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The Saniri Tiga Barang Air Di Seram G Knaap PDF
The Saniri Tiga Barang Air Di Seram G Knaap PDF
Knaap
The Saniri Tiga Air (Seram); An account of its discovery and interpretation between about 1675
and 1950
In: Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 149 (1993), no: 2, Leiden, 250-273
GERRIT J. KNAAP, who obtained his Ph.D. at the University of Utrecht, is Head
of the Department of Historica1 Documentation of the Koninklijk Instituut voor
Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (KITLV). Specialized in Indonesian history, his
publications include Kruidnagelen en Christenen; De Verenigde Oost-Indische
Compagnie en de bevolking van Ambon 1656 - 1696 , Dordrecht, Foris, 1987,
and Memories van overgave van gouverneurs van Ambon in de zeventiende en
achttiende eeuw, 's-Gravenhage, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën, 1987.
Dr. Knaap may be contacted at the KITLV, P.O. Box 9515,2300 RA Leiden.
The Saniri Tiga Air (Serum) 25 1
West Serarn was inhabited by only two ethnic groups: the Wernale in the
southem and eastem parts of the area, and the Alune, also called Makahala,
in the west. Both ethnic groups had their own language and possessed
several distinctive cultural features. According to the local tradition, the
Wernale owed their name to their origin from the area of the 'Wai', or
'river', Mala in the southeast of West Seram. The name Alune, on the other
hand, was said to be derived from the word for the girdle which the female
mernbers of this ethnic group used to wear, made frorn a piece of cloth
which each wornan wove herself. Wemale women, who did not know how
to weave, wore a piece of beaten tree bark instead. The other name for the
Alune, Makahala, rneans 'rice eater', thus pointing to the fact that these
people knew how to grow rice, whereas the Wernale supposedly did not. The
Wemale were organized according to rnatrilineal principles, while the Alune
followed patrilineal rules. Marriages between Wemale and Alune were not
allowed. Wemale femaies were supposed to isolate themselves in special
huts outside their villages during rnenstruation, while Alune fernaies could
stay in their own house (De Vries 1927:9,281; Jensen 1948:19-21).
The division of the population of West Serarn into Alune and Wemale
did not have any substantial political significance. Neither group possessed
any central institutions that rnight have given them some sort of unity.
Instead the villages, which were loosely organized conglomerations of clans,
provided the focal point for political loyaities. These villages can, however,
be grouped into a nurnber of categories according to location, socio-
WEST SERAM
254 Gerrif J. Knaap
In 1605 the Dutch East India Company (VOC) took over the Ponuguese
fortress on the island of Ambon. From this fortress, narned Victoria, the
Company gradually conquered the western coastal areas of the island group
of Seram and Buni. nowadays called Central Moluccas. ï ñ e Dutch occupied
this area in order to control the production of cloves, at that time a highly
profitable trade item. This conml was strongly resisted by small indigenous
states, usually Muslirn ones. Between roughly 1625 and 1655, however, the
Company broke the Muslim opposition with the assistance of the Christian
Ambonese population from the formerly Portuguese part of the islands
(Knaap 1987a: 17-27).
For the first 73 years of Dutch presence in the area the YOC sources do
not say a word about either Kakéan or Saniri. The first information about
contacts between the Dutch and West Seramese Alifuru as such, in
Rumphius' chronicle, however, dates from 1621, when a few Alifuni village
chiefs, including those of Sahulau and Sumit, visited Fort Victoria to meet
Governor-General Jan Pietersz Coen. On this occasion they pledged
allegiance to the States General of the Dutch Republic and to the VOC.
Hereby they becarne participants in the Dutch-Christian Ambonese alliance
against the Muslim Ambonese. Most West Scram Alifuru tended to see a
Patalima, that is, an arch-enemy, in every Muslim. In the 1630s, the Dutch
occasionally made use of Alifuru groups of several hundred warriors in their
military operations against the Muslims. While the Dutch and their
Christian Ambonese allies blockaded Muslirn settlements from the sea, or at
most occupied the sea-shore, bands of Alifuru head-hunters would roam
about the woods behind the settlements, inspiring so much fear that the
Muslims did not dare to frequent their f m l a n d s and were effectively
besieged. The mobilization of Alifuru warriors usually took place through
the agency of the three chiefs of Sahulau, Sumit and Siseulu, called 'raja' or
'kings' by the Dutch (Rumphius 1910:46, 86.98-99, 121, 137-138).
