FOUR DECADES OF LIVING ON THE EDGE IN RIO DE JANEIRO Janice Perlman OXFORD Tareas escpameeaOXFORD ‘Ostont Uaieri ele,pblihe worth farher Oxi! Unie ote of exelance To winch colina eon Oxford New Yor AAvltid Cape Town Daze San Hong Koop Kai KotsLatpls Malad Mourne Medco Cy” Nuch ‘Now Da Suge Tie! Toonto Withafcesie Acgeint Avia Best Chie Caech Rec Parse Ose Cenmonta FhngayTealy_Jgua Poland. Prd Sigipore oui Kens Suteniand “Talsd Tukey “Uline Vitra Copyright © ro by Janice B, Pesan Publi by Oxon Univ Pr i 98 Maton Aves New Yo New Yor 0005 ‘rence ied aan Onfond nest Pos paperback 2011 Ostia eit ademaskof Ont Unie Pres. _Ariht eer Nop of th polation ay be repoucs toed ect tenets in ny fo a EDS, none nedasedyphoteoping eons or ote, Sat she spores oF ed Unive Pes Liar of Congres Citagingin Publication Dita Petar ane E- ‘reli deals of ving the eg a Ride Joni Joie ema, pm clue bogie ences ends ISDN gyros 6-9 hanes 978m 9g83683 Coupe) 4. Sune Hels define 3, Bonr—Bral—Ri devi. 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Noverbe 207. ined in he Uae Su of America aie paper For the billion people around the world who live in frvelas and for ‘my motber and father, wiko taught me to care and to persithVBE with higher status socil groups opened possibilities that would be unthinkah oon the periphery. Of al the stady areas, those from the loteamentos in Caxias ended up wig the highest level of integration into the formal sector. Although they oor at firs, they did.not suffer the stigma of living in a favela, and many, item ended up owning their land, even if they had started ae renters, Uni the favels, when the loteamentos got urban services, they became regul neighbertioods, often indistinguishable fiom others in the maniipality I 1968 the loteamento residents had comparable incomes to those in favelae, : {ng legal stars enabled them to increase their advantage ovee time. Formal helped them climb out of poverty. On all indicators of well-being, including an index of socioeconomic is measured by education, consumption of household appliances, and crowds followed by those from Catacumba, with Nova Brasilia in the middle and the: Canis favelas scoring the lowest. Being peripheral and informal was» dou condemnation, Jt s fashionable to say that due tothe Brazilian legacy of slavery and its deep | inequalities the poor ae trapped and condemned to reproduce their poverty cach generation. That makes sense in theory, but in realty, the syste ‘ Brrmeable The interpretation depends on the reference group. If you comp Dina iterate parents with her computer-nerate granddaughter you the family has come a long way. But how does the progress of Diana compare with that of her contemporaries fiom the South Zone? Is the gap closing or. ARGINALITY FROM MYTH TO REALITY ‘Sim, masa favela nunca foi reduto de marginal, eu fale, "$6 tem gente humilde, marginalizada E essa verdade nfo sal no jormal A favela € um problem social E mais eu sou favela ‘Minha gente € teabalhadeira E nunca teve asistencia social ‘Sim mas s6 vive kt tro jeito Porque pars o pobre no tem outro j Apenas 6 tem o dieeito a um salirio de fore E uma vida normal ‘A favela € um problems socal Yessbat the favla was never the refage of the marginal, tid ‘There ae only Bumble people, marginalized [And this truth does nor appear in the newspaper (Refeain) The favela isa social problem ‘And what's more, am the favela ‘My people are workers And never had social assistance But can live only there& (14a) Te EELWALITY FROW MYTH TO REALITY Continuing my research 30 years Tate, I once again found that the concept arginaliy with its multiple and ebifting ‘connotations provides a window fp che thinking of the general public ‘and some policy-makers, flamed by the 08 nyteria in the mass media. In picking up the threads of my earlier study, «ps eager to find out how the concept of maeginality had evolved in relation rin residents and to what extent sch changes Wee reflected in policy and Bectuse for the poor there is no other way We only have the right to a salary of hunger ‘That’ our normal life (Refrain) The fvela is a social pioblens. a NOCA DA FORTELA AND SERGIO MOSCA, 1994 tice. “This popular samba “Eu Sou Fave says a great deal about the coneept of inayat relates to poverty and pride in Rick favelas ‘The favels in Rio de Janeiro house millions of inhabitants, people who would otherwise be homeless, 35 “The songwriters embrace the favelas as themselves, declaring that they do not accept “handouts” or socal assistance, afirming that they are honest work: tes who ase marginalized by society, undermined by the press, and wndespaid “Theis Iyrics are supported by this research. Of the mote than 2000 people snterviewed (which includes all three generations in 2o0r and the new random sample in 2003), 80 percent had a monthly income of 170 reais (approximately 7 USS68 at that time) or les, but only 38 percent thought this was “suffi fora decent life” Sixty-seven percent stated that they would need almost tw as much, 300 reais per month (about US$120), to lead a “decent life.” Only 19 percent of respondants earned that much or more. “The songwriters use the sarcastic refrain of the song, “The favela isa sol problem,” to mock the way favelas are seen by the rest of society, turning the patronizing phrase inside out and claiming it as their ovn, Tis is reminiscent Df the song from Hest Side Story, in which gang members of East Harlem say Officer Kup that they are down on their knees “eause no one wants fll with a social disease.” 