Mill's Conception of Happiness as an Inclusive End

Robert W. Hoag

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 25, Number 3, July 1987, pp.
417-431 (Article)

Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.1987.0038

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https://muse.jhu.edu/article/226684/summary

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 Mill's Conception of Happiness
as an Inclusive End
ROBERT W. H O A G

FOR A LONG TIME J o h n Stuart Mill's utilitarianism has been regarded as an

implausible, inconsistent ethical hedonism. For example, since the publica-
tion of Utilitarianism many critics have charged that the doctrine of qualities
of pleasures is inconsistent with Mill's fundamental commitment to ethical
hedonism.' Some have also argued that Mill's claims about the intrinsic value
of virtue contradict his view of pleasure as the sole intrinsic good. ~ And
Mill's defense of liberty has often been discounted as a utilitarian argument
because it is said to rely on non-hedonistic values such as individuality.3 But
these and other traditional objections presuppose that Mill advances a
simple, hedonistic theory of value. It is that presupposition that I intend to
challenge in this paper.
A few commentators have recently begun to challenge the standard inter-

Original versions of this paper were completed while participating in a NEH Summer
Seminar at the University of Arizona, June t8-August lo, 1984. I am thankful for the support
of the National Endowment for the Humanities. And for their helpful comments on earlier
versions of this work, I thank Fred Berger, Joel Feinberg, John Simmons, Alan Fuchs, and Joan
Callahan.
' J. B. Schneewind, "Concerning Some Criticisms of Mill's Utilitarianism," in James and John
Stuart Mill/Papers of the Centenary Conference, ed. John M. Robson and Michael Laine (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1976), 46-48. Notable proponents of this objection include: Henry
Sidgwick, The Method.~ of Ethics, 7th ed. (London: MacMillan, 19o7), 94-95; F. H. Bradley,
Ethical Studies, ~d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1926), 117-2o; T. H. Green, Prolegom-
ena to Ethics, ed. A. C. Bradley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1888), w167 G. E.
Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19o3), 77-81; John Plame-
natz, The English Utilitarians (Oxford: Basic Blackwell, 1949), 141-42; R. P. Anschutz, The
Philosophy ofJ. s. Mill (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), xS-19.
' For example: Green, w167 H. J. McCloskey,John Stuart Mill: A Critical Study (New
York: Macmillan, x971), 62, 7 a.
3 Notable proponents of this objection include: James Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty, Equality,
Fraternity (London, 1873), 48-51; Plamenatz, 126-33; Anschutz, 5-1o; C. L. Ten, Mill on Liberty
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 198o).

[417]
418 JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 25:3 JULY 1987
pretation o f Mill's t h e o r y o f value. 4 I h e r e develop this work by arguing that
Mill conceives o f happiness as a higher-order, inclusive end o f life, and by
using this interpretive a p p r o a c h to explain some o f Mill's puzzling remarks
about happiness, parts o f happiness, and pleasures. In the first section o f
this p a p e r I briefly consider Mill's account o f Art or Practice in o r d e r to
reveal the status and function Mill assigns his conception o f happiness. In
the second section I a r g u e that his account o f Art strongly suggests Mill
employs an inclusive conception o f happiness and that this structural feature
o f his conception explains some puzzling remarks in both Utilitarianism and
On Liberty. T h e following section considers some objections to my interpreta-
tion, including difficulties raised by a p r o m i n e n t passage where Mill appears
to define happiness simply as "pleasure and the absence o f pain" (U,II,~). 5 I
conclude by briefly considering some implications o f my view o f Mill's con-
ception o f happiness as an inclusive end.

1.

In the final c h a p t e r o f A System of Logic Mill sketches an account o f the logic

o f Practice or Art. T h e discussion begins with the distinction between Art
and Science: propositions o f science are said to be expressed in the indicative
m o o d and to assert matters o f fact, while, according to Mill, propositions o f
Art are expressed in the imperative m o o d (or in equivalent paraphrases) as
rules or precepts and d o not assert matters o f fact (SL,VI,xii,w Although
Mill does not consistently a d h e r e to these criteria, 6 the i m p o r t o f the distinc-
tion is clear: all types o f normative or evaluative propositions belong to the
realm o f Art, as o p p o s e d to Science. 7 Mill's discussion o f Practice or Art
deals with the logic o f the class o f all value claims.
Although Mill maintains a sharp distinction between factual propositions
o f science and normative propositions o f Art, he also clearly indicates that
these distinct types o f propositions are closely related to one another:

