G.R. No.
182648               June 17, 2015 vehicle in his own auto shop. Beltran, however, was not able to get the jeep since its
HERMAN MEDINA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the January 7, 2008 Decision1 and April 21, 2008 Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29634, which affirmed in toto the March 31, 2005
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 35, Santiago City, Isabela, in Criminal
Case No. 35-4021 convicting petitioner Herman Medina (Medina) of the crime of simple theft,
defined and penalized under Article 308, in relation to Article 309, Paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC).
The Information4 filed against Medina states:
That on or about the 27th day of April, 2002 and for sometime thereafter, in the City of
Santiago, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and
without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal, and carry away the
following to wit: one (1) unit alternator worth Php5,000.00, Starter worth Php5,000.00, battery
worth Php2,500.00[,] and two (2) sets of tire 2.75 x 15 with mugs worth Php10,000.00 all
valued at Php22,500.00, owned by HENRY LIM, represented by PURITA LIM[,] to the
damage and prejudice of the owner thereof in the total amount of Php22,500.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW[.]
The factual antecedents appear as follows:
Henry Lim (Lim) is a resident of Calao West, Santiago City, Isabela. He is the registered
owner of a Sangyong Korando Jeep with Plate No. WPC-207, which was involved in an
accident that caused damage to its roof and door. On April 27, 2002,he engaged the services
of Medina, who is a mechanic and maintains a repair shop in Buenavista, Santiago City,
Isabela. At the time the jeep was delivered to Medina’s shop, it was still in running condition
and serviceable because the under chassis was not affected and the motor engine, wheels,
steering wheels and other parts were still functioning.
A reasonable time elapsed, but no repairs were made on the jeep. So, in the morning of
September 4, 2002, Purita Lim (Purita), Lim’s sister, instructed Danilo Beltran (Beltran) to
retrieve the jeep from Medina’s shop on the agreement that he would instead repair the
alternator, starter, battery, and two tires with rims worth ₱5,000.00, ₱5,000.00, ₱2,500.00,
and ₱10,000.00, respectively, could not be found. Upon inquiry, Medina told him that he took
and installed them on Lim’s another vehicle, an Isuzu pick-up, which was also being repaired
in the shop. Beltran went back in the afternoon of the same day and was able to get the jeep,
but without the missing parts. He had it towed and brought it to his own repair shop. Before
placing the jeep therein, he reported the incident to Purita. Later, the jeep was fully repaired
and put back in good running condition.
On September 12, 2002, a criminal complaint5 for simple theft was filed by Purita,
representing her brother. The City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict
Medina.6 Subsequently, an Information was filed before the court a quo.
In his arraignment, Medina pleaded not guilty.7 No settlement, stipulation or admission was
made by the parties during the pre-trial.8 During the trial proper, Beltran and Lim were
presented as witnesses for the prosecution, while Medina and a certain Angelina Tumamao,
a former barangay kagawad of Buenavista, Santiago City, testified for the defense.
Eventually, the case was submitted for decision, but without the formal offer of evidence by
the defense.9
The trial court found Medina guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The fallo
of the March 31, 2005 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, and considering the absence of mitigating [or] aggravating circumstances and applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum. The accused is likewise ordered to indemnify Henry Lim the total
amount of ₱22,500.00. No imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.10
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of Medina. While the trial court was not convinced
with Medina’s justification that he installed the jeep’s missing parts to the pick-up also owned
by Lim, the CA opined that his excuse is "so lame and flimsy." The CA agreed with the lower
court’s findings that Medina admitted that the jeep is more valuable than the pickup; that
unlike the pick-up, the needed repairs on the jeep is only minor in nature; that Medina failed
to prove that the pick-up was completely repaired and was placed in good running condition;
and that he failed to prove that the pick-up is owned by Lim. The CA also held that the
positive testimony of Beltran deserves merit in contrast with the self-serving testimony of
Medina. Finally, no credence was given to Medina’s assertion that the missing auto parts
were turned over to Crispin Mendoza, who is alleged to be an employee of Lim. For the CA,
the trial court correctly ruled that such claim was unsubstantiated in view of Medina’s failure
to formally offer in evidence the purported acknowledgment receipt. Assuming that the
exception in Mato v. CA11 is taken into account, the receipt could not still be considered
because it was not incorporated in the records of the case.
When his motion for reconsideration was denied, Medina filed this petition which alleges the
following errors:
I.
THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE
CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION
ONLY PRESENTED CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THEIR ATTEMPT TO PROVE THE
GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. WORST, IT SPECIFICALLY
ADVANCED ONLY ONE SINGLE CIRCUMSTANCE[,] THAT IS[,] THE TESTIMONY OF
PROSECUTION WITNESS DANILO BELTRAN THAT THE STARTER, [ALTERNATOR],
BATTERY[,] AND TWO (2) PIECES [OF] TIRES WITH MUGS (MAG WHEELS) OF THE
KORANDO JEEP WERE SIMPLY MISSING, THUS[,] NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN
CONVICTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 4, RULE 133 OF THE RULES OF
COURT.
II.
THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
CONVICTION OFTHE PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION
RELIED NOT ON THE STRENGTH OF ITS EVIDENCE BUT ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE
DEFENSE CONTRARY TO THE RULING OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN PHILIPPINES
VS. ALVARIO.
III.
THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT [AFFIRMED] THE
CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER DESPITE [THE] FACT [THAT] THERE WAS NO
FURTIVE TAKING OR UNLAWFUL ASPORTATION, IN THE CRIMINAL SENSE,
CONSIDERING THAT THE TAKING, IF AT ALL, WAS WITH THE KNOWLEDGE AND
ACQUIESCENCE OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT PURSUANT TO THE RULING OF
THE HONORABLE COURT IN ABUNDO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL. AND THE
UNREBUTTED EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE RECEIPT
MARKED AS EXHIBIT "2" FOR THE DEFENSE, LIKEWISE MARKED AS EXHIBIT "C" FOR
THE PROSECUTION (COMMON EVIDENCE) NOT FORMALLY OFFERED IN EVIDENCE
DUE TO THE GROSS NEGLIGENCE OF THE FORMER COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER
IN THE GREATER INTEREST OF JUSTICE, ONE OFTHE EXCEPTIONS PROVIDED FOR
BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN SARRAGA, SR. VS. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND
MORTGAGE BANK.12
We deny.
Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain, but without violence against or
intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without
the latter’s consent.13 As defined and penalized, the elements of the crime are: (1) there was
taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking was done with
intent to gain; (4) the taking was without the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking was
accomplished without the use of violence against, or intimidation of persons or force, upon
things.14 Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful
taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation.15 Although proof as to motive for the
crime is essential when the evidence of the theft is circumstantial, the intent to gain is the
usual motive to be presumed from all furtive taking of useful property appertaining to another,
unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator.16 As to
the concept of "taking" –
The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft under the penal code is
that it be capable of appropriation. It need not be capable of "asportation," which is defined as
"carrying away." Jurisprudence is settled that to "take" under the theft provision of the penal
code does not require asportation or carrying away.
To appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing. The word "take" in the Revised
Penal Code includes any act intended to transfer possession which x x x may be committed
through the use of the offenders' own hands, as well as any mechanical device x x x.17
In this case, Medina acknowledged without hesitation the taking of the jeep’s alternator,
starter, battery, and two tires with magwheels, but he put up the defense that they were
installed in the pick-up owned by Lim.18 With such admission, the burden of evidence is
shifted on him to prove that the missing parts were indeed lawfully taken. Upon perusal of the
transcript of stenographic notes, the Court finds that Medina unsatisfactorily discharged the
burden. Even bearing in mind the testimony of Tumamao, he failed to substantiate, through
the presentation of supporting documentary evidence or corroborative testimony, the claims
that: (1) Lim was the owner of the pick-up; (2) the missing parts of the jeep were exactly the
same items that were placed in the pick-up; (3) Lim consented, expressly or impliedly, to the
transfer of auto parts; and (4) Mendoza witnessed the removal of the spare parts from the
jeep and their placement to the pick-up. Neither did Medina adduce any justifying 19 or
exempting20 circumstance to avoid criminal liability.
On the contrary, Lim firmly testified that when he entrusted to Medina the jeep’s repair it was
still in running condition and complete with alternator, starter, battery, and tires, which went
missing by the time the vehicle was recovered from the auto shop. 21 Likewise, the testimony
of Beltran is definite and straightforward. He declared that he was not able to get the jeep in
the morning of September 4, 2002 because its alternator, starter, battery, and two tires with
rims could not be found, and that when he asked Medina as to their whereabouts the latter
told him that he took them, placed the starter in Lim’s pick-up while the alternator was in the
repair shop.22 Medina informed him that the jeep’s missing parts were actually installed to
Lim’s other vehicle which was also being repaired at the time. 23 However, Beltran did not
know or had not seen other vehicles owned by Lim at Medina’s shop.24 In the afternoon of the
sameday, he was able to get the jeep but not its missing parts. 25 He concluded that they were
lost because he inspected the jeep.26
Abundo v. Sandiganbayan,27 which was relied upon by Medina, does not apply. In said case,
the element of lack of owner's consent to the taking of the junk chassis was absent since the
records showed that Abundo made a request in writing to be allowed to use one old jeep
chassis among the pile of junk motor vehicles. His request was granted. A memorandum
receipt was issued and signed. Pursuant thereto, the chassis was taken out. There was no
furtive taking or unlawful asportation. The physical and juridical possession of the junk
chassis was transferred to Abundo at his request, with the consent or acquiescence of the
owner, the Government, represented by the public officials who had legal and physical
possession of it. We noted that the crime of theft implies an invasion of possession; therefore,
there can be no theft when the owner voluntarily parted with the possession of the thing. The
Court agreed with the observation of the Solicitor General that a thief does not ask for
permission to steal. Indeed, a taking which is done with the consent or acquiescence of the
owner of the property is not felonious.28
WON the acknowledgment receipt is admissible in evidence. NO
Medina cannot acquit himself on the basis of a purported acknowledgment receipt29 that he
and Tumamao identified during their presentation as witnesses for the defense. According to
his testimony, Mendoza came to his (Medina’s) place and saw the subject auto parts while
being transferred from the jeep to the pick-up and that, relative thereto, Medina even called
barangay officials and let them signed a document to bear witness on the matter.30 The
document, dated July 25, 2002, which was marked as Exhibit "2," was signed byMendoza,
Jovy Bardiaga (said to be Lim’s chief mechanic), Mario Pascual (said to be Medina’s helper),
and Rosalina Bautista and Tumamao (said to be barangay kagawads). Ostensibly, they
signed the document while facing each other in front of Medina’s house.31
In Mato v. CA,32 which referred to People v. Napat-a,33 citing People v. Mate,34 We relaxed the
application of Section 34, Rule 13235 of the Rules of Court by allowing the admission of
evidence not formally offered. To be admissible, however, two essential conditions must
concur: first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and,
second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case.36
As regards this case, the acknowledgment receipt was not considered by the trial court
because it was not formally offered in evidence. While it was duly identified by the defense
testimony that was duly recorded, the receipt itself was not incorporated in the case records.
For its part, the CA opined that nowhere from the case records does Medina’s
acknowledgment receipt appear. Yet, upon examination, it appears that the July 25, 2002
acknowledgment receipt was attached as Annex "3" of Medina’s Appellant’s
Brief.37 Accordingly, the CA should have mulled over this piece of document, especially so
since the prosecution even prayed, and was granted, during the trial proper that said receipt
be marked as Exhibit "C."38
Nevertheless, even if this Court admits in evidence the acknowledgment receipt, the same
would still not exonerate Medina.1âwphi1 This is due to his admission that Bardiaga,
Pascual, and Bautista did not actually see him remove the alternator, starter, battery, and
tires with rims from the jeep and put the same to the pick-up.39 Likewise, while Medina
asserted that Mendoza came to his place and was shown that the missing auto parts were
transferred from the jeep to the pick-up, the latter was not presented as a hostile witness to
confirm such expedient claim. As against the positive and categorical testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, Medina’s mere denials cannot prevail for being self-serving and
uncorroborated. Denial is considered with suspicion and always received with caution
because it is inherently weak and unreliable, easily fabricated and concocted.40
Denial, essentially a negation of a fact, does not prevail over an affirmative assertion of the
fact. Thus, courts – both trial and appellate – have generally viewed the defense of denial in
criminal cases with considerable caution, if not with outright rejection. Such judicial attitude
comes from the recognition that denial is inherently weak and unreliable by virtue of its being
an excuse too easy and too convenient for the guilty to make. To be worthy of consideration
at all, denial should be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The accused cannot
solely rely on her negative and self-serving negations, for denial carries no weight in law and
has no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.41 Further, Medina did not demonstrate any evidence of ill motive on the
part of the prosecution witnesses as to falsely testify against him. In the absence of any
evidence that the prosecution witnesses were motivated by improper motives, the trial court's
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses shall not be interfered with by this Court.42
There being no compelling reason to disregard the same, the Court yields to the factual
findings of the trial court, which were affirmed by the CA. This is in line with the precept that
when the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are
generally conclusive and binding upon Us.43 It is only in exceptional circumstances, such as
when the trial court overlooked material and relevant matters, that We will recalibrate and
evaluate the factual findings of the court below.44 As held in Co Kiat v. Court of Appeals:45
It is a well-settled doctrine in this jurisdiction, that factual findings of the trial court are entitled
to great weight and authority (Macua vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 29) and
that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought toit from the Court of Appeals, is
limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of facts being
conclusive (Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 737).
In a petition for review of decisions of the Court of Appeals, the jurisdiction of this Court is
confined to reviewing questions of law, unless the factual findings are totally bereft of support
in the records or are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute a serious abuse of discretion
(Canete, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 13).
Except in criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher,
appeals to the Supreme Court are not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion and are
allowed only on questions of law and only when there are special and important reasons,
which we do not find in this case (Balde vs. Court of Appeals, 150 SCRA 365).46
Now on the propriety of the penalty imposed by the trial court:
Under Article 309 of the RPC, an accused found guilty of simple theft when the value of the
stolen property exceeds ₱22,000.00 shall be sentenced to:
Art. 309. Penalties. – Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing
stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the
thing stolen exceed the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one
prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the
total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and
in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal,
as the case may be.47
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is that
which, taking into consideration the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the RPC.48 As the value of the auto parts stolen from Lim is in excess of ₱22,000.00,
the penalty imposable is the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by Article 309, which
is the maximum of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since the penalty
prescribed is composed of only two periods, Article 65 of the RPC requires the division into
three equal portions the time included in the penalty, forming one period of each of the three
portions. Thus, the minimum, medium, and maximum periods of the penalty prescribed are:
Minimum - 6 years and l day to 7 years and 4 months
Medium - 7 years, 4 months and 1 day to 8 years and 8 months
Maximum - 8 years, 8 months, and 1 day to 10 years
The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be-anywhere within the range of the penalty
next lower in degree to that prescribed for the offense, without first considering any modifying
circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. 49 In this case, the pep.alty next lower
in degree to that prescribed for the offense is prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, or anywhere from Two (2) years,. Four (4) months and One (1) day to Six
(6) years. Thus, the trial court did not err when it sentenced Medina to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of Three (3) years, Six (6) months and Twenty-One (21) days of prision
correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years, Eight (8) months and One (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum.50 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The
January 7, 2008 Decision and April 21, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR. No. 29634,1 which affirmed in toto the March 31, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 3), Santiago City, Isabela, in Criminal Case No. 35-4021 convicting Herman
Medina for the crime of simple theft, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 192150               October 1, 2014
FEDERICO SABAY, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this petition for review on certiorari 1 the decision2 dated October 23, 2009 and
the resolution3 dated March 22, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31532.
