GAPIDO, ANTHONY CLARK A.

POLITICAL LAW MIDTERM EXAM 03-16-2020

LAW 4C JUDGE NIEVA

1. No. the RTC judge is not correct.

It is well settled that the constitution identifies the limitation to the awesome and near-limitless
powers of the state. Among these limitations are the principles that no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law and that private property shall now be
taken for public use without just compensation. These limitations are enshrined in no less than
the Bill of Rights that guarantees the citizen protection from abuse by the state.

Consequently, our laws require that the state’s power of eminent domain shall be exercised
through expropriation proceedings in the court of law. In must be remember that whenever
private property taken for public use, it becomes the ministerial duty of the concerned office or
agency to initiate expropriation proceedings. By necessary implication, the filing of a complaint
for expropriation is a waiver of state immunity.

It must be noted that when the government expropriates the property for public use without
paying just compensation, it cannot invoke its immunity from suit. Otherwise, the right
guaranteed under the constitution that private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation will be rendered nugatory.

As borne out by the facts of the case, the property taken from A is for public use for the purpose
of road widening, the commissioner of public highways and auditor general has a ministerial
duty to initiate expropriation proceeding. Hence, the RTC judge is not correct.

2. If I were a Judge, I will not dismiss the complaint on the ground that it is a suit against a state.

It was held that the contracts entered into by a sovereign state in connection with the
establishment of a diplomatic mission, including contracts for the upkeep or maintenance of air
conditioning units and among others for the use of embassy and the ambassador’s residence,
are contracts jure imperii which means it is a contract for the repair of wharves.

In the case at bar, the fact that the contract contains a provision that any legal action arising out
of the agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by specify court of
the Philippines does not necessarily mean a waiver of state’s sovereignty immunity from suit.

Hence, I will not dismiss the complaint.

3. the right is available to a child as long as his mother was a Filipino citizen at the time of her
marriage to the alien, even if by reason of such marriage, she lost Philippine citizenship and
even if the mother was not a citizen of the Philippines at birth.

4. The contention of Jose is meritorious.

The filing of certificate of candidacy suffices to renounce foreign citizenship does not apply to
one who, after having reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 9225, runs for public office to
comply with the provision of RA 9225, it is necessary that the candidate for public office must
state a clear and unequivocal that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship. It must be
remembered that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine
citizenship upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy to terminate the status as persons with
dual citizenship. The filing of certificate of candidacy to renounce the foreign citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification as dual citizen. This is so because in the certificate of
candidacy one declares that he is a Filipino citizen and he will support and defend the
constitution and maintain true faith and allegiance to the same. Such declaration under oath
operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.
GAPIDO, ANTHONY CLARK A. POLITICAL LAW MIDTERM EXAM 03-16-2020
LAW 4C JUDGE NIEVA

In this case, Jose’s filing of his certificate of candidacy as congressman of the 3rd district of
Camarines Sur effectively renounce his foreign citizenship and retroacts his natural born status
to his date of birth as well as his domicile in the Philippines.

Hence, Jose is deemed qualified to run as a Congressman of the 3rd district of Camarines Sur.

5. The contention of Jose is meritorious.

It is well settled rule that contracts should not be tampered with by subsequent laws which
would change por modified the rights and obligations of the parties. There is impairment if the
subsequent law changes the terms of the contract between the parties, imposes new condition,
dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for enforcement of the rights of a
party.

As borne out by the facts of the case, Jose granted a timber license permit to operate in Cagayan
Valley for a period of 20 years but the license was terminated on the 10th year the impairment of
obligation in the existing contracts was substantial, hence there was impairment of obligation of
contracts.

6. The trial Judge is not correct.

It must be noted that infringement of constitutional rights of the accused during the custodial
investigation is relevant and material only were an extrajudicial confession or admission from
the accused becomes the basis of conviction.