4 Fred R. Berger, Happiness, Justice, and Freedom (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1984), 3o-45; James Bogen and Daniel M. Farrell, "Freedom and Happiness in Mill's Defence
of Liberty," The Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1978): 325-38 .
5 References to Mill's major works will be provided parenthetically in the text according to
the following system: book, chapter, and section following 'SL' refer to A System of Logic, and
chapter and paragraph number following 'U' and 'OL' refer to Utilitarianism and On Liberty,
respectively.
6 For example, Mill later suggests that propositions of Art can be expressed in the indica-
tive mood using 'ought' or 'should' (SL,VI,xii,w D. G. Brown, "What is Mill's Principle of
Utility?" Canadian Journal o)CPhilosophy 3 (1973): 6.
7 Cf. Mill, "On the Definition of Political Economy," in Essays on Economics and Society, vol. 4
of The Collected Works ofJohn Stuart Mill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), 338-39 &
319-2o.
 MILL'S CONCEPTION OF HAPPINESS 419
the art proposes to itself an end to be attained, defines the end, and hands it over to
the science. The science receives it, considers it a phenomenon or effect to be
studied, and having investigated its causes and conditions, sends it back to art with a
theorem of the combination of circumstances by which it could be p r o d u c e d . . . [i.e.,]
a proposition (obtained by a series of inductions or deductions) that the performance
of certain actions will attain the end . . . . Art concludes that the performance of these
actions is desirable, a n d . . , converts the theorem into a rule or precept.
(SL,VI,xii,w

A n d this suggests that Mill recognizes two basic types o f normative proposi-
tions. T h e basis o f the distinction is Mill's account o f their p r o p e r relation to
a particular science: (1) what Mill calls 'First Principles o f Art', which are
supplied by the art itself and specify the end for a particular art, and (2)
'Doctrines o f Art', which are g r o u n d e d in the theorems o f the c o r r e s p o n d i n g
science and are identified as the rules, precepts, maxims, or secondary prin-
ciples o f a particular art. 8 According to Mill, then, within a particular art
there is a First Principle specifying an e n d for the art and a set o f rules or
precepts g r o u n d e d in the t h e o r e m s o f a c o r r e s p o n d i n g particular science.
It is i m p o r t a n t h e r e to consider Mill's characterization o f some features o f
First Principles o f Art. First, he claims that every particular art has only one
"first principle, or general major premise, not b o r r o w e d f r o m science"
(SL,VI,xii,w Secondly, Mill also claims that a First Principle o f Art has
three distinctive a n d significant features: (a) it proposes the end to be at-
tained, an object or state o f affairs to be aimed at, (b) it defines the end to be
aimed at, and (c) it asserts or affirms that the attainment o f the end is desirable
(SL,VI,xii,w167 Finally, Mill provides examples o f some particular first
principles with which we are familiar: " T h e builder's art assumes that it is
desirable to have buildings; architecture, that it is desirable to have them
beautiful or imposing. T h e hygienic and medical arts assume, the one that
the preservation o f health, the o t h e r that the cure o f disease, are fitting and
desirable ends" (SL,VI,xii,w T h e r e f o r e , we can conclude that a First Prin-
ciple o f Art has the following general form:
(FP) X is desirable as an end.

All first principles exhibit this general f o r m in specifying the end o f a par-
ticular art, and they d i f f e r primarily with respect to the name, specific de-
scription, o r definition o f the end substituted for 'X' in this schema.
Mill clearly holds that t h e r e is a plurality o f particular arts, a plurality o f
distinct objects or states o f affairs specified as desirable ends. And since the
affirmation o f an e n d is not scientifically g r o u n d e d as rules o f Art p r o p e r l y

8 John M. Baker, "Utilitarianism and 'Secondary Principles'," The Philosophical Quarterly 2 a

097a): 7o.
420 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 9 5 : 3 J U L Y 1987
are, "For purposes of p r a c t i c e . . , there is need of general premises, deter-
mining what are the proper objects of approbation, and what is the proper
order of precedence among those objects" (SL,VI,xii,w Mill goes on to say
that "these general premises, together with the principal conclusions which
may be deduced from them form (or rather might form) a body of doctrine,
which is properly the Art of Life . . . . what has been called Teleology, or the
Doctrine of Ends; w h i c h . . , may also be t e r m e d . . , the principles of Practi-
cal Reason" (SL,VI,xii,w And since these general normative principles of
practical reason "are those which must determine whether the special aim of
any particular art is worthy and desirable, and what is its place in the scale of
desirable things," Mill's Art of Life is the supreme art to which all other arts
are subordinate (SL,VI,xii,w
This brief sketch of Mill's account of Art or Practice relates to his concep-
tion of happiness in the following ways. First, since the supreme art is itself
an art, it must have its own first principle of the form (FP) which specifies
one and only one desirable end of the supreme art (SL,VI,xii,w And since
this specified end is one "with reference to and for the sake of which all
other things are desirable," it is "the ultimate end" of life (U,II,lo). Sec-
ondly, since morality is one of the departments of Mill's supreme Art of Life
(SL,VI,xii,w167 U,V,15), this specified ultimate end of life is also the sum-
m u m b o n u m and the foundation of morality (SL,VI,xii,w cf. U,I,1; U,II,lo;
U,IV,8). And finally, Mill clearly indicates that the ultimate end of life is
happiness (SL,VI,xii,w Thus, the first principle of the Art of Life can be
stated as, "Happiness is desirable as the ultimate end. ''9 Mill's view of Art,
then, reveals that his conception of happiness serves to determine the
worthiness and priority among a plurality of diverse ends in life, and that
happiness is the ultimate end of life and the foundation of morality.

