Eur Surg Res 2015;55:43–57

DOI: 10.1159/000377721 © 2015 S. Karger AG, Basel

Received: October 12, 2014 0014–312X/15/0552–0043$39.50/0
Accepted after revision: February 5, 2015 www.karger.com/esr
Published online: April 10, 2015

Invited Review

Ethics in Animal-Based Research

Dominik Gross a René H. Tolba b
a Institute for History, Theory and Ethics in Medicine, Medical School MTI II, RWTH Aachen

University, and b Institute for Laboratory Animal Science and Experimental Surgery,
University Hospital Aachen, RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany

Key Words
Animal ethics · Animal-based research · Animal rights · Non-human primates · Speciesism

Abstract
In recent years, there have been a number of new demands and regulations which have reig-
nited the discussion on ethics in animal-based research. In the light of this development, the
present review first presents an overview of underlying core ethical questions and issues. This
is followed by an outline of the current discussion on whether animals (used for experimenta-
tion) should have rights ascribed to them and whether animals need to have certain charac-
teristics in order to be the beneficiaries of rights. The discourse on concepts of sentience and
the ‘sociozoological scale’ in particular is mapped out in this regard. There follows an outline
of relevant ethical positions and current moral approaches to animal-based research (animal
rights position, utilitarianism, ‘convergence position’, intrinsic cultural value of fundamental
research, ‘contractarianism’, anthropocentrism, principle of the three Rs).
© 2015 S. Karger AG, Basel

Introduction

Questions regarding ethics in animal-based research are currently the subject of much
attention. The reasons for this are evident: in recent years, there have been a number of new
demands and legal regulations which have catalysed and reignited the discussion on ethics in
animal-based research. Of particular significance in this context is EU Directive 2010/63/EU
on the protection of animals used for experiments and other scientific purposes (in short:
Directive on Animal-based Experiments) [1]. The aforementioned directive came into effect
on 9 November 2010. It is a far-reaching revision of the previous set of regulations and also
has sweeping consequences insofar as it was and is required to be transformed into national
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Univ.-Prof. Dr. med. Dr. med. dent. Dr. phil. Dominik Gross
Institute for History, Theory and Ethics in Medicine
NYU Medical Center Library

Medical School MTI II, RWTH Aachen University, Wendlingweg 2

DE–52074 Aachen (Germany)
E-Mail dgross @ ukaachen.de
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law in all 28 EU member states (table 1). The Basel Declaration on animal experimentation in
research, issued on 30 November 2010, has also stimulated and sustained discussion among
European and international experts on how to approach animal-based experiments [2]. These
current developments have prompted us to undertake a review of the field of ethics in animal
research. The aim here is to map out and classify in terms of content all relevant normative
points of discussion and ethical approaches.

Ethics in Animal-Based Research: Main Positions and Core Question

Before proceeding with the actual discussion on ethics, it is necessary to clarify the
question as to whether animal research is required at all from a present-day perspective
because the need for an extensive normative analysis only exists if this question is fundamen-
tally answered in the affirmative. This is a highly controversial issue. Hence, there are several
authors who maintain that it is possible to dispense with animal-based research and who
emphasise that findings in animals are often not reliably replicated in human clinical tests
[3–8]. However, the majority view is that the present state of knowledge is such that it is not
(yet) possible to do without studies on animals. Many researchers share the basic conviction
already held by Novikoff [9] in 1945 that each successive level of organisation has properties
that cannot be predicted from knowing the lower levels of organisation. Quite a few experts
emphasise that ‘animal research remains a small, but vital, part of biomedical research’. In
their view, non-animal tests are ‘useful for pre-screening compounds before the animal-
testing stage, which would therefore reduce rather than replace the number of animals used’
[10]. It would therefore be sending the wrong signal to claim that animal studies could be
abandoned without severe consequences [11, 12]. Others also give pragmatic arguments in
which they point out ‘that the acceptance of replacement tests by regulatory agencies is slow’
[13] and that most medical general practitioners think that new agents have to be tested on
animals before initiating human trials [10, 14]. And it is certainly the case that the devel-
opment of replacement technologies for animal tests is a long and complex process and that
animal studies cannot be completely replaced at this point. In view of this, further ethical
analysis of the field of ‘animal research’ is essential.
Essentially, there are three main positions on animal-based research and experimen-
tation [15]: (1) researchers should not be allowed to carry out any animal-based experimen-
tation whatsoever; (2) researchers should only be allowed to carry out certain animal exper-
iments under certain circumstances (e.g. taking into account risk-benefit evaluation, specific
animal characteristics), and (3) researchers should be allowed carry out any animal-based
experiments they think to be useful.
The first position is advocated by many animal rights activists, whereas the second enjoys
broad public support. It is, however, also home to several disparate modes of argumentation
as well as differing concrete conclusions [16, 17]. The third viewpoint cannot be regarded as
a serious ethical position – it has no genuine proponents and will not therefore be pursued
further within the context of this review. Positions 1 and 2 thus remain. Put in extreme terms,
these can be described as (1) the categorical position and (2) the pragmatic position.
Both aforementioned positions differ from each other – loosely speaking – in that they
give different answers to the core question in the field of animal ethics, which is as follows
[18]: ‘Are human beings morally justified in causing animals distress, and/or pain, and/or
suffering, and/or lasting harm (including death) in research and experimentation aimed at
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alleviating or preventing human suffering and/or furthering scientific knowledge?’

