[1] G.R. Nos.
168992-93               May 21, 2009 biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM,
Petitioner.
Adoption; Husband and Wife; Husband and wife must jointly adopt.—It is
undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had
already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her
husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial court’s decision
denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7,
Article III of RA 8552 reads: SEC. 7. Who May Adopt.—The following may adopt:
x x x Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases: x x x
The use of the word “shall” in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption
by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of
joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be
adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the
spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. The
law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time
the petitions for adop tion were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for
adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario,
the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section
7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of
her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of
petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.
Same; Same; Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 (Republic Act No. 8552); A
foreigner adopting together with his or her Philippine spouse must meet the
qualifications set forth in Republic Act No. 8552, and the requirements on residency
and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot be waived.—The fact
that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent
does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an
American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552
such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic
of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three
continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must
maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity
to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s
country as the latter’s adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and
proved during the trial. These requirements on residency and certification of the
alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The
children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of
petitioner.
Same; Effects; Even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee
is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate
child.—Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 99)
of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give
adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of
parent and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose
the name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be
legal and compulsory heirs of each other. Therefore, even if emancipation terminates
parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter
with all the rights of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father
and the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the
legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with
respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are
entitled such as support and successional rights.
Same; Separation of Powers; Judicial Legislation; While the Court is not
unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the
welfare of the children, regrettably, the law is clear and it cannot be modified
without violating the proscription against judicial legislation.—We are mindful of
the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and
welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide
homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and
give them the protection of society and family, as well as to allow childless couples
or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the
person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law. But, as we have ruled in Republic v. Vergara
(270 SCRA 206 [1997]): We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption
statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare of the children. Accordingly, the law
should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said
purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion, understanding and less
severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care and
education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to
affirm the trial court’s decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is
clear and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription against
judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the matter is amended,
we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses’ petition for adoption. Petitioner, being
married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should have jointly filed the
petitions with her husband. We cannot make our own legislation to suit petitioner.
Same; Husband and Wife; Dissolution of Marriage; The filing of a case for
dissolution of the marriage between the spouses is of no moment—it is not equivalent
to a decree of dissolution of marriage; Since, at the time the petitions for adoption
were filed, the petitioner was married, joint adoption with the husband is mandatory.
—Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that
joint adoption could no longer be possible because Olario has filed a case for
dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court. We
disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and
Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage.
Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between
Page 1 of 24
petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption
by the husband and the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at
the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint
adoption is mandatory.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim (petitioner)
seeking to set aside the Decision 1 dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional
Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case
Nos. 1258 and 1259, which dismissed without prejudice the consolidated
petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim.
The Facts
The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by profession.
On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor
children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain
Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of their own,
petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear that they were
the children’s parents. The children2 were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle)
and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old
when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March 1977. 3
Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioner’s clinic. His
date of birth is 1 August 1983.4
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own.
They sent the children to exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim" in
all their school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November
1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario
(Olario), an American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the
amnesty5 given under Republic Act No. 85526 (RA 8552) to those individuals
who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed
separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial
court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, respectively. At
the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old
and already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 99)
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced
by their Affidavits of Consent. 7 Michael also gave his consent to his adoption
as shown in his Affidavit of Consent. 8 Petitioner’s husband Olario likewise
executed an Affidavit of Consent9 for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.
In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), Michelle was considered as an abandoned child and
the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown. 10 The DSWD issued a
similar Certification for Michael.11
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the
petitions. The trial court ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner
should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court
ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory citing
Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion
was denied in the Order dated 16 June 2005. In denying the motion, the trial
court ruled that petitioner did not fall under any of the exceptions under
Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552. Petitioner’s argument that mere consent
of her husband would suffice was untenable because, under the law, there
are additional requirements, such as residency and certification of his
qualification, which the husband, who was not even made a party in this
case, must comply.
As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint
adoption is merely for the joint exercise of parental authority, the trial court
ruled that joint adoption is not only for the purpose of exercising parental
authority because an emancipated child acquires certain rights from his
parents and assumes certain obligations and responsibilities.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue
Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of whether or
not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it
is the duty of the court and the State to protect the paramount interest and
Page 2 of 24
welfare of the child to be adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim
"dura lex sed lex" is not applicable to adoption cases. She argues that joint
parental authority is not necessary in this case since, at the time the petitions
were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was
already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore necessary since
they have been emancipated having attained the age of majority.
We deny the petition.
Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without
being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm
the trial court’s decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex.
The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity
and legal rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of
any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically
capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than
the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for his/her
children in keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of
sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and
adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of
the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee’s parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for
Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic
relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been
living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to
the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence
until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by
his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government
agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country,
and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her
country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, further, That the
requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification
to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative
within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 99)
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of
his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to
adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the fourth
(4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino
spouses; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the
guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following
cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter
of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate
son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has
signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate
son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the
spouses. (Emphasis supplied)
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance
with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal
situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate
child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also
insures harmony between the spouses.12
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried
at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the
petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her
husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for
adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in
Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of
petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the
Page 3 of 24
illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not
legally separated from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit
of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must
comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth
in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has
diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have
been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the
filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until
the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own
country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the
latter’s adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved
during the trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification
to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or
adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity
of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of
petitioner.
Effects of Adoption
Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary
since the children have been emancipated having reached the age of
majority. This is untenable.
Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and
physical character and well-being. 13 The father and the mother shall jointly
exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. 14 Even
the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority
over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the
guardian of the person or property of the children. 15
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that is, when
he attains the age of majority or 18 years of age 16 — emancipation
terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child, who
shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. 17 However,
parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. Article V
of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:
ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 99)
SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the biological parent is
the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and
the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on the
adopter(s).
SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate
son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is
entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate
sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this end,
the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the
means of the family.
SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and
the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from
legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s)
had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern.
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the
biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the
spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the
adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations
arising from the relationship of parent and child, including but not limited to:
(i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and
(ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of
each other.18 Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority,
the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the
rights19 of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and
the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to
the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents
shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which
biological parents are entitled20 such as support21 and successional rights.22
We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary,
hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration.
They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of
society and family, as well as to allow childless couples or persons to
experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person
of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble
and compassionate objectives of the law. 23 But, as we have ruled in Republic
v. Vergara:24
We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the
promotion of the welfare of the children. Accordingly, the law should be
Page 4 of 24
construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said
purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion, understanding and
less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care
and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a
position to affirm the trial court’s decision favoring adoption in the case at bar,
for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the
proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the
law on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses’
petition for adoption. (Emphasis supplied)1avvphi1.zw+

Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
should have jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot make our
own legislation to suit petitioner.

Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show

that joint adoption could no longer be possible because Olario has filed a
case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior
Court.

We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between

petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of
dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the
dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still
subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the petitions for
adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is
mandatory.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15

September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22
in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 99) Page 5 of 24

[2] G.R. No. 164948             June 27, 2006
DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Adoption; The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural
parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted
interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best
interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.—The general
requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the
natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to
insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the
proposed adoption.
Same; The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the
validity of a decree of adoption.—The written consent of the biological parents is
indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a
parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental
rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. In this
case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the
adoption.
Same; Section 9 of R.A. 8552 provides that if the written consent of the
biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of
the minors will suffice.—Petitioner’s contention must be rejected. When she filed her
petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9
thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be
obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as
claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned
them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent of their legal guardian.
Same; Words and Phrases; Abandonment means neglect and refusal to
perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support.— Ordinarily,
abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child without his consent, is a
conduct which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties. The term
means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and
support. If a parent withholds presence, love, care, the opportunity to display filial
affection, and neglects to lend support and maintenance, the parent, in effect,
abandons the child.
Same; Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care
of others is not such an abandonment.—Merely permitting the child to remain for a
time undisturbed in the care of others is not such an abandonment. To dispense with
the requirement of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the
time of adoption.
Same; It would thus be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration
were to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of
parental authority over his/her children.—Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that
the adoption of the minors herein will have the effect of severing all legal ties
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 99)
between the biological mother, Amelia, and the adoptees, and that the same shall
then be vested on the adopter. It would thus be against the spirit of the law if
financial consideration were to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether
to deprive a person of parental authority over his/her children. More proof has to be
adduced that Amelia has emotionally abandoned the children, and that the latter will
not miss her guidance and counsel if they are given to an adopting parent. Again, it is
the best interest of the child that takes precedence in adoption.
Same; Under Section 34, Rule 132, the offer of evidence is necessary because
it is the duty of the Court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly
upon the evidence offered by the parties.—Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court provides that the Court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. The offer
of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the Court to rest its findings of fact
and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless
and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which
such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative
weight. Mere identification of documents and the markings thereof as exhibits do not
confer any evidentiary weight on documents unless formally offered.
Same; Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the
child, it follows that the financial capacity of prospective parents should also be
carefully evaluated and considered.—Since the primary consideration in adoption is
the best interest of the child, it follows that the financial capacity of prospective
parents should also be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter
should be in a position to support the would-be adopted child or children, in keeping
with the means of the family.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77826
which reversed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City,
Branch 63 in Civil Case No. 2733 granting the Petition for Adoption of the
petitioner herein.
The Antecedents
On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States
of America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a
petition3 for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos who was born on
August 31, 1986;4 Elma Dizon Ramos, who was born on September 7, 1987; 5
and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on August 5, 1989. 6 The minors are
Page 6 of 24
the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioner’s brother, and Amelia
Ramos.
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on
May 19, 1990,7 the children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria
Taruc Ramos; their biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there
and now has two children by her second marriage and no longer
communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws from
the time she left up to the institution of the adoption; the minors are being
financially supported by the petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad;
as Maria passed away on November 23, 2000, petitioner desires to adopt the
children; the minors have given their written consent 8 to the adoption; she is
qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has
children of her own who are already married, gainfully employed and have
their respective families; she lives alone in her own home in Guam, USA,
where she acquired citizenship, and works as a restaurant server. She came
back to the Philippines to spend time with the minors; her children gave their
written consent9 to the adoption of the minors. Petitioner’s brother, Mariano
Ramos, who earns substantial income, signified his willingness and
commitment to support the minors while in petitioner’s custody.
Petitioner prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered in her favor,
as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed to this Honorable Court that
after publication and hearing, judgment be rendered allowing the adoption of
the minor children Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene
Dizon Ramos by the petitioner, and ordering that the minor children’s name
follow the family name of petitioner.
Petitioner prays for such other reliefs, just and equitable under the
premises.10
On March 5, 2002, the court ordered the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) to conduct a case study as mandated by Article 34 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, and to submit a report thereon not
later than April 4, 2002, the date set for the initial hearing of the petition. 11
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance 12 but
deputized the City Prosecutor of Tarlac to appear in its behalf. 13 Since her
petition was unopposed, petitioner was allowed to present her evidence ex
parte.14
The petitioner testified in her behalf. She also presented Elaine Ramos, the
eldest of the adoptees, to testify on the written consent executed by her and
her siblings.15 The petitioner marked in evidence the Affidavit of Consent
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 99)
purportedly executed by her children Ann, Errol, Dennis and Ricfel Branitley,
all surnamed Landingin, and notarized by a notary public in Guam, USA, as
proof of said consent.16
On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao, Social Welfare Officer II of the DSWD,
Field Office III, Tarlac, submitted a Child Study Report, with the following
recommendation:
In view of the foregoing, undersigned finds minors Elaine, Elma & Eugene all
surnamed Ramos, eligible for adoption because of the following reasons:
1. Minors’ surviving parent, the mother has voluntarily consented to
their adoption by the paternal aunt, Diwata Landingin this is in view
of her inability to provide the parental care, guidance and support
they need. An Affidavit of Consent was executed by the mother
which is hereto attached.
2. The three minors subject for adoption have also expressed their
willingness to be adopted and joins the petitioners in Guam, USA in
the future. A joint Affidavit of consent is hereto attached. The minors
developed close attachment to the petitioners and they regarded her
as second parent.
3. The minors are present under the care of a temporary guardian
who has also family to look after. As young adolescents they really
need parental love, care, guidance and support to ensure their
protection and well being.
In view of the foregoing, it is hereby respectfully recommended that minors
Elaine D. Ramos, Elma D. Ramos and Eugene D. Ramos be adopted by
their maternal aunt Diwata Landingin. Trial custody is hereby further