9.

The status and function of happiness in the Art of Life suggests that Mill
conceives of happiness as a higher-order end. Since 'happiness' signifies the
s u m m u m b o n u m and the ultimate end of life, Mill's primary concern is a

9 Mill often uses 'the principle of utility' or 'the greatest happiness principle' to signify this
principle about the desirable end (e.g., U,IV,3). And Bentham also considered the utility princi-
ple as a statement about the desirable end: An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legisla-
tion, 2d edition (London, 1823), Chap. 1, Sec. l, fn.
But if the utility principle asserts what is desirable as the ultimate end, then it is not clear
how the principle generates views about what should be done. Furthermore, Mill himself some-
times characterizes the utility principle as specifying a desirable end and recommending pursuit
of that end (e.g., SL,VI,xii,w Therefore, although the principle of utility can be formulated in
terms of desirable ends, it may not be a principle solely about ends: Mill may understand claims
about desirability and what should be pursued as two aspects of one principle (Berger, 11 ~-14).
 M I L L ' S C O N C E P T I O N OF H A P P I N E S S 491

conception of happiness with respect to an entire life or some fairly long

period of life: uses of 'happy' to indicate mere passing feelings, dispositions,
moods, or contentment are, at best, derivative and secondary. But Mill does
consider happiness in terms of transitory things such as pleasures (e.g.,
U,II,2ff). And Mill recognizes the import of this approach: "the philoso-
phers who have taught that happiness is the end of l i f e . . , m e a n t . . , not a
life of rapture, but moments of such, in an existence made up of few and
transitory pains, many and various pleasures, with a decided predominance of
the active over the passive . . . . A life thus composed.., has always appeared
worthy of the name of happiness" (U,II, I2; emphasis added). Thus, Mill
apparently takes happiness to be a higher-order notion: it is conceived of in
terms of the successful, long-term organization of some specified element(s)
of life. In On Liberty we find further evidence of this point, for there Mill
cites von Humboldt's view that "the end of m a n . . , is the highest and most
harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole"
(OL,III,~). And all this suggests that Mill himself conceives of happiness as
involving the long-term, reasonably successful execution of the proper plan
of life (U,III,11; OL,III,3-4). '~
One can begin to understand Mill's substantive conception of happiness by
identifying what he takes to be the proper plan of life. But this component of
a "theory of life" depends on the element(s) specified as constitutive of happi-
ness in life, e.g., pleasure, duty to God, virtue, contemplation (OL,III,7-8;
U,II,2-4). Theories of life of the sort Mill considers can then be distin-
guished fundamentally with respect to the structure of the ultimate end they
specify, i.e., whether the end is dominant or inclusive. 1~ One might conceive
of the ultimate end in terms of a single, substantially superior activity or state
of affairs, e.g., pleasure, and, consequently, specify the proper plan of life as
seeking to maximize that single, specified element of happiness. Such a theory
of life employs a dominant conception of the ultimate end. On the other
hand, one might conceive of the ultimate end in terms of a plurality of sub-
stantially superior activities or states of affairs, and, consequently, specify the
proper plan of life in terms of some harmonious integration of the specified
elements of happiness. Such a theory of life employs an inclusive conception
of happiness. '* I believe that Mill is most plausibly interpreted as employ!ng
an inclusive conception of happiness.

,o For a relevant discussion of "plans of life," see J o h n Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 4o7-16.
" W. F. R. Hardie, "The Final Good in Aristotle's Ethics," in Aristotle: A Collection of Critical
Essays, ed. J. M. E. Moravcsik (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), 297-32~.
~2 I consistently use 'dominant' in the strong sense in which it means 'exclusive' and is a
contradictory of 'inclusive'. T h a t is, a dominant conception involves specifying only one type of
492 J O U R N A L OF THE H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 25:3 JULY ~987
T h e basic structure o f Mill's account o f Art reveals his acknowledgement
that individuals consider .a plurality o f h e t e r o g e n e o u s things as objects o f
their wants, interests, and desires. First, Mill holds that happiness is the
ultimate e n d o f life to which a diverse plurality o f the particular arts and
their desirable ends are subordinate (SL,VI,xii,w Secondly, Mill claims that
although the p r o m o t i o n o f happiness should not be itself the end o f all
conduct, it is the controller o f all ends (SL,VI,xii,w F u r t h e r m o r e , given the
assumed teleological orientation o f Mill's theory (U,I,~), it is reasonable to
suppose that subordinate ends are assessed on the basis o f their efficacy as
means to h i g h e r ends and, ultimately, to happiness. T h e r e f o r e , given Mill's
general account o f Art or Practice, there is one thing, happiness, desirable as
the ultimate end, a plurality o f things desirable both as ends and means (in a
sense o f 'means' to be explained below), and, presumably, some things desir-
able only as means.
Although Mill clearly adopts a teleological conception o f Art and moral-
ity, he does not exclusively employ the 'ends-means' terminology. First, Mill
holds that X is desirable as the ultimate e n d iff X is that thing "with refer-
ence to and for the sake o f which all o t h e r things are desirable" (U,II, lo).
F u r t h e r m o r e , Mill's remarks indicate he also holds that X is desirable as an
end iff X is desirable for its own sake, and that X is desirable as a means iff
X is desirable for the sake o f something else. T h u s , we can translate Mill's
teleological distinctions into the terminology o f 'for the sake of'. A n d given
the structure o f Art Mill adopts, he then holds that a plurality o f things are
desirable both for their own sakes and for the sake o f something else, that
happiness alone is that for the sake o f which o f all else is desirable, and that
some things are desirable only for the sake o f something else.
Given these terminological points, the key to recognizing Mill's employ-
m e n t o f an inclusive conception o f the ultimate end lies in his claims about
parts or ingredients o f happiness in the f o u r t h chapter o f Utilitarianism.
T h e r e Mill indicates what he means by 'parts of' or 'ingredients of' in at least
two passages. First, he identifies the ingredients o f happiness as those things
desirable both as ends and means, both for their own sake and for the sake
o f something else: " T h e ingredients o f happiness are very various, and each
o f t h e m is desirable in itself, and not merely when considered as swelling an