3 The view of the favelas as “a social problems produced and reproduced 08 a caily basis as those who live there are treated as a threat to the social system that crented the favels in the first place. If other housing options were available forthe poor, perhaps favelas would not exist. A "Taken together, the negative steceotypes about those living in faves have formed an ideology of marginality powerful enough to blot out all eviden to the contrary Insofar asthe favela residents are seen as “social problems” ct idea of getting rid of them will never be off the policy table. As x case in poin Eduardo Paes, the current mayor of Rio, was quoted in April 2009, saying that with regard to favelas, no options would be considered off the table. ‘The Myth of Marginality provoked a gradual shift in the perception of ¢ turban poor. I made the case that the very people who had been dismissed paral or outside the sytem, were actualy playing vital role i the wot ings ofthe city-and were tightly integrated into that sytem, but in a perversely asymmetrical manne DEBUNKING THE MYTHS OF MARGINALITY S she concept of marginality bas been debunked, deconstructed, dismissed, and, gen, rediscovered and reconstructed over the past decades. I researched ia wrote The Myth of Marginaity during ¢ specific historical moment, in Bee vent of widespread antagonism toward the “masses” of migrant HT” soe ne countryside and invading the “citadel” ofthe cviliaed ch ‘The owing quotation, written in x968 by the agency officially responsible for ight ofthe favelas in Rio de Janir, sums up both official and popular pws ofthe era. “Fumie ave fom dhe interior pare and urted..in stable ions. The ds ‘atgration begins in the fovea a «consequence of the promis the bad | examples andthe financial ificultiescherey00ng Bis 8 seduced and aban Genet choy get pregnant but dot fel say shame..iquor and drags se 1 | all ce diappotments hunliation and fond deficion “The nights belong, = othe eriminals.one ean hear the sereams for help: But no one dares (0 inke” seit hey nil be nex. Policeman rely penetete he fv and chen only in groups “In my fieldwork I found that, despite theis widespread accepraice all af oociety,theve propositions had no basis in reality. My research showed propositions to be “empirically false, analytically misleading, ‘and insidious their policy implications." Tn fat, I found the favelas to be socially well aan vatasve and their residents capable of making good use of the ban milieu and its institutions. Culturally, they contributed their slang, 0° Seana srainstrcann” and aspired co improve ther lives, particulasly though the education of thee children. They willingly took an the wore jobs Ghee more than one) for the lowest pay, under the most arduous conditions 4 with the ean security They consumed ther share ofthe products of others en paying more for them, since local shops had a monopoly [and were ‘ling to extend cedit))and they built theic own houses as well as che vrban feastructare of their communities, i 'Ta (ist) ravey GROINALITY FROM MYTH TO REALITY tsi) Favela residents at the time were aware of and keenly involved in those = aspects of politics that affected their lives, both within and outside the favely_ ‘They cooperated with the lientelistic local politicians, bargaining astutely wit candidates for city council, while appearing to remain submissive and apolii In obedience to the rules of the authoritarian regime. Radical ideology and intelligentsia’s hoped-for propensity for revolutionary activism were completely absent. The frame of reference for favela residents was not the millionsives i the neighborhoods that surrounded them but the impoverished rural fa they had left behind. The favelas provided a cost-free solution to the lack of affordable housing and proximity to jobs and services, and they offered tightly. knit communities within which reciprocal favors mitigated the hardships poverty. ‘My conclusion was that the favela residents are not marginal at all inextricably bound into society, albeit in a manner detrimental to their own interests. They contribute their hard work, their high hopes, and their loyal: ties, but do not benefit from the goods and services of the system. Although: they are neither economically nor politically marginal, they are exploit manipulated, and repressed; although they are neither socially nor cultural marginal, they are stigmatized and excluded from a closed class systems ‘To my disappointment, but not my surprise, this continues to be the case 4 today. s TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE LANDSCAPE OF POVERTY sing at hove the meaning and repercussions of marginality have changed Oe = 40 years is cepecilly interesting in light of de macro transform2- iy Brazil political economy and inthe city of Rio de Janeiro. My original Be ae conducted at the height of the Brazilian dictatorship brought about O ittary coup on Apell 1, r964. A gradual poliieal abertura (opening) Ganing in 1974 led, through a series of steps, (0 the end of the dictatorship in EE d redemocratization in 1985. After a period of repressed civil liberties, ght o have rights” movernent finally prevailed ‘and, with the new consti- ‘of 1988, considerably expanded. ; ‘the wake of this cetum to democracy, community groups, federations nimunity groups, and nonprofits working i favclas flourished. Some of ce promoted the rights of citizenship and attempted to correct past social caries, Others were organized around cultural ativities such as theater, i, and filmmaking; sports from capocira to