Rule 78
plain and explicit: the heirs may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased without
Case 1
EPIFANIO SAN JUAN, JR., petitioner, vs. JUDGE RAMON A. CRUZ, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, QUEZON CITY
FACTS: Loreto Samia San Juan executed a Last Will and Testament naming Oscar
Casa as one of the devisees therein. Upon Loreto's death, Atty. Teodorico A. Aquino
filed a petition for the probate of the will in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City.
While the petition was pending, Oscar Casa died intestate on May 24, 1999. The firm
of Aquino & Associates entered their appearance as counsel of Federico Casa, Jr.,
who claimed to be one of the heirs of Oscar Casa and their representative.
In 2002, the probate court issued an Order denying the entry of appearance of said
law firm, considering that Federico Casa, Jr. was not the executor or administrator of
the estate of the devisee, hence, cannot be substituted for the deceased as his
representative as required by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. On November
22, 2002, the court issued an order directing Aquino to secure the appointment of an
administrator or executor of the estate of Oscar Casa in order that the appointee be
substituted in lieu of the said deceased.
On February 26, 2003, Aquino filed a pleading entitled "Appointment of Administrator"
signed by Candelaria, Jesus, Arlyn, Nestor, Edna, Benhur, Federico, Rafael and Ma.
Eden, all surnamed Casa, praying that one of them, Federico Casa, Jr., be
designated as administrator of the estate of the deceased and that he be substituted
for the deceased.
In compliance with the order of the court, Epifanio San Juan filed a "Motion to Declare
Appointment of Administrator As Inadequate or Insufficient." He maintained that the
heirs should present an administrator of the estate of Oscar Casa as the
representative of the estate in the case.
On December 2, 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying the motion of San Juan.
Contrary to its first order, the court held that there was, after all, no need for the
appointment of an administrator or executor as substitute for the deceased devisee. A
1st MR and a subsequent 2nd MR were filed which were both denied by the RTC.
San Juan, now petitioner, filed a petition for certiorari with the CA on November 22,
2004 for the nullification of the orders issued by the probate court which the CA
dismissed on the ground that it was filed beyond the 60-day period counted from
notice to petitioner of the trial court's February 27, 2004 Order. Hence, this petition
before the SC.
ISSUE: WON there is a need for the appointment of an administrator of the estate of
Oscar Casa, or whether it is enough that he be substituted by his heirs.
HELD: NEGATIVE. Petition is without merit.
(Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court) The second paragraph of the rule is
requiring the appointment of an administrator or executor. However, if within the
specified period a legal representative fails to appear, the court may order the
opposing counsel, within a specified period, to process the appointment of an
administrator or executor who shall immediately appear for the estate of the
deceased.
The heirs of the estate of Oscar Casa do not need to first secure the appointment of
an administrator of his estate, because from the very moment of his death, they
stepped into his shoes and acquired his rights as devisee/legatee of the deceased
Loreto San Juan. Thus, a prior appointment of an administrator or executor of the
estate of Oscar Casa is not necessary for his heirs to acquire legal capacity to be
substituted as representatives of the estate.42 Said heirs may designate one or some
of them as their representative before the trial court.
Hence, even on the threshold issue raised in the RTC and in the petition
for certiorari in the CA, the assailed order of the RTC is correct.
Case 2
EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY | G.R. No. 183053 |
October 10, 2012
FACTS: Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay died intestate and was survived by her spouse,
Dr. Federico Suntay and five grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, including
herein respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren, including petitioner
Emilio III, all by Federico’s and Cristina’s only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who
predeceased his parents. After Cristina’s death, respondent Isabel, filed before the
RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over
Cristina’s estate. Federico, opposed the petition, and filed a Motion to Dismiss
Isabel’s petition for letters of administration on the ground that Isabel had no right of
representation to the estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild of the
latter as a result of Isabel’s parents’ marriage being declared null and void.
Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the
decedent’s estate on his behalf in the event letters of administration issues to
Federico. Consequently, Emilio III filed an Opposition-In-Intervention, echoing the
allegations in his grandfather’s opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead,
Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to administer and manage the estate
of the decedent, Cristina. Federico died. Almost a year thereafter, the trial court
rendered a decision appointing Emilio III as administrator of decedent Cristina’s
intestate estate. On appeal by certiorari, the Supreme Court in an earlier case
reversed and set aside the ruling of the appellate court. The Court decided to include
Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristina’s estate, giving weight to his interest in
Federico’s estate.
ISSUE: Whether or not Isabel and Emilio III can be a co-administrators of the estate
of Isabel Cojuanco-Suntay.
HELD: NO. Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists a sequence to be observed,
an order of preference, in the appointment of an administrator. This order of
preference, which categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and
the creditors in the appointment of an administrator, has been reinforced in
jurisprudence. The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator
over the estate of a decedent is the prospective administrator’s interest in the
estate. This is the same consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into account in
establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrator for the estate.
The rationale behind the rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy
and economical administration of the estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the
consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest
and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly. In all, given that the rule
speaks of an order of preference, the person to be appointed administrator of a
decedent’s estate must demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but an interest
therein greater than any other candidate.
The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be
settled does not ipso facto entitle an interested person to co-administration thereof.
Neither does squabbling among the heirs nor adverse interests necessitate the
discounting of the order of preference set forth in Section 6, Rule 78. In the
appointment of administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal
consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed
as administrator. Given Isabel’s unassailable interest in the estate as one of the
decedent’s legitimate grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of kin," the
appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator of the same estate, cannot be a
demandable right. It is a matter left entirely to the sound discretion of the Court and
depends on the facts and the attendant circumstances of the case.
In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and the protracted
litigation, is the inescapable fact that Emilio III and respondent Isabel have a deep
aversion for each other. To our mind, it becomes highly impractical, nay, improbable,
for the two to work as co-administrators of their grandmother’s estate. The allegations
of Emilio III, the testimony of Federico and the other witnesses for Federico and
Emilio III that Isabel and her siblings were estranged from their grandparents further
drive home the point that Emilio III bears hostility towards Isabel. More importantly, it
appears detrimental to the decedent’s estate to appoint a co-administrator (Emilio III)
who has shown an adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those, such as herein
respondent Isabel, immediately interested in the said estate.
Case 3
Hilado vs CA
Facts: -Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his
wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto, and his only daughter, Francisca.
-At the time of his death, there were two pending civil cases against him involving the
petitioners. The first, was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, with petitioner
Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. The second, was then pending with the
RTC of Bacolod City, with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers
Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein.
-On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of
Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor.
-On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued an order appointing private respondent as
administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters of
administration in her favor.
-In January 2001, private respondent submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of
Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband.
In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent included as
among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims then being litigated
before the Bacolod City courts.
-On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a
Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, praying that they be furnished with
copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings.
-Private respondent opposed the manifestation/motion, disputing the personality of
petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband.
-On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the
manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not interested parties within
the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate proceedings.
-After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, a petition for
certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals. The petition argued in general that
petitioners had the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto
Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the civil cases they lodged with the
Bacolod RTC.
-Tha CA denied their petition. Hence, the present petition.
Issue: Whether the lower courts erred in denying them the right to intervene in the
intestate proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto
Ruling: No. The merits of petitioners claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the
civil cases where they were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In the event
the claims for damages of petitioners are granted, they would have the right to
enforce the judgment against the estate. 
The Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any person interested
in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect of the testate or intestate
proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances when such persons may
accordingly act in those proceedings, the Court deemed that while there is no general
right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain
prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if
the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and there
is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can be protected. 
Case 4
BALUYUT vs. PAÑO | G.R. No. L-42088 May 7, 1976 | AQUINO, J.:
FACTS:
 Sotero Baluyut died, leaving an estate allegedly valued at not less than P2
Million.
 His nephew, Alfredo G. Baluyut, filed in the CFI Quezon City a verified petition
for letters of administration.
 He alleged that the deceased was survived by his widow, Encarnacion Lopez,
who was mentally incapable of acting as administratrix of the decedent's estate.
Alfredo surmised that the decedent had executed a will. Alfredo prayed that he
be appointed regular administrator and in the meantime as special
administrator.
 CFI appointed Alfredo G. Baluyut as special administrator which was opposed
by Mrs. Baluyut alleging that she was unaware that her deceased husband
executed a will.
 Mrs. Baluyut asked the court that Espino, an alleged acknowledged natural child
of Sotero Baluyut, be appointed administrator should she not be named
administratrix.
 Alfredo G. Baluyut opposed the urgent motion. He alleged that Espino was not a
natural child of Sotero Baluyut because Espino's parents were the spouses
Elino Espino and Josefa de Guzman. Alfredo further alleged that Mrs. Baluyut
was declared an incompetent by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Quezon City for the guardianship of Mrs. Baluyut.
 Probate Court terminated the appointments of Espino and Alfredo G. Baluyut as
special administrators and appointed Mrs. Baluyut as regular administratrix with
a bond of P20,000.
 The order was based on the fact that as surviving spouse she has a
preferential right to be appointed as administratrix of her deceased
husband's estate. The lower court said it was convinced of the widow's
capacity and that her "sufficient understanding" justified her appointment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in
appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix? – YES.
RULING: We hold that while the probate court correctly assumed that Mrs.
Baluyut as surviving spouse enjoys preference in the granting of letters of
administration (Sec. 6[a), Rule 78, Rules of Court), it does not follow that she
should be named administratrix without conducting a full-dress hearing on her
competency to discharge that trust.
Even the directive of the testator in his will designating that a certain person should
act as executor is not binding on the probate court and does not automatically entitle
him to the issuance of letters testamentary. A HEARING has to be held in order to
ascertain his fitness to act as executor. He might have been fit to act as executor
when the will was executed but supervening circumstances might have rendered him
unfit for that position.
Thus, it was held that a hearing is necessary in order to determine the suitability of
the person to be appointed administrator by giving him the opportunity to prove his
qualifications and affording oppositors a chance to contest the petition.
In this case the probate court briefly and perfunctorily interrogated Mrs. Baluyut in
order to satisfy itself on her mental capacity. The court did not give Alfredo G. Baluyut
a chance to contest her qualifications.
Moreover, it is necessary to convert the proceeding in the lower court into a
testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will cannot be dispensed with and is a
matter of public policy.
After the will is probated, the prior letters of administration should be revoked and