recommended to be dispensed with considering that they are close relatives
and that close attachments was already developed between the petitioner
and the 3 minors.17
Pagbilao narrated what transpired during her interview, as follows:
The mother of minors came home together with her son John Mario, this May
2002 for 3 weeks vacation. This is to enable her appear for the personal
interview concerning the adoption of her children.
The plan for the adoption of minors by their paternal aunt Diwata Landingin
was conceived after the death of their paternal grandmother and guardian.
The paternal relatives including the petitioner who attended the wake of their
mother were very much concerned about the well-being of the three minors.
Page 7 of 24
While preparing for their adoption, they have asked a cousin who has a
family to stay with minors and act as their temporary guardian.
The mother of minors was consulted about the adoption plan and after
weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented.
She realized that her children need parental love, guidance and support
which she could not provide as she already has a second family & residing in
Italy. Knowing also that the petitioners & her children have been supporting
her children up to the present and truly care for them, she believes her
children will be in good hands. She also finds petitioners in a better position
to provide a secured and bright future to her children. 18
However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as witness and offer in
evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption; petitioner,
likewise, failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia
assents to the adoption.
On November 23, 2002, the court, finding merit in the petition for adoption,
rendered a decision granting said petition. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that henceforth, minors Elaine Dizon
Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, Eugene Dizon Ramos be freed from all legal
obligations obedience and maintenance from their natural parents and that
they be declared for all legal intents and purposes the children of Diwata
Ramos Landingin. Trial custody is dispensed with considering that parent-
children relationship has long been established between the children and the
adoptive parents. Let the surnames of the children be changed from "Dizon-
Ramos" to "Ramos-Landingin."
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Tarlac,
Tarlac for him to effect the corresponding changes/amendment in the birth
certificates of the above-mentioned minors.
SO ORDERED.19
The OSG appealed20 the decision to the Court of Appeals on December 2,
2002. In its brief21 for the oppositor-appellant, the OSG raised the following
arguments:
I 2. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF CONSENT OF THE PROPOSED
ADOPTEES’ BIOLOGICAL MOTHER.
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 99)
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE
PETITIONER’S CHILDREN AS REQUIRED BY LAW.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
ADOPTION DESPITE PETITIONER’S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THAT SHE
IS IN A POSITION TO SUPPORT THE PROPOSED ADOPTEES.
On April 29, 2004, the CA rendered a decision 22 reversing the ruling of the
RTC. It held that petitioner failed to adduce in evidence the voluntary consent
of Amelia Ramos, the children’s natural mother. Moreover, the affidavit of
consent of the petitioner’s children could not also be admitted in evidence as
the same was executed in Guam, USA and was not authenticated or
acknowledged before a Philippine consular office, and although petitioner
has a job, she was not stable enough to support the children. The dispositive
portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated November
25, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Tarlac City in Spec. Proc.
No. 2733 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.23
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 24 on May 21, 2004, which the CA
denied in its Resolution dated August 12, 2004. 25
Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari 26 on
September 7, 2004, assigning the following errors:
1. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT HAS OVERLOOKED
AND MISAPPLIED SOME FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH
ARE OF WEIGHT AND IMPORTANCE AND WHICH IF
CONSIDERED WOULD HAVE AFFECTED THE RESULT OF THE
CASE.
CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER-APPELLEE IS NOT
FINANCIALLY CAPABLE TO SUPPORT THE THREE CHILDREN. 27
Page 8 of 24
The issues raised by the parties in their pleadings are the following: (a)
whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written
consent of their biological mother, Amelia Ramos; (b) whether or not the
affidavit of consent purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopter’s children
sufficiently complies with the law; and (c) whether or not petitioner is
financially capable of supporting the adoptees.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to the liberal concept, as stated
in Malkinson v. Agrava,28 that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary,
hold the interest and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration
and are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of
society and family in the person of the adopter as well as to allow childless
couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them
legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their
natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should thus be
sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of
the law.29
However, in Cang v. Court of Appeals, 30 the Court also ruled that the liberality
with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption insofar as it carries
out the beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the rights and privileges of
the adopted child arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount
consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the adopted child, should
be understood in its proper context and perspective. The Court’s position
should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend to inferences
beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence. Thus, the discretion to
approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best interests
of the child but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the parents
over the child.31
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998, provides:
Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. - After being properly
counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of
the adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby
required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 99)
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal
guardian, or the proper government instrumentality which has legal
custody of the child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age
or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of
the adopter, if living with said adopter and the latter’s souse, if any;
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is
intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted
interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the
best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. 32
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the
validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his
child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights
and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. In this
case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the
adoption.
We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that she was able to interview
Amelia Ramos who arrived in the Philippines with her son, John Mario in May
2002. If said Amelia Ramos was in the Philippines and Pagbilao was able to
interview her, it is incredible that the latter would not require Amelia Ramos to
execute a Written Consent to the adoption of her minor children. Neither did
the petitioner bother to present Amelia Ramos as witness in support of the
petition.
Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written consent of the biological
mother is no longer necessary because when Amelia’s husband died in
1990, she left for Italy and never came back. The children were then left to
the guidance and care of their paternal grandmother. It is the paternal
relatives, including petitioner, who provided for the children’s financial needs.
Hence, Amelia, the biological mother, had effectively abandoned the children.
Petitioner further contends that it was by twist of fate that after 12 years,
when the petition for adoption was pending with the RTC that Amelia and her
child by her second marriage were on vacation in the Philippines. Pagbilao,
the DSWD social worker, was able to meet her, and during the meeting,
Amelia intimated to the social worker that she conformed to the adoption of
her three children by the petitioner.
Page 9 of 24
Petitioner’s contention must be rejected. When she filed her petition with the Q From whom did you learn that?
trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof
provides that if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be A From others who came from Italy, sir.
obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice.
If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had Q Did you come to know whether she has children by her second marriage?
indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent
of their legal guardian.
A Yes, sir, she got two kids.37
Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child
without his consent, is a conduct which evinces a settled purpose to forego Elaine, the eldest of the minors, testified, thus:
all parental duties.33 The term means neglect and refusal to perform the filial
and legal obligations of love and support. If a parent withholds presence, Q Where is your mother now?
love, care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and neglects to lend
support and maintenance, the parent, in effect, abandons the child. 34 A In Italy, sir.

Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of Q When did your mother left for Italy?
others is not such an abandonment. 35 To dispense with the requirement of
consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of A After my father died, sir.
adoption.36
Q How old were you when your mother left for Italy in 1990?
In this case, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that of Elaine
Ramos to prove her claim that Amelia Ramos had abandoned her children.
A Two years old, sir.
Petitioner’s testimony on that matter follows:

Q At the time when your mother left for Italy, did your mother communicate
Q Where is the mother of these three children now?
with you?
A She left for Italy on November 20, 1990, sir.
A No, sir.38
Q At the time when Amelia Ramos left for Italy, was there an instance where
However, the Home Study Report of the DSWD Social Worker also stated
she communicated with the family?
the following:
A None, sir.
IV. Background of the Case:
Q How about with her children?
xxxx
A None, sir.
Since the mother left for Italy, minors siblings had been under the care and
custody of their maternal grandmother. However, she died in Nov. 2001 and
Q Do you know what place in Italy did she reside? an uncle, cousin of their deceased father now serves as their guardian. The
petitioner, together with her children and other relatives abroad have been
A I do not know, sir. supporting the minor children financially, even during the time that they were
still living with their natural parents. Their mother also sends financial support
Q Did you receive any news about Amelia Ramos? but very minimal.39

A What I know, sir, was that she was already married with another man. xxxx

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 99) Page 10 of 24

V. Background Information about the Minors Being Sought for Adoption:
xxxx
As the eldest she tries her best to be a role model to her younger siblings.
She helps them in their lessons, works and has fun with them. She also
encourages openness on their problems and concerns and provides petty
counseling. In serious problems she already consult (sic) her mother and
petitioner-aunt.40
xxxx
In their 5 years of married life, they begot 3 children, herein minors, Amelia
recalled that they had a happy and comfortable life. After the death of her
husband, her in-laws which include the petitioner had continued providing
support for them. However being ashamed of just depending on the support
of her husband’s relatives, she decided to work abroad. Her parents are also
in need of financial help as they are undergoing maintenance medication.
Her parents mortgaged their farm land which she used in going to Italy and
worked as domestic helper.
When she left for Italy in November 1990, she entrusted her 3 children to the
care & custody of her mother-in-law who returned home for good, however
she died on November 2000.
While working in Italy, she met Jun Tayag, a married man from Tarlac. They
became live-in partners since 1995 and have a son John Mario who is now 2
years old. The three of them are considered Italian residents. Amelia claimed
that Mr. Tayag is planning to file an annulment of his marriage and his wife is
amenable to it. He is providing his legitimate family regular support.
Amelia also sends financial support ranging from P10,000-P15,000 a month
through her parents who share minimal amount of P3,000-P5,000 a month to
his (sic) children. The petitioner and other paternal relatives are continuously
providing support for most of the needs & education of minors up to
present.41
Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon her
children, or to permanently sever their mother-child relationship. She was
merely impelled to leave the country by financial constraints. Yet, even while
abroad, she did not surrender or relinquish entirely her motherly obligations
of rearing the children to her now deceased mother-in-law, for, as claimed by
Elaine herself, she consulted her mother, Amelia, for serious personal
problems. Likewise, Amelia continues to send financial support to the
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 99)
children, though in minimal amounts as compared to what her affluent in-laws
provide.
Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the adoption of the minors herein will
have the effect of severing all legal ties between the biological mother,
Amelia, and the adoptees, and that the same shall then be vested on the
adopter.42 It would thus be against the spirit of the law if financial
consideration were to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to
deprive a person of parental authority over his/her children. More proof has to
be adduced that Amelia has emotionally abandoned the children, and that
the latter will not miss her guidance and counsel if they are given to an
adopting parent.43 Again, it is the best interest of the child that takes
precedence in adoption.
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for
which the evidence is offered must be specified. The offer of evidence is
necessary because it is the duty of the Court to rest its findings of fact and its
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless
and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for
which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren
of probative weight. Mere identification of documents and the markings
thereof as exhibits do not confer any evidentiary weight on documents unless
formally offered.44
Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilao’s Report and of the Joint
Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity of
which she, likewise, failed to prove. The joint written consent of petitioner’s
children45 was notarized on January 16, 2002 in Guam, USA; for it to be
treated by the Rules of Court in the same way as a document notarized in
this country it needs to comply with Section 2 of Act No. 2103, 46 which states:
Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and authenticated in a
foreign country shall be considered authentic if the acknowledgment and
authentication are made in accordance with the following requirements:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an ambassador,
minister, secretary of legation, chargé d affaires, consul, vice-consul,
or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, acting within the
country or place to which he is accredited, or (2) a notary public or
officer duly authorized by law of the country to take
acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where
the act is done.
Page 11 of 24
 (b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the
person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him,
and that he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged
that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be under
his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his
certificate shall so state. In case the acknowledgment is made before
a notary public or an officer mentioned in subdivision (2) of the
preceding paragraph, the certificate of the notary public or the officer
taking the acknowledgment shall be authenticated by an
ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, chargé de affaires,
consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the
Philippines, acting within the country or place to which he is
accredited. The officer making the authentication shall certify under
his official seal that the person who took the acknowledgment was at
the time duly authorized to act as notary public or that he was duly
exercising the functions of the office by virtue of which he assumed
to act, and that as such he had authority under the law to take
acknowledgment of instruments or documents in the place where the
acknowledgment was taken, and that his signature and seal, if any,
are genuine.
As the alleged written consent of petitioner’s legitimate children did not
comply with the afore-cited law, the same can at best be treated by the Rules
as a private document whose authenticity must be proved either by anyone
who saw the document executed or written; or by evidence of the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the makers. 47
Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by petitioner to
authenticate the written consent of her legitimate children, the same is
inadmissible in evidence.
In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner was not stable
enough to support the children and is only relying on the financial backing,
support and commitment of her children and her siblings. 48 Petitioner
contradicts this by claiming that she is financially capable as she has worked
in Guam for 14 years, has savings, a house, and currently earns $5.15 an
hour with tips of not less than $1,000.00 a month. Her children and siblings
have likewise committed themselves to provide financial backing should the
need arise. The OSG, again in its comment, banks on the statement in the
Home Study Report that "petitioner has limited income." Accordingly, it
appears that she will rely on the financial backing of her children and siblings
in order to support the minor adoptees. The law, however, states that it is the
adopter who should be in a position to provide support in keeping with the
means of the family.
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 99)
Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child, it
follows that the financial capacity of prospective parents should also
be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter should be in a
position to support the would-be adopted child or children, in keeping with the
means of the family.
According to the Adoption Home Study Report 49 forwarded by the
Department of Public Health & Social Services of the Government of Guam
to the DSWD, petitioner is no longer supporting her legitimate children, as the
latter are already adults, have individual lives and families. At the time of the
filing of the petition, petitioner was 57 years old, employed on a part-time
basis as a waitress, earning $5.15 an hour and tips of around $1,000 a
month. Petitioner’s main intention in adopting the children is to bring the latter
to Guam, USA. She has a house at Quitugua Subdivision in Yigo, Guam, but
the same is still being amortized. Petitioner likewise knows that the limited
income might be a hindrance to the adoption proceedings.
Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will be able
to sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing the three children in the
US. She only has a part-time job, and she is rather of age. While petitioner
claims that she has the financial support and backing of her children and
siblings, the OSG is correct in stating that the ability to support the adoptees
is personal to the adopter, as adoption only creates a legal relation between
the former and the latter. Moreover, the records do not prove nor support
petitioner’s allegation that her siblings and her children are financially able
and that they are willing to support the minors herein. The Court, therefore,
again sustains the ruling of the CA on this issue.
While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the best of intentions for
her nieces and nephew, there are legal infirmities that militate against
reversing the ruling of the CA. In any case, petitioner is not prevented from
filing a new petition for adoption of the herein minors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 12 of 24
[3] G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA
GARCIA HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
Parents and Children; Adoption; Names; It is both of personal as well as
public interest that every person must have a name.—For all practical and legal
purposes, a man’s name is the designation by which he is known and called in the
community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or
combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and,
also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at
large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal as
well as public interest that every person must have a name.
Same; Same; Same; The name of an individual has two parts—the given or
proper name and the surname or family name; The given name may be freely
selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is
fixed by law.—The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper
name and (2) the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is
given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other
individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which
he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely
selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is
fixed by law.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Adoption is defined as the process of
making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights
accorded to a legitimate child; The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely
as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act
which endows the child with a legitimate status.—Adoption is defined as the process
of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights
accorded to a legitimate child. It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates
between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate
paternity and filiation. The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act
to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows
the child with a legitimate status. This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the
Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by
the United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with social and
moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted
child. Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the “Domestic Adoption Act of
1998,” secures these rights and privileges for the adopted.
Same; Same; Same; An adopted child is entitled to all the rights provided by
law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to
bear the surname of her father and her mother.—Being a legitimate child by virtue