soccer, volleyball, wrestling, owing or around reclaiming weak or ever lost racial or ethnic practices, th the AfroReggse movement. Still other groups were organized around ns fiom preserving Afro-Brazilian practices such as cansdomblé and rinda, to rediscovering Catholic liberation theology, to building the evan al movernent. Some of these were homegrown while others were inspired ot connected with political parties (including the communist party) labor ions ot both. The Federation of the Residents’ Associations of the State of “Hic became so politically “connected” that its president, J6 Resende, became ry mayor in the first open election for local government, In economic terms, the country went from the economic “miracle” of the :96os to the hyperinflation of the 19708, the so-called lost decade of the r980s, id the attempted stabilization of the 19905. In 1993, finance minister Fer~ ido Henrique Cardoso introduced the Real Plan, which pegged the value of rrency to the U.S, dollar. This seined in inflation and temporarily raised purchasing power of the poo’ but did not solve the problem of economic cb, which remained stagnant during the 1990s. The next 1 years saw finan~ {instability growing unemployment, and persistent inequality. The politcal stem and the discourse on poverty may have changed over this period, but country remains one of the most economically polarized in the world. The 10 percent of Brazilians earn so percent of the national income, and the “The power ofthe ideology of marginality was so great in Brazil in the 1970 that it became self-fulfilling, justifying favela removal and perversely creating precisely the disaffection and disconnection that was professed to be a danget to the stable social order in the first place, ‘The ideology of marginality, with its moralistic, vietim-blaming natce tive, has persisted in the face of blatantly contradictory evidence. There ate multiple overlapping and mutually reinforcing reasons for this persistence First, it justifies extreme inequality while obfuscating the inability of the system fo provide even minimal living standards for a vast subset of 1 population; second, it protects claims of legitimacy and the supposed “fait* ness" of the rules of the game; third, it provides a scapegoat for a wide” array of societal problems, allowing others to feel superior, while prese¥ ing dominant norms; fourth, ie purifies the self-image of the rest of socie (ovhat T call a “specular relationship") by considering the “marginals? #Be source of all social problems (deviance, perversity, and criminality, ete) fifth, it shapes the self-image of those labeled as marginal, so pernicious!y that favela residents often blame themselves for their plight, internalizing the belief that it is their own ignorance, incompetence, and inability that keeps them from getting ahead; and finally it divides poor people, prevent ing those who might make common cause from coalescing into a unified political force. the poverty line.” The global economic shift from manufacturing to services, from resource Piked to knowledge-based production, and from place-based to mobile capital | AGGarvulation has had negative repercussions, particularly for Rio de Janeiro(1821 x HVE HGIMALITY FROM KYTH TO REALITY 1153] © The material, cultural, historical, social-psychological, and political dimen- | ons of marginalization arc intertwined and mutually reinforcing. Each facet J ihe dehumanization (or criminalization) of the poor and of the way they are dered invisible has been developed into a body of literature with its awn set reoncepts and assumptions. In the three chapters that follow, I explore the specs of marginality related to violence and drugs (chapter 7); the limitations democracy and citizenship (chapter 8); and the barriers to residential and jgeconomic mobility (chapter 9). In this chapter T take a closer look at the sway stigma, social exclusion, and the lack of opportunity to fulfill one’s capa ities perpetuate poverty, thereby perpetuating the belief in the inferiority of poor. hundreds of thousands of jobs.” Privatization and reductions in the size oft public sector, social spending, real wages, subsidies for basic staples, wer protections, and forital job contracts have made matters worse," and Rio hag become increasingly reliant on the informal economy (both illicit an and a relatively small (but growing) modern service sector. ‘The erosion of the social contract™ has undermined long-standing work protections and social guarantees that might have helped to mediate the neg tive effects of economic and institutional restructuring.” In fact, in 2001 whe wwe asked our original interviewees, “Wich polit like yourself the most frequent answer was Gerilio Vargas. During his pop list regime, known as the Estado Novo (1930~45), Vargas set up the rudiment tary protections of the welfare state, including workers’ rights and benefits well as the pension system. This answer surprised me at fist since I had antici pated mention of the mayor who had initiated the Favela-Baicro program, some local city councilman who had done favors for the community. Upon reflection, however it made sense given that 54 percent of the original samp) ‘was living on state retirement pensions instituted during the Vargas era, a that many of them were supporting their children and grandchildren on th pensions. STIGMA AND DISCRIMINATION trying to track the changing terms used to distinguish between “us” (the wor- py in-group) and “thems” (the unworthy out-group), | not only