Nevertheless, there was a good deal of discussion in Company circles
about the use and reliability of the Alifuru for VOC operations. Although
the chiefs of Siseulu, Sumit and Sahulau had promised u> send thousands of
followers, in practice they were orily able to supply a few hundred warriors
every now and then. Sometimes, they even failed to send anyone at all.
Commissioner Anthonie van den Heuvel, who visited Ambon in 1633, did
not attach very much value to such allies. He spoke with raja Sumit and raja
Siseulu, who, he found, 'were much more like beggars than noblemen, not
to mention kings'. The Alifuru were 'undisciplined, wild and barbaric
people; cannibals whose dwclling-places were never seen by anyone of our
people'. Van den Heuvel believed that the leaders did not even know the
number of their followers. As warriors, the Alifuru were only useful for
fighting in small groups in the bush, in order to lay ambushes against the
enemy. They were not capable of fighting full-scale battles, or attacking
258 Gerrit J. Knaap
however, for in 1673 his nephew, Ketowaru. also visited Victoria and told
the governor that he, and not Sauelette. was the real raja Sahulau. Sauelette
was a kind of 'crown prince' who already ruled a part of the country. When
half a year later the governor visited the coast of Serarn, however, he was
told that Ketowaru had been guilty of inttigue and that Sauelette was the real
raja (VOC 1293:280v-282v; 1300: 66r). Two years iater, the same Sauelette
explained to the Dutch that, although nominally he had a great many
followers, this did not mean that he was able to control hem. Sometimes.
he conceded, other persons styled themselves 'raja Sahulau' in order to exact
tribute or commit acts of aggression. Sauelette admitted that he was in no
way able to prevent head-hunting or any other acts of violence (VOC
1317:206r-213r).
Another two years later, when Sauelette died, the confusion about
Sahulau rose to new heights. A delegation from Sahulau tumed up at
Victoria, led by the son of the, by then, late Ketowaru, who told the
governor that Sauelette's brother, Tomole Pauta, was the most legitimate
successor and asked the VOC to authorize his accession. Naturally, the VOC
officials were a little puzzled by the matter - it was the first time in history
that they had been requested to confim an Alifuru raja. What could be the
motives behind this move? It was decided to postpone any action until more
information should be available. In the meantime, a certain Lelissa turned
up requesting his confirmation as raja Sahulau. He claimed that his
ancestors had also been raja Sahulau, but had not dared to come to the VOC
and instead had sent 'ambassadors', who had taken the opportunity to present
themselves as 'raja Sahulau' to the Dutch, and thus were usurpers. Later that
year, when the governor visited the coast of Seram again, he formally
confirmed Tomole Pauta as raja at the request of the most prominent leaders
of Sahulau. Lelissa, who was also present on that occasion, withdrew his
former claim (VOC 132586-87 res, 286,329-330; 1334:119r-v).
Alas, just one year later Tomole Pauta died, and the whole procedure
started al1 over again. First, a certain Aloko presented himself in Victoria,
saying that he had been chosen as raja Sahulau. Shortly after that, however,
the Company learnt that a certain Laye Siaé, grandson of Ketowaru, was the
rightful successor. To the astonishment of the Company officials, the first
pretender, Aloko, returned to the castle to present Laye Siaé as the heir with
the most legitimate claim. Al~houghthere were some mmours that a certain
Laye Sorié had a greater right to the title than Laye Siaé but had refused to
become raja, Laye Siaé was sworn in and given a VOC coat and hat as
tokens of his official confirmation. In the end it tumed out that the Dutch
had been tricked by Aloko. When Laye Siaé retumed to the village of
Sahulau, he handed over the emblems of office from the VOC to Laye
Sorié, who apparently had not refused the position of raja Sahulau at al1
(VOC 1334:62v res, 289v, 298r, 3 13v; 1344:30-33).
260 Gerrit J. Knaap
The initiative to convene al1 the rnernbers of the Saniri at the River Eti, for
which the chiefs of Kaibobo, Nuniali and Tanunu had asked the VOC's
pcrmission in 1678, ended in failure. Five hundred persons assembled at the
mouth of the river, but from most of the villages in the Tala district no one
showed up. Moreover, smallpox and malaria soon began to take a tol1 on
those assembled. In the end the leaders of the Saniri decided to disperse. In
particular raja Siseulu, who, though not a member of the Saniri, was
nevertheless attending the gathering, showed himself very disappointed,
because he would have liked to have discussed an inter-village conflict which
was also important to him (VOC 1334:369v-372r, 375r). In 1680. however,
Abraham Ririj of Kaibobo, together with a few other Saniri leaders,
established peace between two villages. The two conflicting parties were
condernned to pay 50 gongs to the Saniri - a rather large number for a poor
Alifuru village. On this occasion Van Thije jotted down the comment that
'this was an Alifuru way of sentencing, for after those under sentence had
given one or two gongs, the remainder could be substituted by pieces of
cloth, knives, Chinese dishes, and so on'; in other words, the fine was to
be seen as a symbolic one (VOC 1356:498-500BI).
