G.R. No.

182648 June 17, 2015

HERMAN MEDINA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

Facts:
On April 27, 2002, Henry Lim (Lim), a resident of Calao West, Santiago City, Isabela, brought
his Sangyong Korando Jeep with Plate no. WPC 207 at the auto repair shop owned by Herman
Medina (Medina), a mechanic. When the jeep was brought at the shop, it was still in running
condition and its part were still functioning.
However, after a some time, the jeep was still not repaired. So, in the morning of September 4,
2002, Purita Lim (Purita), Lim’s sister, instructed Danilo Beltran (Beltran), who also have an
auto repair shop, to get the jeep from Medina’s shop. However, Beltran was not able to retrieve it
becausesome of its parts are missing. When he asked about it, Medina told him that he took and
installed those parts on Lim’s other vehicle, an Isuzu pick-up, which was also being repaired
there. On the same day, Beltran went back in the afternoon and was able to get the jeep, but
without the missing parts. He reported it to Purita and brought it to his own shop. Later, the jeep
was fully repaired and put back in good running condition.
On September 12, 2002, a criminal complaint for simple theft was filed by Purita, representing
Lim. The City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict Medina.
In the arraignment, Medina pleaded not guilty. No settlement, stipulation, or admission was
made by the parties during the pre-trial. During the trial proper, Beltran and Lim were presented
as witnesses for the prosecution, while Medina and a certain Angelina Tumamao, a former
barangay kagawad of Buenavista, testified for the defense. Eventually, the case was submitted
for decision, but without the formal offer of evidence by the defense.
On March 31, 2005, the trial court found Medina guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA), affirmed Medina’s conviction. The trial court was not
convinced with Medina’s justification that he installed the jeep’s missing parts to the pick-up
also owned by Lim, and the CA said that his excuse is “so lame and flimsy.” The CA agreed to
lower court’s findings.
When his motion for reconsideration was denied, Medina filed a petition for certiorari.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it affirmed the conviction of the
petitioner despite the fact that the prosecution only presented circumstantial evidence in their
attempt to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Worst, it specifically
advanced only the testimony of witness Beltran, thus, not sufficient to sustain conviction in
accordance with Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the conviction of the petitioner
despite the fact that the prosecution relied not on the strength of its evidence but on the weakness
of the defense contrary to the ruling of the Honorable Court in Philippines vs. Alvario.
3. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it affirmed the conviction of the
petitioner despite the fact that there was no furtive taking or unlawful asportation, in the criminal
sense, considering that the taking, if at all, was with the knowledge and consent of the private
complainant pursuant to the ruling of the Honorable Court in Abundo vs. Sandiganbayan, et al.
and the unrebutted evidence for the defense.
4. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in not considering the receipt marked as
exhibit "2" for the defense, likewise marked as exhibit "C" for the prosecution (common
evidence) not formally offered in evidence due to the gross negligence of the former counsel for
the petitioner in the greater interest of justice, one of the exceptions provided for by the
Honorable Court in Sarraga, Sr. vs. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank.

