G.R. No.
190486               November 26, 2014 Also, Stanley Fine was forced todeclare them dismissed due to their failure to report back to
STANLEY FINE FURNITURE, ELENAAND CARLOS WANG, Petitioners,
vs.
VICTOR T. GALLANO AND ENRIQUITO SIAREZ, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
To terminate the employment of workers simply because they asserted their legal rights by
filing a complaint is illegal. It violates their right to security of tenure an'd should not be
tolerated.
In this petition for review1 on certiorari filed by Elena Briones,2 we are asked to reverse the
decision3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101145. The Court of Appeals found
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission, and
reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated August 2, 2006 finding that respondents
Victor Gallano and Enriquito Siarez were illegally dismissed.4
Stanley Fine Furniture (Stanley Fine), through its owners Elena and Carlos Wang, hired
respondents Victor T. Gallano and Enriquito Siarez in 1995 as painters/carpenters. Victor and
Enriquito each received 215.00 basic salary per day.5
On May 26, 2005, Victor and Enriquito filed a labor complaint6 for underpayment/non-
payment of salaries, wages, Emergency Cost of Living Allowance (ECOLA), and 13th month
pay. They indicated in the complaint form that they were "still working"7 for Stanley Fine.
Victor and Enriquito filed an amended complaint8 on May 31, 2005, for actual illegal
dismissal, underpayment/non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, premium for holiday pay,
service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, ECOLA, and Social Security System (SSS)
benefit. In the amended complaint, Victor and Enriqui to claimed that they were dismissed on
May 26, 2005.9 Victor and Enriquito were allegedly scolded for filing a complaint for money
claims. Later on, they were not allowed to work.10
On the other hand, petitioner Elena Briones claimed that Victor and Enriquito were "required
to explain their absences for the month of May 2005, but they refused."11
In the decision12 dated August 2, 2006, the Labor Arbiter found that Victor and Enriqui to were
illegally dismissed. The Labor Arbiter noted the following contradictory statements inStanley
Fine’s position paper, thus:
work for a considerable length of time and also, due to the filing of an unmeritorious labor
case against it by the two complainants. . . .
....
The main claim of the complainants is their allegation that they were dismissed. They were
NOT DISMISSED.13 (Emphasis in the original)
The Labor Arbiter resolved these contradictory statements in the following manner:
In fact, the admission that complainants were dismissed due to the filing of a case against
them by complainants is a blatant transgression of the Labor Code that no retaliatory
measure shall be levelled against an employee by reason of an action commenced against
an employer. This is virtually a confession of judgment and a death [k]nell to the cause of
respondents. It actually lends credence tothe fact that complainants were dismissed upon
respondents’ knowledge of the complaint before the NLRC as attested by the fact that four
days after the filing of the complaint, the same was amended to include illegal dismissal.14
The Labor Arbiter also awarded moral and exemplary damages to respondents, reasoning
that: Finding malice, and ill-will in the dismissal of complainants, which exhibits arrogance
and defiance of labor laws on the part of respondents, moral and exemplary damages for
₱50,000 and ₱30,000 respectively for each of the complainants are hereby granted.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents are hereby declared guilty of illegal
dismissal. As a consequence, they are ORDERED to reinstate complainant to their former
position and pay jointly and severally complainants’ full backwages from date of dismissal
until actual reinstatement[.]15
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission reversed16 the Labor Arbiter’s decision,
ruling that the Labor Arbiter erred in considering the statement, "due to the filing ofan
unmeritorious labor case," as an admission against interest. 17 The National Labor Relations
Commission held that:
Contrary to the findings of the Labor Arbiter below . . . respondents-appellants’ allegations in
paragraph 5 of their position paper is not an admission that they dismissed complainants-
appellees moreso [sic], in retaliation for complainants-appellees’ filing a complaint against
them. Had the Labor Arbiter been more circumspect analyzing the facts brought before him
by the herein parties pleadings, he could have easily discerned that complainants-appellees
were merely required to explain their unauthorized absences they committed for the month of
May 2005 alone. Complainants-appellees did notdeny knowledge of the memoranda issued
to them on May 23, 25 and 27, 2005 for complainant-appellee Siarez and June 1, 2005
memo for Gallano. That they simply refused receipt of them cannot extricate themselves from
its legal effects as the last of which clearly show that itwas sent to them thru the mails.
....
The same holds true with the findings of the Labor Arbiter below that respondents-appellants’
evidence, Annexes "7" to "74" "cannot be admissible in evidence" for being mere xerox
copies and "are easily subjected to interpolation and tampering."
Suffice it to state that these pieces of evidence were adduced during the arbitral proceedings
below, where complainants-appellees were afforded the opportunity to controvert and deny
its truthfulness and veracity that complainants-appellees never objected thereto or deny its
authenticity, certainly did not render said documents tampered or interpolated.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSEDand SET ASIDE.Respondents-appellants are however ordered to reinstate
complainants-appellees to their former position without loss of seniority rights and benefits
appurtenant thereto, without backwages.
SO ORDERED.18
Victor and Enriquito filed a motion for reconsideration,19 which the National Labor Relations
Commission denied in the resolution20 dated August 15, 2007.
Thus, Victor and Enriquito filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Generally,
petitions for certiorari are limited to the determination and correction of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. However,the Court of Appeals reviewed
the findings of facts and of law of the labor tribunals, considering that the Labor Arbiter and
the National Labor Relations Commission had different findings.21
The Court of Appeals found that Stanley Fine failed to show any valid cause for Victor and
Enriquito’s termination and to comply with the twonotice rule.22 Also, the Court of Appeals
noted that Stanley Fine’s statements — that it was "forced to declare them dismissed" 23 due
to their absences and "due to the filing of an unmeritorious labor case against it by the two
complainants"24 — were admissions against interest and binding upon Stanley Fine. Thus: An
admission against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the
facts in dispute since no man would declare anything against himself unless such declaration
is true. Thus, an admission against interest binds the person who makes the same, and
absent any showing that this was made thru palpable mistake, no amount of rationalization
can offset it.25
The Court of Appeals also held that the immediate amendment of Victor and Enriquito’s
complaint negated their alleged abandonment.26
With regard to the National Labor Relations Commission’s deletion of the monetary award,
the Court of Appeals ruled that:
Notably, private respondents’ claim of payment is again belied by their own admission in their
position paper that they failed to pay petitioners their ECOLA and to ask for exemption from
payment of said benefits to their employees. In any event, private respondents’ allegation of
payment of money claims is not supported by substantial evidence. The Labor Arbiter found
that the documents presented by private respondents were mere photocopies, with no
appropriate signatures of petitioners and could be easily subjected to interpolation and
tampering.27
The Court of Appeals, thus, granted the petition, set aside the resolutions of the National
Labor Relations Commission, and reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter. 28 The
dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions dated June 18, 2007 and August 15, 2007 of public
respondent NLRC are set aside and the Labor Arbiter’s Decision dated August 2, 2006 is
reinstated.
SO ORDERED.29
Stanley Fine filed a motion for reconsideration, 30 which the Court of Appeals denied in the
resolution31 dated November 27, 2009.
On December 21, 2009, Stanley Fine, Elena, and Carlos Wang filed a motion for extension of
time to file petition for review on certiorari.32
On January 21, 2010, Elena Briones filed a petition for review. 33 Elena alleged that she is the
"registered owner/proprietress of the business operation doing business under the name and
style ‘Stanley Fine Furniture.’"34 She argued that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
Victor and Enriquito were illegally dismissed considering that she issued several memoranda
to them, but they refused to accept the memoranda and explain their absences. 35 As to the
statement, "due to the filing of an unmeritorious labor case,"36 it was error on the part of her
former counsel which should not bind her.37 Further, the monetary claims should not have
been awarded because these were based on the allegations in the complaint form, 38 whereas
Elena presented documentary evidence to show that Victor and Enriquito’s money claims had
been paid. They never rebutted her documentary evidence.39 As to the award of moral and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees, Victor and Enriquito did not present any evidence to
support their claim, thus, it was error for the Court of Appeals to have reinstated the Labor
Arbiter’s decision.40
In compliance with this court’s resolution41 dated February 17, 2010, Victor and Enriquito filed
their comment42 and argued that the petition should be denied because Elena "is neither the
respondent, party in interest or representatives as parties."43 With regard to Victor’s two
absences and Enriquito’s five absences, these should not be interpreted as refusal to go back
to work tantamount to abandonment.44 Considering that Elena’s arguments had been passed
upon by the labor tribunals and the Court of Appeals, this petition should be denied.45
Elena filed her reply46 and posited that she has legal standing to file the petition for review
because she isthe owner/proprietress of Stanley Fine.47 In addition, she argued that Victor
and Enriquito knew that she, Elena, is the real party-in-interest because during the pendency
of the labor case, she filed an ex-parte manifestation, attaching her Department of Trade and
Industry certificate of registration of business name,48 showing that the registration is under
her maiden name, Elena Y. Briones. As per the Department of Trade and Industry’s
certification,49 Stanley Fine is a sole proprietorship owned by "Elena Briones Yam-Wang."
Thus, this court is asked to resolve procedural and substantive issues in this petition as
follows:>
1. Whether Elena Briones has standing to file this petition for review on certiorari;
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Victor Gallano and Enriquito
Siarez were illegally dismissed;
3. Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it agreed with the Labor Arbiter that the
statement, "filing of an unmeritorious labor case," is an admission against interest
and binding against Stanley Fine Furniture; and
4. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in awarding the monetary claims and
damages to Victor Gallano and Enriquito Siarez, considering that they did not
produce evidence to support their claims.
I.
Petitioner Elena Briones has standing to file this case
On this issue, petitioners claimed that Elena Briones is not the real party-in-interest; hence,
the decision of the Court of Appeals is final and executory since the petition for review was
not properly filed.50
In her reply, Elena argued that she is the sole proprietor of Stanley Fine, a fact known to
respondents.51 As the sole proprietor, she has standing to file this petition.52
Respondents cannot deny Elena Briones’ standing to file this petition considering that in their
amended complaint filed before the Labor Arbiter, they wrote "Stanley Fine Furniture, Elina
[sic] Briones Wang as ownerand Carlos Wang" as their employers.53
Also, respondents did not refute Elena’s allegation that Stanley Fine is a sole proprietorship.
In Excellent Quality Apparel, Inc. v. Win Multi-Rich Builders, Inc.,54 this court stated that:
A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical personality separate and distinct from the
personality of the owner of the enterprise. The law merely recognizes the existence of a sole
proprietorship as a form of business organization conducted for profit by a single individual
and requires its proprietor or owner to secure licenses and permits, register its business
name, and pay taxes to the national government. The law does not vest a separate legal
personality on the sole proprietorship or empower it to file or defend an action in
court.55 (Emphasis supplied) Thus, Stanley Fine, being a sole proprietorship, does not have a
personality separate and distinct from its owner, Elena Briones. Elena, being the proprietress
of Stanley Fine, can be considered as a real party-in-interest and has standing to file this
petition for review.
II.
Review of procedural parameters
In her petition for review, Elena raised the following issues: (a) whether "the filing of an
Establishment Termination Report"56 is an act of dismissal; (b) whether counsel’s allegation
that an employee was dismissed due to the filing of an "unmeritorious" case against the
employer is binding;57 (c) whether a Labor Arbiter can award monetary claims based on the
allegations in the complaint form;58 and (d) whether the award of moral and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees is proper even without supporting evidence.59
In a Rule 45 petition for review of a Court of Appeals decision rendered under Rule 65, this
court is guided by the following rules:
[I]n a Rule 45 review (of the CA decision rendered under Rule 65), the question of law that
confronts the Court is the legal correctness of the CA decision – i.e., whether the CA correctly
determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision
before it, and not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was
correct. . . . Specifically, in reviewing a CA labor ruling under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
the Court’s review is limited to:
(1) Ascertaining the correctness of the CA’s decision in finding the presence or
absence of a grave abuse of discretion. This is done by examining, on the basis of
the parties’ presentations, whether the CA correctly determined that at the NLRC
level, all the adduced pieces of evidence were considered; no evidence which should
not have been considered was considered; and the evidence presented supports the
NLRC findings; and
(2) Deciding any other jurisdictional error that attended the CA’s interpretation or
application of the law.60 (Citation omitted)
Thus, the proper issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals correctly determined the
presence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National Labor Relations
Commission. III.
There was no just cause in the dismissal of respondents
The Court of Appeals found grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National Labor
Relations Commission when it reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. The Court of Appeals
held that respondents were illegally dismissed because no valid causefor dismissal was
shown. Also, there was no compliance withthe two-notice requirement.61
Elena admitted that no notices of dismissal were issued to respondents. However,
memoranda were given to respondents, requiring them to explain their absences. She
claimed that the notices to explain disprove respondents’ allegation that there was intent to
dismiss them.62
Grounds for termination of employment are provided under the Labor Code. 63 Just causes for
termination ofan employee are provided under
Article 282 of the Labor Code: ARTICLE 282. Termination by employer.- An employer may
terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of
his employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his
employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized
representatives; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Although abandonment of work is not included in the enumeration, this court has held that
"abandonment is a form of neglect of duty."64 To prove abandonment, two elements must
concur:
1. Failure to report for work orabsence without valid or justifiable reason; and
2. A clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship.65
In Hodieng Concrete Products v. Emilia,66 this court held that:
Absence must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee
simply does not want to work anymore. And the burden of proof to show that there was
unjustified refusal to go back to work rests on the employer.67
The Court of Appeals ruled that the alleged abandonment of work is negated by the
immediate filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal on May 31, 2005. 68 The Court of Appeals
further stated that:
Long standing is the rule that the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal negates the
allegation of abandonment. Human experience dictates that no employee in his right mind
would go through the trouble of filing a case unless the employer had indeed terminated the
services of the employee.69
In this case, Elena failed to pinpoint the overt acts of respondents that show they had
abandoned their work. There was a mere allegation that she was "forced to declare them
dismissed dueto their failure to report back to work for a considerable length of time"but no
evidence to prove the intent to abandon work.70 It is the burden of the employer to prove that
the employee was not dismissed or, if dismissed, that such dismissal was not
illegal.71 Unfortunately for Elena, she failed to do so.
IV.
Generally, errors of counsel bind the client
Elena’s position paper states the following:
5. Also, Stanley Fine was forced to declare them dismissed due to their failure to
report back to work for a considerable length of time and also, due to the filing of an
unmeritorious labor case against itby the two complainants. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
....
8. The main claim of the complainants is their allegation that they were dismissed.
They were NOT DISMISSED. Management was [sic] has only instructed them to
submit a written explanation for their absence before they would be allowed back to
work. . . .72 (Underscoring in the original)
Elena argued that the use of the word "unmeritorious" should not be taken against her
because it is commonly used in pleadings. Also, the use of the word "unmeritorious" came
from her previous counsel.73 In an effort to persuade this court, Elena further argued in her
reply that the statement "unmeritorious case" was a mistake committed by her former counsel
which should not bind her, considering its grave consequence.74
On the other hand, respondents alleged in their position paper75 that they were requesting
from their employer an increase in pay to comply with the minimum wage law. 76 However,
they were reprimanded and were told "not to work anymore."77
Respondents filed a reply78 to Elena’s position paper and argued that:
6. The words "Nag complain pa kayo sa Labor ha, tanggal na kayo" were clear, unequivocal
and categorical. These circumstances were sufficient to create the impression in the mind of
complainants – and correctly so – that their services were being terminated. The acts of
respondents were indicative of their intention to dismiss complainants from their
employment.79
On this issue, the National Labor Relations Commission held that the phrase, "filing of an
unmeritorious labor complaint,"80 if read together with the other allegations in Elena’s position
paper, would show that respondents were not dismissed but simply required to explain their
absences.81
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals agreed with the Labor Arbiter that Elena’s statement
is an admission against interest and binding upon her. The Court of Appeals explained that:
An admission against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the
facts in dispute since no man would declare anything against himself unless such declaration
is true. Thus, an admission against interest binds the person who makes the same, and
absent any showing that this was made thru palpable mistake, no amount of rationalization
can offset it.82
The general rule is that errors of counsel bind the client. The reason behind this rule was
discussed in Building Care Corporation v. Macaraeg:83
It is however, an oft-repeated ruling that the negligence and mistakes of counsel bind the
client.1âwphi1 A departure from this rule would bring about never-ending suits, so long as
lawyers could allege their own fault or negligence to support the client’scase and obtain
remedies and reliefs already lost by operation of law. The only exception would be, where the
lawyer’s gross negligence would result in the grave injustice of depriving his client of the due
process of law.84 (Citations omitted)
There is not an iota of proof that the lawyer committed gross negligence in this case. That
counsel did not reflect his client’s true intentions is a bare allegation. It is not a mere
afterthought meant to escape liability for such illegal act. Elena’s counsel reflected the true
reason for dismissing respondents. Both position papers state that Elena dismissed
respondents because of the filing of a labor complaint. Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err
in affirming the Labor Arbiter’s ruling that the statement, "unmeritorious labor complaint," is an
admission against interest.
V.
Non-compliance with procedural
due process supports the finding of
illegal dismissal
Assuming that the statement, "filing of an unmeritorious labor case," is not an admission
against interest, still, the Court of Appeals did not err in reinstating the Labor
Arbiter’sdecision. Elena admitted85 that no notices of dismissal were issued.
Elena pointed out that there is no evidence showing that at the time she sent the memoranda,
she already knew of the complaint for money claims filed by respondents. 86 The allegation
that she told respondents "Nag complain pa kayo sa Labor ha, sige tanggal na kayo"87 is
hearsay and inadmissible.88
In cases of termination of employment, Article 277(b) of the Labor Code provides that:
ARTICLE 277. Miscellaneous provisions. –
....
(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be
protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and without prejudice to
the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker
whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the
causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires in accordance with company
rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and
Employment. Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the
worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional
branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. The burden of proving that the
termination was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest on the employer[.]
Book VI, Rule I, Section 2(d) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code further
provides:
Section 2. Security of tenure. . . .
....
(d) In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards of due process shall be
substantially observed:
For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the Code:
(i) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination,
and giving said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side.
(ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of
counsel if heso desires is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence, or
rebut the evidence presented against him.
(iii) A written notice of termination served on the employee, indicating that upon due
consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his
termination. King of Kings Transport, Inc. v. Mamac89 extensively discussed the two-notice
requirement and the procedure that must be observed in cases of termination, thus:
(1) The first written noticeto be served on the employees should contain the specific
causes or grounds for termination against them, and a directive that the employees
are given the opportunity to submit their written explanation within a reasonable
period. "Reasonable opportunity" under the Omnibus Rules means every kind of
assistance that management must accord to the employees to enable them to
prepare adequately for their defense. This should be construed as a period of at least
five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice to give the employees an opportunity
to study the accusation against them, consult a union official or lawyer, gather data
and evidence, and decide on the defenses they will raise against the complaint.
Moreover, in order to enable the employees to intelligently prepare their explanation
and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of the facts and
circumstances that will serve as basis for the charge against the employees. A
general description of the charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice should specifically
mention which company rules, if any, are violated and/or which among the grounds
under Art. 282 is being charged against the employees.
(2) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a
hearing or conference wherein the employees will be given the opportunity to: (1)
explain and clarify their defenses to the charge against them; (2) present evidence
insupport of their defenses; and (3) rebut the evidence presented against them by the
management. During the hearing or conference, the employees are given the chance
to defend themselves personally, with the assistance of a representative or counsel
of their choice. Moreover, this conference or hearing could be used by the parties as
an opportunity to cometo an amicable settlement.
(3) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall
serve the employees a written notice of termination indicating that: (1) all
circumstances involving the charge against the employees have been considered;
and (2) grounds have been established to justify the severance of their
employment.90 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
Elena presented photocopies of the memoranda to prove that notices to explain were sent to
respondents. These photocopies were not considered by the Labor Arbiter, on the ground
that they had no probative value. Elena argued that even if the annexes were mere
photocopies, they formed part of the position paper, which is a verified pleading under
oath.91 Elena also cited Lee v. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 8592 where this
court allegedly ruled that photocopies of documents attached to a verified motion, which have
not been controverted, are admissible.93
In Lee v. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85, this court stated the following:
Before we discuss the substance of private respondent’s motion, we note that attached to it
weremere photocopies of the supporting documents and not "certified true copies of
documents or papers involved therein" as required by the Rules of Court. However, given that
the motion was verified and petitioners, who were given a chance to oppose or comment on
it, made no objection thereto, we brush aside the defect in form and proceed to discuss the
merits of the motion.94 (Citation omitted)
A review of the decision in Lee v. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85 shows that
the case involved an omnibus motion to cite Jose C. Lee and the other parties in indirect
contempt, and to impose disciplinary sanctions or disbar Jose C. Lee’s counsel. 95 The
statement cited by Elena is not the controlling doctrine in that case. In addition, it appears that
this court brushed aside "the defect in form" in the exercise of its discretion and, thus, it
should not be taken as the controllingdoctrine. Hence, no error can be attributed to the Court
of Appeals when it agreed with the Labor Arbiter’s ruling that the photocopies of the
memoranda have no probative value since they are mere photocopies.96
Even if this court considers Annexes 1 to 5,97 these pieces of evidence would not save
Elena’s cause. Annexes 1 to 3 are the memoranda issued to Enriquito with a notation that he
refused to sign. Annex 2 is dated May 25, 2005, but the date when Enriquito allegedly
refused to sign is not indicated.98 Annex 3 is dated May 23, 2005, but again, the
memorandum does not show when it was served upon Enriquito and the date he refused to
sign.99 It is quite possible that these memoranda were antedated.
Annex 4 is dated June 1, 2005 and was sent to Enriquito Siarez via registered mail. 100 Annex
5 is the memorandum issued to Victor Gallano and is likewise dated June 1,
2005.101 Respondents were allegedly dismissed on May 26, 2005;102 hence, Annex 1 dated
May 27, 2005,103 Annex 4 dated June 1, 2005, and Annex 5 also dated June 1, 2005, were
issued as a mere afterthought.
VI.
The Court of Appeals did not err in
awarding money claims and damages
With regard to the award of money claims, 104 Elena likewise argues that the Labor Arbiter
erred in notadmitting Annexes 7 to 74, citing Lee v. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 85. On this matter, the Court of Appeals quoted the Labor Arbiter’s decision, stating
that:
With respect to Annexes 7 to 74 to prove compliance of labor standards, the same cannot be
admissible in evidence because they are mere Xerox copies which are easily subjected to
interpolation and tampering.
Besides, Annex 69 which purports to be payment of 13th month pay for 2004 of complainant
Gallano but no amount is indicated. Again, Annex 71 states 13th month pay for ₱4,500.00 for
complainant Gallano yet there is no signature of Gallano acknowledging receipt thereof. If
one document is tainted with fraud, all other Xerox documents are fraudulent.105
In their comment, respondents argued that Elena’s claim of payment is refuted by her own
admission that she did not pay respondents’ ECOLA and she even asked for exemption from
paying them.106
The Court of Appeals found that, indeed, Elena admitted that respondents were not paid their
ECOLA and that she asked for exemption from doing so. 107 In addition, Elena’s allegations of
payment of the other monetary claims, such as 13th month pay, holiday pay, and premium for
holiday pay, were not supported by substantial evidence.108
A review of the records reveals that even if the Court of Appeals considered the vouchers
marked as Annexes 7 to 74 and submitted by Elena, these would only disprove her claim of
payment.
109
Annexes 7 to 74  are vouchers showing payment of holiday pay, 13th month pay, and
service incentive leave pay to respondents. However, not all vouchers were signed by them.
Further, in some of the vouchers, the amount given to respondents was not written. Hence,
these vouchers do not prove Elena's claim of payment.
As to the award of money claims, including moral and exemplary damages, Elena argued that
respondents did not present evidence to prove their entitlement to damages.110
Considering the circumstances surrounding respondents' dismissal, the Court of Appeals did
not err in upholding the Labor Arbiter's award of moral and exemplary damages. Indeed,
there was malice when, as a retaliatory measure, petitioners dismissed respondents because
they filed a labor complaint. Further, Elena violated respondents' rights to substantive and
procedural due process when she failed to issue notices to explain and notices of termination.
Gone are the days when workers were reduced to mendicant despondency by their
employers.1âwphi1 Within our legal order, workers have legal rights and procedures to claim
these rights. The only way for employers to avoid legal action from their workers is to give
them what they may be due in law and.as human beings. Businesses thrive through the
acumen of their owners and entrepreneurs. But, none of them will exist without the outcome
of the sacrifices and toil of their workers. Our economy thrives through this partnership based
upon mutual respect. At the very least, these are the values which are congealed in our
present laws.
Apparently, in this case, the owners forgot that labor is not merely a factor of production. It is
a human product no matter how modest it may seem to them.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals' decision dated July 28, 2009, and
its resolution dated November 27, 2009, reinstating the Labor Arbiter's decision dated August
2, 2006, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 192893               June 5, 2013
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF SPOUSES DIONISIO DELOY and PRAXEDES MARTONITO, represented by
POLICARPIO DELOY, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking the reversal of the November 9, 2009 Decision' and the July 5, 2010 Resolution 2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 96998. The challenged decision set aside the
May 4, 2006 Resolution3 and the September 27, 2006 Order4 of the Regional Trial Court,
Trece Martires City, Branch 23 (RTC), which affirmed the dismissal of an unlawful detainer
case by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Trece Martires City (MTCC).
The Facts
On July 8, 2003, Domingo Deloy, Maria Deloy-Masicap, Zosimo Deloy, Mario Deloy, Silveria
Deloy-Mabiling, Norma Deloy, Milagros Panganiban, Lino Deloy, Cornelio Deloy, Maricel
Deloy, Adelina Banta, Rogelio Deloy, Evelyn Deloy, Edgardo Deloy, Cynthia Deloy, Donnabel
Deloy, Glenda Deloy, Arnel Deloy, Ronnio Deloy, Isagani L. Reyes, and Policarpio Deloy
(respondents), all heirs of Spouses Dionisio Deloy (Dionisio) and Praxedes Martonito-Deloy,
represented by Policarpio Deloy, instituted the Complaint for Unlawful Detainer5 against
Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) before the MTCC.
Respondents are the owners, by way of succession, of a parcel of land consisting of 8,550
square meters located in Trece Martires City (Trece Martires property). On November 12,
1965, Dionisio, respondents’ predecessor-in-interest, donated a 680-square meter portion
(subject land) of the 8,550 square meter property to the Communications and Electricity
Development Authority (CEDA) for the latter to provide cheap and affordable electric supply
to the province of Cavite. A deed of donation 6 was executed to reflect and formalize the
transfer.
Sometime in 1985, CEDA offered for sale to MERALCO, its electric distribution system,
consisting of transformers and accessories, poles and hardware, wires, service drops, and
customer meters and all rights and privileges necessary for providing electrical service in
Cavite. This was embodied in a memorandum of agreement (MOA), 7 dated June 28, 1985,
signed by the parties.
On the same date, June 28, 1985, after the approval of the MOA, CEDA and MERALCO
executed the Deed of Absolute Sale. Thereafter, MERALCO occupied the subject land.
On October 11, 1985, MERALCO, through its Assistant Vice President and Head of the Legal
Department, Atty. L.D. Torres (Atty. Torres), wrote a letter 8 to Dionisio requesting the latter’s
permission for the continued use of the subject land as a substation site.
The parties were not able to reach any agreement. In an internal memorandum, 9 dated
December 16, 1985, from L.G. De La Paz of the Trece Martires Substation of MERALCO to
Atty. G.R. Gonzales and Atty. Torres of the Realty Division of MERALCO, it was stated that
the death of Dionisio, the lack of agreement yet among the heirs, and a request that a
member of the Deloy family be employed by MERALCO were some of the reasons.
Meanwhile, respondents claimed that they had no immediate use for the subject land and that
they were preoccupied with the judicial proceedings to rectify errors involving the
reconstituted title of the Trece Martires property, which included the subject land. On
November 22, 2001, the proceedings were terminated and the decision became final.10 Not
long after,respondents offered to sell the subject land to MERALCO, but their offer was
rejected.
For said reason, in their letter,11 dated May 19, 2013, respondents demanded that MERALCO
vacate the subject land on or before June 15, 2003. Despite the written demand, MERALCO
did not move out of the subject land. Thus, on July 8, 2003, respondents were constrained to
file the complaint for unlawful detainer.
Traversing respondents’ complaint, MERALCO countered that CEDA, as the owner of the
subject land by virtue of the deed of donation executed by Dionisio, lawfully sold to it all rights
necessary for the operation of the electric service in Cavite by way of a deed of sale on June
28, 1985.
MERALCO stressed that the condition of providing affordable electricity to the people of
Cavite,12 imposed in the deed of donation between Dionisio and CEDA, was still being
observed and complied with. Thus, MERALCO claimed that, being CEDA’s successor-in-
interest, it had legal justification to occupy the subject land.
On September 15, 2005, the MTCC rendered the decision 13 dismissing respondents’
complaint for unlawful detainer against MERALCO.
The MTCC ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the case because it would require an
interpretation of the deed of donation making it one not capable of pecuniary estimation.
Nevertheless, it opined that MERALCO was entitled to the possession of the subject land. It
was of the view that it would only be when the deed of donation would be revoked or the
deed of sale nullified that MERALCO’s possession of the subject land would become
unlawful.
Aggrieved, respondents appealed the MTCC ruling to the RTC. In its May 4, 2006 Resolution,
the RTC sustained the MTCC decision.
The RTC pointed out that the only issue in an unlawful detainer case was possession. It
affirmed the MTCC ruling that the latter had no jurisdiction to interpret contracts involving the
sale of the subject land to MERALCO, after the latter raised the issue of ownership of the
subject land. According to the RTC, the interpretation of the deed of sale and the deed of
donation was the main, not merely incidental, issue.
Respondents moved for reconsideration but their motion was denied by the RTC in its
September 27, 2006 Order.
Not satisfied with the adverse ruling, respondents elevated the case before the CA via a
petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
In its November 9, 2001 Decision, the CA set aside the RTC ruling.
The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution, dated May 4,
2006, and Order, dated September 27, 2006, both of the Regional Trial Court of Trece
Martires City, Branch 23, in Civil Case No. TMCV-0055005, are hereby SET ASIDE and a
new one rendered partially granting Petitioners’ Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against
Respondent. Accordingly, Respondent is ordered to vacate the subject property and to pay
Petitioners the amount of ₱50,0000.00 monthly rental counting from June 16, 2003, up to the
time Respondent shall have fully vacated the subject property, and ₱25,000.00 as attorney’s
fees. Costs against Respondent.
SO ORDERED.14
In partially granting the appeal, the CA explained that an ejectment case, based on the
allegation of possession by tolerance, would fall under the category of unlawful detainer.
Unlawful detainer involved the person’s withholding from another of the possession of real
property to which the latter was entitled, after the expiration or termination of the former’s
right to hold possession under a contract, either express or implied. Where the plaintiff
allowed the defendant to use his/her property by tolerance without any contract, the
defendant was necessarily bound by an implied promise that he/she would vacate on
demand, failing which, an action for unlawful detainer would lie.
As to the issue of possession, the CA stated that by seeking Dionisio’s permission to
continuously occupy the subject land, MERALCO expressly acknowledged his paramount
right of possession. MERALCO, thru its representative, Atty. Torres, would not have asked
permission from Dionisio if it had an unconditional or superior right to possess the subject
land. The CA considered the fact that this recognition of Dionisio’s right over the subject land
was amplified by another letter, dated December 16, 1985,15 by one L.G. De la Paz to Atty.
Torres, expressly declaring Dionisio as the owner of the subject land. MERALCO never
disputed the declarations contained in these letters. Neither did it claim that the same was
made through palpable mistake. Indeed, Meralco even marked these letters as documentary
exhibits. Pursuant to Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, these admissions and/or
declarations may be admitted against Meralco.
MERALCO moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied by the CA in its July 5, 2010
Resolution.
Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUES
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL
DETAINER.
II
WHETHER OR NOT EVIDENCE ALIUNDE, SUCH AS THE LETTERS DATED 11
OCTOBER 1985 OF PETITIONER’S ASSISTANT VICE PRESIDENT AND HEAD OF LEGAL
DEPARTMENT, L.D. TORRES AND INTERNAL MEMORANDUM DATED 6 DECEMBER
1985 OF PETITIONER’S L.G. DELA PAZ WHICH PURPORTEDLY RECOGNIZED
RESPONDENTS’ OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY CAN PREVAIL OVER THE DEED OF
ABSOLUTE SALE.
III
WHETHER OR NOT TITLE TO THE PROPERTY DONATED TO CEDA WAS VALIDLY
TRANSFERRED TO THE PETITIONER.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE SALE OF THE PROPERTY TO THE PETITIONER VIOLATED OR
REVOKED THE DONATION TO CEDA.
V
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT WAS BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION AND
LACHES.16
Simply put, the vital issues for the Court’s consideration are: (1) whether an action for
unlawful detainer is the proper remedy in this case; and (2) if it is, who has a better right of
physical possession of the disputed property.
In presenting its case before the Court, MERALCO argues that respondents’ complaint before
the MTCC failed to state a cause of action for unlawful detainer, but for one incapable of
pecuniary estimation, because the issue of physical possession is inextricably linked with the
proper interpretation of the deed of donation executed between Dionisio and CEDA. Thus,
the MTCC was without jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Further, MERALCO avers
that it validly acquired title to the subject land by virtue of the deed of sale executed by CEDA
in its favor on June 28, 1985. As a consequence, MERALCO contends that extrinsic or
extraneous evidence, such as the letters, dated October 11, 1985 and December 6, 1985,
cannot contradict the terms of the deed of sale between CEDA and MERALCO pursuant to
Section 9, Rule 13017 of the Rules of Court.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally
withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under
any contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is
originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to
possess.18 The only issue to be resolved in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the
parties involved.19
An ejectment case, based on the allegation of possession by tolerance, falls under the
category of unlawful detainer. Where the plaintiff allows the defendant to use his/her property
by tolerance without any contract, the defendant is necessarily bound by an implied promise
that he/she will vacate on demand, failing which, an action for unlawful detainer will lie.20
Jurisdiction of the MTCC
MERALCO contends that respondents’ complaint failed to make out a case for unlawful
detainer but, rather, one incapable of pecuniary estimation, properly cognizable by the RTC
and not the MTCC. It stresses the allegations in the complaint involve a prior determination
on the issue of ownership before the issue of possession can be validly resolved.
This contention fails to persuade.
When the issue of ownership is raised in an ejectment case, the first level courts are not ipso
facto divested of its jurisdiction. Section 33 (2) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691,21 provides:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in Civil Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided,
That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings
and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership,
the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
[Underscoring supplied.]
xxxx
In this regard, Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court allows the first level courts, in
ejectment cases, to provisionally determine the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of
resolving the issue of physical possession.
Sec. 16. Resolving defense of ownership.–When the defendant raises the defense of
ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine
the issue of possession.
Accordingly, it is unquestionably clear that the first level courts are clothed with the power to
preliminarily resolve questions on the ownership of real property, if necessary, to arrive at the
proper and complete determination of the question on physical possession or possession de
facto. Thus, as correctly ruled by the CA, the MTCC should have taken cognizance of the
complaint as it was well within its jurisdiction to do so. Moreover, considering that B.P. Blg.
129, as amended, has distinctly defined and granted the MTCC with jurisdiction, it is the trial
court’s duty and obligation to exercise the same when properly invoked.
Right of Possession
As earlier stated, on the issue of possession, the CA opined that by seeking Dionisio’s
permission to occupy the subject land, MERALCO expressly acknowledged his paramount
right of possession.
MERALCO posits that extrinsic evidence, such as the letter request, dated October 11, 1985,
and the Internal Memorandum, dated December 6, 1985, cannot contradict the terms of the
deed of sale between CEDA and MERALCO pursuant to Section 9, Rule 130 22 of the Rules of
Court.
The Court has combed the records and is not convinced.
It is undisputed that on October 11, 1985 or four (4) months after the approval of the MOA
and the corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale, MERALCO, through its Assistant Vice
President and Head of the Legal Department, Atty. Torres , sent a letter to Dionisio seeking
his permission for the continued use of the subject land. The letter reads:
Mr. Dionisio Deloy
Trece Martires City 2724
Province of Cavite
Dear Mr. Deloy:
This has reference to the Deed of Donation (Inter-vivos) executed on November 12, 1965
between Communications and Electricity Development Authority (CEDA) and Dionisio D(e)loy
for a 680-square meter of land used as a substation site adjacent to A.B. Memorial Hospital x
x x.
In compliance with the franchise Nationalization program of the National Government, we
wish to inform you that Meralco had taken over the electric operations in the province of
Cavite being served by CEDA.
In view of this recent development, may we respectfully request you to please allow Manila
Electric Company (Meralco) to continue the use of the above-mentioned portion of land as a
substation site, subject to the terms and conditions which we may mutually agree upon.
In the interest of public service, we shall highly appreciate your kind cooperation on this
matter and awaiting your reply.
Very truly yours,
[Signed]
L. D. TORRES
Assistant Vice-President
& Head, Legal Department23
[Underscoring supplied]
Relative thereto, L.G. De La Paz of the Trece Martires Substation of MERALCO sent the
December 16, 1985 Internal Memorandum, addressed to Atty. G.R. Gonzales and Atty.
Torres, informing them of some obstacles in reaching a lease agreement with the Deloys.
The Internal Memorandum reads:
ATTY. G.R. GONZALES
ATTY. L.D. TORRES TRECE MARTIRES SUBTATION
REALTY SERVICES
DECEMBER 16, 1985
This refers to the proposed contract of lease with Mr. Dionisio Deloy, co-owner of the lot
wherein the Trece Martires Substation is located.
Mr. Deloy had donated the use of 680-sq. m. portion of his co-owned land for CEDA’s
substation in Trece Martires in 1966. Copy of the Donation is enclosed. On October 11, 1985,
the company informed him through its letter of its intention of continuing with the use of the
property as a result of its acquisition of CEDA’s franchise. He agreed to the request and
proposed rental would be free provided one of his sons/grandsons would be employed by
Meralco. Governor Remulla had favorably recommended Lino Deloy, one of his grandsons,
for a position in the company. A son, Mr. Policarpio Deloy, former CEDA employee, had
passed Meralco’s entrance examination. According to PAD, his application papers were
being processed by the Branch Services Department.
It was unfortunate that when we went to see him on December 6, 1985, to finalize the
Contract of Lease, the man was already dead. His body laid at state in his residence. He died
on December 5, 1985. As it was not proper to discuss things with the family, we asked the
wife when the family would be available. She suggested that we should come back on
December 21, 1985. On that day, all the members of the family would be free to confer with
us.
There are some problems that may come up with the death of Mr. Deloy. These are:
1. the settlement of his estate among his heirs
2. the desire to have more members of the family to be employed in Meralco
3. the rent free use of the substation may not push through
4. the proper signatories in the contract of lease to be drawn
We do hope whatever the problem may be, we will be able to work it out.
For your information.
[Signed]
L.G. DE LA PAZ
x x x x.
Evidently, by these two documents, MERALCO acknowledged that the owners of the subject
land were the Deloys. It is clear as daylight. The first letter was written barely four (4) months
after the deed of sale was accomplished. As observed by the CA, MERALCO never disputed
the declarations contained in these letters which were even marked as its own exhibits.
Pursuant to Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, these admissions and/or
declarations are admissible against MERALCO.
SEC. 26. Admissions of a party – The act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant
fact may be given in evidence against him.
In Heirs of Bernardo Ulep v. Ducat,24 it was written, thus:
x x x Being an admission against interest, the documents are the best evidence which affords
