1.

COMSAVINGS BANK (NOW GSIS FAMILY BANK)

Vs.
SPOUSES DANILO AND ESTRELLA CAPISTRANO

Facts: Respondents spouses were the owners of a residential lot in Bacoor, Cavite, and
covered by TCT. Desirous of building their own house on the lot, they availed themselves of
the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP) implemented by the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
In 1992, the spouses executed a construction contract with Carmencita Cruz-Bay, the
proprietor of GCB Builders, for the total contract price of ₱265,000.00 with the latter
undertaking to complete the construction within 75 days. To finance the construction, GCB
Builders facilitated their loan application with Comsavings Bank, an NHFMC-accredited
originator. The same year, the spouses executed in favor of GCB Builders a deed of assignment
of the amount of the ₱300,000.00 proceeds of the loan from Comsavings Bank.
Comsavings Bank then informed respondent Estrella Capistrano that she would have
to sign various documents as part of the requirements for the release of the loan. Among the
documents was a certificate of house completion and acceptance. It also handed Estrella a letter
addressed to GCB Builders informing the latter that respondents had complied with the
preliminary requirements of the UHLP, and were qualified to avail themselves of the loan
amounting to ₱303,450.00 payable within 25 years at 16% per annum, subject to the
following terms and conditions, namely: the signing of mortgage documents, 100% completion
of the construction of the housing unit, original certificate of occupancy permit and certification
of completion, and submission of house pictures signed by the borrower at the back.
Comsavings Bank informed respondents of the approval of an interim financing loan of
₱260,000.00 which amount was to be paid out of the proceeds of the loan from NHMFC. GCB
Builders received from Comsavings Bank the total sum of ₱265,000.00 as construction cost.
Respondents inquired from GCB Builder when their house would be completed
considering that their contract stipulated a completion period of 75 days. Cruz-Bay gave various
excuses for the delay, such as the rainy season, but promised to finish the construction as soon
as possible. The year 1992 ended with the construction of the house unfinished.
In 1993, respondents demanded the completion of the house. Cruz-Bay told them to
give the further amount of ₱25,000.00 to finish the construction. They requested a
breakdown of the amounts already spent in the construction. Instead of furnishing them the
requested breakdown, GCB Builders’ counsel sent a demand letter for an additional
construction cost. Later, respondents received a letter from NHMFC advising that they should
already start paying their monthly amortizations. Estrella Capistrano went to the construction site
and found to her dismay that the house was still unfinished.
Respondents wrote to NHMFC protesting the demand for amortization payments
considering that they had not signed any certification of completion and acceptance, and
that even if there was such a certification of completion and acceptance, it would have been
forged. Respondents again wrote to NHMFC requesting an ocular inspection of the construction
site. Atty. Ruben C. Corona, the Manager of the Collateral Verification & External Examination
Department of NHMFC conducted the inspection and noted:
1) That the subject unit is being occupied by tenant, a certain Mr. Mark Inanil;
2) That the toilet/bath and kitchen counter are not installed with Plumbing fixtures;
3) That there are no door knobs on bedroom and no handles on Kitchen cabinet;
4) That the toilet bath has no concrete flooring and the tiles has no end/corner cappings;
and
5) That there are hairline cracks on flooring.
Respondents sued GCB Builders and Comsavings Bank for breach of contract and
damages, praying that defendants be ordered jointly and severally liable. They amended their
complaint to implead NHMFC as an additional defendant.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents. Specifically, it found that
although the proceeds of the loan had been completely released, the construction of the house
of respondents remained not completed; that the house had remained in the possession of
GCB Builders, which had meanwhile leased it to another person; that GCB Builders did not
comply with the terms and conditions of the construction contract; and that NHMFC approved
the loan in the gross amount. It ruled, however, that only GCB Builders was liable for the
monthly rental because GCB Builders was alone in renting out the house; and that NHMFC was
equally liable with the other defendants by reason of its having released the loan proceeds to
Comsavings Bank without verifying whether the construction had already been completed,
thereby indicating that NHMFC had connived and confederated with its co-defendants in the
irregular release of the loan proceeds to Comsavings Bank.
It was appealed to the CA which affirms the RTC subject to the modification that
NHMFC was absolved of liability, and that the moral and exemplary damages were reduced.
It held Comsavings Bank jointly and severally liable with appellant GCB Builders since it
likewise committed misrepresentations in obtaining the mortgage loan from the NHMFC in the
name of the appellees. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON the court of appeals erred in finding petitioner bank jointly and severally liable
with GCB builders to pay respondent actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s
fees.
Held: NO
SC affirmed the decision promulgated by the CA subject to the modifications that
Comsavings Bank and GCB Builders are further ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to the
Spouses Danilo and Estrella Capistrano the following amounts: (1) ₱25,000.00 as temperate
damages; (2) ₱30,000.00 as attorney’s fees; (3) interest of 6% per annum on all the amounts
of damages reckoned from the finality of this decision; and (4) the costs of suit .
The records show that it was Comsavings Bank which called up Estrella Capistrano
and had her sign various documents as part of the documentary requirements for the
release of the construction loan. One of these documents was the Certificate of House
Completion and Acceptance, which, upon Bank’s representation was signed by the spouses
even if the construction of the house had not yet started. Comsavings Bank informed GCB
Builders that spouses had provisionally complied with the preliminary requirements under the
UHLP and qualified for a loan. One condition for the approval of the loan was "100%
completion of the construction of the housing unit plus: Original Certificate of Occupancy
Permit and Certification of Completion and Submission of House pictures signed at the
back by the borrower.
However, the loan documents which Bank submitted to NHMFC were false. The Bank
in order to show that the construction of the subject house had been completed, submitted a
photograph of a toilet/bath with plumbing and fixtures installed when in the truth, as admitted by
GCB Builders, the plumbing fixtures had not been installed as the spouses were still indebted to
GCB. Comsavings Bank also submitted photographs of wall tiles of the toilet/bath showing them
to be brown or mustard, but the color of the wall tiles actually installed was white per testimony
of Estrella Capistrano and corroborated by GCB Builders’ witness. The spouses complained to
NHMFC that the house which they bought was unfinished on the basis of which NHMFC
conducted an inspection of the housing unit and found the complaint to be true.
By submitting false or forged documents to the NHMFC, Comsavings Bank violated
the warranties contained in the purchase of the loan agreement with appellant NHMFC.
Incidentally, Carmencita B. Cruz, owner and proprietor of appellant GCB Builders admitted that
she is even not an accredited builder of housing units under the UHLP of the NHMFC in the
area. Comsavings Bank in allowing appellant GCB Builders to participate in the UHLP program
undermined and defeated its real purpose, to help low income families build their own homes, to
the damage and prejudice of the spouses.
Comsaving Bank’s liability was not based on its purchase of loan agreement with
NHMFC but on Article 20 and Article 1170 of the Civil Code. The CA rightfully declared
Comsavings Bank solidarily liable with GCB Builders for the damages sustained by respondents.
However, we point out that such liability did not arise from Comsavings Bank’s breach of
warranties under its purchase of loan agreement with NHMFC. Having made the warranties in
favor of NHMFC, it would be liable in case of breach of the warranties to NHMFC, not
respondents, eliminating breach of such warranties as a source of its liability towards
respondents.
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Article 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence,
or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
Based on the provisions, a banking institution like Comsavings Bank is obliged to
exercise the highest degree of diligence as well as high standards of integrity and
performance in all its transactions because its business is imbued with public interest.  "The
stability of banks largely depends on the confidence of the people in the honesty and
efficiency of banks."
Gross negligence connotes want of care in the performance of one’s duties; it is a
negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation
where there is duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious
indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. It evinces a thoughtless
disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them.
There is no question that Comsavings Bank was grossly negligent in its dealings with
respondents because it did not comply with its legal obligation to exercise the required diligence
and integrity. As a banking institution serving as an originator under the UHLP and being the
maker of the certificate of acceptance/completion, it was fully aware that the purpose of the
signed certificate was to affirm that the house had been completely constructed according to the
approved plans and specifications, and that respondents had thereby accepted the delivery of the
complete house.
Given the purpose of the certificate, it should have desisted from presenting the
certificate to respondents for their signature without such conditions having been fulfilled. Yet, it
made respondents sign the certificate (through Estrella Capistrano, both in her personal capacity
and as the attorney-in-fact of her husband Danilo Capistrano) despite the construction of the
house not yet even starting. Its act was irregular per se because it contravened the purpose of the
certificate.
Comsavings Bank is liable for damages. As to the damages that should be awarded to
respondents, moral and exemplary damages were warranted. Under Article 2219 of the Civil
Code, moral damages may be recovered for the acts or actions referred to in Article 20 of
the Civil Code. Moral damages are meant to compensate the claimant for any physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation and similar injuries unjustly caused.
With respect to exemplary damages, the amount of ₱50,000.00 awarded by the CA as
exemplary damages is sustained. Relevantly, we have held that:
The law allows the grant of exemplary damages to set an example for the public
good. The business of a bank is affected with public interest; thus, it makes a sworn profession
of diligence and meticulousness in giving irreproachable service. For this reason, the bank
should guard against injury attributable to negligence or bad faith on its part. The banking sector
must at all times maintain a high level of meticulousness. The grant of exemplary damages is
justified by the initial carelessness of petitioner, aggravated by its lack of promptness in repairing
its error.
However, the award of actual damages amounting to ₱25,000.00 is not warranted. To
justify an award for actual damages, there must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss.
Credence can be given only to claims duly supported by receipts. Respondents did not submit
any documentary proof, like receipts, to support their claim for actual damages. Nonetheless, it
cannot be denied that they had suffered substantial losses. Article 2224 of the Civil Code allows
the recovery of temperate damages when the court finds that some pecuniary loss was suffered
but its amount cannot be proved with certainty. In lieu of actual damages, therefore, temperate
damages of ₱25,000.00 are awarded. Article 2208 of the Civil Code allows recovery of
attorney’s fees when exemplary damages are awarded or where the plaintiff has incurred
expenses to protect his interest by reason of defendant’s act or omission. Considering that
exemplary damages were properly awarded here, and that respondents hired a private lawyer to
litigate its cause, we agree with the RTC and CA that the ₱30,000.00 allowed as attorney’s fees
were appropriate and reasonable.
2. People of the Philippines v. Romeo Dianos
Facts: On 31 December 1990, at around 9:30 in the evening, Teresita, together with her
husband, Virgilio Ortiz (Virgilio), her daughter, Corazon Ortiz Ihanda (Corazon), her brother,
Ricardo Pablo (Ricardo), and her son, Zaldy Ortiz (Zaldy), were on the terrace of their new
house waiting for the other Ortiz children to arrive in time for the New Year's eve
celebration. The three men, Virgilio, Ricardo and Zaldy, momentarily left the terrace. Ricardo
met the accused near the waiting shed. Without any warning, the latter suddenly struck Ricardo
on the face with the butt of an armalite causing him to fall to the ground. The accused then fired
at Ricardo, hitting him on the chest and left arm. The accused then directed his armalite at
Virgilio. The latter was hit on the buttocks. The accused thereupon fired indiscriminately at the
house of Zaldy. Zaldy received a bullet injury in his right thigh, while his daughter, Lizette Ortiz
(Lizette), was hit in her abdomen and wrist. The accused moved towards the direction of the new
house and fired at the terrace. Teresita took a bullet wound on the neck from the volley of shots,
while Corazon escaped unscathed. In the aftermath, two were found dead, namely, Teresita and
Ricardo, while three others, Virgilio, Zaldy and Lizette, sustained injuries. 
Anent the damages incurred by private complainants: Virgilio testified that he had spent P1,000
for medications for his thigh injury. A riprap contractor, he was not able to work for seven
months depriving him of his monthly income of P2,000 for the period or the total amount
of P14,000. He asserted that he had incurred P110,000.00 for funeral services for his wife
Teresita.Nenita Pablo (Nenita) said in her testimony that she had spent P15,000.00 for the
autopsy and coffin of Ricardo, P3,000.00, by way of doctor's fee and P8,000.00 for the
wake. Zaldy testified that he had spent P500 for the treatment of his injury.
The RTC rendered its decision on 10 May 1994 finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes with which he was charged; the trial court adjudged:
1. In Criminal case No. 8524-R, the Court finds accused Romeo Dianos Guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder defined; to indemnify the heirs of deceased Teresita Ortiz the sum
of P50,000.00 for her death and the sum of P110,000.00 as Actual Damages for expenses
incurred for the wake, funeral and burial services and to pay the costs.
2. In Criminal case No. 8525-R, the Court finds accused Romeo Dianos guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Attempted Murder; to indemnify Zaldy Ortiz the sum of P 5,000.00 as Moral
Damages for the injuries sustained by him and to pay the costs.
3. In Criminal Case No. 8526-R, the Court finds accused Romeo Dianos guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Attempted Murder; to indemnify Virgilio Ortiz the sum of P1,000.00 as
actual damages for the expenses incurred for his medical treatment for the injuries sustained by
him and the sum of P14,000.00 as unearned income for 7 months at P2,000.00 a month for being
unable to work as riprap contractor during the treatment of his injuries and the sum of P5,000.00
as Moral Damages for the injuries sustained by him and to pay the costs.
4. In Criminal case No. 8527-R, the Court finds accused Romeo Dianos guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Frustrated Murder; to indemnify Lizette Ortiz the sum of P20,000.00 as
Moral Damages for the injuries sustained by her and to pay the costs.
5. In Criminal case No. 8528-R, the Court finds accused Romeo Dianos guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder; to indemnify the heirs of deceased Ricardo Pablo the sum
of P50,000.00 for his death and the sum of P23,000.00 as Actual Damages for expenses incurred
for the wake, funeral and burial services and to pay the costs.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the award of actual or compensatory damages requires actual proof of
pecuniary loss? Yes.
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased victims may recover moral damages? Yes.
Held: Anent the actual damages, the uncorroborated testimonies of private complainants cannot
suffice. Such damages to be recoverable must not only be capable of proof but must actually be
proved with reasonable degree of certainty.  To seek recovery for actual damages it is essential
that the injured party proves the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty
premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available. Courts cannot simply rely on
speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. Of the
expenses alleged to have been incurred, the Court can only give credence to those supported by
receipts and which appear to have been genuinely expended in connection with the death of the
victim. Since the actual amount was not substantiated, the same cannot be granted.
There is, however, no doubt that injury was sustained by private complainants due to appellant's
actions. In the absence of competent proof on the specific amounts of actual damages suffered,
private complainants are entitled to nominal damages. The Court deems the amounts
of P15,000.00 in Criminal Case Nos. 8524-R (Murder; Teresita) and 8528-R (Murder;
Ricardo), P10,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 8527-R (Frustrated Murder; Lizette), and P5,000.00
in Criminal Case Nos. 8525-R (Attempted Murder; Zaldy) and 8526-R (Attempted Murder;
Virgilio) to be reasonable given the circumstances.
An award of actual or compensatory damages requires actual proof of pecuniary loss. An
exception from the rule, pursuant to Article 2206 of the Civil Code, are "damages for death
caused by a crime or quasi-delict" which can be awarded forthwith to the heirs of the victim by
proof alone of such fact of death. No proof of pecuniary loss is likewise necessary in order that
moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages may be adjudicated, and it is quite
enough that proof of damage or injury is adduced. Being incapable of exact pecuniary
estimation, the assessment of such damages, except for liquidated damages which the parties
themselves fix, is left to the sound discretion of the court.
Akin to, but not exactly in the same category as actual or compensatory damages, is the civil
indemnity ex delicto particularly so referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 104, in relation to
Article 100, of the Revised Penal Code as "indemnification for consequential damages." These
two species of damages differ basically in that civil indemnity ex delicto can be awarded without
need of further proof than the fact of commission of the felony itself while actual or
compensatory damages to be recoverable must additionally be established with reasonable
degree of certainty (except, as aforesaid, in the case of the indemnity for death under Article
2206 of the Civil Code). In fine, the first species merely requires proof of damage or injury
(similar to that needed in an award of moral damages) to be recoverable; the second kind
requires, in addition, proof of damages or pecuniary loss in order to warrant recovery.
Finally, in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence relative to Article 2206 of the Civil Code,
the award of P50,000.00 indemnity for each of the death of Teresita Ortiz and Ricardo Pablo
must be affirmed. Moral damages, in addition to the awards made by the trial court in favor of
the injured victims, are also recoverable under paragraph (3) of Article 2206, in relation to
Article 2217 and paragraph (1) of Article 2219, of the Civil Code, which the Court hereby fixes
at P30,000.00 for each of the two deceased victims payable to their respective heirs.
3. HONORIO LASAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. FRANK SMITH, JR., defendant-
appellant
TOPIC: Sufficiency of damages awarded; effect of caso fortuito on damages
FACTS: The plaintiff are husband and wife and this action is brought to recover damages in the
sum of P20,000 for physical injuries sustained by them in an automobile accident. The trial court
rendered a judgment in their favor for the sum of P1,254.10, with legal interest from the date of
the judgment. Both the plaintiffs and the defendant appeal, the former maintaining that the
damages awarded are insufficient while the latter denies all liability for any damages whatever.
On February 27, 1918, the defendant was the owner of a public garage in the town of San
Fernando, La Union, and engaged in the business of carrying passengers for hire from the one
point to another in the Province of La Union and the surrounding provinces. On the date
mentioned, he undertook to convey the plaintiffs from San Fernando to Currimao, Ilocos Norte,
in a Ford automobile. On leaving San Fernando, the automobile was operated by a licensed
chauffeur, but after having reached the town of San Juan, the chauffeur allowed his assistant,
Remigio Bueno, to drive the car. Bueno held no driver's license, but had some experience in
driving, and with the exception of some slight engine trouble while passing through the town of
Luna, the car functioned well until after the crossing of the Abra River in Tagudin, when,
according to the testimony of the witnesses for the plaintiffs, defects developed in the steering
gear so as to make accurate steering impossible, and after zigzagging for a distance of about half
a kilometer, the car left the road and went down a steep embankment.
In going over the bank of the road, the automobile was overturned and the plaintiffs pinned down
under it. Mr. Lasam escaped with a few contusions and a "dislocated" rib , but his wife, Joaquina
Sanchez, received serious injuries, among which was a compound fracture of one of the bones in
her left wrist. She also appears to have suffered a nervous breakdown from which she had not
fully recovered at the time of the trial.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the damages awarded by the trial court are sufficient for the expenses incurred
by the plaintiffs
2. Whether or not the accident was due to a caso fortuito
HELD:
1. Yes. The plaintiffs maintain that the evidence clearly establishes that they are entitled to
damages in the sum of P7,832.80 instead of P1,254.10 as found by the trial court, and their
assignments of error relate to this point only. There can be no doubt that the expenses incurred
by the plaintiffs as a result of the accident greatly exceeded the amount of the damages awarded.
But bearing in mind that in determining the extent of the liability for losses or damages
resulting from negligence in the fulfillment of a contractual obligation, the courts have "a
discretionary power to moderate the liability according to the circumstances" (De Guia vs.
Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co., 40 Phil., 706; art. 1103, Civil Code), we do not think that
the evidence is such as to justify us in interfering with the discretion of the court below in this
respect. As pointed out by that court in its well-reasoned and well-considered decision, by far the
greater part of the damages claimed by the plaintiffs resulted from the fracture of a bone in the
left wrist of Joaquina Sanchez and from her objections to having a decaying splinter of the bone
removed by a surgical operation. As a consequence of her refusal to submit such an
operation, a series of infections ensued and which required constant and expensive medical
treatment for several years. We agree with the court below that the defendant should not
be charged with these expenses. For the reasons stated, the judgment appealed from is
affirmed, without costs in this instance.
2. No. It is sufficient to reiterate that the source of the defendant's legal liability is the contract of
carriage; that by entering into that contract he bound himself to carry the plaintiffs safely and
securely to their destination; and that having failed to do so he is liable in damages unless he
shows that the failure to fulfill his obligation was due to causes mentioned in article 1105 of the
Civil Code, which reads as follows:
“No one shall be liable for events which could not be foreseen or which, even if
foreseen, were inevitable, with the exception of the cases in which the law expressly
provides otherwise and those in which the obligation itself imposes such liability.”
In a legal sense and, consequently, also in relation to contracts, a caso fortuito presents the
following essential characteristics:
(1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to
comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will.
(2) It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be
foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid.
(3) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation
in a normal manner.
(4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury
resulting to the creditor."
As will be seen, these authorities agree that some extraordinary circumstance
independent of the will of the obligor, or of his employees, is an essential element of a caso
fortuito. Turning to the present case, it is at once apparent that this element is lacking. It is not
suggested that the accident in question was due to an act of God or to adverse road conditions
which could not have been foreseen. As far as the records shows, the accident was caused either
by defects in the automobile or else through the negligence of its driver. That is not a caso
fortuito. The contract of carriage between the parties was breached not due to a caso fortuito but
because of the defects in the automobile and negligence on the part of the driver.