The first written report of a Saniri gathering is of that at the Tala in
1687. It was drawn up by Abraham Ririj, village chief of Kaibobo, and
Alexander Patimura, second-in-command in that village. Present at this
meeting were representatives of the disuicts of the Tala and the Eti, but
none from the entire district of the Sapalewa. A few days after the meeting
broke up, however, the village chief of Nuniali arrived by boat to represent
his district. Raja Sahulau had sent a delegate, moreover, because a few
issues were to be discussed in which he was supposed to have an interest.
What is more surprising is that a few pro-Patalima village chiefs from the
north coast were present, as wel1 as an important Alifuru Patalima leader,
raja Latea. Abraham Ririj played a dominant role in the discussions, and it
is obvious that he was regarded more or less as the representative of the
VOC. The Saniri established peace between a few villages, or at least tried
to do so, and besides discussed a few points of general interest. The Alifuni
The Saniri Tiga Air (Seram)
and the coastai people were advised to stay in their own territories to prevent
any quarrelling between hem. Moreover, a ban was placed on over-zealous
anti-Islamic activities such as the burning down of village mosques (VOC
1437:28v-33v).
The next report of a Saniri meeting. that which took place in the vicinity
of Kaibobo in the district of the Tala in 1717. was wriuen by a captain and
a junior merchant of the VOC. On this occkion again the Sapalewa district
was absent, except for a few coastai villages. One of the reasons for this
absence was that it was allegedly Sapalewa's turn to organize the meeting. It
is clear from the report that there was a 'meeting in the bush', which in later
periods was referred to as 'bicara di darat', without any Company delegates.
The Company officials only witnessed the 'meeting on the beach', later
described as 'bicara di laut', which took place in front of their tent. The
'official' Saniri - that at which the Company officials were present - was
opened with a statement that, according to the laws of the Saniri, anyone
who committed robbery or murder during the gathering was liable to be
attacked by the entire Saniri. In the days following the opening ceremony,
many conflicts were brought forward for discussion. There was a striking
differente with the report of the previous Saniri, of 1687, however. Most of
the conflicts discussed were quarrels among coastal people, and were dealt
with in the style of the councils of justice for indigenous cases which the
VOC had instituted on the islands of Ambon, Haruku, and others off the
coast of Seram; this involved, among other things, a presentation of cases
supported with written claims. The 'official' Saniri meeting was closed after
eight days. Instead of doing so with matakau, the swearing of the traditional
Alifuru oath, the delegates concluded with a move to have the dccisions of
the Saniri endorscd with the signatures of the principal district heads - the
village chiefs of Kaibobo, Tanunu and Nuniali (VOC 1894:64-106; Knaap
1987a:39-42).
The Saniri of 1717, the first at which colonial officials were present,
therefore showed several signs of adaptation to changed circumstances. In
point of fact, the Saniri had not tumed out to be of very much use to the
colonial authorities, as there was no clear evidence that the situation in West
Seram was becoming more peaceful. Consequently, the Supreme
Govemment in Batavia instructed the authorities in Ambon to give no
further authorizations for convoking Saniri meetings. For most of the
eighteenth century, therefore, the gatherings were held without the
Company's knowledge. In the 1760s, however, the colonial authorities'
interest in the Saniri was revived as traders from elsewhere, bent on
'smuggling' cloves, began visiting the island of Seram regularly,
undermining the Company's monopoly in that precious article. West Seram
villages sometimes also planted clove wees themselves. So the VOC started
using the Saniri again in order to prevent this and to remain informed about
what was going on (Knaap 1987b:463).