Further specific questions of relevance can be derived from this question. They will be
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outlined in more detail below.

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Table 1. Implementation of the Directive 2010/63 EU in the member states and national contact points

Member Implementation Ministry and Department website Contact point E-mail address
state EU Directive
2010/63

Austria yes Bundesministerium für Wissenschaft Dr. Alois Haslinger Alois.Haslinger@bmwfw.gv.at

und Forschung (BMWF)
Belgium yes FPS Public Health, Food Chain Safety Dr. Jean Belot jean.belot@sante.belgique.be
and Environment, DG Animals, Plants
and Food, Division of Animal Welfare
and CITES
Bulgaria yes Bulgarian Food Safety Agency Dr. Marina Ivanova- m_ivanova@bfsa.bg
Pojuzina
Croatia yes Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Branka Buković Šošić bsosic@mps.hr
Protection Department
http://www.veterinarstvo.hr/
Cyprus yes Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Yiola Iacovou, animal.health@vs.moa.gov.cy
Resources and Environment, Veterinary Veterinary officer yiacovou@vs.moa.gov.cy
Services, Animal Health and Welfare
Division
Czech yes Ministry of Agriculture of The Czech Jana Říhová jana.rihova2@mze.cz
Republic Republic
http://eagri.cz/public/web/mze/
ochrana-zvirat/
Denmark yes Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Eyd Anni Nilssen eyani@fvst.dk
Fisheries, Veterinary and Food
Administration
http://www.foedevarestyrelsen.dk/
english/Animal/Pages/The-Animal-
Experiments-Inspectorate.asp
Estonia yes Food and Veterinary Department, Sirje Jalakas, Head of sirje.jalakas@agri.ee
Ministry of Agriculture of Estonia Animal Welfare and
Zootechnics Bureau
Finland yes Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Tiina Pullola tiina.pullola@mmm.fi
Department of Food and Health
France yes Inspecteur de santé publique vétérinaire Sandryne Bruyas, Dr. sandryne.bruyas@agriculture.gouv.fr
Référente nationale expérimentation vétérinaire
animale
Germany yes Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Dr. Katharina Kluge 321@bmel.bund.de
Landwirtschaft
Referat Tierschutz
Greece yes Ministry of Rural Development and Anastasia Arvanitis, ka6u032@minagric.gr
Food, Directorate General of Veterinary Veterinarian
Services, Directorate of Veterinary
Support, Drugs, Applications and Animal
Welfare, Division Animal Welfare
Hungary yes Ministry of Rural Development, Zoltán Hüber zoltan.huber@fm.gov.hu
Department of Food Chain Control
http://elelmiszerlanc.kormany.hu/
allatvedelem
http://www.nebih.gov.hu/
szakteruletek/szakteruletek/mgszh_aai
Ireland yes Health Products Regulatory Authority Dr. J.G. Beechinor, jgb@hpra.ie
(HPRA) Veterinary director
http://www.hpra.ie/
Italy yes Ministero della Salute Giovanni Botta, Ufficio sanita.animale@sanita.it
Dipartimento per la sanità pubblica VI Benessere Animale
veterinaria, la nutrizione e la sicurezza
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degli alimenti
Direzione Generale della sanità animale
e del farmaco veterinario
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Table 1 (continued)

Member Implementation Ministry and Department website Contact point E-mail address
state EU Directive
2010/63