the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. The rationale for the rule is based on the
presumption that no man would declare anything against himself unless such declaration was
true. Thus, it is fair to presume that the declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is his
fault if it does not.
Guided by the foregoing rules and jurisprudence, the Court holds that the letter and the
internal memorandum presented, offered and properly admitted as part of the evidence on
record by MERALCO itself, constitute an admission against its own interest. Hence,
MERALCO should appropriately be bound by the contents of the documents.1âwphi1
Nevertheless, in this petition, MERALCO insists that extrinsic evidence, such as the two
documents, even if these were their own, cannot contradict the terms of the deed of sale
between CEDA and MERALCO pursuant to Section 9, Rule 13025 of the Rules of Court.
The Court has read the MOA and the Deed of Absolute Sale but found nothing that clearly
stated that the subject land was included therein. What were sold, transferred and conveyed
were "its electric distribution facilities, service drops, and customers' electric meters except
those owned by the VENDOR'S customers, x x x, and all the rights and privileges necessary
for the operation of the electric service x x x." 26 No mention was made of any land. Rights and
privileges could only refer to franchises, permits and authorizations necessary for the
operation of the electric service. The land on which the substation was erected was not
included, otherwise, it would have been so stated in the two documents. Otherwise, also,
MERALCO would not have written Dionisio to ask permission for the continued use of the
subject land.
At any rate, it is fundamental that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible
and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. It
bears to emphasize that the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership of the
property, including possession.1âwphi1 Thus, the Court must uphold the age-old rule that the
person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to its possession. 27 In Pascual v.
Coronel,28 the Court reiterated the rule that a certificate of title has a superior probative value
as against that of an unregistered deed of sale in ejectment cases.
On a final note, the Court must stress that the ruling in this case is limited only to the
determination as to who between the parties has a better right to possession. This
adjudication is not a final determination on the issue of ownership and, thus, will not bar any
party from filing an action raising the matter of ownership.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191015               August 6, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE C. GO, AIDA C. DELA ROSA, and FELECITAS D. NECOMEDES,** Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The power of courts to grant demurrer in criminal cases should be exercised with great
caution, because not only the rights of the accused - but those of the offended party and the
public interest as well - are involved. Once granted, the accused is acquitted and the
offended party may be left with no recourse. Thus, in the resolution of demurrers, judges
must act with utmost circumspection and must engage in intelligent deliberation and
reflection, drawing on their experience, the law and jurisprudence, and delicately evaluating
the evidence on hand.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the September 30, 2009
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 101823, entitled "People of the
Philippines, Petitioner, versus Hon. Concepcion Alarcon-Vergara et al., Respondents," as
well as its January 22, 2010 Resolution3 denying reconsideration of the assailed judgment.
Factual Antecedents
The following facts appear from the account of the CA:
On October 14, 1998, the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) issued
Resolution No. 1427 ordering the closure of the Orient Commercial Banking Corporation
(OCBC) and placing such bank under the receivership of the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation (PDIC). PDIC, as the statutory receiver of OCBC, effectively took charge of
OCBC’s assets and liabilities in accordance withits mandate under Section 30 of Republic Act
7653.
xxxx
While all the aforementioned events were transpiring, PDIC began collecting on OCBC’s past
due loans receivable by sending demand letters to its borrowers for the immediate settlement
oftheir outstanding loans. Allegedly among these borrowers of OCBC are Timmy’s, Inc. and
Asia Textile Mills, Inc. which appeared to have obtained a loanof [P]10 Million each. A
representative of Timmy’s, Inc. denied being granted any loan by OCBC and insisted that the
signatures on the loan documents were falsified. A representative of Asia Textile Mills, Inc.
denied having applied, much less being granted, a loan by OCBC.
The PDIC conducted an investigation and allegedly came out with a finding that the loans
purportedly in the names of Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. were released in the
form of manager’schecks in the name of Philippine Recycler’s and Zeta International, Inc.
These manager’s checks were then allegedly deposited to the savings account of the private
respondent Jose C. Go with OCBC and, thereafter, were automatically transferred to his
current account in order to fund personal checks issued by him earlier.
On September 24, 1999, PDIC filed a complaint4 for two (2) counts of Estafa thru Falsification
of CommercialDocuments in the Office of the City Prosecutor of the City of Manila against the
private respondents in relation to the purported loans of Timmy’s, Inc.and Asia Textile Mills,
Inc. On November 22, 2000, after finding probable cause, the Office of the City Prosecutor of
the City of Manila filed Informations5 against the private respondents which were docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 in the RTC in Manila.
Upon being subjected to arraignment by the RTC in Manila, the private respondents pleaded
not guilty to the criminal cases filed against them. A pretrial was conducted. Thereafter, trial
of the cases ensued and the prosecution presented its evidence. After the presentation of all
of the prosecution’s evidence, the private respondents filed a Motion for Leave to File
Demurrer to Evidence and a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition. The presiding judge granted the
private respondents’ Motion for Voluntary Inhibition and ordered the case to be re-raffled to
another branch. The case was subsequently re-raffled to the branch of the respondent RTC
judge.6
In an Order dated December 19, 2006, the respondent RTC judge granted the private
respondents’ Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence. On January 17, 2007, the
private respondents filed their Demurrer to Evidence7 praying for the dismissal of the criminal
cases instituted against them due to the failure of the prosecution to establish their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
On July 2, 2007, an Order8 was promulgated by the respondent RTC judge finding the private
respondents’ Demurrer to Evidence to be meritorious, dismissing the Criminal Case Nos. 00-
187318 and 00-187319 and acquitting all of the accused in these cases. On July20, 2007, the
private prosecutor in Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 moved for a
reconsideration of the July 2, 2007 Order but the same was denied by the respondent RTC
judge in an Order9 dated October 19, 2007.10
Surprisingly, and considering thathundreds of millions of Orient Commercial Banking
Corporation (OCBC) depositors’ money appear to have been lost – which must have
contributed to the bank’s being placed under receivership, no motion for reconsideration of
the July 2, 2007 Order granting respondents’ demurrer to evidence was filed by the handling
public prosecutor, Manila Prosecutor Marlo B. Campanilla (Campanilla). Only complainant
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and the
same lacked Campanilla’s approval and/or conformé; the copy of the Motion for
Reconsideration filed with the RTC11 does not bear Campanilla’s approval/conformé;
instead,it indicates thathe was merely furnished with a copy of the motion by registered
mail.12 Thus, while the prosecution’s copy of PDIC’sMotion for Reconsideration 13 bore
Campanilla’s subsequent approval and conformity, that which was actually filed by PDIC with
the RTC on July 30, 2007 did not contain the public prosecutor’s written approval and/or
conformity.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On January 4, 2008, the prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed
anoriginal Petition for Certiorari14 with the CA assailing the July 2, 2007 Order of the trial
court. Itclaimed that the Order was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lackor
excess of jurisdiction; that it was issued with partiality; that the prosecution was deprived of its
day in court; and that the trial court disregarded the evidence presented, which undoubtedly
showed that respondents committed the crime of estafa through falsification ofcommercial
documents.
On September 30, 2009, the CA issued the assailed Decision with the following decretal
portion: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the petition filed in this case is
hereby DENIED and the assailed Orders of the respondent RTC judge are AFFIRMED and
deemed final and executory.
SO ORDERED.15
Notably, in dismissing the Petition, the appellate court held that the assailed July 2, 2007
Order of the trial court became final since the prosecution failed to move for the
reconsideration thereof, and thus double jeopardy attached. The CA declared thus –
More important than the fact that double jeopardy already attaches is the fact that the July 2,
2007 Order of the trial court has already attained finality. This Order was received by the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila on July 3, 2007 and by the Private Prosecutor on July
5, 2007. While the Private Prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order, the
Public Prosecutor did not seek for the reconsideration thereof. It is the Public Prosecutor who
has the authority to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the said order and the Solicitor
General who can file a petition for certiorari with respect to the criminal aspect of the cases.
The failure of the Public Prosecutor to file a Motion for Reconsideration on or before July 18,
2007 and the failure of the Solicitor General to file a Petition for Certiorarion or before
September 1, 2007 made the order of the trial court final.
As pointed out by the respondents, the Supreme Court ruled categorically on this matter in
the case of Mobilia Products, Inc. vs. Umezawa (452 SCRA 736), as follows:
"In a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private
complainant or the offended party is limited to the civil liabilityarising therefrom. Hence, if a
criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, a reconsideration of the
order of dismissal or acquittal may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, insofar as the
criminal aspect thereof is concerned and may be made only by the public prosecutor; or in
the case of an appeal, by the State only, through the OSG. The private complainant or
offended party may not undertake such motion for reconsideration or appeal on the criminal
aspect ofthe case. However, the offended party or private complainant may file a motion for
reconsideration of such dismissal or acquittal or appeal therefrom but only insofar as the civil
aspect thereof is concerned. In so doing, the private complainant or offended party need not
secure the conformity of the public prosecutor. If the court denies his motion for
reconsideration, the private complainant or offended party may appeal or file a petition for
certiorarior mandamus, if grave abuse amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown
and the aggrieved party has no right of appeal or given an adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law."16
In addition, the CA ruled that the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the demurrer, or that it was denied its day in
court; that on the contrary, the prosecution was afforded every opportunity to present its
evidence, yet it failed to prove that respondents committed the crime charged.
The CA further held that the prosecution failed to present a witness who could testify, based
on personal knowledge, that the loan documents were falsified by the respondents; that the
prosecution should not have relied on "letters and unverified ledgers," and it "should have
trailed the money from the beginning to the end;"17 that while the documentary
evidenceshowed that the signatures in the loan documents were falsified, it has not been
shown who falsified them. It added that since only two of the alleged 13 manager’s checks
were being questioned, there arose reasonable doubt as to whether estafa was committed,
as to these two checks; instead, there is an "inescapable possibility that an honest mistake
was made in the preparation of the two questioned manager’s checks since these checks
were made out to the names of different payees and not in the names of the alleged
applicants of the loans."18 The appellate court added –
x x x Finally, the petitioner failed to present evidence on where the money went after they
were deposited to the checking account of the private respondent Jose C. Go. There is only a
vague reference that the money was used to fund the personal checks earlier issued by x x x
Go. The petitioner should have gone further and identified who were the recipients of these
personal checks and if these personal checks were negotiated and honored. With all the
resources of the public prosecutor’s office, the petitioner should have done a better job of
prosecuting the cases filed against the private respondents. It isa shame that all the efforts of
the government will go for naught due to the negligence of the public prosecutors in tying up
the chain of evidence in a criminal case.19
As a final point, the CA held that if errors were made inthe appreciation of evidence, these
are mere errors of judgment – and not errors of jurisdiction – which may no longer be
reviewed lest respondents be placed in double jeopardy.
The OSG moved for reconsideration, but in the assailed January 22, 2010 Resolution, the CA
stood its ground. Hence, the instant Petition was instituted.
Issues
In the Petition, it is alleged that –
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT
–
(a) NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT
RTC JUDGE IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE;
(b) THE ORDER OF ACQUITTAL HAS ALREADY ATTAINED FINALITY WHEN IT
WAS NOT CHALLENGED IN A TIMELY AND APPROPRIATE MANNER; AND
(c) THE LOWER COURT MERELY COMMITTED ERRORS OF JUDGMENT AND
NOT OF JURISDICTION.20
Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner argues that the public prosecutor actually filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
assailed July 2,2007 Order of the trial court granting respondents’ demurrer – that is, by
"joining"the private prosecutor PDIC in the latter’s July 20, 2007 Motion for Reconsideration.
Nonetheless,it admitted that while it joined PDIC in the latter’s July 20, 2007 Motion for
Reconsideration, it had only until July 18, 2007 within which to seek reconsideration since it
received the order on July 3, 2007, while the private prosecutor received a copy of the Order
only on July 5, 2007; it pleads thatthe two-day delay in filing the motion should not prejudice
the interests of the State and the People.
Petitioner assumes further that, since it was belated in its filing of the required Motion for
Reconsideration, it may have been tardy as well in the filing of the Petition for Certiorariwith
the CA, or CA-G.R. SP No. 101823. Still, it begs the Court to excuse its mistake in the
nameof public interest and substantial justice, and in order to maintain stability in the banking
industry given that the case involved embezzlement of large sums ofdepositors’ money in
OCBC.
Petitioner goes on to argue that the CAerred in affirming the trial court’s finding that demurrer
was proper. It claims that it was able to prove the offense charged, and it has shown that
respondents were responsible therefor.
In its Reply,21 petitioner claims thatthe July 2, 2007 Order of the trial court granting
respondents’ demurrer was null and void to begin with, and thus it could not have attained
finality. It adds thatcontrary to respondents’ submission, the private prosecutor’s Motion for
Reconsideration contained the public prosecutor’s written conformity, and that while it may be
saidthat the public prosecutor’s motion was two days late, still the trial court took cognizance
thereof and passed upon its merits; by so doing, the trial court thus validatedthe public
prosecutor’s action of adopting the private prosecutor’sMotion for Reconsideration as his
own. This being the case, it should therefore besaid that the prosecution’s resultant Petition
for Certiorariwith the CA on January 4, 2008 was timely filed within the required 60-day
period, counted from November 5, 2007,or the date the public prosecutor received the trial
court’s October 19, 2007 Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner submits further that a Petition for Certiorariwas the only available remedy against
the assailed Orders of the trial court, since the granting of a demurrer in criminal cases is
tantamount to an acquittal and is thus immediately final and executory. It adds that the denial
of its right to due process is apparent since the trial court’s grant of respondents’ demurrer
was purely capricious and done with evident partiality, despite the prosecution having
adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that they committed estafa through falsification of
commercial documents. Petitioner thus prays that the assailed CA dispositions be reversed
and that Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 be reinstated for further proceedings.
Respondents’ Arguments
Praying that the Petition be denied, respondents Jose C. Go (Go), Aida C. Dela Rosa (Dela
Rosa), and Felecitas D. Necomedes (Nicomedes) – the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 00-
187318 and 00-187319 – argue in their Comment 22 that the trial court’s grant of their
demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal; any subsequent prosecution for the same
offense would thus violate their constitutional right against double jeopardy. They add
thatsince the public prosecutor failed to timely move for the reconsideration of the trial court’s
July 2, 2007 Order, it could not have validly filed an original Petition for Certiorariwith the CA.
Nor can it be said that the prosecution and the private prosecutor jointly filed the latter’s July
20, 2007 Motion for Reconsideration with the trial court because the public prosecutor’s copy
of PDIC’smotion was merely sent through registered mail. Therefore if it were true that the
public prosecutor gave his approval or conformity to the motion, he did so only afterreceiving
his copy of the motion through the mail, and not at the time the private prosecutor actually
filed its Motion for Reconsideration with the trial court.
Next, respondents submit that petitioner was not deprived of its day in court; the grant of their
demurrer to evidence is based on a fair and judicious determination of the facts and evidence
bythe trial court, leading it to conclude that the prosecution failed to meet the quantum of
proof required to sustain a finding of guilt on the part of respondents. They argue thatthere is
no evidence to show that OCBC released loan proceeds to the alleged borrowers, Timmy’s,
Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc., and that these loan proceeds were then deposited in the
account of respondent Go. Since no loans were granted to the two borrowers, then there is
nothing for Go to misappropriate. With respect to the two manager’s checks issued to
Philippine Recycler’s Inc. and Zeta International, respondents contend that these may not
beconsidered to be the loan proceeds pertaining to Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc.’s
loan application because these checks were not in the name of the alleged borrowers
Timmy’s, Inc.and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. as payees. Besides, these two checks were never
negotiated with OCBC, either for encashmentor deposit, since they did not bear the
respective indorsements or signatures and account numbers of the payees; thus, they could
not be considered to havebeen negotiated nor deposited with Go’s account with OCBC.
Next, respondents argue that the cash deposit slip used to deposit the alleged loan proceeds
in Go’s OCBC account is questionable, since under banking procedure, a cash deposit slip
may not be used to deposit checks. Moreover, it has not been shown who prepared the said
cash deposit slip. Respondents further question the validity and authenticity of the other
documentary evidence presented, such as the Subsidiary Ledger, Cash Proof,23 Schedule of
Returned Checks and Other Cash Items (RTCOCI), etc.
Finally, respondents claim that not all the elementsof the crime of estafa under Article 315,
par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code have been established; specifically, it has not been
shown that Goreceived the alleged loan proceeds, and that a demand was made upon him
for the return thereof.
Our Ruling
The Court grants the Petition.
Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 for estafa through falsification of commercial
documents against the respondents are based on the theory that in 1997, fictitious loans in
favor of two entities – Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. – were approved, after which
two manager’s checks representing the supposed proceeds of these fictitious loans were
issued but made payable to two different entities – Philippine Recycler’sInc. and
ZetaInternational – without any documents issued by the supposed borrowers Timmy’s, Inc.
and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. assigning the supposedloan proceeds tothe two payees.
Thereafter, these two manager’s checks – together with several others totaling
₱120,819,475.0024 – were encashed, and then deposited in the OCBC Savings Account No.
00810-00108-0 of Go. Then, several automatic transfer deposits were made from Go’s
savings account to his OCBC Current Account No. 008-00-000015-0 which were then used to
fund Go’s previously dishonored personal checks.
The testimonial and documentary evidenceof the prosecution indicate that OCBC, a
commercial bank, was ordered closed by the BSP sometime in October 1998. PDIC was
designated as OCBC receiver, and it took over the bank’s affairs, assets and liabilities,
records, and collected the bank’s receivables.
During efforts to collect OCBC’s pastdue loan receivables, PDIC as receiver sent demand
letters to the bank’s debtor-borrowers on record, including Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile
Mills, Inc. which appeared to have obtained unsecured loans of ₱10 million each, and which
apparently remained unpaid. In response to the demand letters, Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia
Textile Mills, Inc. denied having obtained loans from OCBC. Timmy’s, Inc., through its
designated representative, claimed that while it is true that it applied for an OCBC loan, it no
longer pursued the application after it was granted a loan by another bank. When the OCBC
loan documents were presented to Timmy’s, Inc.’s officers, it was discovered that the
signatures therein of the corporate officers were forgeries. In their defense and to clarify
matters, Timmy’s, Inc.’s corporate officers executed affidavits and furnished official
documents such as their passports and the corporation’s Articles of Incorporation containing
their respectivesignatures to show PDIC that their purported signatures in the OCBC loan
documents were forgeries. After its investigation into the matter, PDIC came to the conclusion
that the signatures on the Timmy’s, Inc. loan documents were indeed falsified.25
On the other hand, in a written reply 26 to PDIC’s demand letter, Asia Textile Mills, Inc.
vehemently denied thatit applied for a loan with OCBC. On this basis, PDIC concluded that
the AsiaTextile Mills, Inc.loan was likewise bogus. Moreover, PDIC discovered other bogus
loans in OCBC.
Through the falsified loan documents, the OCBC Loan Committee – composed of Go, who
was likewise OCBCPresident, respondent Dela Rosa (OCBC Senior Vice President, or SVP,
and Chief Operating Officer, or COO), Arnulfo Aurellano and Richard Hsu – approved a ₱10
million unsecured loan purportedly in favor of Timmy’s, Inc. After deducting finance charges,
advance interest and taxes, DelaRosa certified a net loan proceeds amounting to
₱9,985,075.00 covered by Manager’s Check No. 000000334727 dated February 5,
1997.28 The face of the check bears the notation "Loan proceeds of CL-484," the alpha
numeric code ("CL-484")of which refers to the purported loan of Timmy’s, Inc. 29 However, the
payee thereof was not the purported borrower, Timmy’s, Inc., but a certain "Zeta
International". Likewise, on even date, Manager’s Check No. 000000334030 for
₱9,985,075.00 was issued, and on its face is indicated "Loan proceeds of CL-477", which
alpha numeric code ("CL-477") refers to the purported loan of AsiaTextile Mills,
Inc.31 Manager’s Check No. 0000003340 was made payable not to Asia Textile Mills, Inc., but
to "Phil. Recyclers Inc."
On the same day that the subject manager’s checks were issued, or on February 5, 1997, it
appears that the two checks – together with other manager’s checks totaling
₱120,819,475.00– were encashed; on the face ofthe checks, the word "PAID" was stamped,
and at the dorsal portion thereof there were machine validations showing thatManager’s
Check No. 0000003347 was presented at 6:16 p.m., while Manager’s Check No. 0000003340
was presented at 6:18 p.m.32
After presentment and encashment, the amount of ₱120,819,475.00 – which among others
included the ₱9,985,075.00 proceeds of the purported Timmy’s, Inc. loan and the
₱9,985,075.00 proceeds of the supposed Asia Textile Mills, Inc. loan – was deposited in Go’s
OCBC Savings Account No. 00810-00108-0 at OCBC Recto Branch, apparently on
instructions of respondent Dela Rosa.33 The deposit is covered by OCBC Cash Deposit
Slip34 dated February 5, 1997, with the corresponding machine validation thereon indicating
that the deposit was made at 6:19 p.m.35 The funds were credited to Go’s savings account.36
It appears that previously, or on February 4, 1997, seven OCBC checks issued by Go from
his personal OCBC Current Account No. 008-00-000015-0 totaling ₱145,488,274.48 were
dishonored for insufficiency of funds.37 After Manager’s Check Nos. 0000003340 and
0000003347, along with several other manager’s checks, were encashed and the proceeds
thereof deposited in Go’s OCBC Savings Account No. 00810-00108-0 withautomatic
transferfeature to his OCBC Current Account No. 008-00-000015-0, funds were automatically
transferred from the said savings account to the current account, which atthe time contained
only a total amountof ₱26,332,303.69. Go’sOCBC Current Account No. 008-00-000015-0
was credited with ₱120,819,475.00, and thereafter the account registered a balance of
₱147,151,778.69. The seven previously dishonored personal checks were thenpresented for
clearing, and were subsequently cleared that sameday, or on February 5, 1997.38 Apparently,
they were partly funded by the ₱120,819,475.00manager’s check deposits – which include
Manager’s Check Nos. 0000003340 and 0000003347.
During the examination and inquiry into OCBC’s operations, oron January 28, 1998, Go
issued and sent a letter39 to the BSP, through Maria Dolores Yuviengco, Director of the
Departmentof Commercial Banks, specifically requesting that the BSP refrain from sending
any communication to Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc., among others. He manifested
that he was "willing to assume the viability and full payment"of the accounts under
investigation and examination, including the Timmy’s, Inc. and AsiaTextile Mills, Inc.
accounts.
Demurrer to the evidence40 is "an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that
the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not,
to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiencyof the
whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the
evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or
sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. x x x Sufficient
evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence in character, weight
or amount as will legally justify the judicial or official action demanded according to the
circumstances. To be considered sufficient therefore, the evidence must prove: (a) the
commission of the crime, and (b) the precise degree of participation therein by the
accused."41 Thus, when the accused files a demurrer, the court must evaluate whether the
prosecution evidence is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.42
"The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court,
and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such
discretion."43 As to effect, "the grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal and
cannot be appealed because it would place the accused in double jeopardy. The order is
reviewable only by certiorariif it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack or
excess of jurisdiction."44 When grave abuse of discretion is present, an order granting a
demurrer becomes null and void.
As a general rule, an order granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence amounts to an
acquittal. There are certain exceptions, however, as when the grant thereof would not violate
the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. For instance, this Court ruled that when
there is a finding that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in
dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence,its judgment is
considered void, as this Court ruled in People v. Laguio, Jr.:
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts
granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of
certiorariunder Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not
result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate
court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double
jeopardy is not violated.
In the instant case, having affirmed the CA finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court when it granted the accused’s demurrer to evidence, we deem its consequent order
of acquittal void.45
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as "that capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. ‘The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.’ The party questioning the acquittal
of an accused should be able toclearly establish that the trial court blatantly abused its
discretion such that it was deprived of its authority to dispense justice."46
In the exercise of the Court’s "superintending control over inferior courts, we are to be guided
by all the circumstances of each particular case ‘as the ends of justice may require.’ So it is
that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do
substantial justice."47
Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, the Court declaresthat the CA grossly erred in
affirming the trial court’s July 2, 2007 Order granting the respondent’s demurrer, which Order
was patently null and void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion and manifest
irregularity, thus causing substantial injury to the banking industry and public
interest.1avvphi1 The Court finds that the prosecution has presented competent evidence to
sustain the indictment for the crime of estafa through falsification of commercial documents,
and that respondents appear to be the perpetrators thereof. In evaluating the evidence, the
trial court effectively failed and/or refused to weigh the prosecution’s evidence against the
respondents, which it was duty-bound to do as a trier of facts; considering that the case
involved hundreds of millions of pesos of OCBC depositors’ money – not to mention that the
banking industry is impressed with public interest, the trial court should have conducted itself
with circumspection and engaged in intelligent reflection in resolving the issues.
The elements of estafa through abuse ofconfidence under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code48 are: "(a) that money,goods or other personal property is received by
the offender in trust oron commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation
orconversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt;
(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d)
there is demand by the offended party to the offender."49
Obviously, a bank takes its depositors’ money as a loan, under an obligation to return the
same; thus, the term "demand deposit."
The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions of the Civil
Code on simpleloan. Article 1980 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "x x x savingsx x x
deposits of money in banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions
concerning simple loan." There is a debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and its
depositor. The bank is the debtor and the depositor is the creditor. The depositor lends the
bank money and the bank agrees to pay the depositor on demand. x x x50
Moreover, the banking laws impose high standards on banks in view of the fiduciary nature of
banking."This fiduciary relationship means that the bank’s obligation to observe ‘high
standards ofintegrity and performance’ is deemed written into every deposit agreement
between a bank and its depositor. The fiduciary nature of banking requires banks to assume
a degree of diligence higher than that of a good father of a family."51
In Soriano v. People,52 it was held that the President of a bank is a fiduciary with respect to
the bank’s funds, and he holds the same in trust or for administration for the bank’s benefit.
From this, it may beinferred that when such bank president makes it appear through
falsification that an individual or entity applied for a loan when in fact such individual or entity
did not, and the bank president obtains the loan proceeds and converts the same, estafa is
committed.
Next, regarding misappropriation, the evidence tends to extablish that Manager’s Check
Nos.0000003340 and 0000003347 were encashed, using the bank’s funds which clearly
belonged to OCBC’s depositors, and then deposited in Go’s OCBC Savings Account No.
00810-00108-0 at OCBC Recto Branch – although he was not the named payee therein.
Next, the money was automatically transferred to Go’s OCBC Current Account No. 008-00-
000015-0 and used to fund his seven previously-issued personal checks totaling
₱145,488,274.48, which checks were dishonored the day before. Simply put, the evidence
strongly indicates that Go converted OCBC funds to his own personal use and benefit. "The
words ‘convert’ and ‘misappropriate’ connote an act of using or disposing of another’s
property as if it were one’s own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that
agreed upon. To misappropriate for one’s own use includes not only conversion to one’s
personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without
right. x x x In proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, a legal presumption of
misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return
the items to be sold and fails to give an account of their whereabouts.Thus, the
merepresumption of misappropriation or conversion is enough to conclude thata probable
cause exists for the indictment x x x."53
As to the third element of estafa, there is no question that as a consequence of the
misappropriation of OCBC’s funds, the bank and its depositors have been prejudiced; the
bank has been placed under receivership, and the depositors’ money is no longer under their
unimpeded disposal.
Finally, on the matter of demand, while it has not been shown that the bank demanded the
return of the funds, it has nevertheless been held that "[d]emand is not an element of the
felony or a condition precedent tothe filing of a criminal complaint for estafa. Indeed, the
accusedmay be convicted ofthe felony under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Code if the prosecution proved misappropriation or conversion by the accused of the
money or property subject of the Information. In a prosecution for estafa, demand is not
necessary where there is evidence of misappropriation or conversion." 54 Thus, strictly
speaking, demand is not an element of the offense of estafa through abuse of confidence;
even a verbal query satisfies the requirement.55 Indeed, in several past rulings of the Court,
demand was not even included as anelement of the crime of estafa through abuse of
confidence, orunder paragraph 1(b).56
On the other hand, the elements of the crime of falsification of commercial document under
Art. 17257 are: "(1) that the offender is a private individual; (2) that the offender committed any
of the acts of falsification; and (3) that the act of falsification is committed ina commercial
document."58 As to estafa through falsification of public, official or commercial documents, it
has been held that –
The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a means of committing
Estafa, because before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the
crime of Falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not
being an element of the crime of falsification of public, official or commercial document. In
other words, the crime of falsification has already existed. Actually utilizing that falsified
public, official or commercial document todefraud another is estafa. But the damage is
caused by the commission of Estafa, not by the falsification of the document. Therefore, the
falsification of the public, official or commercial document is only a necessary means to
commit the estafa.59
Simulating OCBC loan documents – such as loan applications, credit approval
memorandums, and the resultant promissory notes and other credit documents – by causing
it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact
so participate, and by counterfeiting or imitating their handwriting or signatures constitute
falsification of commercial and public documents.
As to the respondents’ respective participation in the commission of the crime, suffice it to
state that as the beneficiary of the proceeds, Go is presumed to be the author of the
falsification. The fact that previously, his personal checks totaling ₱145,488,274.48 were
dishonored, and the day after, the amount of ₱120,819,475.00 was immediately credited to
his account, which included funds from the encashment of Manager’s Check Nos.
0000003340 and 0000003347 or the loan proceeds of the supposed Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia
Textile Mills, Inc. accounts, bolsters this view. "[W]henever someone has in his possession
falsified documents [which he used to] his advantage and benefit, the presumption that he
authored it arises."60
x x x This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so closely
connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the
capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers, and
therefore, had complicity in the forgery.
In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged
document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger.
Certainly, the channeling of the subjectpayments via false remittances to his savings account,
his subsequent withdrawals of said amount as well as his unexplained flight at the height of
the bank’s inquiry into the matter more than sufficiently establish x x x involvement in the
falsification.61
Likewise, Dela Rosa’s involvement inthe scheme has been satisfactorily shown. As OCBC
SVP and COO and member of the OCBC Loan Committee, she approved the purported
Timmy’s, Inc.loan, and she certified and signed the February 2, 1997 OCBC Disclosure
Statement and other documents.62 She likewise gave specific instructions to deposit the
proceeds of Manager’s Check Nos. 0000003340 and 0000003347, among others, in Go’s
OCBC Savings Account No. 00810-00108-0 at OCBC Recto Branch.63 Finally, she was a
signatory to the two checks.64
On the other hand, respondent Nicomedes as OCBC Senior Manager for Corporate Accounts
– Account Management Group, among others prepared the Credit Approval Memorandum
and recommended the approval of the loans.65
In granting the demurrer, the trial court – in its assailed July 2, 2007 Order – concluded that
based on the evidence adduced, the respondents could not have falsified the loan documents
pertaining toTimmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. since the individuals who assert that
their handwriting and signatures were forged were not presented incourt to testify on such
claim; that the prosecution witnesses – Honorio E. Franco, Jr. (Franco) of PDIC, the
designated Assisting Deputy Liquidator of OCBC, and Virginia Rowella Famirin (Famirin),
Cashier of OCBC Recto Branch – were not present when the loan documents were executed
and signed, and thus have no personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the
alleged falsification; and as high-ranking officers of OCBC, respondents could not be
expected to have prepared the saiddocuments. The evidence, however, suggests otherwise;
it shows that respondents had a direct hand in the falsification and creation of fictitious loans.
The loan documents were even signed by them. By disregarding what is evident in the
record, the trial court committed substantial wrong that frustrates the ends of justice and
adversely affects the public interest. The trial court’s act was so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of
discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility. x x x66
On the charge of estafa, the trial court declared that since the payees of Manager’s Check
Nos. 0000003340 and 0000003347 were not Asia Textile Mills, Inc. and Timmy’s, Inc.,
respectively, but other entities– Phil. Recyclers Inc. and Zeta International, and there are no
documents drawn by the borrowers assigning the loan proceeds to these two entities, then it
cannot besaid that there were loan proceeds released to these borrowers. The trial court
added that it is doubtful that the two manager’s checks were presented and negotiated for
deposit in Go’s savings account, since theydo not contain the required indorsements of the
borrowers, the signatures of the tellers and individuals/payees who received the checks and
the proceeds thereof, and the respective account numbers of the respondents; and the
checks were presented beyond banking hours. The trial court likewise held that the fact that a
cash deposit slip – and not a check deposit slip – was used to allegedly deposit the checks
raised doubts as to the truth of the allegation that the manager’s checks were deposited and
credited to Go’s savings account.
The CA echoed the trial court’s observations, adding that the evidence consisted of mere
"letters and unverifiedledgers" which were thus insufficient; that there was an "inescapable
possibility that an honest mistake was made" in the preparation and issuance of Manager’s
CheckNos. 0000003340 and 0000003347, since these two checks are claimed to be just a
few of several checks – numbering thirteen in all – the rest of which werenever questioned by
the receiver PDIC. The appellate court added that the prosecution should have presented
further evidence as to where the money went after being deposited inGo’s savings and
current accounts, identifying thus the recipients of Go’spersonal checks.
What the trial and appellate courts disregarded, however, is that the OCBC funds ended up in
the personal bank accountsof respondent Go, and were used to fund his personal checks,
even as he was not entitled thereto. These, if not rebutted, are indicative ofestafa, as may be
seen from the afore-cited Sorianocase.
The bank money (amounting to ₱8million) which came to the possession of petitioner was
money held in trust or administration by him for the bank, in his fiduciary capacity as the
President of said bank. It is not accurate to say that petitioner became the owner of the ₱8
million because it was the proceeds of a loan. That would have been correct if the bank
knowingly extended the loan to petitioner himself. But that is not the case here. According to
the information for estafa, the loan was supposed to be for another person, a certain "Enrico
Carlos"; petitioner, through falsification, made it appear that said "Enrico Carlos" applied for
the loan when infact he ("Enrico Carlos") did not. Through such fraudulent device, petitioner
obtained the loan proceeds and converted the same. Under these circumstances, it cannot
be said that petitioner became the legal owner of the ₱8 million. Thus, petitioner remained the
bank’s fiduciary with respect to that money, which makes it capable of misappropriation or
conversion in his hands.67
Thus, it is irrelevant that the proceeds of the supposed loans were made payable to entities
other than the alleged borrowers.1âwphi1 Besides, the manager’s checks themselves
indicate that they were the proceeds of the purported Timmy’s, Inc.’s and Asia Textile Mills,
Inc.’s loans, through the alpha numeric codes specifically assigned to them that are printed
on the face of the checks; the connection between the checks and the purported loans is thus
established. In the same vein, the CA’s supposition that there is an "inescapable possibility
that an honest mistake was made inthe preparation of the two questioned manager’s checks"
is absurd; even so, the bottom line is that they were encashed using bank funds, and the
proceeds thereof were deposited in Go’s bank savings and current accounts and used to fund
his personal checks.
Furthermore, as correctly pointed outby petitioner, it issuperfluous to require that the
recipients of Go’s personal checks be identified. For purposes of proving the crime, it has
been shown that Goconverted bank funds to his own personal use when they were deposited
in his accounts and his personal checks were cleared and the funds were debited from his
account.1âwphi1 This suffices. Likewise, the Court agrees that the prosecution’s reliance on
the supposed loan documents, subsidiary ledgers, deposit slip, cash proof, RTCOCI and
other documents was proper. They are both public and private documents which may be
received in evidence; notably, petitioner’s documentary evidence was admitted in full by the
trial court.68 With respect to evidence consisting of private documents, the presumption
remains that "therecording of private transactions has been fair and regular, and that the
ordinary course of business has been followed."69
Go’s January 28, 1998 letter to the BSP stating that he was "willing to assume the viabilityand
full payment" of the accounts under examination – which included the Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia
Textile Mills, Inc. accounts, among others – is an offer of compromise, and thus an implied
admission of guilt under Rule 130, Section 27 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.70
In addition, appellant’s act of pleading for his sister-in-law’s forgiveness may be considered
as analogous to an attempt to compromise, which in turn can be received as an implied
admission ofguilt under Section 27, Rule 130 x x x.71
As a result of the Court’s declaration of nullity of the assailed Orders of the trial court, any
dissection of the truly questionable actions of Prosecutor Campanilla – which should merit
appropriate disciplinary action for they reveal a patent ignorance of procedure, if not
indolence or a deliberate intention to bungle his own case – becomes unnecessary. It is
conceded that the lack of Campanilla’s approval and/or conforméto PDIC’s Motion for
Reconsideration should have rendered the trial court’s assailed Ordersfinal and executory
were it not for the fact that they were inherently null and void; Campanilla’s irresponsible
actions almost cost the People its day in court and their right to exact justice and retribution,
not to mention that they could have caused immeasurable damage to the banking industry.
Just the same, "[a] void judgment or order has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for
any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-existent. Such judgment or order may be
resisted in any action or proceeding whenever it is involved. It is not even necessary to take
any steps to vacate or avoid a void judgment or final order; it may simply be ignored." 72 More
appropriately, the following must be cited:
x x x Clearly, the assailed Order of Judge Santiago was issued in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. A void order is no order at all. It cannot confer any right or be
the source of any relief. This Court is not merely a court of law; it is likewise a court of justice.
To rule otherwise would leave the private respondent without any recourse to rectify the
public injustice brought about by the trial court's Order, leaving her with only the standing to
file administrative charges for ignorance of the law against the judge and the prosecutor. A
party cannot be left without recourse to address a substantive issue in law.73
Finally, it must be borne in mind that "[t]he granting of a demurrer to evidence should x x x be
exercised with caution, taking into consideration not only the rights of the accused, but also
the right of the private offended party to be vindicated of the wrongdoing done against him,
for if it is granted, the accused is acquitted and the private complainant is generally left with
no more remedy. In such instances, although the decision of the court may be wrong, the
accused can invoke his right against double jeopardy. Thus, judges are reminded to be more
diligent and circumspect in the performance of their duties as members of the Bench xx x."74
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The September 30, 2009 Decision and January 22,
2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The July 2, 2007
and October 19, 2007 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49 in Criminal
Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 are declared null and void, and the said cases are
ordered REINSTATED for the continuation of proceedings.
payments and returning a number of empty beer bottles and cases, she noticed that she still
owed petitioner a substantial amount. She then insisted that it provide her with a detailed
statement of account, but it failed to do so. In order to protect her rights and to compel SMC
to update her account, she ordered her bank to stop payment on the last seven checks she
had issued to petitioner,9 the details of which are as follows:10