The CA affirmed the April 28, 2008 decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan
City, Branch 126, finding petitioner Federico Sabay guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two
(2) counts of Slight Physical Injuries. The RTC decision in tum affirmed the Metropolitan Trial
Court's (MTC) judgment.
The Antecedent Facts
At around three o’clock to four o’clock in the afternoon of June 12, 2001, while the petitioner
and his daughter Erlinda Sabay (Erlinda) were busy laying wood and water pipes in the yard
of Godofredo Lopez (Godofredo), the latter confronted the petitioner about his (the
petitioner’s) alleged intrusion into Godofredo’s property. A verbal altercation ensued between
them.
In the course of the verbal exchange, Erlinda hit Godofredo on the head with a hard object.
The petitioner joined in by throwing a stone at Godofredo’s face, breaking the latter’s
eyeglasses. Godofredo claimed that as a result, he felt dizzy.5 The petitioner and Erlinda then
shouted at Godofredo and threatened to kill him.
Immediately thereafter, Jervie Lopez (Jervie) came and pacified the three. But in the course
his efforts, he was hit in the hand with a bolo.6 The neighbors intervened not long after and
pacified the parties.
The Medico Legal Certificates7 dated June 12, 2001 showed that Godofredo suffered a
contusion on the left parietal area of his head and an abrasion in his left cheek, while
Jerviesustained a wound in his right palm.
On June 13, 2001, Godofredo and Jervie filed a complaint against the petitioner before the
barangay.8 The parties agreed to settle the complaint based on the recommendation of the
building inspector and reflected their agreement in their Kasunduang Pag-
aayos9 (Kasunduan) dated June 20, 2001. The Kasunduan, however, was not implemented
because the building inspector failed to make the promised recommendation to resolve the
boundary dispute between the parties.10 Thus, the Office of the Barangay Captain issued a
Certificate to File an Action.
The petitioner was accordingly charged before the MTC with the crime of Physical Injuries
under two (2) Informations11 that read:
Criminal Case No. 209934
That on or about the 12th day of June 2001, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without justifiable cause, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hit with a bolo one JERVIE LOPEZ, thereby
inflicting upon the latter physical injuries which required and will require medical attendance
for not more than seven (7) days or incapacitated or will incapacitate said victim from
performing his habitual work for the same period of time.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 209935
That on or about the 12th day of June 2001, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without justifiable cause, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hit with a bolo one GODOFREDO LOPEZ,
thereby inflicting upon the latter physical injuries which required and will require medical
attendance for not more than seven (7) days or incapacitated or will incapacitate said victim
from performing his habitual work for the same period of time.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The petitioner, together with his daughter Erlinda, was also charged with Light Threats12 for
allegedly uttering threatening words against the private complainant, Godofredo.
When arraigned, both accused pleadednot guilty to all the charges. Trial on the merits
thereafter ensued.
At the trial, the prosecution presented the following eyewitnesses: Rodolfo Lata, Sr. y Dolping
(Rodolfo) and Dina Perez y Alapaap (Dina) (who both testified on the details of the crime);
Godofredo; Jervie; and Dr. Melissa Palugod (Godofredo’s attending physician). The defense,
on the other hand, presented the petitioner, Wilfredo Verdad and Caridad Sabay.
The petitioner denied the charge and claimed that he had simply acted in self-defense. He
narrated that on the date of the incident while he was putting a monument on his lot,
Godofredo suddenly hit him with an iron bar in his right hand, causing him injuries. Jesus
Lopez (Jessie), Godofredo’s son, went out of their house and with a .38 caliber gun, fired the
gun at him. To defend himself, he got a stone and threw it at Godofredo.
The MTC’s and the RTC’s Rulings
In its decision, MTC believed the prosecution's version of the incident and found the petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of slight physical injuries. The MTC,
however, dismissed the light threats charged, as this offense is deemed absorbed in the
crime of slight physical injuries. Further, it absolved Erlinda for the crime of light threats as
there was no allegation that she uttered threatening words against Godofredo.
The MTC rejected the petitioner’s claim of self-defense for lack of clear, convincing and
satisfactory supporting evidence. The MTC held that the petitioner failed to prove that there
had been unlawful aggression by Godofredo; he did not even present the medical certificate
of his injury as evidence. The dispositive partof its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Federico Sabay y Bactol is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for two (2) counts of Slight Physical Injuries and is meted a penalty
ofimprisonment of Eleven (11) Days for each count as there is neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance.
SO ORDERED.
In due course, the petitioner appealed his judgment to the RTC, which fully affirmed the
MTC’s decision.
The petitioner sought recourse with the CA, arguing in this appeal that: (1) the MTC has no
jurisdiction over the case in view of the prosecution’s failure to offer the Certification to File an
Action in evidence; and (2) the trial court erred in not sustaining his claim of self-defense.
The CA’s Ruling
The CA rejected the petitioner’s arguments and affirmed the RTC’s decision. The CA held
that even if there had been no formal offer of exhibit pursuant to Section 34, Rule 132 of the
Rules on Evidence, the Certification to File an Action could still be admitted against the
adverse party if, first, it has been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, it
has been incorporated into the records of the case. Noting that the Certification to File an
Action was identified by the complainants and is attached to the records of the case, the CA
ruled that an exception to Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence could be
recognized.
The CA also dismissed the petitioner’s plea of self-defense. The CA ruled that self-defense is
essentially a factual matter that isbest addressed by the trial court; in the absence of any
showing that both the MTC and the RTC overlooked weighty and substantial facts or
circumstances that could alter their conclusion, the appellate court saw no reason to disturb
their factual ruling.
On March 22, 2010, the CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration; hence, the
present petition.
The Issues
On the basis of the same arguments raised before the CA, the petitioner questions: (1) the
jurisdiction of the MTC over the criminal cases in view of the alleged inadmissibility ofthe
Certification to File Action; and (2) the lower court’s finding of guilt, its appreciation of the
evidence and its rejection of the claim of self-defense.
WON the Certificate to File Action is admissible in evidence. YES
The Court’s Ruling
We find no reversible error committed by the CA and affirm the petitioner’s conviction for two
counts of slight physical injuries.
On the first issue, the petitioner contends that the lower courts erred in disregarding the
existence of the Kasunduan executed by the parties before the Lupon. This existing
settlement between the parties rendered the Certification to File an Action without factual and
legal basis, and is hence null and void. The petitioner also contendsthat the CA erred in not
holding that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the criminal cases in view of the noncompliance
(i.e., issuance of the Certification toFile an Action despite the existence of an agreement) with
conciliation procedures under Presidential Decree No. 1508.
We see no merit in these contentions.
The Office of the Barangay Captain Cannot be Precluded From Issuing a Certification to File
an Action Where NoActual Settlement Was Reached; the Certification to File an Action
Issued by The Office of The Barangay is Valid.
The present case was indisputably referred to the Barangay Luponfor conciliation prior to the
institution of the criminal cases before the MTC. The parties in fact admitted that a meeting
before the Lupontranspired between them, resulting in a Kasunduan.
Although they initially agreed to settle their case, the Kasunduanthat embodied their
agreement was never implemented; no actual settlement materialized as the building
inspector failed to make his promised recommendation to settle the dispute. The Barangay
Captain was thus compelled to issue a Certification to File an Action, indicating that the
disputing parties did not reach any settlement.
The CA correctly observed and considered the situation: the settlement of the case was
conditioned on the recommendation of the building inspector; with no recommendation, no
resolution of the conflict likewise took place.
Furthermore, the BarangayCaptain, as a public official, is presumed to act regularly in the
performance of official duty.13 In the absence of contrary evidence, this presumption prevails;
his issuance of the disputed Certification to File an Action was regular and pursuant to
law.14 Thus, the Barangay Captain properly issued the Certification to File an Action.
Even granting that an irregularity had intervened in the Barangay Captain’s issuance of the
Certification toFile and Action, we note that this irregularity is not a jurisdictional flaw that
warrants the dismissal of the criminal cases before the MTC. As we held in Diu v. Court of
Appeals:15
Also, the conciliation procedure under Presidential Decree No. 1508 is not a jurisdictional
requirement and non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower
courts had already acquired over the subject matter and private respondents as defendants
therein. Similarly, in Garces v. Court of Appeals,16 we stated that:
In fine, we have held in the past that prior recourse to the conciliation procedure required
under P.D. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement, non-compliance with which would deprive
a court of its jurisdiction either over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant.
Thus, the MTC has jurisdiction to try and hear the petitioner’s case; the claimed irregularity in
conciliation procedure, particularly in the issuance of the Certification to File an Action, did not
deprive the court of its jurisdiction. If at all, the irregularity merely affected the parties’ cause
of action.17
The petitioner next contends thateven if there was a valid Certification to File an Action, the
lower courts still erred in admitting the Certificate into evidence as the prosecution did not
formally offer it as required by the Rules on Evidence. He emphasizes that in Fideldia v. Sps.
Mulato,18 the Court held that a formal offer is necessary because judges are required to base
their findings solely upon evidence offered by the parties. In the absence of a formal offer, the
Certification is not admissible pursuant to Section 412 of Republic Act No. 7160, and cannot
be considered by the court.
We do not find this argument sufficiently persuasive.
The Certification to File an Action is Admissible.
Section 34 of Rule 132 of our Rules on Evidence provides that the court cannot consider any
evidence that has not been formally offered.19 Formal offer means that the offering party shall
inform the court of the purpose of introducing its exhibits into evidence, to assist the court in
ruling on their admissibility in case the adverse party objects.20 Without a formal offer of
evidence, courts cannot take notice of this evidence even if this has been previously marked
and identified.
This rule, however, admits of anexception. The Court, in the appropriate cases, has relaxed
the formal-offer rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted.
The cases of People v. Napat-a,21 People v. Mate,22 and The Heirs of Romana Saves, et al. v.
The Heirs of Escolastico Saves, et al.,23 to cite a few, enumerated the requirements so that
evidence, not previously offered, can be admitted, namely: first, the evidence must have been
duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the evidence must have been
incorporated in the records of the case.
In the present case, we find that the requisites for the relaxation of the formal-offer rule are
present.1âwphi1 As the lower courts correctly observed, Godofredo identified the Certification
to File an Action during his crossexamination, to wit:24
Q: And I’m referring to you thisCertification from the Office of the Brgy. docketed as 181-01, is
this the one you are referring to?
A: This is with respect to the hitting of my head.
Atty. Bihag: At this juncture, your Honor, we would like to request that this particular
certification referring to the case 181-01 entitled Mr. Godofredo Lopez, Mr. Jervie Lopez
versus Mr. Federico Sabay and Mrs. Erlinda Castro, be marked as Exh. "1" for the defense.
[TSN, Godofredo Lopez, page 119; emphasis ours.]
Although the Certification was not formally offered in evidence, it was marked as Exhibit "1"
and attached to the records of the case.25 Significantly, the petitioner never objected to
Godofredo’s testimony, particularly with the identification and marking of the Certification. In
these lights, the Court sees no reason why the Certification should not be admitted.
The Claim of Self-Defense
On the claim of self-defense, we recognize that the factual findings and conclusions of the
RTC, especially when affirmed by the CA as in this case, are entitled to great weight and
respect and are deemed final and conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence
on record.26
In the absence of any indication thatthe trial and the appellate courts overlooked facts or
circumstances that would result in a different ruling in this case, we will not disturb their
factual findings.27
We thus uphold the rulings of the RTC and the CA which found the elements of the crime of
slight physical injuries fully established during the trial. The RTC and the CA correctly
rejected the petitioner’s claim of selfdefense because he did not substantiate it with clear and
convincing proof.
Self-defense as a justifying circumstance under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, implies the admission by the accused that he committed the acts that would have
been criminal in character had it not been for the presence of circumstances whose legal
consequences negate the commission of a crime. 28 The plea of self-defense in order to
exculpate the accused must be duly proven. The most basic rule is that no self-defense can
be recognized until unlawful aggression is established.29
Since the accused alleges self-defense, he carries the burden of evidence to prove that he
satisfied the elements required by law;30 he who alleges must prove. By admitting the
commission of the act charged and pleading avoidance based on the law, he must rely on the
strength of his own evidence to prove that the facts that the legal avoidance requires are
present; the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence is immaterial after he admitted the
commission of the act charged.31
In this case, the petitioner admitted the acts attributed to him, and only pleads that he acted in
self-defense. His case essentially rests on the existence of unlawful aggression – that
Godofredo hit him with an iron bar on his right hand.
As the RTC and the CA pointed out, the petitioner failed to substantiate his claimed self-
defense because he did not even present any medical certificate as supporting evidence,
notwithstanding his claim that he consulted a doctor. Nor did he everpresent the doctor he
allegedly consulted. His contention, too, that he was attacked by Godofredo and was shot
with a .38 caliber gun by Jessie was refuted by the prosecution eyewitnesses – Rodolfo and
Dina – who both testified that it was the petitioner who had attacked Godofredo.
The prosecution eyewitnesses' testimonies were supported by the medico legal certificates
showing that Godofredo sustained a contusion on the left parietal area of his head and an
abrasion on his left cheek. These medico legal findings are consistent with Godofredo' s claim
that the petitioner hit him and inflicted physical injuries.
In sum, we are fully satisfied that the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
counts of slight physical injuries, as the lower courts found. His claim of self-defense fails for
lack of supporting evidence; he failed to present any evidence of unlawful aggression and
cannot thus be said to have hit Godofredo as a measure to defend himself.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the appeal and AFFIRM the decision dated
October 23, 2009 and the resolution dated March 22, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 31532.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167454               September 24, 2014
EMERITU C. BARUT, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Petitioner Emeritu C. Barut, a guard of the Philippine National Construction Corporation
(PNCC), was tried for and found guilty of homicide by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 276, in
Muntinlupa City under the judgment rendered on December 11, 2000, whereby he was
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for 10 years and one day of
prision mayor, as the minimum, to 17 years and eight months of reclusion temporal, as the
maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of Vincent Ucag in the total amount of ₱250,000.00,
inclusive of the actual and moral damages.1 On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed
the conviction of Barut through its decision promulgated on March 17, 2005.2
Hence, Barut now seeks the review of his conviction by petition for review on certiorari.
Antecedents
It appears that at around 6:00 o’clock in the afternoon of September 24, 1995 SPO4 Vicente
Ucag was coming from a picnic in Laguna and returning home to Taguig, Metro Manila on
board a passenger jeepney driven by his brother Rolando on the South Luzon Expressway.