4 Philippine National Railways vs Ethel Brunty and Juan Manuel M. Garcia

Facts: Rhonda Brunty, daughter of respondent Ethel Brunty and an American Citizen came to
the Philippines for a visit in 1980. Before their departure, Rhonda and her Filipino Host Juan
Manuel Garcia traveled to Baguio City in a Mercedes Benz sedan driven by Rodolfo Mercelita.
They were approaching a railroad crossing at Brgy. Rizal Moncada, Tarlac, while Mercelita
drove at approx. 70km/hr and drove past a vehicle, unaware of the track up ahead, where a PNR
train was approaching. The PNR train and the Mercedez Benz collided, resulting in the death of
Mercelita and Rhonda.
Ethel Brunty sent a demand letter to the PNR for payment of actual, compensatory and moral
damages as a result of her daughter’s death, but the PNR did not respond. As such, Ethel and
Juan Manuel Garcia filed a complaint for damages against the PNE with the RTC.

The RTC ruled in favor of Ethel and Juan Manuel Garcia and ordered PNR to pay them 30,000
pesos for the death of Rhonda Brunty, 1 million pesos for Moral and Actual damages due the
heirs of Rhonda Brunty, 72,000 pesos for damages sustained by the Mercedez Benz, and 50,000
pesos for atty.’s fees and costs of suit.
PNR appealed to the CA, which affirmed the RTC’s Decision and affirmed with partial
modifications, deleting the award for damages sustained by the Mercedes Benz and increasing
the death indemnity award from 30k to 50k.
ISSUE regarding damages: WHETHER OR NOT the award of 1 million in actual and
moral damages is in order

HELD:

As to Actual/compensatory Damages:
Actual or compensatory damages are awarded in order to compensate a party for an injury or loss
he suffered; arise out of a sense of natural justice, aimed at repairing the wrong done. To be
recoverable, they must be duly proved with a reasonable degree of certainty (a court must depend
upon competent proof that they have suffered, an on evidence of the actual amount thereof).
Respondents failed to present evidence for such damages, the award of actual damages cannot be
sustained.
The court deemed it proper to award temperate damages in lieu of actual damages in the
amount of 25k pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.

As to Moral damages:
Moral damages are not punitive in nature but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some
way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused a person.
Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary computation, must be proportional to and in
approximation of the suffering inflicted.
As the moral suffering of the heirs of Rhonda Brunty was sufficiently established by Ethel, the
award of moral damages was reduced to 500k pesos.