SO ORDERED. Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Date Amount

Check No.
G.R. No. 185522               June 13, 2012 0012825 Sept. 16, 2000 ₱ 62,200.00
0008250 Sept. 18, 2000 190,000.00
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, Petitioner, 0012801 Sept. 25, 2000 190,000.00
vs. 0012802 Sept. 30, 2000 208,162.00
HELEN T. KALALO, Respondent. 0012826 Sept. 30, 2000 62,200.00
0012823 Sept. 30, 2000 104,327.00
DECISION 0012824 Oct. 14, 2000 104,326.00
TOTAL ₱ 921,215.00
SERENO, J.:
On 19 October 2000, instead of updating the account of respondent Kalalo, petitioner SMC
This Rule 45 Petition assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in sent her a demand letter for the value of the seven dishonored checks.11
CA-G.R. CR No. 30473. The CA affirmed the Decision3 and Order4 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 45, Manila, in Crim. Cases Nos. 04-230278-84, which had in turn affirmed the
On 5 December 2000, and in the face of constant threats made by the agents of
Decision5 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 11, Manila, in Crim. Case No.
SMC,12 respondent’s counsel wrote a letter (the "Offer of Compromise") wherein Kalalo
372535-41. The MeTC acquitted respondent Helen T. Kalalo ("Kalalo") of a violation of Batas
"acknowledge[d] the receipt of the statement of account demanding the payment of the sum
Pambansa Bilang 22, or the Bouncing Checks Law, but ruled that she was civilly liable to
of ₱ 816,689.00" and "submitt[ed] a proposal by way of ‘Compromise Agreement’ to settle the
petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) for the amount of ₱ 71,009 representing the value
said obligation."13
of unpaid goods.6

As culled from the records, it appears that respondent Kalalo had been a dealer of beer
products since 1998. She had a credit overdraft arrangement with petitioner SMC whereby,
prior to the delivery of beer products, she would be required to issue two checks to petitioner:
a blank check and a check to be filled up with an amount corresponding to the gross value of
the goods delivered. At the end of the week, Kalalo and an agent of SMC would compute the
actual amount due to the latter by deducting the value of the returned empty beer bottles and
cases from the gross value of the goods delivered. Once they succeeded in determining the
actual amount owed to SMC, that amount would be written on the blank check, and
respondent would fund her account accordingly.7
In time, respondent’s business grew and the number of beer products delivered to her by
SMC increased from 200 to 4,000 cases a week. Because of the increased volume of
deliveries, it became very difficult for her to follow and keep track of the transactions. Thus,
she requested regular statements of account from petitioner, but it failed to comply.8
In 2000, SMC’s agent required Kalalo to issue several postdated checks to cope with the
probable increase in orders during the busy Christmas season, without informing her of the
breakdown of the balance. She complied with the request; but after making several cash
It appears, however, that SMC did not accept the proposal. On 9 March 2001, it filed a
Complaint against respondent for violating the Bouncing Checks Law.14
In the meantime, Kalalo kept reiterating her demands that SMC update her account. During
trial, and after the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner finally complied. After tallying all
cash payments and funded checks and crediting all returned empty bottles and cases, the
Statement of Account showed that the net balance of the amount owed to petitioner was ₱
71,009.15 Respondent thereafter recanted her Offer of Compromise and stated that, at the
time she had the letter prepared, she was being threatened by SMC agents with
imprisonment, and that she did not know how much she actually owed petitioner.16
After trial on the merits, the MeTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, these cases are hereby dismissed and the accused is hereby acquitted of all
the charges against her. However, it appearing that she still owes the private complainant,
the accused is hereby ordered to pay the amount of ₱ 71,009.00 to private complainant.17
As the right against double jeopardy prevented an appeal of the criminal aspect of the case, 1. MRS. EVELYN R. MONTILLA/MINES & LYN General Merchandise
SMC appealed only the civil aspect of the MeTC’s Decision to the RTC. Petitioner claimed 624 Chacon St., Tondo, Manila
that it was entitled to the larger amount of ₱ 921,215.18 After the parties submitted their ₱ 413,444.50 amount of Pilsen, Red Horse and Grande Beers (full goods)
respective Memoranda, the RTC found no reversible error in the MeTC’s Decision, dismissed ₱ 115,500.00 amount of empties.
the appeal of petitioner,19 and denied the latter’s Motion for Reconsideration.20 2. Mr. DANIEL TOMAS/ MRS. FORTUNE TOMAS
Ladies and Rum Gen. Merchandizing (sic)
Dissatisfied with the RTC’s Decision, SMC filed with the CA a Rule 42 Petition for Review, 1501 N. Zamora St., Tondo, Manila
which was eventually dismissed by the appellate court.21 Petitioner moved for reconsideration, ₱ 150,000.00 amount of full goods, Pilsen and Red Horse beers.
to no avail.22
She is respectfully submitting her proposal by way of "Compromise Agreement" to settle the
SMC thereafter filed this Rule 45 Petition before this Court. 23 said obligation:

The Court’s Ruling Advance payment for the empties: ₱ 11,500.00

We deny the instant Petition and uphold the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Installment of ₱ 10,000.00 per month for the principal, then later on for the interest due.
appellate court.
Considering the economic crisis, she is hoping that her proposal merits your kind
I consideration and approval.

The Offer of Compromise may not be considered as evidence against respondent Kalalo. Very respectfully yours,

Petitioner argues that, in her Offer of Compromise, respondent "unequivocally admitted her SGD
liability to private complainant-appellant duly assisted by her counsel."24 Vicente G. Villamil
Counsel for Helen T. Kalalo25
We quote in full Kalalo’s Offer of Compromise addressed to petitioner:
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the aforequoted letter does not contain an express
acknowledgment of liability. At most, what respondent acknowledged was the receipt of the
December 5, 2000
statement of account, not the existence of her liability to petitioner.
Mr. JOSELITO MANALO
Furthermore, the fact that respondent made a compromise offer to petitioner SMC cannot be
GENERAL MANAGER
considered as an admission of liability. In Pentagon Steel Corporation v. Court of
San Miguel Corporation
Appeals,26 we examined the reasons why compromise offers must not be considered as
Biglang Awa Street
evidence against the offeror:
Caloocan City