Latvia yes The Veterinary and Food Processing Liene Ansone, Head of liene.ansone@zm.gov.lv
Department of the Ministry of the Animal Trade,
Agriculture Welfare and Feed
Division
Lithuania yes State Food and Veterinary Service Rasa Sirutkaitytė, rsirutkaityte@vet.lt
http://vmvt.lt/lt/gyvunu.sveikata/kita. Senior veterinarian of
informacija/gyvunu.naudojimas.mokslo. Animal Health and
tikslais/ Welfare Department
Luxemburg yes Administration des Services Georges Meyer, georges.meyer@asv.etat.lu
Vétérinaires Vétérinaire officiel
http://www.asv.public.lu/fr/
administration/index.html
Malta yes Veterinary and Phytosanitary Dr. Duncan Chetcuti duncan.chetcuti.ganado@gov.mt
Regulation Department
Netherlands no Ministry of Economic Affairs Katharina Kardinal- k.kardinal@minez.nl
Department of Animal Supply Chain and Janke
Animal Welfare
Poland no Ministry of Science and Higher Monika Rzepecka, monika.rzepecka@nauka.gov.pl
Education Counsellor to the
Minister
Portugal yes Direcção Geral de Veterinária, Divisão Ana Paula Constantino amartins@dgv.min-agricultura.pt
de Bem-estar Animal Mendonça Martins
Romania yes The National Sanitary Veterinary and Dr. Ioana Niculescu niculescu.ioana@ansvsa.ro
Food Safety Authority
http://www.ansvsa.ro/
Slovakia yes State Veterinary and Food Daniela Bucsuhazyova, bucsuhazyova@svps.sk
Administration of the Slovak republic DVM
http://www.mpsr.sk/index.php?start
Slovenia yes Ministry for Agriculture and Tina Arič tina.aric@gov.si
Environment, Administration for Food
Safety, Veterinary Sector and Plant
Protection
Spain yes DG de Recursos Agricolas y Ganaderos, ceeba@magrama.es
Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Medio
Rural y Marino
http://www.magrama.gob.es/es/
ganaderia/temas/produccion-y-
mercados-ganaderos/bienestanimal/
en-la-investigacion/default.aspx
Sweden yes Ministry for Rural Affairs Lena Odland lena.odland@regeringskansliet.se
UK yes Animals Scientific Procedures Division, Dr. Judy MacArthur Judy.MacArthurClark@homeoffice.gsi.
Home Office Clark gov.uk

Modified according to http://ec.europa.eu/environment/chemicals/lab_animals/.

Ethical Issues

In order to develop an argumentative approach to the aforementioned core question, it

is first of all necessary to break it down into individual ethical issues formulated in more
concrete terms [18, 19]. Five individual questions can essentially be derived from it, the
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content of which will be briefly defined in the following (for examples of ethical reasoning on
the respective issues see the ethical viewpoints outlined in the section Relevant Ethical Posi-
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tions for dealing with Animal-Based Research).

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(1) Is it morally acceptable to house laboratory animals in captive environments with

limited freedom and possibly without contact to fellow species members, thus resulting in
physical or mental suffering?
Wild animals kept in captivity are forced to live in a very different environment to that in
which they were reared. They may suffer both mentally and physically as a result of their lack
of ability to adapt to these captive conditions [18, 20–28]. Some experts are of the view that
it is intrinsically problematic to fulfil the complex social, behavioural and psychological needs
of animals in the laboratory environment, particularly in the case of highly developed animals.
They also believe that the minimum standards of accommodation may be insufficient for their
well-being (or barely so). As a result of these concerns, major investments have been made
in recent years to improve housing conditions for non-human primates (NHPs), with extra
attention being paid to a richer environment and social contact [18, 25–32]. Nevertheless, a
considerable variation in standards remains.
(2) Is it morally acceptable to force animals to undergo painful or distressing scientific
procedures and their consequences, such as restricted mobility, operations, or contagious
illnesses?
It is difficult to establish the extent to which non-human animals experience pain, distress
and suffering [18, 31]. And it is even more difficult to find a basis on which to compare the
potential for suffering in different species. However, in view of the neurophysiological simi-
larities which exist, it seems likely that NHPs in particular (NHP species) and other highly
developed animals can experience pain in a way similar to humans. Furthermore, the issue
goes beyond direct distress or pain, also including the capacity to anticipate and reflect upon
pain as well as the capacity for lasting painful memories. These could also be classified as
suffering [33–38]. For us as humans, it is even more difficult to establish the capacity for
suffering in species which are evolutionarily further from us. Animals of these species in
particular cannot anticipate the course of experiments and their probable endings and are
thus especially helpless in the face of their dull fear, a situation which raises particular ques-
tions as to whether it is morally justifiable to subject them to harmful or distressing scientific
experiments [39].
(3) Is it morally acceptable to kill or euthanize laboratory animals as an integral part of
experiments?
A certain number of animals used in experiments are killed. This may occur as part of the
experiment or at a later stage in order to relieve the animal from unnecessary suffering
(euthanasia) [18, 40]. Apart from the controversial question regarding the moral acceptance
of killing animals used in experiments, the extent to which an animal suffers by being killed
is also the subject of discussion – namely whether the animal can be killed without distress
[41, 42]. A further ethical issue arises in the case of animals which live in social groups [30].
Here, the death of a group member may have a negative impact on the other members of the
social group.
In situations where death is not necessary, animals are sometimes ‘retired’ and allowed
to live out their natural lives [18, 43–45]. Some institutions choose this option as they believe
it to be in the best interests of the animals involved. Under the 2000 Chimpanzee Health
Improvement, Maintenance, and Protection Act, for example, retirement is a legal requirement
in the USA for chimpanzees which are no longer required for biomedical experimentation [18,
46].
(4) Is it morally acceptable to apply new technologies such as transgenesis?
The purpose for which the animals are used can also raise ethical concerns. This aspect
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can be illustrated by the example of transgene animals for experimentation, i.e. those which
are modified using genetic engineering [18, 47–51]. The central question here is the moral
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permissibility of modifying animals through genetic engineering – the aforementioned