Ucag’s wife and 16 year-old son Vincent were then riding an owner-type jeep driven by Rico
Villas on the same route. When the latter vehicle exited at the Sucat Interchange ahead of
Ucag’s passenger jeepney, PNCC guards Conrado Ancheta and Barut stopped Villas and
directed him to park his vehicle at the road side. After informing Villas that his vehicle had no
headlights, Ancheta asked for his driving license, but it took a while before Villas produced
the same apparently waiting for his companions in the passenger jeepney to arrive.
Nonetheless, Villas ultimately surrendered his driving license, and Ancheta issued to him a
traffic violation report (TVR) ticket. Right about then, the passenger jeepney carrying Ucag
stopped where Villas’ jeep had parked. Ucag and Danilo Fabiano, a co-passenger, alighted
and approached Ancheta and Barut to inquire what the matter was. Apprised of the reason
for the stoppage of Villas’ jeep, Ucag requested the return of Villas’ driving license. But
Ancheta refused because hehad already issued the TVR ticket. Ucag argued with Ancheta
and Barut. Later on, however, Ucag turned around in order to avoid further argument,and
simply told Villas to return for his driving license the next day. This apparently irked Ancheta,
who dared Ucag to finish the issue right there and then. Ancheta suddenly pulled out his .38
caliber revolver and fired it several times, hitting Ucag on both thighs. Ucag fired back and hit
Ancheta. Fabiano and Villas witnessed the exchange of gunshots between Ucag and
Ancheta.3
Upon seeing the exchange of gunshots, Vincent Ucag rushed towards his father to go to his
succor. Before Vincent could reach his father, however, Barut fired at Vincent in the chest.
Vincent, badly bleeding, tried to go back to the owner-type jeep where his mother was, but fell
to the ground before reaching the jeep. Vincent was rushed to the Parañaque Medical
Center, where he expired while undergoing emergency surgery. His father was brought to the
Camp Panopio Hospital in Quezon City for treatment and medical attendance.4
Issues
In his petition for review on certiorari, Barut submits that:
(a) The CA misapprehended, overlooked or neglected facts that were favorable to
him; and
(b) The finding on the supposed consistency of the testimonies of the State’s
witnesses constituted a sweeping conclusion.
Ruling
We find no reversible error committed by the CA.
To start with, the CA held that it could not find from its review of the records any compelling
reason to set aside the factual findings of the trial court. It ruled that Villas and Fabiano had
clearly and consistently testified that Barut had been the person who had shot Vincent; and
that Barut’s bare denial of firing at Vincent did not prevail over their positive and categorical
identification of him as the perpetrator.
Although the record of the trial islaid bare and open during every appeal in a criminal case,
the credibility of witnesses is a factual issue that the Court cannot disturb in this appeal. 5 We
reiterate that the findings of fact by the trial court are accorded great respect especially when
affirmed on appeal by the CA.6 This great respect for such findings rests mainly on the trial
judge’s access to the witnesses while they testify in her presence, giving the trial judge the
personal and direct observation of their manner and decorum during intensive grilling by the
counsel for the accused, thereby enabling her to see if the witnesses werefidgeting and
prevaricating, or were sincere and trustworthy.
Secondly, Barut adverts to the extra-judicial sworn statement that Villas gave at about 1:00
o’clock in the afternoon of September 25, 1995 – barely a day following the fatal shooting of
Vincent – in which he declared not having seen Barut fire a gun. Barut contends that this
declaration definitely contradicted Villas’ court testimony on June 10, 1996, and manifested
that he was "not clear and convincing because he never pointed out who [had] really shot
Vincent Ucag."7 Citing Villas’ answer of "Maybe he was hit" to the question on direct
examination: "What was the reason if you know why he [referring to Vincent Ucag] was
weak?"8 Barut insists that Villas was thereby ambiguous and gave rise to the doubt as "to
who [had] really shot and killed the victim," whether it was Ancheta (who had traded shots
with the victim’s father), or himself.9
Noting that neither Ucag nor Ancheta had shot Vincent, the RTC explained that the former
could not anymore fire his gun at Vincent not only because Vincent was his own son but also
because he himself had already been lying on the ground after being hit in his lower
extremities; and that
WON the extrajudicial statement is admissible in evidence. NO
Ancheta could not have fired at Vincent at all because he, too, had been already wounded
and lying on the groundand profusedly bleeding from his own gunshot wounds. The RTC
further noted that the slug extracted from the body of Vincent had come from a .38 caliber
revolver, not from Ucag’s .45 caliber firearm.
Barut’s contention did not itselfgo unnoticed by the CA, which observed that the RTC could
not takethe declaration of Villas into consideration because Villas’ extra-judicial sworn
statement containing the declaration had not been offered and admitted as evidence by either
side. The CA stressed that only evidence thatwas formally offered and made part of the
records could be considered; and that in any event, the supposed contradiction between the
extra-judicial sworn statement and the court testimony should be resolved in favor of the
latter.
The CA’s negative treatment of the declaration contained in Villas’ extra-judicial sworn
statement was inaccord with prevailing rules and jurisprudence. Pursuant to Section 34, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, the RTC as the trial court could consideronly the evidence that had
been formally offered; towards that end, the offering party must specify the purpose for which
the evidence was being offered. The rule would ensure the right of the adverse party to due
process of law, for, otherwise, the adverse party would not be put in the position to timely
object to the evidence, as well as to properly counter the impact of evidence not formally
offered.10 As stated in Candido v. Court of Appeals:11
It is settled that courts will only consider as evidence that which has been formally offered. x x
x human life absolutely brings moral and spiritual losses as well as a definite loss. Moral
A document, or any article for that matter, is not evidence when it is simply marked for
identification; it must be formally offered, and the opposing counsel given an opportunity
toobject to it or cross-examine the witness called upon to prove or identify it. A formal offer is
necessary since judges are required to base their findings of fact and judgment only— and
strictly—upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. To allow a party to attach any
document to his pleading and then expect the court to consider it as evidence may draw
unwarranted consequences. The opposing party will be deprived of his chance to examine
the document and object to its admissibility. The appellate court will have difficulty reviewing
documents not previously scrutinized by the court below. The pertinent provisions of the
Revised Rules of Court on the inclusion on appeal of documentary evidence or exhibits in the
records cannot be stretched as to include such pleadings or documents not offered at the
hearing of the case.
The rule that only evidence formally offered before the trial court can be considered is relaxed
where two requisites concur, namely: one, the evidence was duly identified by testimony duly
recorded; and, two, the evidence was incorporated inthe records of the case.12 Furthermore,
the rule has no application where the court takes judicial notice of adjudicative facts pursuant
to Section 2,13 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court; or where the court relies on judicial admissions
or draws inferences from such judicial admissions within the context of Section 4,14 Rule 129
of the Rules of Court; or where the trial court, in judging the demeanor of witnesses,
determines their credibility even without the offer of the demeanor as evidence.15
The Court also sees fit to correct the indeterminate sentence of 10 years and one day of
prision mayor, as the minimum, to 17 years and eight months of reclusion temporal, as the
maximum, fixed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA. The maximum of17 years and eight
months comes from the maximum period of reclusion temporal, but the maximum of the
indeterminate sentence should insteadcome from the medium period of reclusion temporal,
whose duration is from 14 years, eight months and one day to 17 years and four months,
because neither the RTC nor the CA had found the attendance of any aggravating
circumstance. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence is fixed at 10 years of prision
mayor, and the maximum of 17 years and eight months of reclusion temporalis modified to 17
years and four months of the medium period of reclusion temporal.
Anent the civil liability, the RTC granted ₱250,000.00 without specifying the amounts
corresponding toactual and moral damages, as well as to the civil indemnity for the death of
Vincent. The CA affirmed the grant. Both lower courts thereby erred on a matter of law.
Actual and moral damages are different in nature and purpose. To start with, different laws
govern their grant, with the amounts allowed as actual damages being dependent on proof of
the loss to a degree of certainty, while the amounts allowed as moral damages being
discretionary on the part of the court. Secondly, actual damages address the actual losses
caused by the crime to the heirs of the victim; moral damages assuage the spiritual and
emotional sufferings of the heirs of the victim of the crime. On the civil indemnity for death,
law and jurisprudence have fixed the value to compensate for the loss of human life. Thirdly,
actual damages may not be granted without evidence of actual loss; moral damages and
death indemnity are always granted in homicide, it being assumed by the law that the loss of
damages and death indemnity require neither pleading nor evidence simply because death COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,
through crime always occasions moral sufferings on the part of the victim’s heirs. 16 As the vs.
Court aptly said in one case,17 UNITED SALVAGE AND TOWAGE (PHILS.), INC., Respondent.

x x x a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on DECISION
the partof the victim’s family.1âwphi1 It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain
and anger when a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent PERALTA, J.:
death or brutal killing not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life,
deprives them forever ofhis love, affection and support, but often leaves them with the Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them. Court which seeks to review, reverse and set aside the Decision1 of the Court of Tax Appeals
En Banc (CTA En Banc), dated June 27, 2011, in the case entitled Commissioner of Internal
The death indemnity and moral damages are fixed at ₱75,000.00 each in view of homicide Revenue v. United Salvage and Towage (Phils.), Inc. (USTP), docketed as C.T.A. EB No.
being a gross offense. Considering that the decisions of the lower courts contained no 662. The facts as culled from the records:
treatment of the actual damages, the Court is now not in any position to dwell on this.
Nonetheless, the Court holds that despite the lack of such treatment, temperate damages of Respondent is engaged in the business of sub-contracting work for service contractors
₱25,000.00 should be allowed. Article 2224 of the Civil Codedeclares that temperate engaged in petroleum operations in the Philippines.2 During the taxable years in question, it
damages may be recovered when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount had entered into various contracts and/or sub-contracts with several petroleum service
cannot be proved with certainty. There is no longer any doubt that when actual damages for contractors, such as Shell Philippines Exploration, B.V. and Alorn Production Philippines for
burial and related expenses are not substantiated with receipts, temperate damages of the supply of service vessels.3
atleast ₱25,000.00 are warranted, for it is certainly unfair to deny to the surviving heirs of the
victim the compensation for such expenses as actual damages. 18 This is based on the sound
reasoning that it would be anomalous that the heirs of the victim who tried and succeeded in In the course of respondent’s operations, petitioner found respondent liable for deficiency
proving actual damages of less than ₱25,000.00 would only be put in a worse situation than income tax, withholding tax, value-added tax (VAT) and documentary stamp tax (DST) for
others who might have presented no receipts at all but would still beentitled to ₱25,000.00 as taxable years 1992,1994, 1997 and 1998.4 Particularly, petitioner, through BIR officials,
temperate damages.19 issued demand letters with attached assessment notices for withholding tax on compensation
(WTC) and expanded withholding tax (EWT) for taxable years 1992, 1994 and 1998, 5 detailed
as follows:
Also, in line with recent jurisprudence,20 the interest fixed by the RTC is reduced to six
percent (6%) per annumon all the items of civil liability computed from the date of the finality
of this judgment until fully paid. Assessment Notice No. Tax Covered Period Amount
25-1-000545-92 WTC 1992 ₱50,429.18
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the conviction for homicide of petitioner EMERITU
BARUT, subject to the MODIFICATIONS that: (a) his indeterminate sentence is from 10 25-1-000546-92 EWT 1992 ₱14,079.45
years of prision mayor, as the minimum, to 17 years and four months of reclusion temporal,
as the maximum; (b) he shall pay to the heirs of the late Vincent Ucag civil indemnity of 034-14-000029-94 EWT 1994 ₱48,461.76
₱75,000.00 for his death;moral damages of ₱75,000.00; and emperate damages of 034-1-000080-98 EWT 1998 ₱22,437.016
~25,000.00, plus interest of six percent (6%) per annum on each of the items of damages
hereby awarded from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid; and (c) he shall pay
the costs of suit. On January 29, 1998 and October 24, 2001, USTP filed administrative protests against the
1994 and 1998 EWT assessments, respectively.7
SO ORDERED.
On February 21, 2003, USTP appealed by way of Petition for Review before the Court in
G.R. No. 197515               July 2, 2014 action (which was thereafter raffled to the CTA-Special First Division) alleging, among others,
that the Notices of Assessment are bereft of any facts, law, rules and regulations or
jurisprudence; thus, the assessments are void and the right of the government to assess and
collect deficiency taxes from it has prescribed on account of the failure to issue a valid notice
of assessment within the applicable period.8
During the pendency of the proceedings, USTP moved to withdraw the aforesaid Petition
because it availed of the benefits of the Tax Amnesty Program under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9480.9 Having complied with all the requirements therefor, the CTA-Special First Division
partially granted the Motion to Withdraw and declared the issues on income tax, VAT and
DST deficiencies closed and terminated in accordance with our pronouncement in Philippine
Banking Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.10 Consequently, the case was
submitted for decision covering the remaining issue on deficiency EWT and WTC,
respectively, for taxable years 1992, 1994 and 1998.11
The CTA-Special First Division held that the Preliminary Assessment Notices (PANs) for
deficiency EWT for taxable years 1994 and 1998 were not formally offered; hence, pursuant
to Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, the Court shall neither consider the
same as evidence nor rule on their validity.12 As regards the Final Assessment Notices
(FANs) for deficiency EWT for taxable years 1994 and 1998, the CTA-Special First Division
held that the same do not show the law and the facts on which the assessments were
based.13 Said assessments were, therefore, declared void for failure to comply with Section
228 of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code (Tax Code).14 From the foregoing, the only
remaining valid assessment is for taxable year 1992.15
Nevertheless, the CTA-Special First Division declared that the right of petitioner to collect the
deficiency EWT and WTC, respectively, for taxable year 1992 had already lapsed pursuant to
Section 203 of the Tax Code.16 Thus, in ruling for USTP, the CTA-Special First Division
cancelled Assessment Notice Nos. 25-1-00546-92 and 25-1-000545-92, both dated January
9, 1996 and covering the period of 1992, as declared in its Decision 17 dated March 12, 2010,
the dispositive portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly,
Assessment Notice No. 25-1-00546-92 dated January 9, 1996 for deficiency Expanded
Withholding Tax and Assessment Notice No. 25-1-000545 dated January 9, 1996 for
deficiency Withholding Tax on Compensation are hereby CANCELLED.
SO ORDERED.18
Dissatisfied, petitioner moved to reconsider the aforesaid ruling. However, in a
Resolution19 dated July 15, 2010, the CTA-Special First Division denied the same for lack of
merit.
On August 18, 2010, petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CTA En Banc praying that
the Decision of the CTA-Special First Division, dated March 12, 2010,be set aside.20
On June 27, 2011, the CTA En Banc promulgated a Decision which affirmed with modification
the Decision dated March 12, 2010 and the Resolution dated July 15, 2010 of the CTA-
Special First Division, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated
March 12, 2010 and the Resolution dated July 15, 2010 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
upholding the 1998 EWT assessment. In addition to the basic EWT deficiency of ₱14,496.79,
USTP is ordered to pay surcharge, annual deficiency interest, and annual delinquency
interest from the date due until full payment pursuant to Section 249 of the 1997 NIRC.
SO ORDERED.21
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals is governed strictly by the technical rules
of evidence;
2. Whether or not the Expanded Withholding Tax Assessments issued by petitioner
against the respondent for taxable year 1994 was without any factual and legal basis;
and
3. Whether or not petitioner’s right to collect the creditable withholding tax and
expanded withholding tax for taxable year 1992 has already prescribed.22
After careful review of the records and evidence presented before us, we find no basis to
overturn the decision of the CTA En Banc.