The well settled rule is that, when the confession is uncounselled, it is inadmissible in evidence.
What is sought to be avoided by the rule is ‘’ the evil of extorting from the very mouth of the
person undergoing interrogation for the commission of the offense the very evidence with
which to prosecute and thereafter convict him’’. Even if the extrajudicial confession was in
writing and signed by the counsel, because the accused was not given miranda warning, the
confession was held inadmissible in evidence.

In the at bar, the uncounselled extrajudicial confession signed and made by the accused during
the custodial interrogation, there was an apparent violation to his constitutional right. Hence, by
running counter to the provision of the constitution, the conviction of parricide on the basis of
the confession made by the accused is not correct for it is a blatant violation of the supreme law
of the land.

7. The legislative power is an attribute of sovereignty, in that the constitution itself, the
fundamental law of the state is a legislation of the sovereign people. However, through the
Constitution, the people “delegated” the legislative power to the Congress of the Philippines as
enshrined in the Constitution which shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines. The
delegation entails a surrender of authority to the representatives, or in the case of legislative
power, to the Congress. The Constitution, however, makes reservation as to the delegation in
which no complete delegation of law-making power to the Congress, as the power is reserved to
the people in cases of initiative and referendum. Thus, the laws are made or unmade, first, by
the Congress in the form of “statutes”, and second, by the people in initiatives and
referendums; legislative power is exercised by the Congress and the sovereign Filipino people.
GAPIDO, ANTHONY CLARK A. POLITICAL LAW MIDTERM EXAM 03-16-2020
LAW 4C JUDGE NIEVA

8. Contingent Legislation is an entirely different problems arises when, instead of directing another
department of government to apply a general statute to individual cases, or to supplement it by
detailed regulation, the congress commands that a previously enacted statute be revived,
suspended, or modified or that a new rule be put into operation, upon the finding of certain
facts by an executive or administrative officer.

9. The contention of Vice- governor and Provincial Board is not correct.

The power to punish contempt is lodged only to the house of congress (Senate and the
Representatives) in the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. The Supreme Court
underscored the indispensability and usefulness of the power of contempt in a legislative
inquiry. The Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the House of
Representatives, but also to their respective committees. A conferral of the legislative power of
inquiry upon any committee of Congress must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for
its effective discharge.

In this case, Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Albay/ Provincial Board has no direct conferral power
to be a committee of Senate or Representatives. They are of different and separate body
exercising its quasi-judicial body which has its own governing rules.

10. The doctrine of inappropriate provision states that when the legislature inserts inappropriate
provisions in a General appropriation bill, such provision must be treated as ‘’items’’ for
purposes of the item veto power over general appropriation bill. As the constitution is explicit
that the provision which Congress can include in an appropriation bill must relate specifically to
some particular appropriation therein and be limited in its operation to the appropriation to
which it relates, it follows that any provision which does not relate to any particular item or
which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation is considered an inappropriate
provision which can be vetoed separately from an item.

11. House may punish its members for disordered behavior, and, with the concurrence of two thirds
of all its members, suspend for not more than sixty days or expel a member. It is settled that the
determination of the acts which constitute disorderly behavior is within the full discretionary
authority of the house concerned, and the court will not review such determination, the same
being a political question. Hence, the house has exclusive power to punish its members for
disorderly behavior and the courts have no jurisdiction to interfere.

12. It must be noted always that the constitution provides that no person be twice put in jeopardy
of punishment for the same offense. A legal jeopardy attaches when he was put to trial in the
following condition. First, in court of competent jurisdiction. Second, upon a valid complaint or
information. Third, after he has been arraigned and last, he has pleaded to the information.

As borne out by the facts of the case, the 4 abovementioned conditions were present in this
case since the first jeopardy had already been attached prior to the second and that the first
jeopardy was validly terminated and the second jeopardy was for the same offense or the
second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information.

Hence, x cannot put twice to a trial considering of the aforesaid reasons.

GAPIDO, ANTHONY CLARK A. POLITICAL LAW MIDTERM EXAM 03-16-2020
LAW 4C JUDGE NIEVA