listened carefully 5 innumerable anecdotes of injustices based on prejudice but attended to the the media and the academic community discussed this issue, While much been written about race and gender in Brazil, there is no work J have seen © comparing racism or sexism with the other forms of exclusion based on place of lence, place of community (central or peripheral), and place of origin (Rio- yersus migrant). These combined factors signalled by clothing, speech, body guage, and cues about class, are what create the overall impression-the “pinta” the person. These elements in turn bear direct consequence for the way that 5 from the formal city judge a person’ character and make decisions about ether or not a person from afavela is qualified for employment. In my informal iscussions with people in the communities, heard so much about these sources discrimination that I made them a focus of my 200r and 2003 research. began by asking the people T interviewed in my follow-up study two uestions that I asked in 1969: “Do you think there is racial discrimination in Brazil?” and “Have you or your children experienced racial discrimination?,” sking for examples of both. In oor and 2003 T added a new question: “Is, ere discrimination due to other factors? also asking each person to mention factors that applied and to give examples. ‘The graph in figure 6.1 shows how the original interviewees responded in 2001. The most frequently mentioned basis of discrimination was not racism, favela-iem (ie., being from a favela). Being dark skinned was the second t frequently mentioned stigms, followed by a pinca da pessoa (local slang 4 person's appearance or the way they come across), which was followed by cing born outside Rio (particularly in the Northeast) and Living in the Baixada Pluminense. Only after those did being fernale enter the picture, and after that 9 living in the Nozth Zone and living in a conjunt. ‘THE UNMAKING AND REMAKING OF MARGINALITY ‘The term marginality was not widely used in academic or activist circles aftet the critiques of the 1976s. Those scholars who did wri lication of The Myth of Marginality and other key works of the period fo ‘on decoupling the theories of marginality from the reality. With the democratic opening in the mid-1980s, voices of opposition ‘emerged, and the discourse on urban poverty turned toward the less toxic concepts of social exclusion, inequality, injustice, and spatial segregation. Eael dimension of marginality seems to have reappeared in a new, more benign guise within the new architecture of progressive analytical discourse, Social margit= ality became a discussion of “social exclusion’; cultural marginality became conversation about “otherness”; economic marginality tumed into “capabilit deprivation,” “vulnerabilities,” and a rethinking of “livelihoods” and “as and political marginality became a dialogue about “lack of voice,"“citizensh claims,” and “rights.” These concepts, developed by activists and intellect sympathetic tothe urban poor, placed the blame for intergenerational and pe! sistent poverty on the underlying structures of the state and society rather th on the deficiencies and deficits of the poor. They also exposed how being. ‘can annul the fundamental dignity of being human,(sey " giWALITY FROW MYTH TO REALITY qa Sy (space otsounie =] 57% a ‘one 6.2 Sources of Discrimination as Perceived by Three Generations, zor ing in fvela rermsned the greatest basis of stigma and the only one that did not ‘off by the grandchildrens generation, Trouas 61 Peeve Stigma: Sources of Disimintion at Paced by © As this was not consistent with prevailing thought among scholars | wondered whether these other forms of exclusion were impediments only for the older generation. Not so. When I compared their responses with those of their children and their grandchildren, I found the younger generationy? i in order and magnitude to those of their parents. The responses of the children were almost identical, but for them, living i and having a certain appearance were found to be even more detrimental (see figure 6.2). sy random sample study done 2 years later. wanted to be sure that Iwas not ing up thought patterns transmitted within families before I could speak certainty about sources of prejudice. ‘found that the new random sample (16~ to 65-year-old men and women) the same communities perceived even greater discrimination than the origi- interviewees. The order of perceived bases of discrimination was similar, fuut more acute, with 92 percent mentioning favela residence and skin color “and 88 percent mentioning appearance as bases for being negatively judged. “They felt that prejudice against migrants (anyone not born in Rio) was worse, ably because more of them were migrants. But living in the Baixada was asless of detriment, due to economic development and improved public elders, living in a favela remains the worst source of discrimination (78 percent cited it) and “pinta” is next (60 percent)—both greater barriers than race, gen~ der, oF place of origin, (Only the top four cited factors are shown in figure = 6.2) Living in a favela and not looking like a South Zone young person were obviously impediments to getting work for the youngest generation, who are the best educated and have the highest rate of unemployment-—almo SOCIAL EXCLUSION \ttempis in the academic literature to differentiate the 1960s concept of mar- 50 percent, ality from the current concept of social exclusion often appear arbitrary Still I wondered why the grandchildren