On this score, our ruling in Compagnie Financiere Sucres Et Denrees v. CIR,23 is
enlightening, to wit:
We reiterate the well-established doctrine that as a matter of practice and principle, [we] will
not set aside the conclusion reached by an agency, like the CTA, especially if affirmed by the
[CA]. By the very nature of its function, it has dedicated itself to the study and consideration of
tax problems and has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject, unless there has
been an abuse or improvident exercise of authority on its part, which is not present here.24
Now, to the first issue.
Petitioner implores unto this Court that technical rules of evidence should not be strictly
applied in the interest of substantial justice, considering that the mandate of the CTA explicitly
provides that its proceedings shall not be governed by the technical rules of
evidence.25 Relying thereon, petitioner avers that while it failed to formally offer the PANs of
EWTs for taxable years 1994and 1998, their existence and due execution were duly tackled
during the presentation of petitioner’s witnesses, Ruleo Badilles and Carmelita Lynne de
Guzman (for taxable year 1994) and Susan Salcedo-De Castro and Edna A. Ortalla (for
taxable year 1998).26 Petitioner further claims that although the PANs were not marked as
exhibits, their existence and value were properly established, since the BIR records for
taxable years 1994 and 1998 were forwarded by petitioner to the CTA in compliance with the
latter’s directive and were, in fact, made part of the CTA records.27
Under Section 828 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1125, the CTA is categorically described as a
court of record.29 As such, it shall have the power to promulgate rules and regulations for the
conduct of its business, and as may be needed, for the uniformity of decisions within its
jurisdiction.30 Moreover, as cases filed before it are litigated de novo, party-litigants shall
prove every minute aspect of their cases.31 Thus, no evidentiary value can be given the
pieces of evidence submitted by the BIR, as the rules on documentary evidence require that
these documents must be formally offered before the CTA.32 Pertinent is Section 34, Rule 132
of the Revised Rules on Evidence which reads:
WON the PANs are admissible in evidence. NO
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. – The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
Although in a long line of cases, we have relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence not
formally offered to be admitted and considered by the trial court, we exercised extreme
caution in applying the exceptions to the rule, as pronounced in Vda. de Oñate v. Court of
Appeals,33 thus:
From the foregoing provision, it is clear that for evidence to be considered, the same must be
formally offered. Corollarily, the mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked
as an exhibit does not mean that it has already been offered as part of the evidence of a
party. In Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles[186 SCRA 385, 388-389 (1990)], we had the
occasion to make a distinction between identification of documentary evidence and its formal
offer as an exhibit. We said that the first is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied
by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit while the second is done only when the party
rests its case and not before. A party, therefore, may opt to formally offer his evidence if he
believes that it will advance his cause or not to do so at all. In the event he chooses to do the
latter, the trial court is not authorized by the Rules to consider the same.
However, in People v. Napat-a[179 SCRA 403 (1989)] citing People v. Mate[103 SCRA 484
(1980)], we relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be
admitted and considered by the trial court provided the following requirements are present,
viz.: first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second,
the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case.34
The evidence may, therefore, be admitted provided the following requirements are present:
(1) the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded; and (2) the same
must have been incorporated in the records of the case. Being an exception, the same may
only be applied when there is strict compliance with the requisites mentioned above;
otherwise, the general rule in Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court should prevail.35
In the case at bar, petitioner categorically admitted that it failed to formally offer the PANs as
evidence. Worse, it advanced no justifiable reason for such fatal omission. Instead, it merely
alleged that the existence and due execution of the PANs were duly tackled by petitioner’s
witnesses. We hold that such is not sufficient to seek exception from the general rule
requiring a formal offer of evidence, since no evidence of positive identification of such PANs
by petitioner’s witnesses was presented. Hence, we agree with the CTA En Banc’s
observation that the 1994 and 1998 PANs for EWT deficiencies were not duly identified by
testimony and were not incorporated in the records of the case, as required by jurisprudence.
While we concur with petitioner that the CTA is not governed strictly by technical rules of
evidence, as rules of procedure are not ends in themselves but are primarily intended as
tools in the administration of justice,36 the presentation of PANs as evidence of the taxpayer’s
liability is not mere procedural technicality. It is a means by which a taxpayer is informed of
his liability for deficiency taxes. It serves as basis for the taxpayer to answer the notices,
present his case and adduce supporting evidence.37 More so, the same is the only means by
which the CTA may ascertain and verify the truth of respondent's claims. We are, therefore,
constrained to apply our ruling in Heirs of Pedro Pasag v. Spouses Parocha,38 viz.:
x x x. A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts
and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its
function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent
is presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the
evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court
will not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court.
Strict adherence to the said rule is not a trivial matter. The Court in Constantino v. Court of
Appeals ruled that the formal offer of one's evidence is deemed waived after failing to submit
it within a considerable period of time. It explained that the court cannot admit an offer of
evidence made after a lapse of three (3) months because to do so would "condone an
inexcusable laxity if not non-compliance with a court order which, in effect, would encourage
needless delays and derail the speedy administration of justice."
Applying the aforementioned principle in this case, we find that the trial court had reasonable
ground to consider that petitioners had waived their right to make a formal offer of
documentary or object evidence. Despite several extensions of time to make their formal
offer, petitioners failed to comply with their commitment and allowed almost five months to
lapse before finally submitting it. Petitioners' failure to comply with the rule on admissibility of
evidence is anathema to the efficient, effective, and expeditious dispensation of justice. x x
x.39
Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that the EWT assessment issued for taxable year
1994 has factual and legal basis because at the time the PAN and FAN were issued by
petitioner to respondent on January 19, 1998, the provisions of Revenue Regulation No. 12-
9940 which governs the issuance of assessments was not yet operative. Hence, its
compliance with Revenue Regulation No. 12-8541 was sufficient. In any case, petitioner
argues that a scrutiny of the BIR records of respondent for taxable year 1994 would show that
the details of the factual finding of EWT were itemized from the PAN issued by petitioner.42
In order to determine whether the requirement for a valid assessment is duly complied with, it
is important to ascertain the governing law, rules and regulations and jurisprudence at the
time the assessment was issued. In the instant case, the PANs and FANs pertaining to the
deficiency EWT for taxable years 1994 and 1998, respectively, were issued on January 19,
1998, when the Tax Code was already in effect, as correctly found by the CTA En Banc:
The date of issuance of the notice of assessment determines which law applies- the 1997
NIRC or the old Tax Code. The case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Bank of
Philippine Islands is instructive:
In merely notifying BPI of his findings, the CIR relied on the provisions of the former Section
270 prior to its amendment by RA 8424 (also known as the Tax Reform Act of 1997). In CIR
v. Reyes, we held that:
In the present case, Reyes was not informed in writing of the law and the facts on which the
assessment of estate taxes had been made. She was merely notified of the findings by the
CIR, who had simply relied upon the provisions of former Section 229 prior to its amendment
by [RA] 8424, otherwise known as the Tax Reform Act of 1997.
First, RA 8424 has already amended the provision of Section 229 on protesting an
assessment. The old requirement of merely notifying the taxpayer of the CIR's findings was
changed in 1998to informing the taxpayer of not only the law, but also of the facts on which
an assessment would be made; otherwise, the assessment itself would be invalid.
It was on February 12, 1998, that a preliminary assessment notice was issued against the
estate. On April 22, 1998, the final estate tax assessment notice, as well as demand letter,
was also issued. During those dates, RA 8424 was already in effect. The notice required
under the old law was no longer sufficient under the new law.(Emphasis ours.)
In the instant case, the 1997 NIRC covers the 1994 and 1998 EWT FANs because there
were issued on January 19, 1998 and September 21, 2001, respectively, at the time of the
effectivity of the 1997 NIRC. Clearly, the assessments are governed by the law.43
Indeed, Section 228 of the Tax Code provides that the taxpayer shall be informed in writing of
the law and the facts on which the assessment is made. Otherwise, the assessment is void.
To implement the aforesaid provision, Revenue Regulation No. 12-99was enacted by the
BIR, of which Section 3.1.4 thereof reads:
3.1.4. Formal Letter of Demand and Assessment Notice. –The formal letter of demand and
assessment notice shall be issued by the Commissioner or his duly authorized
representative. The letter of demand calling for payment of the taxpayer’s deficiency tax or
taxes shall state the facts, the law, rules and regulations, or jurisprudence on which the
assessment is based, otherwise, the formal letter of demand and assessment notice shall be
void. The same shall be sent to the taxpayer only by registered mail or by personal delivery. x
x x44
It is clear from the foregoing that a taxpayer must be informed in writing of the legal and
factual bases of the tax assessment made against him. The use of the word "shall" in these
legal provisions indicates the mandatory nature of the requirements laid down therein.
In the present case, a mere perusal of the FAN for the deficiency EWT for taxable year
1994will show that other than a tabulation of the alleged deficiency taxes due, no further
detail regarding the assessment was provided by petitioner. Only the resulting interest,
surcharge and penalty were anchored with legal basis.45 Petitioner should have at least
attached a detailed notice of discrepancy or stated an explanation why the amount of
₱48,461.76 is collectible against respondent46 and how the same was arrived at. Any short-
cuts to the prescribed content of the assessment or the process thereof should not be
countenanced, in consonance with the ruling in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Enron
Subic Power Corporation47 to wit:
The CIR insists that an examination of the facts shows that Enron was properly apprised of its
tax deficiency. During the pre-assessment stage, the CIR advised Enron’s representative of
the tax deficiency, informed it of the proposed tax deficiency assessment through a
preliminary five-day letter and furnished Enron a copy of the audit working paper allegedly
showing in detail the legal and factual bases of the assessment. The CIR argues that these
steps sufficed to inform Enron of the laws and facts on which the deficiency tax assessment
was based.
We disagree. The advice of tax deficiency, given by the CIR to an employee of Enron, as well
as the preliminary five-day letter, were not valid substitutes for the mandatory notice in writing
of the legal and factual bases of the assessment. These steps were mere perfunctory
discharges of the CIR’s duties incorrectly assessing a taxpayer. The requirement for issuing a
preliminary or final notice, as the case may be, informing a taxpayer of the existence of a
deficiency tax assessment is markedly different from the requirement of what such notice
must contain. Just because the CIR issued an advice, a preliminary letter during the pre-
assessment stage and a final notice, in the order required by law, does not necessarily mean
that Enron was informed of the law and facts on which the deficiency tax assessment was
made.
The law requires that the legal and factual bases of the assessment be stated in the formal
letter of demand and assessment notice. Thus, such cannot be presumed. Otherwise, the
express provisions of Article 228 of the NIRC and RR No. 12-99 would be rendered nugatory.
The alleged "factual bases" in the advice, preliminary letter and "audit working papers" did not
suffice. There was no going around the mandate of the law that the legal and factual bases of
the assessment be stated in writing in the formal letter of demand accompanying the
assessment notice.
We note that the old law merely required that the taxpayer be notified of the assessment
made by the CIR. This was changed in 1998 and the taxpayer must now be informed not only
of the law but also of the facts on which the assessment is made. Such amendment is in
keeping with the constitutional principle that no person shall be deprived of property without
due process. In view of the absence of a fair opportunity for Enron to be informed of the legal
and factual bases of the assessment against it, the assessment in question was void. x x x.48
In the same vein, we have held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Reyes,49 that:
Even a cursory review of the preliminary assessment notice, as well as the demand letter
sent, reveals the lack of basis for -- not to mention the insufficiency of -- the gross figures and
details of the itemized deductions indicated in the notice and the letter. This Court cannot
countenance an assessment based on estimates that appear to have been arbitrarily or
capriciously arrived at. Although taxes are the lifeblood of the government, their assessment
and collection "should be made in accordance with law as any arbitrariness will negate the
very reason for government itself."50
Applying the aforequoted rulings to the case at bar, it is clear that the assailed deficiency tax
assessment for the EWT in 1994disregarded the provisions of Section 228 of the Tax Code,
as amended, as well as Section 3.1.4 of Revenue Regulations No. 12-99 by not providing the
legal and factual bases of the assessment. Hence, the formal letter of demand and the notice
of assessment issued relative thereto are void.
In any case, we find no basis in petitioner’s claim that Revenue Regulation No. 12-99 is not
applicable at the time the PAN and FAN for the deficiency EWT for taxable year 1994 were
issued. Considering that such regulation merely implements the law, and does not create or
take away vested rights, the same may be applied retroactively, as held in Reyes:
x x x x.
Second, the non-retroactive application of Revenue Regulation (RR) No. 12-99 is of no
moment, considering that it merely implements the law.
A tax regulation is promulgated by the finance secretary to implement the provisions of the
Tax Code. While it is desirable for the government authority or administrative agency to have
one immediately issued after a law is passed, the absence of the regulation does not
automatically mean that the law itself would become inoperative.
At the time the pre-assessment notice was issued to Reyes, RA 8424 already stated that the
taxpayer must be informed of both the law and facts on which the assessment was based.
Thus, the CIR should have required the assessment officers of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) to follow the clear mandate of the new law. The old regulation governing the
issuance of estate tax assessment notices ran afoul of the rule that tax regulations-- old as
they were -- should be in harmony with, and not supplant or modify, the law.
It may be argued that the Tax Code provisions are not self- executory. It would be too wide a
stretch of the imagination, though, to still issue a regulation that would simply require tax
officials to inform the taxpayer, in any manner, of the law and the facts on which an
assessment was based. That requirement is neither difficult to make nor its desired results
hard to achieve. Moreover, an administrative rule interpretive of a statute, and not declarative
of certain rights and corresponding obligations, is given retroactive effect as of the date of the
effectivity of the statute. RR 12-99 is one such rule. Being interpretive of the provisions of the
Tax Code, even if it was issued only on September 6, 1999, this regulation was to retroact to
January 1, 1998 -- a date prior to the issuance of the preliminary assessment notice and
demand letter.51
Indubitably, the disputed assessments for taxable year 1994 should have already complied
with the requirements laid down under Revenue Regulation No. 12-99. Having failed so, the
same produces no legal effect.
Notwithstanding the foregoing findings, we sustain the CTA En Banc’s findings on the
deficiency EWT for taxable year 1998 considering that it complies with Section 228 of the Tax
Code as well as Revenue Regulation No. 12-99, thus:
On the other hand, the 1998 EWT FAN reflected the following: a detailed factual account why
the basic EWT is ₱14,496.79 and the legal basis, Section 57 B of the 1997 NIRC supporting
findings of EWT liability of ₱22,437.01. Thus, the EWT FAN for 1998 is duly issued in
accordance with the law.52
As to the last issue, petitioner avers that its right to collect the EWT for taxable year 1992 has
not yet prescribed. It argues that while the final assessment notice and demand letter on
EWT for taxable year 1992 were all issued on January 9, 1996, the five (5)-year prescriptive
period to collect was interrupted when respondent filed its request for reinvestigation on
March 14, 1997 which was granted by petitioner on January 22, 2001 through the issuance of
Tax Verification Notice No. 00165498 on even date.53 Thus, the period for tax collection
should have begun to run from the date of the reconsidered or modified assessment.54
This argument fails to persuade us.