Once more the results of its efforts were meagre, however. So Govemor
264 Gernt J. Knaap
Abraham van der Voort wrote in 1772, for instance, that the Saniri was of
no use to the Company, because 'these uncivilized, wild and barbarous
people' were prepared tg make aii kinds of promises under oath simply 'm
earn themselves some presents from the Company, without ever bothering
for even a moment about fulfilling these promises'. Van der Voort's
successor, Bernardus van Pleuren, confronted as he was with an armed
conflict between the VOC and Tidorese invaders in the eastern part of
Seram, thought otherwise. He believed that these gathenngs had a positive
influence on the Company's prestige. Moreover, the Alifuru of West Serarn
had remained loyal to the Dutch when they had been invited to join the anti-
Dutch coalition in East Seram. And in addition, they had recently guided
Company employees to large plantation's of clove trees in the West Seram
mountains. These trees had been immediately cut down. Consequently. Van
Pleuren advised the Company to continue its involvement with the Saniri
(Knaap 1987b:466,481-484).
When one looks at the report of the Saniri of 1771, at which Governor
Van der Voort himself was present, it is clear why he was very disappointed
with the results. Most of the people of the Sapalewa district were absent, as
were dl those from the Taia mountain area. The governor, seated in his tent,
uied to impose a generd ueaty of peace between these mountain people and
those living on the coast. Moreover, he made the Alifuru promise to cut
down al1 clove trees found in their territory. No discussion took place about
the actual state of affairs in the area. The meeting lasted for only one day and
was closed with matakau drinking. For this a pot was filled with palm wine,
to which were added al1 kinds of objects, including a bush knife, an arrow.
the figure of a crocodile, and an effigy of a human smallpox patient. Anyone
who drank from this choice brew and subsequently broke the oath was
supposed to be punished with a violent death, disease, and the like, al1 of
which were symbolically represented in the pot. Finaily, a few chiefs were
given presents, including the three-pointed hals with silver ornaments that
were still regarded as emblems of honour in the lauer part of the nineteenth
century (VOC 3355 (3): from 3-1 1-1771 onward).
Van Pleuren's optimistic views would lead one KIexpect his report of the
Saniri of 1776 to have quite a different tone. It was almost the same, how-
ever, the only differcnce being that at this meeting the district of Sapalewa
was much better represented. Generally speaking, there was a clear over-
representation of the coastal population. The proceedings in front of the
governor's tent m k up just one morning (VOC 3491 (3): from 11-11-1776
onward). Nor did the Saniri of 1786, in the presence of Governor Adriaan de
Bock, differ from the two previous ones. After drinking matakau and
receiving a few presents, the Alifuru leaders were served al1 kinds of
alcoholic drinks, 'which made them so cheerful and contented that they
returned to heir camps singing and jumping'. In the evening, the Alifuru
again joined the governor to perform war dances for him. In the meantime
'the governor threw handfuls of smdl silver and copper coins among them,
The Saniri Tiga Air (Serum) 265
which they scrambled to pick up' (VOC 3755 (4): from 6-11-1786 onward).
The reason for the haste which characterized the colonial government's
involvement at the end of the eighteenth century was that a Saniri was
always called during the hongi, or annual patrol with indigenous Ambonese
warships around the Central Moluccan islands. As this fleet had usually
been on patrol for severd weeks by the time the meeting took place, so that
everybody was longing to go home, the govemor did not want to devote too
much time to the Saniri.
From a report from the beginning of the twentieth century, we know that
the Dutch organized a Saniri meeiing in April 1805, among other reasons in
order to counterbalance the current Tidorese involvement in Seram's affairs
(KITLV H 1051, 108a:37-38). Whether this was successful or not we do not
know. The first pnnted account of the Kakéan and Saniri since Valentijn
was published by W.J.M. van Schmid. Although Van Schmid provides
many new data on the Kakéan (he was the first to actually use the word
explicitiy), he does not give any new information about the Saniri, which
he defines as an organization designed to bring about peace between the
coastal and mountain people. Van Schmid further writes that, according to
the oral tradition, the Kakéan came into being in reaction to the Dutch
destruction of Hoamoal, the westernmost peninsula of Seram - an event
which can.be placed in the middle of the seventeenth century (Van Schmid
1843:26).
had come from Temate. Consequentiy. Van Ekris placed the origin of both
Kakéan and Saniri wel1 before the coming of the Europeans (Van Ekris
1867:297).