Dear Sir:
My client, Ms. HELEN T. KALALO of No. 1055-A Dagupan Street, Tondo, Manila, hereby
acknowledges the receipt of the Statement of Account demanding the payment of the sum of
₱ 816,689.00 representing her unpaid accounts.
The reason why she was not able to pay her accounts on time is because she had great
difficulty in collecting from the following wholesalers:
First, since the law favors the settlement of controversies out of court, a person is entitled to
"buy his or her peace" without danger of being prejudiced in case his or her efforts fail; hence,
any communication made toward that end will be regarded as privileged. Indeed, if every
offer to buy peace could be used as evidence against a person who presents it, many
settlements would be prevented and unnecessary litigation would result, since no prudent
person would dare offer or entertain a compromise if his or her compromise position could be
exploited as a confession of weakness.
Second, offers for compromise are irrelevant because they are not intended as admissions by
the parties making them. A true offer of compromise does not, in legal contemplation, involve
an admission on the part of a defendant that he or she is legally liable, or on the part of a
plaintiff, that his or her claim is groundless or even doubtful, since it is made with a view to
avoid controversy and save the expense of litigation. It is the distinguishing mark of an offer
of compromise that it is made tentatively, hypothetically, and in contemplation of mutual
concessions. 27 (citations omitted)
Petitioner further argues that respondent’s Offer of Compromise may be received in evidence
as an implied admission of guilt.28 It quotes Rule 130, Section 27 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, which states:
Sec. 27. Offer of compromise not admissible. – In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not
an admission of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror.
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those
allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received
in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
We do not agree. As correctly pointed out by respondent, the Offer of Compromise dated 5
December 2000 was made prior to the filing of the criminal complaint against her on 9 March
2001 for a violation of the Bouncing Checks Law.29 The Offer of Compromise was clearly not
made in the context of a criminal proceeding and, therefore, cannot be considered as an
implied admission of guilt.
Finally, during the testimony of respondent and after her receipt of the Statement of Account
from SMC, she recanted the contents of the Offer of Compromise. She explained that, at the
time she had the letter prepared, the final amount owed to petitioner SMC was yet
undetermined; and that she was constantly facing threats of imprisonment from petitioner’s
agents. 30 The trial courts and the CA gave weight to her justification,31 and we find no cogent
reason to disturb their findings. We rule, therefore, that the Offer of Compromise may not be
considered as evidence against respondent Kalalo, nor can it be the basis of her liability to
petitioner in the amount of ₱ 921,215.
II
SMC failed to prove that Kalalo is indebted to it in the amount of ₱ 921,215.
SMC claims that it is entitled to collect the amount of ₱ 921,215 representing the value of
unpaid goods from respondent Kalalo. It argues that the MeTC erred in ruling that respondent
was liable to it to the extent of only ₱ 71,009, because the Statement of Account does not
reflect the transactions covered by the dishonored checks, as it only covers cash
transactions.32
We find, however, that aside from its bare assertions on appeal, SMC failed to present any
evidence to prove that cash transactions were treated differently from check transactions.
Respondent correctly argues that if the check transactions were covered by other statements
of account, petitioner should have presented evidence of those transactions during the
proceedings before the lower court.33
In any event, we cannot allow SMC to recover the amount of ₱ 921,215 from respondent, as
it failed to prove the existence of the purported indebtedness. The records are bereft of any
evidence, other than the dishonored checks, establishing the existence of that obligation.
Checks, however, are not issued merely for the payment of a preexisting obligation. They
may likewise be issued as a guarantee for the performance of a future obligation. In this case,
it was sufficiently established that the dishonored checks were issued merely to guarantee
the performance of a future obligation; that is, the payment of the net value of the goods after
the value of the empty bottles and beer cases returned to petitioner were deducted from the
gross value of the goods delivered to respondent.1âwphi1
As to the amount of ₱ 71,009, both parties admit that the Statement of Account provided by
SMC to respondent showed a liability of only ₱ 71,009. Respondent presented in evidence
the Statement of Account, which petitioner’s witness confirmed to have come from SMC’s
accounting department.34
We therefore rule that SMC failed to present enough evidence to prove Kalalo’s indebtedness
to it in the amount of ₱ 921,215, but that respondent’s obligation to petitioner in the amount of
₱ 71,009 is unrebutted and supported by sufficient evidence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no reversible error committed by the
appellate court, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30473 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 212140-41               January 21, 2015
SENATOR JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, Office of the
Ombudsman, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and ATTY. LEVITO D.
BALIGOD, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has no right to
cross-examine the witnesses which the complainant may present. Section 3, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the right to submit a
counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the
fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be
afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or crossexamine.
- Paderanga v. Drilon1
This case is a Petition for Certiorari 2 with prayer for (1) the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining respondents Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman), Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the Ombudsman, National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), and Atty. Levito D. Baligod (Atty. Baligod) (collectively,
respondents), from conducting further proceedings in OMB-CC-13-03013 and OMB-C-C-13-
0397 until the present Petition has been resolved with finality; and (2) this Court’s declaration
that petitioner Senator Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada (Sen. Estrada)was denied due process of
law, and that the Order of the Ombudsman dated 27 March 2014 and the proceedings in
OMB-C-C-13-03013 and OMB-C-C-13-0397 subsequent to and affected by the issuance of
the challenged 27 March 2014 Order are void.
OMB-C-C-13-0313,3 entitled National Bureau of Investigation and Atty. Levito D. Baligod v.
Jose "Jinggoy" P. Ejercito Estrada, et al.,refers to the complaint for Plunder as defined under
Republic Act (RA) No. 7080, while OMB-C-C-13-0397,4 entitled Field Investigation Office,
Office of the Ombudsman v. Jose "Jinggoy" P. Ejercito-Estrada, et al., refers to the complaint
for Plunder as defined underRA No. 7080 and for violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
The Facts
On 25 November 2013, the Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada a copy of the complaint
in OMB-C-C-13-0313, filed by the NBI and Atty. Baligod, which prayed, among others, that
criminal proceedings for Plunder as defined in RA No. 7080 be conducted against Sen.
Estrada. Sen. Estrada filed his counter-affidavit inOMB-C-C-13-0313 on 9 January 2014.
On 3 December 2013, the Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada a copy of the complaint in
OMB-C-C-13-0397, filed by the FIO of the Ombudsman, which prayed, among others, that
criminal proceedings for Plunder, as defined in RA No. 7080, and for violation of Section 3(e)
of RA No. 3019, be conducted against Sen. Estrada. Sen. Estrada filed his counter affidavit in
OMB-C-C-13-0397 on 16 January 2014.
Eighteen of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints filed their counter-affidavits
between 9 December 2013 and 14 March 2014.5
On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-
Affidavits of the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings (Request)
in OMB-C-C-13-0313. In his Request, Sen. Estrada asked for copies of the following
documents:
(a) Affidavit of [co-respondent] Ruby Tuason (Tuason);
(b) Affidavit of [co-respondent] Dennis L. Cunanan (Cunanan);
(c) Counter-Affidavit of [co-respondent] Gondelina G. Amata (Amata);
(d) Counter-Affidavit of [co-respondent] Mario L. Relampagos (Relampagos);
(e) Consolidated Reply of complainant NBI, if one had been filed; and
(f) Affidavits/Counter-Affidavits/Pleadings/Filings filed by all the other respondents
and/or additional witnesses for the Complainants.6
Sen. Estrada’s request was made "[p]ursuant to the right of a respondent ‘to examine the
evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished’ (Section 3[b],
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to ‘have access to the evidence on record’ (Section 4[c],
Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman)."7
On 27 March 2014, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Order in OMB-C-C-13-0313. The
pertinent portions of the assailed Order read:
This Office finds however finds [sic] that the foregoing provisions [pertaining to Section 3[b],
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman] do not entitle respondent [Sen. Estrada]to be furnished all the
filings of the respondents.
Rule 112 (3) (a) & (c) of the Rules of Court provides [sic]:
(a) The complaintshall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied
by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting
documents to establish probable cause …
x x x           x x x          x x x
(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and
supporting affidavits and documents, the respondent shall submit his counter affidavit
and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his
defense. The counter affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified as
provided in paragraph (a) of this section, with copies thereof furnished by him to the
complainant.
Further to quote the rule in furnishing copies of affidavits to parties under the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman [Section 4 of Rule II of Administrative Order No.
07 issued on April 10, 1990]:
 a) If the complaint is not under oath or is based only on official reports, the
investigating officer shall require the complainant or supporting witnesses to execute
affidavits to substantiate the complaints.
b) After such affidavits have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an
order, attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents,
directing the respondents to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his
counter-affidavits and controverting evidence with proof of service thereof on the
complainant. The complainant may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after
service of the counter-affidavits.
It can be gleaned from these aforecited provisions that this Office is required to furnish [Sen.
Estrada] a copy of the Complaint and its supporting affidavits and documents; and this Office
complied with this requirement when it furnished [Sen. Estrada] with the foregoing documents
attached to the Orders to File Counter-Affidavit dated 19 November 2013 and 25 November
2013.
It is to be noted that there is noprovision under this Office’s Rules of Procedure which entitles
respondent to be furnished all the filings by the other parties, e.g. the respondents. Ruby
Tuason, Dennis Cunanan, Gondelina G. Amata and Mario L. Relampagos themselves are all
respondents in these cases. Under the Rules of Court as well as the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman, the respondents are only required to furnish their counter-
affidavits and controverting evidence to the complainant, and not to the other respondents.
To reiterate, the rights of respondent [Sen.] Estrada in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation depend on the rights granted to him by law and these cannot be based on
whatever rights he believes [that] he is entitled to or those that may be derived from the
phrase "due process of law." Thus, this Office cannot grant his motion to be furnished with
copies of all the filings by the other parties. Nevertheless, he should be furnished a copy of
the Reply of complainant NBI as he is entitled thereto under the rules; however, as of this
date, no Reply has been filed by complainant NBI.
WHEREFORE, respondent [Sen.] Estrada’s Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-
Affidavits of the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filingsis
DENIED. He is nevertheless entitled to be furnished a copy of the Reply if complainant opts
to file such pleading.8 (Emphases in the original)
On 28 March 2014, the Ombudsman issued in OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397 a
Joint Resolution9 which found probable cause to indict Sen. Estrada and his co-respondents
with one count of plunder and 11 counts of violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. Sen.
Estrada filed a Motion for Reconsideration (of the Joint Resolution dated 28 March 2014)
dated 7 April 2014. Sen. Estrada prayed for the issuance of a new resolution dismissing the
charges against him. Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s 27
March 2014 Order denying his Request, Sen. Estrada filed the present Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 and sought to annul and set aside the 27 March 2014 Order.
THE ARGUMENTS
Sen. Estrada raised the following grounds in his Petition:
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, IN ISSUING THE CHALLENGED ORDER DATED 27
MARCH 2014, ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION OR WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
AND VIOLATED SEN. ESTRADA'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF
LAW.10 Sen. Estrada also claimed that under the circumstances, he has "no appeal or any
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, except through this
Petition."11 Sen. Estrada applied for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction to restrain public respondents from conducting further proceedings in
OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397. Finally, Sen. Estrada asked for a judgment
declaring that (a) he has been denied due process of law, and as a consequence thereof, (b)
the Order dated 27 March 2014, as well as the proceedings in OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-
C-C-13-0397 subsequent to and affected bythe issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order, are
void.12
On the same date, 7 May 2014, the Ombudsman issued in OMBC-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-
13-0397 a Joint Order furnishing Sen. Estrada with the counter-affidavits of Tuason,
Cunanan, Amata, Relampagos, Francisco Figura, Gregoria Buenaventura, and Alexis
Sevidal, and directing him to comment thereon within a non-extendible period of five days
fromreceipt of the order.
On 12 May 2014, Sen. Estrada filed before the Ombudsman a motion to suspend
proceedings in OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397 because the denial of his Request
to be furnished copies of counter-affidavits of his co-respondents deprived him of his right to
procedural due process, and he has filed the present Petition before thisCourt. The
Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s motion to suspend in an Order dated 15 May 2014. Sen.
Estrada filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated 15 May 2014 but his motion was
denied in an Order dated 3 June 2014.
As of 2 June 2014,the date of filing of the Ombudsman’s Comment to the present Petition,
Sen. Estrada had not filed a comment on the counter-affidavits furnished to him. On 4 June
2014, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order in OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397
denying, among other motions filed by the other respondents, Sen. Estrada’s motion for
reconsideration dated 7 April 2014. The pertinent portion of the 4 June 2014 Joint Order
stated:
While it is true that Senator Estrada’s request for copies of Tuason, Cunanan, Amata,
Relampagos, Figura, Buenaventura and Sevidal’s affidavits was denied by Order dated 27
March 2014 and before the promulgation of the assailed Joint Resolution, this Office
thereafter reevaluated the request and granted it byOrder dated 7 May 2014 granting his
request. Copies of the requested counter-affidavits were appended to the copy of the Order
dated 7 May 2014 transmitted to Senator Estrada through counsel.
This Office, in fact, held in abeyance the disposition of the motions for reconsideration in this
proceeding in light of its grant to Senator Estrada a period of five days from receipt of the 7
May 2014 Order to formally respond to the above-named co-respondents’ claims.
In view of the foregoing, this Office fails to see how Senator Estrada was deprived of his right
to procedural due process.13 (Emphasis supplied)
On 2 June 2014, the Ombudsman, the FIO, and the NBI (collectively, public respondents),
through the Officeof the Solicitor General, filed their Comment to the present Petition. The
public respondents argued that:
I. PETITIONER [SEN. ESTRADA] WAS NOTDENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
II. THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS PROCEDURALLY INFIRM.
A. LITIS PENDENTIA EXISTS IN THIS CASE.
B. PETITIONER HAS A PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN
THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW.
III. PETITIONER IS NOTENTITLED TO A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
AND/OR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER.14
On 6 June 2014, Atty. Baligod filed his Comment to the present Petition. Atty. Baligod stated
that Sen. Estrada’s resort to a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is improper. Sen. Estrada
should have either filed a motion for reconsideration of the 27 March 2014 Order or
incorporated the alleged irregularity in his motion for reconsideration of the 28 March 2014
Joint Resolution. There was also no violation of Sen. Estrada’s right to due process because
there is no rule which mandates that a respondent such as Sen. Estrada be furnished with
copies of the submissions of his corespondents.
On 16 June 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his Reply to the public respondents’ Comment. Sen.
Estrada insisted that he was denied due process. Although Sen. Estrada received copies of
the counter-affidavits of Cunanan, Amata, Relampagos, Buenaventura, Figura, Sevidal, as
well as one of Tuason’s counter-affidavits, heclaimed that he was not given the following
documents:
a) One other Counter-Affidavit of Ruby Tuason dated 21 February 2014;
b) Counter-Affidavit of Sofia D. Cruz dated 31 January 2014;
c) Counter-Affidavit of Evelyn Sugcang dated 11 February 2014;
d) Two (2) Counter-Affidavits of Alan A. Javellana dated 06 February 2014;
e) Counter-Affidavit of VictorRoman Cojamco Cacal dated 11 December 2013 (to the
FIO Complaint);
f) Counter-Affidavit of VictorRoman Cojamco Cacal dated 22 January 2014 (to the
NBI Complaint);
g) Two (2) counter-affidavits of Ma. Julie A. VillaralvoJohnson both dated 14 March
2014;
h) Counter-affidavit of Rhodora Bulatad Mendoza dated 06 March 2014;
i) Counter-affidavit of Maria Ninez P. Guañizo dated 28 January 2014;
j) Two (2) counter-affidavits of Marivic V. Jover both dated 09 December 2013; and
k) Counter-affidavit of Francisco B. Figura dated 08 January 2014. Sen. Estrada
argues that the Petition isnot rendered moot by the subsequent issuance of the 7
May 2014 Joint Order because there is a recurring violation of his right to due
process. Sen. Estrada also insists that there is no forum shopping as the present
Petition arose from an incident in the main proceeding, and that he has no other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Finally, Sen.
Estrada reiterates his application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain public respondents from conducting
further proceedings in OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397.
This Court’s Ruling
Considering the facts narrated above, the Ombudsman’s denial in its 27 March 2014 Order of
Sen. Estrada’s Request did not constitute grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, the denial did
not violate Sen. Estrada’s constitutional right to due process.
First. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with
copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.
We reproduce below Sections 3 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
as well as Rule II of Administrative Order No. 7, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, for ready reference.
From the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 112: Preliminary Investigation
Section 3. Procedure. — The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following
manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be
accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other
supporting documents to establish probable cause. They shall be in such number of
copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The affidavits
shall be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official
authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary
public, each of who must certify thathe personally examined the affiants and that he
is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall
either dismiss it if he finds no ground to continue with the investigation, or issue a
subpoena to the respondent attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its supporting
affidavits and documents. The respondent shall have the right to examine the
evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished and to
copy them at his expense. If the evidence is voluminous, the complainant may be
required to specify those which he intends to present against the respondent, and
these shall be made available for examination or copying by the respondent at his
expense.
Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be made available for
examination, copying, or photographing at the expense of the requesting party.
(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and
supporting affidavits and documents, the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit
and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his
defense. The counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified as
provided in paragraph (a) of this section, with copies thereof furnished by him to the
complainant. The respondent shall not be allowed to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of
a counter-affidavit.
(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit
counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall resolve
the complaint based on the evidence presented by the complainant.
(e) The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts and issues to be
clarified from a party ora witness. The parties can be present at the hearing but
without the right to examine or cross-examine. They may, however, submit to the
investigating officer questions which may be asked to the party or witness concerned.
The hearing shall be held within ten (10) days from submission of the counter-
affidavits and other documents or from the expiration of the period for their
submission. It shall be terminated within five (5) days.
(f) Within ten (10) days after the investigation, the investigating officer shall determine
whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial. Section 4.
Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review.— If the investigating prosecutor
finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and
information. He shall certify under oath in the information that he, or as shown by the
record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his
witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was
informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he
was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall
recommend the dismissal of the complaint.
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman orhis
deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their
receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such action.
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without
the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.
Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of the complaint but his
recommendation is disapproved by the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor
or the Ombudsman or his deputy on the ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may,
by himself, file the information against the respondent, or direct any other assistant
prosecutor or state prosecutor to do so without conducting another preliminary investigation.
If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of Justice may
prescribe or motu proprio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor
concerned either to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary
investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to
the parties. The same rule shall apply in preliminary investigations conducted by the officers
of the Office of the Ombudsman. From the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, Administrative Order No. 7, Rule II: Procedure in Criminal Cases
Section 1. Grounds. — A criminal complaint may be brought for an offense in violation of R.A.
3019,as amended, R.A. 1379, as amended, R.A. 6713, Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 of the
Revised Penal Code, and for such other offenses committed by public officers and
employees in relation to office.
Sec. 2. Evaluation. — Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall
recommend whether it may be:
a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;
 b) referred to respondent for comment;
c) indorsed to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the
case;
d) forwarded to the appropriate office or official for fact-finding investigation;
e) referred for administrative adjudication; or
f) subjected to a preliminary investigation.
Sec. 3. Preliminary investigation; who may conduct.— Preliminary investigation may be
conducted by any of the following:
1) Ombudsman Investigators;
2) Special Prosecuting Officers;
3) Deputized Prosecutors;
4) Investigating Officials authorized by law to conduct preliminary investigations; or
5) Lawyers in the government service, so designated by the Ombudsman.
Sec. 4. Procedure. — The preliminary investigation of cases falling under the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts shall be conducted in the manner prescribed in
Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following provisions:
a) If the complaint is not under oath or is based only on official reports, the
investigating officer shall require the complainant or supporting witnesses to execute
affidavits to substantiate the complaints.
b) After such affidavits have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an
order, attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents,
directing the respondent to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his
counter-affidavits and controverting evidence with proof of service thereof on
thecomplainant. The complainant may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after
service of the counter-affidavits.
c) If the respondent does not file a counter-affidavit, the investigating officer may
consider the comment filed by him, if any, as his answer to the complaint. In any
event, the respondent shall have access to the evidence on record.
d) No motion to dismiss shall be allowed except for lack of jurisdiction. Neither may a
motion for a bill of particulars be entertained. If respondent desires any matter in the
complainant’s affidavit to be clarified, the particularization thereof may be done at the
time of clarificatory questioning in the manner provided in paragraph (f) of this
section.
e) If the respondent cannot be served with the order mentioned in paragraph 6
hereof, or having been served, does not comply therewith, the complaint shall be
deemed submitted for resolution on the basis of the evidence on record.
f) If, after the filing of the requisite affidavits and their supporting evidences, there are
facts material to the case which the investigating officer may need to be clarified on,
he may conduct a clarificatory hearing during which the parties shall be afforded the
opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine the
witness being questioned. Where the appearance of the parties or witnesses is
impracticable, the clarificatory questioning may be conducted in writing, whereby the
questions desired to be asked by the investigating officer or a party shall be reduced
into writing and served on the witness concerned who shall be required to answer the
same in writing and under oath.
g) Upon the termination of the preliminary investigation, the investigating officer shall
forward the records of the case together with his resolution to the designated
authorities for their appropriate action thereon.
No information may be filed and no complaint may be dismissed without the written authority
or approval of the Ombudsman in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
or of the proper Deputy Ombudsman in all other cases.
xxxx
Sec. 6. Notice to parties.— The parties shall be served with a copy of the resolution as finally
approved by the Ombudsman or by the proper Deputy Ombudsman.
Sec. 7. Motion for reconsideration.— a) Only one (1) motion for reconsideration or
reinvestigation of anapproved order or resolution shall be allowed, the same to be filed within
fifteen (15) days from notice thereof with the Office of the Ombudsman, or the proper deputy
ombudsman as the case may be.
xxxx
b) The filing of a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not bar the filing of the
corresponding Information in court on the basis of the finding of probable cause in the
resolution subject of the motion. (Emphasis supplied)
Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter affidavits of his co-
respondents violates his constitutional right to due process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to
specify a law or rule which states that it is a compulsory requirement of due process in a
preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits
of his co-respondents. Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure nor Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman supports Sen. Estrada’s claim. What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a copy of the
complaint and the supporting affidavits and documents at the time the order to submit the
counter-affidavit is issued to the respondent. This is clear from Section 4(b), Rule II of the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman when it states, "[a]fter such affidavits [of
the complainant and his witnesses] have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an
order, attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the
respondent to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits x x x." At
this point, there is still no counter-affidavit submitted by any respondent. Clearly, what Section
4(b) refers to are affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, not the affidavits of the co-
respondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits of the co-respondents are not part of the
supporting affidavits of the complainant. No grave abuse of discretion can thus be attributed
to the Ombudsman for the issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order which denied Sen. Estrada’s
Request.
Although Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
provides that a respondent "shall have access to the evidence on record," this provision
should be construed in relation to Section 4(a) and (b) of the same Rule, as well as to the
Rules of Criminal Procedure. First, Section 4(a) states that "theinvestigating officer shall
require the complainant or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to substantiate the
complaint." The "supporting witnesses" are the witnesses of the complainant, and do not refer
to the co-respondents.
Second, Section 4(b) states that "the investigating officer shall issue an order attaching
thereto a copy of the affidavits and all other supporting documents, directing the respondent"
tosubmit his counter-affidavit. The affidavits referred to in Section 4(b) are the affidavits
mentioned in Section
4(a). Clearly, the affidavits to be furnished to the respondent are the affidavits of the
complainant and his supporting witnesses. The provision in the immediately succeeding
Section 4(c) of the same Rule II that a respondent shall have "access to the evidence on
record" does not stand alone, but should be read in relation to the provisions of Section 4(a
and b) of the same Rule II requiring the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with the
"affidavits and other supporting documents" submitted by "the complainant or supporting
witnesses." Thus, a respondent’s "access to evidence on record" in Section 4(c), Rule II of
the Ombudsman’s Rules of Procedure refers to the affidavits and supporting documents of
"the complainant or supporting witnesses" in Section 4(a) of the same Rule II.
Third, Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "[t]he
respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which
he may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense." A respondent’s right to
examine refers only to "the evidence submitted by the complainant."
Thus, whether under Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or under Rule II of
the Ombudsman’s Rules of Procedure, there is no requirement whatsoever that the affidavits
executed by the corespondents should be furnished to a respondent. Justice Velasco’s
dissent relies on the ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Reyes (Reyes case), 15 an
administrative case, in which a different set of rules of procedure and standards apply. Sen.
Estrada’s Petition, in contrast, involves the preliminary investigation stage in a criminal case.
Rule III on the Procedure in Administrative Cases of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman applies in the Reyes case, while Rule II on the Procedure in Criminal Cases
of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman applies in Sen. Estrada’s Petition.
In both cases, the Rules of Court apply in a suppletory character or by analogy.16
In the Reyescase, the complainant Acero executed an affidavit against Reyes and Peñaloza,
who were both employees of the Land Transportation Office. Peñaloza submitted his counter-
affidavit, as well as those of his two witnesses. Reyes adopted his counter-affidavit in another
case before the Ombudsman as it involved the same parties and the same incident. None of
the parties appeared during the preliminary conference. Peñaloza waived his right to a formal
investigation and was willing to submit the case for resolution based on the evidence on
record. Peñaloza also submitted a counter-affidavit of his third witness. The Ombudsman
found Reyes guilty of grave misconduct and dismissed him from the service. On the other
hand, Peñaloza was found guilty of simple misconduct and penalized with suspension from
office without pay for six months. This Court agreed with the Court of Appeals’ finding that
Reyes’ right to due process was indeed violated. This Court remanded the records of the
case to the Ombudsman, for two reasons: (1) Reyes should not have been meted the penalty
of dismissal from the service when the evidence was not substantial, and (2) there was
disregard of Reyes’ right to due process because he was not furnished a copy of the counter-
affidavits of Peñaloza and of Peñaloza’s three witnesses. In the Reyes case, failure to furnish
a copy of the counter-affidavits happened in the administrative proceedings on the merits,
which resulted in Reyes’ dismissal from the service. In Sen. Estrada’s Petition, the denial of
his Request happened during the preliminary investigation where the only issue is the
existence of probable cause for the purpose of determining whether an information should be
filed, and does not prevent Sen. Estrada from requesting a copy of the counter-affidavits of
his co-respondents during the pre-trial or even during the trial.
We should remember to consider the differences in adjudicating cases, particularly an
administrative case and a criminal case:
Any lawyer worth his salt knows that quanta of proof and adjective rules vary depending on
whether the cases to which they are meant to apply are criminal, civil or administrative in
character. In criminal actions, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for conviction;in civil
actions and proceedings, preponderance of evidence, as support for a judgment; and in
administrative cases, substantial evidence, as basis for adjudication. In criminal and civil
actions, application of the Rules of Court is called for, with more or less strictness. In
administrative proceedings, however, the technical rules of pleadingand procedure, and of
evidence, are not strictly adhered to; they generally apply only suppletorily; indeed, in
agrarian disputes application of the Rules of Court is actually prohibited.17
It should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the
determination of probable cause, and "probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and
should be determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of the
trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such
as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence."18 Thus,
the rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited to those granted by
procedural law.
A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of
determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of evidence now required in
preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient to "engender a well founded belief" as
tothe fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof. A
preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’
evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded
belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. We
are in accord with the state prosecutor’s findings in the case at bar that there exists prima
facie evidence of petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently
supported by the evidence presented and the facts obtaining therein.
Likewise devoid of cogency is petitioner’s argument that the testimonies of Galarion and
Hanopol are inadmissible as to him since he was not granted the opportunity of cross-
examination.
It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has no right to
cross-examine the witnesses which the complainant may present. Section 3, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the right to submit a
counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the
fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be
afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine.
Thus, even if petitioner was not given the opportunity to cross-examine Galarion and Hanopol
atthe time they were presented to testify during the separate trial of the case against Galarion
and Roxas, he cannot assert any legal right to cross-examine them at the preliminary
investigation precisely because such right was never available to him. The admissibility or
inadmissibility of said testimonies should be ventilated before the trial court during the trial
proper and not in the preliminary investigation.
Furthermore, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction
and control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary
investigation could be waived by the accused, we find no compelling justification for a strict
application of the evidentiary rules. In addition, considering that under Section 8, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court, the record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the record
of the case in the Regional Trial Court, then the testimonies of Galarion and Hanopol may not
be admitted by the trial court if not presented in evidence by the prosecuting fiscal. And, even
if the prosecution does present such testimonies, petitioner can always object thereto and the
trial court can rule on the admissibility thereof; or the petitioner can, during the trial, petition
said court to compel the presentation of Galarion and Hanopol for purposes of cross-
examination.19 (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, in citing the Reyes case, Justice Velasco’s dissent overlooked a vital portion of
the Court of Appeals’ reasoning. This Court quoted from the Court of Appeals’ decision: "x x x
[A]dmissions made by Peñaloza in his sworn statement are binding only on him. Res inter
alios act a alteri nocere non debet. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration or omission of another." In OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397, the
admissions of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents can in no way prejudice Sen. Estrada. Even
granting Justice Velasco’s argument that the 28 March 2014 Joint Resolution in OMB-C-C-
13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-039720 mentioned the testimonies of Sen. Estrada’s
corespondents like Tuason and Cunanan, their testimonies were merely corroborative of the
testimonies of complainants’ witnesses Benhur Luy, Marina Sula, and Merlina Suñas and
were not mentioned in isolation from the testimonies of complainants’ witnesses.
Moreover, the sufficiency of the evidence put forward by the Ombudsman against Sen.
Estrada to establish its finding of probable cause in the 28 March 2014 Joint Resolution in
OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-CC-13-0397 was judicially confirmed by the Sandiganbayan,
when it examined the evidence, found probable cause, and issued a warrant of arrest against
Sen. Estrada on 23 June 2014.
We likewise take exception to Justice Brion’s assertion that "the due process standards that
at the very least should be considered in the conduct of a preliminary investigation are those
that this Court first articulated in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations [Ang
Tibay]."21 Simply put, the Ang Tibay guidelines for administrative cases do not apply to
preliminary investigations in criminal cases. An application of the Ang Tibay guidelines to
preliminary investigations will have absurd and disastrous consequences.
Ang Tibay enumerated the constitutional requirements of due process, which Ang Tibay
described as the "fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character."22 These requirements are "fundamental and
essential" because without these, there isno due process as mandated by the Constitution.
These "fundamental and essential requirements" cannot be taken away by legislation
because theyare part of constitutional due process. These "fundamental and essential
requirements" are:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof. x x x.
 (2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented. x x x.
(3) "While the duty to deliberatedoes not impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, x x x."
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the
evidence must be "substantial." "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion." x x x.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. x x x.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or
his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. x x x.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in sucha manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various
issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.23
The guidelines set forth in Ang Tibay are further clarified in GSIS v. CA 24 (GSIS): "what Ang
Tibay failed to explicitly state was, prescinding from the general principles governing due
process, the requirement of an impartial tribunalwhich, needless to say, dictates that one
called upon to resolve a dispute may not sit as judge and jury simultaneously, neither may he
review his decision on appeal."25 The GSIS clarification affirms the non applicability of the
Ang Tibay guidelines to preliminary investigations in criminal cases: The investigating officer,
which is the role that the Office of the Ombudsman plays in the investigation and prosecution
of government personnel, will never be the impartial tribunal required in Ang Tibay, as
amplified in GSIS. The purpose of the Office of the Ombudsman in conducting a preliminary
investigation, after conducting its own factfinding investigation, is to determine probable
cause for filing an information, and not to make a final adjudication of the rights and
obligations of the parties under the law, which is the purpose of the guidelines in Ang Tibay.
The investigating officer investigates, determines probable cause, and prosecutes the
criminal case after filing the corresponding information.
The purpose in determining probable cause is to make sure that the courts are not clogged
with weak cases that will only be dismissed, as well as to spare a person from the travails of
a needless prosecution.26 The Ombudsman and the prosecution service under the control
and supervision of the Secretary of the Department of Justice are inherently the fact-finder,
investigator, hearing officer, judge and jury of the respondent in preliminary investigations.
Obviously, this procedure cannot comply with Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. However,
there is nothing unconstitutional with this procedure because this is merely an Executive
function, a part of the law enforcement process leading to trial in court where the
requirements mandated in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, will apply. This has been the
procedure under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. To now rule that Ang Tibay, as
amplified in GSIS, should apply to preliminary investigations will mean that all past and
present preliminary investigations are in gross violation of constitutional due process.
Moreover, a person under preliminary investigation, as Sen. Estrada is in the present case
when he filed his Request, is not yet an accused person, and hence cannot demand the full
exercise of the rights of an accused person:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not
a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not
be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of
guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause demands more than "bare
suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify . . . conviction." A finding of
probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of
guilt.
Considering the low quantum and quality of evidence needed to support a finding of probable
cause, wealso hold that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion in refusing to call
the NBI witnesses for clarificatory questions. The decision to call witnesses for clarificatory
questions is addressed to the sound discretion of the investigator and the investigator alone.
If the evidence on hand already yields a probable cause, the investigator need not hold a
clarificatory hearing. To repeat, probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should
be determined in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial and it is
only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to
confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence. In the case at bar, the
DOJ Panel correctly adjudged that enough evidence had been adduced to establish probable
cause and clarificatory hearing was unnecessary.27
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, writing for the Court, emphatically declared in Lozada v.
Hernandez,28 that the "rights conferred upon accused persons to participate in preliminary
investigations concerning themselves depend upon the provisions of law by which such rights
are specifically secured, rather than upon the phrase ‘due process of law’." This reiterates
Justice Jose P. Laurel’s oft-quoted pronouncement in Hashim v. Boncan 29 that "the right to a
preliminary investigation is statutory, not constitutional." In short, the rights of a respondent
ina preliminary investigation are merely statutory rights, not constitutional due process rights.
An investigation to determine probable cause for the filing of an information does not initiate a
criminal action so as to trigger into operation Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution. 30 It is
the filing of a complaint or information in court that initiates a criminal action.31
The rights to due process in administrative cases as prescribed in Ang Tibay,as amplified in
GSIS, are granted by the Constitution; hence, these rights cannot be taken away by
merelegislation. On the other hand, as repeatedly reiterated by this Court, the right to a
preliminary investigation is merely a statutory right,32 not part of the "fundamental and
essential requirements" of due process as prescribed in Ang Tibay and amplified in GSIS.
Thus, a preliminary investigation can be taken away by legislation. The constitutional right of
an accused to confront the witnesses against him does not apply in preliminary
investigations; nor will the absence of a preliminary investigation be an infringement of his
right to confront the witnesses against him.33 A preliminary investigation may be done away
with entirely without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due process
clause to a fair trial.34
The quantum of evidence needed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is greater than the
evidenceneeded in a preliminary investigation to establish probable cause, or to establish the
existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. Ang Tibay
refers to "substantial evidence," while the establishment of probable cause needs "only more
than ‘bare suspicion,’ or ‘less than evidence which would justify . . . conviction’." In the United
States, from where we borrowed the concept of probable cause, 35 the prevailing definition of
probable cause is this:
In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with
probabilities.These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard
of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved.
"The substance of all the definitions" of probable cause "is a reasonable ground for belief of
guilt." McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. St. 63, 69, quoted with approval in the Carroll opinion.
267 U. S. at 161. And this "means less than evidence which would justify condemnation" or
conviction, as Marshall, C. J., said for the Court more than a century ago in Locke v. United
States, 7 Cranch 339, 348. Since Marshall’s time, at any rate, it has come to mean more than
bare suspicion: Probable cause exists where "the facts and circumstances within their [the
officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient
in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that" an offense has been
or is being committed. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 162.
These long-prevailing standards seek to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable
interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime. They also seek to give fair
leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s protection. Because many situations which
confront officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room
must be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the mistakes must be those of
reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability. The rule
of probable cause is a practical, non technical conception affording the best compromise that
has been found for accommodating these often opposing interests. Requiring more would
unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the
mercy of the officers’ whim or caprice.36
In the Philippines, there are four instances in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure where
probable cause is needed to be established:
(1) In Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 112: By the investigating officer, to determine whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
A preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a complaint or information
for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four years, two months
and one day without regard to the fine;
(2) In Sections 6 and 9 of Rule 112: By the judge, to determine whether a warrant of
arrest or a commitment order, if the accused has already been arrested, shall be
issued and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice;
(3) In Section 5(b) of Rule 113: By a peace officer or a private person making a
warrantless arrest when an offense has just been committed, and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(4) In Section 4 of Rule 126: By the judge, to determine whether a search warrant
shall be issued, and only upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines.
In all these instances, the evidence necessary to establish probable cause is based only on
the likelihood, or probability, of guilt. Justice Brion, in the recent case of Unilever Philippines,
Inc. v. Tan37 (Unilever), stated:
The determination of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely
than not, a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was
committed by the accused. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt,
neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. What is merely required is
"probability of guilt." Its determination, too, does not call for the application of rules or
standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. Thus, in
concluding that there is probable cause, it suffices that it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the very offense charged.
It is also important to stress that the determination of probable cause does not depend on the
validity or merits of a party’s accusation or defense or on the admissibility or veracity of
testimonies presented. As previously discussed, these matters are better ventilated during
the trial proper of the case. As held in Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Gonzales:
Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would
excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. x x
x. The term does not mean "actual or positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It
is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not
require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is
enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support
of the charge. (Bold facing and italicization supplied)
Justice Brion’s pronouncement in Unilever that "the determination of probable cause does not
depend on the validity or merits of a party’s accusation or defense or on the admissibility or
veracity of testimonies presented" correctly recognizes the doctrine in the United States that
the determination of probable cause can rest partially, or even entirely, on hearsay evidence,
as long as the person making the hearsay statement is credible. In United States v.
Ventresca,38 the United States Supreme Court held:
While a warrant may issue only upon a finding of "probable cause," this Court has long held
that "the term ‘probable cause’ . . . means less than evidence which would justify
condemnation," Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch 339, 11 U.S. 348, and that a finding of
"probable cause" may rest upon evidence which is not legally competent in a criminal trial.
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 358 U.S. 311. As the Court stated in Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173, "There is a large difference between the two things tobe
proved (guilt and probable cause), as well as between the tribunals which determine them,
and therefore a like difference in the quanta and modes of proof required to establish them."
Thus, hearsay may be the basis for issuance of the warrant "so long as there . . . [is] a
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay." Jones v. United States, supra, at 362 U.S. 272.
And, in Aguilar, we recognized that "an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and
need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant," so long as the magistrate is
"informed of some of the underlying circumstances" supporting the affiant’s conclusions and
his belief that any informant involved "whose identity need not be disclosed . . ." was
"credible" or his information "reliable." Aguilar v. Texas, supra, at 378 U.S. 114. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining
probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely
preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. However, in
administrative cases, where rights and obligations are finally adjudicated, what is required is
"substantial evidence" which cannot rest entirely or even partially on hearsay evidence.
Substantial basis is not the same as substantial evidence because substantial evidence
excludes hearsay evidence while substantial basis can include hearsay evidence. To require
the application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, in preliminary investigations will change
the quantum of evidence required in determining probable cause from evidence of likelihood
or probability of guilt to substantial evidence of guilt.
It is, moreover, necessary to distinguish between the constitutionally guaranteed rights of an
accused and the right to a preliminary investigation. To treat them the same will lead toabsurd
and disastrous consequences.
All pending criminal cases in all courts throughout the country will have to be remanded to the
preliminary investigation level because none of these will satisfy Ang Tibay, as amplified in
GSIS. Preliminary investigations are conducted by prosecutors, who are the same officials
who will determine probable cause and prosecute the cases in court. The prosecutor is hardly
the impartial tribunal contemplated in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. A reinvestigation by an
investigating officer outside of the prosecution service will be necessary if Ang Tibay, as
amplified in GSIS, were to be applied. This will require a new legislation. In the meantime, all
pending criminal cases in all courts will have to be remanded for reinvestigation, to proceed
only when a new law is in place. To require Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, to apply to
preliminary investigation will necessarily change the concept of preliminary investigation as
we know it now. Applying the constitutional due process in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS,
to preliminary investigation will necessarily require the application of the rights of an accused
in Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. This means that the respondent can
demand an actual hearing and the right to cross-examine the witnesses against him, rights
which are not afforded at present toa respondent in a preliminary investigation.
The application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is not limited to those with pending
preliminary investigations but even to those convicted by final judgment and already serving
their sentences. The rule is well-settled that a judicial decision applies retroactively if it has a
beneficial effect on a person convicted by final judgment even if he is already serving his
sentence, provided that he is not a habitual criminal. 39 This Court retains its control over a
case "until the full satisfaction of the final judgment conformably with established legal
processes."40 Applying Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, to preliminary investigations will
result in thousands of prisoners, convicted by final judgment, being set free from prison.
Second. Sen. Estrada’s present Petition for Certiorari is premature.
Justice Velasco’s dissent prefers thatSen. Estrada not "be subjected to the rigors of a criminal
prosecution incourt" because there is "a pending question regarding the Ombudsman’s grave
abuse of its discretion preceding the finding of a probable cause to indict him." Restated
bluntly, Justice Velasco’s dissent would like this Court to conclude that the mere filing of the
present Petition for Certiorari questioning the Ombudsman’s denial of Sen. Estrada’s Request
should have, by itself, voided all proceedings related to the present case.
Although it is true that, in its 27 March 2014 Order, the Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s
Request, the Ombudsman subsequently reconsidered its Order. On 7 May 2014, the same
date that Sen. Estrada filed the present Petition, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order in
OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397 that furnishedSen. Estrada with the counter-
affidavits of Ruby Tuason, Dennis Cunanan, Gondelina Amata, Mario Relampagos, Francisco
Figura, Gregoria Buenaventura, and AlexisSevidal, and directed him to comment within a
non-extendible period of five days from receipt of said Order. Sen. Estrada did not file any
comment, as noted in the 4 June 2014 Joint Order of the Ombudsman.
On 4 June 2014, the Ombudsman issued another Joint Order and denied Sen. Estrada’s
Motion for Reconsideration ofits 28 March 2014 Joint Resolution which found probable cause
toindict Sen. Estrada and his corespondents with one count of plunder and 11 counts of
violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019. In this 4 June 2014 Joint Order, the
Ombudsman stated that "[t]his Office, in fact, held in abeyance the disposition of motions for
reconsideration in this proceeding in light of its grant to Senator Estrada a period of five days
from receipt of the 7 May 2014 Order to formally respond to the above-named respondents’
claims."
We underscore Sen. Estrada’s procedural omission. Sen. Estrada did not file any pleading,
much less a motion for reconsideration, to the 27 March 2014 Order inOMB-C-C-13-0313.
Sen. Estrada immediately proceeded to file this Petition for Certiorari before this Court. Sen.
Estrada’s resort to a petitionfor certiorari before this Court stands in stark contrast to his filing
of his 7 April 2014 Motion for Reconsideration of the 28 March 2014 Joint Resolution finding
probable cause. The present Petition for Certiorari is premature.
A motion for reconsideration allows the public respondent an opportunity to correct its factual
and legal errors. Sen. Estrada, however, failed to present a compelling reason that the
present Petition falls under the exceptions41 to the general rule that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration is required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari. This Court has
reiterated in numerous decisions that a motion for reconsideration is mandatory before the
filing of a petition for certiorari.42
Justice Velasco’s dissent faults the majority for their refusal to apply the Reyes case to the
present Petition. Justice Velasco’s dissent insists that "this Court cannot neglect to
emphasize that, despite the variance in the quanta of evidence required, a uniform
observance of the singular concept of due process is indispensable in all proceedings."
As we try to follow Justice Velasco’s insistence, we direct Justice Velasco and those who join
him in his dissent to this Court’s ruling in Ruivivar v. Office of the Ombudsman
(Ruivivar),43 wherein we stated that "[t]he law can no longer help one who had been given
ample opportunity to be heard but who did not take full advantage of the proffered chance."
44
The Ruivivar case, like the Reyes  case, was also an administrative case before the
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman found petitioner Rachel Beatriz Ruivivar administratively
liable for discourtesy in the course of her official functions and imposed on her the penalty of
reprimand. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision on the ground that she
was not furnished copies of the affidavits of the private respondent’s witnesses. The
Ombudsman subsequently ordered that petitioner be furnished with copies of the counter-
affidavits of private respondent’s witnesses, and that petitioner should "file, within ten (10)
days from receipt of this Order, such pleading which she may deem fit under the
circumstances." Petitioner received copies of the affidavits, and simply filed a manifestation
where she maintained that her receipt of the affidavits did not alter the deprivation of her right
to due process or cure the irregularity in the Ombudsman’s decision to penalize her.
In Ruivivar, petitioner received the affidavits of the private respondent’s witnesses afterthe
Ombudsman rendered a decision against her. We disposed of petitioner’s deprivation of due
process claim in this manner:
The CA Decision dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground that the petitioner failed to
exhaust all the administrative remedies available to her before the Ombudsman. This ruling is
legallycorrect as exhaustion of administrative remedies is a requisite for the filing of a petition
for certiorari. Other than this legal significance, however, the ruling necessarily carries the
direct and immediate implication that the petitioner has been granted the opportunity to be
heard and has refused to avail of this opportunity; hence, she cannot claim denial of due
process. In the words of the CA ruling itself: "Petitioner was given the opportunity by public
respondent to rebut the affidavits submitted by private respondent. . . and had a speedy and
adequate administrative remedy but she failed to avail thereof for reasons only known to her."
For a fuller appreciation of our above conclusion, we clarify that although they are separate
and distinct concepts, exhaustion of administrative remedies and due process embody linked
and related principles. The "exhaustion" principle applies when the ruling court or tribunal is
not given the opportunity tore-examine its findings and conclusions because of an available
opportunity that a party seeking recourse against the court or the tribunal’s ruling omitted to
take. Under the concept of "due process," on the other hand, a violation occurs when a court
or tribunal rules against a party without giving him orher the opportunity to be heard. Thus,
the exhaustion principle is based on the perspective of the ruling court or tribunal, while due
process is considered from the point of view of the litigating party against whom a ruling was
made. The commonality they share is in the same"opportunity" that underlies both. In the
context of the present case, the available opportunity to consider and appreciate the
petitioner’s counter-statement offacts was denied the Ombudsman; hence, the petitioner is
barred from seeking recourse at the CA because the ground she would invoke was not
considered at all at the Ombudsman level. At the same time, the petitioner – who had the
same opportunity to rebut the belatedly-furnished affidavits of the private respondent’s
witnesses – was not denied and cannot now claim denial of due process because she did not
take advantage of the opportunity opened to her at the Ombudsman level.
The records show that the petitioner duly filed a motion for reconsideration on due process
grounds (i.e., for the private respondent’s failure to furnish her copies of the affidavits of
witnesses) and on questions relating to the appreciation of the evidence on record. The
Ombudsman acted on this motion by issuing its Order of January 17, 2003 belatedly
furnishing her with copies of the private respondent’s witnesses, together with the "directive to
file, within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order, such pleading which she may deem fit
under the circumstances."
Given this opportunity to act on the belatedly-furnished affidavits, the petitioner simply chose
to file a "Manifestation" where she took the position that "The order of the Ombudsman dated
17 January 2003 supplying her with the affidavits of the complainant does not cure the 04
November 2002 order," and on this basis prayed that the Ombudsman’s decision "be
reconsidered and the complaint dismissed for lack of merit."
For her part, the private respondent filed a Comment/Opposition to Motion for
Reconsideration dated 27 January 2003 and prayed for the denial of the petitioner’s motion.
In the February 12, 2003 Order, the Ombudsman denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration after finding no basis to alter or modify its ruling. Significantly, the
Ombudsman fully discussed in this Order the due process significance of the petitioner’s
failure to adequately respond to the belatedly-furnished affidavits. The Ombudsman said:
"Undoubtedly, the respondent herein has been furnished by this Office with copies of the
affidavits, which she claims she has not received. Furthermore, the respondent has been
given the opportunity to present her side relative thereto, however, she chose not to submit
countervailing evidence orargument. The respondent, therefore (sic), cannot claim denial of
due process for purposes of assailing the Decision issued in the present case. On this score,
the Supreme Court held in the case of People v. Acot, 232 SCRA 406, that "a party cannot
feign denial of due process where he had the opportunity to present his side". This becomes
all the more important since, as correctly pointed out by the complainant, the decision issued
in the present case is deemed final and unappealable pursuant to Section 27 of Republic Act
6770, and Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07. Despite the clear provisions of
the law and the rules, the respondent herein was given the opportunity not normally
accorded, to present her side, but she opted not to do so which is evidently fatal to her
cause." [emphasis supplied].
Under these circumstances, we cannot help but recognize that the petitioner’s cause is a lost
one, not only for her failure to exhaust her available administrative remedy, but also on due
process grounds. The law can no longer help one who had been given ample opportunity to
be heard but who did not take full advantage of the proffered chance.45
Ruivivar applies with even greater force to the present Petition because here the affidavits of
Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents were furnished to him beforethe Ombudsman rendered her 4
June 2014 Joint Order. In Ruivivar, the affidavits were furnished after the Ombudsman issued
a decision.
Justice Velasco’s dissent cites the cases of Tatad v. Sandiganbayan46 (Tatad) and Duterte v.
Sandiganbayan47 (Duterte) in an attempt to prop up its stand. A careful reading of these
cases, however, would show that they do not stand on all fours with the present case. In
Tatad, this Court ruled that "the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation
and filing the information [by the Tanodbayan] in the present case is violative of the
constitutionally guaranteed right of the petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition
of the cases against him."48 The Tanod bayan took almost three years to terminate the
preliminary investigation, despite Presidential Decree No. 911’s prescription of a ten-day
period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation. We ruled similarly
in Duterte, where the petitioners were merely asked to comment and were not asked to file
counter-affidavits as isthe proper procedure in a preliminary investigation. Moreover, in
Duterte, the Ombudsman took four years to terminate its preliminary investigation.
As we follow the reasoning in Justice Velasco’s dissent, it becomes more apparent that Sen.
Estrada’s present Petition for Certiorari is premature for lack of filing of a motion for
reconsideration before the Ombudsman. When the Ombudsman gave Sen. Estrada copies of
the counter-affidavits and even waited for the lapse of the given period for the filing of his
comment, Sen. Estrada failed to avail of the opportunity to be heard due to his own fault.
Thus, Sen. Estrada’s failure cannot in any way be construed as violation of due process by
the Ombudsman, much less of grave abuse of discretion. Sen. Estrada has not filed any
comment, and still chooses not to.
Third. Sen. Estrada’s present Petition for Certiorari constitutes forum shopping and should be
summarily dismissed.
In his verification and certification of non-forum shopping in the present petition filed on 7 May
2014, Sen. Estrada stated:
3.1 I, however, disclose that I have filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 07 April 2014 in
OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-CC-13-0397, raising as sole issuethe finding of probable cause
in the Joint Resolution dated 28 March 2014.
Such Motion for Reconsideration has yet to be resolved by the Office of the
Ombudsman.49 (Emphasis supplied)
Sen. Estrada’s Motion for Reconsideration of the 28 March 2014 Joint Resolution prayed that
the Ombudsman reconsider and issue a new resolution dismissing the charges against him.
However, in this Motion for Reconsideration, Sen. Estrada assailed the Ombudsman’s 27
March 2014 Joint Order denying his Request, and that such denial is a violation of his right to
due process.
8. It is respectfully submitted that the Ombudsman violated the foregoing rule [Rule 112,
Section 4 of the Rules of Court] and principles. A reading of the Joint Resolution will reveal
that various pieces of evidence which Senator Estrada was not furnished with – hence,
depriving him of the opportunity to controvert the same – were heavily considered by the
Ombudsman in finding probable cause to charge him with Plunder and with violations of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
xxxx
11. Notably, under dated 20 March 2014, Senator Estrada filed a "Request to be Furnished
with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and
Other Filings," pursuant to the right of a respondent "to examine the evidence submitted by
the complainant which he may not have been furnished" (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court), and to "have access to the evidence on record" (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman).
However, notwithstanding the gravity of the offenses leveled against Senator Estrada and the
law’s vigilance in protecting the rights of an accused, the Special Panel of Investigators, in an
Order dated 27 March 2014, unceremoniously denied the request on the ground that "there is
no provision under this Office’s Rules of Procedure which entitles respondent to be furnished
all the filings by the other parties x x x x." (Order dated 27 March 2013, p. 3)
As such, Senator Estrada was not properly apprised of the evidence offered against him,
which were eventually made the bases of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause.50
The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s Motion for Reconsideration in its 4 June 2014 Joint
Order. Clearly, Sen. Estrada expressly raised in his Motion for Reconsideration with the
Ombudsman the violation of his right to due process, the same issue he is raising in this
petition. In the verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached to his petition
docketed as G.R. Nos. 212761-62 filed on 23 June 2014, Sen. Estrada disclosed the
pendency of the present petition, as well as those before the Sandiganbayan for the
determination of the existence of probable cause. In his petition in G.R. Nos. 212761-62, Sen.
Estrada again mentioned the Ombudsman’s 27 March 2014 Joint Order denying his Request.
17. Sen. Estrada was shocked not only at the Office of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable
cause, which he maintains is without legal or factual basis, but also thatsuch finding of
probable cause was premised on evidence not disclosed tohim, including those subject of his
Request to be Furnished with Copiesof Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents,
Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings dated 20 March 2014.
In particular, the Office of the Ombudsman used as basis for the Joint Resolution the
following documents –
i. Alexis G. Sevidal’s Counter-Affidavits dated 15 January and 24 February 2014;
ii. Dennis L. Cunanan’s Counter-Affidavits both dated 20 February 2014;
iii. Francisco B. Figura’s Counter-Affidavit dated 08 January 2014;
iv. Ruby Tuason’s Counter-Affidavits both dated 21 February 2014;
v. Gregoria G. Buenaventura’s Counter-Affidavit dated 06 March 2014; and
vi. Philippine Daily Inquirer Online Edition news article entitled "Benhur Luy upstages
Napoles in Senate Hearing" by Norman Bordadora and TJ Borgonio, published on 06
March 2014, none of which were ever furnished Sen. Estrada prior to the issuance of
the challenged Joint Resolution, despite written request.
xxxx
II
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, IN ISSUING THE CHALLENGED JOINT
RESOLUTION DATED 28 MARCH 2014 AND CHALLENGED JOINT ORDER DATED 04
JUNE 2014, NOT ONLY ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION OR
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION, BUT ALSO VIOLATED SEN. ESTRADA’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
xxxx
2.17 x x x x
Notably, in its Joint Order dated 07 May 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman even arbitrarily
limited the filing of Sen. Estrada’s comment to the voluminous documents comprisingthe
documents it furnished Sen. Estrada to a "non-extendible" period offive (5) days, making it
virtually impossible for Sen. Estrada to adequately study the charges leveled against him and
intelligently respond to them. The Joint Order also failed to disclose the existence of other
counter-affidavits and failed to furnish Sen. Estrada copies of such counter-affidavits.51
Sen. Estrada has not been candid with this Court. His claim that the finding of probable cause
was the "sole issue" he raised before the Ombudsman in his Motion for Reconsideration
dated 7 April 2014 is obviously false.
Moreover, even though Sen. Estrada acknowledged his receipt of the Ombudsman’s 4 June
2014 Joint Order which denied his motion for reconsideration of the 28 March 2014 Joint
Resolution, Sen. Estrada did not mention that the 4 June 2014 Joint Order stated that the
Ombudsman "held in abeyance the disposition of the motions for reconsideration in this
proceeding in light of its grant to [Sen. Estrada] a period of five days from receipt of the 7 May
2014 [Joint] Order to formally respond to the abovenamed co-respondent’s claims."
Sen. Estrada claims that his rights were violated but he flouts the rules himself.
The rule against forum shopping is not limited tothe fulfillment of the requisites of litis
pendentia.52 To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most
important factor to ask is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a
final judgment in one case will amount to res judicatain another. 53 Undergirding the principle
of litis pendentia is the theory that a party isnot allowed to vex another more than once
regarding the same subject matter and for the same cause of action. This theory is founded
on the public policy that the same matter should not be the subject of controversy in court
more than once in order that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided, for the sake of
the stability in the rights and status of persons.54
x x x [D]espite the fact that what the petitioners filed wasa petition for certiorari, a recourse
that – in the usual course and because of its nature and purpose – is not covered by the rule
on forum shopping. The exception from the forum shopping rule, however, is true only where
a petition for certiorari is properly or regularly invoked in the usual course; the exception does
not apply when the relief sought, through a petition for certiorari, is still pending with or has as
yet to be decided by the respondent court, tribunal or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
body, e.g., a motion for reconsideration of the order assailed via a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65, as in the present case. This conclusion is supported and strengthened by Section 1,
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that the availability of a remedy in the
ordinary course of law precludes the filing of a petition for certiorari; under this rule, the
petition’s dismissal is the necessary consequence if recourse to Rule 65 is prematurely taken.
To be sure, the simultaneous remedies the petitioners sought could result in possible
conflicting rulings, or at the very least, to complicated situations, between the RTC and the
Court of Appeals. An extreme possible result is for the appellate court to confirm that the RTC
decision is meritorious, yet the RTC may at the same time reconsider its ruling and recall its
order of dismissal. In this eventuality, the result is the affirmation of the decision that the court
a quo has backtracked on. Other permutations depending on the rulings of the two courts and
the timing of these rulings are possible. In every case, our justice system suffers as this kind
of sharp practice opens the system to the possibility of manipulation; to uncertainties when
conflict of rulings arise; and at least to vexation for complications other than conflict of rulings.
Thus, it matters not that ultimately the Court of Appeals may completely agree with the RTC;
what the rule on forum shopping addresses are the possibility and the actuality of its harmful
effects on our judicial system.55
Sen. Estrada resorted to simultaneous remedies by filing this Petition alleging violation of due
process by the Ombudsman even as his Motion for Reconsideration raising the very same
issue remained pending with the Ombudsman. This is plain and simple forum shopping,
warranting outright dismissal of this Petition.
SUMMARY
The Ombudsman, in furnishing Sen. Estrada a copy of the complaint and its supporting
affidavits and documents, fully complied with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Section 4, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman, Administrative Order No. 7. Both the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
and the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require the investigating officer
to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of the complainant and affidavits of his
supporting witnesses. Neither of these Rules require the investigating officer to furnish the
respondent with copies of the affidavits of his co-respondents. The right of the respondent is
only "to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant," as expressly stated in Section
3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. This Court has unequivocally
ruled in Paderanga that "Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the right to submit a counter-affidavit,
to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a
hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an
opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine." Moreover,
Section 4 (a, b and c) of Rule II of the Ombudsman’s Rule of Procedure, read together, only
require the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of the
complainant and his supporting witnesses.1âwphi1 There is no law or rule requiring the
investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of his co-
respondents.
In the 7 May 2014 Joint Order, the Ombudsman went beyond legal duty and even furnished
Sen. Estrada with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents whom he specifically
named, as well as the counteraffidavits of some of other co-respondents. In the 4 June 2014
Joint Order, the Ombudsman even held in abeyancethe disposition of the motions for
reconsideration because the Ombudsman granted Sen. Estrada five days from receipt of the
7 May 2014 Joint Order to formally respond to the claims made by his co-respondents. The
Ombudsman faithfully complied with the existing Rules on preliminary investigation and even
accommodated Sen. Estrada beyond what the Rules required. Thus, the Ombudsman could
not be faulted with grave abuse of discretion. Since this is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65, the Petition fails in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Ombudsman.
The constitutional due process requirements mandated in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS,
are not applicable to preliminary investigations which are creations of statutory law giving rise
to mere statutory rights. A law can abolish preliminary investigations without running afoul
with the constitutional requirements of dueprocess as prescribed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in
GSIS. The present procedures for preliminary investigations do not comply, and were never
intended to comply, with Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. Preliminary investigations do not
adjudicate with finality rights and obligations of parties, while administrative investigations
governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, so adjudicate. Ang Tibay,as amplified in GSIS,
requires substantial evidencefor a decision against the respondent in the administrative
case.In preliminary investigations, only likelihood or probability of guiltis required. To apply
Ang Tibay,as amplified in GSIS,to preliminary investigations will change the quantum of
evidence required to establish probable cause. The respondent in an administrative case
governed by Ang Tibay,as amplified in GSIS,has the right to an actual hearing and to cross-
examine the witnesses against him. In preliminary investigations, the respondent has no such
rights.
Also, in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, the hearing
officer must be impartial and cannot be the fact-finder, investigator, and hearing officer atthe
same time. In preliminary investigations, the same public officer may be the investigator and
hearing officer at the same time, or the fact-finder, investigator and hearing officer may be
under the control and supervisionof the same public officer, like the Ombudsman or Secretary
of Justice. This explains why Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, does not apply to preliminary
investigations. To now declare that the guidelines in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are
fundamental and essential requirements in preliminary investigations will render all past and
present preliminary investigations invalid for violation of constitutional due process. This will
mean remanding for reinvestigation all criminal cases now pending in all courts throughout
the country. No preliminary investigation can proceeduntil a new law designates a public
officer, outside of the prosecution service, to determine probable cause. Moreover, those
serving sentences by final judgment would have to be released from prison because their
conviction violated constitutional due process. Sen. Estrada did not file a Motion for
Reconsideration of the 27 March 2014 Order in OMB-C-C-13-0313 denying his Request,
which is the subject of the present Petition. He should have filed a Motion for R
econsideration, in the same manner that he filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 15 May
2014 Order denying his motion to suspend proceedings. The unquestioned rule in this
jurisdiction is that certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the acts of the public
respondent.56 The plain, speedy and adequate remedy expressly provided by law is a Motion
for Reconsideration of the 27 March 2014 Order of the Ombudsman. Sen. Estrada's failure to
file a Motion for Reconsideration renders this Petition premature.
Sen. Estrada also raised in this Petition the same issue he raised in his Motion for
Reconsideration of the 28 March 2014 Joint Resolution of the Ombudsman finding probable
cause. While his Motion for Reconsideration of the 28 March 2014 Joint Resolution was
pending, Sen. Estrada did not wait for the resolution of the Ombudsman and instead
proceeded to file the present Petition for Certiorari. The Ombudsman issued a Joint Order on
4 June 2014 and specifically addressed the issue that Sen. Estrada is raising in this Petition.
Thus, Sen. Estrada's present Petition for Certiorari is not only premature, it also constitutes
forum shopping. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 212140-
41.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 134269               July 7, 2010
THE LEARNING CHILD, INC. and SPS. FELIPE AND MARY ANNE ALFONSO, Petitioners,
vs.
AYALA ALABANG VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, SPOUSES ERNESTO AND ALMA
ARZAGA, MARIA LUISA QUISUMBING, ARTURO SENA, KSL CORPORATION, SLV
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION and LAWPHIL, INC., Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 134440
JOSE MARIE V. AQUINO, minor and represented by his parents DR. ERROL AQUINO
AND ATTY. MARILYN AQUINO; LORENZO MARIA E. VELASCO, minor and represented
by his parents FRANCISCO VELASCO AND ROSANNA VELASCO; CHRISTOPHER E.
WALMSLEY, minor and represented by his parents GERALD WALMSLEY AND MA.
TERESA WALMSLEY; JOANNA MARIE S. SISON, minor and represented by her
parents BONIFACIO SISON AND JOSEPHINE SISON; and MATTHEW RAPHAEL C.
ARCE, minor and represented by his parents RAPHAEL ARCE AND MA. ERISSA
ARCE, Petitioners,
vs.
AYALA ALABANG VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, SPOUSES ERNESTO AND ALMA
ARZAGA, MARIA LUISA QUISUMBING, ARTURO SENA, KSL CORPORATION and
LAWPHIL, INC., Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 144518
AYALA ALABANG VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, SPOUSES ERNESTO AND ALMA
ARZAGA, MARIA LUISA QUISUMBING, ARTURO SENA, KSL CORPORATION, SLV
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION and LAWPHIL, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY (now CITY) OF MUNTINLUPA, THE LEARNING CHILD, INC., SPOUSES
FELIPE AND MARY ANNE ALFONSO, AND THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL
FIFTEENTH DIVISION), Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
At bar are three consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari all concerning the operation of
a preparatory and grade school located in Ayala Alabang Village, more particularly on a
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 149166. The Petitions in G.R.
Nos. 134269 and 134440 assail the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 51096, dated November 11, 1997 and July 2, 1998, respectively, which enjoined
said school’s continued operation on the ground that the same is in violation of the Deed of
Restrictions annotated on the title of the subject property that limits the use of the lot to the
establishment thereon of a preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school. The Petition in
G.R. No. 144518 challenges the Court of Appeals’ Decision3 dated August 15, 2000 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 54438, which upheld the validity of a Muntinlupa Municipal Resolution correcting
an alleged typographical error in a zoning ordinance. The zoning ordinance, as corrected by
the challenged Muntinlupa Municipal Resolution, classifies the subject property as
"institutional" where the operation of a grade school is allowed.
FACTS
The factual and procedural antecedents of these consolidated cases are as follows:
Sometime in 1984, subdivision developer Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI) sold a parcel of land to the
spouses Jose and Cristina Yuson. In 1987, the spouses Yuson sold the same to the spouses
Felipe and Mary Anne Alfonso. A Deed of Restrictions was annotated in TCT No. 149166
issued to the spouses Alfonso, as had been required by ALI. The Deed of Restrictions
indicated that:
2.2 USE AND OCCUPANCY - The property shall be used exclusively for the establishment
and maintenance thereon of a preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school, which may
include such installations as an office for school administration, playground and garage for
school vehicles.4
ALI turned over the right and power to enforce the restrictions on the properties in the Ayala
Alabang Village, including the above restrictions on TCT No. 149166, to the association of
homeowners therein, the Ayala Alabang Village Association (AAVA).
In 1989, the spouses Alfonso opened on the same lot The Learning Child Center Pre-school
(TLC), a preparatory school which initially consisted of nursery and kindergarten classes. In
1991, TLC was expanded to include a grade school program, the School of the Holy Cross,
which provided additional grade levels as the pupils who initially enrolled advanced.
AAVA wrote several letters to TLC and the spouses Alfonso, essentially (1) protesting the
TLC’s and the spouses Alfonso’s violation of the Deed of Restrictions, (2) requesting them to
comply with the same, and (3) ordering them to desist from operating the grade school and
from operating the nursery and kindergarten classes in excess of the two classrooms allowed
by the ordinance.5
Injunction Case
On October 13, 1992, AAVA filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City an action
for injunction against TLC and the spouses Alfonso, alleging breach of contract by the
defendant spouses, particularly of the Deed of Restrictions, the contents of which likewise
appear in the Deed of Absolute Sale. It also alleged violation of Metropolitan Manila
Commission Ordinance No. 81-01 (MMC No. 81-01), otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Zoning Ordinance for the National Capital Region and Barangay Ordinance No. 03, Series of
1991. MMC No. 81-01 classified Ayala Alabang Village for zoning purposes as a low-density
residential area, or R-1, thereby limiting the use of the subject property to the establishment
or operation of a nursery and kindergarten school, which should not exceed two classrooms.
The aforementioned barangay ordinance, on the other hand, prohibited parking on either side
of any street measuring eight meters in width. TLC is adjacent to Balabac and Cordillera
Streets, which are both less than eight meters in width. AAVA prayed that defendants be
restrained from continuing the operation of the school. The Complaint was docketed as Civil
Case No. 92-2950, and was raffled to Branch 65.
On November 24, 1992, owners of properties within the vicinity of TLC, namely the spouses
Ernesto and Alma Arzaga, Maria Luisa Quisumbing, Arturo Sena, KSL Corporation, and
LawPhil, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the adjacent property owners), filed a Complaint-in-
Intervention, seeking the same relief as AAVA and prayed for damages.
On July 22, 1994, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of AAVA, disposing of the case as
follows:
WHEREFORE, defendants are ordered to cease and desist at the end of the schoolyear
1994-95 from operating The Learning Child School beyond nursery and kindergarten classes
with a maximum of two (2) classrooms in accordance with the Deed of Restrictions, and to
pay the plaintiff the following:
1) ₱20,000.00 in attorney’s fees
2) costs of this suit.
The complaint-in-intervention is dismissed for failure of the plaintiffs-in-intervention to show
by preponderance of evidence that they are entitled to the damages prayed for.6
The RTC ruled that the operation of the grade school and the nursery and kindergarten
classes in excess of two classrooms was in violation of a contract to which the defendants
are bound. The RTC emphasized that the restrictions were in reality an easement which an
owner of a real estate may validly impose under Article 688 of the Civil Code. The RTC also
agreed with the plaintiffs therein that by allowing parking on either side of the streets adjacent
to the school, the defendants likewise violated Barangay Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1991.
On August 19, 1994, TLC and the spouses Alfonso filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
said Decision. They alleged in the Motion that with the passage of Muntinlupa Zoning
Ordinance No. 91-39 reclassifying the subject property as "institutional," there ceased to be a
legal basis for the RTC to uphold the Deed of Restrictions on the title of the spouses Alfonso.
The adjacent property owners did not move for a reconsideration of, nor appeal from, the said
Decision insofar as it dismissed their Complaint-in-Intervention.
In an Order dated March 1, 1995, the RTC agreed with the spouses Alfonso and set aside its
earlier Decision.1avvphi1 The decretal portion of the RTC Order reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of this Court dated 22 July 1995 is hereby reconsidered and set
aside and the Complaint and Complaint-in-Intervention filed on 13 October 1992 and 24
November 1992, respectively, are dismissed.7
The RTC ruled that with the reclassification by Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance No. 91-39 of the
subject property, the earlier residential classification can no longer be enforced. Citing Ortigas
& Co. Limited Partnership v. Feati Bank & Trust Co.,8 it decreed that while non-impairment of
contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute since it has to be reconciled
with the legitimate exercise of police power by the municipality.
On March 22, 1995, AAVA moved for a reconsideration of the above RTC Order. On July 21,
1995, the RTC denied the said Motion.
AAVA filed a Notice of Appeal on August 4, 1995. The Appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV
No. 51096.
On November 11, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision setting aside the March
1, 1995 RTC Resolution:
WHEREFORE, the appealed order dated March 1, 1995 of the lower court in Civil Case No.
92-2950 is hereby SET ASIDE. The earlier decision of the said court dated July 22, 1994 is
Reinstated. Costs against defendants-appellees.9
On December 4, 1997, TLC and the spouses Alfonso moved for a reconsideration of the said
Decision. On February 5, 1998, petitioners in G.R. No. 134440, namely, Jose Marie V.
Aquino, Lorenzo Maria E. Velasco, Christopher E. Walmsley, Joanna Marie S. Sison, and
Matthew Raphael C. Arce (Aquino, et al.), alleging that they are minor children who suffer
from various learning disabilities and behavioral disorders benefiting from TLC’s full-inclusion
program, filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and their own Motion for Reconsideration with
the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed Resolution denying the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by TLC and the spouses Alfonso. In the same Resolution,
the Court of Appeals denied the Motion to Intervene filed by Aquino, et al., for being
proscribed by Section 2, Rule 1910 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.
TLC and the spouses Alfonso on one hand, and Aquino, et al., on the other, filed separate
Petitions for Review with this Court challenging the July 2, 1998 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals. The Petition of TLC and the spouses Alfonso, filed on July 9, 1998, was docketed
as G.R. No. 134269. The Petition of Aquino, et al., filed within the extended period on August
21, 1998, was docketed as G.R. No. 134440.
Zoning Ordinance Case
In the meantime, on October 3, 1994, while the Motion for Reconsideration of TLC and the
spouses Alfonso was still pending in the RTC, the Municipality of Muntinlupa, through its
Sangguniang Bayan, passed Resolution No. 94-179 correcting an alleged typographical error
in the description of a parcel of land under the heading "Institutional Zone" in Appendix B of
Ordinance No. 91-39, adjusting the description "Lot 25, Block 1, Phase V, Ayala Alabang" to
"Lot 25, Block 3, Phase V, Ayala Alabang." This is the same ordinance which was used as
basis by the Makati RTC in Civil Case No. 92-2950, when it reversed its own Decision on
Motion for Reconsideration in its Order dated March 1, 1995. Lot 25, Block 3, Phase V is the
subject property wherein TLC is located.
On November 29, 1994, the Municipality of Muntinlupa wrote a letter to the Metropolitan
Manila Zoning Administration Office, informing the latter of the enactment of Muntinlupa
Resolution No. 94-179. On December 1, 1994, the Municipality of Muntinlupa filed a Petition
for the approval of Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 with the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB). AAVA and the adjacent property owners filed an Opposition.
On June 26, 1995, the HLURB issued its Resolution on the Petition of the Municipality of
Muntinlupa, the dispositive part of which states:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, we defer action to the Muntinlupa SB Resolution
No. 94-179 and remand the same to the Sanguniang Bayan of Muntinlupa for the conduct of
the required public hearings as mandated by Resolution No. 12, Series of 1991, of the Metro
Manila Council entitled "Uniform Guidelines for Rezoning of the Metro Manila Area."11
According to the HLURB, Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 is not a case of a mere
correction of an error but an actual rezoning of the property into an institutional area, and
therefore remanded the same to the Sanguniang Bayan of Muntinlupa for the conduct of the
required public hearings. The Municipality of Muntinlupa, TLC and the spouses Alfonso
appealed the HLURB Resolution to the Office of the President.
On July 27, 1999, the Office of the President rendered its Decision, which held that
Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 is a mere rectifying issuance to an alleged typographical
error in Ordinance No. 91-39, and therefore does not need for its validity compliance with the
mandatory requirements of notice and hearing pursuant to Resolution No. 12, series of
1991,12 of the Metropolitan Manila Council:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Resolution of the Board of Commissioners, Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board, dated June 26, 1995 is hereby SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Resolution
No. 94-179 of the Sanguniang Bayan (now Sangguniang Panglungsod) of Muntinlupa is
declared valid.13
In said Decision, the Office of the President likewise turned down the alternative prayer of
oppositors AAVA and the adjacent property owners that the Office of the President should
recognize the Deed of Restrictions on the subject property and restrict the use thereof in
accordance therewith. The Office of the President ruled on this matter that:
Turning to the alternative relief being sought by the oppositor [that the Office of the President
should recognize the Deed of Restrictions], the same cannot be granted. The reason is
simple. No less than Ayala Corporation – in consenting to the transfer from the Yusons to the
Alfonsos of the subject property – agreed that the "lot (shall) be used for school and related
activities", thereby effectively freeing the appellants from the deed restriction that the "Lots
(shall) be used exclusively for residential purposes." This is not all. Prior to its sale, the
property in question was already used for school purposes.
Further the aforementioned Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance itself classifies the area occupied
by the appellants’ school as an "institutional zone" and not a residential area. And the fact
that TLC is not the only school operating within the AAV – De la Salle-Zobel, Benedictine
Abbey School, Woodrose School, to name a few, conduct classes within the plush village –
renders unpersuasive appellees’ line that "x x x Through the illegal operation of their school,
the parties-in-interest appellants spouses Alfonso have effectively violated the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of the residents of the Village x x x."14 (Boldfacing
supplied; underscoring and italization are present in the original.)
AAVA and the adjacent property owners filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals.
The Petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54438.
On August 15, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision slightly modifying the
Decision of the Office of the President:
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED,
with the MODIFICATION that the ruling therein passing upon the effect of Ordinance No. 91-
39 on the Deed of Restrictions imposed on the subject property is hereby VACATED.15
The Court of Appeals agreed with the Office of the President that being merely a rectifying
issuance and not a rezoning enactment, the questioned Resolution did not have to comply
with the mandatory requirements of notice and hearing.16 However, the Court of Appeals
found the Office of the President to have exceeded its authority when it ruled 17 that the Deed
of Restrictions had lost its force and effect in view of the passage of Ordinance No. 91-39.
According to the Court of Appeals, the Office of the President effectively overruled said
appellate court’s Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 51096 wherein it ruled that the reclassification
under Ordinance No. 91-39 does not have the effect of nullifying the Deed of Restrictions at
the back of the title of the subject property, inasmuch as there is no conflict between the
Ordinance and the Deed of Restrictions.18
On October 3, 2000, AAVA and the adjacent property owners filed the third consolidated
Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court assailing the above Court of Appeals
Decision. This Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 144518.
ISSUES
Though later in time, we shall first determine the issue in G.R. No. 144518, as the validity of
Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 impinges on the issue of the legality of operating a grade
school in the subject property, which is the main issue in G.R. Nos. 134269 and 134440. We
shall then resolve the issue in G.R. No. 134440 on whether Aquino, et al., should be allowed
to intervene in the injunction case against TLC. Thereafter, we shall rule on the merits of G.R.
Nos. 134269 and 134440 by deciding once and for all whether or not TLC and the spouses
Alfonso should be enjoined from continuing the operation of a grade school in the subject
property.
The main issues to be decided by this Court, culled from the consolidated Petitions, are
therefore the following:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in upholding the validity of
Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in denying Aquino, et al.’s Motion
to Intervene; and
3. Whether or not TLC and the spouses Alfonso should be enjoined from continuing
the operation of a grade school in the subject property.
As regards the third and decisive issue, the parties further exchanged their views on the
following two sub-issues:
a. Whether or not Muntinlupa Municipal Ordinance No. 91-39, as allegedly corrected
by Muntinlupa Resolution No. 91-179, has the effect of nullifying the provisions of the
Deed of Restrictions on the subject property; and
b. Whether or not AAVA is estopped from enforcing the Deed of Restrictions.
RULINGS
Validity of Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179
AAVA claims that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Decision of the Office of the
President that Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 was merely a rectifying issuance and not a
rezoning enactment, and therefore did not have to comply with the requirements of notice and
hearing which are required for zoning ordinances. Notice and hearing are required under the
Uniform Guidelines for the Rezoning of the Metropolitan Manila Area, contained in Resolution
No. 12, series of 1991, of the then Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC).
In asserting that Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 is not a mere rectifying enactment, AAVA
faults the Office of the President and the Court of Appeals in allegedly accepting hook, line
and sinker the assertion of the ENCRFO Regional Officer and the Municipality (now City) of
Muntinlupa itself that Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 was passed merely to correct a
typographical error in Appendix B of Ordinance No. 91-39.19 AAVA adopts the HLURB finding
that it was allegedly:
[H]ard to believe that the denomination in the text of Block 1 and instead of Block 3 as an
institutional zone was an accident of (sic) mere oversight, the numbers 1 & 3 are not
adjoining each other, but are separated by the number 2. TLC’s position would have been
worth considering had the erroneous phrase typed been Block 2 for then it is more plausible
and probable for the typist to have mistyped a "2" instead of a "3." Besides, Blocks 1 and 3
are not even near each other on the map. Finally, if it were an error, it is surprising that no
one noticed it until after a court had ruled against a party, who now seeks to use said
correcting ordinance in its defense.20
We are not persuaded.
The purpose of Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 is clearly set forth in its whereas clauses:
SAPAGKAT, ang Sanguniang Bayan ng Muntinlupa ay pinagtibay ang Kautusang Bayan
Bilang 91-39 na nagsasaad ng bagong pagreresona ng Bayan ng Muntinlupa;
SAPAGKAT, sa pagrerepaso sa nabanggit na kautusang bayan ay napag-alamang
nagkaroon ng isang "typographical error sa Appendix B" nito;
SAPAGKAT, sa halip na Lot 25, Block 3, Phase V, Ayala Alabang, ang nailagay o nai-type sa
hindi sinasadyang dahilan ay Lot 25, Block 1, Phase V, Ayala Alabang;
SAPAGKAT, ang pagtatamang ito sa teksto ng Appendix B na nakapaloob sa institutional
zone ay hindi makakaapekto sa ibang bahagi o kabuuang nilalaman at itinatakda sa
kautusang bayan bilang 91-39.21
Even more telling that there was indeed a typographical error in Appendix B of Ordinance No.
91-39 is the fact that both the Official Zoning Map of Muntinlupa and that of the Ayala
Alabang Village show that the subject property, described as "Lot 25, Block 3, Phase V of
Ayala Alabang" is classified as "institutional." On the other hand, neither the Official Zoning
Map of Muntinlupa nor that of the Ayala Alabang Village classify "Lot 25, Block 1, Phase V of
Ayala Alabang" as institutional. The official zoning map is an indispensable and integral part
of a zoning ordinance, without which said ordinance would be considered void.22 Indeed,
Section 3 of Ordinance No. 91-39 expressly provides that the Official Zoning Map of
Muntinlupa shall be made an integral part of said ordinance. Both the MMC and the HLURB
Board of Commissioners approved the Official Zoning Map of Muntinlupa. Furthermore, the
very reason for the enactment of Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance No. 91-39 is the need to
accomplish an updated zoning map, as shown by the following clause in MMC’s Resolution
No. 2, series of 1992:
WHEREAS, the Sanguniang Bayan of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, approved on 10 December
1991 Municipal Ordinance No. 91-39 rezoning the entire municipality (as shown in the
accompanying zoning map and described in the attached Appendix "B") as a response to the
need to have an updated zoning map. x x x.23 (Emphases supplied.)
It is furthermore noted that TLC’s and the spouses Alfonso’s claim that Lot 25, Block 1, Phase
5 of Ayala Alabang has been and remains to be a residential lot 24 has never been rebutted by
AAVA. As regards the comment that Blocks 1 and 3 are not even near the map, we agree
with TLC and the spouses Alfonso that this bolsters their position even more, as the distance
would make it difficult to commit an error on the map. It is much more plausible to mistype a
single digit than to mistake an area for another that is far away from it.
It is therefore crystal clear that there was a typographical error in Muntinlupa Zoning
Ordinance No. 91-39. AAVA, however, furthermore claims that even assuming arguendo that
there was a typographical error in the said zoning ordinance, the proper remedy is to legislate
a new zoning ordinance, following all the formalities therefor, citing the leading case of
Resins, Incorporated v. Auditor General.25
Again, we disagree.
Resins was decided on the principle of separation of powers, that the judiciary should not
interfere with the workings of the executive and legislative branches of government:
If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of
Congress and approved by the Executive – on which we cannot speculate, without
jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of
our democratic system – the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial
decree.26
In Resins, it was a taxpayer who alleged that there was an error in the printing of the statute,
unlike in the case at bar where it is the Municipality (now City) of Muntinlupa itself which
seeks to correct its own error in the printing of the ordinance. While it would be a violation of
the principle of separation of powers for the courts to interfere with the wordings of a statute,
there would be no violation of said principle for the court to merely affirm the correction made
by the same entity which committed the error. In Resins, there is a presumption of regularity
in favor of the enrolled bill, which the courts should not speculate on. In the case at bar, it is
the curative Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 which is entitled to a presumption of regularity.
Finally, AAVA claims that the power to evaluate, approve or disapprove zoning ordinances
lies with the HLURB under Article IV, Section 5(b) of Executive Order No. 648. 27 AAVA
reminds us that the decisions of administrative agencies on matters pertaining to their
jurisdiction will generally not be disturbed by the courts.28
We should remind AAVA that the Court of Appeals, the court that was first to reexamine the
case at bar, affirmed the Decision of the Office of the President, which had set aside the
HLURB ruling. The authority of the HLURB is certainly subordinate to that of the Office of the
President and the acts of the former may be set aside by the latter. Furthermore, while it is
true that courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special
technical knowledge and training of such agencies, 29 it should be noted that the HLURB and
the then MMC were both tasked to regulate the rezoning of the Metropolitan Manila area. The
then Municipality of Muntinlupa submitted Resolution No. 94-179 to both the HLURB and the
MMC for their appropriate action. The MMC approved Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179, and
this approval should be given more weight than the disapproval of the HLURB since it was
the MMC itself which issued the Uniform Guidelines for the Rezoning of the Metropolitan
Manila Area (MMC Resolution No. 12, Series of 1991), the issuance alleged by AAVA to have
been violated by the Municipality of Muntinlupa.
In sum, Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179, being a mere corrective issuance, is not
invalidated by the lack of notice and hearing as AAVA contends.
Motion to Intervene of Aquino, et al.
It is recalled that the Motion for Leave to Intervene of Aquino, et al., was filed on February 5,
1998, which was three months after the Special Third Division of the Court of Appeals had
already rendered its Decision dated November 11, 1997 setting aside the RTC Resolution
which had been in favor of TLC and the spouses Alfonso.
Aquino, et al., premised their intervention on their being grade school students in the School
of the Holy Cross, wherein they allegedly benefit from the full-inclusion program of said
school. Under said full-inclusion program, Aquino, et al., who claim to suffer from various
learning disabilities and behavioral disorders, are enrolled full-time in educational settings
enjoyed by regular, typically developing children. Aquino, et al., alleges that TLC is the only
educational institution in the Philippines that offers a full-inclusion program, adding that other
schools offer only partial integration programs wherein children with special needs join their
typically developing classmates only in certain classes.
Considering the date of the Motion for Leave to Intervene, February 5, 1998, it is apparent
that Aquino, et al., would not still be in grade school at this time, thus rendering their alleged
interest in this case moot. Neither could Aquino, et al., claim to represent other special
children since the Motion for Reconsideration filed with the Motion for Leave to Intervene bore
no indication that it was intended as a class action; they merely sought to represent
themselves. Since the interest of Aquino, et al., in the instant case is already moot, it is but
proper for us to affirm the denial of their Motion for Leave to Intervene before the trial court.
Assuming, however, for the sake of argument, that Aquino, et al.’s, interest in the injunction
suit had not yet been mooted, we nevertheless find no reversible error in the Court of
Appeals’ denial of their Motion for Leave to Intervene.
The Motion to Intervene filed by Aquino, et al., was denied in the same Resolution wherein
the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration of TLC and the spouses Alfonso.
The ground for the denial of Aquino, et al.’s, Petition is Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules
on Civil Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 2. Time to intervene. – The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition
of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the
motion and served on the original parties. (Emphasis supplied.)
This section is derived from the former Section 2, Rule 12, which then provided that the
motion to intervene may be filed "before or during a trial." Said former phraseology gave rise
to ambiguous doctrines on the interpretation of the word "trial," with one decision holding that
said Motion may be filed up to the day the case is submitted for decision, 30 while another
stating that it may be filed at any time before the rendition of the final judgment. 31 This
ambiguity was eliminated by the present Section 2, Rule 19 by clearly stating that the same
may be filed "at any time before rendition of the judgment by the trial court," in line with the
second doctrine above-stated. The clear import of the amended provision is that intervention
cannot be allowed when the trial court has already rendered its Decision, and much less, as
in the case at bar, when even the Court of Appeals had rendered its own Decision on appeal.
Aquino, et al., claim that they could not have intervened in the case earlier, as the full-
inclusion program was allegedly commenced by defendants TLC and the spouses Alfonso
only in 1997. However, said defendants cannot be benefited by their allegedly recent
introduction of a full-inclusion program. While we sympathize with the plight of the minor
intervenors, we cannot allow that a program commenced by the defendants way beyond the
institution of the case in 1992 could be considered as a valid defense. To do so would put into
the hands of the defendant in a case the power to introduce new issues to a litigation on
appeal with the assistance of intervenors.
Injunction against the operation of the School of the Holy Cross
Effect of Ordinance No. 91-39, as corrected by Resolution No. 94-179 to the Deed of
Restrictions
In reversing itself on Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC cited the Ortigas 32 case and held
that the earlier residential classification can no longer be enforced due to the reclassification
by Muntinlupa Municipal Ordinance No. 91-39 of the subject property.
In Ortigas, the restriction of exclusive use for residential purposes was contained in the
Deeds of Sale of the subject properties at the insistence of developer Ortigas & Co. and was
annotated in the corresponding titles thereof. Therein defendant Feati Bank and Trust Co.
eventually acquired the subject properties from the successor-in-interest of the original
buyers; the deeds of sale and the TCTs issued likewise reflected the same restriction.
However, the then Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal passed a Resolution declaring
the area to which the subject property is situated as an industrial and commercial zone.
Ortigas & Co. later on sued Feati Bank, seeking an injunction to restrain the latter from
completing a commercial bank building on the premises. This Court held that the
Mandaluyong Resolution was passed in the exercise of police power.33 Since the motives
behind the passage of the questioned resolution is reasonable, and it being a legitimate
response to a felt public need, not whimsical or oppressive, the non-impairment of contracts
clause of the Constitution will not bar the municipality’s exercise of police power.34
As previously stated, the Court of Appeals set aside the RTC Resolution and reinstated the
original RTC Decision enjoining TLC and the spouses Alfonso from the operation of the
school beyond nursery and kindergarten classes with a maximum of two classrooms. The
Court of Appeals held that there is no conflict between the Deed of Restrictions, which limited
the use of the property for the establishment of a preparatory school, and the provisions of
the Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance No. 91-39, which reclassified the subject property as
"institutional." The Court of Appeals continued that there are valid grounds for it not to apply
the Ortigas case cited by the RTC Resolution, holding that while the subject property in said
case was found in an area classified as industrial and commercial, "a study of the location of
defendants’ school would clearly reveal that the same is situated within a residential area – 2. Duplex type buildings;
the exclusive Ayala Alabang Village."35
3. Churches or similar places of worship and dwelling for the religious and
TLC and the spouses Alfonso insist on the applicability of Ortigas in the case at bar, and seminaries;
likewise cited Presley v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.36 in order to drive home its point that
reclassification of properties is a valid exercise of the state’s police power, with which 4. Nursery and kindergarten schools, provided that they do not exceed two (2)
contractual obligations should be reconciled. classrooms;

