etc. It happens when
there is a risk of external intervention and the self-defense is insufficient to protect. Using the
resort to force as a last option → military force if needed (although it goes beyond the UN charter),
it should have been agreed by such Charter previously.
- Does not tell you to use force actively, is not combat operation
- Provides the full range of options including up to and including enforcement power
(Declaration that the conflict represents a threat to international peace and security; Non use
of force options –ie sanctions; Use of Armed force – if necessary and as a last resort)
- Establishes the legal context for intervention and the use of force

How it works → To act within these articles it must be determined if there is a (1) threat to peace,
such as a terrorist state, such as Ebola or Climate Change; a (2) breach of peace, such as building
nuclear arms; or an (3) act of aggression, such as the annexation of territory. After this is determined,
they use article 40, which calls for provisional measures:

- Article 41: impose sanctions such as economic and trade sanctions (Iraq), arms embargoes
(Rwanda), etc.
- Article 42: authorize the use of force, to avert aggression (Iraq vs Kuwait), to give authority
to peacekeeping forces (Somalia), or to maintain a specific government (Afghanistan).

All states are expected to follow these measures.

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Chapter VI
Parties request assistance
Commit to peaceful resolution
Political will of the parties
Consent to the operation
Effective cease-fire
Comprehensive agreement
Parties assist the deployment
Signature of SOFA
Barrés & Ticó <3
Chapter VII
Conflict is ongoing
Risk of renewed conflict high
Parties not in agreement
Risky internal situation
Rogue elements not included
Risk of external intervention
Presence of foreign forces
Self defense judged insufficient
Legal basis for intervention needed
SOFA
CSTO → The Collective
Security Treaty Organization
is an intergovernmental
military alliance in Eurasia
consisting of six post-Soviet
states.
Ukraine and Russia
situation→ CHAPTER VIII
Article 42. However, UNSC
will never intervene in the
conflict since Russia would
use the VETO power and
later Russia would boycott
any changes the SC would
like to make.
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In May 2022 Liechtenstein and 80 other member states started to resort to the use of VETO power.
The UN GA cannot make recommendations in regard to any issues that are under the UN SC. There
would be a specific resolution set by the UN GA. However, it is not really a reform, but rather a
strengthening of procedures between bodies of the UN, specifically between UN SC and UN GA.
Therefore, before member states use the VETO, they might think 2 or 3 times.

Emerging Norms Right to Protect: 2005 World Summit Outcome Document:

There are documents in the UN when the words appear such as ethnic cleansing,crimes towards
humanity, etc. using this specific language is useful because it immediately refers you to a concrete
action of the UN SC.

Art 138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of
such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that
responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as
appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United
Nations in establishing an early warning capability.

Art 139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI
and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing
and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely
and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter
VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate,
should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity

Responsibility to Protect (R2P): Redefining State Sovereignty

What is the issue basically? The principle has to be based on respects from the norms and principles
of International Law, related to; sovereignty, peace and security, human rights and armed conflict.

R2P is the legal principle for States to infringe the Westphalian sovereignty of States in case of
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity

R2P premise sovereignty entails a responsibility to protect all populations from mass atrocity crimes
and human rights violations. This is a huge change → lays out the conditions, the UNSC can
intervene in situations that state cannot protect the interest of their own citizens: avoiding that they
are living threatened (case of the Rohingyas).

The principle is based on respect for the norms and principles of International Law. Especially the
underlying principles of law relating to sovereignty, peace and security, human rights, and armed
conflict, it must always be the responsibility of the state.

Three pillars for the right to protect:

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I. The protection responsibilities of the state: "Each individual state has the responsibility
to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against
humanity"
II. International assistance and capacity building: states pledge to collaborate in order to
protect populations under the rule of other states that are threatened. There must be
consequences for grave human rights violations. All countries have to take part in this
responsibility. The responsibility to protect and the right to intervene can only be invoked
if there is a UNSC resolution that authorized this intervention.
III. Timely and decisive collective response: If any state is "manifestly failing" in its
protection responsibilities, then states should take collective action to protect the
population

Right to protect: focus on prevention of human catastrophe. It is always approved by the UN Security
Council. Resorting to military force is only the last resort, if all other possible means fail. R2P
provides a framework for employing measures that already exist (i.e., mediation, early warning
mechanisms, economic sanctions, and chapter VII powers) to prevent atrocity crimes and to protect
civilians from their occurrence.