At the close of the nineteenth century Van Hoëvell, in line with the
information supplied by Van Rees and Ludeking, put forward the idea that
the Kakéan owed its genesis to a reaction of traditional Patasiwa society and
religion to foreign intervention, in particular Dutch intervention in the
middle of the seventeenth century, when the entire society of Hoamoal had
been annihilated. He goes on t relate that the Dutch had given different-
coloured uniforms to the leaders of each patan of the Saniri: yellow for
Sapalewa, red for Eti, and blue for Tala. Van Hoëvell was very pessimistic
about the Saniri's ability to establish peace among the Alifuru. The meeting
of 1888, which was witnessed by delegates of the colonial administration for
the first time in rnany years, had been a failure because of the Saniri
leadership's lack of authority. Instead of new conflicts being solved, many
old ones had erupted again. The most shocking incident, however, had been
the murder of a Saniri dignitary from the Tala district by warriors from
Honitetu during the meeting itself. The last Saniri ever held, that of 1903,
is said to have ended in such turrnoil that the Dutch witnesses were forced t
hastily withdraw (Van Hoëvell 1896:511, 513-51 5; Sachse 1922:138).
Apparentiy the nineteenth-century experiences with the Saniri were no beuer
than those of the eighteenth. Whereas the Saniri was still regarded to a
certain extent as somcthing that rnight have a positive effect on Dutch-
Serarnese relations, the Kakéan came gradually to be seen as a threat to
Dutch expansion. Frorn 1903 onwards the Dutch chose m settle affairs in a
military fashion and to incorporate the island into their 'pacified' colonial
state (Manuhutu 1985278-281,286).
Smn after the last Saniri meeting was held, a sueam of 'volumes of paper'
of an interpretative kind started flowing. Sachse, in his early writings, put
forward the idea that both Kakéan and Saniri were relatively recent
phenomena, because previous authors like Valentijn, writing in the
eighteenth century, did not mention thern. He suggested that the English
might have been responsible for the creation of these institutions during
their brief rule around 1800 (Sachse 1907:61,80; KITLV H 1051, 108b:5).
Other authors did not follow Sachse in this respect, sirnply because they had
read Valentijn much bctter than he and consequently had found interesting
rnaterial on the subject there. After Sachse, Tauern pointed out the
similarity between the Kakéan and certain Melanesian secret societies. On
the basis of some superficial observations about the physical features of the
Seramese people, he even drew the conclusion that the Wemale were
migrants from Melanesia and that, consequently, the genesis of the Kakéan
268 Gerrir J. Knaap
Final Remarks
The discussion about the origin of the Saniri Tiga Air and Kakéan might be
labelled a 'dead-end sueet'. The ideas that it was an invention of the English
and that it was a reaction against Dutch intrusion in the middle of the
seventeenth century are clearly false. The first accounts of West Seram from
the seventeenth century indicate that we are dealing with something that
already existed bcfore the Europcans moved in. The story that somewhere in
the seventeenth century raja Sahulau supposedly was instrumental in the
inuoduction of the Kakéan from Hoamoal into the area of the three nvers,
except to his own followers, is als0 unfounded in the light of the above-
mentioned accounts. The explanation that the origin should be sought in the
resistance to Ternate's Islamization policy is the only remaining option
among the 'historical' explanations. Temate's expansion to the Cenual
Moluccas must be located in the sixteenth rather than the fifteenth century.
In line with this explanation, there was a clear tendcncy among seventeenth-
century Alifuru leaders to join the Dutch anti-Muslim front. Arguing
against it. however, is the fact that the initiative for joining the Dutch was
270 Gerrit J. Knaap
not taken by the Saniri leadership but by the aileged pretenders to the
leadership from Sahulau, Sumit and Siseulu. Another argument against the
anti-Ternate explanation is that there is no mention of this motive at al1 in
the early accounts of the Saniri, in spie of the fact that the leaders involved
must have been aware how much credit they could have gained with the
Dutch by saying anything negative about Temate and Islam.
Tauern's theory about Melanesian migration was refuted within a few
years of its being launched. Nevertheless, several authors have persisted in
the idea that the institutions of Kakéan and Saniri constituted part of a
'layer' of culture which had once spread throughout the entire area of East
Indonesia and Melanesia. Duyvendak's division theory, on the other hand, is
unable to explain the fact that there were three instead of two sub-divisions
in what supposedly 'once' was one 'tribe'. Much more interesting is a
further elaboration of the suggestion put forward by Van Wouden, namely
that we should think in terms of 'coalition' rather than 'division'.
Consequently, the Saniri should be seen as an association of several uibes.
The motive for such an association remains unclear. The idea that it was
designed to protcct the traditional Alifuru life-style right from its beginning
seems rather unlikely. Most plausible is the simple explanation from 1678,
namely that the Saniri was a confederacy aimed at bringing some sort of
peace to an area suffering from endemic petty warfare. What started as an
institution rneant to scttle internal problems, however, gradually developed
into something which also aimed at resisting inuusions into its cultural
legacy. This aspcct of its activities bccame more and more important as
Islam and Christianity starled jostling on Seram's doorstep.