of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law
to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear
the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 99)
the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as
earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the
mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Adoption statutes, being humane
and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of
adoption.—It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary,
should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The
interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount
consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote
and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 10 of the Civil Code which presumes in the
interpretation of application of law that the lawmaking body intended right and
justice to prevail was intended to strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid
an injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the
law.— Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that: “In case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the law making body
intended right and justice to prevail.” This provision, according to the Code
Commission, “is necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor of right and justice
when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts
to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of
interpreting the law.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate
child adopted by her natural father to use, as middle name her mother’s surname,
the Court finds no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.—Hence, since
there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like
Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she
should not be allowed to do so.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue
raised in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition 1
to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He
alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; 2
that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using
her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and
qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name
Page 13 of 24
Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother’s surname, and that her
surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname.
On March 23, 2001,3 the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting
the adoption, thus:
"After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and
in the absence of any opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the
petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualification
provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is qualified to
maintain, care for and educate the child to be adopted; that the grant of this
petition would redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds that the petitioner’s
care and custody of the child since her birth up to the present constitute more
than enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of Presidential
Decree No. 603.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED.
Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all
obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural mother,
and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioner’s legitimate child and
legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the
minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil
Registrar concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record
purposes. SO ORDERED."4
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or
reconsideration5 praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the
surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.
6
On May 28, 2001, the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an
adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle
name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child
may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is
subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle
name as a consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 99)
an adopted child from having a middle name in case there is only one
adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have as middle name
the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the
name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the
adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be violated;
(5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name "Garcia" (her mother’s
surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of
"Garcia" as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia
families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with
petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the
surname of her natural mother for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her
natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to
be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless
hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship with her
natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname
of her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it
allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is
ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by
the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed
that "the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the
surname of the mother."7
We find merit in the petition.
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law –
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by
which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best
known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is
distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation
which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or
in speaking of or dealing with him. 8 It is both of personal as well as public
interest that every person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and
(2) the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is
Page 14 of 24
given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other
individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to
which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may
be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the
child is entitled is fixed by law.9
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules
which regulate the use of surname 10 of an individual whatever may be his
status in life, i.e., whether he may be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted
child, a married woman or a previously married woman, or a widow, thus:
"Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the
surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage
shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his
wife, such as ‘Mrs.’
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party,
she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent
spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may
choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue
using her name and surname employed before the legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he
were still living, in accordance with Article 370.
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 99)
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person
shall be obliged to use such additional name or surname as will avoid
confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and
descendants, the word ‘Junior’ can be used only by a son. Grandsons and
other direct male descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of Middle Name –
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a
middle name. Even Article 17611 of the Family Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as "An Act Allowing Illegitimate
Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father," is silent as to what middle
name a child may use.
The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article
375(1), quoted above, in case there is identity of names and surnames
between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or
the mother’s surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee
may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that "an adopted
child shall bear the surname of the adopter." Also, Article 189 of the Family
Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the
matter, thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate
child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and
obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the
right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil
Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized
the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the child’s mother as his
middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and
Family Law Committees, the members approved the suggestion that the
initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father, thus
Page 15 of 24
"Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by
the wife of the surname and that of the child because the father’s surname
indicates the family to which he belongs, for which reason he would
insist on the use of the father’s surname by the child but that, if he
wants to, the child may also use the surname of the mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of
the mother, how will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up
to him but that his point is that it should be mandatory that the child uses
the surname of the father and permissive in the case of the surname of
the mother.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioa’s point is covered by the present
Article 364, which reads:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the
father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the
person himself precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the
following example: Alfonso Ponce Enrile’s correct surname is Ponce since
the mother’s surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice
Jose Gutierrez David’s family name is Gutierrez and his mother’s surname is
David but they all call him Justice David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to
the effect that it shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname of
the father but he may use the surname of the mother by way of an initial
or a middle name. Prof. Balane stated that they take note of this for
inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the proposed Article
(10) they are just enumerating the rights of legitimate children so that the
details can be covered in the appropriate chapter.
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by
Justice Caguioa that the surname of the father should always be last
because there are so many traditions like the American tradition where they
like to use their second given name and the Latin tradition, which is also
followed by the Chinese wherein they even include the Clan name.
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter
on the Use of Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the
mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that
the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother. Prof.
Balane added that this is really the Filipino way. The Committee
approved the suggestion."12 (Emphasis supplied)
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 99)
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the adopted shall bear
the surname of the adopters."13 Again, it is silent whether he can use a
middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right and
obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon
issuance of the decree of adoption.14
The Underlying Intent of Adoption Is In Favor of the Adopted Child –
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not
to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. 15
It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and
filiation.16 The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to
establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which
endows the child with a legitimate status.17 This was, indeed, confirmed in
1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the
Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the
principle that adoption is impressed with social and moral
responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the
adopted child.18 Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the "Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998,"19 secures these rights and privileges for the adopted. 20
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a
legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article
18921 of the Family Code and Section 1722 Article V of RA 8552.23
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that
Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate
child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the
surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is
consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family
Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the
initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of
the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use of her
mother’s surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal
lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section
1824, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains
an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well
assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in
the house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag,
Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached
Page 16 of 24
to both her mother and father. She calls them "Mama" and "Papa". Indeed,
they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her
mother’s surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued
loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her
illegitimacy.