Humanitarian intervention and R2P share the fact that state sovereignty is not absolute. R2P is for
state protection while Humanitarian intervention is to protect individuals.

This is pre 2006, in this specific case the humanitarian intervention is to expand the interest of states,
which could be political, or economic. The prospect is state-centric (benefits for the state). There is no
specific limit, it is for ‘humanitarian reasons’, however, their objectives can be expanded.

On the other hand, when we talk about the R2P, contrary to the Human Intervention it has to be
always sanctioned by International LAw and this standard of IL is the UN SC resolution. We can only
speak about R2P if there is a UN SC resolution talking about R2P. It is focused on protecting
individual rights, to guarantee the right to life (contrary to HI, it is not state centric). This only
happens in the case if a specific state fails its obligations.

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Humanitarian Intervention R2P (right to protect)

Focus on prevention of human catastrophe: Resort to

Implies only military force: No military force is only last resort, if all other possible
authorization of UNSC (unilateral) means fail; authorization for the use of force by the
UN Security Council.

May be sanctioned by international law,

but it is questioned. reference to customary Is legal, sanctioned by international law.
law

Only can be used in very specific situations: war

No specific limited objective (furtherance
crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing,
of the self-interest of nations)
genocide

Focus on the right to intervene: state

centric.
i.e. Russian, British, French anti-Ottoman
Responsibility to protect: it has to be people-centered
Empire intervention in the Greek
Independence War (1824) to protect
Christian minorities

More than 80 UNSC Resolutions mentioning R2P: Libya 2011 (intervention), 2013 Syria, Ivory Coast
in 2011 (enforcement)…Issue in Syria, UNSC adopted a resolution adopted with the abstention of
China and Russia, but afterwards and due to what happened, the two accused Western Countries of
using this right to protect as a way to perform a regime change in Syria.

The turning point was with Libya in 2011, for the first time after WWII, the UNSC resolution was
adopted authorizing the intervention in Libya.

Syria became very critical and ran out of cash, the UN favored a resolution in the case of Syria,
alleging massive human rights for Asia.

What about the Rohingya, Uyghurs, Tigray…? Why is there no UN SC resolution? Because China is a
permanent member of the UNSC, therefore, it has the VETO power, and you need to have the
alignment of all UNSC members to approve to intervene in this situation.

Is this arbitrary? No, because when there is a member of the UN community that is committing
crimes against humanity and it is detected and observed and approved in the HRC, there is a very
specific procedures that the world community need to conduct.

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Human Rights & International Security: R2P

A barometer of Global Division. Vetoes in thein the UN Security

Council

The use of veto powers: After the 1990s it started to be more mixed,
as at the beginning it was just the USSR who used veto powers. In the
UNSC what has brought more vetoes (mainly from the US) is the
Israeli-Palestine issue, South Africa (Apartheid), Namibia, Nicaragua
and Syria.
As of 2006, China started using its VETO power more often, also
sometimes in coalition with Russia. P5 is composed of the P3 (UK,
France, and the US) and the P2 (China and Russia).

Peacekeeping, peace building: Issue of peacekeeping in the 1950s in the context of the Suez Canal.
No mention at all of peacekeeping in the Charter. Innovative and creative approach. Issues of
peacekeeping often called; Chapter 6 and a half, because it’s an in-between of the two. Based on
interstate conflict (between two governments that are working and in control), and the task of
traditional peacekeeping was to separate the parties. → The international community developed much
more.
The called “Chapter 6 ½” Peacekeeping → There is no legal basis.