activity or state of affairs as substantially superior; all other objects of human wants, desires, and
interests are substantially inferior in value with respect to happiness. On the other hand, an
inclusive conception involves specifying a plurality of types of activities or states of affairs as
substantially superior to all others. But given an inclusive conception, there is a weak sense of
'dominant' which can be used to signify that, within the specified plurality, one type of activity
or state of affairs is more important for happiness than other elements of that specified plural-
ity (cf. note ~5 below).
 M I L L ' S C O N C E P T I O N OF H A P P I N E S S 423

aggregate . . . . T h e y are desired and desirable in and for themselves; besides

being means, they are part o f the e n d " (U,IV,5). Mill similarly characterizes
those things which he considers to be parts o f happiness: "Whatever is de-
sired otherwise t h a n as a means to some e n d beyond itself, and ultimately to
happiness, is desired as itself a part o f happiness, and is not desired for itself
until it has b e c o m e so" (U,IV,8). T h e r e f o r e , on Mill's view, X is a part o f
happiness iff X is an i n g r e d i e n t o f happiness, iff X is desirable both as a
means and as an end, iff X is desirable both for its own sake and for the sake
o f something else.
Given Mill's notion o f parts o r ingredients o f happiness, there is consid-
erable evidence that he employs an inclusive conception o f the ultimate end
o f life. First, f r o m Mill's account o f Art we know that he recognizes a diverse
plurality o f things to be desirable both as means and as ends, and elsewhere
virtue, music, and health are explicitly acknowledged to be parts o f happi-
ness (U,IV,5). A n d Mill also claims that individuality, for example, is not
only a part o r i n g r e d i e n t o f happiness, but is also "one o f the leading essen-
tials o f well-being" (OL,III, 2-3). Thus, Mill often acknowledges that there
is a diverse plurality o f substantially superior experiences or states o f affairs
which are parts o r ingredients o f happiness, or essentials o f happiness, or
desirable both as means and as ends. Finally, in On Liberty Mill suggests that
the p r o p e r plan o f life for a p e r s o n is to seek "the highest and most harmo-
nious d e v e l o p m e n t o f his powers to a complete and consistent whole"
(OL,III,~). All these r e m a r k s indicate Mill conceives o f happiness as an
inclusive r a t h e r than as a d o m i n a n t end o f life.
An obvious difficulty for this interpretive a p p r o a c h is u n d e r s t a n d i n g
Mill's use o f 'means to an end'. As G. E. Moore n o t e d / a Mill's views about
parts o r ingredients o f happiness reflect a confusion o f the distinct notions
o f means and ends: how can one thing be both a means to an end, an end in
itself, a n d also an i n g r e d i e n t o f the e n d to which it is a means? A c o h e r e n t
answer lies in recognizing a broad, technical sense o f 'means'. C o n t e m p o r a r y
usage suggests that 'means' signifies only a causal relation: 'X is a means to
an e n d Y' suggests that X is an object, event, or state o f affairs distinct from Y
and that X causally p r o d u c e s the end Y. But one can distinguish a broader,
non-causal sense o f 'means' which includes, but is not restricted to the com-
mon, c o n t e m p o r a r y m e a n i n g o f the term: 'X is a means to an end Y' sug-
gests that X contributes to, tends toward, or promotes Y, and it need not
signify that X causally p r o d u c e s Y. Thus, for example, the health o f a bodily
o r g a n is a means to and part o f the health o f a person, the e n j o y m e n t o f the
soup is a means to and part o f enjoying the whole dinner, and ten years o f