perceive less discrimination chant confusing to me rather than helpful in clarifying nuances of meaning. * their elders. ‘Thinking about Patricia (Zé Cabo's granddaughter), Sabrind _The most interesting isthe distinction Marcio Pochmann makes between the (Nilton’s granddaughter), and Diana (Djanira’s granddaughter) and others i484 0ld exclusion” in Brazil (1960-80), and the “new exclusion” (1980-2000)." In their cohort suggested to me that perhaps it was their higher educational leve) _ iis view the old social exclusion, based on illiteracy (or low educational levels) and near-perfect adaptation of the South Zone style of speaking and dressing i low income, focused on migrants from the countryside and was particu~ that allowed more of them to “pass” and therefore experience relatively les larly concerned with women and blacks. The new social exclusion, as he sees rejection. ? includes people bom in the city, such as most ofthe people in my restudy, ‘The next logical question for me regarding the bases of exclusion was whethe' o have higher levels of education, urban services, and household goods, but the answers found in the multigenerutional study would be confirmed by th 1 are often unemployed, underemployed, or underpaid. The exclusion is aa ” , FAY A {INALITY FROM MYTH TO REALITY (sry “eraeeT TALK” ‘marginality, it is obvious that by any other name, rig he ery conden rey: Wheteritled “soc exch ' B eecotices eprvaon” or anyother terminate dscous, the Foc lines ha ver a third of Ri’ inhabitants ae rendered nonpertons Mile the term “marginality” may have been discredited within aca jt has never lost its cachet on the ay It a “connotation of the "poorest of the poor” and “outlaws and re aan these meting tal slot about the in tion of poverty in Brazil. The following excerpts from fous ours an by Deepa Narayanis team in So Paulo favelas in 2000 illustrate oa rotations and reinforce the sense of superiority by distinguishing "us 7 The people in these focus groups al ive in faves but see margin. als) a8 others. In one session, a woman described “marginals” as function of theit precarious insertion into the job market. It makes sense 1 found that the people J interviewed see jobs or work as their number oge Priority in life and ehat living in a fave is a source of socal exclusion reg less of skin color or gender, Urban-born, light-skinned males who are ws ployed and/or who live in a favela or conjunto are subject to mote suspicg and discrimination in Rio today than black women who are employed. And much the worse ifthe light-skinned male happens to be young, as this ri immediate suspicion of connection with the drug traffic, In sum, the age-o debates on whether the condition of marginalization is more class-based, race based, or gender-based are not able to yield new insights into today’s forme g exclusion. nonprofit circles CAPABILITY DEPRIVATION Amartya Sen views poverty as not simply alack of income or of low income, bbut asa denial ofthe ability o-use a persons capability and capacity in pure suit of his or her own best interests.!¥ Sen deems capability deprivations as “intrinsically significant,” as opposed to low income, which may be a tem= porary condition or may be the result of a conscious decision to maximize another goal. Many of the people I interviewed have sacrificed income for education, raising a family, leisure, religion, the unwillingness to be humilis ated, the freedom to work for themselves, or simply for peace of mind. The deprivation concept takes into consideration these and other circumstances aside from low incomes that can result in living in a condition of povesty A case in point is that residing in a designated “non-place” like a favela ‘or conjunto confers low status and raises suspicion, regardless of a persoris assets, education, skills, or inteligence—in turn, making it difficult to earn an income commensurate with that of a person living in a legitimate neigh= borhood. ‘The person living in a baireo has a better chance of being hired 3 Eee ee eee sed interchangeably and being treated with respect chan a person witha higher income who hat With tis the word marginalioy” which was tee oe nae itl chosen to live in a favela, There are numerous individvals and families {a Hh “bandos” has come to refer to organized simi! gangs and favelas (over 10 percent in my sample) who have enough income to leaves Bickers. eo is pore that z Se nie bur choote to tty 3 [fire of then now itis the dg aie gu by roy So ty i Sern om i. of favelas by their surrounding neighborhoods. This erosion started to slew Inunder bids or on the tet eat gage colt unkand cal reg ep on cat fr dad stoner el ihn Se school yoard as a mattress and tin cans for cook~ Gehan Thy may spe fc oe eee ine ce nay be ching mon thes bg Thy 0 ying more fom life, They are the ones most sbused by the police ity, jis" were portrayed as “having no scruples, another community, “marginais" were portraye n : hows, murderers and drug addicts trying forthe easy life by barming "In a third group one man was recorded a sayings: Few years ago, go percent of this cominunty was made wp of masginais, but ne improved their circumstances or nowadays itis 2ero [because people have either imp nes “have been squeezed out]. Our realty slike this. We must not be passive, We must Nee ee uranic sein sets to watch, and ous daily meals, We are neither beggars nor marginais. income. Crises, illnesses, or accidents can prevent continued earnings, even tually exhausting savings and assets as well. Sen argues that the relations