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question arises from several fundamental issues (impermissible interference with nature,
instrumentalisation of living creatures), but also in view of possible disadvantages which the
animals in question might experience as a result (manipulation of the animal’s essential
being, negative influences on the animal’s well-being or furthering of its suffering, possible
development of disease and/or shortening of lifespan etc.)
(5) Primates as a special case: is it morally acceptable to use NHPs?
Many people are of the view that the use of NHPs in research raises particular ethical
questions due to the features which NHPs share with humans. Among these are their highly
developed nervous systems, their high level of cognitive ability (e.g. their capacity to antic-
ipate and reflect upon pain, reflective self-awareness) and the fact that they live in social
groups. Many characteristics which the great apes possess can be viewed as indicating
‘personhood’ – the fact that they can recognise themselves and have a capacity for reflective
self-awareness, for example, as well as their distinct personalities and ability to use language.
Further indicators of ‘personhood’ are the close emotional attachments which they develop,
their use of tools and the way in which they are able to pass on learned skills and behaviours
through social interaction [17, 18, 31, 33, 52, 53]. This idea of ‘personhood’ has resulted in
occasional calls proposing that great apes should enjoy the same moral status and legal
rights as humans [54, 55; see also http://www.greatapeproject.org/]. The issue of using
NHPs in experimentation is furthermore exacerbated by particularly thorny issues related
to the overall situation in this regard, such as the continued (re-)use of NHPs over many
years, the capture and breeding of NHPs caught in the wild for research purposes, and the
importation of NHPs from source countries under inhumane conditions [18, 21, 56]. It was
probably consideration of these issues which prompted several countries to ban the use of
great apes in biomedical experimentation altogether or to at least place severe restrictions
on their use.
Almost all authors who concern themselves professionally with the above-mentioned
issues basically consider them to be relevant. And yet they make different assessments
regarding the permissibility and permissible extent of animal-based experiments, a situation
which can be traced back to the fact that they start from different presuppositions and
approaches.

Approaches to Ethical Evaluation

A central point for the ethical analysis and evaluation of the issues addressed is the
question whether animals should have rights ascribed to them and consequently whether
humans have duties towards animals and, if so, what these duties are. The question whether
all animals should be ascribed a uniform status here or whether animals have to possess
certain characteristics or fulfil certain prerequisites in order to be beneficiaries of rights is
linked to this point.

The Role of Animal Rights and Species Membership

Animal Rights
In order to give a reliable answer to the question of animal rights, it is necessary to first
clarify what is understood by the term ‘right’ [57]. Ascribing a right to any particular creature
can mean three things: (1) that it is permitted to do something (which means that it is not
forbidden to do it); (2) that it should not be prevented from doing or not doing something (i.e.
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that it has a certain right of freedom), and (3) that it should gain something positive or be
prevented from experiencing something negative (which means that it has a certain positive
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right) [57, 58].