Evolution of peacekeeping challenges: it became more and more complex, towards the end of the 90s,
as many of the actors are non-state actors and more dynamics take place, the UN and its mission
become more and more complex, and the traditional approach to peacekeeping is not adequate
anymore.

- Traditional peacekeeping: it is no longer effective

- Implementation of complex agreements and settlements
- Preventive deployment
- Observation of a non-UN peacekeeping force
- Co-deployment with regional peacekeeping forces

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- Peace Enforcement
- Provision of Humanitarian

Features of Modern peacekeeping:

- Intra-state conflict - State infrastructure broken down

- Governments ineffective or not in
control; there can be political groups,
or movements.
- Factional Political groupings &
leadership
- Judicial & police breakdown
- Military factions & warlords
- weapons proliferation
- there are no rules
- intermingled with populations
- full range of civilian agencies / NGO

Classic peacekeeping Modern peacekeeping

Inter-state conflict Intra-state conflict

Governments functioning and in control Governments ineffective or not in control

Government infrastructure intact Factional political Groupings & Leadership

Military and police structures operating Judicial and police breakdown

Military factions and warlords; Weapons

Judicial systems in place
proliferation

International rules operate There are no rules

Minimum contact with population Intermingled with population

Full range of civilian agencies / NGOs

Peace operations are not played with the regular budget

of the UN. There is a UN peacekeeping budget, and the
US is the biggest contributor (28.47%), and China
(10.25%), respectively. In 2020, the number of women
as military and police peacekeepers should double.

Rising powers are key partners for UN peace

operations. In particular Turkey, Egypt, Brazil, Russia,
South Africa, China (second contributor to the UN
peacekeeping budget), India and Indonesia.

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The Departments of Political and Peace Building Affairs and Peace operations within the
organigramme of the UN Secretariat

In accordance with the evolution of the specific conflict, the mandate will be changed or modified. In
peacekeeping missions, Africa is the most represented.

If there are situations of the use of VETO, the GA can convene a meeting to explain its vote in front
of the international community, and then it is the GA who takes a vote based on that. Does it change
the situation? No, but it makes it more difficult for the VETO powers to legitimize their actions.

Who is reluctant to admit civil societies participation in the UPR?

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LESSON 7 : Multilateralism, the UN crisis and UN Reform – 😡 cara enutjada

With regards to multilateralism, we were talking about inclusiveness and rule-based solutions. It is not
a matter of 3 or more states, it is not only nominal but also qualitative (it has to do with norms and
values).

7.1 SOME DEFINITIONS

→ Barkin, 2006: Multilateralism: a pattern of state interaction focused on inclusive negotiation
aimed at the creation of rule-based solutions to issues that have the potential to create
international conflict. Multilateralism is now the expected norm of state behavior in a way
that was not true half a century ago. States still act unilaterally on occasion, but when they do,
they are often seen as acting inappropriately.

Multilateralism as a form of globalization

→ Ruggie, 1993: A core and concrete feature of current international institutional arrangements
is in their multilateral form. The term multilateral is an adjective that modifies the noun
institution. What distinguishes the multilateral form from others is that it coordinates
behavior among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct.

Not only nominal, but it is also qualitative. It has to be coordinated in the principles of norms, values,
etc. Multilateralism has taken different forms; it is not static and it adapts itself to every specific
situation.

- should not be equated with universal geographical scope

- was not invented in 1945

7.2 HISTORY OF MULTILATERALISM (multilateralism can be understood as the

product/institutional expression of each specific international society). IOs are dependent on external
conditions (East-West or North-South conflict – not a static system of formal and informal norms).
Transformations can be explained (Robert Cox) by the frameworks for action, historical structures:
interaction between power (=material capacities) – ideas - institutions.