Liberal Construction of Adoption Statutes In Favor Of Adoption –

It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should
be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. 25 The
interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount
consideration,26 hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. 27

Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:

"In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed

that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail."

This provision, according to the Code Commission, "is necessary so that it

may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or
obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice
which may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law." 28

Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her

natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname,
we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly

MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her
mother’s surname "GARCIA" as her middle name.

Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in
the decree of adoption.

SO ORDERED.

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 99) Page 17 of 24

[4] G.R. No. 143989             July 14, 2003
ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner, vs.JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously
referred to as "DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM"), respondent.
Civil Law; Adoption; The Philippines, a State Party to the Convention of the
Rights of the Child accepted the principle that adoption was impressed with social
and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent was geared to favor the
adopted child; Republic Act No. 8552 affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted
child not only in his new family but also in the society as well; The new law
withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the
adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption.—In the early
part of the century just passed, the rights of children invited universal attention; the
Geneva Declaration of Rights of the Child of 1924 and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights of 1948, followed by the United Nations Declarations of the Rights of
the Child, were written instruments that would also protect and safeguard the rights
of adopted children. The Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 on adoption, later
modified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code and then by the Family Code of the
Philippines, gave immediate statutory acknowledgment to the rights of the adopted.
In 1989, the United Nations initiated the Convention of the Rights of the Child. The
Philippines, a State Party to the Convention, accepted the principle that adoption was
impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent was
geared to favor the adopted child. R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights and privileges
for the adopted. Most importantly, it affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted
child, not only in his new family but also in the society as well. The new law
withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the
adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption.
Same; Same; “Vested right” includes not only legal or equitable title to the
enforcement of a demand but also exemption from new obligations created after the
right has become vested; Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is
a present interest, absolute, unconditional and perfect or fixed and irrefutable.—The
concept of “vested right” is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due
process that expresses a present fixed interestwhich in right reason and natural justice
is protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or equitable title
to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created
after the right has become vested. Rights are considered vested when the right to
enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and
irrefutable.
Same; Same; The action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been
initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer, could be
pursued.—It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner
filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new
law, had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code
and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier
pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 99)
adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come
into force, no longer, could be pursued.
Same; Same; The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a
condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to
protection; Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an
adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the State.—
Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the
adoption is subject to the five-year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and
that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of
that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that
could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must also
be acknowledged that a person has no vested right in statutory privileges. While
adoption has often been referred to in the context of a “right,” the privilege to adopt
is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by
statute. It is a privilege that is governed by the state’s determination on what it may
deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption,
including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are
subject to regulation by the State. Concomitantly, a right of actiongiven by statute
may be taken away at anytime before it has been exercised.
Same; Same; An adopter while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption,
can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise
accruing to an undeserving child.—While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly
withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even
in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains,
nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would
be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is still
noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of
adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits
otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds
recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a
will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable
portion of his estate.
VITUG, J.:
The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less than complete without
children. The realization could have likely prodded the spouses Dr. Diosdado
Lahom and Isabelita Lahom to take into their care Isabelita's nephew Jose
Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up as their own. At the tender age of two,
Jose Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and support of the couple who treated
the child like their own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on
legally adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided to file a
petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972, an order granting the petition was
issued that made all the more intense than before the feeling of affection of
Page 18 of 24
the spouses for Melvin. In keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar of
Naga City changed the name "Jose Melvin Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin Lahom."
A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of
1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City. In her
petition, she averred —
"7. That x x x despite the proddings and pleadings of said spouses,
respondent refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to
the frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband until the latter
died, and even before his death he had made known his desire to
revoke respondent's adoption, but was prevented by petitioner's
supplication, however with his further request upon petitioner to give
to charity whatever properties or interest may pertain to respondent
in the future.
xxx             xxx             xxx
"10. That respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to the utter
disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner, and his records with the
Professional Regulation Commission showed his name as Jose
Melvin M. Sibulo originally issued in 1978 until the present, and in all
his dealings and activities in connection with his practice of his
profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.
xxx             xxx             xxx
"13. That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this city
with only her household helps to attend to her, has yearned for the
care and show of concern from a son, but respondent remained
indifferent and would only come to Naga to see her once a year.
"14. That for the last three or four years, the medical check-up of
petitioner in Manila became more frequent in view of a leg ailment,
and those were the times when petitioner would need most the care
and support from a love one, but respondent all the more remained
callous and utterly indifferent towards petitioner which is not
expected of a son.
"15. That herein respondent has recently been jealous of petitioner's
nephews and nieces whenever they would find time to visit her,
respondent alleging that they were only motivated by their desire for