Ruling:
The Court of the Appeals denied the petition.
1. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain, but without violence against or
intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the
latter’s consent. As defined and penalized, the elements of the crime are: (1) there was taking of
personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking was done with intent to
gain; (4) the taking was without the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking was accomplished
without the use of violence against, or intimidation of persons or force, upon things.
In this case, Medina acknowledged without hesitation the taking of the jeep’s alternator, starter,
battery, and two tires with mag wheels, but he put up the defense that they were installed in the
pick-up owned by Lim. With such admission, the burden of evidence is shifted on him to prove
that the missing parts were indeed lawfully taken. Upon perusal of the transcript of stenographic
notes, the Court finds that Medina unsatisfactorily discharged the burden. Even bearing in mind
the testimony of Tumamao, he failed to substantiate, through the presentation of supporting
documentary evidence or corroborative testimony, the claims that: (1) Lim was the owner of the
pick-up; (2) the missing parts of the jeep were exactly the same items that were placed in the
pick-up; (3) Lim consented, expressly or impliedly, to the transfer of auto parts; and (4)
Mendoza witnessed the removal of the spare parts from the jeep and their placement to the pick-
up. Neither did Medina presented any justifying or exempting circumstance to avoid criminal
liability.
2. On the contrary, Lim firmly testified that when he entrusted to Medina the jeep’s repair it was
still in running condition and complete with alternator, starter, battery, and tires, which went
missing by the time the vehicle was recovered from the auto shop. Likewise, the testimony of
Beltran is definite and straightforward.
3. Abundo v. Sandiganbayan, which was relied upon by Medina, does not apply. In said case, the
element of lack of owner's consent to the taking of the junk chassis was absent since the records
showed that Abundo made a request in writing to be allowed to use one old jeep chassis among
the pile of junk motor vehicles. His request was granted. A memorandum receipt was issued and
signed. Pursuant thereto, the chassis was taken out. There was no furtive taking or unlawful
asportation. The physical and juridical possession of the junk chassis was transferred to Abundo
at his request, with the consent or acquiescence of the owner, the Government, represented by
the public officials who had legal and physical possession of it. We noted that the crime of theft
implies an invasion of possession; therefore, there can be no theft when the owner voluntarily
parted with the possession of the thing. The Court agreed with the observation of the Solicitor
General that a thief does not ask for permission to steal. Indeed, a taking which is done with the
consent or acquiescence of the owner of the property is not felonious.
4. Medina cannot acquit himself on the basis of a purported acknowledgment receipt that he and
Tumamao identified during their presentation as witnesses for the defense.
In Mato v. CA, which referred to People v. Napat-a, citing People v. Mate, we relaxed the
application of Section, Rule 13235 of the Rules of Court by allowing the admission of evidence
not formally offered. To be admissible; however, two essential conditions must concur: first, the
same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must
have been incorporated in the records of the case.
As regards this case, the acknowledgment receipt was not considered by the trial court because it
was not formally offered in evidence. While it was duly identified by the defense testimony that
was duly recorded, the receipt itself was not incorporated in the case records. For its part, the CA
opined that nowhere from the case records does Medina’s acknowledgment receipt appear. Yet,
upon examination, it appears that the July 25, 2002 acknowledgment receipt was attached as
Annex "3" of Medina’s Appellant’s Brief. Accordingly, the CA should have mulled over this
piece of document, especially so since the prosecution even prayed, and was granted, during the
trial proper that said receipt be marked as Exhibit "C."
Nevertheless, even if this Court admits in evidence the acknowledgment receipt, the same would
still not exonerate Medina. This is due to his admission that Bardiaga, Pascual, and Bautista did
not actually see him remove the alternator, starter, battery, and tires with rims from the jeep and
put the same to the pick-up. Likewise, while Medina asserted that Mendoza came to his place
and was shown that the missing auto parts were transferred from the jeep to the pick-up, the
latter was not presented as a hostile witness to confirm such expedient claim. As against the
positive and categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Medina’s mere denials cannot
prevail for being self-serving and uncorroborated. Denial is considered with suspicion and
always received with caution because it is inherently weak and unreliable, easily fabricated and
concocted.
There being no compelling reason to disregard the same, the Court yields to the factual findings
of the trial court, which were affirmed by the CA. This is in line with the precept that when the
trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally
conclusive and binding upon us. It is only in exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial
court overlooked material and relevant matters, that we will recalibrate and evaluate the factual
findings of the court below

Decision:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The January 7, 2008 Decision and
April 21, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 29634,1 which affirmed
in toto the March 31, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Santiago City,
Isabela, in Criminal Case No. 35-4021 convicting Herman Medina for the crime of simple theft,
is hereby AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. L-18208 February 14, 1922

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICENTE DIAZ CONDE and APOLINARIA R. DE CONDE, defendants-appellants.

Facts:
On May 6, 1921, a complaint was presented in the Court of First Instance of Manila, charging
Vicente Diaz Conde (Conde) and Apolinaria De Conde (De Conde) with a violation of the Usury
Law (Act No. 2655). They were arrested, arraigned, and pleaded not guilty. The cause was
brought on for trial on September 1, 1921. At the trial, and after a consideration of the evidence
presented, the judge, Honorable M.V. del Rosario, found that the defendants were guilty of the
crime charged in the complaint and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of P120, and, in case of
insolvency, to suffer imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of the law. From that, the
defendants appealed to the court.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the contract upon which the alleged usurious interest was collected was
executed before Act No. 2655 was adopted.
2. Whether or not at the time said contract was made (December 30, 1915), there was no usury
law in force in the Philippine Islands.
3. Whether or not the said Act No. 2655 did not become effective until May 1, 1916, or four
months and a half after the contract in question was executed.
4. Whether or not that said law could have no retroactive effect or operation, and that said law
impairs the obligation of a contract, and that for all of said reasons the judgment imposed by the
lower court should be revoked; that the complaint should be dismissed, and that they should each
be discharged from the custody of the law.