5. Manzanares vs Moreta
Facts: In the case which is brought for the recovery of the damages resulting from the death of
the child Salvador Bona, of from 8 to 9 years of age, who had been run over by an automobile
driven and managed by the defendant on the morning of March 5, 1916, a judgment was
rendered on August 3, 1916, whereby the said defendant was sentenced to pay the sum of P1,000
as indemnity child, and to pay the costs. From this judgment, an appeal was taken by the
defendant after his motion for a new trial had been overruled, and the case is now before this
court by bill of exceptions.
The statement of facts is at once admitted, and we find no reason for disturbing the findings
made by the trail judge in his judgement appealed from, wherein the defendant was found liable
for the accident which occurred to the said child on Solana Street on the morning of said day,
and consequently, the defendant, as the one who had cause the accident, is bound to indemnify
the mother of the deceased child in the amount of P1,000, which was deemed by the trial judge
to be the value of the damages occasioned to the mother for the loss and death of a member of
her family.
Issue: WON award of actual or compensatory damages proper?
Held:
To the reasons given by the trial judge as grounds for his decision, we deem pertinent to add the
following:
If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana Street, had to stop
his auto before crossing Real Street, because he had met vehicles which were going along the
latter street or were coming from the opposite direction along Solana street, it is to be believed
that, when he against stated to run his auto across said Real Street and to continue its way along
Solana Street northward, he should have adjusted the speed of the auto which he was operating
until he had fully crossed Real Street and had completely reached a clear way on Solana Street.
But, as the child was run over by the auto precisely at the entrance of Solana Street, this accident
could not have occurred, if the auto had been running at a slow speed, aside from the fact that the
defendant, at the moment of crossing Real Street and entering Solana Street, in a northward
direction, could have seen the child in the act of crossing the latter street from the sidewalk on
the right to that on the left; and if the accident had occurred in such a way that after the
automobile had run over the body of the child, and the child's body had already been stretched
out on the ground, the automobile still moved along a distance of about 2 meters, this
circumstance shows the fact that the automobile entered Solana Street form Real Street, at a high
speed without the defendant having blown the horn. If these precautions had been taken by the
defendant, the deplorable accident which caused the death of the child would not have occurred.
In view of the foregoing considerations as well as those contained in the judgment of the trial
court, which, we believe that he errors assigned by the appellant are thereby refuted and that
therefore the judgment appealed from, should be, as it hereby is, affirmed, with the costs against
the appellant. So ordered.

6. FAR EASTERN SURETY and INSURANCE CO., INC., vs. THE COURT OF

APPEALS

FACTS: On December 24, 1947, petitioner posted a P3,000 surety bond in favor of the
Commissioner of immigration for the temporary stay in the Philippines of Co Too, a Chinese
alien. The pertinent conditions of the bond are as follows: a) That the undersigned undertakes
that Co Too shall not leave Manila or change his address without the previous written consent of
the Commissioner of Immigration; b) That the undersigned undertakes to make Co Too all times
available to and to present him within 24 hours after receipt of notice to produce before the
Immigration Authorities for investigation of his right to further stay in the Philippines; c) That in
case Co Too after such inquiry is found to have violated any limitation or condition under which
he was admitted as non-immigrant and is subject to deportation. d) That the undersigned agrees
to answer for all expenses for the arrest and apprehension of Co Too should the latter fail to
appear before the Immigration Authorities at the time, date and place set for the investigation. e)
That the undersigned agrees that this bond with all its terms and conditions shall cover and apply
to any and all extension of the temporary stay of said Co Too; That breach of any of the
conditions above-mentioned shall entitle the Commissioner of Immigration to declare this
bond or part thereof forfeited.

On February 6, 1950, the Commissioner of Immigration wrote a letter to the petitioner Far
Eastern Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., requiring Co Too to appear for an investigation of his right
to further stay in the Philippines in excess of one year, with a warning that in case of failure to
produce him, the surety bond will be forfeited, without releasing the petitioner from the
obligation to produce Co Too. 16 days after, the Commissioner of Immigration sent another
letter to petitioner Far Eastern Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., requesting said surety company to
pay the sum of P3,000 within five days from receipt of said letter, otherwise, the necessary legal
steps will be taken for the confiscation of its bond.

Two extensions of time were granted to the petitioner to produce Co Too. However, petitioner
failed to comply with the demand to present Co Too for investigation. The Commissioner of
Immigration then wrote a letter to the Solicitor General, requesting the latter to file a complaint
for the recovery of P3,000 from the petitioner.

In the meantime, Co Too was apprehended by the immigration authorities, without the help of
the petitioner. A deportation proceeding was conducted against him, after which he was ordered
deported. However, due to lack of transportation facilities and of a definite place to deport him,
he continued his stay here by giving a cash bond of P3,000 and a surety bond in the amount of
P7,000, this time posted by the Paramount Surety Company on January 24, 1951, while Far
Eastern Surety & Insurance Company's bond No. 8569 was declared forfeited on April 17, 1950.
After the forfeiture of bond No. 8569, the Commissioner of Immigration sent a letter to the
petitioner Far Eastern Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. with a list of its cancelled bonds, including
therein the name of Co Too. Later on, respondent Commissioner of Immigration sent another
letter to the petitioner, explaining that the inclusion of Co Too's name in the list of cancelled
bonds was due to mistake or inadvertence. This explanation was contained in a letter dated July
26, 1951.

The petitioner in this case urged in this appeal that respondent did not suffer damage because Co
Too did not illegally overstay in the Philippines, claiming that his stay here up to the present was
allowed by the Commissioner of Immigration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in holding that the amount stated in the bond is the
measure of damage, inspite of the failure of the respondent Commissioner of Immigration to
prove actual damage in the trial court.
HELD: No. The records show that the one-year period allowed Co Too to stay in the Philippines
temporary has already expired and the termination of this period even prompted the
Commissioner of Immigration to demand Co Too's appearance for investigation of his right to
further stay, in the Philippines. This demand was ignored not only by the petitioner Far Eastern
Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. but also by Co Too himself and as a consequence, he was arrested
and ordered deported.
In demanding the payment of P3,000 as the amount of the undertaking stated in the bond, the
respondent Commissioner of Immigration based his action on the failure of the petitioner to
comply with its obligation to produce Co Too before the Commissioner of Immigration. Such
failure on the part of the petitioner to produce Co Too constitutes a breach of one of the principal
conditions, especially paragraph (b) of the bond, entitling the Government to forefeit the same to
the full amount, without proving actual damage suffered by it. In the United States, the rule is
that in bonds running to the sovereign, recovery of the full amount is allowed in case of default
on the part of the obligor, altho no actual pecuniary damage is shown. The reason for this rule is
expressed in the case of Clark vs. Banard.
“The bond was declared forfeited in the full amount by reason of the obligor's
default, although no pecuniary damage were shoum to have been sustained by the State.”

7. G.R. No. L-22794           January 16, 1968

RUFO QUEMUEL, petitioner, 
vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Review of the Decision of CA

Facts: Convicted by the Court of First Instance of Rizal of the crime of libel,  with which he is charged,
and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from three (3) months and eleven (11) days
of arresto mayor  to one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, and
to pay the costs, petitioner Rufo Quemuel appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
judgment of conviction, but imposed, instead the penalty of imprisonment, a fine of P500.00, and added
thereto a P2,000.00 indemnity to the offended party, with subsidiary imprisonment, not to exceed six
(6) months, in case of insolvency, aside from the costs.
Petitioner maintains that the decision of the Court of Appeals is erroneous because: 1) it awarded said
indemnity, despite the fact that the offended had not appealed from the decision of the trial court,
which made no award of such nature; 2) the assessment of damages in a criminal case, in which the civil
action is impliedly included, is "vested in trial courts (and not in appellate courts);" 3) there is no proof
that damages had been sustained by the offended party; and 4) subsidiary imprisonment for non-
payment of the indemnity constitutes imprisonment for non-payment of debt, which is unconstitutional.
Issue: Whether petitioner’s contention is tenable.

Held: NO. The appeal in a criminal case opens the whole  case for review and this includes the penalty,
which may be increased and the indemnity is part of the penalty. The indemnity which a person is
sentenced to pay  forms an integral part of the penalty, it being expressly provided by Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code that every person criminally liable is civilly liable.

Although the authority to assess damages or indemnify in criminal cases is vested in trial courts, it is so
only in the first instance. On appeal, such authority passess to the appellate court. Thus, this Court has,
in many cases, increased the damages awarded by the trial court, although the offended party had not
appealed from said award, and the only party who sought a review of the decision of said Court was the
accused. 

As regards the alleged absence of proof that the offended has suffered mental anguish, lost sleep, or
could not look his neighbor straight in the eye, suffice it to stress that, by its very nature, libel causes
dishonor, disrepute and discredit; that injury to the reputation of the offended party is a natural and
probable consequence of the defamatory words in libel cases; that "where the article is libelous  per se"
— as it is in the case at bar — "the law implies damages;" and that the complainant in libel cases is not
"required to introduce evidence of actual damages," at least, when the amount of the award is more or
less nominal, as it is in the case at bar.  5

Needless to say, the civil liability arising from libel is not a "debt", within the purview of the
constitutional provision against imprisonment for non-payment of "debt". Insofar as said injunction is
concerned, "debt" means an obligation to pay a sum of money "arising from contract", express or
implied. In addition to being part of the penalty, the civil liability in the case at bar arises, however, from
a tort or crime, and, hence, from law. As a consequence, the subsidiary imprisonment for non-payment
of said liability does not violate the constitutional injunction

8. TALISAY-SILAY MILLING CO., INC vs ASOCIACION DE AGRICULTORES DE

TALISAY-SILAY, INC

Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. ("TSMC") and Talisay-Silay Industrial Cooperative Association,
Inc. ("TSICA") filed an action for damages against defendants Asociacion de Agricultores de
Talisay-Silay, Inc. ("AATSI"), First Farmers Milling Co., Inc. ("FFMCI"), Dominador
Agravante and other individual sugar planters and Ramon Nolan in his personal and official
capacity as administrator of the Sugar Quota Administration.

In 1952, the Congress of the Republic of the Philippines, still acting by virtue of its powers to
limit and regulate the sugar industry, approved Republic Act No. 809 known as the "Sugar Act
of 1952" which provided for a production-sharing scheme between a sugar mill or central and its
adherent sugar planters in the absence of a written milling agreement between the mill and
planters. Section 1 of R.A. No. 809 read:
Sec. 1. In the absence of written milling agreements between the majority of planters and
the millers of sugar-cane in any milling district in the Philippines, the unrefined sugar
produced in that district from the milling by any sugar central of the sugar-cane of any
sugar-cane planter or plantation owner, as well as all by-products and derivatives
thereof, shall be divided between them as follows:
PLANTER SUGAR CENTRAL Minimum to Maximum Actual Production
60% 40% 150k- not covered, 400k piculs max
62-1/2% 37-1/2%] 400k min 600k max
65% 35% 600k min 900k max
67-1/2% 32-1/2% 900k min 1M max
70% 30% 1M exceeding

On 22 June 1957, Congress approved Republic Act No. 1825 entitled "An Act to Provide for the
Allocation, Re-allocation and Administration of Absolute Quota on Sugar," which governed the
transfer, under certain conditions, of a planter's sugar production allowance or quota from one
sugar mill to another. Section 4 of R.A. No. 1825 provides as follows:
Sec. 4. The production allowance or quota corresponding to each piece of land under the
provisions of this act shall be deemed to be an improvement attaching to the land entitled
thereto. In the absence of a milling contract or contracts, or where such milling contract
or contract shall have expired, such production allowance or quota shall be transferable
preferable within the same district in accordance with such rules and regulations as may
be issued by the Sugar Quota Office: Provided that a plantation owner may transfer his
production allowance or quota from one district to another when the following
conditions exist: (a) when there is no milling contract between the planter and miller or
when said contracts shall have expired;  and (b) when the mill of the district in which the
land of the planter lies is not willing to give him the participation laid down in section
one of Republic Act Numbered Eight Hundred Nine regarding the division of shares
between the sugar mill and plantation owner.

CFI Rizal rendered its decision declaring as illegal the transfer of sugar quota allotments or
production allowance of the defendant planters from the TSMC to FFMCI;Ordering the said
planters to return to and continue to mill their sugar canes with the TSMC.; Restraining the
defendant Sugar Quota Administration or his agents from approving the issuance of quota
license for "A" sugar by FFMCI to defendant farmers; Condemning the defendants jointly and
severally to pay plaintiff TSICA the amount of P6,609,714.32 and to plaintiff TSMC the sum of
P8,802,612.89 with legal rate of interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid, with
costs against defendants.