some material benefits from petitioner.
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 99)
"16. That in view of respondent's insensible attitude resulting in a
strained and uncomfortable relationship between him and petitioner,
the latter has suffered wounded feelings, knowing that after all
respondent's only motive to his adoption is his expectancy of his
alleged rights over the properties of herein petitioner and her late
husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of Civil Case No. 99-4463
for partition against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love and
affection towards respondent, rendering the decree of adoption,
considering respondent to be the child of petitioner, for all legal
purposes, has been negated for which reason there is no more basis
for its existence, hence this petition for revocation," 1
Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into
effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a
decree of adoption.
Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads:
"SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. — Upon petition of
the adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if a minor or if
over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as
guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the
following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical
and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone
counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault
or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to comply with parental
obligations.
"Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject
to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may
disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil
Code." (emphasis supplied)
Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally (a)
that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case and (b) that the petitioner
had no cause of action in view of the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No.
8552. Petitioner asseverated, by way of opposition, that the proscription in
R.A. No. 8552 should not retroactively apply, i.e., to cases where the ground
for rescission of the adoption vested under the regime of then Article 348 2 of
the Civil Code and Article 1923 of the Family Code.
In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the trial court held thusly:
Page 19 of 24
 "On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit,
Section 5(c) of R.A. No. 8369 confers jurisdiction to this Court,
having been designated Family Court in A.M. No. 99-11-07 SC.
"On the matter of no cause of action, the test on the sufficiency of the
facts alleged in the complaint, is whether or not, admitting the facts
alleged, the Court could render a valid judgment in accordance with
the prayer of said complaint (De Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino, et al., 95
Phil. 365).
"Admittedly, Section 19, Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 deleted the right
of an adopter to rescind an adoption earlier granted under the Family
Code. Conformably, on the face of the petition, indeed there is lack
of cause of action.
"Petitioner however, insists that her right to rescind long acquired
under the provisions of the Family Code should be respected.
Assuming for the sake of argument, that petitioner is entitled to
rescind the adoption of respondent granted on May 5, 1972, said
right should have been exercised within the period allowed by the
Rules. From the averments in the petition, it appears clear that the
legal grounds for the petition have been discovered and known to
petitioner for more than five (5) years, prior to the filing of the instant
petition on December 1, 1999, hence, the action if any, had already
prescribed. (Sec. 5, Rule 100 Revised Rules of Court)
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the petition is
ordered dismissed."4
Via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Court, petitioner raises the following questions; viz:
1. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be
revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No.
8552?
2. In the affirmative, has the adopter's action prescribed?
A brief background on the law and its origins could provide some insights on
the subject. In ancient times, the Romans undertook adoption to assure male
heirs in the family.5 The continuity of the adopter's family was the primary
purpose of adoption and all matters relating to it basically focused on the
rights of the adopter. There was hardly any mention about the rights of the
adopted.6 Countries, like Greece, France, Spain and England, in an effort to
preserve inheritance within the family, neither allowed nor recognized
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 99)
adoption.7 It was only much later when adoption was given an impetus in law
and still later when the welfare of the child became a paramount concern. 8
Spain itself which previously disfavored adoption ultimately relented and
accepted the Roman law concept of adoption which, subsequently, was to
find its way to the archipelago. The Americans came and introduced their
own ideas on adoption which, unlike most countries in Europe, made the
interests of the child an overriding consideration. 9 In the early part of the
century just passed, the rights of children invited universal attention; the
Geneva Declaration of Rights of the Child of 1924 and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, 10 followed by the United Nations
Declarations of the Rights of the Child, 11 were written instruments that would
also protect and safeguard the rights of adopted children. The Civil Code of
the Philippines12 of 1950 on adoption, later modified by the Child and Youth
Welfare Code13 and then by the Family Code of the Philippines, 14 gave
immediate statutory acknowledgment to the rights of the adopted. In 1989,
the United Nations initiated the Convention of the Rights of the Child. The
Philippines, a State Party to the Convention, accepted the principle that
adoption was impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its
underlying intent was geared to favor the adopted child. R.A. No. 8552
secured these rights and privileges for the adopted. Most importantly, it
affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child, not only in his new family
but also in the society as well. The new law withdrew the right of an adopter
to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to
sever the legal ties created by adoption.
Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should not adversely
affect her right to annul the adoption decree, nor deprive the trial court of its
jurisdiction to hear the case, both being vested under the Civil Code and the
Family Code, the laws then in force.
The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty
of due process15 that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason
and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action; 16 it includes not
only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also
exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become vested. 17
Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present
interest,18 absolute, unconditional, and perfect19 or fixed and irrefutable.
In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,20 a petition to adopt Jason Condat was filed
by Zenaida C. Bobiles on 02 February 1988 when the Child and Youth
Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603) allowed an adoption to be
sought by either spouse or both of them. After the trial court had rendered its
decision and while the case was still pending on appeal, the Family Code of
the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209), mandating joint adoption by the
husband and wife, took effect. Petitioner Republic argued that the case
should be dismissed for having been filed by Mrs. Bobiles alone and without
Page 20 of 24
being joined by the husband. The Court concluded that the jurisdiction of the noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal
court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain
commencement of the action. The petition to adopt Jason, having been benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the
filed with the court at the time when P.D. No. 603 was still in effect, the right grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his
of Mrs. Bobiles to file the petition, without being joined by her husband, legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a
according to the Court had become vested. In Republic vs. Miller,21 spouses share in the disposable portion of his estate.
Claude and Jumrus Miller, both aliens, sought to adopt Michael Madayag. On
29 July 1988, the couple filed a petition to formalize Michael's adoption WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No
having theretofore been taken into their care. At the time the action was costs.
commenced, P.D. No. 603 allowed aliens to adopt. After the decree of
adoption and while on appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Family Code SO ORDERED.
was enacted into law on 08 August 1988 disqualifying aliens from adopting
Filipino children. The Republic then prayed for the withdrawal of the adoption
decree. In discarding the argument posed by the Republic, the Supreme
Court ruled that the controversy should be resolved in the light of the law
governing at the time the petition was filed.