,3 PrincipiaEthica, 71-7 ~.
424 JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 25:3 JULY 1987
happiness is a means to a n d part of a happy life? 4 T h e important point is
that, in this b r o a d e r sense, 'means to' need not suggest that X and Y must be
distinct things standing in a causal relation to one another: if the end is a
complex one such as d o n n i n g a hat and coat, then walking to the hat rack is
a means to the e n d and d o n n i n g the coat is also a means to the end. 15 Thus,
recognition of this broad sense of 'means' allows u n d e r s t a n d i n g Mill's view
that happiness has parts which are also means to that of which they are
ingredients.
T h e r e is evidence to suggest that Mill does, in fact, employ such a broad
sense o f 'means' in developing his account of practical reasoning and happi-
ness as the ultimate end o f life. It is clear that Mill sometimes uses 'means' in
the narrow sense: rules o f Art, for example, are g r o u n d e d in general causal
claims of science which indicate certain actions will produce a given end
(SL,VI,xii,w But First Principles of Art are not g r o u n d e d in science, the
ends they specify are assessed on the basis of their promotion of happiness,
and Mill nowhere clearly indicates that this promotion-relation is itself only a
causal one. F u r t h e r m o r e , as I have argued, Mill's 'end-means' terminology
is, in his view, translatable into the equivalent language of 'for the sake of';
and the latter does not so clearly indicate only a causal relation between
distinct ends a n d means. A n d finally, Mill's remarks about parts of happi-
ness seem plausible only if it is granted that he does employ 'means' in some
non-causal sense similar to that outlined above. Therefore, my view of Mill
as employing an inclusive conception of happiness is supported by his ac-
count of Art in the Logic, some remarks in O n Liberty, and an otherwise
puzzling discussion of happiness in the fourth chapter of Utilitarianism.

A basis for objecting to my interpretive approach is any evidence that Mill is

fundamentally committed to hedonism and, consequently, to a d o m i n a n t
conception o f happiness. First, one might appeal to Mill's moral psychology
as evidence o f his c o m m i t m e n t to hedonism. If happiness is desirable and is
conceived o f as an inclusive end, then it must be that a diverse plurality of
things (i.e., the ingredients of happiness) can be desired. But Mill holds that
persons desire only pleasure. F u r t h e r m o r e , Mill claims the only evidence for
the desirability o f happiness is that people actually desire it (U,IV,3). And if

14 L. H. G. Greenwood, Aristotle: Nichomachean Ethics, Book Six (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 19o9), 46-48; W. F. R. Hardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1968), 254-56; John M. Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1975), 19-22.
'~ Cooper, 19. Throughout the paper I use 'means' in this broad sense which includes, but
is not restricted to its contemporary sense of 'causal means'.
 MILL'S CONCEPTION OF HAPPINESS 425
persons desire only pleasure, Mill must be committed to the view that plea-
sure is the sole intrinsic good. T h u s , one might a r g u e that Mill's moral
psychology is inconsistent with my interpretive a p p r o a c h or that a hedonistic
interpretation o f Mill is s u p p o r t e d by the role o f his psychological h e d o n i s m
in the " p r o o f " o f the utility principle.
T h e s e a r g u m e n t s fail because, in fact, Mill's moral psychology does not
commit him to the view that pleasure is the object o f all h u m a n desires. This
is clearly suggested by his criticism o f Bentham's " f u n d a m e n t a l principle" o f
h u m a n nature, i.e., "that the actions o f sentient beings are wholly deter-
mined by pleasure and pain. '''6 According to Mill, "the pain or pleasure
which d e t e r m i n e s o u r c o n d u c t is as frequently one which precedes the mo-
m e n t as o n e which follows it"; and Mill says that B e n t h a m is w r o n g in
maintaining that "all o u r acts are d e t e r m i n e d by pains and pleasures in
prospect, pains and pleasures to which we look forward as the consequences o f
o u r acts. ''17 Given that at least some acts are a result o f o u r desires, Mill h e r e
indicates that, o n his own view, not all desires have pleasures as their objects.
Mill's d e p a r t u r e f r o m Bentham's moral psychology is also evident in Utili-
tarianism. First, in the " p r o o f " o f the utility principle Mill's remarks indicate
that the desire for virtue is d e t e r m i n e d by an a n t e c e d e n t pleasure or pain:
" T h o s e who desire [virtue] for its own sake desire it either because the
consciousness of it is a pleasure, or because the consciousness o f being without it/s
a pain" (U,IV,8; emphasis added). F u r t h e r m o r e , Mill's official view is that
empirical evidence establishes an identity between desiring something and
the pleasure o f the t h o u g h t o f it: these are actually "two d i f f e r e n t modes o f
n a m i n g the same psychological fact," and "to desire anything except in pro-
portion as the idea o f it is pleasant is a physical and metaphysical impossibil-
ity" (U,IV, Io). is Since Mill h e r e follows o t h e r n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y writers in
using 'metaphysical' as a s y n o n y m for 'psychological', 19 Mill is not committed
to an analytic or tautological moral psychology: s~ he asserts that, as a m a t t e r
o f fact, sometimes the desire for X is d e t e r m i n e d by the pleasure o f the ante-
c e d e n t idea o f X. Unless o n e implausibly supposes one has a pleasant idea
o f X only if X is o r p r o d u c e s pleasure, Mill consistently allows that one can