In their respective decisions, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held that the
abovequoted Section 4 had been violated by AATSI and certain individual sugar planters when
they transferred their production allotments or sugar quota from TSMC to FFMCI despite the
non-concurrence of the twin conditions specified in Section 4 for the lawful transfer of such
quota, i.e., (a) the absence or expiration of their milling contract with TSMC; and (b) the refusal
of the sugar mill TSMC and of TSICA to comply with the production-sharing or participation
scheme established by Section 1 of R.A. No. 809.

In its motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals, appellant AATSI contended that
when it left TSMC and moved over to appellant FFMCI during crop year (CY) 1964-1965, there
no longer existed a milling contract between AATSI and TSMC as their last milling contract had
expired at the end of crop year (CY) 1951-1952 and had never been renewed or extended.

Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the CFI Rizal - absolved from
liability appellants Ramon Nolan of the Sugar Quota Administration, the PNB and the NIDC,
and (b) reduced the amount of damages due plaintiffs-appellees TSMC and TSICA from
approximately P15.4 million to only P1 million.

The present Petition for Review was filed by TSMC and TSICA and by intervenor-petitioner
Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales, seeking a review of the decision of the CA reducing the award of
damages granted from approximately P15.4 million to only P1 million.

ISSUE: WON AATSI, et al. are, in fact, liable to TSMC and TSICA- POSITIVE

HELD: We find no cogent reason to disturb the conclusion of the Court of Appeals and the
court a quo that the transfer of export sugar quota by AATSI and certain individual sugar
planters from TSMC to FFMCI was illegal and invalid for having been effected despite the
absence of the second condition imposed by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 1825, that is, that
TSMC was not willing to give AATSI, et al. the participation of the plantation owner laid down
in Republic Act No. 809 vis-a-vis the sugar mill. Two (2) circumstances show the willingness of
TSMC, et al. to comply with the participation scheme mandated by Republic Act No. 809. First,
AATSI had seceded from TSMC only at the end of crop year (CY) 1964-1965, i.e., only after
twelve (12) years had elapsed since crop year (CY) 1951-52 which significantly was the same
year that Republic Act No. 809 was approved. These twelve (12) years were marked by the
continued production of sugar and its by-products by TSMC, TSICA and AATSI, et al. despite
the nonexistence of a written milling contract among them. Second, when the constitutionality of
R.A. 809 was assailed in Asociacion de Agricultores de Talisay-Silay, Inc., et al. v. Talisay-
Silay Milling Co., Inc., et al.,  14 in particular, the participation or sharing scheme Republic Act
No. 809 had provided, TSMC nevertheless deposited from time to time, in escrow with the PNB
subject to the disposition of the trial court, amounts representing the participation mandated by
Republic Act No. 809. 15 TSMC thereby signalled its willingness to abide by the seventy percent
(70%) share claimed by the planters should the court hold them entitled to such percentage share.
These are conclusions for the overturning of which respondents AATSI, et al. have offered no
reasonable basis.

AATSI, et al. had no legal basis for transferring its sugar allotment or quota to FFMCI since
TSMC never refused and in fact was complying with the participation scheme required by
Republic Act No. 809. We agree with the Court of Appeals and the trial court that, by so
transferring their sugar allotments, AATSI as well as the individual sugar planters similarly
situated became liable to TSMC and TSICA. By accepting AATSI, et al's invalidly transferred
sugar allotments, FFMCI became solidarily liable with the transferors to TSMC and TSICA.

ISSUE: WON CA erred in reducing the amount of damages awarded by the trial court to TSMC
and TSICA from P15.4 million to P1 million; and (c) assuming error on the part of the Court of
Appeals, whether the amount of damages awarded by the trial court is supported by the evidence
of record. POSITIVE

HELD: SC did not agree to CA, cited Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:
Sec. 5 Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. — When issues not
raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated
in all respects, as if they had been raised in the pleadings.

The failure of a party to amend a pleading to conform to the evidence adduced during
trial does not preclude an adjudication by the court on the basis of such evidence which
may embody new issues not raised in the pleadings, 20 or serve as a basis for a higher
award of damages. When evidence is presented by one party, with the expressed or
implied consent of the adverse party, as to issues not alleged validly as regards those
issues, which shall be considered as if they have been raised in the pleadings. There is
implied consent to the evidence thus presented when the adverse party fails to object
thereto. 

TSMC and TSICA formally offered as evidence documents the estimated unrealized
income suffered, the failure of realization being attributed to the transfer by AATSI, et al.
of their sugar quota to FFMCI, the corroborative testimony CPA Ricardo Yapjoco of
TSMC.

In fine, AATSI, et al. maintains that TSMC and TSICA failed to clearly prove unrealized
profits or ganancias frustradas and that the court a quo had erred in awarding the same.
We consider that the evidence of record requires us to reject this overly broad contention.
The familiar rule is that damages consisting of unrealized profits, frequently referred as
"ganancias frustradas"or "lucrum cessans," are not to be granted on the basis of mere
speculation, conjecture or surmise but rather by reference to some reasonably definite
standard such as market value, established experience or direct inference from known
circumstances. 29 Uncertainty as to whether or not a claimant suffered unrealized profits
at all — i.e., uncertainty as to the very fact of injury — will, of course, preclude recovery
of this species of damages. Where, however, it is reasonably certain that injury consisting
of failure to realize otherwise reasonably expected profits had been incurred, uncertainty
as to the  precise amount of such unrealized profits will not prevent recovery or the award
of damages. The problem then would be the ascertainment of the amount of such
unrealized profits.
 As earlier noted, the Court of Appeals' award of P1 million based simply on the amount
set out in the original complaint of TSMC and TSICA must be discarded. Upon the other
hand, the award by the trial court of damages to TSMC and TSICA was arrived at merely
by totalling up the unrealized income sustained by TSMC and TSICA over the relevant
four (4) crop year period:

The figures and computations utilized by the trial court in its award of damages need
further examination and refinement. Award of damages rendered by the trial court took
into account the loss of income suffered by TSMC and TSICA when AATSI, et al.
transferred two (2) types of sugar quota: the "domestic quota" and the "export quota." In
respect of the domestic quota, the Court, in Hawaiian Philippines Corporation
v.Asociacion de Hacenderos de Silay-Saravia, Inc., 35 ruled that the transfer by AATSI, et
al. of their domesticquota was valid considering that Section 9 of Act No. 4166 as
amended by R.A. No. 1072, required only one (1) condition for the validity of a transfer
of such quota: the absence or expiration of a milling contract between the sugar central
and the sugar planter. The consent of the sugar central was not required for the validity of
a transfer of the domestic sugar quota. Accordingly, the transfer by AATSI, et al. of
their domesticsugar quota must be regarded as valid and the loss of income attributable to
the transfer of such domestic sugar quota from TSMC and TSICA to FFMCI must
be deducted from the aggregated amount of damages due to TSMC and TSICA.

WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby
MODIFIED insofar as the award of actual damages, case is REMANDED to the Court of
Appeals for the determination (28 years case under litigation).

9. Villa Rey Transit v. CA

Facts: On March 17, 1960, Policronio Quintos, Jr. was riding the petitioner’s bus, when the said
bus frontally hit the rear side of a bullcart filled with hay. The protruding end of the bamboo pole
at the rear of the cart penetrated the windshield of the bus and landed at Policronio’s face. He
died of traumatic shock due to cerebral injuries. Private respondents are sisters and surviving
heirs of the deceased. They brought this action against herein petitioner, Villa Rey Transit, Inc.,
as owner and operator of said passenger bus, for breach of the contract of carriage between said
petitioner and the deceased Policronio Quintos, Jr., to recover the aggregate sum of P63,750.00
as damages, including attorney's fees. Said petitioner — defendant in the court of first instance
— contended that the mishap was due to a fortuitous event, but this pretense was rejected by the
trial court and the Court of Appeals, both of which found that the accident and the death of
Policronio had been due to the negligence of the bus driver, for whom petitioner was liable under
its contract of carriage with the deceased. As the complaint alleged a total damage of only
P63,750.00 although as elsewhere shown in this decision the damages for wake and burial
expenses, loss of income, death of the victim, and attorneys fee reach the aggregate of
P79,615.95, this Court finds it just that said damages be assessed at total of only P63,750.00 as
prayed for in plaintiffs' amended complaint.

The decision of the trial Court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the present petition
for review on certiorari, filed by Villa Rey Transit, Inc.

Issues: The only issue raised in this appeal is the amount of damages recoverable by private
respondents in relation to
(1) The number of years to be used as basis of computation
(2) The rate at which the losses sustained by respondents should be fixed
Held: (1) The determination of the indemnity to be awarded to the heirs of a deceased person
has  no fixed basis. Much is left to the discretion of the court considering the moral and material
damages involved, and so it has been said that "(t)here can be no exact or uniform rule for
measuring the value of a human life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise
mathematical calculation, but the amount recoverable depends on the particular facts and
circumstances of each case. The life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiary, whichever
is shorter, is an important factor.' Other factors that are usually considered are: (1) pecuniary loss
to plaintiff or beneficiary; (2) loss of support; (3) loss of service; (4) loss of society; (5) mental
suffering of beneficiaries; and (6) medical and funeral expenses."
Thus, life expectancy is, not only relevant, but, also, an importantelement in fixing the amount
recoverable by private respondents herein. Although it is not the sole element determinative of
said amount, no cogent reason has been given to warrant its disregard and the adoption, in the
case at bar, of a purely arbitrary standard, such as a four-year rule. In short, the Court of Appeals
has not erred in basing the computation of petitioner's liability upon the life expectancy of
Policronio Quintos, Jr.
(2)  With respect to the rate at which the damages shall be computed, petitioner impugns the
decision appealed from upon the ground that the damages awarded therein will have to be
paid now, whereas most of those sought to be indemnified will be sufferedyears later. This
argument is basically true, and this is, perhaps, one of the reasons why the Alcantara case points
out the absence of a "fixed basis" for the ascertainment of the damages recoverable in litigations
like the one at bar. Just the same, the force of the said argument of petitioner herein is offset by
the fact that, although payment of the award in the case at bar will have to take place upon the
finality of the decision therein, the liability of petitioner herein had been fixed at the rate only of
P2,184.00 a year, which is the annual salary of Policronio Quintos, Jr. at the time of his death, as
a young "training assistant" in the Bacnotan Cement Industries, Inc. In other words, unlike the
Alcantara case, on which petitioner relies, the lower courts did not consider, in the present case,
Policronio's potentiality and capacity to increase his future income. Indeed, upon the conclusion
of his training period, he was supposed to have a better job and be promoted from time to time,
and, hence, to earn more, if not considering the growing importance of trade, commerce and
industry and the concomitant rise in the income level of officers and employees therein much
more.
Damages consist, not of the full amount of his earnings, but of the support, they received or
would have received from him had he not died in consequence of the negligence of petitioner's
agent. In fixing the amount of that support, We must reckon with the "necessary expenses of his
own living", which should be deducted from his earnings. Only net earnings, not gross earning,
are to be considered that is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of
such earnings or income and less living and other incidental expenses.
All things considered, SC of the opinion that it is fair and reasonable to fix the deductible living
and other expenses of the deceased at the sum of P1,184.00 a year, or about P100.00 a month,
and that, consequently, the loss sustained by his sisters may be roughly estimated at P1,000.00 a
year or P33,333.33 for the 33-1/3 years of his life expectancy. To this sum of P33,333.33, the
following should be added: (a) P12,000.00, pursuant to Arts. 104 and 107 of the Revised Penal
Code, in relation to Article 2206 of our Civil Code, as construed and applied by this Court; (b)
P1,727.95, actually spent by private respondents for medical and burial expenses; and (c)
attorney's fee, which was fixed by the trial court, at P500.00, but which, in view of the appeal
taken by petitioner herein, first to the Court of Appeals and later to this Supreme Court, should
be increased to P2,500.00. In other words, the amount adjudged in the decision appealed from
should be reduced to the aggregate sum of P49,561.28, with interest thereon, at the legal rate,
from December 29, 1961, date of the promulgation of the decision of the trial court.
10. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. MANUEL GALVEZ y ESTANISLAO.