The statute of limitations on assessment and collection of national internal revenue taxes was
shortened from five (5) years to three (3) years by virtue of Batas Pambansa Blg. 700. 55 Thus,
petitioner has three (3) years from the date of actual filing of the tax return to assess a
national internal revenue tax or to commence court proceedings for the collection thereof
without an assessment.56 However, when it validly issues an assessment within the three (3)-
year period, it has another three (3) years within which to collect the tax due by distraint, levy,
or court proceeding.57 The assessment of the tax is deemed made and the three (3)-year
period for collection of the assessed tax begins to run on the date the assessment notice had
been released, mailed or sent to the taxpayer.58
On this matter, we note the findings of the CTA-Special First Division that no evidence was
formally offered to prove when respondent filed its returns and paid the corresponding EWT
and WTC for taxable year 1992.59
Nevertheless, as correctly held by the CTA En Banc, the Preliminary Collection Letter for
deficiency taxes for taxable year 1992 was only issued on February 21, 2002, despite the fact
that the FANs for the deficiency EWT and WTC for taxable year 1992 was issued as early as
January 9, 1996. Clearly, five (5) long years had already lapsed, beyond the three (3)-year
prescriptive period, before collection was pursued by petitioner.
Further, while the request for reinvestigation was made on March 14, 1997, the same was
only acted upon by petitioner on January22, 2001, also beyond the three (3) year statute of
limitations reckoned from January 9, 1996, notwithstanding the lack of impediment to rule
upon such issue. We cannot countenance such inaction by petitioner to the prejudice of
respondent pursuant to our ruling in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Global
Communication, Inc.,60 to wit:
The assessment, in this case, was presumably issued on 14 April 1994 since the respondent
did not dispute the CIR’s claim. Therefore, the BIR had until 13 April 1997. However, as there
was no Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy served on the respondents nor any judicial
proceedings initiated by the BIR, the earliest attempt of the BIR to collect the tax due based
on this assessment was when it filed its Answer in CTA Case No. 6568 on 9 January 2003,
which was several years beyond the three-year prescriptive period. Thus, the CIR is now
prescribed from collecting the assessed tax.61
Here, petitioner had ample time to make a factually and legally well-founded assessment and
implement collection pursuant thereto.1âwphi1 Whatever examination that petitioner may
have conducted cannot possibly outlast the entire three (3)-year prescriptive period provided
by law to collect the assessed tax. Thus, there is no reason to suspend the running of the
statute of limitations in this case.
Moreover, in Bank of the Philippine Islands, citing earlier jurisprudence, we held that the
request for reinvestigation should be granted or at least acted upon in due course before the
suspension of the statute of limitations may set in, thus:
In BPI v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Court emphasized the rule that the CIR
must first grant the request for reinvestigation as a requirement for the suspension of the
statute of limitations. The Court said:
In the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Gancayco, taxpayer Gancayco requested for a
thorough reinvestigation of the assessment against him and placed at the disposal of the
Collector of Internal Revenue all the evidences he had for such purpose; yet, the Collector
ignored the request, and the records and documents were not at all examined. Considering
the given facts, this Court pronounced that—
x x x The act of requesting a reinvestigation alone does not suspend the period. The request
should first be granted, in order to effect suspension. (Collector v. Suyoc Consolidated, supra;
also Republic v. Ablaza, supra). Moreover, the Collector gave appellee until April 1, 1949,
within which to submit his evidence, which the latter did one day before. There were no
impediments on the part of the Collector to file the collection case from April 1, 1949…
In Republic of the Philippines v. Acebedo, this Court similarly found that –
x x x T]he defendant, after receiving the assessment notice of September 24, 1949, asked for
a reinvestigation thereof on October 11, 1949 (Exh. "A"). There is no evidence that this
request was considered or acted upon. In fact, on October 23, 1950 the then Collector of
Internal Revenue issued a warrant of distraint and levy for the full amount of the assessment
(Exh. "D"), but there was follow-up of this warrant. Consequently, the request for
reinvestigation did not suspend the running of the period for filing an action for collection.
[Emphasis in the original]62 With respect to petitioner’s argument that respondent’s act of
elevating its protest to the CTA has fortified the continuing interruption of petitioner’s
prescriptive period to collect under Section 223 of the Tax Code, 63 the same is flawed at best
because respondent was merely exercising its right to resort to the proper Court, and does
not in any way deter petitioner’s right to collect taxes from respondent under existing laws.
On the strength of the foregoing observations, we ought to reiterate our earlier teachings that
"in balancing the scales between the power of the State to tax and its inherent right to
prosecute perceived transgressors of the law on one side, and the constitutional rights of a
citizen to due process of law and the equal protection of the laws on the other, the scales
must tilt in favor of the individual, for a citizen’s right is amply protected by the Bill of Rights
under the Constitution."64 Thus, while "taxes are the lifeblood of the government," the power
to tax has its limits, in spite of all its plenitude.65 Even as we concede the inevitability and
indispensability of taxation, it is a requirement in all democratic regimes that it be exercised
reasonably and in accordance with the prescribed procedure.66
After all, the statute of limitations on the collection of taxes was also enacted to benefit and
protect the taxpayers, as elucidated in the case of Philippine Global Communication,
Inc.,67 thus:
x x x The report submitted by the tax commission clearly states that these provisions on
prescription should be enacted to benefit and protect taxpayers:
Under the former law, the right of the Government to collect the tax does not
prescribe.1âwphi1 However, in fairness to the taxpayer, the Government should be estopped
from collecting the tax where it failed to make the necessary investigation and assessment
within 5 years after the filing of the return and where it failed to collect the tax within 5 years
from the date of assessment thereof. Just as the government is interested in the stability of its
collections, so also are the taxpayers entitled to an assurance that they will not be subjected
to further investigation for tax purposes after the expiration of a reasonable period of time.
(Vol. II, Report of the Tax Commission of the Philippines, pp. 321-322).68
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The June 27, 2011 Decision of the Court of Tax
Appeals En Banc in C.T.A. EB No. 662 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155483             April 27, 2007
HEIRS OF PEDRO PASAG, represented by EUFREMIO PASAG; HEIRS OF MARIA
PASAG, represented by EPIFANIA LUMAGUI; HEIRS OF JUANITA PASAG, represented
by ASUNCION ORTIOLA; HEIRS OF ISIDRO PASAG, represented by VIRGINIA P.
MENDOZA; HEIRS OF BASILIO PASAG, represented by MILAGROSA P. NABOR; and
HEIRS OF FORTUNATA PASAG, represented by FLORENTINA S.
MEMBRERE, Petitioners,
vs.
Sps. LORENZO and FLORENTINA PAROCHA, PRISCILLA P. ABELLERA, and MARIA
VILORIA PASAG, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The rule on formal offer of evidence is not a trivial matter. Failure to make a formal offer
within a considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it. Consequently, as
in this case, any evidence that has not been offered shall be excluded and rejected.
The Case
The present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks the annulment of the
February 15, 2002 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 68544, and its
September 6, 2002 Resolution2 denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration. In effect,
petitioners entreat this Court to nullify the February 24, 2000 Resolution of the Urdaneta City
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45 in Civil Case No. U-5743, granting the demurrer to
evidence filed by respondents and dismissing their Complaint, which ruling was upheld by the
CA.
The Facts
The instant case arose from a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents and Titles,
Recovery of Possession and Ownership, Reconveyance, Partition and Damages filed by
petitioners at the Urdaneta City RTC of Pangasinan against respondents. Petitioners alleged
a share over three (3) properties owned by respondents, which formed part of the estate of
petitioners’ deceased grandparents, Benito and Florentina Pasag. They averred that Benito
and Florentina Pasag died intestate, thus, leaving behind all their properties to their eight (8)
children––Pedro, Isidro, Basilio, Severino, Bonifacio, Maria, Juanita, and Fortunata. However,
Severino, the predecessor of respondents, claimed in an affidavit of self-adjudication that he
is the sole, legal, and compulsory heir of Benito and Florentina Pasag. Consequently, he was
able to appropriate to himself the properties covered by Original Certificates of Title (OCT)
Nos. 2983 and 1887. Thereafter, Severino executed a deed of absolute sale over the said
properties in favor of his daughter, respondent Florentina Parocha. Moreover, petitioners
alleged that Severino used the same affidavit of self-adjudication to secure a free patent over
an agricultural land that had long been under the possession of Benito and Florentina Pasag.
In denying the material allegations in the Complaint, respondents averred in their Answer that
the properties left behind by the spouses Benito and Florentina Pasag had already been
partitioned among their eight (8) surviving children. They claimed that the parcels of land
covered by OCT Nos. 2983 and 1887 are Bonifacio’s share of which he later on renounced in
a Quitclaim Deed in favor of his brother, Severino. As regards the parcel of land covered by
OCT No. P-20607, respondents asserted that the said land had been in Severino’s
possession and occupation since 1940, thus, giving him the right to apply for and be granted
a free patent over it. Having complied with the requirements of law, Severino’s title had now
become indefeasible.
The trial of the case commenced on March 19, 1996. On March 9, 1999, petitioners rested
their case and were granted ten (10) days within which to submit their formal offer of
documentary exhibits. However, petitioners failed to submit the said pleading within the
required period.
On April 19, 1999, petitioners asked the trial court to give them until May 11, 1999 to submit
their offer of evidence; and it subsequently granted their motion. However, on May 11, 1999,
they again failed to submit their offer of evidence and moved for another extension of five (5)
days.
Unfortunately, petitioners still failed to submit their formal offer of evidence within the
extended period. Consequently, in its June 17, 1999 Order, 3 the trial court deemed waived
petitioners’ right to make their formal offer of evidence.
On July 27, 1999, petitioners moved for the admission of their offer of evidence. On
September 1, 1999, however, the trial court issued an Order4 denying petitioners’ formal offer
of evidence for their "consistent failure"5 to submit it.
On October 28, 1999, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence.
On February 24, 2000, in its Resolution,6 the trial court granted respondents’ demurrer to
evidence and ordered the dismissal of the Complaint. Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration
was denied for lack of merit.
Petitioners appealed the case to the CA.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Affirming the ruling of the trial court, the CA held that petitioners failed to prove their claim by
a preponderance of evidence. It observed that "no concrete and substantial evidence was
adduced by [petitioners]"7 to substantiate their allegation that Severino, the predecessor of
respondents, fraudulently executed an affidavit of self-adjudication in order to exclude
petitioners from the settlement of the estate of Benito and Florentina Pasag.
The Issues
Petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:
I.
The Hon. Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming the Decision of the Court a
quo despite the gross negligence of their counsel thus depriving their rights to due process.
II.
The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming the Decision of the trial court
instead of remanding the case for further proceedings to clearly establish their respective
claims on the subject properties.8
Simply stated, the issues revolve on the propriety of the following: (1) waiver of petitioners’
offer of documentary evidence; and (2) dismissal of the Complaint on a demurrer to evidence.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has no merit.
WON the petitioner’s offer of documentary evidence is deemed waived. YES
Waiver of the Offer of Evidence
The Rules of Court provides that "the court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered."9 A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their
findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties
at the trial.10 Its function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which
the proponent is presenting the evidence.11 On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to
examine the evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the
appellate court will not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial
court.12
Strict adherence to the said rule is not a trivial matter. The Court in Constantino v. Court of
Appeals13 ruled that the formal offer of one’s evidence is deemed waived after failing to
submit it within a considerable period of time. It explained that the court cannot admit an offer
of evidence made after a lapse of three (3) months because to do so would "condone an
inexcusable laxity if not non-compliance with a court order which, in effect, would encourage
needless delays and derail the speedy administration of justice."14
Applying the aforementioned principle in this case, we find that the trial court had reasonable
ground to consider that petitioners had waived their right to make a formal offer of
documentary or object evidence. Despite several extensions of time to make their formal
offer, petitioners failed to comply with their commitment and allowed almost five months to
lapse before finally submitting it. Petitioners’ failure to comply with the rule on admissibility of
evidence is anathema to the efficient, effective, and expeditious dispensation of justice.
Under the Rule on guidelines to be observed by trial court judges and clerks of court in the
conduct of pre-trial and case of deposition and discovery measures,15 it is provided that:
On the last hearing day allotted for each party, he is required to make his formal offer of
evidence after the presentation of his last witness and the opposing party is required to
immediately interpose his objection thereto. Thereafter the judge shall make the ruling on the
offer of evidence in open court. However, the judge has the discretion to allow the offer of
evidence in writing in conformity with Section 35, Rule 132[.]
On the other hand, Section 35 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that "documentary
and object evidence shall be offered after the presentation of a party’s testimonial evidence."
It requires that "such offer shall be done orally unless allowed by the Court to be done in
writing."
The pre-trial guidelines and Sec. 35 of Rule 132 jointly considered, it is made clear that the
party who terminated the presentation of evidence must make an oral offer of evidence on the
very day the party presented the last witness. Otherwise, the court may consider the party’s
documentary or object evidence waived. While Sec. 35 of Rule 132 says that the trial court
may allow the offer to be done in writing, this can only be tolerated in extreme cases where
the object evidence or documents are large in number––say from 100 and above, and only
where there is unusual difficulty in preparing the offer.
The party asking for such concession should however file a motion, pay the filing fee, set the
date of the hearing not later than 10 days after the filing of the motion,16 and serve it on the
address of the party at least three (3) days before the hearing. 17 In short, it is a litigated
motion and cannot be done ex parte. Counsels for parties should not however rely on the
benevolence of the trial court as they are expected to have thoroughly and exhaustively
prepared for all possible pieces of evidence to be presented and the purposes for which they
will be utilized. As a matter of fact, the draft of the offer of evidence can already be prepared
after the pre-trial order is issued, for, then, the counsel is already fully aware of the
documentary or object evidence which can be put to use during trial. Remember that under
the pre-trial guidelines, the trial court is ordered to integrate in the pre-trial order the following
directive:
No evidence shall be allowed to be presented and offered during the trial in support of a
party’s evidence-in-chief other than those that had been identified below and pre-marked
during the pre-trial. Any other evidence not indicated or listed below shall be considered
waived by the parties. However, the Court, in its discretion, may allow introduction of
additional evidence in the following cases: (a) those to be used on cross-examination or re-
cross-examination for impeachment purposes; (b) those presented on re-direct examination
to explain or supplement the answers of a witness during the cross-examination; (c) those to
be utilized for rebuttal or sur-rebuttal purposes; and (d) those not available during the pre-trial
proceedings despite due diligence on the part of the party offering the same.18
It is apparent from the foregoing provision that both parties should obtain, gather, collate, and
list all their respective pieces of evidence–– whether testimonial, documentary, or object––
even prior to the preliminary conference before the clerk of court or at the latest before the
scheduled pre-trial conference. Otherwise, pieces of evidence not identified or marked during
the pre-trial proceedings are deemed waived and rendered inutile. The parties should strictly
adhere to the principle of "laying one’s cards on the table." In the light of these issuances and
in order to obviate interminable delay in case processing, the parties and lawyers should
closely conform to the requirement that the offer of evidence must be done orally on the day
scheduled for the presentation of the last witness.