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In the case of the rights postulated for animals, it is normally a case of positive rights
which correspond to certain duties on the part of humans to either act or to refrain from
acting. The negatively expressed rights predominate here, i.e. those rights which demand that
humans refrain from certain actions. The extent of the above-mentioned ‘human duty to
refrain from acting’ and the resulting positive rights of animals (used for experimentation) is
the subject of continuing controversy. It is nevertheless possible to compile a list ranking the
positive rights which are asserted most frequently: on this basis, the most frequently postu-
lated right is freedom from suffering and the minimisation of suffering while the second most
frequently postulated right is that of physical integrity in the sense of the prohibition of harm.
The third most frequent right is the right to life in the sense of the prohibition of killing and
the fourth most frequent and furthest-reaching right is the right to protection from radical
instrumentalisation such as the use of animals for experimentation for medical or other
human purposes. Acceptance of these rights is dependent to a large degree on the positions
differentiated above with regard to animal experimentation.
The last-mentioned, particularly far-reaching right is primarily advocated by animal
rights activists. Critics of this position point out that recipients of positive rights act respon-
sibly in exchange, i.e. they have to abide by the law. They can usually be prosecuted in cases
where they break the law providing that they can be shown to have acted with intent. In law,
an act can only be classed as criminal in nature if the criminal act is carried out with criminal
intent. According to this argument, no animal can ever commit a crime, and bringing animals
to criminal trial [59] would be looked upon as absurd – an intellectual experiment which
nonetheless shows that there are arguments in favour of the view that human rights and
animal rights are to be seen in different categories. In view of this, it comes as no surprise that
most individuals regard animal rights as relevant, but nonetheless scalable – in particular in
comparison to the rights (and responsibilities) of humans [57].

The Relevance of Species Membership

Many experts and ethicists make the recognition of rights (also) dependent on the char-
acteristics of animals. Two concepts are especially important in ethical discussions on the
significance of species here: sentience and the sociozoological scale [19, 60].
Sentience is the ability to feel and perceive things, and a sentient being experiences the
environment in which it lives [19, 60, 61]. In general, we as humans base our belief that other
individuals are sentient on the fact that they are similar to us. Smith and Boyd have compiled
a list of physiological and behavioural criteria which can be used as a means of establishing
whether an animal can experience pain, stress and anxiety [19]. Included on the list are
factors such as the possession of a higher brain centre and evidence of behavioural reaction
to potentially painful, anxiety-inducing or stressful experiences. Sentience is only understood
up to a certain degree, and largely imperfect analogies are used to attribute it to animals. All
vertebrates and possibly some invertebrates can be shown to be sentient on the basis of a
systematic checklist of scientifically acceptable indicators [62]. With regard to ethics,
sentience is a core factor in the selection of species for animal research. Moral positive rights
can ultimately only be ascribed to a being which is capable of being subjectively affected by
the granting or withholding of its rights in some way. Thus, sentience is an indispensable
prerequisite for the possession of moral positive rights.
But the question as to whether and in what way animal species matter can also be
answered by adopting a different approach: the notion of a hierarchy among animals has
always been present throughout human culture. This moral ordering, as it were, accords
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some species greater value than others and has been described as ‘the sociozoological scale’
[19, 63]. Its central idea is that humans regard animal species as of greater or lesser impor-
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tance in moral terms on the basis of a number of factors. Various animals are hence more or
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less worthy of protection. The factors include how useful, ‘cute’ and vulnerable animals are
as well as the extent to which humans typically have contact with them. The sociozoological
scale varies according to historical era and cultural area. In modern Western societies at least,
companion animal species – notably dogs and cats – are at the top of it. Large carnivores and
NHPs can also be found at the top of the scale. Vermin and pests such as rats and mice rank
towards the bottom. A similar hierarchy exists in the case of animals used for research,
starting at the top with primates, continuing down to rodents and fish, and finally ending with
insects and other invertebrates [19].
From a scientific viewpoint, the sociozoological scale is controversial to say the least,
being based on tradition and unexamined bias. On the other hand, the order described is to a
large extent intuitive as it corresponds roughly to our everyday morality, at least in the
context of our Western Christian culture, and thus to the norms in practice to which many
people in these parts feel bound.
In summary, it can be established that the negative rights ascribed or accorded to animals
are ranked according to the particular capabilities and needs of the animals in question and/
or according to their sociozoological status. All relevant positions arrived at in specialist or
ethical discourses on animals used in experimentation refer in some way to the question of
animal rights and the significance of animal species. These positions will be contrasted
below.