bs ate ceaeada betwen ow incomes and lw eapeilies vais stag dfercr group ai old rng he ero of aber (opening) nthe tat ws WN lies, and individuals, and is often contingent on personal characteristics. This #8 down. The unfortunate conflation of* ‘maging eal ae a ites ek ‘borne out by the narratives and life stories of the most successful individuals Sully reasserted pad ane pine bce aa pres ee cetive between, from among all the original study participants, and by the conclusions I deaw alii ovis abut the many innocent vis of the eros between from those at the end of the mobility chapter. lice and gangs, the middle class once again fears proximity to the fatesay : HE GAREINALITY FROM MYTH TO REALITY 188] ofjobs for unskilled workers and proliferation of jobs for university-trained ‘This, in tura, is reflected in the job market, the real estate market, and the con rh ries it ee _ ‘a . fessionals, Brazil is one of the most economically polarized countries in the sumer market. On recent visits Thave heard a new twist of the term within the favelas: J frequently warned to leave before dark or to avoid cestain areas becsuse th are controlled by:*a marginalidade” (the tharginality), With this new a marginality has made the transfiguration from a sociogeographical condi (on the margins, outside the mainstream) to criminal postion (member drug gang) ta collective noun forthe gangsters themselves—the marginal More and more of my friends in favelas and conjuntos ae considering, ing afterall these years due to their fear that their children might beeo involved in “the marginality.” When used in rap and funk lyrics, the term ¢ ‘often used with defiant bravado: “We are not matginais, we are not the margi ality —we are the marginalized,” This is a call for an uprising or revolt. pte the widespread pereption of deepening of inequity, data show that have remained fuy constant over reent decades. And, Riot economy is fom prosperous. Its economic growth is lower than most of Brazils other sropoltan areas and it has lost che prosperity ofits golden years (pre-r960) to the move ofthe capital to Brasilia, the de-industrialization and decline “ofthe port area, and the move of the busines, cultural and intellectual center Sto Paulo, So, Rio does not fc the first proposition of advanced marginaliy. Absolute Surplus Population ‘absolute surplus population” Waequant means that a significant portion of eee eee een il never work again. In addition there is widespread poverty among those who ‘have jobs because of low pay and the exploitation of temporary workers—as we saw in the case of Sabrina in her telemarketing job. Fewer employers are 1g to provide worker protection and benefits since there are so many peo~ who need work. Brazil’ unemployment levels during 2001-03 were among highest in its history, and Rio was among the metropolitan areas suffer- ng most. Without doubt there has been a weakening of the labor unions and erosion of conditions of formal employment. The difference in Rio may be the proliferation of the informal economy masks what might be consid- a surplus population. One-quartér of the houscholds of our original favela ple reported having one or more unemployed houschotd member of work age, but the majority of households included one or more people of working currently active in the labor force. The big surprise was that the percentage those working who had formal employment, with a carter ssinada(a signed ork card) guaranteeing the fll range of workers benefits hed risen from 1969 +10 2001, and rose with each generation studied. The other. Secreta e a Jetimanent underclass is the high degree of turnover. Within the space ofa few Aortic ia loo rmveeent eo andl out of abor feo io and _ ut of formal labor contracts. There ae some who remain inactive for one reason _ Ot another, but, in general, despite Rio's weak job marlct,1 would not character- ize the unemployed as a surplus population that will never work again, Beginning in the late 1990s the term marginalit itself begun to reappear in ac: demic circles in discussions of persistent poverty in First World cities. Terms such as the “new underclass,” the “new poverty” the “new marginality” or “advanced Imarginality” were being used to describe the conditions ofthe chronic poot i the black ghettos of the United States and the migrant “slums” of Europe. idea is that advance marginality reflects the current stage of global capitalism ia ‘which a large portion of the urban population is simply irrelevant and exclu from the rest of the city: warchoused in segregated ghettos, Lofe Wacquant developed this concept most filly, starting with a 199 auticle wherein he described the “contiguous configuration of color, clas, and place" in the Chicago ghetto, the French dandiewe, and the British and Dutt Jinner cites, He posits a distinctive postindustrial marginality characterized by ew constraints, stigmas, territorial separation, dependency on the welfare stat and institutions within “territories of urban relegation.” Four key “structural dynamics," Wacquant suggests, are reshaping urbat Poverty in advanced industrial societies: social inequality, an absolute surplif population, the retrenchment of the welfare state, and spatial concentrato ‘igmatization, Javier Auyero had already tried to apply these to Buenos Aires tnd I wondered to what extent these four conditions would apply to the condi tions I found in Rio de Janeico and Brazil : ctrenchment of the Welfare State Social Inequality - Retrenchment of the Welf Retrenchment of the welfare