- Institutions have to allow the maintenance of hegemonic orders Are the product of these
world orders
- Give political legitimacy to the rules of the world order
- Co-opt elites of periphery
- Absorb counter-hegemonic ideas

- The UN is a clear example of the move to institutions that began with the League of Nations
and characterized the practice of multilateralism during the 20th century.
- Multilateralism can be understood as the product /institutional expression of each specific
international society

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Marxist author Robert Cox: If you approach the idea of multilateralism in which you relate the
action on the basis of norms, then, according to Cox, it can be approached in a specific way. For him,
what is important is the power and the ideas. He distinguished multilateralism in 3 forms,
multilateralism is shaped when these three elements are changing.

1. Power (money): who has the power or material conditions. Powers shift change.
2. Ideas: which are the values that are being promoted in a certain historical framework. Ideas
vary when power switches.
3. Institutions: which accompany and express this specific framework. Institutions will be
adapted to changes in power and ideas over time.

When there are power shifts everything changes. If these changes coincide in time and place, there
will be a transformation from one type of multilateralism to another form of multilateralism. → UN
clear example of the “move of institutions” (Ruggie) that began with the League of Nations and
characterized the practice of multilateralism during the 20th century.

Sanahuja says the key role is the institutions, because they're the ones who create and defuse the ideas
of human rights (diffused and legitimized by the UN).

According to Costa: Three different phases in the evolution of multilateralism, corresponding to

three historic structures/framework of action (as a product of the corresponding international
society and which have been working in a cumulative manner during the history of the UN).

1. Based on coexistence (Multilateralism of coexistence)

- Seen as a minimal expression: we coexist. We should limit and coordinate the actions of
states, which is the best way to dominate international order.
- Sustain the pluralist nature of the Westphalia system of states
- The main goal is “to limit and coordinate the interaction between states in order to allow them
a major scope of freedom to pursue their national interests with the minimum interference or
imposition from the other. This is a negative multilateralism: aimed at preventing conflict
does not go beyond preventing and reframing, “prevention and removal of threats”.
- Sort of multilateralism represented by the LoN: that was a response to the need for
multilateral institutions capable of providing collective security to mitigate the effects of the
anarchical system.

- Art 1.1 & 2 (Chart of UN)

Art. 1.1: “To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for
the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other
breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice
and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a
breach of the peace”;

Art. 2: The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.... All Members
shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and
security, and justice, are not endangered. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other

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manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. All Members shall give the United Nations every
assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance

Nothing contained in the Charter shall authorize the UN to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.

Type of International Society: eurocentrism, following the 1stWW, Watchdog state (primary task:
maintenance of the domestic peace, the external defense and the minimum conditions for the good
functioning of the markets)

2. Based on cooperation

Burley: UN system as a set of norms can be understood as a transition to an organized system of

cooperative efforts: rules of cooperation have to govern interactions between states. It is set up not
only to coexist but also to cooperate. Not only prevention, suppression and reframing as a negative
approach, but a much more positive approach, aimed at cooperating with one another.

Preamble UN Charter: “promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom”

Article 1.3. “To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic,
social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human
rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”

- This allows working on issues conventionally considered of domestic concern. (Health,

education, culture, science, human rights, labor rights, food security, protection of the
environment)

Based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all of its members.

Type of International Society: How do we account for the emergence of this kind of multilateralism?

The type of state that we have is:

Multilateralism of cooperation is the result of the historical context of the post 2ndWW world,
determined by a unipolar world dominated by the US (one of the first hegemony in the human history
which is a fully-fledged democracy), and the liberal nature of the political hegemony influences the
type of organizations created. It’s a democracy, transparent, a liberal power… This is what it transmits
to the international institutions.
- USA (US political system, checks and balances. The first hegemonic power that is a democracy,
characterized by transparency, access to the domestic political arena, even for foreign interests (open
society)
- Ikenberry: not only American hegemony but above all American hegemony.

Transformation of the main subject of multilateral institutions: the state → the shift in state-citizen
relations also triggered a shift in relations between states.