Facts: At around 11:30pm, Danilo Julia, Loreto Palad, and AlvinAdolfo were at a local fair
inside the DM Compound in Caloocan City. Danilo Julia was playing bingo, while Loreto Palad,
Alvin Adolfo, and the victim Romen Castro were playing a game where they would throw 25
centavo coins in one of the stalls. Loreto Palad was on the left side facing the stall, while Romen
Castro was on his left side. Danilo Julia was around three meters away. After a while, five men
arrived, including Manuel Galvez (accused). 
Two of the men approached Castro, while the other two men served as lookouts. Galvez
then went up directly to Romen Castro and stabbed him at the back with a knife. Galvez
afterward threw the knife away and then fled with his companions. With the help of Danilo Julia,
Loreto Palad took the victim to the Ospital ng Caloocan, where he was declared dead on
arrival. Danilo and Loreto then informed the relatives of the victim that the latter had
died. Danilo Julia did not know Galvez’s companions but he was able to recognize accused
because the place where the stabbing took place was well-lighted. 
On the other hand, PO3 Feliciano testified that he was on duty on the night of incident when
he received a report. He and another policeman went to the Caloocan City General Hospital to
view the body of the victim and later proceeded to the scene of the crime where they found
bloodstains on the cemented pavement near the gate of the DM Compound. Upon investigation,
they learned that the assailant of Romen Castro was accused-appellant Manuel Galvez. They
were not able to arrest Galvez for lack of knowledge of his whereabouts.
Reynaldo Castro, brother of the victim, testified that the day after his brother’s death, two
policemen arrived in his house with accused-appellant Galvez. Reynaldo Castro told them,
however, that Galvez was not the one who stabbed his brother and should be released. The
policemen, therefore, left and allowed Galvez to go. A few minutes after they had left, the people
inside Reynaldo Castro’s house began talking and told Reynaldo that Galvez was the one who
had stabbed Romen Castro. Danilo Julia, Loreto Palad, Armando Rufo, and Alvin Adolfo, who
were then in the house of Reynaldo Castro, pointed to Galvez as Romen’s assailant. At the
instance of Reynaldo, Arturo Saligumba, a barangay tanod, apprehended Manuel Galvez.
Arturo Saligumba admitted that Reynaldo did not have personal knowledge of Galvez’s
culpability but was only told by others about the stabbing. Saligumba explained that it was the
policeman who actually arrested Galvez, and that he only took the latter to the headquarters.
Saligumbas testimony was corroborated by SPO2 Vivencio Gamboa, investigator of the
Station Investigation Division of the Caloocan City police, who testified that Barangay Tanod
Saligumba turned over accused-appellant Galvez to him for investigation. Gamboa was the one
who took the statements of witnesses.
On cross-examination, Gamboa explained that the statements of the witnesses were prepared
only when Galvez was already in the custody of the police authorities. From the time he was
brought to the police station, accused-appellant had been under detention, having been
committed to the Caloocan City Jail during the inquest. Gamboa narrated that there were six
suspects in the stabbing of Romen Castro, but they could not be found in their respective
residences at the time of the initial investigation.  During Gamboa’s cross-examination, the
prosecution stipulated that there was no warrant of arrest at the time Galvez was taken into
custody by Saligumba.  On re-direct examination, Gamboa explained that they inquired about the
knife used by the assailant, but it could not be found because the incident occurred at
nighttime. When questioned by the trial court, Gamboa also stated that he asked Galvez where
the knife was, but the latter invoked his right to remain silent. During his investigation, Gamboa
relied on the report of Almojuela and the affidavits executed by the witnesses.
Dr. Ludovico Lagat, Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation,
conducted an autopsy on the body of Romen Castro. Dr. Lagat testified that only one stab wound
was found on the body of the victim, although the latter also sustained several abrasions. The
stab wound at the back was the fatal wound. According to Dr. Lagat, the stab wound was
caused by a pointed sharp-bladed instrument, such as a knife. From the direction of the stab
wound, which was from the back going forward, Dr. Lagat concluded that the assailant was at
the back of the victim when the latter was stabbed. On cross-examination, Dr. Lagat stated that
any injury found on the hands, such as the abrasions suffered by the victim in this case, could be
considered defense wounds. Galvez testified in his behalf, denying the allegations against
him. He claimed that he was at his familys store in Monumento, Caloocan City on the night of
stabbing incident. He said that at around 9am of that day, two policemen went to his house and
told him that he was suspected of stabbing Romen Castro. They asked him to accompany them to
Reynaldo Castro’s house. To clear his name, Galvez agreed to do so but, upon arriving, the
people in the house told the policemen that he was not the one who killed Romen Castro because
the one who did so was fair-complexioned and short. Although allegedly released, he was later
forced by a barangay tanod to board a taxi and go to the police headquarters in Caloocan
City. There, he was told that he was a suspect in the killing of Romen Castro. He was not shown
a warrant when he was arrested nor was he interviewed by the policemen at the headquarters.
Another witness for the defense, testified that he was at the fair when Romen Castro
arrived. According to him, after Romen Castro’s enemies arrived, a commotion ensued, with
these people throwing stones and pieces of wood at the victim and the latter retaliating. Romen
Castro tried to run, but his attackers, around five in all, were able to catch up with him, and he
was stabbed by one of them on his left buttock. After stabbing their victim, the group ran
away. He said that he did not see Galvez at the local fair that night and that the latter was not one
of those who attacked and killed Romen Castro. Corroborating Galvez’s testimony are his
neighbor Edwin Mangalabanan, his aunt Elena Javier, and his mother Epida Galvez.  based on
the evidence presented, the trial court rendered a decision, establishing to a moral certainty the
guilt of Accused MANUEL GALVEZ Y ESTANISLAO of the crime of Murder.
Issues: 1. WON the trial court erred in convicting him of murder despite the failure of the
prosecution to establish his identity beyond reasonable doubt
Held:
Galvez’s arrest was illegal. Arturo Saligumba admitted that he arrested Galvez on the basis
solely of what Reynaldo Castro had told him and not because he saw accused-appellant commit
the crime charged against him. Indeed, the prosecution admitted that there was no warrant of
arrest issued against accused-appellant when the latter was taken into custody. Considering that
accused-appellant was not committing a crime at the time he was arrested nor did the arresting
officer have any personal knowledge of facts indicating that accused-appellant committed a
crime, his arrest without a warrant cannot be justified.
But by entering a plea of not guilty and participating actively in the trial, Galvez waived his
right to raise the issue of the illegality of his arrest. It is now settled that objection to a warrant of
arrest or the procedure by which a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of an accused must
be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. The fact that the
arrest was illegal does not render the subsequent proceedings void and deprive the State of its
right to convict the guilty when all the facts point to the culpability of the accused.
2. Credibility of eyewitnesses Danilo Julia, Alvin Adolfo, and Loreto Palad:
Held:
Romen Castro was known to Danilo Julia, Loreto Palad, and Alvin Adolfo since they were
all residents of Caloocan City, just like accused-appellant Galvez was. As such, the witnesses did
not have to pay any particular interest to these people. It is but natural for them to recognize
people whom they knew. Furthermore, Danilo Julia and Loreto Palad were only around three
meters away from Romen Castro, while Alvin Adolfo was just three arm lengths away from the
victim when the incident happened.  There was no need for any commotion before the
eyewitnesses could notice the movements of the victim and his assailants. Considering their
proximity, these eyewitnesses had every reason to notice the presence of Romen Castro and the
arrival of the five men, one of whom was accused-appellant. Nor was it necessary for them to be
alarmed by the five men since the latter were not doing anything illegal at that time. Only when
they approached the victim and hemmed him in, while accused-appellant stabbed him did the
eyewitnesses have reason to focus their attention on the assailants and notice the details of this
startling event.
Where there is favorable lighting and the witnesses do not appear to be biased against the
accused, their positive identification of the perpetrators should be accepted. In the absence of
evidence showing ill motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses, the logical conclusion is
that no such improper motive exists and their testimonies are thus worthy of full faith and credit.
It may be noted that while Danilo Julia and Loreto Palad testified that Romen Castro had
been stabbed on the right side of his back, the autopsy report stated that the stab wound was
located at the left lumbar area of the victim. This single lapse on a minor detail cannot, however,
undermine the credibility of these prosecution witnesses. Inconsistencies in the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses are not an uncommon event, and acquittals have resulted in cases where
the inconsistencies and self-contradictions dealt with material points as to altogether erode the
witnesses’ credibility. But when such inconsistencies are minor in character, not only do they not
detract from the credibility of the witnesses but they in fact enhance it for they erase any
suggestion of a rehearsed testimony.
Time and again we have held that the determination of the credibility of witnesses is a
matter best to the trial court, since it is in the best position to observe the witnesses demeanor,
behavior, conduct, and attitude. Thus, unless the trial court overlooked facts of substance and
value that, if considered, might change the outcome of the case, its findings command great
weight and the utmost respect.
3. Failure of prosecution witnesses to identify accused-appellant as Romen Castros
assailant when he was presented before them in the house of Reynaldo Castro:
Held:
Fear for one’s life is a valid explanation for the witnesses failure to immediately identify the
perpetrator to the proper authorities. Such failure does not necessarily impair the credibility of
the witnesses. The eyewitnesses identified Galvez as the person who stabbed Romen Castro as
soon as accused-appellant had left the house. Understandably, these witnesses, who had seen
accused-appellant stab the victim, were afraid of accused-appellant and were hesitant to identify
him face to face. But they lost no time in pointing to accused-appellant as Romen Castros
assailant as soon as accused-appellant had left. This only goes to show that their initial reluctance
was due more to fear than to their inability to identify accused-appellant.
The same may be said of the corroborative testimonies of Galvez’s aunt, mother and his
friend. Corroborative testimony is not credible if tainted with bias, particularly in cases where the
witnesses are so closely related to the accused as to be interested in his acquittal. Considering
that they are bound by friendship and family ties to accused-appellant, it is not inconceivable that
they would be inclined to make excuses for him to help free him from culpability. In any event,
his aunt and mother both testified that they saw Galvez at the store after the stabbing incident. It
is thus possible for accused-appellant to have committed the crime and go to the store near the
place where the fair was located, to establish an alibi.
4. Neither evident premeditation nor treachery attended the commission of the crime
and that, at most, the crime committed was homicide:
Held:
The court agree that evident premeditation cannot be taken against Galvez as there was no
proof to show
(1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime;
(2) an act manifestly indicating that the offender had clung to his determination; and
(3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination to commit the crime and the
execution thereof to allow the offender time to reflect on the consequences of his act.
 Where there is no evidence as to how and when the plan to kill was decided and what time
had elapsed before it was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered as an
aggravating circumstance. Accused-appellant mistakenly thinks, however, that the trial court
appreciated evident premeditation in the commission of the crime when the fact is that it did not.
Treachery attended the killing of Romen Castro. To prove treachery, the following must be
established: 
(1) the employment of means of execution which gives the person attacked no opportunity
to defend himself or to retaliate and
(2) that said means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.
The victim, Romen Castro, had his back to his five assailants and was playing a game at the
fair when these men suddenly approached him. Two of these men stayed within the vicinity to
serve as lookouts, while two other assailants went to each side of the victim to restrain
him. Then, accused-appellant went up to the victim, who was busy playing the game and thus
was unaware of the arrival of the five men, and stabbed him at the back. The attack was thus
sudden and unexpected. It was made without warning and without giving the victim an
opportunity to defend himself or repel the initial assault.
5. As regards accused-appellants civil liability:
The trial court’s award of P50,000.00 as indemnity to the heirs of the victim Romen Castro
is in accord with our current rulings. The award of actual damages in the amount of P30,000.00
should likewise be upheld. Although receipts should ordinarily support claims of actual damages,
the defense in this case stipulated that Romen Castros funeral and burial expenses amounted
toP30,000.00. Hence, in view of the defenses admission as to the claim for actual damages, the
award should be sustained.
The award of exemplary damages should, however, be deleted. Exemplary damages are
awarded in criminal offenses when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. Since no aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime in this
case, no exemplary damages should be awarded to the heirs of the victim. As regards the moral
damages, the same should be increased to P50,000.00 pursuant to recent rulings.
On the other hand, accused-appellant should also be held liable for loss of earning
capacity. In determining the amount of lost income, the following must be taken into
account: 
(1) the number of years for which the victim would otherwise have lived and
(2) the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the deceased. 
The second variable is computed by multiplying the life expectancy by the net earnings of
the deceased, i.e., the total earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or
income less living and other incidental expenses. Net earnings is computed at fifty percent (50%)
of the gross earnings. Romen Castro was 21 years old at the time of his death and was working
as a construction worker five days a week earning P150.00 a day. Applying this formula, the
victims lost income should be computed as follows:
2 x [80-21 (age of the victim at time of death)] = 39.33
3
P150 (daily wage) x 261 (number of working days in a year) = P39,150.00
(gross annual salary)