AAVA counters that even where the exercise of police power is valid, the same does not 5. Clubhouses, lodges and other social centers;
operate to automatically negate all other legal relationships in existence since the better
policy is to reconcile the conflicting rights and to preserve both instead of nullifying one 6. Parks, playgrounds, pocket parks, parkways, promenades and playlots;
against the other, citing the case of Co v. Intermediate Appellate Court.37 AAVA thus adopt
the finding of the Court of Appeals that even assuming that the subject property has been
validly reclassified as an institutional zone, there is no real conflict between the Deed of 7. Recreational uses such as golf courses, tennis courts, baseball diamonds,
Restrictions and said reclassification. swimming pools and similar uses operated by the government or private individuals
as membership organizations for the benefit of their members, families or guests not
primarily for gain;
A careful study of the pertinent documents yields the conclusion that there is indeed a way to
harmonize the seemingly opposing provisions in the Deed of Restrictions and the assailed
zoning ordinance. 8. Townhouses.39 (Emphasis supplied.)

To recall, the annotation at the back of TCT No. 149166 covering the subject property On the other hand, the following are the principal uses of an institutional site, the
provides: classification of the subject property by virtue of Ordinance No. 91-39 as corrected by
Muntinlupa Municipal Resolution No. 94-179:
PE-222/T-134042 – RESTRICTIONS – The property cannot be subdivided for a period of fifty
(50) years from the date of sale. The property shall be used exclusively for the establishment Institutional
and maintenance thereon of a preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school which may
include such installations as an office for school administration, playground and garage for Principal Uses
school vehicles. x x x.38 (Emphasis ours.)
1. Barangay health centers;
It is noted that the above restriction limits the use of the subject property for preparatory
(nursery and kindergarten) school, without regard to the number of classrooms. The two- 2. Day-care centers;
classroom limit is actually imposed, not by the Deed of Restrictions, but by MMC Ordinance
No. 81-01, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance for the National Capital 3. Puericulture centers;
Region, which classified Ayala Alabang Village as a low density residential area or an "R-1
zone." The principal permitted uses of a "low-density residential area" or "R-1 zone," the
4. Clinics, family planning clinics and children’s clinics;
classification of the subject property if not for the correction under Muntinlupa Municipal
Resolution No. 94-179, is listed in Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01 as follows:
5. Nursery and kindergarten schools;
In R-1 districts, no building, structure or land used, and no building or structure shall be
erected or altered in whole or in part except for one or more of the following: 6. Elementary schools;

Principal Uses 7. Elementary and high school;

1. One-family dwellings; 8. Local civic centers, local auditoriums, halls and exhibition centers;
 9. Churches, temples and mosques; In the Ortigas case which had been interpreted differently by the RTC and the Court of
Appeals, this Court, in upholding the exercise of police power attendant in the reclassification
10. Chapels; of the subject property therein over the Deed of Restrictions over the same property, took into
consideration the prevailing conditions in the area:
11. Barangay centers;
Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part of Highway 54, now E. de los Santos
Avenue (EDSA, for short) from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial and
12. Maternity hospitals;
commercial zone, was obviously passed by the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in
the exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order
13. National executive, judicial, legislative and related facilities and activities; and general welfare of the people in the locality. Judicial notice may be taken of the
conditions prevailing in the area, especially where lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. The lots
14. Government buildings; themselves not only front the highway; industrial and commercial complexes have flourished
about the place. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through several cities and
15. Tertiary and provincial hospitals and medical center; municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting
activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the
16. National museums and galleries; residents in its route. Having been expressly granted the power to adopt zoning and
subdivision ordinances or regulations, the municipality of Mandaluyong, through its Municipal
Council, was reasonably, if not perfectly, justified under the circumstances, in passing the
17. Art galleries;
subject resolution.41 (Emphasis supplied.)