state in the United States and Western Europe characterized by service cutbacks in social programs and—in some cuses— turning such programs into instruments of surveillance and control, In ‘The frst of the structural dynamics of advanced marginality as postulated by. ‘Wacquant is that social inequality persists and deepens within « context of ‘overall economic prosperity. This divergence is due tothe simultaneous eimint=tno] FAVELA | i ae Second, favelas in Rio are not concentrated in any one area ofthe city, but are _prerned geographically with more prosperous neighborhoods. Ifthe meaning | fre is chat the boundaries ofthe morro and asfalto are readily apparent Rio is pattern well bu spatial concentration means that ll favelas ean be located = Fh one part of the urban landscape, Rio is just the opposite, As we saw on the crop in chapter 2, Ri’ favela ae scattered across the urban space rather than Jflegted 10 specific are Indeed, as Pero Abramo bas shown, some are co ‘el located that rentl and sale prices within them are higher chan those in cet- ‘jin parts of Copacabana or Botafogo, two upper and middle-income areas. chaps the most striking evidence against the premise of advanced margin= “aly is has Favela residents (even dark-skinned) are not “forcibly relegated” to ~ Feayng in their commanites. As I discuss in more deta in chapter 9 only 37 Lula da Silva (known as Lula). ipercent of the original randomly. selected study participants we found were still I discuss this further in my chapter on policy (chapter 11). Suffice it to sj ving in favelas—25 percent were in conjuntos and 34 percent were in neigh- here that this form of negative income tax or “citizen's wage,” complemented by _ “ borhoods, mostly located in the periphery of the city. local city and state programs, has meant an enormous expansion of the welfare seate rather than a retrenchment. 2 ‘We also found a strong presence of the old welfire state in the form of - retirement payments, Neaely 60 percent of the original interviewees said their retirement payments were their principal source of income, and for household heads it was 66 percent. Retirees receive about one “minimum salary” per month, - (equivalent to about US$90.2) In many cases extended families, including unem= ployed children and young grandchildren, are living on that retirement check. camining to what extent this disinvestment and punitive focus applies tothe | case of Rio, it is critical to remember that Brazil never had a highly developed ‘sure to reform and rationalize state social expenditures as part of a fiscal austerity package demanded by international lending agencies under the tem “structing adjustment.” families on the condition that they investin their chiles education or health “These “conditional cash transfers,” often referred to as CCTS," were consol dated into Bolsa Familia (Family Stipend) in 2003 under President Luiz Inicio. concLusion “What I have been observing over these decades is the transformation from the myth of marginality” to “the reality of marginality.” In 1969, there was “widespread hope that the sacrifices made by the cityward migrants would vide their children (if not theraselves) with broader opportunities and a ter range of choice. This s one season the expected radicalism of the squat “fers never materialized. New migrants were not infuriated by the disparities ‘berween themselves and the upper classes surrounding them in Rio because their reference group was not the rich who lived in Rio but those who stayed ‘Wacquant posits that spatial concentration and stigmatization arc “physically. ‘bchind in the countryside, Although their children and grandchildren have expressed in hard-core areas of outcasts, territorial stigma and prejudice, 2 ‘benefited in many ways from being born and raised in Rio, they face some a diminishing sense of community life.’ Although favelas may not be " allenges the older generation could not have foreseen, not the Least of which core areas of outcasts,” they are punitively stigmatized spaces as demonstrated © are living with the constant fear of death. earlier in this chapter, and the community trust and unity that characterized close this chapter with the lyrics of “Soldado do Morro” (Soldier of the them when I lived there years ago is being eroded. ip-hop icon of Rio de Janeiro, MV Bill He is from Tl take the proposition piece by piece. First, in Rio, being poor does not “Cidade de Deus, where several Catacumba residents were sent after the demoli- mean being an outlaw any more than living in a favela means you are Poot = in 1970. Aside from using his music to denounce the marginalization of or an outlaw. Favelas are heterogeneous—racially, soctlly, culturally, and ec nomicaly (some more so than others), and there is a high degree of variation ela residents, MV Bill is an activist leader who runs «local teen center and is founder of Central Unica de Favelas, better known as CUFA (Central Asso~ among them. In contrast o the total racial segregation characterizing the new ‘manginality, Rio's favelas have always been racially mixed. In the x969 study | Gaon of Favela), « network of nonprofit organizations dedicated to offering “Youth an alternative to the drug traffic. Along with hip-hop, break dancing, and 21 percent of the randomly sampled favela residents were black, 30 percent _kraffti, these groups teach young people computer and job skills and create a ‘mulatto, and 49 percent white; and these percentages were almost identical i cial identity and sense of belonging