Thus, the trial court is bound to consider only the testimonial evidence presented and exclude
the documents not offered. Documents which may have been identified and marked as
exhibits during pre-trial or trial but which were not formally offered in evidence cannot in any
manner be treated as evidence. Neither can such unrecognized proof be assigned any
evidentiary weight and value. It must be stressed that there is a significant distinction
between identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer. The former is done in the
course of the pre-trial, and trial is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit;
while the latter is done only when the party rests its case. 19 The mere fact that a particular
document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has already been
offered as part of the evidence.20 It must be emphasized that any evidence which a party
desires to submit for the consideration of the court must formally be offered by the party;
otherwise, it is excluded and rejected.21
Dismissal of the Complaint on a Demurrer to Evidence
Having established that the documentary evidence of petitioners is inadmissible, this Court is
now tasked to determine the propriety of the dismissal of the Complaint on a demurrer to
evidence.
A demurrer to evidence is an instrument for the expeditious termination of an action; 22 thus,
abbreviating judicial proceedings.23 It is defined as "an objection or exception by one of the
parties in an action at law, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is
insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or sustain the
issue."24 The demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence to sustain a
verdict.25 In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is
merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the
indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.26
In the present case, we have thoroughly reviewed the records and are convinced that
petitioners have failed to sufficiently prove their allegations. It is a basic rule in evidence that
the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegations. 27 However, petitioners did
not substantiate their allegations and merely argued that the Complaint should be "threshed
out in a full blown trial in order to establish their respective positions on issues [which are] a
matter of judicial appreciation."28
Regardless of the bare argument of petitioners, however, we find that the trial and appellate
courts were correct in dismissing the Complaint. The allegation that Severino fraudulently
excluded the other heirs of Benito and Florentina Pasag in the settlement of the latter’s estate
was not supported by concrete evidence. While petitioners maintain that the estate of Benito
and Florentina was never partitioned among their heirs, the testimony of their witness,
Eufemio Pasag, proves otherwise. Significantly, during cross-examination, Eufemio admitted
that the children of Benito and Florentina, including the father of petitioners, had received
properties as inheritance from the said spouses. He testified, thus:
Q Are you aware that there are eight (8) children of the spouses Benito and Faustina Pasag?
A Yes, sir.
Q And one of whom is Bonifacio Pasag?
A Yes, sir.
Q And one of whom is Severino Pasag?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are you likewise aware, Mr. Witness, that after the death of the spouses Benito and
Faustina Pasag, there was no last will and testament?
A Yes, sir.
Q And of course, you are aware that there are properties left by the said spouses, is that
right?
A Yes, sir. DECISION

Q And in fact, your father Pedro Pasag has already a title in his name of the properties left by
the spouses to Pedro Pasag, is that right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And in fact, it is where your house was situated or erected among those properties that
was given to your father, is that right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And of course you are aware that likewise Severino Pasag, after the death of the spouses
Benito and Faustina Pasag, acquired some properties as inheritance, is that right?
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the nullification of the
December 17, 2002 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in People v. Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr.,
Wainwright Rivera, et al., and its February 11, 2003 Order, denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof.
The Antecedents
On May 19, 1998, an Amended Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan charging
Justiniano Montano IV, John Doe and Peter Doe with violation of Republic Act No. 3019. The
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 24642. The accusatory portion reads:

A Yes, sir. That, on or about May 31, 1995, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Justiniano Montano
IV, a public officer, being then the Deputy General Manager for Special Projects of Public
xxxx
Estate Authority (PEA), conspiring, confederating and cooperating with John Doe, Peter Doe,
officials of the Philippine Government, whose identities are yet to be established, did then and
Q And you also agree with me that Isidro Pasag, Juanito Bustillo, Fortunata Savellano, there willfully, unlawfully and criminally receive from Amari Coastal Bay Development
Basilio Pasag, and Maria Lumague and the other brothers and sisters of your father likewise Corporation (AMARI), the amount of ₱6.25 million in consideration for a favorable action on
received property of their own as a result of the death of your grandfather, is that right? the Joint Venture Agreement between PEA and AMARI, a transaction in which they had
intervened in their official capacities.
A Yes, sir.29
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
It must be stressed that fraud is not presumed; and it must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence,30 and not by mere conjectures or speculations.31 No such evidence was presented Another Amended Information was later filed with the Sandiganbayan charging Amado S.
in this case to sustain petitioners’ allegations. Lagdameo, Jr., Wainwright Rivera, et al. with violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 24643. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the assailed February 15, 2002 Decision
and September 6, 2002 Resolution of the CA, with costs against petitioners. That on or about April 25, 1995, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
SO ORDERED. Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr., Wainwright R. Rivera, Arturo Q. Trinidad, Gregorio B. Fider,
Marylou C. Ventura, Justiniano Montano IV, Theron V. Lacson, Manuel R. Berina and Oscar
G.R. No. 157824             January 17, 2005 I. Garcia, being then the General Manager of Public Estate Authority (PEA), Chairman, Board
of Directors, Deputy General Managers and Chief, Office of the Government Corporate
WAINWRIGHT RIVERA, petitioner, Counsel, respectively, while in the performance of their respective official functions and acting
vs. with evident bad faith, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then
HONORABLE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES of the FOURTH DIVISION, SANDIGANBAYAN and there willfully, unlawfully and criminal give Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation
RODOLFO PALATTAO, GREGORY ONG, MA. CRISTINA CORTEZ-ESTRADA and (AMARI), undue advantage, benefits and preference by entering into and confirming the Joint
PROSECUTORS JOHN I.C. TURALBA, ORLANDO I. INES, JAIME C. BLANCAFLOR, Venture Agreement with Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation (AMARI), dated April
ROSALYN M. LOJA of the OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL 25, 1995 and its supplement, dated August 9, 1995, a contract which is grossly
PROSECUTORS/OMBUDSMAN, respondents. disadvantageous to the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The graft court ordered a consolidation of the two cases. During the arraignment, the accused
pleaded not guilty to the charges. After the pre-trial in both cases, the prosecution
commenced presenting its testimonial evidence on November 27, 2000. By September 27,
2001, the prosecution had already presented fourteen (14) witnesses on its evidence-in-
chief.3 During trial on even date, the prosecution manifested that it had no more witnesses to
present, and prayed for a period of twenty (20) days within which to file its formal offer of
documentary evidence. The 4th Division of the Sandiganbayan granted the motion. It also
granted the accused a period of fifteen (15) days from service of the said formal offer of
evidence within which to file their comment thereon.4 The Sandiganbayan set the trial for the
accused to adduce their evidence at 8:30 a.m. of December 3, December 5 and December
11, 2001.5
Instead of filing its formal offer of evidence on or before October 17, 2001, the prosecution
filed an "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Issuance of Subpoena" on
October 22, 2001.6 The prosecution alleged that, after a serious study of the facts and the
evidence, it found it imperative to withdraw its oral manifestation that it had no more witness
to present which was made during the trial of September 27, 2001, and prayed that it be
allowed to adduce additional testimonial and documentary evidence from the following banks:
UCPB - Binondo Branch
Far East Bank – Binondo Branch
Solid Bank – Binondo Branch
Metrobank – Arranque Branch
Allied Bank – Binondo Branch
The prosecution then prayed that the Sandiganbayan reconsider and set aside its previous
Order issued in open court on September 27, 2001, mandating the prosecution to formally
offer its evidence; and, instead, allow it to present additional witnesses, more specifically the
Branch Managers of the five banks, to testify on the checks and/or documents enumerated
therein and to offer the same in evidence.7
Accused Lagdameo and Gregorio Fider opposed the motion of the prosecution. In an
Order8 dated October 29, 2001 promulgated on December 12, 2001, the graft court granted
the motion of the prosecution in Criminal Case No. 24642, but denied the said motion in
Criminal Case No. 24643. In the latter case, the court granted the prosecution seven (7) days
within which to formally offer its documentary evidence. The dispositive portion of the Order
reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution’s Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration dated October 16,
2001, is hereby partially granted, hereby amending the Resolution of September 27, 2001,
such that the evidence in chief for the prosecution in Criminal Case No. 24642 against
accused Justiniano Montano IV for Violation of Section 3(b), Republic Act No. 3019 is hereby
reopened for the purpose only of the issuance of subpoena duces tecum specified in
paragraph 2 of the prayer in said Omnibus Motion, but limited to the bank managers therein
identified and no "others." For this purpose, let Criminal Case No. 24642 be scheduled for the
reception of the additional evidence for the prosecution, as so limited, on January 15 & 16,
2002, at 8:30 in the morning; and let subpoena duces tecum prayed for by the prosecution be
issued.
The prosecution’s said Omnibus Motion is hereby denied insofar as Criminal Case No. 24643
for Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, and the prosecution is hereby granted
an extension of seven (7) days from receipt of this Order within which to formally offer its
documentary exhibits in said Criminal Case No. 24643, furnishing copies thereof to the
accused who are given fifteen (15) days from receipt of said offer within which to file their
reaction thereto.
SO ORDERED.9
On November 21, 2001, accused Lagdameo, Jr., filed a motion to dismiss Criminal Case No.
24643 because of the prosecution’s failure to file its formal offer of evidence. The other
accused adopted the motion, which the prosecution opposed.10 The prosecution then filed a
Manifestation with Prayer for Partial Reconsideration dated January 10, 2002 of the
Sandiganbayan’s October 29, 2001 Resolution.l^vvphi1.net The accused Rivera, Lagdameo
and Oscar Garcia opposed the motion.11
On February 7, 2002, the Sandiganbayan resolved to deny the motion to file formal offer of
evidence in Crim. Case No. 24643.12
On February 27, 2002, the graft court issued a Resolution13 denying the motion of the
Prosecutor on the ground that such motion was a proscribed second motion for
reconsideration and that no cogent reason was cited to set aside its October 29, 2001
Resolution. The Sandiganbayan gave the prosecutor seven (7) days from notice of said
resolution within which to file the said formal offer of evidence in Criminal Case No. 24643. It
also warned the prosecution that the failure to file the formal offer of evidence on or before
the deadline shall be considered as a waiver of its right to do so. The prosecution received a
copy the Resolution dated February 27, 2002 on March 5, 2002.
During the trial of March 6, 2002, the prosecutor opted not to present any witness, in view of
graft court’s denial of its January 10, 2002 Motion for Partial Reconsideration. The court then
issued an Order14 granting the motion of the prosecution for a resetting of the trial to May 4,
2002, and the filing of its formal offer of evidence.
On March 11, 2002, the prosecution filed a Manifestation with Motion for Reconsideration of
the Sandiganbayan’s October 29, 2001 Order, alleging that:
3. Indeed, on March 5, instant, the representatives of the bank appeared and
confirmed with the Prosecutors, the deposit of such checks which were previously
marked in evidence by the prosecution;
4. With particular reference to Citibank Check No. 278607 in the name of KDM Realty
and Development Corporation reflecting the amount of ₱25,000,000.00, and already
marked Exhibit "ZZZ" for the Prosecution, the representative of the Philippine
National Bank submitted the microfilm of said check together with the Corporate
Secretary’s Certificate of KDM Realty and Development Corporation showing the
names of the officers of the corporation who are allowed to withdraw the deposits
with said bank;
5. Significantly, the President and General Manager of KDM Realty and Development
Corporation in 1994 was EDUARDO G. CASTELO who signed as a witness together
with Mr. THERON V. LACSON who is one of the accused in CC#24643, in the Joint
Venture Agreement (JVA) between AMARI then represented by Emmanuel Sy and
Public Estates Authority then represented by Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr., also one of
the accused in Criminal Case No. 24643, the photocopy of the last page of the JVA is
hereto attached as Annex "A;"
6. Said Eduardo Castelo also signed a Provisional Receipt for Eight Hundred Ninety
Six Million Eight Hundred Sixty-Three Thousand and Fifty (896,863,050.00) from
AMARI Coastal Bay Corporation on June 9, 1995 which were also the uniform dates
of the checks already marked by the Prosecution;
7. Copies of the documents that will be additionally marked and offered by the
Prosecution are the last page of the JVA, Microfilm of check, Secretary’s Certificate
and Provisional Receipt which are hereto attached as Annexes "A," "B," "C" and "D,"
respectively;
8. If the bank representatives will be allowed to testify in the two cases (CC #24642
and CC #24643) the Prosecution will be able to prove where the amounts reflected in
the checks already marked in evidence went thereby establishing the conspiracy
between the AMARI representatives and the herein accused who facilitated and
allowed the approval of the Joint Venture Agreement which was grossly
disadvantageous to the government;
9. This will not be the first time that this Honorable Court will reconsider its previous
Order in the supreme interest of justice as it did in the case of People vs. Rosalinda
Talingting (Crim. Case No. 17071), where a decision of conviction promulgated on
September 5, 1999 was reconsidered and a new trial was granted, but the accused
repeatedly failed to present her evidence and this Honorable Court also repeatedly
acted favorably on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the accused, the latest of
such Order was November 22, 2001, where this Honorable Court set aside its Order
for execution of judgment and reinstated its Order granting the accused the
opportunity to present her evidence on February 19 to 22, 2002 at the Hall of Justice,
Davao City;
10. In another case where the accused was already convicted and the decision was
already promulgated (People vs. ROMEO D. LONZANIDA, CC #23850, 24644-52), a
third Motion for Reconsideration was also granted by this Honorable Court in the
supreme interest of substantial justice;
11. As pointed out by the Prosecution in its Manifestation with Prayer for Partial
Reconsideration and also in open court on March 5, 2002, the testimonies of
additional witnesses representing the banks, will establish the conspiracy of all the
accused in Criminal Case No. 24643 because the checks represented the
commissions given by AMARI by reason of the favorable action on the Joint Venture
Agreement. In short, this being a joint trial of the two (2) cases, the testimonies of the
bank representatives will establish the paper trail which will prove beyond reasonable
doubt the liability of all the accused in the two (2) cases.15
Petitioner Wainwright Rivera opposed the motion, praying that:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing reasons, it is most respectfully prayed that an order
be issued:
1. Denying and/or expunging from the record the Manifestation with Motion for Partial
Reconsideration dated March 11, 2002 filed by the prosecution;
2. Holding that the prosecution be deemed to have waived its right to formally offer its
evidence and disregarding all documentary and object object presented by the
prosecution for not having been formally offered;
3. Citing the prosecutors for direct contempt; and
4. Dismissing the present case for lack of evidence against the accused.
Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for.16
On April 10, 2002, the court issued an Order17 amending its March 5, 2002 Order, resetting
the trial to 8:30 a.m. of May 9, 2002. On September 2, 2002, the prosecution filed its Formal
Offer of Evidence18 dated August 29, 2002 in Criminal Case No. 24643. The prosecution
manifested therein that with the testimonies of all its witnesses, as well as the admission of
the exhibits described therein, it was resting its case.
Nevertheless, on December 17, 2002, the Sandiganbayan made a volte face and issued a
Resolution19 granting the March 11, 2002 Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the
prosecution and allowing it to adduce additional evidence in the two cases. The petitioner
filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Resolution which the court denied in an
Order20 dated February 11, 2003.1awphi1.nét
Hence, the petition at bar.
The issue for resolution is whether the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess of lack of jurisdiction (a) in issuing Resolution of December
17, 2002 and Order dated February 11, 2003 in Criminal Case No. 24643; and (b) in ordering
the dismissal of the case as against accused Oscar Garcia.