18. Planetarium;
Near the end of the Ortigas Decision, this Court added:

19. Colleges or universities;

Applying the principle just stated to the present controversy, We can say that since it is now
unprofitable, nay a hazard to the health and comfort, to use Lots Nos. 5 and 6 for strictly
20. Vocational and technical schools, special training; residential purposes, defendants-appellees should be permitted, on the strength of the
resolution promulgated under the police power of the municipality, to use the same for
21. Convents and seminaries; commercial purposes. In Burgess v. Magarian, et al., it was held that "restrictive covenants
running with the land are binding on all subsequent purchasers x x x." However, Section 23 of
22. Welfare and charitable institutions; the zoning ordinance involved therein contained a proviso expressly declaring that the
ordinance was not intended "to interfere with or abrogate or annul any easements, covenants
23. Municipal buildings; or other agreement between parties." In the case at bar, no such proviso is found in the
subject resolution. (Emphasis supplied.)
24. Fire and police station buildings;
In the case at bar, as observed by the Court of Appeals, the subject property, though
declared as an institutional lot, nevertheless lies within a residential subdivision and is
25. Local museum and libraries; surrounded by residential lots. Verily, the area surrounding TLC did not undergo a radical
change similar to that in Ortigas but rather remained purely residential to this day.
26. University complexes; and Significantly, the lot occupied by TLC is located along one of the smaller roads (less than
eight meters in width) within the subdivision. It is understandable why ALI, as the developer,
27. Penal institutions.40 (Emphasis supplied.) restricted use of the subject lot to a smaller, preparatory school that will generate less traffic
than bigger schools. With its operation of both a preparatory and grade school, TLC’s student
The jurisprudence cited by TLC and the spouses Alfonso requires a meticulous review. We population had already swelled to around 350 students at the time of the filing of this case.
find that a clarification of the doctrines laid down in the aforestated cases of Co, Ortigas, and Foreseeably, the greater traffic generated by TLC’s expanded operations will affect the
Presley is in order. adjacent property owners enjoyment and use of their own properties. AAVA’s and ALI’s
insistence on (1) the enforcement of the Deed of Restrictions or (2) the obtainment of the
approval of the affected residents for any modification of the Deed of Restrictions is
reasonable. On the other hand, the then Municipality of Muntinlupa did not appear to have
any special justification for declaring the subject lot as an institutional property. On the
contrary, Engr. Hector S. Baltazar, the Municipal Planning and Development Officer of
Muntilupa, testified that in declaring the subject property as institutional the municipality
simply adopted the classification used in a zoning map purportedly submitted by ALI itself. In
other words, the municipality was not asserting any interest or zoning purpose contrary to that
of the subdivision developer in declaring the subject property as institutional.
It is therefore proper to reconcile the apparently conflicting rights of the parties herein
pursuant to the aforementioned Co case. In Co, agricultural tenant Roaring, facing a
demolition order, filed a complaint for maintenance of possession with the Court of Agrarian
Relations of Quezon City. The landowner challenged the jurisdiction of the court arguing that
the classification of the subject property therein from agricultural to a light industrial zone.
This Court denied the applicability of the reclassification, and clarified Ortigas:
This is not to suggest that a zoning ordinance cannot affect existing legal relationships for it is
settled that it can legally do so, being an exercise of the police power. As such, it is superior
to the impairment clause. In the case of Ortigas & Co. v. Feati Bank, for example, we held
that a municipal ordinance establishing a commercial zone could validly revoke an earlier
stipulation in a contract of sale of land located in the area that it could be used for residential
purposes only. In the case at bar, fortunately for the private respondent, no similar intention is
clearly manifested. Accordingly, we affirm the view that the zoning ordinance in question,
while valid as a police measure, was not intended to affect existing rights protected by the
impairment clause.
It is always a wise policy to reconcile apparently conflicting rights under the Constitution and
to preserve both instead of nullifying one against the other. x x x.42 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Presley, the Deed of Restrictions of Bel-Air subdivision likewise restricted its use for a
residential purpose. However, the area (Jupiter Street) where the lot was located was later
reclassified into a high density commercial (C-3) zone. Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA)
sought to enjoin petitioner therein from operating its Hot Pan de Sal Store, citing the Deed of
Restrictions. We allowed the operation of the Hot Pan de Sal Store despite the Deed of
Restrictions, but not without examining the surrounding area like what we did in Ortigas:
Jupiter Street has been highly commercialized since the passage of Ordinance No. 81-01.
The records indicate that commercial buildings, offices, restaurants, and stores have already
sprouted in this area. We, therefore, see no reason why the petitioner should be singled out
and prohibited from putting up her hot pan de sal store. Thus, in accordance with the ruling in
the Sangalang case, the respondent court's decision has to be reversed.43
Furthermore, we should also take note that in the case of Presley, there can be no
reconciliation between the restriction to use of the property as a residential area and its
reclassification as a high density commercial (C-3) zone wherein the use of the property for
residential purposes is not one of the allowable uses.
Alleged estoppel on the part of AAVA from enforcing the Deed of Restrictions
TLC and the spouses Alfonso’s main argument against the enforcement of the Deed of
Restrictions on their property is the AAVA had allegedly abrogated said restrictions by its own
acts. TLC and the spouses Alfonso proceeded to enumerate acts allegedly constituting a
setting aside of said restrictions:
1. AAVA Village Manager Frank Roa admitted before the trial court that AAVA had
previously approved the proposed construction of a school building with 24
classrooms, which approval is further evidenced by a stamp mark of AAVA on the
Site Development Plan with the signature of Frank Roa himself.44
2. While the case was submitted for resolution with the Court of Appeals, AAVA,
through its president Jesus M. Tañedo, authorized through a letter the construction of
a new "school building extension."45
3. ALI itself requested the reclassification of the subject property as institutional, as
allegedly proven by the testimony of then Municipal Planning and Development
Officer Engineer Hector S. Baltazar, who said:
Engineer Baltazar:
There was a publication, your Honor, the developer of the Ayala Alabang Village, in fact, was
the one who submitted this map of theirs. In deference to the Ayala Land, Inc. which is the
developer of the Ayala Alabang Village whom we know "na maayos naman ang kanilang
zoning," we just adopted what they submitted to us. Whereas, the other areas are "talagang
pinag-aralan pa namin."46
TLC and the spouses Alfonso point out that the subject property was considered institutional
in the Official Zoning Map, thereby implying that the submission of the latter constitutes an
intent to have the subject property reclassified as institutional.
4. ALI assented to the reclassification of the subject property to institutional, as shown by its
letter dated July 24, 1991, wherein it stated:
This refers to the 26 June 1991 letter of Mr. Manuel Luis C. Gonzales concerning the
proposed expansion of the school curriculum to grade school of the Learning Child Pre-
school owned by Mrs. Mary Anne Alfonso.
Insofar as an evaluation of such proposed expansion of the school is concerned, we believe
that it is a worthy undertaking that will definitely benefit the community, and thus interpose no
objection to such proposal as long as the conditions mentioned below are met.47
We are not convinced.
Estoppel by deed is "a bar which precludes one party from asserting as against the other
party and his privies any right or title in derogation of the deed, or from denying the truth of
any material facts asserted in it."48 We have previously cautioned against the perils of the
misapplication of the doctrine of estoppel:
Estoppel has been characterized as harsh or odious, and not favored in law. When
misapplied, estoppel becomes a most effective weapon to establish an injustice, inasmuch as
it shuts a man’s mouth from speaking the truth and debars the truth in a particular case.
Estoppel cannot be sustained by mere argument or doubtful inference; it must be clearly
proved in all its essential elements by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. x x x.49
TLC and the spouses Alfonso failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the gravity of
AAVA’s acts so as to bar the latter from insisting compliance with the Deed of Restrictions.
In numbers 1 and 2 above, TLC and the spouses Alfonso claim that the previous approvals
by AAVA of the construction of additional classrooms allegedly constitute a revocation of the
Deed of Restrictions. However, as we have previously discussed, the two-classroom
restriction is not imposed in the Deed of Restrictions but rather in MMC Ordinance No. 81-01.
The alleged assent of AAVA to the construction of additional classrooms is not at all
inconsistent with the provisions of the Deed of Restrictions, which merely limit the use of the
subject property "exclusively for the establishment and maintenance thereon of a preparatory
(nursery and kindergarten) school which may include such installations as an office for school
administration, playground and garage school vehicles."
The circumstances around the enumerated acts of AAVA also show that there was no
intention on the part of AAVA to abrogate the Deed of Restrictions nor to waive its right to
have said restrictions enforced. Frank Roa’s signature in the Site Development Plan came
with the note: "APPROVED SUBJECT TO STRICT COMPLIANCE OF CAUTIONARY
NOTICES APPEARING ON THE PLAN AND TO RESTRICTIONS ENCUMBERING THE
PROPERTY REGARDING THE USE AND OCCUPANCY OF THE SAME." 50 The Site
Development Plan itself was captioned "The LEARNING CHILD PRE-SCHOOL,"51 showing
that the approval was for the construction of a pre-school, not a grade school. AAVA’s letter
dated March 20, 1996 contained an even more clear cut qualification; it expressly stated that
the approval is "subject to the conditions stipulated in the Deed of Restrictions covering your
above-mentioned property, which states, among others, that the property shall be used
exclusively for the establishment and maintenance thereon of a PREPARATORY (NURSERY
AND KINDERGARTEN) SCHOOL."
We furthermore accept AAVA’s explanation as regards the March 20, 1996 letter that at it had
to allow the construction of the new school building extension in light of the trial court’s
Orders dated March 9, 1995 and August 3, 1995. It should be noted here that AAVA was the
party appealing to the Court of Appeals as the trial court decision favorable to them had been
reversed by the same court on Motion for Reconsideration.
Numbers 3 and 4 are acts allegedly performed by ALI. AAVA claims that these acts cannot
be considered in the case at bar under the res inter alios acta rule, as ALI is not a party to the
case. Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court embodies said rule:
Sec. 28. Admission by third party. — The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.
We have to clarify that ALI’s statements, if damaging to AAVA, would be binding on the latter.
The general Ayala Alabang Village "Deed Restrictions," which was attached to the Deed of
Restrictions on the title of the subject property, expressly state that: "2. Compliance with the
said restrictions, reservation, easements and conditions maybe enjoined and/or enforced by
Court action by Ayala Corporation and/or the Ayala Alabang Village Association, their
respective successors and assigns, or by any member of the Ayala Alabang Village
Association."52 As such, it appears that Ayala Corporation is jointly interested with AAVA in an
action to enforce the Deed of Restrictions, and is therefore covered under the following
exception to the res inter alios acta rule:
Sec. 29. Admission by copartner or agent. — The act or declaration of a partner or agent of
the party within the scope of his authority and during the existence of the partnership or
agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the partnership or agency is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The same rule applies to the act or
declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the
party.53 (Emphasis supplied.)
However, the acts of ALI are not at all damaging to the position of AAVA. The act in number 1
concerns the alleged assent of ALI to the reclassification of the subject property as
institutional which, as we have already ruled, does not amount to a nullification of the Deed of
Restrictions. As regards the act in number 2, the statement in ALI’s July 24, 1991 letter that it
believes the expansion of TLC is a "worthy undertaking," it should be pointed out that ALI’s
purported assent came with conditions:
Insofar as an evaluation of such proposed expansion of the school is concerned, we believe
that it is a worthy undertaking that will definitely benefit the community, and thus interpose no
objection to such proposal as long as the conditions mentioned below are met.
It is true that the Ayala Alabang Village Association (AAVA) Board does not have the
authority on its own to alter the Deed of Restrictions for Ayala Alabang Village, and the
approval of Ayala is an indispensable condition precedent to any change in the restrictions.
However, we feel that any change in the restrictions for Ayala Alabang should be concurred
to by the AAVA Board on the premise that any change in the restrictions affects the general
welfare of the community which is the primary concern of the AAVA Board. On this same
premise, we have imposed as an additional condition to our approval of the change in
restrictions, that such change should be approved by the residents of the Village or by the
residents of the particular district where the school is situated, at the option of the Board. We
feel that the concurrence of not only the AAVA Board but also of the residents of the Village
or of the affected district (as the case may be) is fair and reasonable under the
circumstances. 54 (Emphases supplied.)
As previously stated, a majority of AAVA’s members, on April 5, 1992, voted to ratify the
Board of Governors’ resolutions that the Deed of Restrictions should be implemented.
Therefore, the conditions for ALI’s approval of the alteration of the Deed of Restrictions,
namely the concurrence of the AAVA Board and the approval of the affected residents of the
village, were clearly not met.
Finally, a thorough examination of the records of the case furthermore shows that AAVA
consistently insisted upon compliance with the Deed of Restrictions:
1. Petitioner Mary Anne Alfonso, as directress of TLC, wrote AAVA on May 20, 1991
requesting "reconsideration and approval to modify the restrictions at our property at
111 Cordillera to include the establishment and maintenance of a grade school" and
avowed to make a similar representation to ALI.55 AAVA replied on June 26, 1991
with a letter stating that the matter of interpretation or relaxation of the Deed of
Restrictions is not within its power, but of ALI, and thus referred the request to the
latter.56 ALI wrote AAVA on July 24, 1991 stating that while it interposes no objection
to the modification of the restrictions on the subject property, any change on such
restrictions should be concurred in by AAVA’s Board of Governors and approved by
the residents of the village, particularly the residents of the district where the school is
situated.57 AAVA’s Board of Governors, during its regular meeting on August 27,
1991, voted unanimously to retain the restrictions and recommended said retention to
ALI.58
2. The spouses Alfonso wrote AAVA on October 25, 1991 requesting a
reconsideration of the decision of AAVA’s Board of Governors.59 On October 31,
1991, AAVA wrote ALI to inquire about the reasons for the restrictions. 60 ALI replied
that the restrictions were imposed because the school sites located along small roads
had to be limited to small nursery schools since the latter generate less traffic than
bigger schools. ALI reiterated that the residents should be consulted prior to any
change in the restrictions.61 In the meantime, TLC proceeded to operate a grade
school on the subject property. On February 27, 1992, AAVA’s former counsel wrote
TLC a letter demanding that they suspend the enrollment of students other than for
pre-school.62
3. The spouses Alfonso wrote AAVA on March 11, 1992, reiterating their request to
operate a grade school in the subject property. 63 On March 24, 1992, the Board of
Governors of AAVA affirmed its earlier decision to retain the restrictions. On March
27, 1992, AAVA replied to the spouses Alfonso’s letter informing them of the denial.64
4. On April 5, 1992, during AAVA’s annual membership meeting, the spouses Alfonso
appealed directly to the members of AAVA. Majority of AAVA’s members voted to
ratify the Board of Governor’s Resolutions,65
5. On April 24, 1992, the spouses Alfonso wrote AAVA another letter requesting that
it be allowed to continue holding classes for Grades I to III at their premises for at
least the coming school year, since they needed time to relocate the same outside
the village.66 AAVA replied on April 30, 1992, explaining that the Board of Governors
has to follow the April 5, 1992 decision of the members and demanded that the TLC
close its grade school in the coming school year.67
6. On June 4, 1992, the spouses Alfonso wrote to AAVA again, appealing to be
allowed to continue in their premises for three more months, June to August, after
which they solemnly promised to move the grade school out of the village, possibly in
TLC’s former school site in B.F. Homes Parañaque.68 AAVA replied on June 16, 1992
denying their request, and demanded that TLC cease its operation of a grade school
on the subject property.69
7. In view of the continued operation of the grade school, AAVA sent letters to TLC
on August 17 1992 and September 4, 1992 demanding that the latter immediately
cease and desist from continuing and maintaining a grade school in the subject
property.70
From the foregoing, it cannot be said that AAVA abrogated the Deed of Restrictions. Neither
could it be deemed estopped from seeking the enforcement of said restrictions.
DISPOSITION
This Court hereby resolves to affirm with modification the Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51096 insofar as they reinstated the July 22, 1994 RTC
Decision ordering the defendants in Civil Case No. 92-2950 to cease and desist from the
operation of the Learning Child School beyond nursery and kindergarten classes. Pursuant to
Muntinlupa Ordinance No. 91-39, as corrected under Muntinlupa Municipal Resolution No.
94-179, we therefore delete the two-classroom restriction from said Decision.
This Court, however, understands the attendant difficulties this Decision could cause to the
current students of the School of the Holy Cross, who are innocent spectators to the litigation
in the case at bar. We therefore resolve that the current students of the School of the Holy
Cross be allowed to finish their elementary studies in said school up to their graduation in
their Grade 7. The school, however, shall no longer be permitted to accept new students to
the grade school.
WHEREFORE, the Court rules on the consolidated Petitions as follows:
1. The Petition in G.R. No. 134269 is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51096 dated November 11,
1997 and July 2, 1998, respectively, insofar as they reinstated the July 22, 1994 RTC
Decision ordering the defendants in Civil Case No. 92-2950 to cease and desist from
the operation of the Learning Child School beyond nursery and kindergarten classes
 with a maximum of two classrooms, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that (1) the two-classroom restriction is deleted, and (2) the current students of the
School of the Holy Cross, the Learning Child School’s grade school department, be
allowed to finish their elementary studies in said school up to their graduation in their
Grade 7. The enrollment of new students to the grade school shall no longer be
permitted.
2. The Petition in G.R. No. 134440 is DISMISSED on the ground of mootness. The
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51096 dated July 2, 1998,
insofar as it dismissed the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by Jose Marie V.
Aquino, Lorenzo Maria E. Veloso, Christopher E. Walmsley, Joanna Marie S. Sison,
and Matthew Raphael C. Arce is hereby AFFIRMED.
3. The Petition in G.R. No. 144518 is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 54438, dated August 15, 2000, which upheld the validity of a
Mandaluyong Municipal Resolution correcting an alleged typographical error in a
zoning ordinance is hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 146710-15      March 2, 2001
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES,
VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES
FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.
----------------------------------------
G.R. No. 146738      March 2, 2001
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito
Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
claims she is the President. The warring personalities are important enough but more
transcendental are the constitutional issues embedded on the parties' dispute. While the
significant issues are many, the jugular issue involves the relationship between the ruler and
the ruled in a democracy, Philippine style.
First, we take a view of the panorama of events that precipitated the crisis in the office of the
President.
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Some ten (10) million
Filipinos voted for the petitioner believing he would rescue them from life's adversity. Both
petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998.
From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems
that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October
4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went
on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos
from jueteng lords.1
The exposẻ immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day, October 5, 2000, Senator
Teofisto Guingona, Jr., then the Senate Minority Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery
privilege speech entitled "I Accuse." He accused the petitioner of receiving some P220 million
in jueteng money from Governor Singson from November 1998 to August 2000. He also
charged that the petitioner took from Governor Singson P70 million on excise tax on
cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was referred by then Senate
President Franklin Drilon, to the Blue Ribbon Committee (then headed by Senator Aquilino
Pimentel) and the Committee on Justice (then headed by Senator Renato Cayetano) for joint
investigation.2
The House of Representatives did no less. The House Committee on Public Order and
Security, then headed by Representative Roilo Golez, decided to investigate the exposẻ of
Governor Singson. On the other hand, Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera
and Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the petitioner.
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. On October 11, Archbishop Jaime
Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral statement in behalf of the Presbyteral Council of the
Archdiocese of Manila, asking petitioner to step down from the presidency as he had lost the
moral authority to govern.3 Two days later or on October 13, the Catholic Bishops Conference
of the Philippines joined the cry for the resignation of the petitioner. 4 Four days later, or on
October 17, former President Corazon C. Aquino also demanded that the petitioner take the
"supreme self-sacrifice" of resignation.5 Former President Fidel Ramos also joined the
chorus. Early on, or on October 12, respondent Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the
Department of Social Welfare and Services6 and later asked for petitioner's
resignation.7 However, petitioner strenuously held on to his office and refused to resign.
The heat was on. On November 1, four (4) senior economic advisers, members of the
Council of Senior Economic Advisers, resigned. They were Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala,
former Prime Minister Cesar Virata, former Senator Vicente Paterno and Washington
Sycip.8 On November 2, Secretary Mar Roxas II also resigned from the Department of Trade
and Industry.9 On November 3, Senate President Franklin Drilon, and House Speaker Manuel
Villar, together with some 47 representatives defected from the ruling coalition, Lapian ng
Masang Pilipino.10
The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session on November 13,
House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment11 signed by 115
representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the
Senate. This caused political convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator Drilon was
replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker Villar was unseated by
Representative Fuentebella.12 On November 20, the Senate formally opened the
impeachment trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one (21) senators took their oath as judges with
Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.13
The political temperature rose despite the cold December. On December 7, the impeachment
trial started.14 The battle royale was fought by some of the marquee names in the legal
profession. Standing as prosecutors were then House Minority Floor Leader Feliciano
Belmonte and Representatives Joker Arroyo, Wigberto Tañada, Sergio Apostol, Raul
Gonzales, Oscar Moreno, Salacnib Baterina, Roan Libarios, Oscar Rodriguez, Clavel
Martinez and Antonio Nachura. They were assisted by a battery of private prosecutors led by
now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez and now Solicitor General Simeon Marcelo.
Serving as defense counsel were former Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, former Solicitor
General and Secretary of Justice Estelito P. Mendoza, former City Fiscal of Manila Jose
Flaminiano, former Deputy Speaker of the House Raul Daza, Atty. Siegfried Fortun and his
brother, Atty. Raymund Fortun. The day to day trial was covered by live TV and during its
course enjoyed the highest viewing rating. Its high and low points were the constant
conversational piece of the chattering classes. The dramatic point of the December hearings
was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank. She
testified that she was one foot away from petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature
"Jose Velarde" on documents involving a P500 million investment agreement with their bank
on February 4, 2000.15
After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of
Christmas. When it resumed on January 2, 2001, more bombshells were exploded by the
prosecution. On January 11, Atty. Edgardo Espiritu who served as petitioner's Secretary of
Finance took the witness stand. He alleged that the petitioner jointly owned BW Resources
Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges of insider trading.16 Then came the
fateful day of January 16, when by a vote of 11-10 17 the senator-judges ruled against the
opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner
held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde." The public and
private prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned
as Senate President.18 The ruling made at 10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous outburst of
anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. By midnight, thousands had assembled at the
EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the
eleven (11) senators.
On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker Fuentebella tendering
their collective resignation. They also filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance
with the impeachment tribunal.19 Senator Raul Roco quickly moved for the indefinite
postponement of the impeachment proceedings until the House of Representatives shall
have resolved the issue of resignation of the public prosecutors. Chief Justice Davide granted
the motion.20
January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioner's resignation. A 10-
kilometer line of people holding lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino
Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's
solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation. Students and teachers walked out of their
classes in Metro Manila to show their concordance. Speakers in the continuing rallies at the
EDSA Shrine, all masters of the physics of persuasion, attracted more and more people.21
On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the
petitioner informed Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to
the holding of a snap election for President where he would not be a candidate. It did not
diffuse the growing crisis. At 3:00 p.m., Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and
General Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed services went to the EDSA
Shrine.22 In the presence of former Presidents Aquino and Ramos and hundreds of
thousands of cheering demonstrators, General Reyes declared that "on behalf of Your Armed
Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are
withdrawing our support to this government."23 A little later, PNP Chief, Director General
Panfilo Lacson and the major service commanders gave a similar stunning
announcement.24 Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and
bureau chiefs quickly resigned from their posts.25 Rallies for the resignation of the petitioner
exploded in various parts of the country. To stem the tide of rage, petitioner announced he
was ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening of the highly controversial second
envelope.26 There was no turning back the tide. The tide had become a tsunami.
January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first round of negotiations for
the peaceful and orderly transfer of power started at Malacañang'' Mabini Hall, Office of the
Executive Secretary. Secretary Edgardo Angara, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Ramon
Bagatsing, Political Adviser Angelito Banayo, Asst. Secretary Boying Remulla, and Atty.
Macel Fernandez, head of the Presidential Management Staff, negotiated for the petitioner.
Respondent Arroyo was represented by now Executive Secretary Renato de Villa, now
Secretary of Finance Alberto Romulo and now Secretary of Justice Hernando
Perez.27 Outside the palace, there was a brief encounter at Mendiola between pro and anti-
Estrada protesters which resulted in stone-throwing and caused minor injuries. The
negotiations consumed all morning until the news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would
administer the oath to respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine.
At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as
President of the Philippines.28 At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang
Palace.29 He issued the following press statement:30
"20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath
as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal
minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will
prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of
this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our
nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to
me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may
come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in to promotion of a constructive
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter:31
"Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby
transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my
office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting
President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
A copy of the letter was sent to former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m. on January
20.23 Another copy was transmitted to Senate President Pimentel on the same day although it
was received only at 9:00 p.m.33
On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged
the powers the duties of the Presidency. On the same day, this Court issued the following
Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC, to wit:
"A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC — In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
to Take her Oath of Office as President of the Republic of the Philippines before the
Chief Justice — Acting on the urgent request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the Republic of the Philippines, addressed to
the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001,
which request was treated as an administrative matter, the court Resolve
unanimously to confirm the authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court
then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath of office
of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon of
January 20, 2001.
This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may
be filed by a proper party."
Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her Cabinet as well as ambassadors and special
envoys.34 Recognition of respondent Arroyo's government by foreign governments swiftly
followed. On January 23, in a reception or vin d' honneur at Malacañang, led by the Dean of
the Diplomatic Corps, Papal Nuncio Antonio Franco, more than a hundred foreign diplomats
recognized the government of respondent Arroyo.35 US President George W. Bush gave the
respondent a telephone call from the White House conveying US recognition of her
government.36
On January 24, Representative Feliciano Belmonte was elected new Speaker of the House of
Representatives.37 The House then passed Resolution No. 175 "expressing the full support of
the House of Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, President of the Philippines."38 It also approved Resolution No. 176 "expressing the
support of the House of Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its
congratulations and expressing its support for her administration as a partner in the
attainment of the nation's goals under the Constitution."39
On January 26, the respondent signed into law the Solid Waste Management Act.40 A few
days later, she also signed into law the Political Advertising ban and Fair Election Practices
Act.41
On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her Vice
President.42 The next day, February 7, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 82 confirming the
nomination of Senator Guingona, Jr.43 Senators Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Juan Ponce
Enrile, and John Osmena voted "yes" with reservations, citing as reason therefor the pending
challenge on the legitimacy of respondent Arroyo's presidency before the Supreme Court.
Senators Teresa Aquino-Oreta and Robert Barbers were absent.44 The House of
Representatives also approved Senator Guingona's nomination in Resolution No.
178.45 Senator Guingona, Jr. took his oath as Vice President two (2) days later.46
On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court
is functus officio and has been terminated.47 Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated "for
the record" that she voted against the closure of the impeachment court on the grounds that
the Senate had failed to decide on the impeachment case and that the resolution left open
the question of whether Estrada was still qualified to run for another elective post.48
Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse Asia, President Arroyo's public acceptance rating
jacked up from 16% on January 20, 2001 to 38% on January 26, 2001.49 In another survey
conducted by the ABS-CBN/SWS from February 2-7, 2001, results showed that 61% of the
Filipinos nationwide accepted President Arroyo as replacement of petitioner Estrada. The
survey also revealed that President Arroyo is accepted by 60% in Metro Manila, by also 60%
in the balance of Luzon, by 71% in the Visayas, and 55% in Mindanao. Her trust rating
increased to 52%. Her presidency is accepted by majorities in all social classes: 58% in the
ABC or middle-to-upper classes, 64% in the D or mass class, and 54% among the E's or very
poor class.50
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal problems appeared in clusters.
Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in
motion. These are: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October
23, 2000 for bribery and graft and corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the
Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft
and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct, violation of the Code of Conduct for
Government Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines
Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery,
perjury, serious misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et al.,
on November 28, 2000 for malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and
property, plunder, etc.; (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on
November 28, 2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD
46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on
December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and corruption.
A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to
investigate the charges against the petitioner. It is chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman
Margarito P. Gervasio with the following as members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan,
Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January
22, the panel issued an Order directing the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and the
affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in answer to the
aforementioned complaints against him.
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court
GR No. 146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It
sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from "conducting any further proceedings in
Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal
complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over
and only if legally warranted." Thru another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No.
146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the
duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the
Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution." Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same day, February 6,
required the respondents "to comment thereon within a non-extendible period expiring on 12
February 2001." On February 13, the Court ordered the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15
and GR No. 146738 and the filing of the respondents' comments "on or before 8:00 a.m. of
February 15."
On February 15, the consolidated cases were orally argued in a four-hour hearing. Before the
hearing, Chief Justice Davide, Jr.51 and Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban52 recused
themselves on motion of petitioner's counsel, former Senator Rene A. Saguisag. They
debunked the charge of counsel Saguisag that they have "compromised themselves by
indicating that they have thrown their weight on one side" but nonetheless inhibited
themselves. Thereafter, the parties were given the short period of five (5) days to file their
memoranda and two (2) days to submit their simultaneous replies.
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of resolution and
press statement for "Gag Order" on respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in
G.R. No. 146738, the Court resolved:
"(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001
declaring the office of the President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice
issue a press statement justifying the alleged resolution;
(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court
under pain of being cited for contempt to refrain from making any comment or
discussing in public the merits of the cases at bar while they are still pending decision
by the Court, and
(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the respondent
Ombudsman from resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending investigation in
his office against petitioner, Joseph E. Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it
appearing from news reports that the respondent Ombudsman may immediately
resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days after the
hearing held on February 15, 2001, which action will make the cases at bar moot and
academic."53
The parties filed their replies on February 24. On this date, the cases at bar were deemed
submitted for decision.
The bedrock issues for resolution of this Court are:
I
Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
II
Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner
Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
III
Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the
criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that
petitioner is still President, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution.
IV
Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of
prejudicial publicity.
We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.
I political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only
Whether or not the cases
At bar involve a political question
Private respondents54 raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose a political question,
and hence, are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to decide. They contend that shorn of its
embroideries, the cases at bar assail the "legitimacy of the Arroyo administration." They
stress that respondent Arroyo ascended the presidency through people power; that she has
already taken her oath as the 14th President of the Republic; that she has exercised the
powers of the presidency and that she has been recognized by foreign governments. They
submit that these realities on ground constitute the political thicket, which the Court cannot
enter.
We reject private respondents' submission. To be sure, courts here and abroad, have tried to
lift the shroud on political question but its exact latitude still splits the best of legal minds.
Developed by the courts in the 20th century, the political question doctrine which rests on the
principle of separation of powers and on prudential considerations, continue to be refined in
the mills of constitutional law.55 In the United States, the most authoritative guidelines to
determine whether a question is political were spelled out by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962
case or Baker v. Carr,56 viz:
"x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on question. Unless one of these
formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non
justiciability on the ground of a political question's presence. The doctrine of which we
treat is one of 'political questions', not of 'political cases'."
In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with cases calling for a
firmer delineation of the inner and outer perimeters of a political question.57 Our leading case
is Tanada v. Cuenco,58 where this Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,
held that political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure." To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government.59 Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt
not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. 60 With the new
provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to
prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant
the Court power of doing nothing. In sync and symmetry with this intent are other
provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming the so called political thicket. Prominent of these
provisions is section 18 of Article VII which empowers this Court in limpid language to "x x x
review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ (of habeas
corpus) or the extension thereof x x x."
Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A.
Lozano v. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al. 61 and related cases62 to support their thesis
that since the cases at bar involve the legitimacy of the government of respondent
Arroyo, ergo, they present a political question. A more cerebral reading of the cited cases will
show that they are inapplicable. In the cited cases, we held that the government of
former President Aquino was the result of a successful revolution by the sovereign
people, albeit a peaceful one. No less than the Freedom Constitution63 declared that the
Aquino government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino
people "in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as amended." In is
familiar learning that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by
people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the
constitutional loop. In checkered contrast, the government of respondent Arroyo is not
revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at the EDSA Shrine is the oath under the
1987 Constitution.64 In her oath, she categorically swore to preserve and defend the
1987 Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is discharging the powers of the
presidency under the authority of the 1987 Constitution.1âwphi1.nêt
In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II is
clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the
whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and
freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only
affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of
the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II
is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the
succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I
presented a political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief discourse on
freedom of speech and of the freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of
grievance which are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not inappropriate.
Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are treasured by Filipinos. Denial of these
rights was one of the reasons of our 1898 revolution against Spain. Our national hero, Jose
P. Rizal, raised the clarion call for the recognition of freedom of the press of the Filipinos and
included it as among "the reforms sine quibus non."65 The Malolos Constitution, which is the
work of the revolutionary Congress in 1898, provided in its Bill of Rights that Filipinos shall
not be deprived (1) of the right to freely express his ideas or opinions, orally or in writing,
through the use of the press or other similar means; (2) of the right of association for
purposes of human life and which are not contrary to public means; and (3) of the right to
send petitions to the authorities, individually or collectively." These fundamental rights were
preserved when the United States acquired jurisdiction over the Philippines. In the
Instruction to the Second Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900 issued by President
McKinley, it is specifically provided "that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the
Government for redress of grievances." The guaranty was carried over in the Philippine Bill,
the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 and the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of August 29,
1966.66
Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in our 1935 Constitution,67 and
the 197368 Constitution. These rights are now safely ensconced in section 4, Article III of the
1987 Constitution, viz:
"Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of
the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances."
The indispensability of the people's freedom of speech and of assembly to democracy is now
self-evident. The reasons are well put by Emerson: first, freedom of expression is essential as
a means of assuring individual fulfillment; second, it is an essential process for advancing
knowledge and discovering truth; third, it is essential to provide for participation in decision-
making by all members of society; and fourth, it is a method of achieving a more adaptable
and hence, a more stable community of maintaining the precarious balance between healthy
cleavage and necessary consensus."69 In this sense, freedom of speech and of assembly
provides a framework in which the "conflict necessary to the progress of a society can
take place without destroying the society." 70 In Hague v. Committee for Industrial
Organization,71 this function of free speech and assembly was echoed in the amicus
curiae filed by the Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar Association which
emphasized that "the basis of the right of assembly is the substitution of the expression of
opinion and belief by talk rather than force; and this means talk for all and by all."72 In the
relatively recent case of Subayco v. Sandiganbayan,73 this Court similar stressed that "… it
should be clear even to those with intellectual deficits that when the sovereign people
assemble to petition for redress of grievances, all should listen. For in a democracy, it is the
people who count; those who are deaf to their grievances are ciphers."
Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues
for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution,
notably section 1 of Article II,74 and section 875 of Article VII, and the allocation of
governmental powers under section 1176 of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on
the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the
right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v.
Madison,77 the doctrine has been laid down that "it is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is . . ." Thus, respondent's in vocation of the
doctrine of political question is but a foray in the dark.
II
Whether or not the petitioner
Resigned as President
We now slide to the second issue. None of the parties considered this issue as posing a
political question. Indeed, it involves a legal question whose factual ingredient is determinable
from the records of the case and by resort to judicial notice. Petitioner denies he resigned as
President or that he suffers from a permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the office of
the President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath as President.
The issue brings under the microscope the meaning of section 8, Article VII of the
Constitution which provides:
"Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of
the President, the Vice President shall become the President to serve the unexpired
term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of
both the President and Vice President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his
inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President
until the President or Vice President shall have been elected and qualified.
x x x."
The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered
resigned as of January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14 th President of the
Public. Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and
its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be
coupled by acts of relinquishment. 78 The validity of a resignation is not government by any
formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be
implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation
before he evacuated Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-
taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be
determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by
the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
bearing a material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the petitioner, it is important to
follow the succession of events after the exposẻ of Governor Singson. The Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee investigated. The more detailed revelations of petitioner's alleged
misgovernance in the Blue Ribbon investigation spiked the hate against him. The Articles of
Impeachment filed in the House of Representatives which initially was given a near cipher
chance of succeeding snowballed. In express speed, it gained the signatures of 115
representatives or more than 1/3 of the House of Representatives. Soon, petitioner's powerful
political allies began deserting him. Respondent Arroyo quit as Secretary of Social Welfare.
Senate President Drilon and former Speaker Villar defected with 47 representatives in tow.
Then, his respected senior economic advisers resigned together with his Secretary of Trade
and Industry.
As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the people's call for his resignation
intensified. The call reached a new crescendo when the eleven (11) members of the
impeachment tribunal refused to open the second envelope. It sent the people to paroxysms
of outrage. Before the night of January 16 was over, the EDSA Shrine was swarming with
people crying for redress of their grievance. Their number grew exponentially. Rallies and
demonstration quickly spread to the countryside like a brush fire.
As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window on the state of
mind of the petitioner. The window is provided in the "Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada,"
the diary of Executive Secretary Angara serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer.79 The
Angara Diary reveals that in the morning of January 19, petitioner's loyal advisers were
worried about the swelling of the crowd at EDSA, hence, they decided to create an ad hoc
committee to handle it. Their worry would worsen. At 1:20 p.m., petitioner pulled Secretary
Angara into his small office at the presidential residence and exclaimed: "Ed, seryoso na ito.
Kumalas na si Angelo (Reyes) (Ed, this is serious. Angelo has defected.)" 80 An hour later or
at 2:30 p.m., the petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential election and stressed he
would not be a candidate. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where
he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the
presidency even at that time. At 3:00 p.m., General Reyes joined the sea of EDSA
demonstrators demanding the resignation of the petitioner and dramatically announced the
AFP's withdrawal of support from the petitioner and their pledge of support to respondent
Arroyo. The seismic shift of support left petitioner weak as a president. According to
Secretary Angara, he asked Senator Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option
of "dignified exit or resignation."81 Petitioner did not disagree but listened
intently.82 The sky was falling fast on the petitioner. At 9:30 p.m., Senator Pimentel repeated
to the petitioner the urgency of making a graceful and dignified exit. He gave the proposal a
sweetener by saying that petitioner would be allowed to go abroad with enough funds to
support him and his family.83 Significantly, the petitioner expressed no objection to the
suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would never leave the
country.84 At 10:00 p.m., petitioner revealed to Secretary Angara, "Ed, Angie (Reyes)
guaranteed that I would have five days to a week in the palace."85 This is proof that
petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to resign. His mind was
already concerned with the five-day grace period he could stay in the palace. It was a
matter of time.
The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m., former President Ramos called up
Secretary Angara and requested, "Ed, magtulungan tayo para magkaroon tayo ng (let's
cooperate to ensure a) peaceful and orderly transfer of power."86 There was no defiance to
the request. Secretary Angara readily agreed. Again, we note that at this stage, the problem
was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the
petitioner was implied.
The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power immediately started at
12:20 a.m. of January 20, that fateful Saturday. The negotiation was limited to three (3)
points: (1) the transition period of five days after the petitioner's resignation; (2) the guarantee
of the safety of the petitioner and his family, and (3) the agreement to open the second
envelope to vindicate the name of the petitioner.87 Again, we note that the resignation of
petitioner was not a disputed point. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this
fact. According to Secretary Angara, at 2:30 a.m., he briefed the petitioner on the three points
and the following entry in the Angara Diary shows the reaction of the petitioner, viz:
"x x x
I explain what happened during the first round of negotiations.
The President immediately stresses that he just wants the five-day period promised
by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelope to clear his name.
If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.
The President says. "Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit.
Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don't want
any more of this – it's too painful. I'm tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the
intrigue.)
I just want to clear my name, then I will go."88
Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign
is clear when he said "x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit." "Ayoko na" are words of
resignation.
The second round of negotiation resumed at 7:30 a.m. According to the Angara Diary, the
following happened:
"Opposition's deal
7:30 a.m. – Rene arrives with Bert Romulo and (Ms. Macapagal's spokesperson)
Rene Corona. For this round, I am accompanied by Dondon Bagatsing and Macel.
Rene pulls out a document titled "Negotiating Points." It reads:
'1. The President shall sign a resignation document within the day, 20 January 2001,
that will be effective on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice
President will assume the Presidency of the Republic of the Philippines.
2. Beginning to day, 20 January 2001, the transition process for the assumption of
the new administration shall commence, and persons designated by the Vice
President to various positions and offices of the government shall start their
orientation activities in coordination with the incumbent officials concerned.
3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police shall
function under the Vice President as national military and police authority effective
immediately.
4. The Armed Forced of the Philippines, through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the
security of the President and his family as approved by the national military and
police authority (Vice President).
5. It is to be noted that the Senate will open the second envelope in connection with
the alleged savings account of the President in the Equitable PCI Bank in accordance
with the rules of the Senate, pursuant to the request to the Senate President.
Our deal
We bring out, too, our discussion draft which reads:
The undersigned parties, for and in behalf of their respective principals, agree and
undertake as follows:
'1. A transition will occur and take place on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, at which
time President Joseph Ejercito Estrada will turn over the presidency to Vice President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
'2. In return, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed security and safety of
their person and property throughout their natural lifetimes. Likewise, President
Estrada and his families are guarantee freedom from persecution or retaliation from
government and the private sector throughout their natural lifetimes.
This commitment shall be guaranteed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
through the Chief of Staff, as approved by the national military and police authorities
– Vice President (Macapagal).
'3. Both parties shall endeavor to ensure that the Senate sitting as an impeachment
court will authorize the opening of the second envelope in the impeachment trial as
proof that the subject savings account does not belong to President Estrada.
'4. During the five-day transition period between 20 January 2001 and 24 January
2001 (the 'Transition Period"), the incoming Cabinet members shall receive an
appropriate briefing from the outgoing Cabinet officials as part of the orientation
program.
During the Transition Period, the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall
function Vice President (Macapagal) as national military and police authorities.
 Both parties hereto agree that the AFP chief of staff and PNP director general shall
obtain all the necessary signatures as affixed to this agreement and insure faithful
implementation and observance thereof.
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo shall issue a public statement in the form
and tenor provided for in "Annex A" heretofore attached to this agreement."89
The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has resigned. It will
be noted that during this second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was
again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be
undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period.
According to Secretary Angara, the draft agreement, which was premised on the resignation
of the petitioner was further refined. It was then, signed by their side and he was ready to fax
it to General Reyes and Senator Pimentel to await the signature of the United Opposition.
However, the signing by the party of the respondent Arroyo was aborted by her oath-taking.
The Angara diary narrates the fateful events, viz;90
"xxx
11:00 a.m. – Between General Reyes and myself, there is a firm agreement on the
five points to effect a peaceful transition. I can hear the general clearing all these
points with a group he is with. I hear voices in the background.
Agreement.
The agreement starts: 1. The President shall resign today, 20 January 2001, which
resignation shall be effective on 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President
will assume the presidency of the Republic of the Philippines.
xxx
The rest of the agreement follows:
2. The transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall
commence on 20 January 2001, wherein persons designated by the Vice President
to various government positions shall start orientation activities with incumbent
officials.
'3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the
safety and security of the President and his families throughout their natural lifetimes
as approved by the national military and police authority – Vice President.
'4. The AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function under the Vice
President as national military and police authorities.
'5. Both parties request the impeachment court to open the second envelope in the
impeachment trial, the contents of which shall be offered as proof that the subject
savings account does not belong to the President.
The Vice President shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for
in Annex "B" heretofore attached to this agreement.
11:20 a.m. – I am all set to fax General Reyes and Nene Pimentel our agreement,
signed by our side and awaiting the signature of the United opposition.
And then it happens. General Reyes calls me to say that the Supreme Court has
decided that Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is President and will be sworn in at 12 noon.
'Bakit hindi naman kayo nakahintay? Paano na ang agreement (why couldn't you
wait? What about the agreement)?' I asked.
Reyes answered: 'Wala na, sir (it's over, sir).'
I ask him: Di yung  transition period, moot and academic na?'
And General Reyes answers: ' Oo nga, I delete na natin,  sir (yes, we're deleting the
part).'
Contrary to subsequent reports, I do not react and say that there was a double cross.
But I immediately instruct Macel to delete the first provision on resignation since this
matter is already moot and academic. Within moments, Macel erases the first
provision and faxes the documents, which have been signed by myself, Dondon and
Macel, to Nene Pimentel and General Reyes.
I direct Demaree Ravel to rush the original document to General Reyes for the
signatures of the other side, as it is important that the provisions on security, at least,
should be respected.
I then advise the President that the Supreme Court has ruled that Chief Justice
Davide will administer the oath to Gloria at 12 noon.
The President is too stunned for words:
Final meal
 12 noon – Gloria takes her oath as president of the Republic of the Philippines.
12:20 p.m. – The PSG distributes firearms to some people inside the compound.
The president is having his final meal at the presidential Residence with the few
friends and Cabinet members who have gathered.
By this time, demonstrators have already broken down the first line of defense at
Mendiola. Only the PSG is there to protect the Palace, since the police and military
have already withdrawn their support for the President.
1 p.m. – The President's personal staff is rushing to pack as many of the Estrada
family's personal possessions as they can.
During lunch, Ronnie Puno mentions that the president needs to release a final
statement before leaving Malacañang.
The statement reads: At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with
many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the
legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a
factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of
this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our
nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to
me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may
come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.
MABUHAY!"'
It was curtain time for the petitioner.
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by
his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he
acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with
reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the
presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He
did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and that he was going to re-
assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to
the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past
opportunity given him to serve the people as President (4) he assured that he will not shirk
from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which
he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The
press release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in
the part tense.
It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary leave dated
January 20, 2001 of the petitioner sent to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker
Fuentebella is cited. Again, we refer to the said letter, viz:
"Sir.
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby
transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my
office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting
president.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada"
To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery. 91 The pleadings filed by the
petitioner in the cases at bar did not discuss, may even intimate, the circumstances that led to
its preparation. Neither did the counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court these
circumstances during the oral argument. It strikes the Court as strange that the letter, despite
its legal value, was never referred to by the petitioner during the week-long crisis. To be sure,
there was not the slightest hint of its existence when he issued his final press release. It was
all too easy for him to tell the Filipino people in his press release that he was temporarily
unable to govern and that he was leaving the reins of government to respondent Arroyo for
the time bearing. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the
resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release of the petitioner
clearly as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press released, still, it commands
scant legal significance. Petitioner's resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of
a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the resignation is the result of his
reputation by the people. There is another reason why this Court cannot given any legal
significance to petitioner's letter and this shall be discussed in issue number III of this
Decision.
After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also argues that he
could not resign as a matter of law. He relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known
as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which allegedly prohibits his resignation, viz:
 "Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an
investigation, criminals or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for
any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on
bribery."
A reading of the legislative history of RA No. 3019 will hardly provide any comfort to the
petitioner. RA No. 3019 originated form Senate Bill No. 293. The original draft of the bill,
when it was submitted to the Senate, did not contain a provision similar to section 12 of the
law as it now stands. However, in his sponsorship speech, Senator Arturo Tolentino, the
author of the bill, "reserved to propose during the period of amendments the inclusion of a
provision to the effect that no public official who is under prosecution for any act of graft or
corruption, or is under administrative investigation, shall be allowed to voluntarily resign or
retire."92 During the period of amendments, the following provision was inserted as section 15:
"Sec. 15. Termination of office – No public official shall be allowed to resign or retire
pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against
him, for any offense under the Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
on bribery.
The separation or cessation of a public official form office shall not be a bar to his
prosecution under this Act for an offense committed during his incumbency."93
The bill was vetoed by then President Carlos P. Garcia who questioned the legality of the
second paragraph of the provision and insisted that the President's immunity should extend
after his tenure.
Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially similar Senate Bill No. 293, was thereafter
passed. Section 15 above became section 13 under the new bill, but the deliberations on this
particular provision mainly focused on the immunity of the President, which was one of the
reasons for the veto of the original bill. There was hardly any debate on the prohibition
against the resignation or retirement of a public official with pending criminal and
administrative cases against him. Be that as it may, the intent of the law ought to be obvious.
It is to prevent the act of resignation or retirement from being used by a public official as a
protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case against
him and to prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or prosecution for bribery under
the Revised Penal Code. To be sure, no person can be compelled to render service for that
would be a violation of his constitutional right. 94 A public official has the right not to serve if he
really wants to retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a public
official is facing administrative or criminal investigation or prosecution, such resignation or
retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or administrative proceedings against
him. He cannot use his resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution.
There is another reason why petitioner's contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar,
the records show that when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the cases filed against
him before the Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-
1757 and 0-00-1758. While these cases have been filed, the respondent Ombudsman
refrained from conducting the preliminary investigation of the petitioner for the reason that as
the sitting President then, petitioner was immune from suit. Technically, the said cases
cannot be considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on them.
Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates
of cases whose investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle
like the immunity from suit of a sitting President.
Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that,
under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature
of an impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an
administrative proceeding, it can not be considered pending at the time petitioner resigned
because the process already broke down when a majority of the senator-judges voted against
the opening of the second envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public
prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were
postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no impeachment case pending against petitioner
when he resigned.
III
Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily unable to Act as President.
We shall now tackle the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to
perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. As
aforestated, the inability claim is contained in the January 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent on
the same day to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella.
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge the
inability of the petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. His significant
submittal is that "Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine
whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in
section 11 of article VII."95 This contention is the centerpiece of petitioner's stance that he
is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:
"SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-
President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of
the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
 office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the
office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability
exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a
majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of
the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall
convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules
and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in
session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-
thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as
President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties
of his office."
That is the law. Now, the operative facts:
1. Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the
Senate President and Speaker of the House;
2. Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President
on January 20, 2001 at about 12:30 p.m.;
3. Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed on
January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. 175;96
On the same date, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No.
17697 which states:
"RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS
SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT
OF THE NATION'S GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, as a consequence of the people's loss of confidence on the ability of
former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern, the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, the Philippine National Police and majority of his cabinet had
withdrawn support from him;
WHEREAS, upon authority of an en banc resolution of the Supreme Court, Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as President of the Philippines on
20 January 2001 before Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.;
WHEREAS, immediately thereafter, members of the international community had
extended their recognition to Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President
of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has espoused a
policy of national healing and reconciliation with justice for the purpose of national
unity and development;
WHEREAS, it is axiomatic that the obligations of the government cannot be achieved
if it is divided, thus by reason of the constitutional duty of the House of
Representatives as an institution and that of the individual members thereof of fealty
to the supreme will of the people, the House of Representatives must ensure to the
people a stable, continuing government and therefore must remove all obstacles to
the attainment thereof;
WHEREAS, it is a concomitant duty of the House of Representatives to exert all
efforts to unify the nation, to eliminate fractious tension, to heal social and political
wounds, and to be an instrument of national reconciliation and solidarity as it is a
direct representative of the various segments of the whole nation;
WHEREAS, without surrending its independence, it is vital for the attainment of all
the foregoing, for the House of Representatives to extend its support and
collaboration to the administration of Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, and to be a constructive partner in nation-building, the national interest
demanding no less: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives, To express its support to the assumption
into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of
the Philippines, to extend its congratulations and to express its support for her
administration as a partner in the attainment of the Nation's goals under the
Constitution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on January 24, 2001.
 (Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General"
On February 7, 2001, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No.
17898 which states:
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO'S
NOMINATION OF SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the
assumption to the Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the
event of such vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of
the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon
confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both Houses voting separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated
Senate Minority Leader Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., to the position of Vice President of
the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., is a public servant endowed with
integrity, competence and courage; who has served the Filipino people with
dedicated responsibility and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true
statesmanship, having served the government in various capacities, among others,
as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the Commission on Audit,
Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the Philippines – qualities which
merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore,
be it
Resolved as it is hereby resolved by the House of Representatives, That the House
of Representatives confirms the nomination of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as
the Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General"
(4) Also, despite receipt of petitioner's letter claiming inability, some twelve (12)
members of the Senate signed the following:
"RESOLUTION
WHEREAS, the recent transition in government offers the nation an opportunity for
meaningful change and challenge;
WHEREAS, to attain desired changes and overcome awesome challenges the nation
needs unity of purpose and resolve cohesive resolute (sic) will;
WHEREAS, the Senate of the Philippines has been the forum for vital legislative
measures in unity despite diversities in perspectives;
WHEREFORE, we recognize and express support to the new government of
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and resolve to discharge and overcome the
nation's challenges." 99
On February 7, the Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82100 which states:
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO'S
NOMINATION OF SEM. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the
assumption to the Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9 Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the
event of such vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of
the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon
confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both Houses voting separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated
Senate Minority Leader Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. to the position of Vice President of
the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. is a public servant endowed with integrity,
competence and courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated
responsibility and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true
statemanship, having served the government in various capacities, among others, as
Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the Commission on Audit,
Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the land - which qualities merit
his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved,  That the Senate confirm the nomination of Sen.
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines.
Adopted,
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of the Senate"
(5) On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No. 84 "certifying to the existence of
vacancy in the Senate and calling on the COMELEC to fill up such vacancy through election
to be held simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the Senatorial
candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the
unexpired term of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.'