to counteract the appeal of dug, gangs.” the random sample in the same locations in 2003. That does not mean that “The song beautifully reflects the major themes of marginality discussed in racial mix in favelas is proportional to that in the ety as a whole (since blad are disprovortionately represented), but they are by no means racial chettos. Spatial Concentration and Stigmatization his chapter. First, that marginal stats is the creation of society, not the faultee ee erreurs z es aes Mi ' FAVEL, TRALITY FROM MYTH TO REALITY Fazendo dinheiro com a nessa realidade “Me deiaram entie o crime a necesidade Feioeesperto com uma cara de mal A ociedade me eriou mas ura exaeginal En tenho wma nove ¢ una HK Com dio na veis pronto para stirar Violéacia da favela comesou a descer pro asflto Homicidi seqiestro assalto ‘Quem deveria dara protegio Noe aie defi mao iu sei que o mundo que eu vivo éerrado Mas quando eu peste inguém teva do meu ado ‘Brrado por errado quem nunca ero! [gue que pede voto também jf matou Vida do crime € suicdio lento [Na cadeia Bangi: 2 3 meus amigos tenho Ii dentro Eu tO lgado qual ései qual é final Um soldado negative menos um marginal Pra sociedade wna baixa na lista FE engordar uma triste estatistiea ‘Nio sci se pior var bandido (Ou se matar por im salétio mim of the poor. Second, that the poor are trapped between dealing drugs (whic destroy their community and themselves) and trying to get a job—a humiligg ing and futile endeavous, Third, that even the lucky few who get a job for g = tinimum salary and work overtime still do not ear enough to support thy families. Fourth, that policemen and politicians who are supposed to be pay. tecting the poor are perpetrators of crime and violence themselves; and A that the soldade do morro (Favela solder) is expendable and that if he dies, hy death is just one more statistic in the daily news—no more than a small view in the fight to rid the city of “bad elements.” [In the song, the soldado do morro chose a path of early and violent de and he protests the injustice of the system that fils to produce alternatives him and others like him. This element of defiance and what he calls “disgus? is heard in many rap songs which are vehicles for exposing the way things and calling for defiance >> ‘The lives of the poor have always been cheap, but in the milieu of drug and arms traffic, they been devalued even more. Death rates in the favelas are much: greater than in the rest of the city—and for favela youth are higher still This. nev violence may be the ultimate manifestation of the marginalization of the — poor, the reality of marginality. a SOLDADO Do MORRO Vaca eves me sent menos homem Detempregide meu moleque cam fome muito ficil vir aqui me criticar ‘A sociedad ine criou agora manda me maar Me condentre more na prisio Vir noi de televisi 1 pe etmoa me humihes Fa pitoteado 6 ene que eu pase “Toligado no vi justine ‘Meu tempo pequeno nfo st o quanto vai dora E prior do que pedi favor ‘Amuna um emprego tenho um fhe pequeno see dautor Fila grande eens ezentor Depois de muito tempo ser vaga no momento ‘Amesmahistia todo da € fda Taso que geouaminba revlia Me dsivou desnoredo mais um malice srmado “Toligadobolado que ¢o culpado? (ye fin gute es mome por ela ‘istbui a droga que destoi a fla ‘Many i the time Te fee less than a an Unemployed with my cid going hungry Tes easy to. Society created me and now demands my death ‘Condemning me to die in prison “Transformed into tlevision news Ive been a begges already humiliated myself vgs al go Long waiting ist;meand joo others After an errno openings athe moment “The same story every day, al this generates revolt Tam hooked, who isto blame? “Those who ate making this war never die in it 1 isibuted the drags that destroy the favela ‘Making money fiom our realty ‘am caught between crime and necesity “Those who shoul be providing protection vost =ae 647 Tevade the favela with weapons in hand... “Those who come secking our votes they too have killed “he lifeoferime is slow suicide Bango, 1,2, 3, my frends inside there ‘Tam involved, I know the outcome A negative balance, minus one marginal For society to count, one fewer on the list Adding weight toa sad statistic... | dorit know which is worse, turning into bandit (Or killing yourself forthe minimaur wage... seven VIOLENCE, FEAR, AND LOSS most dramatic and devastating change for Rio’ poor over the last three jes has been the growth of lethal violence. In 1969, the poor living in “fnvcla feared that their homes and communities would be demolished. Today, F the turf wars among rival drug gangs or that they will be in the wrong place luring 2 police raid. They are terrified that their children will not return alive the end of the school day or that their baby will be shot while playing on the avelas are appealing locations for the deug gangs, with their narrow, wind- alleys, abundant hiding places, and unemployed youth. They provide the deal staging area for breaking down large shipments of drugs into smaller ‘kages for sale to Rio’ rich playboys (or “daddy's boys") and for shipping, to Europe via North Africa or to the United States via the Caribbean. Violence follows poverty. The trafficantes or bandidos, as the drug dealers are led, began entering the favelas in the mid-1980s, and their presence spread | icky to the conjuntos and loteamentos. Now the dealers are becoming a prob- = lem in the poor neighborhoods to which the favela residents have fled. It was eartbreaking to discover that those who managed to move their families out