On the first issue, the petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its December 17, 2002
Resolution allowing the prosecution to adduce additional evidence in Criminal Case No.
24643, and its February 11, 2003 Order denying his motion for reconsideration of the said
resolution. The petitioner points out that despite the Sandiganbayan’s repeated denials of the
prosecution’s motions to adduce additional evidence, the graft court made a volte face and
allowed the prosecution to adduce additional evidence just the same. The petitioner asserts
that, by filing its formal offer of evidence on September 2, 2002, the prosecution thereby
waived its plea to adduce additional evidence; yet, the Sandiganbayan allowed it to adduce
additional evidence. He further asserts that the graft court should have cited the respondents-
prosecutors in contempt of court for their repeated failure to file their formal offer of evidence
despite its order for them to do so. Finally, the petitioner insists that the Sandiganbayan
gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the case against Oscar Garcia without dismissing
the case as against the other accused therein, including himself.
On June 16, 2003, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition.
In their Comment on the petition, the respondents-prosecutors maintain that the matter of the
reopening of the case for the reception of additional evidence for the People is addressed to
the sound discretion of the Sandiganbayan, taking into account the interest of substantial
justice. They posit that they filed their successive motions for the reconsideration of the
October 29, 2001 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan insofar as Criminal Case No. 24643 was
concerned in the exercise of this mandatory duty to prosecute the case and see to it that
justice is done. They maintain that the graft court acted judiciously when it allowed the
prosecution to adduce additional evidence despite their filing of a formal offer of documentary
evidence. According to the respondents, such filing of formal offer of evidence was without
prejudice to the resolution of their March 11, 2002 Motion for Partial reconsideration of the
Sandiganbayan’s Resolution of October 29, 2001.
The respondents-prosecutors further aver that the petition for certiorari assailing the dismissal
of the case against accused Oscar Garcia is premature because the Sandiganbayan has yet
to resolve the petitioner’s October 4, 2002 motion for reconsideration thereof.
The Court’s Ruling
In a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the petitioner is burdened to
establish that the respondent tribunal acted without jurisdiction, meaning that it does not have
the legal power to determine the case; or that it acted without or in excess of jurisdiction,
meaning having been clothed with power to determine the case, it oversteps its authority as
determined by law, or that it committed grave abuse of its discretion or acted in a capricious,
whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.21 In a petition for certiorari, the
jurisdiction of the court is narrow in scope. It is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It
is not to stray at will and resolve questions or issues such as errors of judgment. Such errors
are to be resolved by the appellate court on appeal by writ of error or via a petition for review
on certiorari in this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. An error of judgment is one in
which the Court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
In the present case, we find and so hold that the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of
its discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolution and Order.
YES
Section 35, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that documentary and object evidence
shall be offered by a party after the presentation of its testimonial evidence. Such offer shall
be done orally unless allowed by the trial court to be done in writing.
We agree with the respondents-prosecutors that the Sandiganbayan may allow the reopening
of a case for the reception of additional proofs before judgment. The Rules of Court does not
contain any provision prohibiting the trial court from allowing a party to offer additional proofs
on the evidence-in-chief or rebuttal evidence after it had rested its case, or even after the
case has been submitted for decision but before the rendition thereof. Neither does the Rules
of Court contain a specific rule allowing the reopening of a case to allow a party to adduce
additional proofs. However, the reopening of a case by the court either on its own motion or
on motion of a party, allowing him or them to present additional proofs, is a recognized
procedural recourse or device, deriving validity and acceptance from long-established
usage.22 The matter of the trial court’s allowing the reopening of a case for additional proof by
a party or by the parties is addressed to the court’s discretion provided that, by reopening the
case, the court does not commit a grave abuse of its discretion. The trial court may allow the
reopening of a case and the presentation of additional proofs for the orderly administration of
justice or where evidence has been omitted by a party, through inadvertence or mistake, or
oversight.23
We also agree with the respondents-prosecutors that they are mandated to exhaust available
proofs to establish the guilt of the accused and being taken to justice for their offense against
the State; and, if they deliberately and willfully refused to do so, they would be prosecuted for
dereliction of duty.24 The prosecutors are mandated to lay before the court the pertinent facts
at their disposal with methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and filling
up gaps and loopholes in their evidence to the end that the trial court’s view may not be
tortured by doubts, that the innocent may not suffer and the guilty may not escape
unpunished. This is their duty to the State, the Court and the accused.25
In the present case, the prosecution believed that, after presenting fourteen (14) witnesses
and voluminous documentary evidence, it had discharged its duty of proving the guilt of all
the accused in both cases. Thus, during the trial of September 27, 2001, the prosecution
manifested that it had no more witnesses to present, and prayed for a period of twenty (20)
days within which to file a written offer of its documentary evidence, which the graft court
granted. In the interim, however, the prosecution discovered its oversight, that it was
imperative for it to present additional witnesses and documentary evidence on its evidence-
in-chief consisting of the bank managers of the United Coconut Planters Bank, Far East
Bank, Solid Bank, Metrobank and Allied Bank, the corporate secretary of the Public Estate
Authority, thirteen (13) checks, among others, to prove the crimes charged in the Informations
and filed on October 22, 2001, and filed its "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration" of the
September 17, 2001 Resolution of the Court and prayed for the issuance of subpoena duces
tecum and ad testificandum to the said witnesses. The Sandiganbayan then resolved to grant
the motion for reconsideration of the prosecution per its October 29, 2001 Resolution insofar
as Criminal Case No. 24642 was concerned, and denied the said motion for reconsideration
of the prosecution insofar as Criminal Case No. 24643 was concerned. However, the
Sandiganbayan did not state therein the reason for the denial of the said motion insofar as
Criminal Case No. 24643 was concerned, except for its observation that the additional proofs
the prosecution wanted to adduce were only in relation to Criminal Case No. 24642. Hence,
on January 10, 2002, the prosecution filed its Manifestation with prayer for partial
reconsideration of the October 29, 2001 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan which the latter
denied per its February 27, 2002 Resolution. Contrary to the ruling of the graft court, the
January 10, 2002 Manifestation with Prayer for Partial Reconsideration filed by the
prosecution was not a "proscribed second motion for reconsideration." Upon such denial of
the motion, the remedy of the prosecution was two-fold: either to file a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the nullification of the October 29, 2001
and February 27, 2002 Resolutions predicated on grave abuse of discretion, or to file its
formal offer of documentary evidence as directed by the Sandiganbayan. However, the
prosecution opted not to file any petition for certiorari in this Court. Indeed, during the trial on
March 5, 2002, respondent Prosecutor John I.C. Turalba manifested, in open court, that the
prosecution was opting not to present any witness because of the Sandiganbayan’s denial of
its January 10, 2002 Manifestation with Prayer for Partial Reconsideration. The respondent-
prosecutor even prayed for a resetting of the case, presumably to enable him to file the
formal offer of the documentary evidence to which all the accused offered no objection. Still,
the prosecution failed to file any formal offer of its documentary evidence. Instead, barely a
week thereafter, the prosecution, through respondents Prosecutors John I.C. Turalba and
Jaime C. Blancaflor, made a "somersault," and filed on March 11, 2002, a Manifestation with
Motion for Reconsideration of the October 20, 2001 and February 27, 2002 Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan, praying that it be allowed to adduce additional proofs in Criminal Case No.
24643 to establish conspiracy among all the accused in both cases. The prosecution made
another volte face when, without waiting for the resolution of their March 11, 2002 Motion for
Partial Reconsideration, respondents Prosecutors Orlando I. Ines and Jaime C. Blancaflor
filed a "Formal Offer of Evidence" dated August 29, 2002, manifesting that "with the
testimonies of all the prosecution witnesses, as well as the admission of the documentary
evidence accounted to them, the plaintiff rested its case."26 The respondents-prosecutors
even noted in their pleading that "due to the voluminous documentary evidence previously
submitted by the prosecutors to the court, the parties may directly examine the same at their
convenience."27 By filing such formal offer of evidence, without any preconditions whatsoever,
the respondents-prosecutors thereby withdrew their March 11, 2002 Motion for
Reconsideration of the February 27, 2002 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan; as such, there
was no longer a March 11, 2002 Motion for Partial Reconsideration to speak of and to be
resolved by the Sandiganbayan.1a\^/phi1.net
The Sandiganbayan should have merely resolved the Formal Offer of Evidence of the
respondents-prosecutors. However, with grave abuse of its discretion, the graft court ignored
such formal offer of evidence and resolved and granted the March 11, 2002 Motion for
Reconsideration of the respondents-prosecutors per its December 17, 2002 Resolution. In
effect, the Sandiganbayan set aside its October 29, 2001 and February 27, 2002 Resolutions,
as well as its Order of March 6, 2002. The graft court did not even bother to explain why it
ignored the Manifestation of respondent prosecutor John I.C. Turalba made in open court
during the trial on March 5, 2002 that he was no longer presenting any witness, in view of the
Sandiganbayan’s denial of their January 10, 2002 Motion for Reconsideration. Instead, the
Sandiganbayan resolved and granted the March 12, 2002 Motion for Reconsideration of the
respondents-prosecutors.
We have reviewed the records and find no substantial basis for the claim of the respondents-
prosecutors that their filing of formal offer of evidence on September 2, 2002 was without
prejudice to the Sandiganbayan’s resolution of their March 11, 2002 Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolutions of October 29, 2001 and February 27, 2002. We note that
the ponente of the December 17, 2002 and February 11, 2003 Resolutions is Justice Rodolfo
G. Palattao, who concurred in the October 29, 2001 and February 27, 2002 Resolutions and
in the graft court’s March 6, 2002 Order.
In resolving and granting the March 11, 2002 Motion for Reconsideration of the respondents-
prosecutors, the Sandiganbayan declared that pleadings should be liberally construed so that
the issues may be properly ventilated and resolved. Such rather curt statement is
disconcerting, considering that the Sandiganbayan failed to explain in its October 29, 2001
Resolution why it declared that the additional proofs that the prosecution wanted to adduce
pertained solely to Criminal Case No. 24642, and its reason for ignoring the formal of
documentary evidence of the prosecution; instead, it granted the March 11, 2002 Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the prosecution. Indeed, while it is true that litigation is not a game of
technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the
prescribed procedure, to insure an orderly administration of justice. 28 It is this symbiosis
between form and substance that guarantees that discernible result. The Court emphasized
in People v. Mamalias ,29 that the great goal of our criminal law and procedure is not to send
people to the gaol but to do justice. Public order and our system of justice are well served by
a conscientious observance of the rules of procedure, particularly by government officials and
agencies.30
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan tolerated and condoned the deft but deleterious
somersaults of the respondents-prosecutors and itself flip-flopped, to the prejudice of the
accused, including the petitioner, and the orderly, fair and impartial administration of justice.
While the Sandiganbayan may set aside and recourse its Resolutions and Orders for valid
and cogent reasons, in the present case, it did so imprudently and capriciously.
On the second issue, we find the petition bereft of merit, and insufficient in form and in
substance. Under Section 1, Rule 65, in relation to Section 3,31 Rule 46 of the Rules of Court,
the petitioner is mandated to append to his petition a certified true copy of the assailed
resolution, that is, the September 19, 2002 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dismissing
Criminal Case No. 24643 insofar as accused Oscar Garcia is concerned; and his motion for
the reconsideration of said resolution. The petitioner failed to do so. Under the last paragraph
of the said Rule, the Court may dismiss the petition on such ground. Besides, the petition was
premature, considering that the Sandiganbayan had not as yet resolved the said motion for
reconsideration of the petitioner. Finally, the petitioner failed to implead Oscar Garcia as
party-respondent who is an indispensable party, considering that what is being assailed is the
September 19, 2003 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dismissing the case as against him.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The December
17, 2002 and February 11, 2003 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, insofar as Criminal Case
No. 24643 is concerned are NULLIFIED. The petition, in so far as it assails the September
19, 2002 Order of the Sandiganbayan dismissing Criminal Case No. 24643 as to Oscar
Garcia is DENIED due course and is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 143935             June 4, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
WILLIAM ANCHETA, EDGARDO AREOLA, ANTOS DACANAY, LITO DE LA CRUZ,
FELIPE ULEP @ BOY ULEP AND ELY CALACALA, accused.
FELIPE ULEP @ BOY ULEP, appellant.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision1 dated October 16, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 30, convicting the appellant Felipe "Boy" Ulep of the crime of
robbery with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Appellant, together with William Ancheta, Edgardo "Liling" Areola, Antos Dacanay, Lito dela
Cruz and Ely Calacala, was charged with the crime of robbery with multiple homicide and
frustrated murder in an Information dated November 2,1987:
That on or about the 20th day of March, 1987, at 12:00 o’clock to 1:00 o’clock in the
afternoon, at Manggahan, Bicos, Rizal, Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, through force and intimidation upon persons, take, rob and carry away
thirty (30) cavans of clean palay valued at ₱4,500.00 belonging to Alfredo Roca, to
his damage and prejudice, and in order to successfully carry out the robbery, the
above-named accused, pursuant to the same conspiracy, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with evident premeditation and with treachery, and with intent to kill, fired
their guns at Marjune Roca, which caused his death, shot at Benita Avendaño Roca
and Febe Roca and hurled a grenade against them and both of them died as
consequence of the wounds they sustained; and also fired upon Alfredo Roca with
their firearms, thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the
crime of murder as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by
reason of the timely running for cover by the said Alfredo Roca.
That in the commission of the crime, the generic aggravating circumstances of
treachery, disregard of the respect due the deceased Febe Roca and Benita
Avendaño Roca on account of their age and sex and that the crime was committed
by a band.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.2
All of the accused remain at large to this day except for appellant who was arrested on
January 5, 1990. He pleaded not guilty during arraignment on January 25, 1990. In order to
expedite the hearing of his case, appellant was granted a separate trial.
The prosecution presented Alfredo Roca, Virgilita Roca-Laureaga, Dr. Aurora Belsa and
Emilio Roca as its witnesses. The prosecution anchored its case principally on the testimony
of Alfredo Roca who saw how appellant and his companions robbed them of 35 sacks
of palay after killing his son Marjun Roca, his wife Benita Roca and his mother Febe Roca.
Alfredo Roca testified that between 12:00 noon and 1:00 p.m. of March 20, 1987, he was in
his farm in Manggahan, Rizal, Nueva Ecija to thresh palay. With him at that time were Marjun
Roca, Benita Roca, Febe Roca and daughter Virgilita Roca-Laureaga. He, Benita and Febe
were about to take their lunch inside his hut. Marjun and Virgilita were done eating and were
standing outside. At this point, Alfredo noticed the arrival of an owner-type jeep with trailer
which stopped at a spot not far from his hut. He recognized the occupants as accused Antos
Dacanay, Edgardo "Liling" Areola, William Ancheta, Lito de la Cruz, Ely Calacala and
appellant Felipe "Boy" Ulep who all alighted from the jeep. Dacanay, Areola and Ancheta
stood on one side of the irrigation canal facing Marjun Roca who was standing on the other
side. From a distance of 10 to 12 meters, Alfredo saw Dacanay suddenly pull out a gun and
shoot Marjun on the head, causing the latter to fall to the ground. As he lay on the ground,
Marjun was again shot, this time by Areola and Ancheta. Thereafter, Ulep, de la Cruz and
Calacala started firing at Alfredo’s hut. Alfredo was not hit, however, because he was able to
get out of the hut and dive into the irrigation canal in the nick of time. However, Benita and
Febe were fatally hit by the initial volley of gunfire. The assailants fired at Alfredo in the canal
but they did not hit him. Ancheta then hurled a grenade which exploded near the hut. When
the group ran out of bullets, Alfredo emerged from the canal and hid inside his hut. He saw
the group load onto the trailer 35 sacks of palay, each containing an average of 50 kilos
valued at ₱4.50 per kilo. Alfredo owned the stolen palay. Appellant Ulep and his companions
then boarded their jeep and left.