Relevant Ethical Positions for Dealing with Animal-Based Research

Animal Rights Position

In contrast to all the other positions outlined below, the ‘animal rights position’ is char-
acterised by the fact that it combines the right to minimisation of suffering and non-harming
of animals with a right to life and a right to protection from radical instrumentalisation. In the
eyes of most of its supporters, this means the total prohibition of animal-based experiments
[40, 57, 58]. The supporters advocate a deontological approach here, i.e. they refer to human
duties towards animals or – in other words – to the positive rights of animals. Tom Regan can
be regarded as the most prominent advocate of deontological and egalitarian animal ethics.
Regan rejects any form of instrumentalisation of mammals, as this is irreconcilable with the
‘inherent value’ which they possess as ‘subjects of a life’ [57, 64]. Supporters of the animal
rights position have argued not only in favour of abolishing animal research completely, but
also in favour of abolishing other forms of animal use, such as keeping animals in zoos and for
food production. The all-deciding argument is as follows: every time an animal is used for an
experiment, it is treated as a mere means to an end. The permissibility of animal experiments
is therefore denied in principle – irrespective of whether the experiment has the potential to
harm the animal and/or whether the experiment promises major gains in knowledge.
A distinction must be made here between radical activists and categorical proponents of
animal rights who act within the law. Representatives of the former group advocate what are
in part militant positions in that they invoke or justify violent acts on animal researchers.
Activists such as Tim Daley (‘In a war you have to take up arms and people will get killed […]
It’s a war, and there’s no other way you can stop vivisectors’) and Alex Pacheco (‘Arson,
property destruction, burglary and threat are “acceptable crimes” when used for the animal
cause’) are regarded as prominent advocates of those positions [65]. In cases such as these, it
is a sheer case of incitement to violence and – as a practical consequence – unlawful acts which
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not only harm and discredit their victims but also the position of categorical but peaceful and
law-abiding animal rights proponents [66–70]. The above-mentioned radical advocates clearly
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act outside the specialist discourse on the ethics of carrying out animal research.
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More moderate advocates of the animal rights position, by contrast, demand the cate-
gorical prohibition of all harmful animal experiments (pathocentric position). By this, the
majority of the advocates mean not just the harm inflicted on animals in the experiment itself,
but also the potential harm through breeding and the animal’s living conditions before and
after the experiment, also including – apart from the seriousness of the type and length of
harm – its frequency (e.g. in the case of frequently repeated experiments) and the number of
harmed animals. While this less radical position deviates from the standard animal rights
view, it still retains the fundamental idea that absolute, non-negotiable limits exist regarding
what can be acceptably inflicted on animals [19].
Further weighing-up processes are possible in the case of all other positions outlined
below, i.e. there must be a particular reason for animal-based experiments, but these are not
rejected as such (balancing of interests). On closer examination, however, the aforemen-
tioned principle of balancing interests can be shown to be home to many different positions.
This is the case with the question raised above regarding the understanding of the term ‘harm’
and how far this terms extends, and with the question whether the principle of equality
should apply, i.e. whether equal suffering should carry equal weight irrespective of whether
humans or animals suffer or whether there is a (categorical or gradual) difference between
animals and humans [71, 72]. The same holds true, for example, for the question of how harm
and killing should be weighted against the suffering inflicted, and how the status of funda-
mental research should be classified (also in relation to applied research).
The relevant discourse among specialists will be mapped out in the following by outlining
some of the fundamental and influential positions in more detail.

Utilitarianism
According to utilitarianism, humans should act so as to maximise the well-being of those
affected by their actions [18, 19, 73]. Well-being is usually defined in terms of enjoyment and
the absence of suffering. It therefore requires sentience. If something can be done to increase
well-being, humans have a duty to do it. On closer examination, a wide range of views can be
found to be represented within the utilitarian approach. Out-and-out utilitarians believe that
all sentient creatures, both human and non-human, deserve equal moral consideration. The
utilitarian philosopher Peter Singer [71], for example, maintains that human and animal
interests deserve equal consideration and concludes that it is only acceptable to sacrifice vital
animal interests if the benefits are of exceeding importance. A pragmatic utilitarian, by
contrast, might be willing to weigh animal interests against human interests, i.e. he or she
might be disposed to applying the ‘principle of the three Rs’ [19] (see below). The interests of
different animals are also sometimes balanced against each other by utilitarians. It is obvious
that both animals and humans can benefit from animal-based experiments. In fact, modern
veterinary medicine uses many insights derived from experiments on animals. The benefits
for both human and animals can be weighed against the cost to the animals whose interests
are infringed upon in the relevant experiments. Whatever their viewpoint, however, all utili-
tarians agree that ethical decisions regarding animal-based experiments necessitate a
balancing of the harm done to laboratory animals against the benefits derived from this harm
for humans and other animals. Utilitarians thus basically presuppose that it is possible to
establish an ethical position by balancing one group of interests against another.