proceedings for the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration under the will
should be conducted.
Whether Sotero Baluyut died testate or intestate, it is imperative in the interest of the
orderly administration of justice that a hearing be held to determine Mrs. Baluyut's
fitness to act as executrix or administratrix. Persons questioning her capacity should
be given an adequate opportunity to be heard and to present evidence.
WHEREFORE, the APPOINTMENT of Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix is SET ASIDE.
The letters of administration granted to her are cancelled. The probate court is
directed to conduct further proceedings in consonance with the guidelines
delineated in this decision.
Case 5
Pdf – Gabriel vs CA
Case 6
Sps Butiong et al Rinoza
Case 7
Iona Leriou et al vs Longa
Facts: Respondent-minors Yohanna and Victoria Longa, represented by their mother,
Mary Jane B. Sta. Cruz, instituted a petition for letters of administration. Respondents
alleged that Enrique died intestate, survived by petitioners and respondents. The RTC
issued the Letters of Administrator in favor of Mary Jane. Petitioners on the other
hand, filed a motion to have Mary Jane removed as the administratrix on the ground
of negligence and misrepresentation. Mary Jane denied any of it. In opposing
petitioners’ preferential right to administer the estate, respondent-administratrix
averred that petitioners are disqualified to act as administrators because petitioner
Iona, a Greek national, is already divorced from Enrique and has already remarried
as shown be her name. Also, petitioners Eleptherios and Stephen are non-residents
of the Philippines.
Issue: Who has the preferential right to be administrators of the estate of Enrique?
Held: Here, petitioners cannot assert their preferential right to administer the estate or
that their choice of administrator should be preferred because they are the nearest of
kin of the decedent. It is worth emphasizing that the preference given to the surviving
spouses, next of kin, and creditors is not absolute, and that the appointment of an
administrator greatly depends on the attendance facts and circumstances.
In the instant case, petitioners are non-residents of the Philippines, which disqualify
them from administering the decedent’s estate pursuant to Rule 78, Sec. 1 of the
Rules of Court. We are mindful that respondents are also disqualified by reason of
their minority. In view of the evident disqualification of petitioners and respondents
and the lack of any known creditors, the parties have no choice but to have
somebody else administer the estate for them. Petitioners nominated Juan Manuel
Elizalde (Elizade) but failed to give adequate justification as to why Leters of
Administration should be issued in Elizalde’s favor. We fully agree with the ruling of
the trial and appellate courts in choosing respondent-administratrix over Elizalde.
Compare to Elizalde whose interest over the decedent’s estate is unclear,
respondent-administratrix’s interest is to protect the estate for the benefit of her
children with Enrique. Indeed, it is respondents who would directly benefit from an
orderly and efficient management by the responde-administratrix. In the absence of
any indication that responde-administratrix would jeopardize her children’s interest, or
that of petitioners in the subject estate, petitioners’ attempts to remove her as
administratrix of Enrique’s estate must fail.
Case 8
LEON vs MANUFACTURERS LIFE
Facts: The case involves the estate of Basil Gordon Butler,formerly a resident of the
Philippines, died in Brooklyn, New York City, in 1945, leaving a will which was duly
probated in New York County and of which James Ross, Sr., James Madison Ross,
Jr. and Ewald E. Selph were named executors. The estate having been settled, the
proceedings were closed on July 17, 1947. The will contained this residuary clause
bequeathing the remaining estate to Mercedes de Leon who is to receive an amount
sufficient for her current needs. James Madison Ross was appointed as trustee.
Ross bought an annuity from the Manufacturer's life Insurance Co. at its head office
in Toronto, Canada, paying in advance $17,091.03 as the combined premiums. The
contract stipulates for a monthly payment of $57.60 to Mercedes Benz during her
lifetime. De Leon has been receiving the stipulated monthly allowance through the
Insurance Company's Manila Office. To get hold of the entire amount, de Leon
presented the will for probate in CFI, Manila with Ghezzi as administrator. After
having qualified, the administratrix filed the motion to demand accounting from
Manulife which Judge Amparo has denied.
Statement of Issue:Whether or not De Leon can demand accounting from Manulife.
Ruling of the Court: Section 4 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides:
Estate, how administered.-When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters
testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters
testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the
Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of
administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may
operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in
cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of
another state or country.
It is manifest from the facts before set out that the funds in question are outside the
jurisdiction of the probate court of Manila. Having been invested in an annuity in
Canada under a contract executed in the country, Canada is the suits of the money.
The party whose appearance the appellant seeks is only a branch or agency of the
company which holds the funds in its possession, the agency's intervention being
limited to delivering to the annuitant the checks made out and issued from the home
office. There is no showing or allegation that the funds have been transferred or
removed to the Manila Branch.
FACTS:
Basil Gordon Butler, formerly a resident of the Philippines, died in Brooklyn, New York
City, in 1945 leaving a will which was duly probated in the Surrogate’s Court of New
York County on August 3 of the same year, and of which James Ross, Sr., James
Madison Ross, Jr. and Ewald E. Selpfc were named executors. The.estate having
been settled, the proceedings were closed on July 17, 1947.
The will contained this residuary clause:
I devise, give and bequeath all of my remaining estate dad personal effects of which I
may die possessed to Mercedes de Leon, of Maypajo, Caloocan, Rizal xxx Since the
said Mercedes de Leon is not of sound judgment, and discretion in the handling of
money, it is not my wish that she be given any sums of money other than for her
current needs, except as my executors in their judgment deem advantageous to her.
In case the amount available for this bequest be sufficient to purchase an adequate
annuity, the executors in their discretion may do so. xxx
For the purpose of carrying out that testamentary provision, James Madison Ross
was appointed trustee by the New York Country Surrogate’s Court. Once appointed,
and with the beneficiary signing the application with him, Ross bought an annuity from
the Manufacturers Life Insurance Co., at its head office in Toronto, Canada, paying in
advance $17,091.03 as the combined premiums.
The contract stipulates for a monthly payment of $57.60 to Mercedes de Leon during
her lifetime, with the proviso that in the event of her death, the residue, if any, of the
capital sum shall be paid in one sum to James Madison Ross or his successor as Case 9
trustee. Beginning May 27, 1948, Mercedes de Leon has been receiving the Republic vs Marcos
stipulated monthly allowance through the Insurance Company’s Manila Office.