Ruling:
1. The essential facts constituting the basis of the criminal action are not in dispute, and may be
stated as follows:(1) That on the 30th day of December, 1915, the alleged offended persons
Bartolome Oliveros (Oliveros) and Engracia Lianco (Lianco) executed and delivered to the
defendants a contract (Exhibit B) evidencing the fact that the former had borrowed from the
latter the sum of P300, and (2) that, by virtue of the terms of said contract, the said Oliveros and
Lianco obligated themselves to pay to the defendants interest at the rate of five per cent (5%) per
month, payable within the first ten days of each and every month, the first payment to be made
on the 10th day of January, 1916.
The lower court, in the course of its opinion, stated that at the time of the execution and delivery
of said contract, there was no law in force in the Philippine Islands punishing usury; but,
inasmuch as the defendants had collected a usurious rate of interest after the adoption of the
Usury Law in the Philippine Islands (Act No. 2655), they were guilty of a violation of that law
and should be punished in accordance with its provisions.
2. The law is well established that when a contract contains an obligation to pay interest upon the
principal, the interest thereby becomes part of the principal and is included within the promise to
pay. In other words, the obligation to pay interest on money due under a contract, be it express or
implied, is a part of the obligation of the contract. Laws adopted after the execution of a contract,
changing or altering the rate of interest, cannot be made to apply to such contract without
violating the provisions of the constitution which prohibit the adoption of a law "impairing the
obligation of contract." (8 Cyc., 996; 12 Corpus Juris, 1058-1059.)
The obligation of the contract is the law which binds the parties to perform their agreement if it
is not contrary to the law of the land, morals or public order. That law must govern and control
the contract in every aspect in which it is intended to bear upon it, whether it affect its validity,
construction, or discharge. Any law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the
intention of the parties, necessarily impairs the contract itself. If a law impairs the obligation of a
contract, it is prohibited by the Jones Law, and is null and void. The laws in force in the
Philippine Islands prior to any legislation by the American sovereignty, prohibited the
Legislature from giving to any penal law a retroactive effect unless such law was favorable to the
person accused. (Articles 21 and 22, Penal Code.)
3. A law imposing a new penalty, or a new liability or disability, or giving a new right of action,
must not be construed as having a retroactive effect. It is an elementary rule of contract that the
laws in force at the time the contract was made must govern its interpretation and application.
Laws must be construed prospectively and not retrospectively. If a contract is legal at its
inception, it cannot be rendered illegal by any subsequent legislation. If that were permitted then
the obligations of a contract might be impaired, which is prohibited by the organic law of the
Philippine Islands. (U.S. vs. Constantino Tan Quingco Chua, 39 Phil., 552; Aguilar vs. Rubiato
and Gonzales Vila, 40 Phil., 570.)
4. Ex post facto laws, unless they are favorable to the defendant, are prohibited in this
jurisdiction. Every law that makes an action, done before the passage of the law, and which was
innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action, is an ex post facto law. In the present
case Act No. 2655 made an act which had been done before the law was adopted, a criminal act,
and to make said Act applicable to the act complained of would be to give it an ex post facto
operation. A law may be given a retroactive effect in civil action, providing it is curative in
character, but ex post facto laws are absolutely prohibited unless its retroactive effect is
favorable to the defendant.
For the reason, therefore, that the acts complained of in the present case were legal at the time of
their occurrence, they cannot be made criminal by any subsequent or ex post facto legislation.
What the courts may say, considering the provisions of Article 1255 of the Civil Code, when a
civil action is brought upon said contract, cannot now be determined. A contract may be annulled
by the courts when it is shown that it is against morals or public order.

Decision:
WHEREFORE, the acts complained of by the defendants did not constitute a crime at the time
they were committed, and therefore the sentence of the lower court should be, and is hereby,
revoked; and it is hereby ordered and decreed that the complaint be dismissed, and that the
defendants be discharged from the custody of the law, with costs de oficio.