Birnbacher’s ‘Convergence Position’

The medical and animal ethicist Dieter Birnbacher recently [72] endeavoured to establish
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a ‘convergence point’ between the categorical animal rights position and the more pragmatic
animal rights position. Starting from a careful analysis which received a great deal of attention
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from ethics experts, he argued in favour of grading the prevailing norms in practice in this
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area. According to Birnbacher, stricter norms in practice should apply to animal-based exper-
iments for fundamental research than, for example, to animal-based experiments for medical
purposes and safety tests. This is because it is usually a question of direct and clear human
interest in the latter cases (which does not, however, imply that applied research is to be
ranked higher than fundamental research in every individual case). In order to formulate the
desired norms in practice in more precise terms, Birnbacher was guided by the four-step
scale drawn up by the US Department of Agriculture. This differentiates between the following
categories [72]: ‘(1) little or no pain or distress, (2) minor pain or distress of short duration,
(3) significant but unavoidable pain or distress, (4) severe pain or distress or chronic unre-
lieved pain’. Examples of (3) which are named are deprivation studies, toxicity studies, the
production of radiation damage and smaller burns and wounds. Examples of (4) are the
infliction of serious burns or wounds without anaesthesia, stress from which the animal
cannot escape, and major surgical procedures without anaesthesia. Referring to precisely
these categories, Birnbacher’s suggestion is as follows: experiments of harm categories 3 and
4 should be prohibited in cases of animal-based experiments for fundamental research, while
experiments of harm category 4 should be prohibited in cases of animal-based experiments
for medicine, environmental protection, and the testing of substances and products. Birn-
bacher’s critical view of the apparent need for fundamental research in particular is shared
by many experts, notably with regard to the use of NHPs.

Intrinsic Cultural Value of Fundamental Research

Birnbacher’s position is in strong opposition to views held by some experts on animals in
experimentation and by other decided advocates of the interests of fundamental research. For
example, Klaus Gärtner is of the view that fundamental research in its own right must be char-
acterised as necessary [72, 74]. The consequence in practice of this view is the relativisation
of aspects related to animal protection. This opinion is justified by the argument that funda-
mental scientific research has an intrinsic cultural value. Constitutional law provides a further
argument, at least in those states which have committed themselves explicitly to protecting
freedom of research. All legal regulations which permit the infliction of serious harm for purely
scientific purposes more or less uphold the principle of freedom of research. The strong
position enjoyed by freedom of research in many places is used to some extent as a basis for
concluding that legal regulations which make animal experiments dependent on ethical defen-
sibility are unconstitutional. In contrast to this, others see freedom of research as limited both
by human dignity and the human responsibility towards animals which derives from this [75].

Contractarianism
For contractarians, morality is a system of hypothetical formal agreements or ‘contracts’
between humans [19, 76, 77]. As animals lack the linguistic and intellectual skills to enter into
these contracts, they do not have corresponding rights and duties. Nevertheless, the contrac-
tarian approach includes ethical protection to animals, albeit on an indirect basis: while
animals are not inherently entitled to be treated in a particular way, they do possess a type
of borrowed moral status or secondary moral protection because they are valued by certain
humans. In other words: from the contractarian point of view, animals only matter to the
extent to which humans happen to care about them. According to contractarians, the scien-
tific community which uses animals in experiments should act in accordance with what would
be generally acceptable in society or would form the basis of a ‘contract’. Seen in this light,
NHPs are probably more worthy of protection than other animals because many people are
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greatly concerned about their fate. In a contractarian approach, defining a publicly acceptable
framework which allows humans to gain from the potential benefits of animal-based research
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is the starting point for setting ethical limits to the use of animals in research.
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Anthropocentrism
Contractarianism is characterised by some parallels with anthropocentrism. The starting
point for anthropocentrism is the assumption that humans are the measure of all things and
insofar enjoy a special ontological status [78]. The anthropocentric world view regards
creation in general as being geared towards humans and only attaches value to extra-human
nature insofar as it relates to humans. This traditional outlook, which is derived from the
story of creation among others, is therefore subjected to the accusation of speciesism (right
to primacy simply by belonging to the human species/Homo sapiens) as well as to the accu-
sation of human chauvinism. Although animals are seen as objects in anthropocentric ethics,
moral principles of action towards animals can also be valid in anthropocentric concepts.
Cruel treatment of animals is therefore unacceptable to many people, as it desensitises and
brutalises humans, negatively affecting morality in relation to other humans as a result. In the
light of this, animal-based experiments are basically not morally permissible. In Immanuel
Kant’s view, for example, direct duties towards humans exist, and indirect duties derived
from these exist towards animals.