From the Watchdog state to the Welfare state, or from the New Deal (a big programme which tried
to create jobs and growth at a domestic level)- this programme being exported to the UN system. The

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move to institutions was deeply influenced by domestic experiences (Ikenberry, Sanahuja). Foreign
policy: made well beyond Foreign Offices and Defense Ministries. Foreign policy is no longer made
exclusively by the ministry of foreign affairs, but it also enlarges and includes other types of
government ministries.

3. Based on solidarism

Solidarism changes (would change) the relationship between the individual and individual rights and
the international society.

Appears after the 1980s, started with the end of the Cold War (and genocides) + the increase of
international Organizations and an incipient global civil society. And the new norm that emerges is
R2P and the positive peace (linked with human security).

R2P and the activity of the SC during the 90s in Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, Haiti or Sierra Leona. The
state is no longer the focus, but rather the individual. This has been going on since the end of the
1980s, when the USSR came down, and the US became much more unipolar.

- Contradicts with the principle of non-sovereignty interference: due to power shift there is a
new political context which allows to discuss a debate on how the international community
can act against international issues.
- Kofi Annan, Millennium Summit. Conflict in Kosovo: how to react in cases of massive
human rights violations.

Positive peace: human security + Development issues importance

Solidarism has no explicit reference in the UN Charter: it’s an interpretation. These new norms, in
particular R2P, are not part of the UN Charter.

The type of international society that we have is: new challenges and threats `an hegemonic
historical structure with no antagonist power. BUT:

How do we account for the emergence of these norms?

Changes in violent conflicts. Intra-state conflicts, gross violations of human rights. Humanitarian
dimension of violent conflicts has taken central stage.

The support of a strong coalition of states that…

- had no fear of foreign interference (material or normative),

- were used to set and interpret international norms (instead of receiving them) and, – on
occasions, were less than orthodoxly Westphalian in practicing sovereignty.
- The Greater West.

The emergence of a transnational civil society.

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Type of International Society: new challenges and threats + hegemonic historical structure with no
antagonist power, BUT:
1. Solidarity deployed itself at the same time that the conditions for its existence were
disappearing.
2. Fundamental contradictions between solidarism and coexistence.

Then Libya 2011 (issue of the right to protect in the country) happened: CRISIS OF
MULTILATERALISM.

Costa: Contemporary Multilateralism is a superposition of

7.3 CHALLENGES FOR MULTILATERALISM OF THE 21ST CENTURY

- Lack of legitimacy and effectiveness

- Era of power transition, with declining powers and rising powers. Zakaría (2008). “the rise
of the rest”. (HDR “The Rise of the South”)

Given this situation, we see 3 basic tendencies:

(1) how the institutional framework is contested → contestation of the prevailing institutional
framework
(2) emerging powers which have not joined the multilateralism of solidarity,
(3) the question arises whether the UN will be capable of adapting to this power transition

Demographic trends: population growth and representativity; strengthened economic road,

progressively the western countries are losing protagonists in economic exchange and activities.

- Regions and regional dynamics are becoming basic pillars of world politics, since the end of
the Cold War.
- Globalisation
- Increasing relevance of transnational policy networks

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One of the main examples is the evolution of Sub-Saharan Africa and the rise in the South-South trade
(look at the graphs)

7.4 NEED FOR NEW MULTILATERALISM: a more Cosmopolitan multilateralism?

- Needs to overcome dual democratic deficit: non-state actors + new power distribution

- Need for Representative, legitimate and effective multilateralism, capable of responding

to the growing needs for international cooperation

- To guarantee the democratic governance of globalization: more inclusive (non-state actors);

more representative (new power distribution); more effective in the provision of global public
goods.

Feasibility for a new multilateralism

Is there a shared commitment to multilateralism? Understood as a common narrative for the

different International blocks? YES: effective multilateralism is supposed to be a preferred
instrument of global governance for different blocks (US, UE, AL). BUT:

According to Sanahuja, we can identify several narratives of multilateralism in order to name

the reality. These construct reality and give it a specific meaning to make them coherent and
accessible. To him, multilateralism does not only refer to the norms, right to protect, etc., but also and
in particular to political discourse that is socially constructed. It has to be functional and logical,
otherwise, it does not work. It has to be able to give a proper response to international problems.