~6 Mill, "Remarks on Bentham," in Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society, vol. xo of The
Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), x~.
'7 Ibid,
,s Although they need not be addressed in this context, interpretive problems are raised by
Mill's assertion of an/dent/ty between desiring X and a pleasant idea of X. See Berger, 1~-18.
,9 Maurice, Mandelbaum, "On Interpreting Mill's Utilitarianism," Mill's Utilitarianism, ed.
Samuel Gorovitz (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 197a), 334, note 19.
,o This has been a common criticism of Mill's psychological hedonism. See, for example,
Sidgwick, 43; Moore, 65-68; H. D. Aiken, "Definitions, Factual Premises, and Ethical Conclu-
sions," Mill's Utilitarianism, 145-46.
426 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y ~ 5 : 3 J U L Y i987
and does desire things other than pleasures. Therefore, Mill's moral psy-
chology is not an adequate basis for objecting to my interpretive approach to
his conception o f happiness.
A p r o m i n e n t passage early in Utilitarianism appears to provide a second
reason for questioning my interpretation of Mill's conception of happiness as
an inclusive end. Since it is at this point that Mill apparently defines happiness
simply in terms of pleasure, I quote the important paragraph in full.
[1] The creed which accepts, as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest-
happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to pro-
mote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happi-
ness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the
privation of pleasure. [2] To give a clear view of the moral standard set up by the
theory, much more requires to be said; in particular, what things it includes in the
ideas of pain and pleasure, and to what extent this is left an open question. [3] But
these supplementary explanations do not affect the theory of life on which this
theory of morality is grounded--namely, that pleasure, and freedom from pain, are
the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things (which are as numer-
ous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure
inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention
of pain. (U,II,~)
This passage certainly has the appearance of an official p r o n o u n c e m e n t of
Mill's own views, a n d commentators understandably have cited parts of the
paragraph as justification for interpreting Mill as a hedonist. But I believe
attention to the context and internal structure of the paragraph indicate
that, in an i m p o r t a n t sense to be explained, Mill is not fundamentally com-
mitted to a simple f o r m o f ethical hedonism.
T h e context o f the p a r a g r a p h in question indicates that it does not repre-
sent Mill's own final views. In the second chapter of Utilitarianism Mill in-
tends to clarify the utilitarian conception of the summum bonum by dealing
with some c o m m o n misunderstandings and practical objections to the doc-
trine (U,I,6). T h e p a r a g r a p h just quoted is immediately preceded by a brief
discussion o f some common, gross misconceptions of what 'utilitarian' means
a n d by a discussion of some ignorant objections to "those who stand up for
utility as the test o f right or wrong" (U,II,1); and the quoted paragraph is
immediately followed by Mill's own clarification o f the utilitarian moral stan-
dard, i.e., the discussion of qualities of pleasures (U,II,3-6). Thus, the con-
text alone suggests the p a r a g r a p h primarily offers a historical context for
Mill's subsequent development of his own conception of the moral standard.
T h e internal structure of the long paragraph confirms this general ap-
proach to Mill's remarks. In [1] Mill continues the historical focus of his
preceding p a r a g r a p h and offers a rough, general characterization of how
utilitarians have u n d e r s t o o d and employed happiness as a moral standard.
 M I L L ' S C O N C E P T I O N OF H A P P I N E S S 427
Then in [~] Mill expresses his own belief that his predecessors' utilitarian
axiologies are deficient as moral standards (i.e., "much more requires to be
said") and suggests at least one way in which he intends to improve tradi-
tional utilitarian axiology. Finally, in [3] Mill claims that his own forthcoming
"supplementary explanations" of a utilitarian moral standard "do not affect"
the traditional utilitarian theory of life whereby pleasures are valuable as
ends. Thus, when considered as a whole, the paragraph in question actually
summarizes relevant features of a major historical tradition, briefly suggests
distinctive features of Mill's own conception of an adequate moral standard,
and indicates Mill's view that his own conception of happiness does not
affect a traditional utilitarian thesis regarding the value of pleasures. And
since Mill's own final views are not explicit in the paragraph in question,
Mill's hedonistic characterizations of his predecessors' moral standard and
theory of life need not establish conclusively that Mill himself is fundamen-
tally committed to ethical hedonism.
This important passage in Utilitarianism also does suggest important fea-
tures of Mill's own, distinctive conception of happiness as moral standard.
First, in referring to "supplementary explanations" of his predecessors'
views, Mill's remarks reflect his claims that, "under proper explanations," he
accepts Bentham's utility principle as a moral standard. 2~ Now the most
conspicuous modification of Bentham's utility principle is Mill's introduction
of qualities of pleasures; and given the proximity of the paragraph in ques-
tion (U,II,2) to the discussion of qualities of pleasures, the latter must be the
"supplementary explanations" suggested in the former. Therefore, the dis-
cussion of qualities of pleasure is intended to establish what happiness "in-
cludes in the ideas of pain and pleasure" (U,II,2). Mill apparently accepts
the traditional, utilitarian view that all pleasures are valuable as ends; but he
also intends to establish some are so much more valuable with respect to
happiness that they are included in the moral standard of happiness. 2~
It remains to consider how Mill's "supplementary explanations do not
affect" the traditional, utilitarian hedonism. I propose the following under-
standing of Mill's position. As a general theory of value, hedonism is typi-
cally characterized as the view that pleasure is the only intrinsic good. This
view involves at least two types of claims: (1) substantive claims regarding
what things are intrinsic goods, e.g., individual pleasures; and (2) an explan-
atory claim which specifies some good-making characteristic, pleasure or
pleasantness, in virtue of which certain things are intrinsic goods. Note that