Principle of the Three Rs

The charge of ‘suspicion of ideology’ can be levelled at many of the aforementioned
concepts, i.e. they presuppose a certain ideological conviction, such as the principle of utili-
tarianism or contractualism. Ideological convictions are, however, generally only shared by a
greater or smaller section of the population, i.e. they are not, as a rule, likely to enjoy consensus.
That is why there is a strong tendency in medical ethics – as in medicine itself – to use dogma-
free models of reasoning. What might be described as a middle level of abstraction where the
various basic positions meet (with certain limitations) is used for this [79]. In other words:
the aim is to find a moral approach based on evaluations which are generally accepted by
most intellectual, cultural and religious traditions. Beauchamp and Childress’ principlism in
clinical ethics is on this level, for example, with its four principles of non-maleficence, respect
for autonomy, beneficence and equality [80, 81]. Enough of a consensus on these principles
exists to permit them to be accepted by representatives from the most varying ideal-type
ethical systems. The same holds true for the principle of the three Rs in animal-based research.
The British scientists William M.S. Russell and Rex L. Burch already formulated this principle
in their book The Principles of Humane Experimental Techniques at the end of the 1950s,
whereby the three Rs stand for ‘replace’, ‘reduce’ and ‘refine’ [82–86]. ‘Replace’ means substi-
tuting animal experiments with alternative methods, ‘reduce’ aims at reducing the number of
animals required, and ‘refine’ means minimising the level of harm inflicted on animals and
improving their life situation. ‘Refinement’ in particular is often misunderstood; it refers to
any approach which furthers the well-being of the animals and which serves to avoid or
lessen the actual or potential pain, distress and other negative effects they experience at any
point during their lives. Thus, it is recommended that researchers should apply the principle
of ‘refinement’ throughout the lifetime of the animals. This includes how they are sourced and
transported as well as how they are housed and kept. In terms of actual experimentation, it
refers to experimental design and techniques, how the animals are cared for and handled at
all times before, during and after each procedure and, in addition, how they are treated at the
end of the procedures, i.e. the way in which they are killed or subjected to another fate at the
end of the experiments. It is also stated that potential further ‘refinements’ should be contin-
ually explored throughout the research programme. As NHPs are highly intelligent animals,
behavioural management techniques and their integration into human-NHP interactions are
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suggested as methods for reducing stress during capture, transport, maintenance and
research. Some researchers have added a fourth ‘R’. It refers to the ‘rehabilitation’ of animals
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post-experimentation and stresses responsibility to experimental animals after use [87].

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Ultimately, the three Rs are mid-range bio-ethical criteria for methodology in animal
experimentation which take into account concepts from reformist animal protection. They
are welcomed and valued by many of those most closely involved, especially with regard to
the special need for protection of NHPs. Regarding NHPs, experts recommend that researchers
should set out why scientific objectives cannot be achieved by other means and should clearly
show the very significant scientific advantages of using NHPs over all other possible
approaches. They furthermore suggest that independent experts with an in-depth knowledge
of the research field in question and of all available alternative approaches should critically
appraise the reasons for using NHPs, whereby they acknowledge that this may require a
wider than normal pool of scientific referees. Where NHP use is necessary, careful thought
should be given to species selection, with scientific, animal welfare and practical consider-
ations taken into account. Insofar as the aims of the experiment allow it, animal-based exper-
iments should use invertebrates ahead of vertebrates, cold-blooded animals ahead of warm-
blooded animals, mice and rats ahead of guinea pigs and rabbits, these ahead of domestic
farm animals and these in turn ahead of cats, dogs and monkeys.
In addition to its value as an ethical framework for humane experiments, the three Rs
principle has considerable scientific merit and enjoys tacit public support in opinion polls on
animal experimentation [18]. It therefore features in most codes of conduct on animal
research and, in developed countries at least, scientists are required by law to apply some-
thing along its lines.

Conclusions

An exploration of the pertinent literature in the field shows that the categorical animal
rights position on the one hand and the classical anthropocentric position on the other
represent normative extreme positions. A whole range of viewpoints which exist between
these extremes have been discussed above. They favour a balancing of interests and result in
more or less far-reaching animal protection. Animals are living beings and (in part) sentient
fellow creatures with a dignity of their own. This means that humans have a duty towards
animals and thus bear responsibility for them – irrespective of the question of the existence
and extent of positive rights [78]. It is thus not morally permissible to behave arbitrarily
towards animals or to inflict unjustified suffering on them. At the same time, humans are
strictly obliged to maintain and foster the well-being of animals in the best possible way. This
has given rise to demands to limit to a minimum the number of experiments and the pain
inflicted on animals, to search for alternative methods and to keep the means used in experi-
ments at a reasonable level. All of these points speak in favour of a consistent and continual
further development of the principle of the three Rs while strictly observing the special status
of NPHs, and also in favour of an open discussion on further positions which seek to arrive at
a ‘convergence point’ between the categorical animal rights position and the more pragmatic
animal protection position. In the case of every ethical concept, however, it must be borne in
mind that humans ultimately form the starting and reference point. In other words: ethics
itself remains anthroporelational at all times [88] – because it is always designed by humans
for humans.
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