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Shared commitment to MT → MT is generally a preferred outcome and instrument for different

blocks (US, UE, AL).

But there are different narratives which can be identified. “The Rashomon effect” (Sanahuja, 2012).
Narratives often have a crucial role in social construction of reality by providing it with certain
rationality and coherence. They are being configured as interpretative frames capable of giving sense
to facts → multilateralism is (1) legal principle and norm, as well as (2) political discourse, (3) moral
aspiration and (4) functional logic.

Three great narratives that coexist in a conflictive relation should be identified within the triangle.

1. The hegemonic multilateralism of the US: wants multilateralism but does not want to
subjugate to international principles.

2. Normative multiculturalism of the EU: experience of integrating where states cooperate and
work together, EU emerges as a proponent as an example of regional integration

3. Defensive and revisionist multilateralism of the emerging powers (Global South and
LATAM): those countries that come from colonization and economic underdevelopment are
not so happy with the idea of R2P, because they’ve had their own experience of being
invaded. They value the idea of non-interference in domestic affairs.
a. defensive powers→ aims to achieve a better representation of the emerging powers.
Based on specific fuel ideas, which were built in a specific time, for example, China
now wants to be more representative in more agencies in the UN.
b. revisionist powers → try to not only to have better representation, but they try to
become definitional power. Want to have much more leverage in the framework in
order to defy the ideas that are altering the international order, they want to be more
part of the decision making. i.e. China and Russia

The different narratives will reveal the fractures that exist in concrete topics of their agenda: UNSC
reform, policies about climate change, peace-making missions in R2P.

Although many can think that the UN is an ideal framework every actor decides what they want to get
from this system as well as what they want to give to it.

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7.5 WHAT ROLES FOR THE UN? SCENARIOS

3 SCENARIOS

1st SCENARIO: 2nd SCENARIO: the UN as a 3rd SCENARIO: Business as

Marginalisation of the UN world government usual. The UN as it is now

- States privilege other forums
- Coalitions of willing or other
IOs and regimes
- Systematic avoidance of the
SC
- Intensification of the Security
dilemma: as there is no
common denominator, there is
a risk that we will return to
anarchy and this would trigger
security dilemmas..
- Away from the idea of state
sovereignty, but rather to have
a global UN government which
has the exclusive monopoly on
the use of force.
- Central actor of a federalised
world republic. Central
coordination of global
governance process:
- Monopoly of the use of
force, capacity to coordinate
economic order, and guarantee
a sort of global citizenship
rights (still very far away).
- We continue as it is, so we
accept it is not bad but also
imperfect, so there is a need
for reform → Imperfect
instrument in need of reform
but also an important IO in
many areas
- SC no monopoly of use of
force but increasing
legitimization, international
actors do not recognize it but it
is increasingly being
considered the only legitimate
actor which can use force
- Gap between norms and their
realization in Human Rights.

7.6 UN REFORM PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS:

I. Gap between pressures and capability linked to an IGO. Only the member states have the power
to implement changes. There are two possible options
a) Internal reforms (without amending the Charter)
b) Constitutional Changes (require revision of the Charter) Art.108 and 109, amendment
process. Represents high burdens as:
- ⅔ majority in the GA
- Ratification of ⅔ members states (+ than 120 members)
- All 5 permanent members
- Role of G77

II. UN has shown itself capable of development and adaptation

a) Tending to universality: increasing membership
b) broadening mandate and increasing number of subsidiary organs.
- Functional for developing and industrial countries
- But it evolved as a sort of solar system with centrifugal force

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III. After the end of the Cold War: the situation changed and the debate emerged in two different
directions: Either more participation or more effectiveness. The West is stressing for more
effectiveness while the Global South insists more on more participation.