(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR. (6) Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by
President of the Senate respondent Arroyo as President.

This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001. (7) Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without any recognition
from any sector of government, and without any support from the Armed Forces of the
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO Philippines and the Philippine National Police, the petitioner continues to claim that his
Secretary of the Senate" inability to govern is only momentary.

On the same date, February 7, the Senate likewise passed Senate Resolution No.
83101 which states:
"RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE IMPEACHMENT COURT IS FUNCTUS
OFFICIO
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved.  That the Senate recognize that the Impeachment
Court is functus officio and has been terminated.
Resolved, further, That the Journals of the Impeachment Court on Monday, January
15, Tuesday, January 16 and Wednesday, January 17, 2001 be considered
approved.
Resolved, further,  That the records of the Impeachment Court including the "second
envelope" be transferred to the Archives of the Senate for proper safekeeping and
preservation in accordance with the Rules of the Senate. Disposition and retrieval
thereof shall be made only upon written approval of the Senate president.
Resolved, finally. That all parties concerned be furnished copies of this Resolution.
Adopted,
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress
have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that
recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada. Is no longer
temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary
inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of
Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as president of the Philippines. Following Tañada
v. Cuenco,102 we hold that this Court cannot exercise its judicial power or this is an issue "in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative xxx branch
of the government." Or to use the language in Baker vs. Carr,103 there is a "textually
demonstrable or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it."
Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon petitioner's claim of inability to discharge the power and
duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to
Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue, which cannot be decided by this Court
without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely
unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the
decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of
government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. IV

President of the Senate
Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.
Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the
respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the
impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of
suit, whether criminal or civil.
Before resolving petitioner's contentions, a revisit of our legal history executive immunity will
be most enlightening. The doctrine of executive immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a
case law. In the 1910 case of Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crosfield,104 the
respondent Tiaco, a Chinese citizen, sued petitioner W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General
of the Philippine Islands. J.E. Harding and C.R. Trowbridge, Chief of Police and Chief of the
Secret Service of the City of Manila, respectively, for damages for allegedly conspiring to
deport him to China. In granting a writ of prohibition, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice
Johnson, held:
" The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary
has no authority to touch the acts of the Governor-General; that he may, under cover
of his office, do what he will, unimpeded and unrestrained. Such a construction would
mean that tyranny, under the guise of the execution of the law, could walk defiantly
abroad, destroying rights of person and of property, wholly free from interference of
courts or legislatures. This does not mean, either that a person injured by the
executive authority by an act unjustifiable under the law has n remedy, but must
submit in silence. On the contrary, it means, simply, that the governors-general, like
the judges if the courts and the members of the Legislature, may not be personally
mulcted in civil damages for the consequences of an act executed in the performance
of his official duties. The judiciary has full power to, and will, when the mater is
properly presented to it and the occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of the
Governor-General illegal and void and place as nearly as possible in status quo any
person who has been deprived his liberty or his property by such act. This remedy is
assured to every person, however humble or of whatever country, when his personal
or property rights have been invaded, even by the highest authority of the state. The
thing which the judiciary can not do is mulct the Governor-General personally in
damages which result from the performance of his official duty, any more than it can
a member of the Philippine Commission of the Philippine Assembly. Public policy
forbids it.
Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the chief executive may not be
personally sued at all in relation to acts which he claims to perform as such official.
On the contrary, it clearly appears from the discussion heretofore had, particularly
that portion which touched the liability of judges and drew an analogy between such
liability and that of the Governor-General, that the latter is liable when he acts in a
case so plainly outside of his power and authority that he can not be said to have
exercised discretion in determining whether or not he had the right to act. What is
held here is that he will be protected from personal liability for damages not only
when he acts within his authority, but also when he is without authority, provided he
actually used discretion and judgement, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining
whether he had authority to act or not. In other words, in determining the question of
his authority. If he decide wrongly, he is still protected provided the question of his
authority was one over which two men, reasonably qualified for that position, might
honestly differ; but he s not protected if the lack of authority to act is so plain that two
such men could not honestly differ over its determination. In such case, be acts, not
as Governor-General but as a private individual, and as such must answer for the
consequences of his act."
Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief Executive was not granted
immunity from suit, viz "xxx. Action upon important matters of state delayed; the time and
substance of the chief executive spent in wrangling litigation; disrespect engendered for the
person of one of the highest officials of the state and for the office he occupies; a tendency to
unrest and disorder resulting in a way, in distrust as to the integrity of government itself."105
Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not contain any specific provision on executive
immunity. Then came the tumult of the martial law years under the late President Ferdinand
E. Marcos and the 1973 Constitution was born. In 1981, it was amended and one of the
amendments involved executive immunity. Section 17, Article VII stated:
"The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit
whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific
orders during his tenure.
The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent President referred to in
Article XVII of this Constitution.
In his second Vicente G. Sinco professional Chair lecture entitled, "Presidential Immunity and
All The King's Men: The Law of Privilege As a Defense To Actions For
Damages,"106 petitioner's learned counsel, former Dean of the UP College of Law, Atty.
Pacificao Agabin, brightened the modifications effected by this constitutional amendment on
the existing law on executive privilege. To quote his disquisition:
"In the Philippines, though, we sought to do the Americans one better by enlarging
and fortifying the absolute immunity concept. First, we extended it to shield the
President not only form civil claims but also from criminal cases and other claims.
Second, we enlarged its scope so that it would cover even acts of the President
outside the scope of official duties. And third, we broadened its coverage so as to
include not only the President but also other persons, be they government officials or
private individuals, who acted upon orders of the President. It can be said that at that
point most of us were suffering from AIDS (or absolute immunity defense syndrome)."
The Opposition in the then Batasan Pambansa sought the repeal of this Marcosian concept
of executive immunity in the 1973 Constitution. The move was led by them Member of
Parliament, now Secretary of Finance, Alberto Romulo, who argued that the after incumbency
immunity granted to President Marcos violated the principle that a public office is a public
trust. He denounced the immunity as a return to the anachronism "the king can do no
wrong."107 The effort failed.
The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when President Marcos was ousted from office by the
People Power revolution in 1986. When the 1987 Constitution was crafted, its framers did not
reenact the executive immunity provision of the 1973 Constitution. The following explanation
was given by delegate J. Bernas vis:108
"Mr. Suarez. Thank you.
The last question is with reference to the Committee's omitting in the draft proposal
the immunity provision for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the
Committee did very well in striking out second sentence, at the very least, of the
original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But would the
Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence that the
President shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not
provide him that kind of an immunity, he might be spending all his time facing
litigation's, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing litigation's almost daily?
Fr. Bernas. The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present
jurisprudence that during his tenure he is immune from suit.
Mr. Suarez. So there is no need to express it here.
Fr. Bernas. There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by
the 1973 Constitution was to make that explicit and to add other things.
Mr. Suarez. On that understanding, I will not press for any more query, Madam
President.
I think the Commissioner for the clarifications."
We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We reject his
argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the
impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the
walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on
February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the
Impeachment Court is Functus Officio."109 Since, the Impeachment Court is now functus
officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then
convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar
against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him
in a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment
proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in
the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have
become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may
already be filed against him, viz:110
"xxx
Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against
the President, for example, and the President resigns before judgement of conviction
has been rendered by the impeachment court or by the body, how does it affect the
impeachment proceeding? Will it be necessarily dropped?
Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office,
then his resignation would render the case moot and academic. However, as the
provision says, the criminal and civil aspects of it may continue in the ordinary
courts."
This is in accord with our ruling In Re: Saturnino Bermudez111 that 'incumbent Presidents are
immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and
tenure" but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process
against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner
Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the
Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. His reliance on the case
of Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan112 and related cases113 are inapropos for they have a different
factual milieu.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting
President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve
plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes,
especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of
immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing
the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from
liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful
acts and conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State
and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any
trespasser.114
Indeed, critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial
disinclination to expand the privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or
impairs the vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US v. Nixon, 115 US President Richard
Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce certain recordings and documents
relating to his conversations with aids and advisers. Seven advisers of President Nixon's
associates were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct Justice and other offenses, which
were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in Washington's
Watergate Hotel during the 972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was named
an unindicted co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the ground,
among others, that the President was not subject to judicial process and that he should first
be impeached and removed from office before he could be made amenable to judicial
proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded that "when the
ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is
based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the
fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice." In
the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald,116 the US Supreme Court further held that the immunity
of the president from civil damages covers only "official acts." Recently, the US Supreme
Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v. Jones 117 where it
held that the US President's immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their
official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of executive
immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public
office is a public trust.118 It declared as a state policy that "the State shall maintain honesty
and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and
corruptio."119 it ordained that "public officers and employees must at all times be accountable
to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."120 It set the rule that 'the right of the State to
recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from
their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, latches or estoppel." 121 It
maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court.122 It created the office of the
Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers, among which is to "investigate on its
own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust improper or
inefficient."123 The Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal autonomy.124 These
constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioner's claim that a non-sitting
president enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency.
V lose there impartially. xxx xxx xxx. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to
Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner
Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity
Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting
the investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on
his guilt. He submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set file
the criminal cases violation of his right to due process.
There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the
rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases.125 The
British approach the problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus,
English courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial
suffers a threat.126 The American approach is different. US courts assume a skeptical
approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair
trial. They have developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e., substantial;
probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc.
This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this Court to stop the
trials or annul convictions in high profile criminal cases.127 In People vs. Teehankee,
Jr.,128 later reiterated in the case of Larranaga vs. court of Appeals, et al.,129 we laid down the
doctrine that:
"We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due
to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at
bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then
and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a
free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances accused's right to a fair trial
for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the
criminal field xxx. The press does not simply publish information about trials but
guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and
judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The
mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage
does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and
impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the
bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The
state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to
our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our
everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and
impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not
installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they
disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to litigation.
Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect
their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge
due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the
case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of
prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a
finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have
been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In
the case at a bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias
against appellants as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial
and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the
trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity, which is
incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the
burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.'
We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of Webb vs. Hon. Raul de
Leon, etc.130 and its companion cases, viz:
"Again petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process
while undergoing preliminary investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its
early invocation considering the substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a
preliminary investigation.
xxx
The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be
avoided and oftentimes, its excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic
developments in the telecommunications industry. For sure, few cases can match the
high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary investigation
of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and fiction about the case continues
unabated even today. Commentators still bombard the public with views not too
many of which are sober and sublime. Indeed, even the principal actors in the case –
the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their sympathizers have participated in
this media blitz. The possibility of media abuses and their threat to a fair trial
notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the press and public.
In the seminal case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, it was
xxx
a. The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American
justice demonstrates conclusively that at the time this Nation's organic laws
were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been
presumptively open, thus giving assurance that the proceedings were
conducted fairly to all concerned and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of
participants, or decisions based on secret bias or partiality. In addition, the
significant community therapeutic value of public trials was recognized when
a shocking crime occurs a community reaction of outrage and public protest
often follows, and thereafter the open processes of justice serve an important
prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility and
emotion. To work effectively, it is important that society's criminal process
satisfy the appearance of justice,' Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99
L ED 11, 75 S Ct 11, which can best be provided by allowing people to
observe such process. From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported
by reasons as valid today as in centuries past, it must be concluded that a
presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under
this Nation's system of justice, Cf., e,g., Levine v. United States, 362 US 610,
4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.
b. The freedoms of speech. Press and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the
First Amendment, share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of
communication on matters relating to the functioning of government. In
guaranteeing freedom such as those of speech and press, the First
Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so
as give meaning to those explicit guarantees; the First Amendment right to
receive information and ideas means, in the context of trials, that the
guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from
summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at
the time the First Amendment was adopted. Moreover, the right of assembly
is also relevant, having been regarded not only as an independent right but
also as a catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment
rights with which the draftsmen deliberately linked it. A trial courtroom is a
public place where the people generally and representatives of the media
have a right to be present, and where their presence historically has been
thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place.
c. Even though the Constitution contains no provision which be its terms
guarantees to the public the right to attend criminal trials, various
fundamental rights, not expressly guaranteed, have been recognized as
indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights. The right to attend
criminal trial is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment: without the
freedom to attend such trials, which people have exercised for centuries,
important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press be eviscerated.
Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain
circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus,
in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., we held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial
publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly
influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at
bar, we find nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the
publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and
impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of
publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically
unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an
Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long
experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining whether
they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their 26-page
Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that they
considered any extra-record evidence except evidence properly adduced by the
parties. The length of time the investigation was conducted despite its summary
nature and the generosity with which they accommodated the discovery motions of
petitioners speak well of their fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek
the disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting
from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity." (emphasis supplied)
Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court
to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent
Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden
of proof.131 He needs to show more weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the
impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well to note, the cases against
the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of prosecutors
in the office of the respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the
petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have already been infected by
bias because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has
yet to come out with its findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its
recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner.
The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman himself with
bias. To quote petitioner's submission, the respondent Ombudsman "has been influenced by
the barrage of slanted news reports, and he has buckled to the threats and pressures
directed at him by the mobs."132 News reports have also been quoted to establish that the
respondent Ombudsman has already prejudged the cases of the petitioner 133 and it is
postulated that the prosecutors investigating the petitioner will be influenced by this bias of
their superior.
necessarily resolved by the power of number for in a democracy, the dogmatism of the
majority is not and should never be the definition of the rule of law. If democracy has proved
to be the best form of government, it is because it has respected the right of the minority to
convince the majority that it is wrong. Tolerance of multiformity of thoughts, however
offensive they may be, is the key to man's progress from the cave to civilization. Let us not
throw away that key just to pander to some people's prejudice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy

of the news reports referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this
Court especially in light of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged
prejudice and the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty
to which he is entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner,
i.e., that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth,
our Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, give investigation prosecutors the independence to
make their own findings and recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their
superiors.134 They can be reversed but they can not be compelled cases which they believe
deserve dismissal. In other words, investigating prosecutors should not be treated like
unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases
against the petitioner and the latter believes that the findings of probable cause against him is
the result of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it before the proper court.

VI.

Epilogue

A word of caution to the "hooting throng." The cases against the petitioner will now acquire a
different dimension and then move to a new stage - - - the Office of the Ombudsman.
Predictably, the call from the majority for instant justice will hit a higher decibel while the
gnashing of teeth of the minority will be more threatening. It is the sacred duty of the
respondent Ombudsman to balance the right of the State to prosecute the guilty and the right
of an accused to a fair investigation and trial which has been categorized as the "most
fundamental of all freedoms."135 To be sure, the duty of a prosecutor is more to do justice and
less to prosecute. His is the obligation to insure that the preliminary investigation of the
petitioner shall have a circus-free atmosphere. He has to provide the restraint against what
Lord Bryce calls "the impatient vehemence of the majority." Rights in a democracy are not
decided by the mob whose judgment is dictated by rage and not by reason. Nor are rights