.... Remarks on Bentham," 7; "Bentham," also in vol. 10 of The Collected Works, 11o.
" My understanding of the prominent passage considered here has been aided consider-
ably by the work of Fred Berger, 37-38.
428 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 25:3 J U L Y 1987
Mill, for example, could consistently accept some of the substantive claims of
hedonism while rejecting the hedonists' explanatory claim: it is possible to
adopt a non-hedonistic account of intrinsic good which is compatible with the
substantive claims of traditional hedonism. And one might then say that
such a non-hedonistic account of intrinsic good "does not affect" (U,II,~) or
"does not contradict" (U,IV,11) the substantive "theory of life" whereby
pleasures and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends
(U,II,2). Futhermore, Mill can consistently hold that both happiness and
pleasures are desirable as ends if he conceives of happiness as an inclusive
end where pleasures are valuable both as ends and as means to happiness.
Finally, given an inclusive conception of happiness, Mill can also consistently
maintain that all pleasures are desirable as ends while also maintaining that
some (i.e., the mental pleasures) are included in his moral standard because
they are substantially superior as means to happiness. Thus, although Mill
accepts the substantive value claims of some traditional hedonists, he is not
fundamentally committed to ethical hedonism in that he does not accept the
hedonists' account or explanation of those claims. Therefore, this prominent
passage in Utilitarianism does not establish that Mill is fundamentally com-
mited to hedonism nor that it is incorrect to interpret Mill as employing an
inclusive conception of happiness? 3

The model of an inclusive conception of happiness is useful as an interpre-

tive framework for Mill's theory of value. Although my argument relies
primarily on the Logic account of Art and the fourth chapter of Utilitarian-
ism, the last section suggests my interpretive approach is at least compatible
with claims about happiness made elsewhere in Utilitarianism. If one inter-
prets Mill as advancing a conception of happiness as an inclusive end, then
one can understand Mill's talk of virtue and individuality, for example, as
parts or ingl~edients of happiness, as desirable both as ends and as means to

93 T h e r e is a historical explanation for the subtle way in which Mill disguises his rejection of
the hedonists' account of value. In his earlier writings (e.g., "Remarks on Bentham" in 1833 and
"Bentham" in 1838 ) Mill hoped to establish a distinction between utilitarianism and Bentham's
particular version of it; the tactic employed was to criticize openly Bentham's views. By the
185o's, however, the tactic of open criticism of Bentham had succeeded only in aiding attacks by
opponents of utilitarianism. So, in the essay on Whewell and later in Utilitarianism itself, Mill
employed a different tactic for the same end: his writings include the differences between his
own views and Bentham's, but they are not emphasized. Thus, in the passage just considered
(U,II,2) we observe that Mill emphasizes the historical continuity of utilitarianism (including his
own views) while subtly indicating his own significant departure from Bentham's hedonism. F.
E. L. Priestly, "Introduction," Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society, vol. lo of The Collected Works,
xxxiv-xxxviii.
 M I L L ' S C O N C E P T I O N OF H A P P I N E S S 429
happiness. Thus, my interpretive approach reveals a consistent, unified
structure to Mill's theory of value as he makes use of it in some of his major
writings.
The interpretation advanced in this paper also offers a useful framework
for understanding Mill's substantive theory of value, including the account of
qualities of pleasures. The textual analysis of section III indicates how the
doctrine of qualities of pleasures is consistent with Mill's basic theory of value.
Although Mill accepts certain substantive claims regarding the value of plea-
sures, he does not accept the hedonists' account of pleasures' values: X might
then be more valuable than Y even if X is less pleasant than Y. Thus, the
traditional charge that Mill's qualitative hedonism is inconsistent (note 1
above) is moot. In fact, Mill defends the value of the mental pleasures by an
appeal to certain preferences (U,II,5-6) and to an explanation of those pref-
erences in terms of the sense of dignity common and essential to the happi-
ness of all human beings (U,II,6). In short, Mill's account of the qualities of
pleasures is a justification of the value of mental pleasures in terms of their
relation to happiness? 4 Thus, on Mill's view, pleasures are desirable as ends
and as means to happiness, but the mental pleasures are substantially superior
in value because of their relation to human happiness. ~5
This understanding of the doctrine of qualities of pleasures then suggests
that Mill's defense of justice and liberty are not fundamentally inconsistent
applications o f his theory of value. Mill analyzes justice in terms of rights
(U,V,15), and he justifies rights in terms of the interest in security (U,V,~5).
Justice is then of paramount value because it concerns "the essentials of
well-being more n e a r l y . . , than any other rules for the guidance of life"
(U,V,32). Individuality is "one of the principal ingredients of human happi-
ness" (OL,III,1) because autonomous choice in conditions of social liberty is
closely tied to the mental pleasures (OL,III,3). Mill thereby accords priority
to liberty because of its close connection with the higher pleasures that are
supremely valuable because they are essential to human happiness? 6 Thus,
approaching Mill's view of happiness as an inclusive end explains some of
Mill's puzzling remarks about happiness, reveals a structural unity to the
theory o f value employed in some of Mill's major writings, and suggests an
understanding of his defense of liberty as a consistent application of the
theory of value developed in Utilitarianism.
The model of an inclusive conception of happiness does not solve all