IV. Possible Reforms:

a) Reform of the UN Security Council
b) Reform UN Secretariat (UNSG, sectoral reforms peace, development, environment, human
rights)
c) Financing
d) World Parliament

7.7 TYPOLOGIES OF REFORMS:

A. Oriented to increase efficiency: bureaucratic rationalization, new procedures...
B. Institutional reforms: institutional remodeling and adjustment to new challenges. UNSC
reform, creation of new agencies
C. Fundamental changes: affect the current principles on which the UN is founded. (Lifting the
prohibition on intervention in domestic affairs...)

Feasibility of the above-mentioned reforms depends on whether they are: Internal reforms (without
amending the Charter) or Constitutional changes (require revision of the Charter).

Art. 108 and 109, amendment process. High burdens

- 2/3 majority in the GA
- Ratification of 2/3 member states (more than 120 members)
- All five Permanent members.

Reform process for being successful: small steps, within the competence of the GA or the SG

Reform of the UNSC:

- Lack of representation of Latin America and Africa in particular.
- Germany and Japan (G4) want to have a seat in the UNSC.
- Regions underrepresented as Latin America and Africa

Does veto right still make sense?

- The drafters of the UN Charter included it to guarantee the engagement of the Big 5.
However, there is no Big 5 anymore, therefore, it has been questioned if veto power should be
abolished or otherwise, adding other members.
- Trade-offs between legitimation and effectiveness (gridlock in the case of Syria).

Different attempts of reform: adding non-permanent members, increasing the number of NPM
without possibility of renewal, reforming or extending membership…
- Example:
- Successful extension in 1963 of the non permanent members.
- The Razali Plan (1996-97)
- In Larger Freedom (2005)
- OEWG / IGN (Open ended Intergovernmental negotiations under the auspices of GA)
- ACT (outside the debate of reforming/extending membership)

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Every specific group has its own priorities, and has to negotiate with one another to get the desired
outcome.

The two reform models that were proposed at the time were (a) expansion in both categories and (b)
not expanding in both categories. It failed because the US, a couple of weeks before the Millenium
Summit.

7.8 IN LARGER FREEDOM: WHY IT FAILED

- K. Annan wanted to adopt all proposals as a package and urged member state delegations to
come to consensus in time for the Millennium 5 Summit in 2005.
- After months of negotiations the US demanded hundreds of revisions just three weeks before
the Summit. Other states proposed new amendments so the text was reduced to a set of vague
generalities.

Why it failed?
Sharp opposition of the US and China to permanent membership of Germany and Japan respectively
- Africa insistence on the right to veto
- G4 missed the opportunity to negotiate with UfC
- It was needed a political convergence preceding institutional change

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- Too ambitious package

Reform movement towards the process to select the SG (Secretary General). A more democratic
UN begins at the top.

- The campaign 1 for 7 billion (global movement of civil society groups)

- Women SG
- ACT (Accountability, Coherence, Transparency)

Demands: transparent nomination procedure; formal list of selection criteria based on merit, gender
balance, and ethnic and geographic diversity; public debates; at least two candidates for the GA to
choose from; a single, but longer term for the SG. Current SG chosen via new regulations proposed by
Pres. GA in 2015, and from July-Dec. 2016 several public hearings for new UNSG (Guterres
nominated on January 1, 2017. It’s more feasible as it is a change in the procedure that can be adopted
as a GA resolution.

7.9 Financing of the UN

- US criticism during the mid 90s resulted in the withholding of financial contributions.
- Many countries have delays in disbursements (represents half of the core budget and
peacekeeping operations budget)
- The only sanctioning instrument Charter, article 19. (States owing the UN more than 2 years
lose their right to vote in the GA → however, the GA never actually does it)
- In December 2000 a solution was found (like a financial rule): The US reduced its
contributions (to 22%) while considering the realistic financial capacities of the poorest

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countries.
These were more ambitious reforms: How can the reluctant domestic legislatures be avoided?
Global taxes, fears regarding Global taxes.

Could a world parliament solve the democratic dilemma? Civic proposal to endow the UN with a
Parliamentary Assembly.

We are currently still stuck in scenario 3: business as usual.

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