Virgilita Roca-Laureaga corroborated the eyewitness account of her father Alfredo Roca. She
declared that, from a distance of 10 meters, she saw her brother Marjun fall to the ground
after being shot by Dacanay. Following the grenade explosion, Areola aimed his gun at her
and pulled the trigger but the gun did not fire because he had apparently run out of bullets.
She also saw appellant Ulep fire his gun at her father’s hut.
Dr. Aurora Belsa, assistant provincial health officer of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, conducted the
autopsy on the bodies of Marjun, Benita and Febe. Her report showed that: (1) Marjun
sustained gunshot wounds in the head, stomach and chest; (2) Benita suffered gunshot
wounds that punctured her small and large intestines and (3) Febe’s gunshot wounds in her
chest damaged her lungs, heart and liver. Dr. Belsa declared that all the gunshot wounds
sustained by the victims were fatal, causing their immediate death.
Emilio Roca, 81 years old and husband of Febe Roca, testified on the civil aspect of the case.
He stated that, as a result of the death of Febe, Marjun and Benita, the family incurred
expenses for the wake and funeral in the amount of ₱85,000. Likewise, the death of his wife,
sister-in-law and grandson caused him to suffer a fit of depression. He lived in fear and was
forced to sell his house. He transferred residence because the perpetrators might return to kill
him.
The defense had a different story.
Appellant Ulep, a cogon-gatherer in the farm of Edgardo Areola, alleged that at around 10:30
a.m. on March 20, 1987, he went to Areola’s farm to check whether the palay crops had
adequate water. The farm was located just beside Alfredo Roca’s. When he saw that the
crops were almost withered, appellant diverted the flow of water from Alfredo’s farm to that of
Areola’s. While he was beside the irrigation ditch, he noticed 10 male strangers in the vicinity
of Alfredo’s hut. He saw Alfredo attempting to throw a grenade at the other side of the canal
but two women prevented him from doing so by embracing him. As a result of the struggle,
Alfredo dropped the grenade. Whereupon Alfredo immediately jumped into the irrigation canal
to take cover. The grenade then exploded. He never saw his co-accused in the vicinity nor
did he hear any gunshots. After witnessing these events, appellant walked away and
continued irrigating Areola’s farm.
At about 1:00 p.m., he had lunch in the house of his in-laws in Bicos, Rizal, Nueva Ecija and
returned to the farm at 2:00 p.m. He worked until 5:00 p.m. and spent the night in the house
of his in-laws. The next morning, he went home to Villa Paraiso, Rizal, Nueva Ecija.
Federico Catalan, appellant’s neighbor and a barangay captain, testified that at around 11:00
a.m. on March 20, 1987, he went to his farm which was about 100 meters away from
Edgardo Areola’s farm. Between 12:00 noon and 12:30 p.m., he saw appellant walking
towards the irrigation canal and joined him to go there. At 1:00 p.m., they both went home to
eat lunch and later returned to continue irrigating their farms up to 5:00 p.m. After work, they
proceeded home to Villa Paraiso. He also testified that the wife of appellant was his niece. On
cross-examination, he declared that he heard a gunshot at around 1:00 p.m.
On October 16, 1998, the trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of robbery with homicide. The dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration and finding that the accused,
FELIPE ULEP, is guilty of the special complex crime of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE,
he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA; to
indemnify the heirs of Marjun Roca, Benita Avendaño-Roca and Febe Roca
₱50,000.00 each for their deaths; to pay the sum of ₱50,000.00 for expenses
incurred for the burial of Marjun Roca and Benita Avedaño-Roca; to pay the sum of
₱50,000.00 to Emilio Roca for burial expenses incurred; and to pay the heirs of
Marjun Roca, Benita Avendaño-Roca and Febe Roca, ₱50,000.00 each by way of
moral damages; to pay Alfredo Roca the sum of ₱7,877.00 for the 35 cavans of palay
taken on the occasion of the robbery; and to pay the cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED.3
Thus, the instant appeal based on the following assignments of error:
I
THE COURT  A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AND GIVING WEIGHT
AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES
DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO MAKE A FORMAL OFFER
BEFORE THEY (WITNESSES) TESTIFIED.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
III
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY
THE DEFENSE.4
In the first assignment of error, appellant alleges that the trial court erred in admitting as
evidence the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses despite the failure of the prosecution to
make a formal offer thereof in violation of Rule 132, Section 34 of the Rules of Court:
WON the testimonies of the witnesses are admissible in evidence. YES
Sec. 34. Offer of Evidence ― The Court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered. xxx.
Corollarily, Section 35 of the same Rule 132 states that:
Sec. 35. When to make offer. ― As regards the testimony of a witness, the offer must
be made at the time the witness is called to testify.
This formal offer of testimonial evidence is necessary in order to enable the court to
rule intelligently on any objections to the questions asked. As a general rule, the
proponent must show its relevance, materiality and competence. Where the
proponent offers evidence deemed by counsel of the adverse party to be
inadmissible for any reason, the latter has the right to object. But such right can be
waived. Necessarily, the objection must be made at the earliest possible time lest
silence, when there is an opportunity to speak, operates as a waiver of the objection.5
The records show that the prosecution failed to formally offer the questioned testimonies of
witnesses Alfredo Roca and Virgilita Roca-Laureaga. However, appellant waived this
procedural error by failing to make a timely objection, i.e., when the ground for objection
became reasonably apparent the moment said witnesses were called to testify without any
prior offer having been made by the proponent. He even impliedly acquiesced to the
materiality, competence and relevance of the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies by cross-
examining them. Since appellant failed to raise before the trial court the issue of the
prosecution’s failure to formally offer the testimonies of its witnesses, an objection on this
score raised for the first time on appeal will not be entertained.
The second and third assignments of error, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.
Appellant assails the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, Alfredo and Virgilita, for being
unbelievable and contrary to human nature. According to appellant, the natural tendency of a
person being fired at is to take cover. Thus, it was inconceivable for Alfredo to still attempt to
take a look at his assailants as he was at risk of being shot and killed. Besides, he could not
have witnessed the killing of Marjun if he himself was being attacked at the same time.
It is apparent that appellant’s defense rests mainly on the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses. It is settled, however, that, when the issue of credibility of a witness is involved,
the appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that
the latter was in a better position to resolve the matter, having heard the witness and
observed his deportment during trial, unless certain facts of value were plainly ignored, which
if considered might affect the result of the case.6
We find the trial court’s evaluation of the facts and its conclusions fully supported by the
evidence. Alfredo and Virgilita were straightforward and categorical in their narration of how
appellant and his cohorts killed Marjun, Febe and Benita, and thereafter took 35 cavans
of palay from their farm. Despite the grueling cross-examination, they never wavered in their
testimonies regarding the details of the crime.
What made their testimonies even more credible was the fact that both Alfredo and Virgilita
had no ill-motive to testify against appellant and his co-accused. It has been our consistent
ruling that a witness’ testimony deserves full faith and credit where there exists no evidence
to show any improper motive why he should testify falsely against the accused, or why he
should implicate the accused in a serious offense.7 Further, the relationship of Alfredo and
Virgilita to the victims all the more bolstered their credibility as they naturally wanted the real
culprits to be punished. It would be unnatural for the relatives of the victims in search of
justice to impute the crime to innocent persons and not those who were actually responsible
therefor.
Appellant also points out the glaring inconsistencies in the testimonies of Alfredo and Virgilita.
Appellant cites the testimony of Virgilita that the assailants waited for about five minutes after
they stopped firing at Marjun before they started shooting at her father Alfredo. This,
according to appellant, contradicted Alfredo’s testimony that the perpetrators started firing at
him immediately after Marjun was killed. Likewise, while Virgilita declared that Ancheta threw
the grenade before her father jumped into the irrigation canal, Alfredo testified that Ancheta
threw the grenade when he was already in the canal. Appellant insists that these
inconsistencies tainted the credibility of both Alfredo and Virgilita.
The alleged discrepancies in the testimonies of Alfredo and Virgilita referred only to minor
matters. There was no inconsistency as far as the principal occurrence and the positive
identification of the assailants were concerned. Both Alfredo and Virgilita positively identified
appellant’s group as the persons who attacked and robbed them. The court a quo correctly
cited the case of People vs. Fabros8 where we held that:
Inconsistencies among witnesses testifying on the same incident may be expected
because different persons may have different impressions or recollections of the
same incident. One may remember a detail more clearly than another. Witnesses
may have seen that same detail from different angles or viewpoints. That same detail
may be minimized by one but considered important by another. Nevertheless, these
disparities do not necessarily taint the witnesses’ credibility as long as their separate
versions are substantially similar or agree on the material points. Thus, although it
may be conceded that there are some variations in the separate testimonies xxx,
these do not, in our view, detract from the integrity of their declarations. On the
contrary, they represent a believable narration, made more so precisely because of
their imperfections, of what actually happened. xxx
 Moreover, the testimonies of Alfredo and Virgilita were supported by the medical
findings of Dr. Belsa. The presence of gunshot wounds in the bodies of the victims
materially corroborated the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies that appellant and his
co-accused repeatedly fired their guns at their hapless victims.
Appellant also interposes the defense of alibi. The time-tested rule is that alibi cannot prevail
over the positive assertions of prosecution witnesses9, more so in this case where appellant
failed to prove that he was at another place at the time of the commission of the crime and
that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene. Appellant’s claim that he
was in Edgardo Areola’s farm from 10:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. did not negate the possibility that
he had gone to Alfredo’s farm between 10:30 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. to commit the crime,
considering the fact that Areola’s farm was just beside Alfredo’s farm, the scene of the crime.
It was, on the contrary, appellant’s alibi that was considerably weakened by the major
inconsistencies between his and Federico Catalan’s supposedly corroborating testimony.
While appellant testified that he did not hear any gunshot the entire day on March 20, 1987,
Catalan contradicted this by attesting that he heard a gunshot at about 1:00 p.m. Likewise,
appellant claimed that after working in the farm, he proceeded to the house of his in-laws in
Bicos and only went home to Villa Paraiso the next day Catalan, on the other hand, stated
that after work that same day, they went home to Villa Paraiso together.
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to prove the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide. He insists that there was no showing that the perpetrators killed the
victims in order to steal the palay.
There is robbery with homicide when there is a direct relation or an intimate connection
between the robbery and the killing, whether the killing takes place prior or subsequent to the
robbery or whether both crimes are committed at the same time.10
Based on the facts established, the Court is convinced that the prosecution adequately
proved the direct relation between the robbery and the killing. Immediately after shooting the
victims, the assailants loaded the sacks of palay onto the trailer of the jeep. As they did so, no
conversation took place and there was no hesitation on their part, indicating that they were
proceeding from a common, preconceived plan. In fact, why would they bring a trailer if their
only purpose was to massacre the Roca family? The series of overt acts executed by
appellant and his companions, in their totality, showed that their intention was not only to kill
but to rob as well. The group tried to kill all the members of the Roca family to ensure lack of
resistance to their plan to take Alfredo’s palay. Whenever homicide is perpetrated with the
sole purpose of removing opposition to the robbery or suppressing evidence thereof, the
crime committed is robbery with homicide.11
Further, in order to sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, robbery must be proven as
conclusively as the killing itself.12 A review of the entire records of this case leads us to
conclude that robbery was established beyond reasonable doubt. As long as the killing is
perpetrated as a consequence or on the occasion of the robbery, the special complex crime
of robbery with homicide is committed.
Of the aggravating circumstances alleged in the information,13 only treachery and band were
established.
There was treachery as the events narrated by the eyewitnesses pointed to the fact that the
victims could not have possibly been aware that they would be attacked by appellant and his
companions. There was no opportunity for the victims to defend themselves as the
assailants, suddenly and without provocation, almost simultaneously fired their guns at them.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest
provocation on the part of the person attacked.14
We deem it necessary to reiterate the principle laid down by the Court en banc in the case
of People vs. Escote, Jr.15 on the issue of whether treachery may be appreciated in robbery
with homicide which is classified as a crime against property. This Court held:
xxx (t)reachery is a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide
although said crime is classified as a crime against property and a single and
indivisible crime. xxx
xxx     xxx     xxx
xxx     xxx     xxx
xxx     xxx     xxx
In fine, in the application of treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance to
robbery with homicide, the law looks at the constituent crime of homicide which is a
crime against persons and not at the constituent crime of robbery which is a crime
against property. Treachery is applied to the constituent crime of "homicide" and not
to the constituent crime of "robbery" of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide.
The crime of robbery with homicide does not lose its classification as a crime against
property or as a special complex and single and indivisible crime simply because
treachery is appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. Treachery merely
increases the penalty for the crime conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code absent any generic mitigating circumstance.
xxx     xxx     xxx
xxx     xxx     xxx
 xxx     xxx     xxx

In sum then, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with

homicide when the victim of homicide is killed by treachery.

The offense was also proven to have been executed by a band. A crime is committed by a
band when at least four armed malefactors act together in the commission thereof. In this
case, all six accused were armed with guns which they used on their victims. Clearly, all the
armed assailants, including appellant, took direct part in the execution of the robbery with
homicide.

Under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of robbery with homicide carries
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Inasmuch as the crime was committed on March
20, 1987 which was prior to the effectivity of RA 7659 on December 31, 1993, the penalty of
death cannot be imposed even if the aggravating circumstances of treachery and band
attended its commission. Only the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua is
imposable on appellant.

With respect to damages, we affirm the award of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity each for the
death of Marjun, Febe and Benita Roca. In addition, moral damages must be granted in the
amount of ₱50,000 for each of the deceased victims. The amount of ₱7,875 is also due to
Alfredo Roca as reparation for the 35 sacks of palay stolen from him, each valued at ₱225.
The heirs of the victims are likewise entitled to exemplary damages in the sum of ₱20,000 for
each of the three victims due to the aggravating circumstances that attended the commission
of the crime. However, the award of burial expenses cannot be sustained because no
receipts were presented to substantiate the same. Nonetheless, the victims’ heirs are entitled
to the sum of ₱25,000 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages, pursuant to the case
of People vs. Abrazaldo.16

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 30,
convicting appellant Felipe "Boy" Ulep of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Appellant is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victims: (1) ₱50,000 as civil indemnity for
each of the three victims; (2) ₱50,000 as moral damages for each of the three victims; (3)
₱7,875 as reparation for the 35 stolen sacks of palay; (4) ₱20,000 as exemplary damages for
each of the three victims and (5) ₱25,000 as temperate damages.

SO ORDERED.