With the object, so it would seem, of getting hold at once of the entire amount
invested in the annuity, Mercedes de Leon on September 4, 1948, presented Butler’s
will for probate in the CFI-Manila, and secured the appointment of Ada Loggey
Ghezzi as administratrix with the will annexed early in 1949.

After having qualified, Ghezzi filed a motion for the citation of the Manager of the
Manila Branch of the Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. of Toronto, Canada, to appear
and render a complete accounting of certain funds the said Branch allegedly has in its
possession and claimed to belong to the estate. Judge Amparo denied, thus this
appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
(1) WON Ghezzi, the Philippine administratrix, has the power to administer properties
outside the Philippines? (NO)
(2) WON the funds in Canada is within the control of the probate court? (NO)

RATIO:
(1) The general rule universally recognized is that administration extends only to the
assets of a decedent found within the state or country where it was granted, so that
an administrator appointed in one state or country has no power over property in
another state or country.

This principle is specifically embodied in Section h of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:

Estate, how administered. When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters
testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters
testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the
Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of
administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may
operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in
cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of
another state or country.

Having been invested in an annuity in Canada under a contract executed in that

country, Canada is the situs of the money.

Manulife Philippine Branch’s intervention is limited to delivering to Leon the checks

made out and issued from the home office. There is no showing or allegation that the
funds have been transferred or removed to the Manila Branch.

Even if the money were in the hands of the Manila Branch, yet it no longer forms part
of Butler’s estate and is beyond the control of the court. It has passed completely into
the hands of the company in virtue of a contract duly authorized and validly executed.

Whether considered as a trust or as simple consideration for the company’s assumed

obligation, which it has been religiously performing, of paying periodical allowances to
the annuitant, the proceeds of the sale cannot be withdrawn without the consent of
the company, except, upon the death of the annuitant, the residuary legatee may
claim the remainder, if there be any.