It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed
an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new
law,22 had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the
Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently
with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for
rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after
R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued.

Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside
the adoption is subject to the five-year bar rule under Rule 100 23 of the Rules
of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption
decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a
prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a
vested right entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged that a
person has no vested right in statutory privileges. 24 While adoption has often
been referred to in the context of a "right," the privilege to adopt is itself not
naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. 25
It is a privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it may
deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. 26 Matters relating to
adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the
adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the State. 27 Concomitantly, a
right of action given by statute may be taken away at anytime before it has
been exercised.28

While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a

consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the
adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless,
the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the
hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is still

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 99) Page 21 of 24

[5] G.R. No. 113054 March 16, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, SR., petitioner-appellant, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, and
SPOUSES LEOPOLDO and OFELIA BEDIA, respondents-appellees.
Civil Law; Family Code; Parent and Child; The right of custody accorded to
parents springs from the exercise of parental authority.—The right of custody
accorded to parents springs from the exercise of parental authority. Parental authority
or patria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby parents
rightfully assume control and protection of their unemancipated children to the
extent required by the latter’s needs. It is a mass of rights and obligations which the
law grants to parents for the purpose of the children’s physical preservation and
development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their
heart and senses. As regards parental authority, “there is no power, but a task; no
complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the
welfare of the minor.”
Same; Same; Same; Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and
may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law.—Parental
authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced
except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being
purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of
adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan institution.
When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or
godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does
not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is
manifest, the law still disallows the same.
Same; Same; Same; The father and mother, being the natural guardians of
unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody
and company.—The father and mother, being the natural guardians of
unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody
and company. The child’s welfare is always the paramount consideration in all
questions concerning his care and custody.
Same; Same; Same; Only in case of the parents’ death, absence or
unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparent.—The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over
the persons of their common children. In case of absence or death of either parent,
the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the
parents’ death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be
exercised by the surviving grandparent.
Same; Same; Same; Private respondents’ demonstrated love and affection for
the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over the
grandparents.—We find the aforementioned considerations insufficient to defeat
petitioner’s parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the
minor Leouel Santos, Jr., particularly since he has not been shown to be an
unsuitable and unfit parent. Private respondents’ demonstrated love and affection for
₯Special Proceedings (Rule 99)
the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over the grandparents.
The latter’s wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that
at the present time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy. The fact that he
was unable to provide financial support for his minor son from birth up to over three
years when he took the boy from his in-laws without permission, should not be
sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent right to the child’s custody. While
petitioner’s previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only the severest criticism,
it cannot be construed as abandonment.
ROMERO, J.:
In this petition for review, we are asked to overturn the decision of the Court
of Appeals1 granting custody of six-year old Leouel Santos, Jr. to his
maternal grandparents and not to his father, Santos, Sr. What is sought is a
decision which should definitively settle the matter of the care, custody and
control of the boy.
Happily, unlike King Solomon, we need not merely rely on a "wise and
understanding heart," for there is man's law to guide us and that is, the
Family Code.
The antecedent facts giving rise to the case at bench are as follows:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by
profession, were married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one
child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born July 18, 1987.
From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime
thereafter, he had been in the care and custody of his maternal
grandparents, private respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place Leouel Jr. in the temporary custody
of the latter's parents, the respondent spouses Bedia. The latter alleged that
they paid for all the hospital bills, as well as the subsequent support of the
boy because petitioner could not afford to do so.
The boy's mother, Julia Bedia-Santos, left for the United States in May 1988
to work. Petitioner alleged that he is not aware of her whereabouts and his
efforts to locate her in the United States proved futile. Private respondents
claim that although abroad, their daughter Julia had been sending financial
support to them for her son.
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On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the
Bedia household, where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private
respondents contend that through deceit and false pretensions, petitioner
abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in
Bacong, Negros Oriental.
The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of
Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City,
with Santos, Sr. as respondent.2
After an ex-parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the trial court issued an order
on the same day awarding custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his
grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.3
Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals. 4 In its decision dated
April 30, 1992, respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court's
order. 5 His motion for reconsideration having been denied, 6 petitioner now
brings the instant petition for review for a reversal of the appellate court's
decision.
The Court of Appeals erred, according to petitioner, in awarding custody of
the boy to his grandparents and not to himself. He contends that since
private respondents have failed to show that petitioner is an unfit and
unsuitable father, substitute parental authority granted to the boy's
grandparents under Art. 214 of the Family Code is inappropriate.
Petitioner adds that the reasons relied upon by the private respondents in
having custody over the boy, are flimsy and insufficient to deprive him of his
natural and legal right to have custody.
On the other hand, private respondents aver that they can provide an air-
conditioned room for the boy and that petitioner would not be in a position to
take care of his son since he has to be assigned to different places. They
also allege that the petitioner did not give a single centavo for the boy's
support and maintenance. When the boy was about to be released from the
hospital, they were the ones who paid the fees because their daughter and
petitioner had no money. Besides, Julia Bedia Santos, their daughter, had
entrusted the boy to them before she left for the United States. Furthermore,
petitioner's use of trickery and deceit in abducting the child in 1990, after
being hospitably treated by private respondents, does not speak well of his
fitness and suitability as a parent.
The Bedias argue that although the law recognizes the right of a parent to his
child's custody, ultimately the primary consideration is what is best for the
happiness and welfare of the latter. As maternal grandparents who have
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amply demonstrated their love and affection for the boy since his infancy,
they claim to be in the best position to promote the child's welfare.
The issue to be resolved here boils down to who should properly be awarded
custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.
The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of
parental authority. Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is the
juridical institution whereby parents rightfully assume control and protection
of their unemancipated children to the extent required by the latter' s needs. 7
It is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the
purpose of the children's physical preservation and development, as well as
the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and senses. 8
As regards parental authority, "there is no power, but a task; no complex of
rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of
the minor."9
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be
transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. 10 The right
attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver
of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to
a children's home or an orphan institution. 11 When a parent entrusts the
custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a
document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not
constitute a renunciation of parental authority. 12 Even if a definite
renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same. 13
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated
children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and
company. 14 The child's welfare is always the paramount consideration in all
questions concerning his care and custody. 15
The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the
persons of their common children. 16 In case of absence or death of either
parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. 17 Only
in case of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental
authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent. 18 The situation obtaining
in the case at bench is one where the mother of the minor Santos, Jr., is
working in the United States while the father, petitioner Santos, Sr., is
present. Not only are they physically apart but are also emotionally
separated. There has been no decree of legal separation and petitioner's
attempt to obtain an annulment of the marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity of his wife has failed. 19
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Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court
to award custody of his minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses
on the ground that under Art. 214 of the Family Code, substitute parental
authority of the grandparents is proper only when both parents are dead,
absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to him, has not been
successfully shown by private respondents.
The Court of Appeals held that although there is no evidence to show that
petitioner (Santos Sr.) is "depraved, a habitual drunkard or poor, he may
nevertheless be considered, as he is in fact so considered, to be unsuitable
to be allowed to have custody of minor Leouel Santos Jr." 20
The respondent appellate court, in affirming the trial court's order of October
8, 1990, adopted as its own the latter's observations, to wit:
From the evidence adduced, this Court is of the opinion that
it is to be (sic) best interest of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.
that he be placed under the care, custody, and control of his
maternal grandparents the petitioners herein. The petitioners
have amply demonstrated their love and devotion to their
grandson while the natural father, respondent herein, has
shown little interest in his welfare as reflected by his conduct
in the past. Moreover the fact that petitioners are well-off
financially, should be carefully considered in awarding to
them the custody of the minor herein, lest the breaking of
such ties with his maternal grandparents might deprive the
boy of an eventual college education and other material
advantages (Consaul vs. Consaul, 63 N.Y.S. 688).
Respondent had never given any previous financial support
to his son, while, upon the other hand, the latter receives so
much bounty from his maternal grandparents and his mother
as well, who is now gainfully employed in the United States.
Moreover, the fact that respondent, as a military personnel
who has to shuttle from one assignment to another, and, in
these troubled times, may have pressing and compelling
military duties which may prevent him from attending to his
son at times when the latter needs him most, militates
strongly against said respondent. Additionally, the child is
sickly and asthmatic and needs the loving and tender care of
those who can provide for it. 21
We find the aforementioned considerations insufficient to defeat petitioner's
parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor
Leouel Santos, Jr., particularly since he has not been shown to be an
unsuitable and unfit parent. Private respondents' demonstrated love and
affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred
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over the grandparents. 22 The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor,
particularly because there is no proof that at the present time, petitioner is in
no position to support the boy. The fact that he was unable to provide
financial support for his minor son from birth up to over three years when he
took the boy from his in-laws without permission, should not be sufficient
reason to strip him of his permanent right to the child's custody. While
petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only the severest
criticism, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the
unfavorable decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his
custody may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To
award him custody would help enhance the bond between parent and son. It
would also give the father a chance to prove his love for his son and for the
son to experience the warmth and support which a father can give.
His being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy.
So many men in uniform who are assigned to different parts of the country in
the service of the nation, are still the natural guardians of their children. It is
not just to deprive our soldiers of authority, care and custody over their
children merely because of the normal consequences of their duties and
assignments, such as temporary separation from their families.
Petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws,
though unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him.
Private respondents' attachment to the young boy whom they have reared for
the past three years is understandable. Still and all, the law considers the
natural love of a parent to outweigh that of the grandparents, such that only
when the parent present is shown to be unfit or unsuitable may the
grandparents exercise substitute parental authority, a fact which has not
been proven here.
The strong bonds of love and affection possessed by private respondents as
grandparents should not be seen as incompatible with petitioner' right to
custody over the child as a father. Moreover, who is to say whether the
petitioner's financial standing may improve in the future?
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals dated April 30, 1992 as well as its Resolution dated
November 13, 1992 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Custody over
the minor Leouel Santos Jr. is awarded to his legitimate father, herein
petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr.
SO ORDERED.
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