94 This is also Berger's view of Mill's account: 3 8 - 4 o.

,5 In effect, Mill considers the mental pleasures to be dominant in the weak sense (See note
12 above).
96 This kind of account of Mill's utilitarianism is developed at length by Berger and by J o h n
Gray, Mill On Liberty: A Depnce (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983).
43 ~ J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y ~ 5 : 3 J U L Y 1 9 8 7

interpretive problems, and it does, in fact, point to a fundamental tension

within Mill's utilitarianism. In his account of practical reasoning and Art Mill
argues that "there must be one standard by which to determine the goodness
or b a d n e s s . . , of ends" (SL,VI,xii,w Furthermore, in at least some cases of
conflicting obligations, agents are to determine the morally correct action by
appealing directly to the utility principle, i.e., by calculating acts' conse-
quences for happiness (e.g., U,II,25). 27 Finally, Mill claims "that the truths of
arithmetic are applicable to the valuation of happiness, as of all other mea-
surable quantities" (U,V,36,fn.). But if happiness is an inclusive end consist-
ing of a hierarchy of heterogeneous goods, then it is not clear they can be
compared and measured by a standard other than an appeal to intuition. On
the other hand, if the ingredients of happiness are comparable and measur-
able, then they are not heterogeneous and the basis of comparison becomes
the end of life. Furthermore, calculating consequences for an inclusive end
becomes even more impractical than for a simple hedonist, and it is not clear
that one can make sense of arithmetic notions as applied to an inclusive
conception of happiness? 8 Thus, my interpretive approach to Mill's theory
of value may conflict with important features of utilitarianism that Mill him-
self took to be advantages of his own moral theory.
Mill does not actually address these questions in any systematic way. He
uses 'pleasure' broadly to signify many different types of simple and com-
plex conscious states (SL,I,iii,w167 3,14; U , I I , 4 , 8 ) , ~9 acknowledges that pleasures
are not homogeneous (U,II,8), and simply assumes one can apply arithmetic
notions in calculating consequences for happiness (e.g., U,II, lo). But this
noted tension in Mill's utilitarianism can be understood as a genuine philo-
sophical problem. As Mill recognizes, there is need for one standard to rank
the various ends of life (SL,VI,vii,w And a simple, dominant conception of
that end (e.g., hedonism) theoretically allows a decision procedure based on
facts and calculating consequences. But, as Mill recognizes, such simple,
dominant conceptions encourage the pursuit of one objective to the exclu-
sion of the diversity of human aims in life (e.g., U,II,3-4; OL,III,7-8). And
in recognizing an inclusive conception of the ultimate end of life, one ap-
pears to compromise the theoretical elegance of a decision procedure re-
garding the value of acts and ends. Thus, the noted tension in Mill's theory
of value reflects a problem for any theory of life where the aim is to specify
an ultimate end both sufficiently specific to allow calculating consequences

97 For a discussion of this aspect of Mill's utilitarianism, see my paper, "Mill on Conflicting
Moral Obligations," Analysis 43 (1983): 49-54-
,s Similar questions are raised by Berger, 286-88. See also Brown, 5-12.
99 See D. E. Cohen, "J. S. Mill's Qualitative Hedonism: A Textual Analysis," The Southern
Journal of Philosophy 18 (198o): 151-58.
 M I L L ' S C O N C E P T I O N OF H A P P I N E S S 431

and sufficiently broad to accommodate the diversity of human pursuits. 3~

Even if an inclusive model of happiness cannot be reconciled with certain
features of his utilitarianism, many of the traditional charges of blatant
inconsistency are inappropriate: Mill's theory of value reflects an attempt to
deal with a genuine problem for an adequate view of happiness as the
ultimate end of life.

Berea College

3o Rawls, 552-6o.