39,150.00 x .50 (allocation for living expenses) = P19,575.00 | 39.33

x P19,575.00 = P769,884.75 (loss of earning capacity)
Hence, aside from the damages awarded by the trial court, accused-appellant should pay the
legal heirs of the victim the amount of P769,884.75 representing unearned income of the victim.
the decision of the Regional Trial Court finding Manuel Galvez y Estanislao guilty of
murder and sentencing him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATIONS that the award of exemplary damages is deleted, the award of moral damages
is increased to P50,000.00, and the further amount of P769,884.75 is further given to the heirs of
the victim, Romen Castro, representing the latters unearned income, in addition to
the P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P30,000.00 actual damages awarded by the RTC.

11. People of the Philippines v. Cuenca

Facts: On February 14, 1998, around 9:30 in the evening, while lying down with his wife and
family in his house at Module
Subdivision, Barangay Tambo, Lipa City, Batangas, Marcial Morillo heard a commotion
taking place outside his house. Dogs were barking loudly, so he decided to go out of the
house to see what was happening outside. He then saw a man being mauled and beaten by
four (4) persons. Upon seeing the incident, he hid himself behind a PLDT telephone post.
From a distance of about ten (10) meters, he recognized the four (4) assailants as
Gerry Cuenca, Jackson Cuenca, Crisanto Agon and Bernie Agon, while the person being
mauled was Wilfredo Edok Castillo. Marcial knew the four assailants and the victim for
eight (8) years since they were all neighbors, Gerry and Jackson being brothers
and Crisanto and Bernie being father and son. He witnessed Crisanto hold Edoks left hand
while Bernie held his right hand. Gerry was at Edoks front and to the right while Jackson was
at Edoks front and to the left and both were beating Edok continuously. Gerry and Jackson
each used a piece of wood in hitting Edok several times on the face, head, chest and other
parts of his body. Edok tried to struggle but his efforts proved futile. Edok then gave in,
stooped down and eventually lost consciousness (Lumugmok na po siya). The four (4)
assailants then carried Edoks body with one holding on to his right arm, the other one his left
arm and the other two each held the right and left legs of Edok towards the direction
of Calabarzon Highway.
The RTC finds the accused GERRY CUENCA and CRISANTO AGON, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, both as principals by direct participation for having conspired and
confederated with one another in the commission of the crime of murder, each of them to pay the
heirs of Wilfredo Castillo the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, the sum
of P38,800.00, as actual damages, the sum of P4,800,000.00 for loss of earning capacity, the
sum of P20,000.00, as moral damages and to pay their proportionate share of the costs. Because
their co-accused were at large, trial on the merits proceeded only as against them.
Issue: Whether or not the awards of damages are proper?
Held: The award of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto  for the loss of the victims life is in accord
with prevailing jurisprudence. Likewise, the award of P20,000 as moral damages is
reasonable. However, the actual damages granted is improper and should be reduced
from P38,800 to P7,300 considering that only the latter amount, representing burial expenses,
was duly supported by receipts. The unsubstantiated balance of P31,500 should be deleted. We
also find the court a quos  award of P4,800,000 for loss of earning capacity to be improper.
True, in People v. Verde, we granted an award for the loss of earning capacity to the heirs of the
deceased despite the absence of documentary evidence to substantiate such claim. We deemed
the testimony of the victims wife sufficient to establish the basis for the grant. However, the new
ruling in People v.  Panabang modifies this principle and now precludes an award for loss of
earning capacity without adequate proof. The bare testimony of the brother of the
deceased Felicisimo Castillo that, at the time of his death, Wilfredo Castillo was
earning P250.00 daily as carpenter is not sufficient proof. In Panabang, we held that the
indemnification for loss of earning capacity must be duly proven. Justice Jose C. Vitug,
expressing the current view of the Court, wrote: Indemnification for loss of earning capacity
partakes of the nature of actual damages which must be duly proven. A self-serving statement,
being unreliable, is not enough. The father of the victim has testified on the latters monthly
income of P12,000.00. But for lost income to be recovered, there must likewise be an unbiased
proof of the deceased’s average, not just gross, income. An award for lost of earning capacity
refers to the net income of the deceased, i.e., his total income net of expenses. x x x. (Emphasis
in the original, citations omitted)WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED but the
actual damages awarded by the RTC is REDUCED  from P35,850 to P7,300 while the grant
of P4,800, loss of earning capacity is DELETED.

12. ROBERT DA JOSE and FRANCISCO OCAMPO y ANGELES, Petitioners, vs.

CELERINA R. ANGELES, EDWARD ANGELO R. ANGELES and CELINE ANGELI R.
ANGELES, Respondents.
TOPICS: application of Article 2206 of the NCC; rules on hearsay evidence
FACTS: Eduardo Tuazon Angeles died in a vehicular collision between a Mitsubishi Lancer
driven by him and a Nissan Patrol driven by Francisco Ocampo, where the Nissan Patrol
encroached on the lane of the Mistubushi Lancer upon overtaking a truck.
The wife of Eduardo Tuazon, Celerina Angeles alongside with her children with Eduardo, Celine
and Edward, sought for damaged against Francisco Ocampo. The RTC awarded the following
damages:
1) ₱50,000.00 for the fact of death of the late Eduardo T. Angeles;
2) ₱500,000.00 as moral damages;
3) ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4) ₱4,830.00 for the hospitalization and ₱50,000.00 for the burial expenses
of the aforenamed deceased; and
5) ₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus the costs of suit.

Both parties appealed before the CA. The CA agreed with the RTC’s findings that Francisco
was clearly negligent in driving the Nissan Patrol and that such negligence caused the
vehicular collision which resulted in the death of Eduardo. Like the RTC, the CA also
dismissed Francisco’s claim that the Mitsubishi Lancer’s headlights were not on at the time of
the incident and found that petitioners failed to adduce any evidence to the contrary that Eduardo
was of good health and of sound mind at the time. The CA thus ruled that no contributory
negligence could be imputed against Eduardo. While sustaining the RTC’s award of civil
indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000; actual damages in the amount of ₱4,830 as
hospitalization expenses and ₱50,000 as burial expenses; and attorney’s fees and costs of the
suit in the amount of ₱50,000, the CA reduced the awards for moral and exemplary damages in
the amounts of ₱50,000 and ₱25,000 respectively, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.
Moreover, the CA awarded respondents indemnity for Eduardo’s loss of earning capacity based
on the documentary and testimonial evidence they presented. Excluding the other cash vouchers,
the CA took into consideration the ₱20,000 monthly salary Eduardo received from Glennis
Laundry Haus in the computation thereof, finding that the said cash vouchers were typewritten
and duly signed by employees who prepared, checked and approved them and that said business
venture was validated by the aforementioned Joint Affidavit. Thus, the CA awarded the amount
of ₱2,316,000 for loss of earning capacity in favor of respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in awarding the sum of ₱2,316,000 for loss of earning
capacity
HELD: Yes. While indeed the petition raises a factual issue (as opposed to the SC only has
jurisdiction over question of law as a general rule) on the probative value of the cash vouchers
submitted in support of the claim for lost earnings, the present case falls under two of the
exceptions, because the findings of the CA conflict with the findings of the RTC and that the CA
manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts. Since petitioners raised these
circumstances, it is but proper for this Court to resolve this case.
Under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, the heirs of the victim are entitled to indemnity
for loss of earning capacity. Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings,
but for loss of capacity to earn money. The indemnification for loss of earning capacity
partakes of the nature of actual damages which must be duly proven by competent proof and
the best obtainable evidence thereof. Thus, as a rule, documentary evidence should be presented
to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity.
By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the
absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-employed and earning less than
the minimum wage under current labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the
fact that in the deceased’s line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the
deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws. Based on the foregoing and in line with respondents’ claim that Eduardo
during his lifetime earned more or less an annual income of ₱1,000,000 then the case falls
under the purview of the general rule rather than the exceptions.
Now, while it is true that respondents submitted cash vouchers to prove Eduardo’s
income, it is lamentable as duly observed by the RTC that the officers and/or employees who
prepared, checked or approved the same were not presented on the witness stand. The CA
itself in its assailed Decision disregarded the cash vouchers rom Classic Personnel, Inc. and the
Jhamec Construction Corp. due to lack of proper identification and authentication. We find that
the same infirmity besets the cash vouchers from Glennis Laundry Haus upon which the award
for loss of earning capacity was based.
It bears stressing that the cash vouchers from Glennis Laundry Haus were not identified
by Celerina contrary to the findings of the CA but by Celine in her testimony before the RTC on
November 13, 200249 and Celine, under crossexamination, admitted by way of stipulation that
she had no participation in the preparation thereof.
We thus agree with the RTC’s ruling that said cash vouchers though admitted in
evidence, whether objected to or not, have no probative value for being hearsay. Evidence is
hearsay when its probative force depends on the competency and credibility of some
persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to be produced. The exclusion of
hearsay evidence is anchored on three reasons: (1) absence of cross-examination; (2) absence of
demeanor evidence; and (3) absence of oath. Basic under the rules of evidence is that a witness
can only testify on facts within his or her personal knowledge. This personal knowledge is a
substantive prerequisite in accepting testimonial evidence establishing the truth of a disputed
fact. Corollarily, a document offered as proof of its contents has to be authenticated in the
manner provided in the rules, that is, by the person with personal knowledge of the facts
stated in the document.
Except for the award for the loss of earning capacity, the Court concurs with the findings
of the CA and sustains the other awards made in so far as they are in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence. In addition, pursuant to this Court's ruling in Del Carmen Jr. v. Bacoy citing
Eastern Shipping Lines Inc. v. Court of Appeals an interest of 6% per annum on the amounts
awarded shall be imposed, computed from the time of finality of this Decision until full payment
thereof.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The award for the loss of earning
capacity in the amount of ₱2,316,000 granted by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated
August 29, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 83309 in favor of respondents is hereby SET ASIDE.
All the other monetary awards are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that interest at
the rate of 6 per annum on the amounts awarded shall be imposed, computed from the time of
finality of this Decision until full payment thereof.