Not al1 Patasiwa in West Seram belonged to the Kakéan or Saniri. As
was already pointed out above, Siseulu and the whole of Sahulau's
following were non-membcrs of the Saniri. The Wemale from the Uwin
valley should also be mentioned in this connection. According to some
authors. the villages from the Uwin valley had once been affiliated to a river
district called Ulibatai, which was also connected with some sort of Kakéan-
like organization called Wapulane. Some of Jensen's informants claimed
that UlibataiIWapulane was an original Wemale institution, while Saniri
Waele Telu / Kakéan was originally an Alune one (KITLV H 1051,
108a:14-15; Jensen 1948:109-111). Although Jenscn was loath to draw
conclusions from this information, there might be some uuth in it. If one
looks at the leadership of the Saniri, i.e. the kepala saniri. kapitan saniri,
pohon bendera, ujong bendera, porter0 and sarimeten, it is clear that the
majority of hem, at least thirteen out of eighteen. were Alune. Of the
remaining five, I was not able to determine whether they were Alune or
Wemale. Furthermore, it is hard to believe that the Saniri leadership
originally included such dignitaries as raja and palih tanah. Twentieth-
century authors speak of the raja as dignitaries hom a distant past, while the
paiih tanah have always bcen pictured as relative outsiders to the Saniri. The
outsiders may have been inlroduced by the colonial authorities in order to
The Saniri Tiga Air (Serum)
keep an eye on things. The patih tanah may have been identical with the
tangan kiri mentioned in Von Gaffron's repon.
What is clear from the evidence so far is that the Sanin organization
underwent a great deal of change. This is not surprising, as the period under
discussion is fairly long. Moreover, Alifuru society was always in a state of
flux and showed a great deal of instability. Apparently, many of those
involved in the Saniri themselves did not take certain structures for granted.
Frequently, pretenders trying to use this ancient institution for heir own
personal advantage appeared on the scene. These were not always members
of Alifuru society itself, like Sumit or Sahulau, but might aiso be outsiders
like the patih tanah. The village chiefs of Kaibobo, Tanunu and Nuniali,
who were the fist to inform the Dutch about the Saniri, might be classified
as pretenders as well, as later reports often assert that village chiefs and
Saniri chiefs were not identical. It is clear that many pretenders tried to
exploit heir good relations with the colonial authorities as much as they
could in order to gain power. The traditional Saniri leadership very likely
suffered a loss of authority whenever such pretenders entered the scene.
However, it is not only in the Saniri leadership that changes were
noticeable, but the membership was not fixed, either. This becomes clear
when one compares the relevant lists from the seventcenth century wilh
those of the early twentieth (VOC 1334:240r, KITLV H 1051,108a:ll-13).
The most striking thing here is that even Sahulau gradually came to be
considered as a membcr, at Icast from about the last quarter of the nineteenth
century (Sachse 1922:281).The location of the Saniri leadership als0 tended
to change with time. In the seventeenth century only the kepala saniri were
resident in villages near the coast. By the twentieth century, most of the
olher leaders had als0 moved to the coast. This drift towards the coast was a
continuing process, which was also stimulated by the Dutch. For a long
time the colonial authorities considered concentration on the coast as the
only means of effective control of the population.
For the fust two hundred years after its 'discovery', the Saniri remained
fairly unimportant to the Dutch, because Seram was not an attractive
proposition to them, eithcr economicaily or strategically. The VOC and the
Netherlands Indies govemment actcd the part of a distant authority that was
not reaily interested in what happencd. The Dutch did not even bolher about
the division of Saniri gatherings int0 a bicara di laut and a bicara di darat. In
the nineteenth century, however, the colonial ideology began to change. The
fact that the Saniri was unable to solve Seram's problem of endemic warfare
put the Dutch in a serious predicament, as colonial policy-makers aimed to
gradually establish pcace and order in dl societies in the Indies, even in areas
which had little economic value such as Seram. The wave of 'modem
imperialism', which had its roots in the ideology of the 'white men's
burden' or the Europcan's 'mission civilisatrice', thus finally became the
Saniri Tiga Air's nemcsis.
272 Gerrit J . Knaap
I would like to thank Chris van Fraassen for his critical comments on an
earlier version of this article md Rosernary Robson for her correction of the
English.
SOURCES
Unpublished
Published