13 Filomena Benedicto vs Antonio Villaflores

Facts: Maria Villaflores owned Lot 2-A covered by TCT no T84.761 in Poblacion,
Meycauayan, Bulacan. In 1980, she sold a portion of Lot 2-A to herein respondent
Villaflores, who then took possession of it and built his house thereon. 12 yrs later, on Aug
15,1992, Maria Villaflores executed a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan in favor of herein
respondent covering the entire lot, but the sale was not registered nor were the real property taxes
paid by respondent.
The same lot was sold to petitioner by Maria Villaflores in 1994, evidenced by a kasulatan ng
bilihang tuluyan which was duly registered in the Registry of Deeds of Meycauayan in the same
year. The TCT in the name of Maria was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of
herein petitioner. Petitioner also paid real property taxes for the same.
In 2000, petitioner brought an accion publiciana wih notice of adverse claim, damages and
attorney’s fees against respondent with the RTC. The RTC sustained Filomenas ownership as she
was the one who registered the sale in good faith, thereby giving her a better right than
respondent. However, Antonio was declared a builder in good faith. Both parties moved for a
reconsideration but was denied for lack of merit, so they filed separate appeals with the CA.
Filomena assails the RTC pronouncement which declared Antonio a builder in good faith and
denied her claim of damages, while Antonio faulted the RTC for sustaining Filomena’s
Ownership of the land.
The CA affirmed the RTC in upholding Filomena’s Ownership of the subject lot and declared
Antonio a builder in good faith; it remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings to
determine the respective rights of the parties under art 448 & 546 of the civil code, and the
amount due Antonio.
ISSUE relevant to damages: WHETHER OR NOT RTC and the CA erred in denying her
claim for attorney’s fees
HELD: No.
The Court discussed the award of attorney’s fees:
It is settled that the award of attorney’s fees is the exception rather than the general rule;
counsel's fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit because of the policy that no
premium should be placed on the right to litigate. Attorney's fees, as part of damages, are not
necessarily equated to the amount paid by a litigant to a lawyer. In the ordinary sense, attorney's
fees represent the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he
has rendered to the latter; while in its extraordinary concept, they may be awarded by the
court as indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party.
Attorney's fees as part of damages are awarded only in the instances specified in Article 2208
of the Civil Code. As such, it is necessary for the court to make findings of fact and law that
would bring the case within the ambit of these enumerated instances to justify the grant of such
award, and in all cases it must be reasonable.
The SC cited a case Scott Consultants and Resource Development v. CA:  
It is settled that the award of attorneys fees is the exception rather than the rule
and counsels fees are not to be awarded every time a party wins suit. The power
of the court to award attorneys fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands
factual, legal, and equitable justification; its basis cannot be left to speculation or
conjecture. Where granted, the court must explicitly state in the body of the
decision, and not only in the dispositive portion thereof, the legal reason for the
award of attorneys fees.

Moreover, a recent case ruled that in the absence of stipulation, a winning party may be
awarded attorneys fees only in case plaintiffs action or defendants stand is so untenable
as to amount to gross and evident bad faith.

14. Construction Development Corp vs. Estrella

Facts: Respondents Rebecca G. Estrella and her granddaughter, Rachel E. Fletcher, boarded in
San Pablo City, a BLTB bus bound for Pasay City. However, they never reached their
destination because their bus was rammed from behind by a tractor-truck of CDCP in the South
Expressway. The strong impact pushed forward their seats and pinned their knees to the seats in
front of them. They were injured due to the collision.
Thereafter, respondents filed a Complaint5 for damages against CDCP, BLTB,
EspiridionPayunan, Jr. and Wilfredo Datinguinoo. They alleged (1) that Payunan, Jr. and
Datinguinoo, who were the drivers of CDCP and BLTB buses, respectively, were negligent and
did not obey traffic laws; (2) that BLTB and CDCP did not exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees; (3) that BLTB allowed its
bus to operate knowing that it lacked proper maintenance thus exposing its passengers to grave
danger; (4) that they suffered actual damages amounting to P250,000.00 for Estrella and
P300,000.00 for Fletcher; (5) that they suffered physical discomfort, serious anxiety, fright and
mental anguish, besmirched reputation and wounded feelings, moral shock, and lifelong social
humiliation; (6) that defendants failed to act with justice, give respondents their due, observe
honesty and good faith which entitles them to claim for exemplary damage; and (7) that they are
entitled to a reasonable amount of attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
Trial court rendered a decision finding CDCP and BLTB and their employees liable for damages
jointly and severally to pay for actual damages, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees.
The trial court held that BLTB, as a common carrier, was bound to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the safety of its passengers. Thus, where a passenger dies or is
injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or has acted negligently. BLTB's inability to
carry respondents to their destination gave rise to an action for breach of contract of carriage
while its failure to rebut the presumption of negligence made it liable to respondents for the
breach.9
Regarding CDCP, the trial court found that the tractor-truck it owned bumped the BLTB bus
from behind. Evidence showed that CDCP's driver was reckless and driving very fast at the time
of the incident. The gross negligence of its driver raised the presumption that CDCP was
negligent either in the selection or in the supervision of its employees which it failed to rebut
thus making it and its driver liable to respondents.
CDCP appealed the decision contending that liability for actual damages and attorney's fees is
based on culpa contractual, thus, only BLTB should be held liable. Respondents, on the other
hand, argue that petitioner is also at fault, hence, it was properly joined as a party. There may be
an action arising out of one incident where questions of fact are common to all. Thus, the cause
of action based on culpa aquiliana in the civil suit they filed against it was valid.
ISSUE: 1) whether BLTB and its driver Wilfredo Datinguinoo are solely liable for the damages
sustained by respondents; (2) whether the damages, attorney's fees and legal interest awarded by
the CA are excessive and unfounded.
RULING: (1) CDCP is solidarily liable with BLTB for damages.The case filed by respondents
against petitioner is an action for culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. In this regard, Article 2180 provides that the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable for the acts or omissions of those persons for whom one is responsible.
Consequently, an action based on quasi-delict may be instituted against the employer for an
employee's act or omission. The liability for the negligent conduct of the subordinate is direct
and primary, but is subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the
employee.14 In the instant case, the trial court found that petitioner failed to prove that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Payunan,
Jr.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found petitioner solidarily liable with BLTB for the
actual damages suffered by respondents because of the injuries they sustained. It was established
that Payunan, Jr. was driving recklessly because of the skid marks as shown in the sketch of the
police investigator.
It is well-settled in Fabre, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,15 that the owner of the other vehicle which
collided with a common carrier is solidarily liable to the injured passenger of the same. The same
rule of liability was applied in situations where the negligence of the driver of the bus on which
plaintiff was riding concurred with the negligence of a third party who was the driver of another
vehicle, thus causing an accident. As in the case of BLTB, private respondents in this case and
her co-plaintiffs did not stake out their claim against the carrier and the driver exclusively on one
theory, much less on that of breach of contract alone.After all, it was permitted for them to allege
alternative causes of action and join as many parties as may be liable on such causes of action so
long as private respondent and her co-plaintiffs do not recover twice for the same injury. The
difficulty in the contention of the appellants is that they fail to recognize that the basis of the
present action is tort. They fail to recognize the universal doctrine that each joint tort feasor is
not only individually liable for the tort in which he participates, but is also jointly liable with his
tort feasors.
(2) Moral damages may be recovered in quasi-delicts causing physical injuries.21 The
award of moral damages in favor of Fletcher and Estrella in the amount of P80,000.00 must be
reduced since prevailing jurisprudence fixed the same at P50,000.00.22 While moral damages
are not intended to enrich the plaintiff at the expense of the defendant, the award should
nonetheless be commensurate to the suffering inflicted.23
The Court of Appeals correctly awarded respondents exemplary damages in the amount of
P20,000.00 each. Exemplary damages may be awarded in addition to moral and compensatory
damages.24 Article 2231 of the Civil Code also states that in quasi-delicts, exemplary damages
may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.25 In this case, petitioner's driver
was driving recklessly at the time its truck rammed the BLTB bus. Petitioner, who has direct and
primary liability for the negligent conduct of its subordinates, was also found negligent in the
selection and supervision of its employees. In Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals, we held, thus:
ART. 2229 of the Civil Code also provides that such damages may be imposed, by way of
example or correction for the public good. While exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a
matter of right, they need not be proved, although plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or
not exemplary damages should be awarded. Exemplary Damages are imposed not to enrich one
party or impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb
socially deleterious actions.
15. FORMER MAYOR BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR vs. FLORIDA R. MARTINEZ
FACTS: Martinez started working at the Quezon City Health Department as a nurse in 1954. She rose
from the ranks and became Nursing Program Supervisor IV or Chief Nurse of the Quezon City Health
Department in 1983.-She finished her nursing degrees at the UP-Philippine General Hospital (UP-PGH)
and Arellano University-obtained a Certificate in Public Health from UP and a masters’ degree from the
Philippine Women’s University.-President of the Philippine Nurses Association (PNA) and an officer and
member of several organizations.-She also received several awards and was a participant of numerous
seminars here and abroad.
On November 3, 1986, Martinez was called by City Kaimo to his office, who gave her three choices: to
resign, retire or be dismissed. When she asked what the specific charges against her were, she was told to
just wait for the letter of dismissal. Martinez, through her lawyer-husband Pedro, sent a letter dated
November 10, 1986 to Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of Quezon City Brigido R. Simon, Jr.(Simon), asking
Simon to inform them of the specific charges against Martinez.
On November 12, 1986, Martinez received a letter dated October 30, 1986, signed by Simon, Kaimo, and
Nestor P. Borromeo (Borromeo), Secretary to the Mayor, separating her from the service, pursuant to
Proclamation No. 3 and Executive Order No. 17 issued by then President Corazon C. Aquino, on the
following grounds:
Item 2 & 5 -Existence of a probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act as determined by the Ministry Head concerned;
and/or – Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is unfit to remain in the service
or her separation/replacement is in the interest of the service.
Martinez filed a motion for reconsideration with the Review Committee of the Ministry of Justice which
issued a Resolution dated January 5, 1987, ordering Martinez’s reinstatement. The committee found that
Simon failed to substantiate Martinez’s alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;
neither was there any analogous ground showing Martinez to be unfit to remain in service.
Martinez was reinstated. However, she was not allowed to receive her salary and allowances during the
period she was separated from the service she was considered as being on vacation leave without pay
during the time she was out of the service.
Martinez filed a complaint for damages against Simon, Borromeo, Kaimo, the Quezon City Government;
Reynaldo M. Lupisan, Chief of Disease Intelligence and Control Division/Assistant City Health
Officer/OIC of the Health Department of Quezon City alleging that the said defendants connived in
causing her separation from the service. Martinez prayed that defendants be ordered to pay, jointly and
severally, the salary and benefits due her invoking Article 21 of the Civil Code.
The defendants (herein petitioner) contend that Martinez’s notice of termination was served after a
judicious assessment by the Review Committee of the Office of the Mayor and was unanimously voted
upon by the members after finding that there exists a probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and other analogous grounds showing that Martinez is unfit to remain in the
service.
Simon argues that: Article 27 of the New Civil Code refers to action for damages when the public official
or employee neglects to perform his official duty without just cause; in this case, he performed his duty as
Chief Executive of Quezon City empowered by law to hire and fire employees of the Quezon City
government; he even gave Martinez a citation after she was reinstated indicating the absence of ill-will,
bad faith, malice and gross negligence; he simply acted positively towards the recommendation of the
Committee on Review of the Mayor’s Office which was tasked to evaluate and recommend the
employment and termination of personnel of the Quezon City government, and could not be faulted for
the errors committed by the said committee; as there were many personnel who were recommended to be
purged, it was impossible for him to personally evaluate all their acts and review the causes for their
termination.
Kaimo and Borromeo contend that: Art. 27 of the Civil Code does not apply in this case as petitioners did
not refuse nor neglect to perform their official duties; there was no definite finding that petitioners acted
with malice or bad faith in the termination of Martinez from the service; when petitioners terminated
Martinez, they were of the honest belief that they had sufficiently complied with the requirements
imposed under the Freedom Constitution and Executive Order No.
RTC rendered its Decision in favor of Martinez holding Simon, Borromeo, and Kaimo liable for damages
for signing Martinez termination letter, and Lupisan, for recommending Martinezs termination, without
verifying the truth of the charges against Martinez; but dismissed the complaint against the Quezon City
Government. The court granted moral damages; exemplary damages; actual damages; and Attorney’s
Fees. Upon Appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages were proper.
HELD: Yes. Except, Actual Damages. Article 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a
public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without justifiable cause, to perform his official duty may
file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary
administrative action that may be taken.
The records show, petitioners failed to substantiate the purported grounds for Martinez’s termination. In
his testimony, Kaimo could only point to Lupisan, then Acting Head of the Health Department of Quezon
City, as the one who recommended Martinez’s termination. Lupisan however denied that he ever made
such recommendation and claims that he does not know who did so. Kaimo also admitted that she talked
to Martinez, not to give her the opportunity to rebut the charges against her, but only to inform her of the
decision of the committee. Petitioners likewise failed to show that they conducted an investigation which
was required under the Guidelines for the Review Committee of the Office of the Mayor which they
themselves signed. Pertinent portion of said guidelines is hereby quoted as follows:
If there is a complaint against a particular employee and/or office investigation is to be conducted in order
to determine if there exists a probable cause.
While petitioners claim that an investigation was conducted to evaluate and review the complaint and
evidence against Martinez, petitioners were not able to present any proof when and where such
investigation was undertaken. Although under Sec. 1 of Executive Order No. 17, Simon as then OIC
Mayor, had the power to dismiss government employees even without any formal investigation, the same
may be done only in cases where the charges against the employees were serious, the evidence of guilt is
strong and when it is shown that the department head exercised sound discretion in dismissing the
employee because of wrongful acts and was not prompted by whim or caprice. In the present case, not
only were the charges against Martinez vague and couched in general terms, no evidence of her guilt was
presented. There is no showing that the officials concerned exercised sound discretion in the exercise of
their power. The words of Executive Order No. 17 are clear. Only those found corrupt, inefficient and
undeserving should be separated from the service. Petitioners failed to show that Martinez falls under any
of these categories. As petitioners failed to justify the termination of Martinez and show that they
observed due process, the award of damages in Martinez’s favor is warranted.
As to the award of actual damages, however, the RTC failed to explain how it came up with the amount
of P31,940.00. Martinez, in her testimony, admitted that she could not present receipts to support her
claim for actual damages. She explained however that her claim for actual damages consists of salaries
due her covering the period of her unjust separation from the service, as well as expenses of litigation. In
the Memorandum she submitted to the RTC, she admitted that, pending trial of the case, she had been
paid her salary covering the period of her separation from work.
In view of Martinez’s admission that she has already received her salary covering the period in question,
and the award of attorneys fees in this case covers the expenses of litigation which she incurred as a result
of the wrongful act of petitioners, the Court deems it proper to delete the award of actual damages from
the sum of damages to be given her.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated November 29, 2001 and
Resolution dated November 13, 2002 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
that the award of actual damages in the amount of P31,940.00 is DELETED.

19. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

RONALD CREDO aka "ONTOG," RANDY CREDO and ROLANDO CREDO y SAN
BUENA VENTURA
Facts:
On June 22, 2005 at around 10:30 in the evening in Camarines Sur, Ronald Credo, Randy
Credo and Rolando Credo conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then
and there, with intent to take the life of Joseph Nicolas y Arroyo, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack and hack the latter with a bolo, wounding him in the different parts of the
body, per autopsy report thereby causing his direct and immediate death. The victim, Joseph
Nicolas (Joseph), was at a "bingohan" together with his wife Maria and friends. Randy Credo
(Randy) arrived at the "bingohan," approached Joseph and suddenly punched the latter on the
chest, causing him to fall down. Randy then immediately ran away towards the direction of their
house. Joseph stood up, gathered his things consisting of a lemon and an egg, and gave Randy a
chase. The people at the "bingohan" all scampered away as a result of the commotion. After a
while, he met Randy, who was already accompanied by his co-appellants: his brother Ronald
Credo (Ronald) and their father Rolando Credo (Rolando). The three were each armed with a
bolo.
Meanwhile, when Joseph’s children heard that their father was in trouble, they decided to
look for him. On their way, they met appellants, who suddenly started throwing stones at them,
causing them to run away. Joseph’s son got separated from his siblings but he continued to look
for his father. He came across appellants again where he saw them hacking somebody with their
bolos. That person later turned out to be their father. Russel saw that when all three appellants
were done hacking their victim, Randy and Rolando went back to where the victim was lying
and gave him another blow, saying in the Bicolano dialect, "pang-dulce" (for dessert). The scene
was witnessed by another resident, Francis. According to him, at the time of the incident, he
heard a commotion outside his house. He heard Roger Credo, the brother of Randy and Ronald,
shout: "Tama na Manoy, gadan na!" (Enough brother, he is already dead!) Francis went out and
saw appellants, all armed with a bolo, repeatedly hacking Joseph to death. He saw the hacking
incident very clearly because the place was lighted by a lamppost and the moon was shining
brightly. Moreover, the distance between the crime scene and the window from where he was
watching is only about 3 to 4 meters. Francis was able to note that Joseph was unarmed and was,
in fact, holding a lemon in his right hand and an egg in his left hand.
The trial court found that appellants conspired in the commission of the crime and that
the killing of Joseph was attended by abuse of superior strength. Hence, the trial court rendered
its decision finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, sentencing
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering them to pay the widow of Joseph
the amounts of ₱14,000.00 as actual damages, ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages, and ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction but modified the
award of damages in the following manner: (1) civil indemnity was increased from ₱50,000.00
to ₱75,000.00; (2) the award of moral damages was likewise increased from ₱50,000.00 to
₱75,000.00; (3) the amount of exemplary damages was reduced from ₱50,000.00 to ₱30,000.00;
and (4) temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 was imposed in place of actual damages.
Pending resolution of this appeal, the Court received a letter, from the OIC, New Bilibid
Prison, informing the Court that Rolando had died at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital. "Cardio
respiratory Arrest" was the immediate cause of death. As a consequence of Rolando’s death
while this case is pending appeal, both his criminal and civil liability ex delicto were
extinguished. Aticle 89 states that criminal liability is totally extinguished by "the death of the
convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment." This appeal
shall, as a result, be decided as against Randy and Ronald only
Issues:
WON the CA gravely erred in finding that the accused-appellants conspired with each other in
the commission of the crime charged.
WON the court of appeals gravely erred in increasing the award of civil indemnity of ₱50,000.00
to ₱75,000.00.

Held:
At the outset, it bears repeating that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by
the CA, are generally binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court. Except for compelling or
exceptional reasons, such as when they were sufficiently shown to be contrary to the evidence on
record, the findings of fact of the RTC will not be disturbed by this Court. Thus, once a guilty
verdict has been rendered, the appellant has the burden of clearly proving on appeal that the
lower court committed errors in the appreciation of the evidence presented. Here, there is no
showing that the TC or CA overlooked some material facts or committed any reversible error in
their factual findings.
Corollary to the principle that appellate courts generally will not interfere with the factual
findings of the trial court."As consistently adhered to by this Court, the matter of assigning
values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial
judge, who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility
by the various indicia available but not reflected on the record." The court agree with the
findings of both the TC and the CA which gave weight to the accounts of the two eyewitnesses,
Russel and Francis. Their respective testimonies positively and categorically identified
appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. Their statements on the witness stand also corroborate
each other on material aspects. Both Russel and Francis testified that they saw the appellants
hacking a man. Although Francis was able to immediately recognize the victim as Joseph, Russel
was to learn only later on that the appellants’ victim was his own father. It is also worth noting
that the statement of Russel and Francis claiming that all three of the appellants were holding a
bolo at the time of the incident is corroborated by another witness: Manuel Chica. Manuel
testified that after Randy and Joseph left the "bingohan," he also left to follow the two. On his
way, he met the three appellants all armed with a bolo.
The inconsistency in the respective statements of Francis and Russel with respect to who
among the three appellants actually dealt the final blow on the victim is understandable
considering that they witnessed the scene from different vantage points. Francis definitely had a
clearer view as he was nearer the scene of the crime (3-4 meters) whereas Russel was much
farther as evidenced by the fact that from where he was watching, he was unable to recognize the
victim as his father. All the same, both were one in saying that at least one of the appellants
returned to where the victim was prostrate to give him another blow. The primordial
consideration is that both Russel and Francis were present at the scene of the crime and that they
positively identified appellants as the perpetrators of the crime charged. This Court has been
consistent in ruling that "although there may be inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses
on minor details, they do not impair their credibility where there is consistency in relating the
principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailant."
Finally, the attack of appellants on the credibility of Francis as a witness for the
prosecution on the ground that the victim is the brother of Francis’ mother – making Francis the
nephew of the victim – loses significance when the relationship of Francis with the appellants is
considered: appellant Rolando is his uncle, being the brother of his father, thereby making
appellants Randy and Ronald his first cousins. Considering that appellants are also his close
relatives, it is difficult to believe that Francis would point to appellants as the killers, if such
were not true. Moreover, the lack of proof of ill-motive on the part of Francis, indicate that he
testified, not to favor any of the parties in this case, but solely for the purpose of telling the truth
and narrating what he actually witnessed. His testimony deserves full faith and credit.
1. Requisites for valid defense of a relative not present
 As found by the trial court, there can be no unlawful aggression on the part of Joseph
because at the time of the incident, he was only holding a lemon and an egg. According to the
trial court, the fact that Joseph was unarmed effectively belied the allegation of Ronald that he
was prompted to retaliate in self-defense when Joseph first hacked and hit him on his neck. The
trial court further pointed out that if Joseph indeed hacked Ronald on the neck, "it is surprising
that the latter did not suffer any injury when according to them, Joseph was running fast and
made a hard thrust on Ronald, hitting the latter’s neck.
2. Appellants acted in conspiracy with one another in the execution of the crime
"Conspiracy is said to exist where two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not essential to prove
conspiracy for it may be deduced from the acts of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime charged, from which it may be indicated that there is a common
purpose to commit the crime.
While no evidence was presented to show that appellants met beforehand and came to an
agreement to harm Joseph, their concerted acts before, during and after the incident all point to a
unity of purpose and design. Indeed, "proof of a previous agreement and decision to commit the
crime is not essential but the fact that the malefactors acted in unison pursuant to the same
objective suffices.
3. Abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the crime
There is abuse of superior strength when the perpetrators of a crime deliberately used
excessive force, thereby rendering the victim incapable of defending himself. "The notorious
inequality of forces creates an unfair advantage for the aggressor."48
It cannot be denied that appellants took advantage of their superior strength to ensure the
successful execution of their crime. This is evident from the fact that there were three of them
against the victim who was alone. More importantly, their victim was unarmed while the three of
them were each armed with a bolo.
4. Award of damages
The award of civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without
need of proof other than the commission of the crime. The Court held that even if the penalty of
death is not to be imposed because of the prohibition in R.A. 9346, the civil indemnity of is
proper, because it is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact
that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the
commission of the offense. While R.A. No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty,
the fact remains that the penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense is still death, and the
offense is still heinous.
Moral damages are mandatory in cases of murder, without need of allegation and proof
other than the death of the victim. However, consistent with recent jurisprudence on heinous
crimes where the imposable penalty is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to R.A.
No. 9346, the award of moral damages should be increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals was correct in increasing the lower court’s award of
civil indemnity from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00. Regardless of the penalty imposed by the trial
court, the correct amount of civil indemnity is ₱75,000.00.
The Court of Appeals, however, erred when it increased the amount of moral damages
from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00. The correct sum should be ₱50,000.00.
In connection with the award of exemplary damages, the Court of Appeals correctly
reduced the amount from ₱50,000.00 to ₱30,000.00 in line with current jurisprudence.
Finally, "when actual damages are proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than
₱25,000, as in this case, the award of temperate damages for ₱25,000 is justified in lieu of actual
damages of a lesser amount. Conversely, if the amount of actual damages proven exceeds
₱25,000, then temperate damages may no longer be awarded; actual damages based on the
receipts presented during trial should instead be granted." As a result, the Court of Appeals
likewise correctly held that, since the receipted expenses of Joseph's family amounted to only
₱14,300.00, temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 in lieu of actual damages should be
awarded.
The appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the CA finding appellants Ronald,
Randy and Rolando, all surnamed Credo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is reduced from
₱75,000.00 to ₱50,000.00. The appeal with respect to the deceased appellant Rolando Credo is
DISMISSED.